Rel. No. 8436 / July 6, 2004

Rel. No. 49970 / July 6, 2004

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-10765

In the Matter of




On the basis of the Commission's opinion issued this day, it


ORDERED that Edgar B. Alacan be, and he hereby is, barred from association with any broker or dealer; and it is further

ORDERED that Edgar B. Alacan cease and desist from committing or causing any violation and committing or causing any future violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; and it is further

ORDERED that Edgar B. Alacan disgorge $9,768.16, plus interest determined in conformity with 26 U.S.C. § 6621(a)(2) and compounded quarterly; interest shall run on $306.74 of the disgorgement amount from October 1, 1997, on an additional $374.50 from January 1, 1998, on an additional $2,340.50 from April 1, 1998, on an additional $4,600 from October 1, 1998, on an additional $1,521 from January 1, 1999, and on an additional $625.42 from April 1, 1999, and on the total amount, $9,768.16, from that date through the last day of the month preceding the month in which payment is made (Alacan to be given credit for allamounts he previously has paid towards his disgorgement obligation); and it is further

ORDERED that Edgar B. Alacan pay to the United States Treasury a civil money penalty of $110,000, pursuant to Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, within 21 days of the issuance of this Order. Such payment shall be: (i) made by United States postal money order, certified check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order; (ii) made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission; (iii) delivered by hand or courier to the Comptroller, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 5th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549; and (iv) submitted under cover letter which identifies the respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings. A copy of this cover letter and check shall be sent to Kathryn A. Pyszka, Counsel for the Division of Enforcement.

By the Commission.

Jonathan G. Katz


1 Alacan, who became associated with Barclay in approximately April 1996, currently is associated with another broker-dealer, Salomon Grey Financial Corporation, where he works with other former Barclay salespersons.

2 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Barclay and several other Barclay employees were named as respondents in the Order Instituting Proceedings in this matter. All but one of these other respondents either defaulted, or agreed to findings, without admitting or denying them, that they violated various provisions of the securities laws and to sanctions. See J.W. Barclay & Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Rel. Nos. 47496, 47497, 47498 (Mar. 13, 2003), 79 SEC Docket 2837-2848; Exchange Act Rel. No. 47506 (Mar. 14, 2003), 79 SEC Docket 3011; Exchange Act Rel. No. 47544 (Mar. 20, 2003), 79 SEC Docket 3066. An additional Barclay employee consented to a Division of Enforcement (the "Division") motion for partial summary disposition as to findings of violations and to certain sanctions but asserted an inability to pay the disgorgement and civil penalty amounts sought by the Division. The law judge issued an opinion rejecting his claim of inability to pay. See J. W. Barclay & Co., Inc., Init. Dec. Rel. No. 233 (July 23, 2003), 80 SEC Docket 2536. The law judge's decision as to this respondent was not appealed and has become final. See Mayer Dallal, Exchange Act Rel. No. 48443 (Sept. 4, 2003), 80 SEC Docket 3727.

3 Alacan testified that the account was serviced jointly by him and another broker, who had opened the account, but that, according to Alacan, Alacan was the "broker on record."

4 Max Knopf managed the account on behalf of the couple.

5 Specifically, Knopf complained about Alacan's purchases of 2,000 shares of stock of Lexington Health Care Group, Inc., 10,000 shares of the Hungarian Broadcasting Co. (when Knopf had authorized the purchase of just 4,000 shares), and 3,000 shares of Tellurian Inc.

6Specifically, Lassiter challenged Alacan's purchases of 50,000 shares of Scoop Inc. and 2,000 shares of Dell Computer Corp., and Alacan's sale of 2,000 shares of American Express Co.

7 According to the Division, Lassiter "ultimately assented to the American Express sale," which was at a price that produced a profit for him.

