THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

ROUNDTABLE ON REGULATORY APPROACHES

TO COMBATING RETAIL INVESTOR FRAUD

Wednesday, September 26, 2018

9:30 a.m.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, NE

Washington, D.C.

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4	Kara Stein, Commissioner	4	David Becker
5	Robert Jackson, Commissioner	5	Cromwell Coulson
6	Elad Roisman, Commissioner	6	Robert Franz
7	Hester Peirce, Commissioner	7	Christopher Gerold
8	Brett Redfearn	8	Mark Harmon
9	Lizzie Baird	9	Andrea Manning
10	Valerie Dahiya	10	Christy Oeth
11	Laura Gold	11	Michael Paley
12	Tim White	12	Chris Stone
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3 the Securities and Exchange Commission Suff's Roundable 3 search feature that enables retail investors to research 4 on Combaing Retail Investor Fraud. The Brett Redfeam, 5 deputy - excuse me - 5 6 (Langher.) 6 interfeat anables retail investors avoid 7 7 MR. REDFEARN: - Director of the Division of 7 financial fraud by giving them more information about whe 9 of any coffee - Director of the Division of Trading and 9 juint agency task force, spartheaded by the Department of 10 Markets. 13 I also want to introduce my Deputy Director in 11 11 In addition to detecting and punishing 11 Trading is and Low abo sexpect the other Commissioner Jackson, who 13 paramount that we act proactively and consider preventive measures. Put simply, we need to continue to examine 12 fraudulent conduct that has alread yoccurred, it is a many to my mind. For cexample, are there specific rule changes the Commission for a short in the ore many of the 13 nake and will segreming making chairman Clayton to 14 Troday's roundtable on' example, are there specific rule changes the Commission for a short in this area that have been on my mind. For 20 CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: Good morning, everyone. And 22 reactices? ar		PROCEEDINGS	1	Additionally, in May, we launched the SEC
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1 1 in mind. here. And I think we are starting in exactly the right 2 2 I want to thank the participants for being place, which is, regardless of how we got here, what is 3 3 willing to share their time and I look forward to the the best way forward for average investors we're sworn to 4 4 day. Thank you. protect? 5 MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Chairman. 5 That's why I'm so excited, not only about 6 So for other opening statements, Commissioner 6 today's roundtable but about all the conversations we're 7 Peirce? Thank you and welcome. 7 going to have in this area over the coming months. I am 8 COMMISSIONER PEIRCE: Thanks, Brett. And 8 very pleased to have the opportunity to work with the 9 thanks to all of you for being here today. I especially 9 Chairman, with Director Redfearn and others on these 10 thank the participants in today's roundtable. One thing 10 important subjects. I know we all have the same goal, 11 that has not changed over time is the capacity and 11 which is creating markets where retail investors are 12 ingenuity of people who want to engage in retail fraud. 12 protected and safe and have the opportunity to 13 And so I think we are working very hard. That's 13 participate in our nation's economic growth. 14 reflected in today's roundtable and also reflected in the 14 Thanks so much to all of you for being here 15 work of the Divisions of Enforcement, Trading and 15 today and I look forward to the conversation. 16 Markets, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy and 16 MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Commissioner Jackson. 17 the Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations, 17 Commissioner Roisman. 18 among others here at the agency, working very hard to 18 COMMISSIONER ROISMAN: Well, good morning. 19 combat retail fraud. 19 Thank you, everyone attending the roundtable today in 20 I am very enthusiastic about today's 20 person and those watching online as well. Today's event 21 roundtable. I think it looks at some issues that can 21 is one of particular importance to all of us at this 22 help us take a more systematic approach to dealing with 22 agency. The first part of the SEC's three-part mission 23 retail fraud, which I think is important. I'm 23 is to protect investors. And this particularly motivates 24 particularly interested in the work that we can do with 24 many of us in this building who know victims of retail 25 respect to transfer agents and finders, which could again 25 investor fraud who have worked on these types of SEC Page 11 1 be helpful in taking a systematic approach but also could 1 matters. 2 be helpful in making sure that we don't squelch 2 3 legitimate activity in our efforts to combat fraud. 3 4

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4 So I think the conversation today will be very 5 useful to me. Although I won't be able to be here for 6 much of it in person, I do look forward to watching it 7 afterwards. And thank you again for your time and the 8 effort of everyone who put this roundtable together. 9 Thanks. 10 MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Commissioner Peirce. 11 Commissioner Jackson. 12 COMMISSIONER JACKSON: Thank you, Director 13 Redfearn. I just want to join my colleagues in 14 expressing our deep gratitude to the panelists and 15 participants today. And I'll be brief, because we are 16 really here to hear from you. 17 But the point I want to make is I've spent some 18 time recently thinking through, working through the long 19 and detailed history of the issues in this area. And I 20 want to say that in my view, we're starting in exactly 21 the right place, which is how it affects retail 2.2 investors. To me, it's really easy to get lost in the 23 complexities of market structure. It's really easy to 24 wonder about all the different institutional choices

25 we've made over the years, how we got here, why we got

While I have only served as commissioner for a short period of time, I've been greatly troubled by the number of cases involving harm to Main Street investors, some of whom have lost their life savings. Like my fellow commissioners and the incredible Staff here at the SEC, I am committed to doing everything I can to eradicate these types of behavior. While OIEAs, OCs and Enforcement's roles in combatting retail investor fraud are more apparent, the entire SEC, including the policymaking divisions, actively work to address it. Today's roundtable demonstrates this, and also it brings together many important market participants, including regulated entities such as investment advisers, broker-dealers, market centers, regulatory organizations, as well as state authorities, amongst others. We're all in this together, working to make the market safer and bolster investor confidence.

Today's panels provide an excellent launching pad for many of the issues on which the SEC and others are focused. Thank you to the Division of Trading and Markets for hosting this roundtable, and to our Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations and Division of Enforcement for all that you do to identify bad actors and hold them accountable.

Page 16

	rage 14		Page 10
1	Finally, I commend my fellow commissioners and	1	introductory comments, I just want to provide our
2	Chairman Clayton for their continued focus on Main Street	2	standard disclaimer that the views I and the Staff that
3	investors in both enforcement matters and in our	3	are here today provide are our own and do not necessarily
4	rulemaking agenda here at the Commission. I look forward	4	reflect the views of the Commission, Chairman Clayton,
5	to hearing from all of the panelists about your	5	other commissioners or my colleagues on the SEC Staff.
6	experiences as well as any suggestions as to how we can	6	So as you all know, this is the second in a
7	improve our current effort. Thank you.	7	series of roundtables we will be holding that are focused
8	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Commissioner Roisman.	8	on trading and market-specific rules and topics. In
9	Commissioner Stein.	9	April, we held a roundtable focused on thinly traded,
10	COMMISSIONER STEIN: Thank you, Brett. I just	10	exchange-listed securities. And as we announced on
11	want to welcome you all again for being here and taking	11	Monday, we will be holding a two-day roundtable on market
12	time out of very busy schedules to give us your best	12	data and market access on October 25 and 26.
13	thoughts today.	13	Today, as you know, our focus is on retail
14	Retail fraud and, I think, more importantly,	14	investor fraud and possible regulatory measures to help
15	how to prevent retail fraud is at the heart of the	15	counteract fraudulent activity. The U.S. securities
16	Commission's mission. And unfortunately, as Elad was	16	markets, like other global markets, historically have
17	saying, every week I see investors harmed by different	17	attracted fraudsters, particularly with respect to
18	types of cons and schemes and market manipulation. And	18	schemes involving the latest hot or in trend. Over the
19	sadly, I think a lot of the time, there's very little we	19	years, we've witnessed schemes involving penny stocks,
20	can do to get money back to investors because the money	20	mining stocks, tech stocks. And, more recently, digital
21	is already gone. And that's why the focus on prevention	21	asset securities. These schemes are perpetrated by both
22	is so important.	22	registered and unregistered persons who work hard to
23	And I think we need to think about prevention	23	convince individuals to invest in enterprises that they
24	broadly, because I guess fraud and they, when it comes	24	claim will be sure to be moneymakers.
25	in so many forms, so I think sometimes it's like whack-a-	25	Targets of such fraudulent activities have
	Page 15		Page 17
1	mole, there's always a new scheme. It's about Ebola	1	changed little over the years. Seniors and members of
2	vaccines or marijuana dispensing machines or there's	2	affinity groups continue to be preyed upon by the
3	always some new investment scheme. And these lies or	3	unscrupulous. And we don't have to look far to find
4	misrepresentations are not limited to individuals or	4	these schemes.
5	small groups of people. You know, unfortunately it can	5	As Chairman Clayton and others have mentioned,
б	happen at major institutions, at small institutions, on	6	just last week, the Commission announced that it had
7	the Internet. And therefore, I think we all need to be	7	charged several individuals and entities with engaging in
8	looking at all corners of the market to pleas for fraud.	8	a Ponzi-like scheme that netted more than \$345 million.
9	And I think the other thing that about being a	9	The investors included retirees, doctors, accountants and
10	Securities and Exchange commissioner that's hard	10	current and former professional athletes. The Commission
11	sometimes is you see the real-world effects that fraud	11	alleges the defendants faked documents to show phony
12	has on real people. It affects retirements, college	12	transfers, bank statements and portfolio reports, and
13	plans, homebuying and other things that people were	13	stole money to fund their own lavish lifestyles.
14	saving money for. And to prevent the damage caused by	14	The Commission has been busy bringing cases

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14 saving money for. And to prevent the damage caused by15 fraudsters, government and industry need to work hand in16 hand in partnership.

So please give us your best thoughts today.
Are there any changes to existing rules, policies or laws
that could help in this area? And what other advice do
you have for us, you know, on this important part of our
mission?

So again, thank you to everyone for being here
and I look forward to the conversation.
MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Commissioner Stein.
Great. So before I start with a couple other

Long Island-based cold calling scams that bilked more than 100 victims out of more than \$10 million through high-pressure sales tactics and lies about penny stocks.

against scammers as well as seeking trading suspensions

2017, the Commission suspended trading in the securities

2016, in order to combat potential market manipulation in

In fiscal year 2017, the Commission brought

charges against 13 individuals allegedly involved in two

in instances of suspected fraud. In fact, in fiscal year

of 309 issues, a 55 percent increase over fiscal year

microcap fraud threats to investors.

		1	
1	And also 27 individuals and entities behind various	1	space. And so why don't we start with Charu
2	alleged stock promotion schemes that left investors with	2	Chandrasekhar? We'll start with you. Did I get that
3	the impression they were reading independent, unbiased	3	right?
4	analyses on investing websites, while writers actually	4	MS. CHANDRASEKHAR: Great, perfect. Yes,
5	were being secretly compensated for touting company	5	thanks, very much, Brett.
6	stock.	6	Hi, I'm Charu Chandrasekhar. I am the Chief of
7	The Commission's Enforcement Staff cannot carry	7	the Retail Strategy Task Force in the Division of
8	this burden alone. Well-tailored regulatory measures	8	Enforcement. Delighted to be here. As always, my
9	along with investor education efforts can also help to	9	remarks reflect my own views and not those of the Staff
10	protect investors from fraudulent and manipulative	10	or the Commission.
11	schemes. To that end, we are holding this roundtable to	11	So the task force is the newest national group
12	highlight problems associated with retail investor fraud	12	within the Enforcement Division. We launched earlier
13	and possible regulatory approaches to these problems.	13	this year and we have a presence in eight of the 12
14	Today's roundtable will consist of three	14	regional offices and here in the home office.
15	panels. I will be moderating the first panel that will	15	Retail fraud is obviously a very broad category
16	focus on the types of fraudulent and manipulative schemes	16	and, accordingly, our mandate as a task force is
17	that are currently targeting retail investors.	17	similarly expansive. Retail fraud includes classic
18	Specifically, we will discuss what types of schemes	18	frauds such as Ponzi schemes, boiler room schemes,
19	retail investors should be wary of and the role that the	19	misappropriation and churning by brokers, market
20	Internet chatrooms, online platforms and social media	20	manipulation and pump and dumps and, more recently, fraud
21	play in these schemes.	21	involving cryptocurrencies and digital assets. And the
22	The next two panels will focus on the ways that	22	common thread across all of these cases is harm to an
23	we can enhance the ability of broker-dealers to combat	23	ordinary, everyday investor.
24	retail fraud that are discussed during the first panel,	24	So, in turn, our task force has two objectives,
25	and whether there are steps the Commission can take with	25	enforcement and investor advocacy. So first, when it
	5 10	1	
	Page 19		Page 21
1	Page 19 respect to broker-dealer regulation. Panel Two will be	1	Page 21 comes to enforcement, the task force deploys data and
1 2		1 2	
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2	respect to broker-dealer regulation. Panel Two will be moderated by Lizzie and will discuss Rule 15c2-11,	2	comes to enforcement, the task force deploys data and technology to strategically identify widespread abuses
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	Page 22		Page 24
1	and appropriateness.	1	can't get the kind of return on cash in banks or through
2	Thank you.	2	safe investments and they are approached with higher
3	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. Secondly, I'd like	3	interest rate returns and they're purported to be safe
4	to introduce Cam Funkhouser from the Office of Fraud	4	investments. I mean, that's a very big challenge for
5	Detection and Market Intelligence at FINRA.	5	regulators and law enforcement.
6	MR. FUNKHOUSER: Thank you. First of all,	6	So we work very hard to identify through the
7	thank you, Chairman, for hosting this event and inviting	7	tips and complaints we see about these types of schemes
8	FINRA. We, too, share your concerns that retail	8	and put them together at FINRA and send them to law
9	investors are our primary mission. In fact, FINRA's	9	enforcement and the SEC. We work very closely with the
10	mission statement is very simple. It's investor	10	SEC's Office of Market Intelligence to identify these
11	protection and market integrity. And we have about 3,000	11	schemes, the trends we see, the people we see. Last
12	people who every day work to carry out that mission in a	12	year, my office sent about 850 referrals to the SEC. We
13	variety of ways.	13	also worked with the state regulators in sharing
14	I oversee the Office of Fraud Detection and	14	intelligence. In fact, in just the last couple of weeks,
15	Market Intelligence. That's a group we started about 10	15	my co-panelist Chris and I had a discussion about a
16	years ago, designed specifically to be a centralized	16	situation he was looking at and we had intelligence on
17	intake group of all tips, complaints and other techniques	17	that situation which we happily share with our colleagues
18	we use to identify fraudulent or potentially fraudulent	18	in other regulatory agencies.
19	schemes and identify the perpetrators and gatekeeps of	19	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Cam. Next, Chris
20	these schemes.	20	Gerold, Chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities.
21	One of the things we do in my office is we're	21	MR. GEROLD: Thank you. And thank you,
22	really a fusion group where we're bringing in a lot of	22	Chairman Clayton and the rest of the Commissioners, for
23	data through our surveillance, our electronic	23	welcoming us here and allowing us to be on the panel. I
24	surveillance of the marketplace, and also through the	24	am the chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities. We
25	human intelligence that we gather through tips,	25	are the agency in the state of New Jersey charged with
1			
	Page 23		Page 25
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1 risks again are the unregistered area, the Ponzi schemes. 2 One of the big ones that the SEC brought action against 3 recently is a \$1 billion Ponzi scheme out of Florida, 4 which was in bankruptcy in Delaware -- I'm forgetting the 5 name as I'm sitting right here -б MR. FUNKHOUSER: Woodbridge. It remains front 7 of mind. Woodbridge. 8 MR. GEROLD: Woodbridge, thank you. Forgive 9 me. Woodbridge, where 10,000 investors were impacted and 10 a billion dollars potentially lost. You know, those 11 things, those cases, unfortunately are all too common. 12 And so those are certainly things that are a risk to 13 13 retail investors as well as classic pump and dump, Ponzi 14 schemes and, of course, as you've stated, whatever the 15 hot issue is at that point in time, whether it's 16 cryptocurrency, tech or unicorn companies, fraudsters 17 will latch onto that and use that to sell and defraud 18 18 individuals and investors. So those are the areas we're 19 in. Thank you. 20 MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Chris. Next, I'd 21 like to turn it over to Jean Setzfand. SVP of AARP 22 programs, AARP. 23 MS. SETZFAND: Thank you. Thank you to the 24 Chair and commissioners for your remarks on your focus 25 and concern for the retail investors.

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1	Hello, everybody. I'm Jean Setzfand from AARP.
2	For those of you who aren't familiar with AARP, we're a
3	membership organization protecting the interest of those
4	over the age of 50. We are a membership organization
5	that's mission based, as well as nonpartisan. We have 38
6	million members that we represent.
7	What we do for our members is really focused on
8	providing sort of trusted resources focused on helping
9	them prevent fraud. We also provide them guidance on
10	where to report scams. They like to share their
11	experiences and stories. But also, for those who have
12	actually been victimized or have been impacted in some
13	way by victimization, they actually want to actually join
14	forces and combat fraud. So we actually have several of
15	our members who are very active volunteers who really are
16	out there fighting fraud.
17	So for AARP and for where we sit as an
18	organization, we are all about fighting for the older
19	consumers as well as empowering them through resources.
20	The ways that we go about that beyond education is, one,
21	we hear a lot from our members. We hear a lot just in
22	terms of the overall calls that we receive. But we also
23	have a dedicated help line where we are we have
24	volunteer staff who actually take incoming calls around
25	fraud. And later on, I'll share some insights in terms

of what we hear about frauds in general but more specifically focused on investment fraud.

Through our education, we always want to ensure that what we're providing content wise is basically current and relevant to our consumers, but also the way that we approach them. So we do a fair amount of research, understanding the profile of victims compared to the general population. So there's where I can also share some insights in terms of our research profiling older investors as well as vulnerable segments, like the military.

But the key concerns in terms of what we see from AARP is for older individuals -- this is not going to be s shock to anybody -- they are targeted as victims. What we see in terms of evidence and reports, if we look at the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Sentinel Report, we know that older victims represent more than half of those victims. But the losses are far greater.

So 53 percent of the victims who actually report are over the age of -- or older -- over the age of 50. But the losses represent over 60 percent, 61 percent. So as you actually age as a victim, the size of impact or size of loss continues to grow. And that continues if you actually look at the various age segments. So for those over the age of 70, they

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represent 16 percent of the victims and yet 23 percent of the losses. So the impact is not only greater financially but it also emotionally takes a much greater toll amongst older consumers. One, they have less time to recover and also several of them are suffering diminished capacity.

Beyond that, in terms of just the pure impact, other emerging trends that we see, there's been several discussions around technology and the pervasiveness that fraud exhibits right now. And what we hear from our consumers is a sense of apathy, quite frankly. So a lot more people are feeling like it's inevitable, it's just going to happen to me, I might as well brace myself rather than protect myself.

So that notion, that emotional notion, is something that we have to really guard against. And we can't sort of -- and so a lot of, I think, what we do educationally has to be smarter and penetrate through that apathy.

Another concern we have around sort of the emotions of people is the treatment of victims. And what we like to say, if we take a look at a victim who has been held at gunpoint, versus those who have fallen prey as a result of a bad action they've taken or feel like it's a bad action, they're treated very differently. So

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1	the shaming of the victims is also another trend that we	1	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you very much, Nicole, and
2	want to be careful of. Because again, reporting wise, in	2	we appreciate your efforts to join us even remotely.
3	terms of what we see, particularly around the older	3	So obviously, there is a lot of different areas
4	victims, is far lower, far less than the general	4	of fraud, retail fraud, that we're seeing that are of
5	population. So we have to be very careful in terms of	5	great concern to us. And I think what I'd like to
6	how we treat victims so they can come forward and report.	6	explore first are just some of the you know, some
7	Thank you.	7	things that we should be looking at as the more recent
8	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Jean. And last but	8	trends and some of the newer forms of fraud that seem to
9	not least, by webcast, we have Nicole Iannarone,	9	be popping up. Because it does seem these things kind of
10	Associate Clinical Professor at Georgia State University	10	get reinvented in new ways depending on the times and new
11	College of Law. Welcome.	11	technologies and so on.
12	MS. IANNARONE: Hello. Thank you for having me	12	So, Charu, maybe we can start with you. What
13	with you today.	13	are some of like the key trends? You mentioned earlier
14	I work with a clinic at Georgia State	14	Ponzi schemes, pump and dump, churning. But if you had
15	University College of Law. We represent investors who	15	to sort of say like the biggest areas that you're focused
16	have already been defrauded or been harmed financially in	16	on right now, what are they and what is sort of unique
17	some way. We work with investors who have claims before	17	about them in the packaging they're in today?
18	FINRA arbitration. They've typically worked with a	18	MS. CHANDRASEKHAR: Sure. So to your point, I
19	retail broker. And the things that we see are the same	19	do think that a lot of traditional retail frauds are now
20	things that we've seen for some time. While there may be	20	taking new forms and transforming with technology. The
21	some new trends in products from time to time, we	21	first one that immediately comes to mind is the ICO
22	continually see high-fee products being suggested to	22	cryptocurrency space. And in terms of enforcement, the
23	retail investors. We are still seeing some REITs. We	23	Commission has been very active here in bringing cases
24	see variable annuities. We see things like mutual funds	24	against multiple individuals and entities that have, we
25	with high levels of fees.	25	allege, perpetrated these sorts of cryptocurrency-related
	Page 31		Page 33
1	We also do some work with our state securities	1	frauds.
2	administrator. And in that realm, we see a great deal of	2	To give you some examples, we can tick through
3	unregistered investments related to things that are	3	cases like the Titanium Blockchain case, the BitFunder
4	important locally in our area and in our news. So	4	case, the AriseBank case, all cases involving either
5	Georgia is a great state for movies and new development	5	cryptocurrency platforms or digital assets, where really
6	there, so we are seeing more unregistered securities	6	in an older era these might have been more traditional
7	being offered to folks related to the movie deals that	7	offering frauds. But now with the advent of digital
8	we're having in Georgia.	8	technology and ICOs, they have become Internet-based and
9	For what our clients see, when they come to us	9	digital frauds. And again, the Internet is front and
10	in the clinic and what they tell us is that they trusted	10	central here to recruiting investors and to perpetrating
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11 the individual they were working with. They didn't 12 understand the products that were being provided to them. 13 They don't know what they cost. And a lot of the harms

- 14 come from that trust and a reliance upon the professional 15 to do the right thing for the individual. 16 So we can always provide legal assistance and
- 17 help out a consumer investor who can't otherwise obtain 18 an attorney to help them recover their costs. But we 19 prefer that they don't ever need our services at all. So 20 we do engage in some investor education and outreach and 21 we're really grateful for opportunities like this to talk 22 about how to prevent fraud with retail investors so
- 23 perhaps someday our services are not needed.
- 24 Thank you very much for the opportunity to join 25 you and I'm very sorry I can't be there in person today.

