U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
SEC Seal
Home | Previous Page
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C.

Securities Act of 1934
Rel. No. 39465 / February 11, 1998

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8327

In the Matter of


On June 27, 1996, an administrative law judge dismissed the proceedings that had been brought by our Division of Enforcement against Richard J. Adams. The law judge based her dismissal on the decision in Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996), which held that 28 U.S.C. Section 2462 prohibited this Commission from imposing a censure and a supervisory suspension in an administrative proceeding because the proceeding had been initiated more than five years after the conduct at issue. It is undisputed that all of the conduct at issue here occurred more than five years before the institution of proceedings. The law judge further found that the Division had not proved that Adams violated any section of the securities laws, and used that finding as an alternative basis for her decision to dismiss. On July 30, 1997, we granted the Division's petition for review.

Although the Division vigorously disputes the law judge's factual conclusions, it has decided not to seek reversal of her decision in light of the Johnson decision and the "current procedural posture of this case."1 In a parallel proceeding in federal district court, the Division is currently seeking an injunction against Adams based on the same allegations as in this proceeding. We have determined that, given the age of this case, and that the Division does not oppose dismissal, it is appropriate to dismiss this matter. We intimate no view on the merits.2

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this proceeding be, and it hereby is, dismissed.

By the Commission.


Jonathan G. Katz



1 The Division has also asked us to vacate or reverse the law judge's factual findings in the event we dismiss the proceedings. However, because we granted the Division's petition for review, the initial decision (including the challenged factual findings) ceased to have any force or effect. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(f).
2 Adams' request for oral argument is denied. Under our formal rules of practice, which govern these proceedings, oral argument may be denied when there are "exceptional circumstances mak[ing] oral argument impractical or inadvisable." 17 C.F.R. § 201.21(a). Our dismissal of the proceedings against Adams makes oral argument impractical.



Modified: 05/27/2003