8 Specifically, Latimer stated that a purchase of 5,000 shares of Digital Data Networks, Inc. and a 10,000 share purchase of what is referred to on the confirmation as "ECGOF" were unauthorized. Latimer contemporaneously wrote "NotAuthorized" on the confirmation he received for the first unauthorized purchase. Upon receiving a confirmation for the second, Latimer immediately sent the confirmation back to Alacan with the following note: "I told you I can't buy all this . . . ." Similarly, Latimer had no recollection of authorizing an additional purchase of 5,000 shares of Digital Data in July 1997, for roughly $15,000. Contemporaneously, Latimer wrote "Did I buy this?" next to the entry for Digital Data on an account summary prepared by Barclay, which Latimer transmitted back to Alacan.

9 The record is unclear as to the trades to which Latimer is referring in this memorandum.

10 In a letter dated October 1, 1998, Latimer complained to Barclay's compliance officer that he was "extremely irritated and frustrated with the unauthorized trade at $8 3/16" because Latimer "did not authorize the purchase at any price higher than $7 per share" and did so "only . . . after being cursed at, yelled at, being called an idiot, being told that $10-$12 per share was guaranteed 100% and that there was no chance of the stock going down." (emphases in original)

11 Latimer brought an arbitration proceeding against Alacan and another Barclay employee alleging unsuitable and unauthorized trading and churning. Alacan testified that this proceeding was settled for $45,000 and that he contributed approximately half of that amount.

12 For example, in May 1998, Alacan purchased, without Old's knowledge, 1,000 shares of American Express Co. stock for $105,000, and approximately 8,000 warrants issued by the Hungarian Broadcasting Corp. for roughly $21,000.

13 Old testified that the funds to pay for these unauthorized trades came "from cash that [he] had accumulated and it was in the account." Old added that, "in most cases when [he] did send a check" to pay for a trade, he "had received a phone call previous to the buy."

14 Old further testified that no one at Barclay ever discussed with him the risks associated with margin trading.

15 While the evidence establishes that Old did not take an active interest in managing his account, it also indicates that Alacan understood that Old expected to be consulted in advance of trades. For example, Alacan testified that trading in the Old account was done based on Alacan's solicitations and that, according to Alacan, "[s]ometimes [Old] did, sometimes he didn't" accept Alacan's recommendations.

16 For example, on a confirmation for a purchase of 10,000 shares of stock of Euroweb International Corp., dated December 1, 1998, Leonard Beare wrote, "Authorized no shares to buy. [Barclay compliance official] Josh Chaffey corrects to 2500 shares." Similarly, Leonard Beare wrote on a December 3, 1998 margin notice letter, which directed him to deposit $63,135 or acceptable securities into his account, "will ask that this unauthorized trade be stopped . . . ." (emphasis in original) On a December 1998 confirmation for the purchase of 5,000 shares of VDC Communications, Inc. for roughly $19,000, Leonard Beare wrote "ask for office mgr at JW Barclay . . . Complaints Nat Ass of Sec Dealers Sec & Exchange Comm." On a February 1999 confirmation for the purchase of 5,000 shares of stock of Finet Holdings Corp. for $11,095, Leonard Beare wrote: "canceled this but find it already sold" the day following its purchase. Beare further wrote "called Ed Alacan to cancel this and make [clear] no trading for us without specific instructions."

17 Vander Weide testified that the Beares' daughter assisted Leonard Beare because Beare was "unable" to close the account by himself.

18 The record indicates that the IDT stock was sold by Barclay on September 20, 1999 for roughly $32,000, or a loss of $15,000.

The Beares subsequently brought an arbitration proceeding against Alacan, which Alacan settled by paying the Beares $50,000.

19 Susan Sollecito testified that "I couldn't go to the grocery store, I couldn't do anything without him right next to me, sewing classes, et cetera. He was always right next to me." As we discuss below, Sebastian Sollecito's condition makes it highly unlikely that he would have had contact with Barclay of which his wife was unaware.

20 She initially could not recall whether she discussed her husband's condition with Alacan prior to sending the January1997 letter, although she "absolutely" recalled such conversations subsequent to the January letter. Because our focus is on Alacan's actions subsequent to January, the extent to which Alacan knew of Sollecito's condition prior to that time is largely irrelevant.