- mediately comes to mind is the ICO
- space. And in terms of enforcement, the
- been very active here in bringing cases
- individuals and entities that have, we
- ed these sorts of cryptocurrency-related

ou some examples, we can tick through itanium Blockchain case, the BitFunder Bank case, all cases involving either platforms or digital assets, where really these might have been more traditional But now with the advent of digital ICOs, they have become Internet-based and And again, the Internet is front and recruiting investors and to perpetrating 11 false statements about the business lines and the 12 potential for expansion. So I think that would be the 13 first area. 14 The second area is one Cam touched upon, which 15 is the global proliferation of market manipulation 16 schemes, pump and dumps. As Cam put it well, the 17 Internet really is borderless and we've seen global rings 18 of market manipulators and fraudsters really deploy the 19 Internet and technology really to recruit victims 20 worldwide and to propagate false statements about product 21 lines and businesses across the globe. 22 MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Charu. 23 So, Cam, again, for you, you mentioned a number 24

- of different things. But how would you answer that in
- 25 terms of the most pressing things that you're seeing now

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1 in the sort of packaging of these sorts of frauds? 2 MR. FUNKHOUSER: Yeah, it's a good question 3 that we probably could expand on for hours. I think it 4 comes down to two kind of big things, right? So you have 5 the people who perpetrate fraud do it really in one of б two ways. They're either going to use this mass 7 marketing campaign, right, to either send out spam 8 emails, you know, even get fliers in the mailbox, you 9 know, advertising some investment. You might even get 10 text messages, you might see these things in social 11 media. And so that impacts a whole bunch of people who 12 have computers and cell phones, so that segment of the 13 market. 14 And then in terms of the other broad place is 15 sort of the very personal, one on one, I'm going to 16 target a senior citizen group, a church group, some sort 17 of affinity group. And somebody somehow hacks into that 18 person or that church or some source, some school or some 19 affinity group and becomes the trusted adviser for that 20 person. And then they recruit other people. And that 21 can happen pretty frequently. And it's not easy to 22 identify that wolf in sheep's clothing until you try to 23 get your money back. 24 You know, this is an industry where it's highly 25 regulated, the securities industry, right? The SEC and

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	rage 55
1	FINRA regulate registrants. But, you know, a lot of what
2	we see in terms of victimization is by people who are
3	unregistered, who are out there victimizing individuals
4	in a variety of these schemes.
5	And so it's important for us to send that
б	message out that, you know, you've got to educate and
7	this is what's great about this discussion is, one of the
8	things we try to do is educate investors. And we have
9	some great resources to so people can educate
10	themselves to help prevent being victimized. And also
11	what also we encourage is if you see something, say
12	something. Because many times, you know, the regulators
13	are coming in from behind when, you know, these schemes
14	start to unfold. Like we really appreciate any tips you
15	might have of people that are, you know, sort of nosy
16	neighbors type tips.
17	I know, again, back to this Ponzi scheme that
18	the Chairman talked about. I mean, one of the
19	perpetrators of that had 25 cars in his driveway.
20	Probably a pretty good sign he's either doing something
21	well or maybe something else. So those are the types of
22	very subtle pieces of data that might help head off a
23	retail fraud.
24	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Cam. So, Chris, from
25	the perspective a state regulator, are the trends you're

seeing consistent with this or is there something you would add in terms of new packaging, new trends?

MR. GEROLD: Sure. Actually, the NASAA and the enforcement committee specifically, their annual survey of all the state regulators and the types of actions that they've brought over the course of 2017, the trend that emerged from that is that, for the first time in three years, there were more actions brought against nonregistrants than registrants. And that's -- like I said, that's a change over the last -- it wasn't that way over the last two years.

I think part of that has to do with the number of cases that have been brought related to cryptocurrencies or I call them crypto-frauds, because they're not really against currencies, they're just cases involving crypto, blockchain and essentially frauds around cryptocurrencies that we've seen emerge the end of '17 and continued into '18.

State securities regulators filed or have open investigations on more than 200 cases. We actually did Operation Crypto Sweep, which was a multijurisdictional effort to stop some of these online crypto frauds. I think it was very successful. But I think the biggest success to come out of it was to raise awareness and as a deterrent. Especially -- and I'll give the example, at

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Christmas 2017, I'm sitting around the table and my mother starts talking to me about cryptocurrencies and everyone is getting rich. And right there, saying, there's a problem here. And, sure enough, over the next couple months, we did a great number of actions and hopefully have raised awareness that this is ripe for fraud.

The other thing that Cam alluded to was a classic pump and dump. One of the things we've seen, and it's sort of evolved over time, is -- it started -- I don't know if it started but I recall in years past, it was someone calling up and saying, invest in a penny stock, buy it from me. With the Internet, it evolved into paid promoters, which we still see as an ongoing issue, where companies are paid to promote specific stocks and you see the price go up. And then insiders sell out.

And then more recently, in the last two months, we've had three complaints along those same lines of people actually getting phone calls, seniors primarily, getting telephone calls promoting a stock -- not offering to sell it to them or for them to buy it from them but rather telling them to go on their online account, check it out, it's publicly traded, and buy it. And they've done that in a coordinated effort with both a website and

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1	a paid promotion along with that phone call. And those	1	the phone use with robocalls and better targeting, per
2	people did go out and buy it and within two months, the	2	se. But that's still the main form of loss, based on
3	stock price went way up and came crashing right down. So	3	what we hear. So in terms of our sort of helpline, we
4	that was something new.	4	have seen our top 10 frauds, investment fraud is
5	And New Jersey is putting out actually NASAA	5	eighth in our rank. It's roughly about 3 percent of the
6	is working on an investor alert about that, about not	6	calls we get, and we get roughly about 20,000 calls a
7	only the promotion via the Internet, which we've all seen	7	year just on our fraud line.
8	before, but along with personal telephone calls from	8	From a profile standpoint, I think this is
9	local phone numbers with I don't want to say very	9	relatively well known as well. The typical victim tends
10	common-sounding names. We've traced those calls to	10	to be older. So our victims are 74 years in age, they
11	overseas and it seems like it's an international effort	11	tend to be more male than female, so 59 percent are male.
12	in manipulating a stock or a penny stock. So those are	12	The losses involved are relatively great. They're over
13	some of the trends we've been seeing.	13	\$100,000 is what they report to us. And again, the most
14	MR. REDFEARN: Very interesting. And it is	14	common method of contact is inbound phone calls. They
15	particularly notable that this trend of sort of ICOs and	15	are also reporting online and in-person contact as well.
16	cryptocurrencies has been coupled with the observation	16	But that's kind of just what we see. Over and over
17	that more non-registrants than registrants are the	17	again, phone is by far, I think, greatly used. Emails as
18	problem now, right? And this has been a big area of	18	well. More so, the expansion and use of technology-based
19	focus for Chairman Clayton and the Commission as we try	19	ways of reaching people more through the phone base
20	to get our arms around this new sort of asset class, some	20	still, unfortunately, still a bad mode.
21	of which may be okay but much seem to be kind of	21	The other thing I wanted to pick up on in terms
22	problematic.	22	of the profiling as well, we are looking at sort of more
23	MR. FUNKHOUSER: And also, Brett, on that note,	23	of the psychological behavior. So how certain victims
23	you have the direct cryptocurrency issue. We also	23	have a different view or perspective on investing. And I
24	observe stocks that claim to be somehow tied into a	25	think there is the newness factor of products I think
20	observe stocks that claim to be somenow fied into a	25	unitk there is the newness factor of products I unitk
	Dago 30		Dago 11
	Page 39		Page 41
1	cryptocurrency. In effect, FINRA just brought its first	1	speak to this whole notion that, from the victim's
2	cryptocurrency. In effect, FINRA just brought its first case involving a registered person who was involved in a	2	speak to this whole notion that, from the victim's perspective, the psychological mindset that we see more
2 3	cryptocurrency. In effect, FINRA just brought its first case involving a registered person who was involved in a cryptocurrency issue. You can see the public	2 3	speak to this whole notion that, from the victim's perspective, the psychological mindset that we see more so in victims versus nonvictims is that they really value
2 3 4	cryptocurrency. In effect, FINRA just brought its first case involving a registered person who was involved in a cryptocurrency issue. You can see the public announcement on that. But it's not only the	2 3 4	speak to this whole notion that, from the victim's perspective, the psychological mindset that we see more so in victims versus nonvictims is that they really value wealth accumulation. So one, some of the most important
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1	timeshares as tenth.	
2	MR. REDFEARN: That's really interesting. And	
3	I'm sure on the educational side, it's good to let people	
4	know that when you hear you just won the sweepstakes or	
5	you just won a lottery or any of those things, that, you	
б	know, obviously, beware of those.	
7	MS. SETZFAND: Absolutely.	
8	MR. REDFEARN: When you said grandparents, what	
9	was that one?	
10	MS. SETZFAND: So a lot of grandparents are	
11	preyed upon by scammers where the fraudster will pretend	
12	to be a grandchild, usually stuck in a foreign country,	
13	saying that they've either lost their passport or they've	
14	been kidnapped and they need ransom money. So they need	
15	sort of a wire transfer. And unbelievably so, a lot of	
16	grandparents do fall for that.	
17	And with the advent of social media, you can	
18	get a lot of information about your family through	
19	Facebook and other means. And that's why I think it's	
20	become more and more rampant.	
21	MR. REDFEARN: Great, thank you.	
22	So Nicole, out in Georgia, is it the same kind	
23	of stuff? Or is it something a little bit different in	
24	terms of what you're hearing from the folks who are	
25	reaching out to your folks?	

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1	MS. IANNARONE: I think we have a little bit of
2	a difference in that it takes folks a couple of years to
3	get to us after they've realized that they lost something
4	as a result of a scam. But we are seeing along the same
5	lines as Jean the same methods of communication that have
6	previously been used. So telephone is definitely one
7	that we see, as well as getting to know the community and
8	the individuals within it before putting a new product or
9	investment out there.
10	One that we're beginning to see that I hope is
11	not a trend, and it comes up more quickly because the
12	losses come up more quickly, is in currency trading. We
13	are beginning to get calls from individuals who are
14	engaged in currency swaps and really should not be in
15	them. They are very unsuitable investments for the
16	individuals who are reaching out to us.
17	I've spoken with another clinic who also has
18	seen something like that. So we're going to hope that
19	that is not a continuing issue, simply because it is so
20	easy to quickly lose money within that trading. And it's
21	usually done by the investor themselves.
22	MR. REDFEARN: So that's somebody reaches out
23	by phone or by email and they say I have a currency
24	trading strategy that is great and you're likely to make
25	a bunch of money doing this? And they get them into it

and somehow or another, they are able to just defraud them and take their money while they're trying to run these strategies?

MS. IANNARONE: Yeah, the trades happen very, very quickly in the process. Sometimes, I've heard from another claim, that one of them involved, well, learn before you start investing your money. We'll set up a dummy account for you so you can trade in that account. But perhaps the dummy account isn't as easy to discern from the regular account with the investor's own money. So they start practicing through what really seems to be like play gambling and it can lead to a loss of a significant amount of money very, very quickly.

When we get currency trading calls at our clinic, we are looking at someone losing 90 percent of what they had invested, usually in a few months, because they start out thinking they're going to do okay, they lose some money initially and they are trying to make it up, there are significant losses later. And after a while, pretty much all of the investment is gone.

MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. I want to take a minute to look at a couple more -- the details on some of the specifics to see if we can understand both how they work and what people should look out for. And the Ponzi scheme has come up a lot and people know of a lot of the

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big, more famous Ponzi schemes, but Charu, can you just help? Give us an example of another -- yet another Ponzi scheme is out there. What does it look like? What is an example? How do people see the footprint of a Ponzi scheme coming their way?

MS. CHANDRASEKHAR: Sure. So the Ponzi schemes, to Jean's point, are perpetrated both through a lot of traditional means, for example, outreach via phone or personal contact, but also some online Internet recruiting. And this is a space, where we in partnership with our Office of Investor Advocacy and Education, have been very active in reaching out to warn people about the red flags of Ponzi schemes. We see a lot of the same problematic indicia, such as promises of high returns, promises of guaranteed returns, a sense of urgency that people need to get in and invest right away or the opportunity will vanish. So a lot of the same highpressure sales tactics with reassurances of large, large payouts at the end.

And we've also been, as both the Chairman and you noted, the Commission has been very active in bringing cases in this space, most recently the \$345 million case in Baltimore, the Woodbridge case, the Life Pay case, the First Nationle case, a lot of the same methods of recruitment are being used over and over again

	Page 46		Page 48
1	and it's an area we are very much focused on in terms of	1	scheme that doesn't show up on our surveillance reports,
2	raising investor awareness.	2	doesn't show up, you know, in any type of data analytics.
3	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. So Cam, you	3	This is very personal. And as my colleagues have
4	mentioned affinity fraud, affinity groups. You said it	4	pointed out, the victims of this scheme are really
5	could be church, it could be school, it could be	5	retirees who trust this person. And, in fact, in many
6	military. How do those work? How does that targeting	6	· ·
7	happen?	7	ways, they don't realize they're being defrauded. And
8	MR. FUNKHOUSER: Yeah, again, these are some of	8	they like the person. And so when you meet them, the
9		9	Ponzi schemers, they're very likable people. They put on
10	the, I guess, worst of the worst type offenders. They somehow integrate themselves into a community, either		the charm offensive and you trust them. So you don't
11		10	realize you're being defrauded. In fact, you willingly
	through a church or another type of, you know, retiree	11	give your money and then you recruit the bad guy there
12	group, it could be a cultural community. And, you know,	12	sort of counts on one of the victims to recruit more
13 14	so in these types of schemes, it's very personal. You go, you show up at the meeting, you find someone who is	13	victims.
		14	So it's a very dangerous situation for retirees
15	vulnerable. You explain to them how you can help them.	15	and other retail investors. It's also incredibly hard to
16	Generally, people aren't really trying to hit the	16	detect for regulators.
17 18	lottery. They're trying to get some type of return for	17	CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: Hey, Brett, do you mind if I
	the humble money they have and this person says, you	18	jump in?
19	don't want to trust the people on Wall Street, those guys	19	MR. REDFEARN: No, please. Please. I welcome
20 21	are all thieves. Let me tell you about a very special	20	that.
	investment that I have. Right?	21	CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: First, I want to thank, you
22	So, let me give you an example. We had one	22	know, our friends in FINRA, the states, AARP, Nicole,
23	case that came in through our whistleblower program. It	23	what you do. You know, this is a partnership. We have
24	was actually, the tip came in by somebody that FINRA	24	limited resources. And, as you note, particularly in
25	had barred for a securities fraud violation. And he	25	some of these retail investment frauds, acting quickly is
	Page 47		Page 49
1	said, I'm working at this place that even I can't work	1	very important. Ponzi schemes grow for all the reasons
1 2	said, I'm working at this place that even I can't work here. Right?	1 2	
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2	here. Right?	2	very important. Ponzi schemes grow for all the reasons you say, and we need to do that.
2 3	here. Right? And it turned out that this person was working	2 3	very important. Ponzi schemes grow for all the reasons you say, and we need to do that. I just want to make some observations. They're
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1	mean, if the trading of a few retail investors can move
2	the price significantly, that's not a stock that should
3	look like, you know, a large-cap stock.
4	Another thing. Unregistered investment
5	professionals, they look like registered investment
6	professionals. We all know, because we sit through the
7	cases every week, 500 of them a year, if you're in
8	unregistered land, the risk of fraud it's orders of
9	magnitude higher. We have bad actors in the registered
10	world. We seek to identify them and get them out.
11	That's, you know, FINRA, what you spend a lot of time,
12	you know, doing, what we spend a lot of time doing. But
13	once you move into unregistered land, you know, enough
14	said.
15	One of the hardest things is taking confidence
16	in the confidence of others. That's a really tough nut
17	to crack but it is an indicia of legitimacy. Smart-
18	looking people, friends of mine are investing, I take
19	confidence from that. I think about that one. I'm not
20	as sure about how to crack the code on that.
21	So what comes out of all this from my
22	perspective? How do we help investors? We know what to
23	do in Enforcement, we're trying to get better. How do we
24	help investors? Key questions. Are you registered? You
25	know, if you're not registered with the SEC or the states
	Page 51

transition just for a second to just sort of -- I want to throw something out generally to whomever wants to answer it. Which is that, so the Chairman just listed four questions that we think people should be on the lookout for that will help them to basically have a little bit of a screening to determine whether or not they actually want to take their money in that direction.

Let me just ask, is there anything -- maybe since we just finished, Chris, is there anything else you would add to that list? What other things do you think we should tell people to really kind of think about before they put their money somewhere?

MR. GEROLD: Well, I think the Chairman's questions kind of run into the second and third part of today's program in terms of both investor education as well as finders and really private offerings, which some of those questions makes -- scares you when it comes to private offerings and who those are being sold to.

In terms of what we would add to that, we in New Jersey have had a long-running initiative, Check Before You Invest, which encourages anyone before they sign up with an adviser or buy any securities from a broker to go on BrokerCheck, which FINRA has and is readily available, to go on there and check their background out and make sure they're registered.

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1	as an investment professional, you really need to take a	1	You know, one of the things that we always
2	pause. Like every potential investor should know that.	2	teach in our investor education classes is don't invest
3	Is the investment registered? If it's not	3	in anything that you don't fully and completely
4	registered, it doesn't mean it's bad. But you need to	4	understand. I take it one level even above that, is
5	take a pause, you really need to take a pause.	5	don't invest in things that you don't use. That's my
б	A question I love to ask, how much of my money	6	philosophy. But, you know, others have a different one.
7	is going to work for me? To Nicole's point, if there's a	7	In terms of, I guess, what to add to that, I
8	high fee, there's a high carrying cost, there's, you	8	think some of the questions that he encourages investors
9	know, a back-end fee, no.	9	to ask are fantastic. And I wish every investor would
10	Last question, and then I'll pause, are there	10	have done that.
11	audited financial statements anywhere around this	11	Going back to what Cam touched upon was and
12	investment? I have not seen, you know, a better question	12	what I have found is people only do business with other
13	in terms of separating the speculative from the less	13	individuals that they know, like and trust. And
14	speculative.	14	naturally, almost every victim that we've ever spoken to
15	So those are my thoughts. I wanted to share	15	is, oh, he's a great I'm going to say guy. It's
16	them with the group. And, you know, I really appreciate	16	traditionally men but we have some bad actors that are
17	your spending the time. Prevention is key here and we	17	women. No, he's such a nice guy, we have complete
18	are looking at all of our rules, trading rules,	18	confidence in him.
19	disclosure rules, registration rules. You know we are	19	And then in other cases, for instance, when we
20	pursuing regulation, best interest, with an eye toward	20	investigated Woodbridge, for instance, we spoke to a
21	greatly reducing the opportunity for retail fraud. So	21	number of individuals and they said, don't screw this up.
22	thank you.	22	We're getting 5 percent interest, the bank is paying us
23	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you, Chairman.	23	less than 1, don't screw this up on us. They drank the
24	I think that that set of questions and set of	24	Kool-Aid, I mean, that's how we refer to it in our
25	issues sort of provides an opening for us to just	25	office. And once someone has bought into the product or
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1	the individual, it is extremely hard, especially if		for individuals, typically seniors, to go out and buy
2	they're continuing to get paid the commission excuse	2	that security in their online account.
3	me, not the commission but their interest or their coupon	3	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. Jean, just kind of
4 5	to back them away from that and say, well, there are	5	continue on this trend. One of the things you had
5	problems here. And oftentimes, they don't come to that realization until after a case is filed. Or even,	6	mentioned in your sort of top list was identity fraud.
		7	And can you just describe a little bit more in detail about how that works and how that works to defraud
7 8	sometimes after the case is filed, the bad actor will blame the regulator and say, hey, they're the ones who	8	investors?
9 10	screwed this up; you'd still be getting paid otherwise.	9 10	MS. SETZFAND: So identity fraud is or
10	But those are, you know, the problems we run into. The Chairman did offer some fabulous questions	11	identity theft, quite frankly, fraud is all about stealing somebody's identity through various means. A
12	that all investors can and should be asking. And that's	12	lot of it can come in different forms.
13	going to touch upon our investor ed on how we get that	13	So one that we really focused on a lot was the
14	word out.	14	issuance of the new Medicare cards that came out earlier
15	MR. REDFEARN: I will just ask one other thing,	15	this year. There's a process that you go through or
16	Chris. Earlier, you mentioned paid promoters and we	16	actually don't have to go through. But fraudsters will
17	haven't talked about that much. So I just want like,	17	convince you that you do have to go through a process,
18	the paid promoter type scheme, just tell me a little bit	18	relinquish information about you, and then from that they
19	more.	19	claim they take your account information, identity,
20	MR. GEROLD: Yeah, so what I was referring to	20	and then start to essentially either steal your money or
21	was not so much the individual paid promoter but paid	21	use it to issue a fraudulent IRS tax return form, so on
22	promotional ads, where they go out to these companies	22	and so forth, a whole host of different things. But they
23	that have email lists and then go by various names, Penny	23	take your identity, it wreaks havoc in your life. So
24	Stock Locks or Guaranteed Penny Stock Returns or what	24	that's essentially another form of fraud.
25	have you on the Internet. These are typically paid for	25	But I also wanted to comment on the other
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	Page 55		Page 57
1	Page 55 by the issuer of a penny stock and they will send out	1	Page 57 questions that you should ask. One of the things that
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	by the issuer of a penny stock and they will send out		questions that you should ask. One of the things that
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	by the issuer of a penny stock and they will send out newsletters touting the stock. Now, technically, it's legal. I mean, the SEC has guidance on it. As long as they're disclosing as long as they're not saying anything false and we generalize, so anyone, go check out the rules. But as long as they're not saying anything false, as long as they're disclosing they're being paid, the amount they're being paid, they will send out email blasts to hundreds of thousands of people. Actually, the more email addresses they have, the more they'll get paid for their promotion of it. And they'll say things such as, if you bought at yesterday's opening of 1 penny and sold in the afternoon and sold in the afternoon when it traded at, you know, 2 cents, you would have made a 100 percent gain, you know, exclamation point, underline. And they'll go on with this, usually in conjunction with some news release by the issuer about some contract they're about to enter or some other news, depending on how nefarious or how far they want to stretch the truth in terms of how they frame the story. That's what I meant by paid promoters. Really,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	questions that you should ask. One of the things that strike me is we're asking the consumers as well as potential victims to do quite a bit. And yet, fraudsters don't have to do a lot to steal money. So they make that process of taking money away really easy and yet we make the preventative action relatively hard. So I think it's really important for us to list out preventative actions that people can take, ask the right questions. But also let's think about how we can make this easier in terms of protecting people. Are there places that, as we get into this world where Amazon is going to make our lives so easy, we don't have to go anywhere anymore, how do we actually make prevention that way, too? So that's something that strikes me is the field that quite frankly isn't fair to consumers. They are it is a little bit of a David and Goliath. So how do we even that a little bit further and make the process around prevention far easier for them, rather than putting the onus and responsibility purely on consumers? MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. Nicole, we've talked about a lot of different things but I wanted to just make

	Page 58		
1	can you know, including microcap stocks. So I'm	1	а
2	wondering if you have any insights from your	2	y
3	constituencies in that area for us.	3	
4	MS. IANNARONE: I'm not sure I have anything	4	١
5	more than really anecdotal evidence on what we're seeing	5	f
6	from our clients and the people who are coming to us.	6	t
7	Really, we are seeing investments that, if I could	7	t
8	classify them generally, that the investor does not	8	F
9	understand, can't understand, and trusted somebody else,	9	e
10	and that's why they're in them.	10	t
11	So they might have asked some of the questions	11	c
12	that the Chairman set forth. They developed a trust	12	c
13	relationship with somebody. And they are in an	13	f
14	investment that they cannot explain. They don't know	14	v
15	what a REIT is. Sometimes, we hear some accents in	15	c
16	Georgia. And we hear about the names of the products	16	k
17	like "Areat," that they believe they have, and we're	17	
18	looking for a legal document like a writ. And we realize	18	t
19	what they have is a real estate investment trust. It's	19	t
20	not something that the client can explain, they wouldn't	20	а
21	have the background necessarily to ask questions about to	21	
22	understand it and know whether it's something that's	22	F
23	suitable for them.	23	Ŷ
24	Added to the Chairman's list of questions, I	24	k
25	might ask, what do you get from this? How much are you	25	а
	Page 59		
1	being paid and by whom?	1	
2	It's surprising to me how many of the people	2	
3	who come to us actually believe that they haven't paid	3	
4	anything for the advice that they have been provided, or	4	
5	that the products that they're purchasing come with no	5	
6	fees at all.	6	
7	And I think finally, convincing victims and	7	
8	encouraging them to come forward early and asking	8	
9	questions is really very, very important. Don't just	9	
10	look at your account statement and say, is my money still	10	
11	there? Ask questions about, what's going on? How is	11	
12	this working? Why is this good for me? How would I	12	
13	explain this to my family members? Encourage them to	13	
14	find some way to talk to their friends and their family	14	
15	about it to make sure that it is the right investment for	15	
1	C C	1	

MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. I want to get for a

second to the question of who are these people? Right?

different flavors that we may be running into here. Are

Charu, can you give us some sense of -- and

we talking about just straight up con men, fraudsters?