21 See NASD Rule 11870(d), NASD Manual -- Uniform Practice Code at 7952 (1996) (within three days of receiving transfer instruction, carrying member required to validate instruction and "freeze" account or take exception to the instruction).

22 Alacan claimed that Sebastian Sollecito verbally rescinded the account transfer on several occasions prior to April 16, 1997, but this claim by Alacan was expressly rejected by the law judge as "incredible." Susan Sollecito offered various reasons why her husband could not have signed the letter, including that the two had traveled together out of town on the date on which the letter was purportedly written. In addition, as indicated earlier, she explained that it was inconceivable that her husband could have executed the letter without her knowledge "[b]ecause he was never out of [her] sight. It was like having an 18 month old, be at your knee every second . . . ."

23 See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 678 (11th Cir. 1988); Brophy v. Redivo, 725 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp 1059, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(unauthorized trades violate the antifraud provisions of the securities laws when they are the result of, and accompanied by, "deception, misrepresentation or non-disclosure").

24 Sandra K. Simpson, Exchange Act Rel. No. 45923 (May 14, 2002), 77 SEC Docket 1983, 2001-02 (quoting Donald A. Roche, 53 S.E.C. 16, 24 (1997)).

25 See, e.g., J. Stephen Stout, Exchange Act Rel. No. 43410 (Oct. 2, 2000), 73 SEC Docket 1441, 1459-60 ("'Purchasing securities on margin in customer accounts without customer approval violates the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.'") (quoting SEC v. Hasho, 784 F.Supp. 1059, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). We note that a securities purchase that otherwise is authorized can constitute a violation of the antifraud provisions if it is purchased on margin where the customer did not authorize margin trading. Id.

26 Although not raised by Alacan before us, we note that the law judge stated that a "customer's oral grant of general discretion to an account executive [to trade on the customer's behalf] is irrelevant to the analysis of liability" for unauthorized trading. The law judge cited requirements of certain self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") which are enforceable in SRO disciplinary proceedings but do not govern our analysis under the antifraud provisions involved here. A customer's grant of discretionary trading authority, whether written or oral, is relevant to a determination of liability for fraudulent unauthorized trading because it relates to whether the customer was deceived by the salesperson's actions and whether the respondent acted with scienter.

27 Alacan expressly admitted that he had no agreement with the Beares to engage in discretionary trading in their account.

Alacan asserted before the law judge that certain of his customers accepted or ratified some of the trades at issue after the fact. As we have held, "after the fact 'acceptance' of an unauthorized trade does not transform that transaction into an authorized trade." Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 2002-03. Moreover, we do not believe that the evidence, which includes the facts that certain customers' paid for disputed trades or did not immediately complain and, in some cases, contributed additional funds into their accounts, proves that they approved of Alacan's actions. Evidence indicates that each of the customers complained to Alacan, others at Barclay, or to regulatory authorities, and that any delay in doing so was a consequence of misplaced trust in Alacan, rather than approval of his actions.

28 Although he does not expressly address in his brief to us the findings of violation as they relate to the remaining customer accounts, i.e., accounts other than the Beare and Sollecito accounts, Alacan seeks to incorporate by reference the factual assertions he made with respect to these accounts in his brief before the law judge. In short, Alacan claimed before the law judge that (i) the customers' assertions of unauthorized trading were false, and motivated by adverse changes in the market, and (ii) his recommendations and trading in their accounts were consistent with the customers' investment objectives and therefore not unsuitable. The law judge rejected Alacan's assertions based largely on credibility findings he made in favor of the customers and against Alacan. We have found no basis for rejecting the law judge's findings. See, e.g., Anthony Tricarico, 51 S.E.C. 457, 460 (1993) (credibility findings overcome only where there is "substantial evidence" for doing so).