Are they typically securities professionals gone bad,

other sorts of bad actors from overseas markets?

very likable people, but there's a lot of, you know,

So, Cam, you mentioned it's somebody with charisma and

answer the question of who are these people? Where would you point us to look?

MS. CHANDRASEKHAR: Sure. As Cam and Jean and Nicole all noted, there are often cases in which the frauds are perpetrated by people who are known to and trusted by the victims. For example, there was a case the Commission charged earlier this year involving a very prominent pastor who allegedly lured seniors into an entirely fraudulent scheme involving -- involving false bonds and told them they were worth millions. There are other cases where you have members of certain religious communities or ethnic communities and really affinity frauds, people who are really members of the community, who are capitalizing and exploiting that trust and that compassion and care really to defraud people who are known to them.

And, as Cam mentioned, I think in many cases, the fraudsters are well known and well-liked members of the community and they use that, that hook, to their advantage.

I think in other cases, we see people who are portraying themselves as somehow skilled professions, where there is a seeming inequality in the amount of knowledge or competence -- to Chris's point -- and taking advantage of that seeming differential to lure in

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victims. So I think it comes in a couple of different flavors. But I think in all of these cases, it's really exploiting a relationship of trust and confidence to reign in victims.

MR. FUNKHOUSER: Let me follow up on that, too. I think, you know, one of the interesting things about the Internet, while we talk about how the bad guys can exploit information, you too can do your own research on people. And so many of these perpetrators, the individuals that you come into contact, will claim to have educational backgrounds that can be checked out, they'll have work histories that can be checked out. And a simple Google search, just a simple Google search could uncover a whole lot of information about the person that you're about to entrust your money with. And I think that's one of the simple things people can do.

Don't believe what you're reading or seeing. Check it out. And, like I said, sometimes you will see even a simple search of the person's name plus fraud might return some sort of commentary on a blog or some other type of news story that might be of interest to you. That's a very simple thing to do for individuals. Also, you know, for FINRA, I mean, Chris

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mentioned our BrokerCheck. If it's a licensed person, you can get the whole history of the person if they're

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them.

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1	registered. But mostly the trouble, most of these	1	where it then requires the it's related to all
2	schemes, the vast, vast majority are perpetrated by	2	financial professionals but certainly broker-dealers as
3	people who are working in some unregistered capacity but	3	well as IAs, in those situations to notify state
4	will claim to be registered in some ways, and you can	4	regulators and adult protective services of that
5	check that out, too.	5	potential exploitation. And about two years ago, some
6	MR. REDFEARN: Yeah, Chris, you did mention	6	states started enacting it. I know Alabama and Texas,
7	BrokerCheck before. I mean, do you think many people are	7	for instance, both have that as part of our enforcement
8	in the habit of saying, oh, let me check BrokerCheck and	8	survey. And that is actually starting to yield results.
9	see what the situation is here? Or do you think that's	9	I know Texas got 200 additional reports as a
10	just something that's just not happening?	10	result of approximately 200 of that act that they
11	MR. GEROLD: The short answer is, no. I don't	11	passed. And that act actually has the support of both
12	think hardly anyone does. I don't want to say anyone.	12	industry as well as advocacy groups, because it does
13	I'm sure millions of people go on BrokerCheck, just not	13	provide a safe harbor for not disbursing money and for
14	nearly in terms of percentage the number that should be	14	reporting senior exploitation or vulnerable adult
15	going on there and checking out the person they're giving	15	exploitation. And it's starting to yield results, where
16	their money to.	16	investigations are being opened and cases being
17	And I really thought Jean asked a very	17	prosecuted.
18	interesting question on why is it so easy for the bad	18	So it is some effort to address the problem.
19	guys and so hard for the investors? It's a little	19	Hopefully, more jurisdictions will be passing it in the
20	different perspective than we normally or normally the	20	near future. Hopefully, we'll hit a tipping point where
21	way I look at it. But I think it's a very interesting	21	eventually all jurisdictions pass it. Because that
22	question. I know FINRA has passed some rules recently	22	information is critical and it does give us one more tool
23	about disbursing money to excuse me, I'm forgetting	23	to identify bad actors that are in the space.
24	the rule number.	24	MR. REDFEARN: Indeed. And we will be in our
25	MR. GEROLD: Yes, thank you.	25	panels later spending a lot of time on how do we
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1	MR. FUNKHOUSER: It's FINRA Rule 2165. And we	1	hopefully make it a little harder for the bad guys to,
2	took some not to hijack what you were just saying, but	2	you know, make it not so easy for them and harder for the
3	so I can tell you about the rule, you know, you talk	3	investor. I think that's part of the intent there.
4	about what can you do to prevent it. Well, FINRA took	4	I guess, Jean, I just want to follow up with
5	sort of an offensive action and empowered our registered	5	the same question in terms of who are these people? Now,
6	brokers across the country to, in certain circumstances,	6	obviously, they're coming in, in many cases, you talked
7	and I'll give you the short story here, is when you see	7	about through the phone or robodialing. I don't know if
8	potential financial exploitation by someone who is senior	8	in that vein then it's that easy to know who are these
9	or of diminished capacity or of some sort of vulnerable	9	people?
10	type of customer, they can they can intervene and	10	MS. SETZFAND: Right. I think it's been stated
11	prevent certain transactions from happening within their	11	before but it's probably more bad actors than registered
12	account so they can be checked out.	12	reps who are perpetrating the really egregious acts. But
13	And we have also asked all of our registered	13	even to kind of build on Chris's point there, what we're
14	persons in firms to get a trusted adviser or trusted	14	trying to do is in the course of any transaction, we're
15	individual assigned to the account so that if, you know,	15	just trying to make sure that investors have the right
16	you mentioned your mother or grandmother and my mother-	16	tools to make the best decision. So we've actually
17	in-law is always getting these calls. Before they give	17	teamed up with NASAA to build an ask-your-investor
18	up the information or do the transaction within the	18	interview-your-investor tool. So what are the sort of
19	brokerage account, the registered rep in the firm can	19	standard questions you should ask, regardless? Because
20	contact the trusted person on the account and get them	20	again, going back to the profile of victims, we know that
21	involved, so it's done, you know, sort of at a family	21	victims are actually more investor savvy, are making more
22	level or a trusted adviser.	22	transactions. So probability wise, they're kind of in
23	MR. GEROLD: No, I appreciate that. And states	23	the course of both good and bad, because they're in the
24	have actually gone one step further with that. I think	24	vein of action, and therefore they fall prey.
25	13 jurisdictions have enacted the NASAA Senior Safe Act,	25	So what we want to do is ensure that they're
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1 taking -- taking the right steps to at least ask a set of 2 basic questions. A lot of the questions the Chair, Chair 3 Clayton, outlined. And that also brings them and 4 presents them the easy access to BrokerCheck, quite 5 frankly. So what we want to do is have them ask a set of 6 questions and then at the end of that whole process, 7 ensure that they're actually looking and making sure that 8 the person they're talking to is a registered rep with no 9 issues, so on and so forth. 10 So if that helps. Again, we're just trying to 11 get people in the sort of practice of doing these things 12 regularly. 13 MR. REDFEARN: It sounds like a good thing 14 there. 15 So Nicole, just again from your perspective, I 16 don't know what kind of insight you would have in terms 17 of who are the people behind the, you know, the schemes 18 that the folks you're dealing with are experiencing? 19 MS. IANNARONE: So we don't deal as much with 20 the things in the unregistered world and with the bad 21 actors in that sense. I can say, in regard to the 22 earlier question, do a lot of investors automatically do 23 a BrokerCheck? No, they don't. In our experience, 24 someone who has come to us has typically not done a great 25 deal of research on the professional who is registered

about, you know, if some opportunity is presenting itself in that space. Charu?

MS. CHANDRASEKHAR: So I think people should interrogate cryptocurrency investments in the same way they would look at a traditional bricks-and-mortar investment. And many of the red flags we've seen in the classic frauds such as Ponzi schemes still apply to online investments. Promises of high returns, promises of swift returns, guarantees that there won't be any losses, pressure to invest, these are all the same old techniques that are being imported into the cryptocurrency and digital asset space.

Really, it's -- I would say encourage investors to stay on alert for these claims that have migrated to the online and the Internet context and the cryptocurrency context. So it's really in some ways, I think the expression, old wine in new casks really applies to a lot of the Internet and crypto frauds. And I would encourage, as all of our panelists have said, people really should be doing the same sorts of diligence about the promoters in these investments, about the actual business plan of the investments. A lot of these investments have so-called whitepapers. People should really read those, think through the claims in those and generally remain on alert in the space of these

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that they will be working with. And in some cases, in 1 2 looking at a BrokerCheck, they would have been alerted to 3 a great number of disclosure events that might have 4 caused them to ask some questions at the front end as to 5 whether this is someone they felt comfortable working 6 with. So the more that we can do to continue to get 7 investors to run a quick Google search, as Chris and Cam 8 said, or to run the BrokerCheck and see if there's 9 information out there that might prevent -- might give 10 them pause as to whether they want to work with the 11 individual or at least give rise to some questions about 12 what the individual has to say about those past events 13 could help prevent some situations that many of our 14 clients have dealt with. 15 MR. REDFEARN: Thanks. So probably just a 16 couple more questions before we wrap up. 17 I want to turn back for a second to this area 18 of cryptocurrencies and digital assets, because it is so 19 new and it is seemingly on the rise. And, you know, 20 notwithstanding the fact that certainly there will be 21 digital assets or cryptocurrencies that are out there 22 that are, you know, fine and legitimate in their own 23 right, presumably. But what is your take right now on 24 this space, on cryptocurrencies and digital assets? And 25 how do you think that people should sort of be thinking

investments.

MR. REDFEARN: Same question, Cam. And is it -- do you think that in that space, where in terms of the related fraud activities, we're at the bottom of the curve, at the middle of the curve? Or do you think that this is still a pretty rapidly growing trend?

MR. FUNKHOUSER: Well, I've been doing this a long time and I never think there is a finish line to fraud, right? So I would -- that would even be speculating on the answer, forgetting the investment itself.

So I think it's always a challenge when there's something new out there that's sort of unknown, and so investors want to get in on it, right? I missed the .com era, I -- you know, there's always this, I'm going to miss this next investment. So the currency itself, I think, is

-- it's unknown because there's -- it's really

unregulated in many ways. So that's hard to predict. But what I do know is that most people know nothing about it. So how -- for the retail investor,

- from where I sit, one of the most dangerous places is,
- 23 you know, somebody calling them or getting pitched.
 - Here's a fund that invests in digital currency. Here's a

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1	what retail investors do understand. They have invested	1	older population, is unfortunately a very popular scam.
2	in stocks, they have invested in funds.	2	So interestingly enough, I think if there is
3	So I think, from where I sit, of course, the	3	some sense of prospecting, it's the new gold of the
4	digital currency is an unknown. But how it's going to be	4	future. Right? So that's, I think, where I would pay my
5	pitched to retail people is probably, at least in one	5	attention. Is how closely sold or pushed, promoted
6	way, the stocks or the funds that are investing in it,	6	cryptocurrencies is to gold coins amongst our population.
7	which is the safe place where people think it's	7	MR. REDFEARN: That's interesting. So they
8	disclosed, it's regulated, and it may not be.	8	know the interest in that community of gold and gold
9	MR. REDFEARN: Yeah, I think that we've been	9	coins.
10	very cautious here about actual securities coming into	10	MS. SETZFAND: Correct.
11	our markets that are based upon these products. We still	11	MR. REDFEARN: And they try to repackage it in
12	contemplate these things. But so far, we're not seeing a	12	that kind of a wrapper to get that kind of
13	lot of it and you have seen the messaging come out of the	13	interesting.
14	Commission, the Division as well as IM, about crypto	14	Nicole, again, cryptocurrencies, digital
15	potential crypto-related funds and ETFs and so on.	15	assets, in terms of the incoming calls that you're
16	Chris, any thoughts on the crypto digital asset	16	getting there, is this something that you see also as a
17	space that you'd like to share?	17	rising trend that keeps you concerned?
18	MR. GEROLD: Well, New Jersey has filed a	18	MS. IANNARONE: I think we will begin to see
19	number of actions, cease and desists against crypto-	19	more of it. We haven't begun to see it just yet. I do
20	related frauds. Going back to actually what Jean was	20	see a great deal out on Twitter. And the folks that I
21	mentioning and I think for her base, the AARP	21	hear most about it from are, frankly, our students who
22	individuals, the telephone is how they get solicited.	22	are incredibly interested in it, seeing more of it from
23	In the crypto space, it's the complete	23	younger generations. And whenever a student comes and
24	opposite. It is Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, any other	24	asks me about it, what do I think about investing in some
25	one you can think of. I am sure there are a bunch I	25	cryptocurrency idea that they've seen, my response is, if
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1	don't even know about. And once we started getting into	1 2	you or I can't explain the investment opportunity, how it
2 3	that space and trying to identify these crypto frauds and		
3	we get up a dummy account on these the information		is working and how I have an opportunity to make money, I
4	we set up a dummy account on those, the information	3	don't think it would be the right investment for me or
4	starts pouring in from those mediums. And so we are	3 4	don't think it would be the right investment for me or for somebody else to get into.
5	starts pouring in from those mediums. And so we are very, very, very, very cautious of the cryptocurrencies	3 4 5	don't think it would be the right investment for me or for somebody else to get into. So, yes, I do think that we are going to begin
5 6	starts pouring in from those mediums. And so we are very, very, very, very cautious of the cryptocurrencies and the crypto space. Not the technology, necessarily,	3 4 5 6	don't think it would be the right investment for me or for somebody else to get into. So, yes, I do think that we are going to begin to see more of it. I think we're going to see it
5	starts pouring in from those mediums. And so we are very, very, very, very cautious of the cryptocurrencies and the crypto space. Not the technology, necessarily, which is different than cryptocurrencies. But we are	3 4 5	don't think it would be the right investment for me or for somebody else to get into. So, yes, I do think that we are going to begin to see more of it. I think we're going to see it probably from younger generations who tend to be more son
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of the language or promotional elements around it have

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investors? What are the policy areas that you think we

MS. CHANDRASEKHAR: So I think Reg Best

should be focused on? Charu.

		1	
1	Interest will be an important regulatory vehicle going	1	that is a great place to wrap up. I think that, you
2	forward to really help both members of the financial	2	know, we have a lot more discussion to come later today.
3	community but also customers really to understand what	3	We probably jumped into some of those areas a little bit
4	the obligations are in terms of educating customers,	4	here but we have the benefit of having you all here with
5	placing them in suitable investments and the like.	5	us today. And so I think that this discussion in those
6	MR. REDFEARN: Thank you. Cam.	6	areas was extremely useful. So I'd like to thank you all
7	MR. FUNKHOUSER: Just off the top of my head,	7	again for coming here, sharing all of these thoughts and
8	but I think the FINRA Rule 2165 is sort of forward	8	we really appreciate it and we look forward to the
9	thinking and maybe can be expanded so that there are some	9	additional discussions this afternoon.
10	responsibilities on gatekeepers and, you know, others who	10	Also, thank you, Commissioner Roisman, for
11	are handling financial transactions for individuals to	11	staying here with us as well.
12	maybe do some first-alert type of prevention. But like I	12	And we will now take a break and we will be
13	said, if you take a look at FINRA Rule 2165, I think	13	back here at 11:30 for our second panel. So thank you
14	that's a really good start in that regard.	14	all very much.
15	MR. REDFEARN: Great. Chris.	15	(Recess.)
16	MR. GEROLD: Sure. I think the largest policy	16	MR. REDFEARN: Okay, for the second panel, I am
17	and one that we're in the process of adopting in New	17	pleased to be able to turn this one over to Lizzie Baird,
18	Jersey will be a uniform fiduciary standard, which the	18	my deputy director, who has been here about a month now,
19	governor announced last week that we're going to be	19	a little over a month. So happy to have you, Lizzie.
20	pursuing over the next couple months.	20	Thank you. And take it away.
21	MR. REDFEARN: Okay. Jean.	21	MS. BAIRD: Thanks. Well, welcome back,
22	MS. SETZFAND: So building on Chris, definitely	22	everyone. As you probably heard, one of the themes that
23	I think keeping the investor and insuring that the advice	23	I think emerged from the morning panel was the benefits
24	that they get is of best interest to them is definitely	24	of being registered and that so many of the fraudsters
25	important. And then I think just kind of underscoring	25	out there today are themselves unregistered. The firms
	Page 75	1	
	rage 75		Page 77
1	the fact that, again, whatever we can do to make the	1	Page //
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2	the fact that, again, whatever we can do to make the preventative actions as easy as possible for investors, I	2	they purport to work for are probably also unregistered. And in many cases, the securities are unregistered, as
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1	substantial amount of work administering Rule 15c2-11.	1	investment banking boutique focused in the community bank
2	And so she will also be moderating this portion of the	2	space. And today's discussion on the 2-11 applications
3	panel.	3	was certainly intriguing and thought that it would be
4	So in 1971, the Commission adopted Rule 15c2-11	4	best if I participated with my opinions.
5	as a means to protect the investing public from	5	15c2-11 is the official application. But for
б	fraudulent and manipulative potential inherent in	6	today, I think the abbreviated 2-11 is probably how it
7	situations when a broker-dealer submits quotations	7	will be mostly referred to. So again, I appreciate the
8	concerning any infrequently traded security in the	8	invitation and thank you.
9	absence of certain information. At a very basic level,	9	MS. DAHIYA: Next, we are going to turn it over
10	Rule 15c2-11 requires broker-dealers to publish	10	to Yvonne Huber, who is the senior vice president of
11	quotations in OTC securities to understand the products	11	market regulation at FINRA.
12	that they are quoting.	12	MS. HUBER: Hi, thank you. So I am a vice
13	The rule requires broker-dealers to review	13	president in the market regulation department at FINRA
14	certain specific information prior to initiating or	14	and I oversee the OTC compliance team. But by way of
15	resuming a quotation in an OTC security and form a	15	background, I have been working at FINRA for 28 years and
16	reasonable basis for understanding that the information	16	when I started, it was 1990 and it was right at the
17	that's being quoted is reliable and accurate.	17	height of a lot of scrutiny on the over-the-counter
18	There are many exceptions to the requirements	18	securities and the over-the-counter space. And there was
19	of the rule, such as unsolicited customer orders, the	19	the penny stock task force, there were the amendments to
20	piggyback exception and securities that are admitted to	20	15c2-11 that were being proposed and subsequently adopted
21	trade on a national securities exchange. As with many	21	and FINRA had or NASD at the time had just started the
22	rules, understanding the exceptions is important to fully	22	Form 211 filing process.
23	appreciate the rule's strengths and limitations.	23	In fact, I was hired to staff a team of people
24	Over the last two decades, the Commission has	24	that FINRA had or NASD had created solely for the
25	proposed to amend the rule by modifying certain existing	25	purpose of conducting surveillance in over-the-counter
		1	
	Page 79		Page 81
1	Page 79	1	Page 81
1	exceptions and adding new ones. In 1999, the Commission	1	securities. So I spent the first five years of my tenure
2	exceptions and adding new ones. In 1999, the Commission sought to limit the piggyback exception, require annual	2	securities. So I spent the first five years of my tenure with the organization conducting surveillance and
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	exceptions and adding new ones. In 1999, the Commission sought to limit the piggyback exception, require annual review of current information about the issuer, expand the information required for certain nonreporting issuers, and create new exceptions for certain securities, amongst other things. Although the Commission did not adopt the 1999 proposed amendments, the 1999 proposal contains an appendix that includes guidance regarding the Commission's expectations for broker-dealers when they conduct the review. I recommend that broker-dealers who are involved in conducting 15c2-11 reviews acquaint themselves with the 1999 release and, in particular, the red flags discussed within that release. Recent actions by the Commission as well as other matters that have come to the Staff's attention suggest that some broker-dealers are not fulfilling their review obligations as required by the rule. I'm looking forward to the discussion and hearing your views on the rule and receiving your input on ways that it can be improved. Thanks.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	securities. So I spent the first five years of my tenure with the organization conducting surveillance and investigations into potentially fraudulent activity in over-the-counter stocks. I moved out of that area and for the next 19 years focused on short sale regulations. But in January of 2014, I was brought back into the over-the-counter space to take over heading up the OTC compliance team. And in addition to my short sale regulatory responsibilities. The OTC compliance team is responsible for receiving Form 211 applications from broker-dealers who wish to quote securities in the over-the-counter markets. We have a Rule 6432 which requires that firms file these applications with us to demonstrate that they have met the information review and gathering requirements of Rule 15c2-11. Our team is responsible for reviewing these Form 211s when they're received to ensure that they – that the broker-dealer has, in fact, met these requirements. And if, during our review, we find that there are any deficiencies in the information that they've gathered or any red flags or discrepancies in the

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1	Once we believe that a broker-dealer has fully	1
2	complied with Rule 15c2-11 and any outstanding	2
3	deficiencies or discrepancies have been addressed, then	3
4	we will process the Form 211 and allow the broker-dealer	4
5	to begin quoting the security. It's important though to	5
б	know that this process that we undergo is in no way a	6
7	merit review of the issuer. We do not weigh in on the	7
8	qualifications of the issuer in any way. This isn't a	8
9	listing process at FINRA. It's really strictly a	9
10	compliance review to ensure that the requirements of the	10
11	rule have been met.	11
12	I very much appreciate, though, having an	12
13	opportunity to sit at the table today and to provide some	13
14	feedback on the rule. So thank you.	14
15	MS. DAHIYA: Thanks, Yvonne. Next, we'll go to	15
16	Dan Zinn, general counsel at OTC Markets.	16
17	MR. ZINN: Thank you, Val, and thanks to Brett	17
18	and Lizzie, everybody at the SEC, for having us and for	18
19	putting this panel together.	19
20	As Val said, I'm the general counsel at OTC	20
21	Markets. For a little bit of background on what we do,	21
22	we operate the primary interdealer quotation system.	22
23	It's an alternative trading system, known as OTC Link,	23
24	for the quoting and trading of OTC equity securities. So	24
25	for purposes of this discussion, when Yvonne's team has	25
	Page 83	
1	done the work that they do and approved a 211 and told a	1
2	broker-dealer that they can quote that security, they	2
3	will quote it most likely on our market. There are some	3
4	other competitors as well.	4
5	And so we sort of take the ball after the	5
6	broker dealer, after comebody in Tray's position, has not	6

of an iterative process that winds up with the business that's conducted on our market.

I think we will get into a number of the other issues and kind of explanations as we go through the questions. But just in terms of how we all sit, hopefully that gives some good background.

MS. DAHIYA: Thanks, Dan. Laura is going to kick it off with our first question.

MS. GOLD: Thank you, Val. And thanks to everyone who is participating today.