29 At oral argument, Alacan's counsel asserted that a respondent who has been accused of engaging in the kinds of fraudulent sales practices alleged here cannot receive a fair hearing unless the customers are present and available for cross-examination. As discussed below, we reject this assertion.

30 Mark James Hankoff, 50 S.E.C. 1009, 1012 (1992). See also Wheat, First Securities, Inc., Exchange Act Rel. No. 48378 (Aug. 20, 2003), 80 SEC Docket 3406, 3429; Charles D. Tom, 50 S.E.C. 1142, 1145 (1992) (admitting hearsay evidence based on finding that it was reliable and probative and where there was no unfairness in its use).

31 Hankoff, 50 S.E.C. at 1012.

32 Neither witness had a financial incentive to give false testimony since the Division was not seeking disgorgement on behalf of the Beares (who had previously recovered against Alacan in an arbitration proceeding) and was seeking only a small amount of disgorgement, $307, on behalf of the Sollecitos.

33 See Carlton Wade Fleming, Jr., 52 S.E.C. 409, 411 n.8 (1995) (finding hearsay evidence "sufficiently reliable and probative" where it was "consistent," with respect to material facts, with other non-hearsay evidence).

34 See Fleming, 52 S.E.C. at 411 (noting, in crediting testimony and admitting affidavits, similarities in customers' experiences, as detailed in testimony and affidavits, with salesperson who engaged in unauthorized trading).

35 While, as we have discussed, the law judge's decision to admit and consider Vander Weide's and Susan Sollecito's testimony was entirely appropriate, we also note that there is significant additional evidence supporting the finding of unauthorized trading in those accounts.

36 We note that Alacan chose not to subpoena Leonard Beare or Sebastian Sollecito in his own defense. At oral argument, counsel for Alacan, who was not representing Alacan at that earlier stage in the case, stated that he did not know why Alacan failed to subpoena them but speculated that it "may have been a futile exercise [because] they would have been unable to come . . . ."

37 We note that the law judge made findings that Alacan failed to transfer the Sollecito account to another firm in April 1997. Alacan's refusal to transfer the Sollecito account is related to, and supports, our finding that Alacan engaged in unauthorized trading in the Sollecito account following the Sollecito transfer request. The law judge also found that Alacan failed to follow instructions to close the Beare account in the fall of 1999. While we believe that Alacan's failures to follow his customers' instructions were deplorable, and relevant to our consideration of Alacan's scienter and assessment of sanctions, we decline to reach the question of whether they provide independent bases for finding that Alacan violated the antifraud provisions.

38 Vander Weide noted that, despite having a net worth of approximately $1 million, the Beares lived in the same house they had bought for $5,000 when first married in 1938, until moving to an assisted living center shortly after the trading at issue in this case.

39 Leonard Beare was a chemist with Sinclair from 1933 to the mid-1970s, when he retired.

40In Parkes' opinion, the Beares' "circumstances called for low-risk, income-producing investments." Among the stocks in the Beare account that Parkes identified as "high risk" were Euroweb International, Inc., People Soft, Inc., Doubleclick, Inc., and Excite, Inc.

41 The account had $5,787 in cash and securities at the start of this period and received an additional $83,433 in deposits from the Beares.

42 Sandra Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 1991 n.16 (citing Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 49 S.E.C. 1119, 1122 n.10 (1989)).

43 See Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 1991 n.17.

44 See n.4, supra.

45These stocks included Hungarian Broadcasting, Tellurian, and Digital Data.

46 Knopf deposited $99,161 into his account.

47During testimony, Alacan could not recall ever discussing investment objectives with Old but stated that he believed Old sought "to speculate" because that was "the same purpose as all of [Alacan's] accounts."