So to jump into our conversation, I would like to pose the following question. Since the last time the Commission proposed amendments to 15c2-11, there have been many changes to the over-the-counter market, particularly for equity securities, including the move towards an electronic quoting market, greater transparency and regulation of quotation mediums.

In your view, given the changes that have taken place, are there any considerations that the Commission should take into consideration if it were to engage in rulemaking in this space? Troy, would you like to start us off?

MR. CARLSON: Sure, thank you. Yes, well, I'll certainly say that today's OTC market is not your father's OTC market. There's been tremendous leaps made

1	done the work that they do and approved a 211 and told a	1	in terms of improving the transparency and communication,
2	broker-dealer that they can quote that security, they	2	including, Yvonne, being able to electronically apply for
3	will quote it most likely on our market. There are some	3	the 211 application was a tremendous improvement and
4	other competitors as well.	4	increased efficiency, which has just been the last year
5	And so we sort of take the ball after the	5	or two. There's been a tremendous advancement in terms
б	broker-dealer, after somebody in Troy's position, has put	6	of all the groups and parties working together in the OTC
7	a filing together, after FINRA has done the work to	7	market.
8	ensure that that compliance responsibility has been met,	8	And I guess I would say that if I was going to
9	we then allow for the broker to begin quoting.	9	suggest any sort of change or amendment to the rules, it
10	Upon receiving a Form 211, an approved 211 from	10	would be just to continue increased visibility and
11	FINRA, we will do a couple of things. We will contact	11	reporting by the issuers.
12	the applicable broker-dealer to make sure that they	12	MS. HUBER: I'll be happy to go next. I would
13	understand the form has been approved and that we will	13	definitely agree that the environment is much different
14	open the market for them to be able to quote. We will	14	today than it was when the amendments were first approved
15	also then start tracking the time line and making sure	15	back in 1991. And I think that the disclosure issues
16	that they meet their responsibilities, that the time line	16	that were inherent, you know, at the time, they're not as
17	is met before other brokers can begin quoting on what's	17	big a concern. I mean, with the Internet, not that I
18	called piggyback eligibility, which I'm sure we'll get	18	think there shouldn't continue to be disclosure, just
19	into to some degree.	19	that they're not as prevalent an issue.
20	As the market, our interaction is with about	20	But I do think that the rule could be more
21	100 or so FINRA member broker-dealer subscribers. And so	21	effective if there was a little bit more of an onus
22	our interest is in seeing them have as much information	22	placed on the broker-dealers to just ensure that they are
23	as possible, seeing them have be able to offer their	23	looking over the information more critically from a
24	clients and particularly retail as much of a transparent	24	potential fraud standpoint. As you mentioned, there were
25	trading experience as they can. And so this is all kind	25	these red flags that were issued in 1999 when certain
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1	amendments were proposed that are still that are still	1	OTCQX market, which for context is roughly 380 or so of
2	out there. But I feel that the way that the rule is	2	those companies. Those are companies that are meeting
3	structured, that the narrow amount of information that	3	certainly the 15c2-11 standards in terms of audited
4	broker-dealers need to review in compliance with the	4	financial information. They also have quarterly and
5	rule, these red flags would not necessarily make	5	current reporting obligations. And they're also meeting
6	themselves evident. They would not necessarily be	6	a set of quantitative requirements.
7	something that would be observed. They tend to be	7	Beneath that, we have the OTCQB market which we
8	something that gets observed after we make an inquiry	8	call our venture stage market. The disclosure
9	back to the firm to ask certain questions or for them to	9	qualifications, which I think is really of import when
10	get certain pieces of information.	10	we're talking about Rule 15c2-11, are similar, the same
11	So I think that either to somehow formally	11	in terms of current information and having audited
12	codify some of these red flags or potentially pull some	12	financials and the like. But some of the quantitative
13	of them certain key red flags into the rule could be	13	standards are more geared towards what you might think of
14	helpful. For example, one major area that I think should	14	with a venture company.
15	be considered would be the tradability aspect,	15	And then at the bottom we have what we call the
16	concentration of ownership.	16	pink market, which is the open market. It's certainly a
17	We've received Form 211s where the freely	17	nod to the Pink Sheets, which was that predecessor
18	trading shares, as far as we could tell, totaled 5,000.	18	publication. And pink is the open market, and it exists
19	There were two shareholders that held shares totaling	19	because broker-dealers have the responsibility to give
20	5,000, one held one for 1,500 shares and the other held,	20	their clients the best possible trading experience, have
21	you know, 3,500 shares. Those types of things, I think,	21	best execution and other responsibilities under the FINRA
22	should be on the onus of the broker-dealer to be looking	22	rules. And the pink market allows that to happen in a
23	at and assessing before coming forward and filing those	23	transparent manner.
24	forms with us.	24	I am going to bring this back to the question
25	MR. ZINN: We have about 20 minutes left? I	25	about regulation, specifically. So certainly one of the
	Page 87		Page 89
1	Page 87	1	Page 89
1	can go?	1	biggest differences between the way the market was set
2	can go? (Laughter.)	2	biggest differences between the way the market was set up, I think, in 1999, if that's our reference point, and
2 3	can go? (Laughter.) MR. ZINN: I wanted to address even the first	2 3	biggest differences between the way the market was set up, I think, in 1999, if that's our reference point, and the way it's set up now is the ability for the system on
2 3 4	can go? (Laughter.) MR. ZINN: I wanted to address even the first part of the question and just the developments in the OTC	2 3 4	biggest differences between the way the market was set up, I think, in 1999, if that's our reference point, and the way it's set up now is the ability for the system on which these securities are quoted to provide information.
2 3 4 5	can go? (Laughter.) MR. ZINN: I wanted to address even the first part of the question and just the developments in the OTC market, I think. Yvonne did a great job of talking about	2 3 4 5	biggest differences between the way the market was set up, I think, in 1999, if that's our reference point, and the way it's set up now is the ability for the system on which these securities are quoted to provide information. So we are already building in all of these incentives
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1	possible from the 211 filing and then have other brokers
2	be able to work with that information in order to create
3	a better market is something that can be addressed to the
4	211 process.
5	Similarly, having a system like ours, you know,
6	our system is now an SEC-regulated alternative trading
7	system. We are a FINRA member broker-dealer, which is a
8	requirement of all alternative trading systems. So
9	having the system be more involved in the process itself,
10	even to the extent that we have all of the relevant
11	information and sometimes more, or sometimes have a
12	contractual relationship with the issuer with respect to
13	OTCQB and OTCQX, we may be able to file a Form 211 or
14	otherwise provide that kind of support and background for
15	other broker-dealers to file a Form 211.
16	I think having all of the capability that we
17	have now should cause kind of a second look at what we
18	can do from a technology standpoint and even from a
19	regulatory standpoint with respect to where we sit to
20	help improve the process.
21	MS. GOLD: Thanks, everyone. And so what
22	you've all brought up is the need to address the
23	disclosure that's being provided, whether it's, you know,
24	on the Form 211 and to retail investors. And so, you
25	know, it sounds like there will be there could

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there who are interested and sort of jumping into the market and, you know, investing in their companies.

So I think at the end of the day, putting forth regulations to make sure that the markets are fair and the investors are protected really is going to help all the market participants.

MR. ZINN: Just jumping in on that, I think there's a lot of truth to that, certainly. But it obviously can go too far, just to some degree, right? If you only allowed the S&P 500 to trade, certainly there would be massive investor confidence in everything that trades on the markets. But that's not, you know, an end goal in itself. And so I agree with you, there's always going to be that rub and trying to get to that appropriate point where investor protection concerns are being met and being met at various stages in the process, as we kind of all represent from broker-dealers to the regulators to the market.

And so one of the things that we've thought about from kind of a specific proposal standpoint is how do you allow the broker-dealer -- and, you know, I think Val kind of led off with what the broker-dealers' responsibilities are -- how do you allow the brokerdealer to best fulfill their responsibilities? In some circumstances, the broker is already going to have an

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1	potentially be some increased costs to broker-dealers	1	existing relationship, they're going to have informed the
2	based on these suggestions that you've provided.	2	issuer with respect to an offering or provide other
3	So in your opinion, in the context of, you	3	investment banking services. In other circumstances,
4	know, if the Commission were to engage in rulemaking,	4	have a broker that their primary responsibility is to
5	what would be the best ways to achieve an appropriate	5	facilitate trading and to do that in securities where,
б	balance between capital formation and retail investor	6	you know, some work needs to be done to some degre
7	protection?	7	order to kind of meet that standard that Yvonne was
8	MS. HUBER: Well, I'd have to say that there's	8	talking about.
9	always going to be a rub between adequately protecting	9	And so just like an underwriter is compensated
10	investors and enabling companies to go and enter into the	10	for taking that risk and going out and doing the work
11	capital formation process. But I don't necessarily think	11	necessary to get that offering qualified and to kind of
12	that they need to be mutually exclusive. I don't	12	stand in that underwriter role, a firm that is taking a
13	necessarily think that you'd have investor protection at	13	company public, which is really what it is through the
14	the cost of capital formation. And in fact, I really	14	211 process, should also have an opportunity to establ
15	think investor protection will foster the capital	15	a direct relationship with the issuer. That's the kind
16	formation process. And the reason is because at the	16	of communication you want. You want there to be an
17	heart of it, what you really are looking for is investor	17	line between the broker and the issuer. And to
18	confidence.	18	potentially be compensated for it by the issuer so that
19	If you let frauds go through, if you let	19	there is maybe some of that offsetting or that helps
20	companies who are frauds be traded and quoted, in time,	20	offset some of the attendant cost and gives the market
21	that's going to erode investor confidence. And all the	21	better experience when that information is ultimately
22	rulemaking that you want to put in place, however easy	22	brought to FINRA and that security is ultimately trade
23	you want to make it for companies to be able to get their	23	with us.
24	securities, you know, publicly traded, it's not going to	24	MR. CARLSON: I'd like to add, I agree with
25	do them any good if there aren't going to be investors	25	Dan. But with regards to the additional costs

sting relationship, they're going to have informed the er with respect to an offering or provide other estment banking services. In other circumstances, you e a broker that their primary responsibility is to ilitate trading and to do that in securities where, know, some work needs to be done to some degree in

ing about. And so just like an underwriter is compensated taking that risk and going out and doing the work essary to get that offering qualified and to kind of nd in that underwriter role, a firm that is taking a npany public, which is really what it is through the process, should also have an opportunity to establish rect relationship with the issuer. That's the kind communication you want. You want there to be an open between the broker and the issuer. And to entially be compensated for it by the issuer so that re is maybe some of that offsetting -- or that helps set some of the attendant cost and gives the market a ter experience when that information is ultimately ught to FINRA and that security is ultimately traded h us.

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1	associated, I just don't see that being a significant	1	But there are often times when there is still
2	deterrent. As it ties to my thoughts on rulemaking or	2	somebody who is out there in a name only quote or with an
3	changes to rulemaking, to think about the relationship	3	unpriced quote. And they are they feel precluded from
4	about the broker-dealer, underwriter and issuer, should	4	being able to inactivate the symbol in that situation.
5	play a significant part of the amount of disclosure or	5	Now, typically, they will go and they will approach the
6	the amount of of protection that the retail investor	6	firm and let them know, hey, you've got a quote out here
7	is going to be the beneficiary of.	7	or an unpriced quote out here in a stock that hasn't
8	You know, as an underwriter, we are, when	8	traded in a certain amount of time. And usually, they're
9	representing that issuer, absolutely doing what it is	9	not aware and they take it down and it gets resolved.
10	that we do every day as part of our core business. The	10	But I think if we built into Rule 15c2-11 the
11	expenses that are incurred in the application process,	11	ability for us to or for the piggyback exemption to be
12	the listing, all of that again is we have not seen a	12	sunset in situations where there's been you know, the
13	significant increase. And it's again just the natural	13	stock has been inactive for a certain period of time, I
14	course of us doing business.	14	think that would be beneficial.
15	And I think it needs to be taken into	15	MR. ZINN: I will go quick, I promise.
16	consideration when you have that relationship between	16	You know, I think, largely in respect to the
17	issuer and underwriter and investment bank, who is in	17	types of securities that Yvonne is talking about, that's
18	this case filing the application and listing those	18	where you kind of need to focus, which is the securities
19	shares, the checks and balances are already existent,	19	that we have identified for the most part as no
20	they're already there. The investor has been given the	20	information. The SEC has done a really good job,
21	opportunity or is being protected for any fraud because	21	particularly of late, with suspensions. We work kind of
22	of the amount of liability that we've already basically	22	directly with the SEC on, you know, unable to contact,
23	put on ourselves as the underwriter, the broker-dealer.	23	companies that don't seem to exist anymore for whatever
24	I guess to summarize, I'd say that in thinking	24	reason. And that certainly is a great tool for clearing
25	about the rulemaking, some emphasis should be put on the	25	those out.
		1	
	Page 95		Page 97
1	2	1	_
1	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter	1	You know, there are investors, there are
2	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application.	2	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an
2 3	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application. MS. DAHIYA: Thanks. So we are running a	2 3	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an interest in those securities. I think if it's if it's
2 3 4	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application. MS. DAHIYA: Thanks. So we are running a little short on time but we wanted to get in one last	2 3 4	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an interest in those securities. I think if it's if it's not clear that a company could have that symbol pulled or
2 3	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application. MS. DAHIYA: Thanks. So we are running a little short on time but we wanted to get in one last question, and one that everyone has strong views on, on	2 3	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an interest in those securities. I think if it's if it's not clear that a company could have that symbol pulled or that piggyback eligibility could be sunset, you're going
2 3 4 5	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application. MS. DAHIYA: Thanks. So we are running a little short on time but we wanted to get in one last question, and one that everyone has strong views on, on the piggyback exception.	2 3 4 5	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an interest in those securities. I think if it's if it's not clear that a company could have that symbol pulled or that piggyback eligibility could be sunset, you're going to have a lot of unnatural impact on the trading of that
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2 3 4 5 6	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application. MS. DAHIYA: Thanks. So we are running a little short on time but we wanted to get in one last question, and one that everyone has strong views on, on the piggyback exception. So with the piggyback exception, it allows broker-dealers to quote even for issuers who don't have	2 3 4 5 6	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an interest in those securities. I think if it's if it's not clear that a company could have that symbol pulled or that piggyback eligibility could be sunset, you're going to have a lot of unnatural impact on the trading of that security. Who is going to want to be left holding the hot potato, basically? Before you know some deadline is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	relationship between the broker-dealer and underwriter and who is actually filing the application. MS. DAHIYA: Thanks. So we are running a little short on time but we wanted to get in one last question, and one that everyone has strong views on, on the piggyback exception. So with the piggyback exception, it allows broker-dealers to quote even for issuers who don't have currently available information. And oftentimes, issues	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	You know, there are investors, there are sometimes very sophisticated investors, who still have an interest in those securities. I think if it's if it's not clear that a company could have that symbol pulled or that piggyback eligibility could be sunset, you're going to have a lot of unnatural impact on the trading of that security. Who is going to want to be left holding the hot potato, basically? Before you know some deadline is coming up or some other action is going to be taken.
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	Page 96		Page 100
1	CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: Brett, can I jump in here?	1	MR. REDFEARN: I know that we are going to need
2	MR. REDFEARN: Please.	2	to move on to the next panel. I just want to say we do
3	CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: You know, going back to what	3	have a place to post comments for all of the discussions
4	I said at the beginning, which is the playing field for	4	that we're having here. I think this question in
5	retail investors, and I think your comment both of	5	particular is one that we're keenly interested in, which
6	your comments bring this out, there's a lot of activity	6	is specifically to the extent that there is no financial
7	based on the piggyback exception that, speaking for	7	information for an extended period of time, or any of the
8	myself, I don't think is an appropriate playing field for	8	other factors, no corporate actions or whatever, the
9	retail investors. I think your comments draw that out.	9	question is what do we do? Do you eliminate the
10	And your comments also make it clear that, if we feel	10	piggyback exception? You'd suggested, you know,
11	that way and the market feels that way, the market	11	potentially a professional's market. But I think there's
12	functions better if we make it clear.	12	a view that more clarity would be helpful and perhaps
13	You can come back.	13	some evolution of the regulatory regime here would be
14	MR. ZINN: No, believe me, I'm not trying to	14	beneficial for the marketplace, especially when it
15	cut you off.	15	pertains to retail. Because we have had experiences
16	No, I think, again, with respect to that subset	16	where retail investors do find their way into some of
17	of securities where there is no information, I think that	17	these names.
18	makes, you know, some degree of sense, having that	18	CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: As usual in this space,
19	experts only or otherwise sort of segmenting that off.	19	Brett said it better than I did.
20	But the piggyback exemption generally, what you want	20	MR. REDFEARN: I'm going to differ with you on
21	really is to provide more opportunity for price	21	that one.
22	discovery, to have more brokers that are available. So I	22	So I apologize, but I do think that we do need
23	wouldn't want to cut it off, you know, at the knees,	23	to move on to the next subpanel.
24	right?	24	MS. BAIRD: So thank you, Val and Laura. And
25	CHAIRMAN CLAYTON: No, I understand. But where	25	thank you, Troy, Yvonne and Dan.
	Page 99		5 101
	rage JJ		Page 101
1	_	1	
1 2	it stands today, I think there's room for improvement.	1	Next up, Tim can you help provide us with an
2	it stands today, I think there's room for improvement. MR. ZINN: Yeah, I agree. And I think with	2	Next up, Tim can you help provide us with an overview of what the current requirements are for broker-
2 3	it stands today, I think there's room for improvement. MR. ZINN: Yeah, I agree. And I think with respect to the types of issuers, certainly, we're		Next up, Tim can you help provide us with an overview of what the current requirements are for broker-dealer registration?
2	it stands today, I think there's room for improvement. MR. ZINN: Yeah, I agree. And I think with respect to the types of issuers, certainly, we're aligned.	2 3	Next up, Tim can you help provide us with an overview of what the current requirements are for broker- dealer registration? MR. WHITE: Absolutely. Thank you, Lizzie.
2 3 4	it stands today, I think there's room for improvement. MR. ZINN: Yeah, I agree. And I think with respect to the types of issuers, certainly, we're aligned. MS. HUBER: And I think particularly, and this	2 3 4	Next up, Tim can you help provide us with an overview of what the current requirements are for broker- dealer registration? MR. WHITE: Absolutely. Thank you, Lizzie. So this subpanel is focused on BD registration.
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	Page 102		Page 104
1	and provide important safeguards for investors. They are	1	formation, which was one of the, I believe, the
2	subject to books and records requirements, financial	2	motivations behind this bill. And also a concern for the
3	responsibility obligations, targeted antifraud	3	original founders of the task force.
4	provisions, supervisory obligations, anti-money	4	So I will be glad to elaborate on that later.
5	laundering requirements which will, I think, be discussed	5	MR. WHITE: Thank you. Maybe if we could just
6	later, and examinations by regulators.	6	go down the line. Chris, if you don't mind introducing
7	Many retail investors buy securities through	7	yourself again?
8	registered broker-dealers and are afforded these	8	MR. GEROLD: Sure, Christopher Gerold. I am
9	protections of registration. Although fraud may still	9	the chief of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities. The
10	happen in these instances, the system is set up to try to	10	bureau is in charge of regulating the securities markets
11	minimize and address such circumstances.	11	in New Jersey and protecting investors. One of the
12	But there are also persons that sell securities	12	things I forgot to say before and I should have is the
13	that are not registered broker-dealers but maybe need to	13	views expressed here today are my own and do not reflect
14	be or maybe should be registered.	14	those views of the attorney general or any other state
15	This takes us to our topic of discussion for	15	agency.
16	this subpanel, finders and private placement agents. To	16	Well, I'm sure we'll get into our discussion
17	discuss this topic, I am pleased to have the panelists	17	after.
18	introduce themselves, starting with Faith.	18	MR. REDFEARN: We'll apply that retroactively
19	MS. COLISH: Thank you. It's a privilege to be	19	for the last panel then, Chris.
20	here. And I am looking forward to a good dialogue with	20	MR. GEROLD: Thank you.
21	you all. I am Faith Colish. I am a securities lawyer.	21	MR. WHITE: Ignacio.
22	I am in private practice in New York at Carter Ledyard.	22	MR. SANDOVAL: Thanks, Tim. I'm Ignacio
23	I started my career at the SEC in 1960 in the general	23	Sandoval, a partner in the Washington office of Morgan
24	counsel's office in a much smaller building. And most of	24	Lewis. I work in all things related to securities
25	my practice over the years has been focused on smaller	25	intermediaries and, in particular, registered broker-
		1	
	Page 103		Page 105
1	Page 103	1	Page 105
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1 know, at its core, when I think of a finder, I think of 2 someone who just gets paid for making introductions and 3 that's it. You just make the introductions and you walk 4 away. Now, that's the typical framework under which I 5 evaluate whether someone is a finder or a broker. 6 And so, you know, in speaking whether -- on 7 whether someone is a finder or not, really the epicenter 8 of most of this focuses on the so-called Paul Anka 9 letter. It was issued in 1991 by the SEC Staff and that 10 sort of provides the framework under which you've 11 evaluated the situations where that may arise broker 12 registration issues. 13 So the premise of the Paul Anka letter -- so 14 Paul Anka was a Canadian singer. So, incidentally, he 15 wrote the song -- he wrote the lyrics to "My Way" even 16 though Frank Sinatra sang it. It was something I was 17 actually taught on the Staff my first day here. So he 18 was looking to get paid a success-based fee for 19 furnishing the names of potential investors to personnel 20 of a Canadian hockey team that was looking to raise 21 funds. 22 So under the terms of the letter -- and when I 23 read no-action letters, especially those older ones, you 24 read what the Staff's response is, but you also have to 25 read what the incoming letter represents. Because in

As Tim mentioned earlier, you know, broker status is you typically look at it as having two prongs. You know, one is whether the person is effecting transactions and the other is whether the person is engaged in the business. And engaged in the business, you know, the indicia there is whether somebody is getting paid based on the size, value or occurrence of a transaction. So when I think about what it means to effect a transaction, I usually associate that with affirmative efforts to make the deal go through, right? You have a salesman stake, right?

So when you look at indicia that the Staff has sort of provided over the years, suggesting that these are indicia of effecting transactions, right, you contrast that with the activities Paul Anka couldn't do, right? So the activities typically associated with effecting include soliciting investors, preparing offering materials and sending them to investors, collecting those materials back, sending them to the issuer. Offering advice. Hey, this is a pretty good investment. Or conducting, you know, other types of due diligence.

So when you look at the Paul Anka letter, even though he was getting paid what was arguably a successbased fee based on which of the contacts he provided

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1	some of those older letters, the Staff's response is a
2	little different than what was represented. You know,
3	just adding that as a bit of an additional note.
4	So under the premise of the Paul Anka letter,
5	he was effectively going to hand over his Rolodex to this
б	Canadian hockey team and let them see if anyone they
7	contacted through that Rolodex would be interested in
8	investing. So, you know, the important thing to think
9	about in terms of the Paul Anka letter was what he was
10	not allowed to do. Right? So under the terms of that
11	letter, he wasn't allowed to solicit potential investors,
12	negotiate transactions, participate in any advertisement,
13	endorsement or general solicitation, help prepare any
14	materials or provide those materials to investors, wasn't
15	permitted to do any due diligence or analysis of the
16	issuer, provide financing or any advice, or be involved
17	or have been involved in any other securities
18	transactions.
19	And so, you know, from my perspective and the
20	way I've always reviewed the Paul Anka letter, the reason
21	the Staff back then was comfortable in issuing the letter
22	was because he was arguably not effecting transactions,
23	even though he was getting paid transaction-based
24	compensation. So, yeah, I wanted to sort of unpack that
25	a little bit more.

actually invested, because he was limited in what he can do to just an introduction, you know, I've always analyzed that as being, well, you have one part of the prong, you have the business prong, but you don't have the effecting transactions prong. So it's really through that framework where you -- both when I was on the Staff and in private practice, when I evaluate whether somebody rises to the level of a broker or not.

So, you know, contrast what Paul Anka was permitted to do against, you know, cases where the SEC has gone after folks for unregistered broker status. I think in recent memory, the most significant one had to do with unregistered broker activity involving a private equity fund. So there, I think even though the purported unregistered broker was characterized as a consultant, they were getting paid transaction-based compensation and the efforts that this person engaged in, you know, you can just check the boxes, effecting transactions, right? Sending private placement memorandum, collecting subscription agreements, due diligence, you know, urging people to invest. You know, things of that nature.

So, you know, that's typically how you -- at least I analyze the issue. But given the dichotomy that I've just sort of outlined, I would be remiss if I didn't mention a 2011 case out of the Middle District of

	Page 110		Page 112
1	Florida, where the SEC suffered a loss. It's SEC v.	1	And the issuers, their clients, were small.
2	Kramer case. You know, in that case, when the the	2	They had no track record. They had no assets. They
3	reason I mention that case is the Court, even though the	3	might be working out of a garage, whatever. They could
4	Staff made some pretty compelling arguments that the	4	not get a registered broker-dealer to pay attention to
5	Defendant in that case was actually effecting	5	them. They could not get a registered broker-dealer to
6	transactions and acting as an unregistered broker-dealer,	6	answer their phone calls, and with good reason. Because
7	the Court in that case eventually took the view that the	7	the amount of money that could be raised would not and
8	person was acting was merely facilitating a	8	the fee that would be earned would not justify the
9	transaction.	9	amount of work and the overhead of a registered broker-
10	And so the reason I think Kramer is important	10	dealer.
11	is because, unlike other broker cases out of the district	11	So what were they doing? They were going to
12	courts, the judge in Kramer actually went through the	12	unregistered finders. And actually and so these what
13	process of evaluating each of the indicia that typically	13	I'll call '33 Act lawyers were concerned about was
14	get thrown out by the Staff as indicative of broker	14	there's a provision in the '34 Act that says any
15	status and really just tore them all apart.	15	transaction made in violation of the '34 Act, which would
16	So I normally would have been a little	16	include using an unregistered broker who should be
17	dismissive of Kramer except for the fact that you have a	17	registered, is void. Which means that there are
18	lot more courts citing to it now to find people that were	18	rescission rights against the issuer and presumably also
19	not acting as broker-dealers.	19	against the intermediary. And this was a very scary
20	So that's a long-winded way of saying that this	20	thing to them.
21	area has become grayer over the years. And, you know,	21	That coupled with the then lack of clarity or
22	probably could benefit from some clarity.	22	lack of landscape, if you will, in terms of what the SEC
23	In the private placement context, I think,	23	at least thought or what the courts thought about what
24	there, you're going to see people engaging a little more	24	does or doesn't trigger the need to be registered as a
25	in solicitation efforts and passing documents back and	25	broker led to the formation of the task force. And since
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	Page 111		Page 113
	Page 111		Page 113
1	forth.	1	these were all, as I say, '33 Act lawyers, they thought
2	forth. MR. WHITE: And I think clarity, exactly, is	2	these were all, as I say, '33 Act lawyers, they thought it might be helpful to have someone who knew something
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1	paper Rolodex still on my desk it was not it didn't
2	involve you enough in the interaction or potential for
3	misleading people. So that was thing number one, was we
4	need more clarification.
5	And, B, we need a more customized, bespoke,
6	hospitable process for becoming a registered broker, what
7	we sometimes refer to as BD Lite. Not to throw out the
8	baby with the bathwater, not to completely disregard the
9	need for regulation, but to come up with a regulatory
10	scheme that was more well designed for people who do a
11	limited kind of business. The limited kind of business
12	would be with no custody of any customer assets, with
13	essentially relatively smaller transactions and a few
14	other indicia that we felt were overburdened by the
15	existing regulatory structure.
16	And, by the way, and this is not to denigrate
17	FINRA. I mean, FINRA is a wonderful organization and we
18	couldn't live without it. But most of the burdens of
19	being a registered broker-dealer come from FINRA
20	regulation. Once you are registered as a broker-dealer,
21	obviously, there are antifraud requirements but I would
22	say the single biggest burden that a registered broker-
23	dealer has that comes directly from the SEC and the
24	federal securities laws as opposed to FINRA is the Net
25	Capital Rule.

they don't -- they're the missing link between the issuer and the source of capital. And these are typically smaller issuers who don't -- the owners of them don't necessarily know a bunch of accredited investors or people that they can go to directly. So you have those tensions there.

And by the way, one of the suggestions I've made when I've shocked and horrified people by suggesting to drop the Net Capital Rule for certain categories of finders is to replace it with a concept which is fairly common among the states, and I would commend it to the Commission or to whoever is going to be in charge of this, which is a bonding requirement. And for probably a relatively -- certainly less than \$20,000 a year, you can purchase -- you will be able -- I guarantee you, there will be insurers out there that will see a market and will be willing to write insurance that will provide investor protection that will be less expensive for the general population of finders and which will eliminate a whole lot of regulatory -- I don't want to say red tape, but a lot of regulatory burdens that, frankly, I think are a disincentive to finders to come out of the closet, to come into the sunshine and to be known to regulators. And so I think that is a win-win situation.

There have been a number of things that have

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1	And I know when I've had discussions with
2	people on the SEC Staff about maybe dropping the Net
3	Capital Rule for certain kinds of brokers such as
4	finders, I've the reaction has been shock and horror.
5	I mean, it was like sacrilege to even suggest it. But,
б	frankly, most of these broker-dealers are eligible for
7	the lowest net capital bracket which effectively means
8	and I'm going to oversimplify but essentially net
9	worth of \$5,000. But it means that under FINRA rules you
10	have to have a FINOP, which is a registered financial and
11	operations principal, you have to file FOCUS reports,
12	which are at least quarterly financial reports, and the
13	most burdensome in terms of cost is you have to have an
14	independent audit, which as of now, although maybe that
15	will change, has to be by a PCAOB qualified auditor and
16	that's going to cost you, I don't know, 20 grand, 25
17	grand, which is just too much money.
18	So you end up with finders who either are or
19	potential finders who are actually doing an illegal
20	business, and I see them all the time. I can't tell you
21	how many there are but they're out there. And they say,
22	I haven't been caught and I'm not going to commit any
23	fraud so I'll take my chances. And the issuers will also
24	take their chances. Or what is even perhaps more
25	troublesome is they don't, they don't participate and

happened since the task force report was issued in 2005. I mentioned this M&A broker letter which I am very pleased to have participated in. There are a bunch of both Commission actions and legislative actions to facilitate capital formation for small businesses, but essentially all on what I'm calling the '33 Act side. So you have Regulation A+ and you have a number of other initiatives that are designed to make it easier for small businesses to raise money. But in most cases, you still have the missing link between those issuers and the retail investors.

Now, FINRA has a CAB, a capital appreciation broker rule, which went into effect two or three years ago. But in that -- and these are obviously registered broker-dealers and FINRA members, but they can only solicit investments from not just accredited investors but institutional investors, which typically means 50 million and up. That's not retail in my book.

We also have the issue of what is an accredited investor, which I know is a whole topic much too big for this discussion today. But is an accredited investor the retail investor that we're talking about today? And I think it would be helpful to define those terms to see what category of investors do we consider to be the most vulnerable and which are presumed to be able to fend for

	Page 118		Page 120
1		1	
1 2	themselves? Which is how we got to the definition of accredited.	2	unregistered securities by unregistered agents, unregistered broker-dealers. And perhaps our view is
3	MR. WHITE: And, Faith, can I just add to what	3	jaded somewhat because that's what we see. But I guess
4	you just said there? And I know we're running short on	4	the does this serve retail investors? Does having
- 5	time. But I think you hit the nail on the head in terms	5	this exemption serve retail investors? Does having
6	of bringing people into the light and trying to give	6	serving capital formation? And as a retail investor
7	options to finders or broker-dealers that people can rely	7	forum in our function to protect investors, we have a lot
	on at a lower cost basis.	8	_
8	There have been many options thrown around	9	of concern around that. And primarily, you know, who's selling what? And without that knowledge, we won't learn
9	• •	10	•
10	including, as you stated, legislation, your task force.	11	until there's a problem we won't find out until
11	We've also been it was suggested to us about	12	there's a problem.
12	disclosures in which the finder tells the person they're		MR. WHITE: Thank you. And I think we're
13	finding that, hey, I'm getting paid to provide them a	13	running out of time. But, in essence, from what I'm
14	document, just to show the conflict of interest.	14	hearing from the panel, the takeaway is, there are a lot
15	But, Faith, you also mentioned the states. I	15	of people outside of the regulatory framework that are
16	just want, because we're short on time, want to give	16	unregistered but performing potentially broker-dealer
17	Chris an opportunity just to very quickly state	17	activities, and that's fraught for fraud, affinity fraud
18	MS. COLISH: Okay.	18	or whatever the case may be. And there are many ways to
19	MR. WHITE: whether or not what he's	19	bring them into the light. To Faith's point, maybe full
20	seeing on a state level in terms of unregistered broker-	20	registration is over-costly and overburdensome for these
21	dealers and any concerns for people who might be in your	21	type of people but there must be some sort of middle
22	state.	22	ground.
23	MR. GEROLD: Sure. Thank you, Tim.	23	So thank you very much for highlighting this
24	We do have a concern in this area, New Jersey	24	for us and we appreciate it.
25	specifically and other states as well. The idea, and you	25	Lizzie, back to you.
		<u> </u>	
	Page 119		Page 121
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1 compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act for broker-dealers 2 and investment companies. Followed that by a stint in 3 Enforcement, running the SAR review program there, where 4 we reviewed suspicious activity reports. Then came over 5 to FINRA with Mike, here, and worked on both the б enforcement and the examination programs in the anti-7 money laundering area and also running FINRA's program 8 that reviews suspicious activity reports. And now I'm 9 here at Vanguard on the other side of the table. 10 MS. GONZALEZ: And Jim. 11 MR. FIEBELKORN: You bet. Also very happy to 12 be here. Thank you, Lourdes. My name is Jim Fiebelkorn. 13 I am the anti-money laundering officer and identity 14 theft prevention officer for Ameriprise Financial, where 15 I also lead the anti-fraud and surveillance functions. 16 Ameriprise Financial is a large, publicly traded company 17 that includes wealth management, insurance, trust bank 18 and asset management services. 19 MS. GONZALEZ: And Mike. 20 MR. RUFINO: Sure, and thank you, Lourdes, and 21 thank you for the invitation, as well, on such an 22 important topic. Michael Rufino and I oversee our sales 23 practice program at FINRA. And a major part of what we 24 do in our program is conducting examinations of our 25 member firm broker-dealers, including those branch

that is, a broker-dealer must report a transaction to FinCEN, which is the Financial Requirements Enforcement Network, which is part of the U.S. Treasury, if it's conducted or attempted by, at or through a broker-dealer. It involves or aggregates funds or other assets of at least \$5,000, and the broker-dealer knows, suspects or has reason to suspect that the transaction or pattern of those transactions involve funds derived from illegal activity or are conducted to disguise the funds or assets derived from that illegal activity, designed to evade the Bank Secrecy Act and the requirements thereunder, clearly serve no apparent business reason. Fourth is not the sort of activity that the customer would normally deal in, and there is really no reasonable explanation as to why they're conducting such activity. And lastly, if it involves using the broker-dealer to facilitate the criminal activity. And that's a synopsis of both the reporting and the AML program requirements.

MS. GONZALEZ: Great. And now I'm going to ask Sarah and Jim to begin and tell me, so what are some of the typologies that you're seeing at your firms.

MS. GREEN: Sure. Well, a lot of the typologies certainly are things that we've already talked about today. I think we filed the most SARs on, I would say, account intrusion and account takeover. And that

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1	offices and the registered individuals that work at those	1
2	locations.	2
3	MS. GONZALEZ: Great. So, Mike, set the stage	3
4	for us. Will you give us a brief overview of the anti-	4
5	money laundering, or AML for short, and SAR filing	5
6	requirements for brokers?	6
7	MR. RUFINO: Sure. With regard to broker-	7
8	dealers, as Lourdes said, broker-dealers are required to	8
9	have an anti-money laundering program. Under Section 352	9
10	of the Patriot Act, it requires broker-dealers to have	10
11	such a program. The program needs to be in writing and	11
12	have like five major components. First and foremost is	12
13	policies, procedures and internal controls reasonably	13
14	designed to achieve compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act	14
15	and the implementing rules. Second, having policies and	15
16	procedures that can be reasonably expected to detect and	16
17	cause the reporting of transactions and the implementing	17
18	of regulations thereunder. Third, the designation of an	18
19	AML compliance officer. Fourth is having ongoing AML	19
20	training. And last is an independent test of the firm's	20
21	AML program.	21
22	As part of that, as you can see in the	22
23	reporting requirement, Section 356 of the U.S.A. Patriot	23
24	Act requires a reporting requirement for broker-dealers.	24
25	With regard to that, just to give you a synopsis of what	25
		1

includes both new account fraud, so people stealing credentials or stealing people's identity and then opening up new accounts, and also breaking into existing accounts, sometimes using credentials, sometimes using stolen answers to security questions and then developing new credentials and getting into those accounts.

I will also add that one fraud that we spent so much time on at FINRA and also the SEC is what I would call this convertible note that is used with microcap firms. So essentially what happens is an investor will loan money to the issuer and the issuer will issue a convertible note which essentially says, if we can't pay you back, we will issue you shares in the -- in the company. A lot of times, the note is not paid back. Many times, because the company is not making any money. So shares are issued. Then the shares are oftentimes unloaded onto the market, into the hands of unsuspecting investors. And that's -- that's a fraud that we see a lot and is -- is terrible to see.

I do want to add that you included the suspicious activity reports portion of this panel. This is a big way in which law enforcement and regulators know about all these retail frauds. The woman from the AARP mentioned it briefly. People are embarrassed to report these to law enforcement a lot of times. They're

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1	embarrassed to tell relatives. A lot of times, the only	1	but to the extent that we're talking about sorry
2	way we as regulators and law enforcement know about these	2	about these kinds of funds in the OTC market, I think
3	crimes is through these suspicious activity reports.	3	certainly with that kind of stock loan fraud you're
4	MR. FIEBELKORN: That's right. And I'll add,	4	talking about, a lot of times that is involved with a
5	echoing Sarah's comments, there is a current typology	5	pump and dump scheme as well, where the lender is trying
6	that's especially pernicious so I thought I would take a	6	to increase, you know, the number of shares. All they
7	minute to mention it. It's the latest evolution and it	7	want is a liquid market, basically. And one of the
8	shows how the bad actors or cybercriminals continue to	8	things we have sort of talked to the SEC about, that I
9	evolve their typologies.	9	don't know if it would be helpful in the way you think
10	We as an industry have spent a lot of time	10	about it, is looking at promoters and increasing the
11	battling email account compromises, to use FinCEN's term,	11	disclosure required of promoters and making sure that
12	where bad actors or cybercriminals would gain control of	12	when that activity is being engaged in, when the pump
13	retail investors' email accounts. And the fraud that we	13	part of the pump and dump is happening, that might help
14	saw in the past was the bad actors would use that email	14	you backfill and sort of see who's you know, who's
15	account to send an email to their adviser or registered	15	responsible, who is working with those bad actors.
16	representative to try and disburse funds from their	16	It's sort of tangential but your comment made
17	accounts.	17	me think about that potential unfortunate solution.
18	As firms have increased awareness around that	18	MS. GONZALEZ: So I checked down with the folks
19	typology and implemented controls around that typology,	19	in Enforcement. There's a SAR review group, it's called
20	we've seen the next iteration of that fraud, which I call	20	the Office of Market Intelligence within the Division of
21	real estate email account compromise. And the red flags	21	Enforcement and I asked them what we are seeing here at
22	here are those same bad actors are gaining control of	22	the SEC, and this is what they told me from the SEC's
23	real estate agents' email accounts or title insurance	23	perspective in SARs that are being filed. Ponzi schemes
24	companies or attorneys involved in real estate	24	or Ponzi-like schemes involving misappropriation of
25	transactions, and shortly before a retail investor is	25	funds, offering frauds involving retail investors who are
	Page 127		Page 129
1	Page 127 closing on a house or a property, that bad actor will	1	Page 129 unsophisticated, unaccredited or solicited to participate
1 2	5	1 2	2
	closing on a house or a property, that bad actor will send an email saying that the account for closing for those funds has changed. Instead of sending those funds		unsophisticated, unaccredited or solicited to participate in the offering in connection with they're members of an affinity group, such as seniors or specific ethnic or
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 closing on a house or a property, that bad actor will send an email saying that the account for closing for those funds has changed. Instead of sending those funds to bank A as you previously had been instructed, send them to bank B. That retail investor gives authorized instructions to their financial firm to send those closing funds to bank B, not realizing that bank B account is actually controlled by the bad actor. And this is a fraud that we've seen, that we know many other firms have seen, and therefore we're spending a lot of time trying to educate our employees, advisers and clients about it. MS. GONZALEZ: And then, Mike, do you have anything to add? MR. RUFINO: Just for the most part, as Sarah said, a lot of what we do see is on the microcap securities side. What we do at FINRA is, on an ad hoc basis, depending on our examinations, if we do see underlying problematic behavior, we will go to the SAR database, we will see whether the SAR has been filed by the firm or other firms. So it's important as something 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	unsophisticated, unaccredited or solicited to participate in the offering in connection with they're members of an affinity group, such as seniors or specific ethnic or religious communities. Also seeing pyramid schemes, which are really multilevel marketing opportunities. Initial coin offerings involving fraudulent conduct in the solicitation of investor funds. Also seeing more SAR filings from brokers with investment adviser platforms. The suspicious activities in these SARs include cherry picking, elder exploitation, investment fraud, excessive fees, other activities such as breach of fiduciary duty, failure to disclose material facts to clients about private investments. So quite the range in the SARs that the SEC is seeing. Let me switch to the next topic which is detecting retail fraud at your firms. So the SAR requirement is very broad and requires reporting of a wide range of suspicious activities. So, Jim and Sarah, in your AML program, how do you detect potentially suspicious activity involving fraud directed at individual investors? Now, you have two very different firms here.

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1	MR. FIEBELKORN: That's right, absolutely. I
2	often describe AML and antifraud as two halves to the
3	same coin. From an AML perspective, we are trying to
4	prevent our firm's platforms and the U.S. financial
5	system from being exploited by bad actors. From an
6	antifraud perspective, we're trying to protect clients
7	from being defrauded. Nonetheless, the way that we
8	identify and surveil for AML and antifraud are very
9	similar. Therefore, we've combined much of our antifraud
10	and AML operations to make sure that we're leveraging
11	technology, the case management systems are very similar,
12	the investigations that our teams conduct are very
13	similar. So there's a lot of overlap between AML and
14	antifraud. But there are a couple of key differences.
15	Typically, in AML, we're looking for patterns
16	over time for large amounts of money moving through an
17	account. From an antifraud perspective, we're much more
18	interested in analyzing transactions on a one-by-one
19	basis in almost real time, because the goal is to try and
20	prevent unauthorized money from leaving the firm in the
21	first place. So a lot of overlap but a few differences.
22	MS. GREEN: Right. I would add, so in your
23	typical what you might think of money laundering schemes,
24	we rely on a lot of automated surveillances to look at
25	things like sudden change in activity. For instance,

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question which is a particular challenge, I think, in a lot of firms. Often, when we see that something goes wrong at a firm, it wasn't that the suspicious activity was missed entirely, it was that the information formed the basis of a SAR didn't get to the right group. And how do you address this problem at your firms?

MR. FIEBELKORN: That's right, Lourdes. Several different ways, echoing what Sarah just said in terms of training and education. We provide AML and antifraud training to all of our employees, broadly. And then, as new fraud risks or trends emerge, we will do targeted trainings with the groups in the firm that would be most likely to experience them, typically in an operational area like new account openings or wire processing.

Ameriprise is fortunate to have a business model where our advisers typically meet with clients face to face. It's a financial planning relationship. They have a deep knowledge of our clients' financial needs. And therefore, they are very well positioned to be able to identify financial transactions that are out of pattern for the client and refer those. So we spend a lot of time making sure that all of our employees and advisers know how to refer, to make sure that information is getting into the hands of AML and antifraud.

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1	maybe a senior investor who is buying a microcap stock
2	for the first time. We would certainly look at things
3	like international wires, when they haven't been sent
4	before. Unrelated customers all sending money to the
5	same place, that can be an indication of, for instance, a
6	Ponzi scheme or an unregistered investment professional.
7	That's for more, I would say, common money laundering
8	scenarios.
9	On the fraud side, when we think of the account
10	intrusion and so forth, our most important detection
11	scenario is people. It's the people on the phones, it's
12	the people looking at, say, when people come into their
13	account online. They're picking up the phone, they are
14	submitting internal referrals to us and telling us that
15	something doesn't seem right.
16	And for this reason, it is critically important
17	within a financial institution such as both of ours that
18	we train everybody on the indicia of retail fraud and we
19	have policies and procedures and quality assurance to
20	make sure that when we are receiving indicia of fraud in
21	all areas of the firm, that those people know to give us
22	a call and let us know about it and that they are
23	escalating the types of things that we need to hear
24	about.
25	MS. GONZALEZ: Great. This leads me to my next

A couple of other methods that I'll mention. Number one is systematizing high-risk transactions like Sarah mentioned. Human referrals, referrals where people are always valuable but for those transactions that we know are high risk, trying to implement technology so that they're reviewed beforehand, so you don't rely on a person having to push a button.

I think it's very important for our industry, financial firms, to be talking with each other and talk about new risks that they see emerging, because that helps protect our firms and helps protect our clients. And we're also seeing a trend in the industry where vendors, third party vendors, are providing fraud-related services, where they aggregate information that might be indicative of fraud, such as devices that have been used for fraud, bad IP addresses, bad phone numbers, collecting that from financial firms, anonymizing it and then sharing that information back down so it can become a source of intelligence that a single financial firm, in and of themselves, wouldn't have.