48 These include Hungarian Broadcasting, Rockwell Medical Technologies, and Harvey Electronics.

49 Old deposited $119,227 into his account.

50 Stout, 73 SEC Docket at 1460 n.47 (citing Donald T. Sheldon, 51 S.E.C. 59, 74 n.59 (1992) ("[T]he broker has a duty to satisfy himself that speculative investments are suitable for the customer and that the customer understands and is willing to undertake the risks."), aff'd, 45 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1995). As we have held, it is "incumbent" on salespersons, "as part of their basic obligation to deal fairly with the investing public, to make only such recommendations as they had reasonable grounds to believe met the customers' expressed needs and objectives." Richard N. Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8, 18 (1969). See also Kenneth Ward, Exchange Act Rel. No. 47535 (Mar. 19, 2003), 79 SEC Docket 3035, 3057 (salesman violated antifraud provisions based on unsuitable recommendations where salesman failed to disclose associated risks), aff'd, 75 Fed. Appx. 320 (5th Cir. 2003); Laurie Jones Canady, Exchange Act Rel. No. 41250 (Apr. 5, 1999), 69 SEC Docket 1468, 1482-83 (finding fraud based on salesperson's unsuitable recommendations of securities purchases on margin), pet. denied, 230 F.3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

51 Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 2004.

52 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing elements of a private unsuitability claim under Exchange Act Section 10(b)). Scienter, according to the Second Circuit, "may be inferred by finding that the defendant knew or reasonably believed that the securities were unsuited to the investor's needs, misrepresented or failed to disclose the unsuitability of the securities, and proceeded to recommend or purchase the securities anyway." Id. at 1031.

53 See, e.g., Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 2004 (finding fraudulently unsuitable recommendations based on annualized turnover rates of 2.10 to 8.09 and annualized break-even rates of 11.98% to 54.95%); Canady, 69 SEC Docket at 1476 (finding excessive trading based on turnover rates ranging from 3.83 to 7.28 and breakeven levels of 8.96% to 27.48%).

54 As we have noted, while margin trading increases the risks to customers it also increases the salesperson's commissions by "permit[ting] the customers to purchase greater amounts of securities, thereby generating increased commissions for" the salesperson, and the potential for abuse. Stephen Thorlief Rangen, 52 S.E.C. 1304, 1307-08 (1997).

55 See Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 2005-06 (finding fraudulently unsuitable recommendations based on margin trading where the customers had conservative investment objectives, modest means, and were ignorant of the associated risks and generally unsophisticated regarding investment matters); Stout, 73 SEC Docket at 1461 (finding fraud in connection with unsuitable recommendations based, among other things, on salesman's failure to disclose, to trusting customers,risks associated with margin, and related aggressive trading strategies). See also Canady, 69 SEC Docket at 1482 n.27 (finding fraud based on excessive margin trading and noting the associated risks).

56 In light of our finding that Alacan made fraudulently unsuitable recommendations to the Beares, we decline to reach the question of whether he also churned their account.

57 The Division introduced an exhibit that showed that Alacan's fraudulent activities generated total commissions of $74,777, and that he received 50% of those commissions or $37,388. The Division introduced a second exhibit which reflected the fact that Alacan had paid out a portion of his commissions in settlements, and listed the amount of his illegal profits now to be disgorged as $9,768.

58 See, e.g., Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1973) ("The fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary [of Agriculture], not the court. The court may decide only whether under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the secretary made 'an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy.'") (quoting Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946)).

59Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).

60 On September 4, 1997, Basis instituted a policy requiring the order tickets of Alacan and certain other salesmen to be signed by Basis prior to submission to the trading desk for execution. According to Basis, Alacan failed to comply with this policy "[t]o a great degree." Alacan testified that, once he was subject to heightened supervision, he continued to receive customer complaints alleging personal misconduct but that the number of complaints "dropped considerably."

61 On December 1, 1997, Basis wrote a memo to Barclay president Bruno regarding allegations that Alacan had engaged in unauthorized trading in the accounts of three customers other than the customers at issue in this proceeding. Describing Alacan as "an individual who has and will continue to wreak havoc at this firm," Basis recommended Alacan's "immediate termination." In March 1998, Basis fined Alacan $2,000 for unauthorized trading in the account of a deceased client, which was noticed by the client's executor. Basis also renewed his effort to get Alacan terminated at this time.