MS. GONZALEZ: Great. So, Mike, I want to turn to you and talk a little bit about how SARs are used from the FINRA perspective and how valuable they are. And before I do that, I want to preface it and explain how SARs are used from the SEC perspective and the sort of

	Page 134		Page 136
1	review that we do.	1	told about it.
2	So the SEC aspires to review all SARs by	2	In this one example, we had money movements
3	broker-dealers as well as other financial institutions	3	that were somewhat questionable. We went to the SAR
4	that report on potential securities violations. There's	4	database and realized that a bank had also filed a SAR
5	also a SAR filing hotline for more serious tips and we	5	with regard to this individual. And when you read the
6	urge people to use it. It's 202-551-SARS. Talking to	6	narrative of the bank, it really gave us a lot more
7	our Enforcement colleagues, they told me that in the past	7	information that really helped us uncover a Ponzi-like
8	year, past fiscal year, the SEC reviewed approximately	8	scheme on an investment fraud.
9	30,000 SARs which were a combination of securities, bank	9	So when we look at the importance of it,
10	and money service businesses. And they do one of three	10	sometimes you may be filing it, looking at it as activity
11	things. They may do a triage process where they look at	11	in your respective financial institution. But from a law
12	SARs individually, they may do an analytical process	12	enforcement, regulators, sometimes other activities
13	where they aggregate large groups of SARs looking for	13	we're looking at it through the lends of one broker-
14	trends, and the third way is they do a daily proactive	14	dealer. But if we see that it's going on elsewhere a
15	search where they look for certain securities-related	15	lot of conversations today are microcap. Well, microcap
16	categories of SARs.	16	happens, there's a buy and a sell somewhere, activities,
17	So, Mike, I am going to turn it over to you	17	money movements going through. Because the name of the
18	because you're our partners in this effort. How does	18	game is to move the money sometimes through the financial
19	FINRA use SARs and review SARs?	19	system. And if you can muddy the waters a little bit,
20	MR. RUFINO: Sure. And first, as you said, we	20	then you want to move the money, you know, to, you know,
21	are partners in that. And of all the reviews I've been	21	the end the end state. So when we see these SARs
22	involved in over the years, the partnership that we have	22	being filed, it's invaluable to the regulators,
23	with the SEC in terms of making sure we're lockstep on	23	invaluable to law enforcement.
24	conducting reviews, making sure that we're consistent,	24	And I know sometimes firms will kind of raise
25	has really been kind of, in my mind, you know, the kind	25	their hand and say, is it really being utilized by the
	Page 135		Page 137
1	of like the model for what we can do from a coordination	1	regulators? I will assure you that it's being used day
2	perspective.	2	in and day out.
3	With that being said, we know that the industry	3	MS. GONZALEZ: Thank you, Mike. So I often
4	spends a lot of time, effort and money on their anti-	4	think of SARs as only as useful as the information that
5	money laundering program. But when you look at the end	5	is on the SAR. Is there information from your
6	goal of protecting retail investors, it's really money	6	perspective that is often omitted that you wish were
7	well spent. And I'll share with you some examples as	7	there?
8	well.	8	MR. RUFINO: What sometimes happens, Lourdes,
9	When you look at what we do, we conduct, as I	9	is
10	said before, many examinations in a given year. And what	10	first and foremost, as you said, the narrative is
11	we will do is we have a program rule, our Rule 3310,	11	paramount to the SAR. Those checkboxes are very
12	FINRA Rule 3310, is an AML program rule. As part of that	12	important. They're also critical for doing analytics
13	review, we will look at underlying activity. We will try	13	because you can analyze off a checkbox. It's harder to
14	to identify what might be some high you know, high	14	do off narratives without kind of machine learning or
15	kind of not suspicious but questionable activity that we	15	artificial intelligence. But the narrative is critical,
16	want to ask questions of the firm. We'll test a firm's	16	critically important, when you look at overall a SAR.
17	systems. And what we'll sometimes do is we'll identify	17	Sometimes what happens is we'll see they'll
18	what we we'll look at money movements.	18	list the transactions in the narrative but they won't say
19	In this one example, we saw some money	19	why the activity is suspicious or why they have concerns.
20	movements that were somewhat questionable. When you see	20	So it's great to have all of that activity but without
21	a multitude, you know, wiring money, say, to the same	21	the underlying rationale because the institution is
22	account, the question is why. Many brokers will have	22	going to know best why they think it's suspicious and why
			they're tiling the NAR. No the more that you can take
23	outside business activities. So when you look at their	23	they're filing the SAR. So the more that you can take
23 24 25	outside business activities. So when you look at their U4 and the question is and sometimes it's outside activity that the firm is unaware of and they're never	23 24 25	the time and effort to identify the activity, the individuals involved and inviting a clear, concise and

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1 really comprehensive narrative goes a long way. 2 MS. GONZALEZ: That's great. So from the SEC's 3 perspective, we urge you to consider the SAR drafting 4 tips that FinCEN has issued before. And the narrative, 5 make sure to include who, what, when, where and why. 6 That's very helpful. Because the best leads tell a good 7 story. And finally, if it's possible to state up front in the summary what the problem is. And please avoid 8 9 using all caps. That's very helpful to reviewers. 10 And the last part, we only have a few minutes, 11 and I'm going to turn it to Jim and Sarah, to --12 considering everything that you have filed, what sort of 13 -- if you have any further observations on sort of trends 14 that you're seeing and, finally, what sort of guidance 15 would you suggest if any that regulators can give to the 16 industry? Knowing full well that we are providing 17 guidance not just for the biggest firms, but for a lot of 18 firms that have a very small employee base. 19 MS. GREEN: Sure. Well, I think the one thing 20 we've really seen in the AML and the SAR area is that 21 what we are filing on is very different from what firms 22 were filing on in 2003 when this rule was passed, right? 23 We are expecting -- there are checkboxes on the form for 24 account intrusion, for elder exploitation. A lot of 25 things, and identity theft.

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1	As that scope broadens of what we are expecting
2	financial institutions to file on, which I think is very
3	important, and financial institutions play a key
4	gatekeeper role in this area, I think that we should be
5	mindful of laying out expectations for the areas on which
б	we are expecting firms to file in the form of, say, an OC
7	risk alert or other guidance, as opposed to say an
8	enforcement action.
9	MR. FIEBELKORN: That's right. Echoing Sarah's
10	comments, I think in the industry as a whole, many firms
11	have started to reach a tipping point where they file
12	more fraud-related SARs than AML-related SARs. And
13	that's because of the increasing fraud attempts across
14	the industry, as we've heard the previous speakers talk
15	about.
16	Certainly, in our firm, we're very attuned to
17	vulnerable client issues, as retail investors start to
18	age and typically a lot of their assets are held within
19	broker-dealers in the form of IRAs or 401(k) accounts.
20	So making sure that we have good relationships with state
21	regulators and adult protective services can be very
22	useful towards that end.
23	And in terms of asking for what kind of
24	guidance would be beneficial, Lourdes, OC alerts are very
25	helpful. But also just encouraging information sharing

between financial firms. Because if there is a fraud targeting a retail investor, as Mike said, typically that money will move between financial institutions. And to the extent that financial institutions are able to communicate with each other pretty quickly, when we're able to do that, we have a much better chance of protecting clients and keeping client assets safe.

MS. GONZALEZ: Thank you, Jim. And I'm going to end by asking Mike to -- if you could give us just a little recap of the guidance that's out there? Because FINRA has actually issued a lot of very good guidance to firms over the years.

MR. RUFINO: There's a lot of guidance out there for the membership to really -- and the brokerdealer community to utilize. First and foremost is, you look at the websites of FINRA and the SEC, dedicated sections with regard to anti-money laundering. We recently updated our small firm template for the smaller firms that really gives an outline for a firm to follow in terms of putting together an AML program.

You also look at, as we said, the risk alerts put out by the SEC. We've issued many reg notices with regard to AML. We issued one even when the rules were first promulgated that really laid out a lot of red flags for the firms to consider. When you look at firms'

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dens of what we are expecting	1	overall programs, a lot of them are incorporated within
le on, which I think is very	2	there.
institutions play a key	3	The typologies. When you look at the typology
ea, I think that we should be	4	put out by FinCEN, put out by FATF, those are great
pectations for the areas on which	5	opportunities for firms to learn from and say, if it's
o file in the form of, say, an OC	6	happening somewhere else, these are the type of
ce, as opposed to say an	7	typologies. Is it happening within my respective
	8	organization?
N: That's right. Echoing Sarah's	9	So when you took this all together, and just
industry as a whole, many firms	10	the fact that you can pick up the phone and communicate
pping point where they file	11	with the regulators as we've always said, we're here
than AML-related SARs. And	12	to assist the broker-dealer community as best as we can.
easing fraud attempts across	13	And working with the broker-dealers, with the
ard the previous speakers talk	14	associations, that's part of our responsibility as
	15	regulators to make sure that, you know, we're working
rm, we're very attuned to	16	with you to assist you.
as retail investors start to	17	MS. GONZALEZ: Thank you, Mike. For our part
their assets are held within	18	we work with the broker-dealer community. I've worked
n of IRAs or 401(k) accounts.	19	for a long time with Jim and Sarah. I've also worked for
ave good relationships with state	20	a long time with Mike on these issues. And we continue
ective services can be verv	21	- we look forward to continuing that. We also represent

the SEC internationally, so there are a lot of players here. But we learn from you, so we're very grateful for that.

And with that, I'm going to turn it over to

	Page 142		Page 144
1	Lizzie.	1	counsel at FINRA and also former alum of the Commission
2	MS. BAIRD: Thank you, Lourdes. And thank you,	2	Staff, so we're happy to see her again.
3	Sarah, Mike and Jim. And I want to thank all the	3	And then finally, we'll be closing out on the
4	panelists for helping us to paint the picture of how	4	investor education piece with Owen Donley, who is just
5	protections are provided to retail investors through the	5	sitting to the right of Racquel, who is the chief counsel
6	requirement for disclosures and reviews before a security	6	in the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy and will
7	can be quoted, for registration requirements, for	7	be moderating that final panel.
8	entities engaged in the securities business, and even how	8	So let's jump in right away. So the first
9	registered entities help us to surveil for investors who	9	subpanel discussion will focus on transfer agents. And
10	may be engaged in illegal activity.	10	we know there's a whole range of issues to discuss with
11	This discussion will continue at 2:00 with our	11	respect to policy matters and transfer agents, given the
12	final panel. We are going to take a quick break now	12	focus of today's roundtable on measures to prevent retail
13	until then. Thank you.	13	fraud. We're going to try to keep the discussion very
14	(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., a luncheon recess was	14	much on the point of that theme. But in particular
15	taken.)	15	today, I think we're looking forward to discussion about
16	AFTERNOON SESSION	16	the role transfer agents play in removing restrictive
17	MR. SABELLA: Okay, I think we're going to kick	17	legends.
18	off, if folks can find their seats, please.	18	For those of you who follow this space, you
19	Great, so I would like to welcome everyone back	19	would be aware that transfer agents will provide services
20	who has been with us since this morning. And for those	20	to issuers of restricted and control securities and
21	of you who weren't, welcome.	21	they're generally responsible for processing requests
22	My name, for those of you who aren't familiar	22	from selling shareholders to remove these restrictive
23	with me, I'm Christian Sabella. I am the other deputy	23	legends in connection with the intended resale of the
24	director for Trading and Markets. I know that Brett	24	securities by the owners. Now, if the transfer agent
25	Redfearn and Lizzie Baird were here this morning. And so	25	improperly or inappropriately removes a legend, the
	5 142		
	Page 143	1	Page 145
1	Page 143	1	Page 145
1	I am the third piece of that puzzle.	1	result could be the facilitation of an illegal public
2	I am the third piece of that puzzle. We're looking very much forward to today's	2	result could be the facilitation of an illegal public distribution of securities and that could harm investors,
2 3	I am the third piece of that puzzle. We're looking very much forward to today's third and final panel, scheduled for about an hour and 30	2 3	result could be the facilitation of an illegal public distribution of securities and that could harm investors, including retail investors. And this is a topic that was
2 3 4	I am the third piece of that puzzle. We're looking very much forward to today's third and final panel, scheduled for about an hour and 30 minutes, focusing on transfer agents, trading halts and	2 3 4	result could be the facilitation of an illegal public distribution of securities and that could harm investors, including retail investors. And this is a topic that was discussed in not a small amount of detail in the 2015
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1 enforcement actions in this area, often involving small 2 microcap companies. In some of these transactions, a key 3 step in the illegal distribution is the removal of 4 restrictive legends to make what would otherwise be 5 restricted or control securities freely tradable. In б these instances, transfer agents may be positioned to 7 serve as a gatekeeper in preventing the fraud, due to 8 their role in processing those requests for the removal 9 of the restrictive legend. 10 While we recognize that this is a complicated 11 area that, on its own, could probably merit its own full-12 day roundtable, for our purposes today we would like to 13 focus on two areas in particular. First, we'd like to 14 hear from our panelists about their day-to-day practices 15 and experiences regarding legend removal. And second, in 16 light of those day-to-day practices and experiences, we'd 17 like to hear their views on some of the potential 18 policymaking solutions that were discussed in the concept 19 release that Christian alluded to. It's our hope that 20 through this discussion today we could gain further 21 insight into the many different perspectives on and 22 potential solutions to these complex issues. 23 So before we begin, I'd like to turn it over to 24 our panelists so they can introduce themselves. David, 25 if you don't mind, let's start with you.

on restricted securities.

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What's the standard practice in sort of the day-to-day, run-of-the-mill legend removal requests? What do you do to process the transaction? What does it look like from your perspective? And if you have specific examples or anything like that, it might help set the table for what the normal process might look like and that will help us get into some of the trickier, thornier issues that we see in this space.

MR. BECKER: Sure. So I've been at three different transfer agents, actually four if you count one that was in a merger. A couple of things we do -- and remember that transfer agents by law, according to the Securities and Exchange Act, are -- take their actions on behalf of the issuer, not on behalf of the shareholder. So that's the first thing we have to keep in mind.

But when we get in restrictive legends that have to be removed, we get in the letters, what do we actually do with those? So the first thing we do is we review the letter to make sure it's consistent. Does it actually say what it's supposed to say? Does it have the required time parameters of ownership? Does it say everything -- does it look professional? Let's start with that.

What we also do is we check -- and we started

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1	MR. BECKER: Sure, I'm David Becker. I'm the
2	general counsel and chief risk and compliance officer for
3	Equiniti Trust Company, doing business as EQ by Equiniti.
4	We are the business that used to be known as Wells Fargo
5	Shareowner Services. We changed ownership back in
6	February.
7	MR. FRANZ: Robert Franz from Broadridge. I'm
8	the senior director of compliance for the transfer agent.
9	MR. HARMON: Mark Harmon. I'm a partner at
10	Hodgson Russ's New York City office for the last 25
11	years. And a substantial portion of my practice has been
12	representing transfer agents that don't have in-house
13	counsel and assisting them in review of issuances, legend
14	removals and compliance with state and federal law.
15	MS. MANNING: I'm Andrea Manning. I'm
16	corporate counsel at Computershare. I've been at
17	Computershare for over 20 years now in the TA industry.
18	I'm also the cochair of the Securities Transfer
19	Association Legal Committee.
20	MR. ROTHMAN: Thank you all and welcome.
21	So to start the discussion, we thought it might
22	make sense for each of our transfer agent panelists and,
23	Mark, maybe your experience with your clients, start with
24	maybe a discussion of what your firm or your clients do
25	when they receive requests to remove restrictive legends

this ourselves several years ago at a prior transfer
agent and I've carried it forward to where we are today.
We check a list of attorneys who have been sanctioned by
the Commission, particularly for bad 144 letters. And
there's a number of those that we've uncovered. But, in
addition to that, and something that we uncovered -- that
we discovered just a little while ago, is that one of the
market participants, OTC Markets, actually maintains a
page that has bad attorneys and bad accountants and
others, and we do look at that as well to make sure we
didn't miss anybody. So we do look for all of that as we

Once we do that, we then move forward with the processing of that, depending on how we feel about that letter. And if we have questions, we do look further into the letter itself. We might look at the law firm or the lawyer involved to make sure we're comfortable with them.

I've never been a big fan of the lawyers who advertise themselves as 144 lawyers. There's a couple websites out there like that. I've never been a big fan of those because I think they're just shops that are just doing this quickly and possibly inappropriately, although not always inappropriately. But we do like to check those as well.

	Page 150		Page 152
1	MR. FRANZ: At Broadridge, we also have a	1	have a very detailed guide for various scenarios for our
2	practice where we check the Department of Justice list of	2	staff that we train them on, so that they can, you know,
3	disbarred attorneys. We check the OTC Markets list that	3	maneuver their way through the various scenarios.
4	David mentioned. We do a quality control review of the	4	As indicated, Rule 144 are the kind of easy,
5	opinion. Is it addressed appropriately to the transfer	5	vanilla transactions. But we have a lot of things that
6	agent, as opposed to the issuer. We can make exceptions	6	kind of go outside of that. Reg S, for example, has
7	there, if need be. Does it address all the points that	7	become more common. 144(a). So there's a variety of
8	are required to qualify for the exemption, things like	8	other exemptions and abilities to remove restrictive
9	the holding period, the volume limitations, the reporting	9	legends, so we have a very detailed guide that goes
10	status of the issuer. The presentation will also include	10	through various scenarios in terms of what to look for
11	a broker's rep letter for affiliates, a seller's rep	11	for those transactions.
12	letter, and we'll quality control all those documents and	12	MR. ROTHMAN: That's really helpful. I think
13	make sure that everything relates to the same transaction	13	one of the things that, at the Staff level, we're
14	because those things can get mixed up.	14	interested in and we've talked about internally is, it
15	You know, I don't want to add anything, Mark.	15	seems like a lot of the recommendations deal with the
16	MR. HARMON: So speaking for the smaller agents	16	Rule 144, kind of the standard exception. So a lot of
17	and clients, it would be a lot the world would be a	17	the potential solutions maybe might gear towards that
18	lot easier if all they got were 144 opinions, because	18	more routine, easier transaction, if you will. So I
19	those are really straightforward and they receive the	19	heard everyone kind of allude to this easy easy
20	opinion, they make sure that the opinion matches to the	20	situation. But Mark and Andrea, in particular, you guys
21	information they have, they do as much as they can to	21	mentioned sort of these outliers or these additional
22	obtain documentary evidence on shareholder	22	situations.
23	representations, broker representations. But the real	23	I think one area that would be helpful and we
24	issues, I think, for them, the challenges for them come	24	think might be worth discussing is what do you do in
25	because of the Rule 144I exclusion for former shell	25	those? How does the process look different? What
	Page 151		Page 153
1	Page 151 companies. So it's very difficult to make that	1	Page 153 changes? What additional steps might you take or
1 2	companies. So it's very difficult to make that determination when you're getting conflicting	1 2	changes? What additional steps might you take or different steps might you take if you're not dealing with
	companies. So it's very difficult to make that determination when you're getting conflicting information. They do what they can to determine that.		changes? What additional steps might you take or different steps might you take if you're not dealing with a vanilla 144 request or something like that?
2 3 4	companies. So it's very difficult to make that determination when you're getting conflicting information. They do what they can to determine that. They then have to deal with 4(a)(1) opinions for shares	2 3 4	changes? What additional steps might you take or different steps might you take if you're not dealing with a vanilla 144 request or something like that? So, Mark, if you see anything in your area that
2 3 4 5	companies. So it's very difficult to make that determination when you're getting conflicting information. They do what they can to determine that. They then have to deal with 4(a)(1) opinions for shares having come to rest if they can't qualify for the 144	2 3 4 5	changes? What additional steps might you take or different steps might you take if you're not dealing with a vanilla 144 request or something like that? So, Mark, if you see anything in your area that you can speak to that? And I would invite any of the
2 3 4 5 6	companies. So it's very difficult to make that determination when you're getting conflicting information. They do what they can to determine that. They then have to deal with $4(a)(1)$ opinions for shares having come to rest if they can't qualify for the 144 safe harbor.	2 3 4 5 6	changes? What additional steps might you take or different steps might you take if you're not dealing with a vanilla 144 request or something like that? So, Mark, if you see anything in your area that you can speak to that? And I would invite any of the other panelists as well to jump in. I'm sure you all see
2 3 4 5 6 7	companies. So it's very difficult to make that determination when you're getting conflicting information. They do what they can to determine that. They then have to deal with 4(a)(1) opinions for shares having come to rest if they can't qualify for the 144 safe harbor. But beyond legend removal and something that	2 3 4 5 6 7	changes? What additional steps might you take or different steps might you take if you're not dealing with a vanilla 144 request or something like that? So, Mark, if you see anything in your area that you can speak to that? And I would invite any of the other panelists as well to jump in. I'm sure you all see those as well.
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1 So it creates, again, a particular problem for agents 2 trying to do their job who would reject that request and 3 then expose themselves to the potential liability of the 4 loss of a customer because they're trying to get 5 information that they don't necessarily have a right to 6 get but that they think that they need in order to create 7 a good file. 8 In most instances, I think that they create or 9 try to create that file but they could use some 10 assistance in protecting them, A, in getting the 11 information they need, making sure that they have a right 12 to get the opinion of counsel, that the opinion matches, 13 and also removes them from the difficult position of 14 having to be exposed to liability if they're trying to do 15 their job and question the propriety of the opinion or 16 the issuance request. 17 MR. BECKER: Well, I think it goes beyond just 18 the potential risk of loss of a customer. There's also a 19 conflict between what we have to do in the eyes of the 20 SEC in terms of monitoring the transaction that's coming 21 in and what state law mandates. There's a conflict in that area because state law mandates that unless we see 22 23 something overtly wrong, we're supposed to act on it and 24 process that transaction. And that's not what the 25 Commission and the industry expect from us. And that

But I think that's the biggest difference. But the importance, of course, is on having the staff -- I think Andrea mentioned having a guide for the staff to follow that, you know, when something is called into question, most of it is addressed in the policy and issues can be escalated to counsel or internal compliance for review.

MR. BECKER: Yeah, I mean, along those lines, remember that our employees are not generally -- they're rarely registered individuals. They don't have extensive training in the federal securities laws and rules. They perform administrative tasks. So we have to give them outlines of what to look for.

But, of course, when an anomaly arises, it's going to raise questions. And that causes delays which can lead to further issues as we go down the road.

MR. SABELLA: I just wanted to drill into one topic that I think David unearthed initially, which is the ability to get the information in the first place. So focusing on -- forget about like if you get all the information and you see some anomalies or something, but even the right to get information in the first place. How important is that, do you think, for each of the panelists, to your ability to do the work you need to do in this area? In other words, recognizing UCC Article 8

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	Page 155		
1	leads to a major issue.	1	does put pressure rig
2	I know that came up in some of the comment	2	perspective to move
3	letters that were sent in in response to the concept	3	would it be if basica
4	release.	4	the information you
5	MR. SALTZBURG: I'd like to ask one follow-up	5	you could move alor
6	question. Robert, you mentioned some of the issues that	6	get the information
7	are attendant to control securities that are held by an	7	complex facts and c
8	affiliate, like volume limitations and the reporting	8	MR. FRANZ:
9	status of the issuer and the holding period. I just	9	it addresses kind of
10	wanted to focus a little bit more on where there's an	10	agent and its client i
11	affiliate and a controlled securities situation. Does	11	you know, the share
12	that that's a more complex situation than when you	12	for the information.
13	have a nonaffiliate and the holding period is met.	13	pushback because th
14	Are there additional steps in your standard	14	supplied is sufficien
15	practice that you use to examine and address those	15	further. And now, a
16	issues?	16	there's the conflict b
17	MR. FRANZ: So we do have a policy procedure	17	transaction timely a
18	guide that outlines all the different scenarios for	18	properly. And I thir
19	removing restrictions as it relates to affiliate versus	19	specifically points to
20	nonaffiliate for 144 restrictions. The bigger	20	makes it easier for the
21	difference, really the most material difference between	21	MR. HARMO
22	the documentation requirements is the broker rep letter,	22	helpful to have that.
23	what you need for the affiliate versus the nonaffiliate.	23	calls I get from disg
24	And that's where the broker attests to the fact that	24	transfer agent doesn
25	it's an ordinary brokerage transaction.	25	many times, I also re

does put pressure right on you from a state law perspective to move things quickly, you know, how helpful would it be if basically you had a firmer ability to get the information you needed sooner rather than later so you could move along. As opposed to, well, even if you get the information quickly, it's still going to be a complex facts and circumstances process?