62 Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

63 KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Rel. No. 43862, 74 SEC Docket 384, 430, reh'g denied, Exchange Act Rel. No. 44050(Mar. 8, 2001), 74 SEC Docket 1351, pet. denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

64 See Ward, 79 SEC Docket at 3062 (identifying factors to be considered in imposing cease-and-desist order).

65 Simpson, 77 SEC Docket at 2010 n.58 (citing 15 U.S.C § 78u-2(c)).

66 See, e.g., Mark David Anderson, Exchange Act Rel. No. 48352 (Aug. 15, 2003), 80 SEC Docket 3250, 3270-71 (imposing civil money penalties for each violative trade). See 17 C.F.R. § 201.1001 (raising penalty to $110,000).

67 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b).

68 See n.67, infra.

69Section 2462 states in pertinent part that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . ."

70 See Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying statute of limitations to Commission proceeding imposing censure and suspension on securities professional).
We also note that certain misconduct occurred in April 1997, slightly prior to the period specified in the OIP, i.e., "from in or about June 1997 through in or about December 1998." We consider the OIP language broad enough to encompass this period, particularly because the Division's Witness List summary, which was provided to Alacan several months before the hearing, gave notice that testimony would be presented regarding the Sollecito and Wittemyer accounts throughout April 1997 (and earlier). We also have considered evidence regarding Alacan's actions after the ending date specified in the OIP, not as a basis for findings of violation, but in assessing the public interest. See, e.g., Joseph J. Barbato, 53 S.E.C. 1259, 1282 (1999) (respondent's efforts to influence customer witnesses' testimony considered in setting sanctions). The sanctions we have imposed, however, would be warranted even without a consideration of this later conduct.

71 Johnson, 87 F.3d at 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

72 See Terence Michael Coxon, Exchange Act Rel. No. 48385 (Aug. 21, 2003), 80 SEC Docket 3288, 3314 n.60 ("Because a cease and desist order is forward-looking, we believe that Section 2462 does not apply to actions for a cease-and-desist order."), appeal pending, No. 03-73732 (9th Cir.).

73 We note that, while our decision regarding sanctions is based on Alacan's actions with respect to all eight customer accounts at issue, we would still impose these sanctions even if, assuming arguendo, we were to accept Alacan's arguments regarding the Beare and Sollecito accounts and found violations only with respect to the remaining six accounts. In that event, the sole adjustment we would make would be to reduce the disgorgement amount by the commissions charged on the Sollecito trades, $306.74.

74 Alacan's payment of the disgorgement ordered does not moot the question of the proper amount of disgorgement because, as discussed infra, there is an unresolved issue of the appropriate rate of interest to be assessed on the principal amount.

75 The law judge suggests that there has been some inconsistency, in Commission proceedings, regarding determination of the interest rate to be applied to disgorgement amounts. As we discuss, interest generally should be assessed based on the underpayment rate. Different results may arise, however, in settled cases as a result of negotiations among the parties. Moreover, in exceptional cases, we may impose a lower rate of interest or no interest at all. See, e.g., Orlando Joseph Jett, Exchange Act Rel. No. 49366 (Mar. 5, 2004), __ SEC Docket __, __ n.56 (exercising "equitable discretion" in declining to order prejudgement interest on disgorgement but noting that such interest should be awarded on disgorgement"[e]xcept in the most unique and compelling circumstances"). We also have discretion to fix the date of violation in order to determine the date on which interest begins to accrue.

76 See 26 U.S.C. § 6621(a)(2).

77 The rate under Section 1961 is equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the week preceding judgment, 1.29% as of the date of the law judge's decision, compounded annually.

78 17 C.F.R. § 201.600(a) and (b).

79In Canady, we stated that the IRS underpayment rate is applicable to disgorgement amounts for the entire period from the date of assessment until paid. See Canady, 69 SEC Docket at 1488.

80 We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties. We reject or sustain them to the extent that they are inconsistent or in accord with the views expressed herein.