MR. FRANZ: I think the first thing it does is it addresses kind of the headaches that arise between the agent and its client in pushing for the information. Or, you know, the shareholder and the issuer in being asked for the information. So a lot of times, you'll get pushback because they feel that the documentation they've supplied is sufficient and there's no reason to push further. And now, as I think all of us have mentioned, there's the conflict between needing to do the transaction timely and needing to ensure that it's done properly. And I think that having a regulation that specifically points to requirements in this case, it makes it easier for the transfer agent to push.

MR. HARMON: I think it would be incredibly helpful to have that. I cannot tell you the number of calls I get from disgruntled shareholders saying that XYZ transfer agent doesn't require that. And fortunately, many times, I also represent XYZ and I know that that's

	Page 158		Page 160
1	not true. But still, that's something that you hear all	1	have disciplinary history.
2	the time. "Why are you asking for this? Nobody else	2	You know, fortunately, we do get a lot of
3	asks for this." And if there were some assistance in	3	opinions from, you know, a lot of the larger firms. So
4	saying, this is what you need and the transfer agent has	4	those don't, you know, usually have the same scrutiny.
5	the right to ask for it, then they would have a much	5	But certainly, if it's not coming directly from issuer's
6	easier time doing their job and, in my view, most of	6	counsel, internal or external, we do take a closer look
7	these agents are trying to do their job.	7	at those opinions.
8	MS. MANNING: Yeah, I agree. Because	8	MR. BECKER: Agreed. We try not to have to go
9	sometimes, you know, we'll get a legal opinion and it has	9	outside the four corners if we don't have to, because
10	absolutely no detail in it. You know, they'll just say	10	that just opens us up to a greater amount of additional
11	that we believe, you know, this transaction is exempt.	11	work, delay. But if we have to do it, we will do it,
12	And then we have to go back and we have to ask for more	12	depending on the circumstances.
13	information and sometimes they push back and say, well,	13	MR. ROTHMAN: Thank you for that. I think just
14	we're the issuer, we're instructing you to do it. We've	14	sort of pivoting off of something that David mentioned in
15	given you the opinion that says it's okay.	15	terms of the safe harbor and some of the other potential
16	But we need to understand the facts a little	16	policy solutions, one of the as I think you all know,
17	bit better and there's pushback. And that creates delay	17	in the 2015 concept release, we discussed three potential
18	and sometimes shareholders will be calling and saying,	18	policy solutions in this area with respect to transfer
19	why hasn't this been processed yet? And the issuer is	19	agents and their role in removing restrictive legends.
20	not getting back to us quickly.	20	The first approach would involve a standard
21	So I think having some parameters there for the	21	that prohibits transfer agent negligence in facilitating
22	types of information we should be able to obtain would be	22	illegal distributions, such as by removing legends while
23	very helpful.	23	being aware of illegality and turning a blind eye, or
24	MR. BECKER: And I think along those lines,	24	being ignorant of apparent illegality. This has sort of
25	look, we all know it's really difficult if not impossible	25	been referred to as an antifraud approach, if you will.
	Page 159		Page 161
1	Page 159 to lay out you have to have A, B, C, D, E, F, G. But I	1	Page 161 The second approach would be more flexible and
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	to lay out you have to have A, B, C, D, E, F, G. But I		The second approach would be more flexible and
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1 for which they've been held liable in various situations, 2 and probably increasingly in the recent past. And I 3 think that agents are already very aware of the potential 4 for being charged with a Section 5 violation if they 5 don't act in good faith. So I don't know that layering 6 it on with a specific rule is going to make a lot of 7 difference. 8 Having specific policies and procedures is 9 difficult because of the myriad of options for legend 10 removal or issuance free trading would make it virtually 11 impossible to cover every area. And so you could have a 12 generalized policy and procedure talking about due 13 diligence but the specifics of it aren't going to work 14 because it's something new every time. 15 So I -- you know, I think that those two 16 probably are not good. I think it absolutely would be 17 helpful to mandate that an opinion is required, whether 18 it's a shareholder's opinion, which creates more 19 problems, or issuer's opinion, but the requirement to 20 have an opinion would at least give the transfer agents 21 leverage when they go to somebody and say, we need an 22 opinion that fully covers every aspect of this, so not 23 just an opinion, as Andrea said, that said we think that 24 this is okay, but an opinion that addresses tacking, that 25 addresses affiliate status, shell status, everything that

available to staff that includes details of opinion requirements, letter requirements, details around the regulations for which the exemptions apply, I think that helps. I think a minimum level of due diligence on the firms presenting those opinions. It's hard to say or hard to list specific red flags, because they change every day. But a reasonable level of due diligence on the issuing firm, I think, is also something that could fit into that. And if those conditions are met by the agent, a safe harbor is provided, if an action is brought as a result of that transaction.

MS. MANNING: I guess I agree on the safe harbor as kind of the best approach here. It provides the protection, I think, for investors and the industry. It also will set some, I think, commercial certainty amongst agents, brokers, issuers. Everyone will know kind of what the rules are so there will be less pushback and the expectations will be set up front as to what agents are going to be looking for to remove that legend. So I think that's also the best approach.

MR. SALTZBURG: I would like to drill down a little bit more on two of the concepts that were mentioned here, the notion of mandating legal opinions and the creation of a safe harbor. I'd like to ask panelists to examine a potential downside of that issue,

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1	is on the checklist for what you need to do. So that, I
2	think that, together with authorizing transfer agents
3	or just recommending that transfer agents have the
4	ability to get independent support for that would go a
5	long way in assisting transfer agents in fulfilling the
б	gatekeeper function that the SEC imposes on them.
7	MR. BECKER: Well, I hate the term
8	"gatekeeper." I think it raises implications that are
9	just incorrect, but we can talk about that offline.
10	I agree with Mark. You can't have something
11	that says you have to have A, B, C, D, E, F. But if you
12	have something that says, if you have A, B, C, D, E, F,
13	you've got air cover, I think would be very helpful. So
14	really providing the safe harbor type of provision.
15	MR. FRANZ: We've talked about it, I think all
16	four of us. The requirement for an opinion would be
17	great. Because we get a lot of pushback on folks who
18	don't want to pay for the opinion. And you don't have a
19	transfer agent, I don't think, that will do it without an
20	opinion. So you'd kind of resolve that impasse.
21	And I think if you can develop a rule that
22	prescribes not specific policies or steps but a series of
23	actions that can be taken reasonably to provide for a
24	safe harbor for the transfer agent, I think that works.
25	Things like ensuring that there is a policy or procedure

particularly the question of if those requirements were instituted, would it slow down or make more expensive the processing of private securities transactions? And, you know, another potential downside that's been noted is, you know, there's this risk that if a safe harbor is created, would fraudsters try to squeeze within it and, you know, follow the letter of the law but not the spirit? And would they be shielded by the safe harbor?

MR. BECKER: And interesting question, Mark. If you think about -- I'll take the second part. If you think about fraudsters, the safe harbor really would not be protecting them, so much. It would not be protecting the bad actor on the outside. The safe harbor would really be there to help protect the agent who's acting in accordance with the letter. We're making sure that we have the right information there.

It would still be incumbent upon us to make sure that we're not accepting letters from people who are on bad lists or who we know to be bad actors, even if they haven't yet been caught up with by the Commission or a state agency. So I think that -- I think that's not necessarily a major concern, from my perspective.

With respect to whether it would slow down the process, I don't think so. Because what it would do is it would prevent the delays that we face now where we

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1	have to go back at someone and tell them you have to get	1	MR. COULSON: Just, you know, from my side as a
2	us the letter that you haven't yet given us. And now	2	market operator downstream, you know, we published a list
3	they have to go out and get that letter. And the expense	3	of attorneys who didn't do the work and, you know, part
4	of it is something they should have borne from the	4	of it was we got them to sign a letter saying they'd
5	beginning anyway. So I don't think that's a major	5	indemnify us if they sued us. Which, you know, an
б	concern as we look at it.	6	attorney then who threatens to sue you after indemnifying
7	MR. HARMON: So the removal of a legend is a	7	you is probably that's another tell that they're not
8	nonroutine item to begin with and doesn't fall within the	8	the greatest attorney. So we put that out to the market
9	guidelines for the processing of routine items. So built	9	and turned on a bunch of things and actually John Palisi
10	into the concept that you're removing a legend is that	10	was running the microcap efforts back then and really
11	it's going to take some time.	11	turned on an underbelly that needed to be worked on where
12	Putting the onus on the presenter and requiring	12	the work wasn't being done by lawyers.
13	an opinion that fully deals with all of the requirements	13	But, you know, from the market operator
14	for the exemption shifts the burden onto the shareholder	14	standpoint, the problem we see is both sides. You know,
15	and the potential fraudster and the fraudster's lawyer to	15	number one, it's a cost issue. You know, for JOBS Act,
16	do the work that you asked the transfer agent to do but	16	crowdfunding Reg A, you know, these are distributed
17	without the transfer agent having the authority to do it.	17	offerings that need to have a cost-effective way to get
18		18	into the regulated broker-dealer community. And, you
19	So the transfer agent retains whatever due	19	know, a \$1,000 opinion on a \$200 investment is not going
20	diligence it has in reviewing the presentment but now	20	to work.
21	you've created a real burden for the presenter and the	21	The other part though is we're seeing blunt
22	presenter's attorney to do that due diligence as well and	22	force of brokers and clearing firms not accepting any
23	not just make a presentment that superficially looks okay	23	shares that have had their restrictions lifted. These
24	and then requires the transfer agent to dig down into it.	24	are fully SEC reporting issuers and, you know, right now
25	MS. MANNING: I definitely agree with the safe	25	they've done it to OTC securities. But since we've seen
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1	harbor. I'm not sure that I agree necessarily with	1	the recent Honig case which the SEC brought, these take
2	mandating opinions in every scenario. Because I think	2	place in smaller exchange, NASDAQ and NYSE MKT
3	I can't speak for the other agents here but there are	3	securities, so the risks are going to be there for
4	certainly, I think, less risky transactions, a	4	brokers and clearing firms as well.
5	nonaffiliate that's held for a year, I can't speak to	5	And unless we figure out a way to create the
6	others' practices but there are certain transactions,	6	transfer agents be trusted recordkeepers that give the
7	gifting scenarios, that, you know, to require an opinion	7	information brokers need to be able to fulfill their
8	in some of those scenarios, you know, I'm not sure I'd	8	duties, you know, this is all just wasting time. Because
9	want that mandated. You know, I think to Mark's point,	9	the brokers just aren't going to accept it.
10	you know, you are now creating an expense for a scenario	10	And, you know, it's been a little frustrating
11	that not every agent may decide they want to ask their	11	for us to watch, because we would think there should be
12	client for or the clients are going to push back on.	12	differentiation between many transfer agents have really
13	And we all know opinions are extremely	13	high-quality processes and some don't. So how do we get

And we all know opinions are extremely 13 expensive, especially the law firms. A lot of them don't 14 to a level that transfer agents are providing the level even want to give opinions. We have certain major law 15 of information they need to brokers so they can do what 16 firms that have essentially refused to give a legal they need to do? And then when it gets in the brokerage opinion. They'll give us an instruction and an 17 system, we've got other work to do. But that's another authorization to release a legend, but they will refuse 18 panel. to provide an actual legal opinion. 19 So I think mandating versus a safe harbor, I 20 thank all of you for your comments. I think, Cromwell, think there is a distinction there. And I -- you know, 21 you've highlighted how complex this area is and how much my view is I think the safe harbor is the better 22 thinking we have to do. So we really appreciate your 23

22 23 approach. It gives agents a little bit of discretion for 24 those transactions where they feel it might not be

25 necessary to get a legal opinion.

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I think we have just a few minutes left. So I 25 would like to, if any of you have any closing comments or

time in contributing to that conversation.

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MR. SABELLA: Thanks for that. I'd like to

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1	final thoughts you'd like to share, I'd like to offer	1	woul
2	that opportunity and thank you for your time.	2	trans
3	David, we'll start with you.	3	ment
4	MR. BECKER: I want to thank the Staff for the	4	just t
5	opportunity to be heard on this issue. This is obviously	5	about
6	a very significant issue for us as transfer agents. I	6	you a
7	think as you move forward, hopefully hopefully with	7	
8	the ideas that were raised in the concept release, this	8	will t
9	will lead to much more extensive discussion between all	9	will t
10	of us.	10	for th
11	I think including Mark to get the perspective	11	
12	of the smaller transfer agent was really a very good	12	up th
13	idea. Because you normally just hear from the big guys,	13	the au
14	and it's good to get that other perspective. So thank	14	
15	you.	15	panel
16	And, look, you all know that the STA and the	16	many
17	individual members of the STA are all very interested in	17	later,
18	this topic and others and stand ready, willing and able	18	But a
19	to do what we can to help you get to where we all need to	19	that.
20	be as we go forward. So thank you.	20	
21	MR. FRANZ: I just want to echo David's	21	turn t
22	sentiments. I mean, thank you for the opportunity for	22	launc
23	the dialogue and certainly look forward to future	23	Racq
24	dialogue and all of those entities that David's	24	
25	mentioning all ready to talk about this openly, so look	25	pleas

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1	forward to making good changes where it's appropriate.	1
2	MR. HARMON: Right. So, of course, thank you.	2
3	And I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And, of	3
4	course, I'm available for follow up. I would use my few	4
5	minutes or few seconds left to make one final plug to	5
б	help transfer agents or protect transfer agents from	6
7	lawsuits when they are trying to do the right thing by	7
8	rejecting a transfer because they don't think it's	8
9	compliant with federal securities laws and are between	9
10	that duty to the SEC and the securities laws and the	10
11	state law obligation to process the transfer. And so	11
12	they subject themselves to large liability, even if they	12
13	win the case, having to pay lawyers to protect them,	13
14	which can be an onerous burden on the smaller agent.	14
15	MS. MANNING: I also want to thank the	15
16	Commission for inviting me to participate in this. It	16
17	definitely is a very important topic for transfer agents.	17
18	I have to say there's not a day that goes by that I	18
19	don't get pulled into some restricted stock transfer	19
20	issue at Computershare, whether it's pushback from	20
21	clients, having to talk to clients to explain to them why	21
22	we need an opinion, it's a problem that's not going away.	22
23	So, you know, really appreciate the opportunity and hope	23
24	that we'll have some rulemaking soon.	24
25	MR. BECKER: And I see Eric out there. It	25

wouldn't be appropriate to have a meeting between the transfer agent community and the division without mentioning escheatment and loss shareholders, so I will just throw it out there. You guys know what I'm talking about. It's a topic that we raise at every meeting with you and I can say for the record it was raised today.

MR. SABELLA: Well, as everyone knows, there will be a public transcript of this roundtable, so that will be duly noted in the record, David. So thank you for that.

And the reference is to Eric Garvey, who heads up the OC transfer agent program, who is sitting over in the audience over there. Just raised his hand.

So I will thank Moshe and Mark for leading the panel through, I agree, a very fruitful discussion. In many ways, I think, you know, and we'll do a wrap up later, but, you know, familiar echoes of comment letters. But always helpful to dig down deeper and refresh on that.

I think without any further delay, I will now turn the mic over to Racquel Russell and ask her to launch us into the trading halt panel. Thank you, Racquel.

MS. RUSSELL: Thank you, Christian. I am pleased to be here discussing this important topic, a

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topic that is important for FINRA, investors and for our membership.

As part of FINRA's oversight responsibilities, we do have Rule 6440, which provides authority to impose trading halts in OTC equity securities under limited circumstances. The rule generally provides that, when it's necessary to protect investors and the public interest, FINRA is permitted to halt trading in three general buckets of cases. The first one is a foreign regulatory halt. This is where the stock is trading OTC here in the U.S. but it's listed overseas and subject to the regulation of a foreign jurisdiction, who then halts a security and we follow that here. The second is a derivative halt. This is where the OTC equity security is a derivative or a component of a security that's listed and that listed security is halted. Then we, for reasons of price discovery, et cetera, we halt the related OTC equity security. And the final category is probably the one of most interest today, which is the extraordinary event halt. This is where FINRA determines that an extraordinary event has occurred or is ongoing that has had a material effect on the market for the security or has caused or has the potential to cause major disruption to the marketplace or a significant uncertainty in the settlement and clearance process. And

1	once FINRA provides notice of a halt, quoting and trading	1	с
2	by members is prohibited until FINRA provides notice that	2	k
3	the halt no longer is in effect.	3	S
4	Some of the factors that FINRA considers under	4	r
5	our rule to determine whether or not imposing a halt is	5	ť
б	appropriate are the nature of the event, whether the	6	e
7	material facts surrounding the event are undisputed and	7	
8	not in conflict, whether or not the event has caused	8	k
9	widespread confusion in the marketplace, whether there	9	d
10	has been a material negative effect on the market for the	10	а
11	security, whether the potential exists for a major	11	n
12	disruption to the marketplace and whether there is	12	
13	significant uncertainty in the settlement and clearance	13	
14	process.	14	у
15	And in addition to halts declared for any of	15	Ι
16	those first three prongs, we also halt whenever the SEC	16	ť
17	issues a trading suspension. Due to the fact that FINRA	17	p
18	does not have a direct relationship with issuers, FINRA's	18	a
19	halt authority historically has been used in limited	19	с
20	circumstances.	20	I
21	To get into the discussion further today, I'm	21	
22	happy to introduce our panelists. We have a great	22	t
23	representation, cross section of regulators and market	23	c
24	participants here.	24	e
25	We have Chris Stone, vice president of	25	c
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1	Transparency Services at FINRA: Christy Oeth. chief	1	r

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creator of graduates to exchanges in the world. And, you know, we'd like to do more. I mean, I wish Facebook and Spotify traded on our market before. But a lot of these regulations to stop fraudsters have made it harder for there to be transparent trading in these securities earlier. Now, we've taken a different view, is, you know, we want to make our markets data and disclosure driven. Put more information on the screen. Make it available to be used in a machine. And that's going to make markets more efficient over the long term. But with transparency, not everything is great. You turn on the lights and you see things, often things you don't want to see. You know, we live in a culture --I went to see the movie Oceans 8 this summer with my wife this summer who works in a museum. And, you know, most people cheer. They think it's a great movie. But it's about robbing a museum and defrauding an insurance company. And we have that culture in the United States. It's more widespread than we think. So those people are going to be in markets all the time. You may think it's fun watching George Clooney or his sister. But they're trying to take advantage of every part of the system of our lives. And, you know, in

our space, in the small company world, financing takes

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1	Transparency Services at FINRA; Christy Oeth, chief	1	place in the PIPE space. It's the private market. It's
2	compliance officer at Virtu Financial; Cromwell Coulson,	2	unregulated. It's unregulated entities. It's opaque.
3	president and CEO of OTC Markets; and Michael Paley,	3	And it has very many bad effects on the public markets.
4	assistant regional director, Division of Enforcement at	4	So when we went to see Jay Clayton, we came in
5	the SEC.	5	and we said, you know, one of the things we need to think
6	I would like to start off by asking each of you	6	about is how do we act more like credit card issuers, to
7	to just provide us a bit of an overview of your	7	freeze things the second we see something wrong? The
8	touchpoints in your role with trading halts and your	8	second we see George Clooney on the video cameras, let's
9	high-level observations on this topic as it concerns	9	freeze it. And let's also have a way to restart when we
10	retail investor fraud.	10	make a mistake. Let's have a rehabilitation process.
11	I'll start with you, Cromwell, if that's okay.	11	And Jay, you know, to his credit, we saw much more active
12	MR. COULSON: Great. So at OTC Markets, we	12	SEC suspensions of frauds that we'd pointed out or others
13	despise fraud. I mean, fraud makes markets not work. It	13	had and much faster. Mike's team Mike's team really
14	puts your thumb on the scale, fraud and manipulation.	14	sped up and it was a really you know, Jay Clayton is a
15	Most of the time, you can have markets handle that. But	15	law and order guy, and that was great.
16	as the Chair said, in microcap securities on exchanges in	16	But, you know, we need to see how the FINRA
17	the OTC market, there's less liquidity, there's less	17	halt authority that can act quicker, how it fits in.
18	active trading. You know, there's also a lot less short	18	And, you know, when are the times we should use it?
19	selling. While Tesla can see 25 percent of its market	19	And I'm very glad that we have everyone on the
20	cap sold short, the most sold short stocks OTC is 5	20	panel. Except you know, the only ones missing is the
21	percent and the average illiquid OTC security is less	21	exchanges. Because, as I said earlier, there have been
22	than 1 percent of its shares sold short, and that's from	22	quite a few microcap cases, enforcement cases brought by
23	Reg SHO. So there are there's more volatility here.	23	the SEC shining a light on the fact that the problems
24	But our market serves an important role. We	24	that we're talking about today are not only on the OTC
25	have ADRs. We have community banks. We're the largest	25	market. If you look you know, if you looked at the

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	rage 170		rage 100
1	Honig case, one was OTC, it's now on NASDAQ. Another one	1	What we focus on, among other things, is
2	NYSE MKT, it's now OTC. And then another one is still	2	coordinating and sharing intelligence in this, you know,
3	NASDAQ. You know, and then there's another one, Riot	3	very massive area where there are huge webs of
4	Blockchain, which they didn't which one of the	4	participants. And, in particular, on gatekeepers such as
5	executives was named, and it's still on NASDAQ.	5	attorneys and auditors who facilitate these crimes and
6	So what I'd like to see from one side is we'd	6	serial violators and we are constantly trying to do our
7	learn when do they decide to use their halt authority and	7	job faster and more efficiently with better data analysis
8	when do they not? When do they let the market function,	8	and better communications with market participants.
9	knowing the market will eventually correct itself?	9	In particular, I want to add that in addition
10	Because long term, if we turn on the transparency,	10	to the FINRA trading halts, the SEC has 12(k) authority
11	eventually the market gets it right, no matter how	11	to get a trading suspension. And the trading suspensions
12	illiquid or inefficient the market is.	12	may be brought in situations where, you know, it is
13	Thank you for having me.	13	"necessary in the public interest for the protection of
14	MS. RUSSELL: Thank you. Christy, would you	14	investors." And that's a very broad authority. The SEC,
15	like to share your thoughts?	15	however, generally applies a higher standard than that to
16	MS. OETH: Sure, I'll be brief here. Just to	16	make sure that we are not sort of interfering more than
17	give you some context, I ended up on this panel by virtue	17	necessary in the market. But I would say that there are
18	of the fact that Virtu serves as one of the largest	18	you can look at the statistics that we have out there
19	market makers in the U.S. equities markets.	19	on our trading suspension releases, about how often it is
20	Globally, we made markets by providing	20	that we do find it necessary to have a trading
21	competitive bids and offers in 19,000 securities in 235	21	suspension. And yet we it seems that we are not
22	trading venues in 36 different countries. Here in the	22	sometimes it feels as if we're not really making a dent.
23	United States, we're one of the biggest market players in	23	And that's why I'm very glad that we're also
24	the OTC securities space and we regularly interact with	24	talking about FINRA trading halts because with the limit
25	OTC Markets as well as FINRA on issues of market	25	on SEC resources and all of the other areas that we have
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1	transparency, market stability and investor protection.	1	to focus on, to the extent that we can find a way for
2	So we are thrilled to have this opportunity to share our	2	FINRA or others to act in this area, it would be very
3	view as a market maker and a dealer in this space and to	3	helpful in cleaning up the market.
4	provide some of our thoughts on what FINRA's role should	4	MS. RUSSELL: Thank you, Michael. And Chris,
5	be when it's invoking its both trading halt rule and its	5	your thoughts from the FINRA perspective?
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MR. STONE: Sure. Thanks, Racquel.

I'm Chris Stone, vice president in FINRA's Transparency Services Department. And I am responsible for the business units that run our fixed income and equity markets systems, this is the TRFs that we run in partnership with our exchange partners, the ORF, the OTC BB, the ADF and our OTC volume dissemination product.

Specifically with respect to the ORF, I am part of the team that in real time, intraday, analyzes potential OTC equity U3 extraordinary market, market halts. And I think one thing that's worth noting is I think FINRA's general theme throughout the usage of 6440 and extraordinary market condition halts is that we're not an exchange in this space. So we lack contractual privity with issuers in the OTC equity space and we don't have listing agreements in the same way that the exchanges do. So for the 18,000-plus OTC equity symbols, and that compares with over 8,000 national market system symbols, it can be challenging to find in real time the valid information that we need to execute a U3

25	OTE Markets as well as I livery on issues of market	
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1	transparency, market stability and investor protection.	
2	So we are thrilled to have this opportunity to share our	
3	view as a market maker and a dealer in this space and to	
4	provide some of our thoughts on what FINRA's role should	
5	be when it's invoking its both trading halt rule and its	
б	clearly erroneous rule.	
7	Thank you.	
8	MS. RUSSELL: Thank you, Christy. Michael.	
9	MR. PALEY: Hi, I'm Michael Paley. I'm with	
10	the Division of Enforcement of the SEC. And before I say	
11	anything else, as a Staff member at the SEC, I need to	
12	remind everyone that any opinions that I express are my	
13	own, probably my own, but certainly do not represent the	
14	opinion of anyone else at the Commission, much less the	
15	commissioners themselves.	
16	And with that, I just want to briefly introduce	
17	why it is that I'm included in this panel. I am a	
18	cochair of the Microcap Fraud Task Force, which is a	
19	group within Enforcement that started in about 2013,	
20	specifically in response to the need that many Staff felt	
21	to do more to combat microcap fraud. And, you know,	
22	largely what we were looking at at the time was OTC	
23	Markets, which is the subject of this panel. But I agree	
24	with Cromwell that many of the issues that we see are not	
25	limited to OTC Markets.	

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1		1	real time and then follow up with, obviously, our SAR
1 2	extraordinary market halt in this space. That said, we have a range of exchange-like	2	reporting responsibilities. So that's our general
3	tools that we use in the space. Yvonne spoke at length	3	proposition.
4	earlier about our 211 qualification process. We also	4	Our experience has been and obviously, it's
5	have a Rule 6490, which has allowed us to declare certain	5	contexted in what Chris has shared and what Racquel
6	corporate actions deficient and not process them if we	6	
7	believe they're related to fraud or would otherwise	7	shared in her overview, is that this market doesn't operate the same way as an exchange does because there
8	threaten the clearance at settlement system. And then,	8	isn't the same privity between the issuers and the
9	obviously, lastly is 6440, our halt provision.	9	
10	So I think, you know, I know we're going to get	10	regulator that there is in the exchange context. And we fully appreciate, because we have very robust and
11	into this a little bit later on the panel, some other	11	comprehensive dialogue with FINRA, how challenging these
12	ideas around things that people have talked about and	12	situations become.
13	things we've thought about in terms of changes to 6440 or	13	So I think that where the real hard work needs
14	ways we could use 6440. But I guess that's just one	14	
15	thing I would like to set the table with for FINRA is, I	15	to be done between the industry and FINRA and with SEC as sort of, you know, an interested party in this whole
16	think, our difference from being an exchange is kind of	16	conversation is if we want to view trading halts in OTC
17	critical in this space.	17	securities as a tool to prevent or minimize or mitigate
18	MS. RUSSELL: Thank you, Chris. And in a	18	this type of fraud, then we need to find a tool that's
19	complex issue like deciding when to halt trading, you	19	effective. Because right now, it's a very limited tool
20	know, everyone has a role. So we'd like to kind of start	20	that has limited applicability in its current context.
21	the in-depth discussion with talking a bit about	20	And we just need to, I think, find some rules of the road
22	everyone's role in your space in the marketplace.	22	that are more comfortable for the broker-dealers who are
23	So Christy, if you don't mind, starting with	23	escalating this and who are at the end of the day, their
24	just some thoughts on what you view your role as a dealer	24	client base is getting impacted by it and our business is
25	when you see activity in a security that may be	25	getting impacted by these securities that don't trade
			getting impleted by these securities that don't that
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1	Page 183 problematic?	1	Page 185 efficiently and the price discovery process is not as
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1 was creating 2 -- it's a two-part process. Providing services for 3 companies that are doing the right thing and having them 4 see a benefit of doing that. And also exposing when 5 something icky is happening. 6 And we have been very successful, you know, and 7 we probably use more behavioral economics than we do 8 standard economics, but getting that to move along. And our top market is recognized by, you know, 30-plus states 9 10 for blue sky disclosure, which is a pretty incredible 10 11 invention in 10 years if you understand the development 11 12 of state securities law speed. 12 13 So where we see in this role is, you know, we 13 14 think we can provide a very good side of feeding 14 15 information in as part of it, who's going to the SEC, to 15 16 going to FINRA. When FINRA has done a halt, ourselves 16 17 and the market makers have been very much in the 17 18 conversation. 18 19 I also see a value for companies where we have 19 20 contractual privity for them to be able to do news halts 20 21 when they see something not happening right in the 21 22 market. And because we -- you know, we brought out last 22 23 year a disclosure product around tracking promotion. And 23 24 we did two parts of it. We flagged promotion that was 24 25 occurring and we made it machine readable to the 25

And the final part is, after FINRA does a halt or the SEC does one, it does a suspension, it would be very good to quickly publish to investors what they found. And, you know, FINRA has SRO immunity, we don't, so we're a little more careful about what we can put out there. But it would be really good for investors, saying these are the reasons we did it and then let the market have a rehabilitation process to bring something in, how it gets cured, what are the things we need to do. Because, you know, at the end of the day, the way you stop the Oceans 8 guys and girls is you bankrupt them. You stop them in the middle when they've got their investment and they can't get the money.

And, you know, if we're suspending things, if it's taking too much time or there's not enough capacity, we want to be able to do it. You know, I think we can probably hire some small-cap analysts because there wasn't a hiring boom after the tick pilot. So, you know, put some smart analysts' look on these things and, you know, start to, you know, make our markets safer in real time to build confidence. And that way, we don't have the cost on the honest issuers who are compliant and doing the right thing.

MS. RUSSELL: Thank you. Those are great points and you both mentioned escalating these issues in

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1	brokerage industry, and available on the screen to	1
2	investors.	2
3	But a second part is we require companies to	3
4	issue a press release and correct any misinformation,	4
5	disclose if they've been doing any financing and disclose	5
6	if any of the insiders or affiliates are selling. And	6
7	that part is I really think issuers have a requirement in	7
8	this real-time world, it's an old rule that the New York	8
9	Stock Exchange used to have, that companies have a duty	9
10	to immediately release material information, as well as	10
11	correct any misleading information that's affecting the	11
12	market. And so we should be able to freeze the market	12
13	and then get the companies to come back and say, this is	13
14	what is here, this is here, if there's something breaking	14
15	it.	15
16	I mean, we live in a world where, you know, the	16
17	Kardashians took a billion dollars' worth of Snap's	17
18	market cap out with one tweet. And, you know, we're	18
19	going to have these things happening. That one gets	19
20	fixed by the market. Bomb at the White House gets fixed.	20
21	Other things in these less liquid securities don't get	21
22	fixed as quickly as market forces. So I think we need to	22
23	think like credit card issuers and, you know, work	23
24	together as a team, each feeding them in and then putting	24
25	them to a regulator.	25

kind of interaction with the regulators. And I think it would be a great segue to hear more from Chris and Michael about, you know, your thoughts on what Christy and Cromwell just said and what you think of in terms of the relationship between the front-line kind of folks that oftentimes may notice something kind of in real time and what the communication escalation to the regulators should be.

Chris, can we start with you?

MR. STONE: Sure. Yeah, I would like to echo what both Christy and Cromwell said in terms of the benefits of market participant, market maker and ATS involvement in funneling the information we need to the regulator. You know, I wouldn't say there's a lot of magic to how we get information in connection with U3 extraordinary market halt declarations. It's Bloomberg, it's blogs, it's talking to investors, issuers, issuers' counsel and market participants.

So I know one of the questions that I saw on the agenda was, you know, what are the additional sources of information that might help FINRA? And I'm not sure there's a magic bullet for that. It's still we just need better information quicker that's more granular in connection with issuers.

You know, sometimes we'll have cases, fairly

1	recently within the last two weeks, where a price will	1	suspension orders over time, we have actually been making
2	move dramatically such that we'll get calls from Christy	2	a concerted effort to provide additional detail in our
3	or Cromwell, saying, you know, the price moved at a point	3	orders about the underlying reasons, maybe referring to
4	where clearly this needs to be halted. Then when we look	4	specific press releases, for example, that we believe to
5	back at our kind of precedent around U3 usage, there's so	5	have false statements or suspicious trading or more
6	many illiquid stocks that can be so volatile in the space	6	specific guidance to investors.
7	that we tend to want to see that price spike tied to a	7	MR. COULSON: And that's been very helpful. My
8	huge share volume move as well, to indicate that there's	8	comment was more when FINRA does it to have the same
9	clear investor confusion around what they're even	9	you know, we go back and look when we're talking to an
10	trading.	10	issuer that's been suspended and very quickly know the
11	So the Twitter tweeter example was a good one,	11	level of concern at the SEC.
12	GM Liquidation Trust was another good one, and those were	12	MS. RUSSELL: Thank you for that, Michael. And
13	U3s.	13	it's a great segue into exploring kind of how do you get
14	But again, the way the rules are written,	14	at solutions. Part of that is to explore the challenges
15	they're rare. And we've done three U3s year to date.	15	and look at the challenges kind of head on.
16	MR. PALEY: Yeah, I would add to that. You	16	In this space, as folks have noted, it's
17	know, first, I would be remiss if I didn't note how much	17	difficult to get definitive and reliable information.
18	of the trading suspension work that we're able to do and	18	You also have to consider the needs of, you know, all of
19	the reason we can do it in a timely manner is often	19	the investors. Which I'm sure Gerri will kind of talk
20	because of information that FINRA provides to us. And,	20	about. Sometimes you get calls on both sides when
21	you know, so FINRA has been really, you know, terrific	21	there's a halt. And then balancing. Michael, you
22	and we've been working with them in terms of the	22	mentioned interfering with the market, you know, kind of
23	information that we need and how we need it, how we need	23	restricting how much regulators do that and balancing
24	to get it, so that it can be sort of incorporated as	24	kind of when that's appropriate.
25	quickly as possible into our own process.	25	So, Chris, if you don't mind, you know, what's

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1	But I would love to hear sort of more	1	your view kind of on the challenges? And then everyone,
2	specifics, you know, to the extent that there is time	2	you know, kind of provide your thoughts on that quickly.
3	from everybody about, you know, what exactly we can do to	3	MR. STONE: Yeah, I think you hit the nail on
4	define what is an extraordinary event and if there are	4	the head with your question. There's a tension between
5	some particular parameters, you know, whether it is an	5	the market integrity, investor protection side versus
6	asset, certain asset to market value ratio, whether there	6	letting market forces take effect and making sure you're
7	are certain types of disclosure deficiencies or other red	7	not preventing buyers and sellers from buying and selling
8	flags or particular trading patterns or, you know, a	8	securities when they need to, probably when they most
9	particular level of volatility. I do think that we could	9	want to in those cases.
10	probably come up with some, you know, standards.	10	So we're always open for looking at our rules
11	I also just want to remark on that I thought it	11	and thinking about ways to improve them and enhance them.
12	was fantastic that there was that panel on suspicious	12	I mean, I know there's been conversations around what
13	activity reporting. As Christy mentioned, that is hugely	13	Cromwell just said. We ask issuers for information
14	important to us in this area. It's also really important	14	directly. If they're not responsive, you know, maybe
15	to the extent that anyone that maybe is working on	15	there's room there for a halt. I mean, again, some of
16	something like that, because acting on a trading	16	these things would require rule changes. Drastic or
17	suspension is only effective if it happens immediately.	17	extreme corporate actions, maybe you could halt around
18	The harm to investors can happen while you're writing a	18	those. You know, again, those aren't in the rule
19	report to the SEC. So if you can give us a heads up,	19	currently.
20	that is hugely valuable.	20	And then finally, Cromwell, I know we've talked
21	And finally, I just want to refer to something	21	over the years about the reopen. It's been because
22	that Cromwell said about providing reasons for the	22	there's not a book to build on like on an exchange, the
23	trading suspensions. Of course, there are limits, there	23	way our rule reads now, it talks about allowing closed
24	are various reasons why we can't, you know, always	24	quote periods. You know, are there ways we can improve
25	provide detailed reasons. But if you look at trading	25	that reopening process to make it smoother intraday?

Pao	re	1	9	6

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1	Those are the kind of things we'd be willing to continue	1	ι
2	to talk about for sure.	2	t
3	MS. RUSSELL: Thank you. And Cromwell,	3	
4	Christy, your thoughts on that or on the challenges and	4	V
5	potential solutions overall?	5	1
6	MR. COULSON: So the challenges part I would	6	
7	say, you know, I think a good example where a FINRA halt	7	v
8	would have been better was the crypto company about a	8	
9	year ago. Which was you know, it was one of the	9	t
10	companies where a name changed. They were engaging in	10	
11	some crypto-type businesses. SEC-registered company.	11	1
12	But the market just broke. And this happens when some	12	t
13	market makers get short and then the Reg SHO buy-ins	13	1
14	start to come in. And once that happens, the price stops	14	1
15	reflecting any market forces. It's just a real the	15	
16	system breaks really badly.	16	
17	Now, that company has still tried being	17	(
18	reporting. It was a broken market rather than this is a	18	f
19	fraud going on. And, you know, it was a bit more	19	5
20	aggressive because I think the other parts to get in the	20	e
21	conversation is, you know, the people have histories	21	
22	doing this much better as the exchanges. And, you know,	22	i
23	why does LongFin Financial get halted by the exchanges	23	Į
24	and then other kind of crypto names don't? And with	24	1
25	other questionable actors in it. And what's the call to	25]

unique to our markets. We see it in every market around the world that has successful small company markets.

MS. RUSSELL: Thank you. As everyone can tell, we could probably continue to explore these issues at length. And we thank you, Christian, for having us here. We at FINRA look forward to continuing this dialogue with our members and with the SEC.

MR. SABELLA: Thanks so much, Racquel, and thank you to the panelists.

So I'm mindful of the clock and I know folks have come from near and far to get here and have traveling schedules to adhere to, so I will pass the mic now to Owen to bring us home on, last but certainly by no means least, investor education issues.

Thanks, Owen.

MR. DONLEY: Thanks, Christian. And I do know our panelists have a hard 3:30 stop, so I'm going to talk for about 30 seconds about what we're doing here at the SEC in investor education and turn it over to our esteemed panelists.

Very briefly, very briefly, we have a robust investor education platform here at the SEC. We spend a great deal of time creating public-facing content for retail investors, much of which is in the retail space. In the last year or so, we've spent a lot of time on

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1	do? Because I don't think we want to go like suddenly,	1	backgro
2	this area gets harsher.	2	panelist
3	And, you know, I'm a big believer in bringing	3	majorit
4	in the companies. Because when we have panels like this,	4	who are
5	we focus on, you know, the characters George Clooney	5	SEC an
6	plays that exist in our markets. But we don't have, you	6	public s
7	know, the people trying to do the right thing.	7	v
8	And, you know, securities law is all about	8	and bul
9	companies being completely truthful with high-quality	9	facing f
10	information. There's other practices of law.	10	Iı
11	Matrimonial law, I mean, I've heard cynically said,	11	is our w
12	everybody is a liar. And juvenile law, which I think for	12	A little
13	smaller companies is more important to use, is where	13	Iı
14	early intervention and understanding that maybe they	14	social c
15	didn't know the full rule, the laws. And a third is a	15	email li
16	rehabilitation process for the deserving. And how do we	16	social c
17	make the halt process be able to do that, to bring things	17	account
18	in, so we make it not as you know, if a pump and dump,	18	I
19	because sometimes companies are involved with pump and	19	engagir
20	dumps. Otherwise, just companies ran into bad financing	20	ICO spa
21	players. And the longer those goes on, the more stuck	21	those.
22	the company gets.	22	person
23	So that's my like, is if we want to move	23	FINRA
24	this forward and make this safer place for capital	24	librarie
25	formation, because this is not these problems are not	25	gamut o

background checks. I know this morning one of the panelists noted that a significant portion if not a majority of retail-facing fraud is committed by persons who are not licensed with a state, with FINRA or with the SEC and that has been a key focus of our -- including a public service campaign.

We similarly create dozens of investor alerts and bulletins a year, many of them focused on retailfacing fraud.

In terms of distribution, our primary platform is our website, our award-winning website, investor.gov. A little plug.

In addition, we are using new digital and social channels from RSS feeds to content marketing, spam email lists -- I would not spam email lists -- as well as social channels. We have a fairly prolific Twitter account.

I would be remiss not to mention we are engaging in some interesting digital strategies in the ICO space. Maybe we will get a chance to talk about those. And, of course, we participate in 100-plus inperson events, often in partnership with the states and FINRA, everything from military bases to schools to libraries to senior centers. So that is sort of the gamut of what the SEC is doing.

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1		1	
2	Gerri, Chris, can I ask you guys to introduce yourself, describe your investor education programs,	2	is to try to go back to the basics, focus on some, you know, younger individuals before, you know, maybe even
3	especially how they are focused on retail fraud?	3	before they become adults and have money to invest, put
4	MR. GEROLD: Sure, thank you. Christopher	4	the focus there.
5	Gerold. I am the chief of the New Jersey Bureau of	5	MS. WALSH: Thanks for having me. It's great
6	Securities.	6	to be here. My name is Gerri Walsh. I am the president
7	Certainly part of our mission is investor	7	of the FINRA Investor Education Foundation and I am
8	education and we are doing many of the same things that	8	senior vice president at FINRA, head of the Investor
9	the SEC does but at the state level. We have a number of	9	Education Department. So everything Owen said,
10	initiatives. We do put out investor alerts from time to	10	everything Chris just said, and we all work together.
11	time. We are going out into the community. In New	11	Which is really important. I think it's the only way
12	Jersey, if you walk into any public library, there's one	12	that we're going to be able to combat fraud.
13	of our posters in it. But it's challenging.	13	The foundation has a variety of strategic
14	And so one of the examples I always give to our	14	priorities, including benchmarking financial wellness and
15	investor ed people is that broker-dealers and investment	15	financial health and financial knowledge in the United
16	advisers are inviting the public in to a nice restaurant,	16	States. And, Chris, you're spot on. It is low. And
17	giving them a free dinner and then soliciting money from	17	people are financially fragile.
18	them. And how are we supposed to compete with that? We	18	The truth is, most Americans are not investing.
19	can't give away nice dinners.	19	Only about 30 percent of people have taxable brokerage
20	You know, the good thing is that many of those	20	accounts. About half of Americans are investing through
21	programs, you know, they're getting decent information	21	the workplace, so the workplace is a really important
22	from good people. I'm not going to knock all of them.	22	platform that we should all be thinking about.
23	But too often, they're not.	23	But there is no doubt that if you start young,
24	So, you know, the challenge for investor ed is	24	if you get people even before they're investing, then
25	how do we get people in the seats? How do we get them to	25	they're more likely to contribute to a workplace
	Page 199		Page 201
1	Page 199	1	Page 201
1 2	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to	1	retirement plan and to get into the markets that way,
1 2 3	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to really do it is creatively.		retirement plan and to get into the markets that way, which is probably, you know, a less risky onramp to
2	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to really do it is creatively. I mean, we're doing what we can now. We are	2	retirement plan and to get into the markets that way, which is probably, you know, a less risky onramp to investing.
2 3	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to really do it is creatively. I mean, we're doing what we can now. We are exploring other avenues to do that. And some of the ones	2 3	retirement plan and to get into the markets that way, which is probably, you know, a less risky onramp to investing. There are other things that we do, as Chris was
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2 3 4 5	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to really do it is creatively. I mean, we're doing what we can now. We are exploring other avenues to do that. And some of the ones we're looking at, and I just came from NASAA's annual	2 3 4 5	retirement plan and to get into the markets that way, which is probably, you know, a less risky onramp to investing. There are other things that we do, as Chris was similar to what Chris was saying. We try to get out
2 3 4 5 6	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to really do it is creatively. I mean, we're doing what we can now. We are exploring other avenues to do that. And some of the ones we're looking at, and I just came from NASAA's annual event, fraud bingo. Keep it interesting. Videos, kind	2 3 4 5 6	retirement plan and to get into the markets that way, which is probably, you know, a less risky onramp to investing. There are other things that we do, as Chris was similar to what Chris was saying. We try to get out into the community. We're a small shop, so the
2 3 4 5 6 7	listen? And how do we do that? And the only way to really do it is creatively. I mean, we're doing what we can now. We are exploring other avenues to do that. And some of the ones we're looking at, and I just came from NASAA's annual event, fraud bingo. Keep it interesting. Videos, kind of like American Greed. We've gone out to one of the	2 3 4 5 6 7	retirement plan and to get into the markets that way, which is probably, you know, a less risky onramp to investing. There are other things that we do, as Chris was similar to what Chris was saying. We try to get out into the community. We're a small shop, so the foundation does it through intermediaries. We work in
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1 benefit. 2 We are also looking at the psychology of scams. 3 What are the behavioral biases that people have 4 generally when it comes to investing? And then are there 5 differences between victims and nonvictims? And again, 6 we're seeing that there are. 7 We do outreach. We work with partners, as I 8 alluded to. But we really think about three things when 9 it comes to fraud. We focus on the types, we focus on 10 the targets and we focus on the tactics that the cons 11 use. And while we often hear the really good advice that 12 if something sounds too good to be true it probably is, 13 the reality is that for most investors that's very 14 difficult advice to implement. Because to paraphrase an 15 SEC colleague who -- I don't even know who said it first. 16 But if something doesn't sound too good to be true, then 17 you're probably dealing with an amateur. Fraudsters are 18 super smart, they're super slick. And they cause people 19 who fall prey to fraud to buy that dream. You're 20 invested before you even pull out your checkbook. 21 And so that's what we're combatting when we're 22 combatting fraud. It's a very emotional reality. And 23 that's hard to overcome and so that's part of what we're 24 trying to tease out. 25 MR. DONLEY: Thanks, Gerri. That's fantastic.

we get into legitimate cannabis investing?

And so there is this array of opportunities that people see and they glom on to these companies that are being pumped inappropriately. So that's one of the areas that I'm most concerned about.

MR. DONLEY: Chris, anything in particular to New Jersey that you're saying at the NASAA level?

MR. GEROLD: Yeah. Well, certainly a few items. Unregistered promissory notes, they continue to be an issue. How they package those keeps changing but it's usually some promissory note attached to it. Specifically and most recently, real estate schemes. We mentioned Woodbridge earlier. There are others, there are more local ones in New Jersey that we've brought in the last year. Real estate continues to be popular, I guess.

Pre-IPO type of offerings where a unicorn is identified, whether it's Uber or Facebook before it went public. We've seen a number of frauds where individuals say they have access to pre-IPO shares from either former employees or employees at the time. So really forward contracts and they're marketing them. Whether or not they're enforceable contracts is a question but most times they are a fraud. And it just so happens everyone has heard of Uber and it's a private company, how do I

Page 205

get in on that. We've certainly seen that.

And then you touched upon cannabis. New Jersey, it does appear, is working on some cannabis legislation. We're trying to get out ahead of it on the securities side to warn people because we're sure that's going to be the next area where we'll see some fraudsters promoting companies that would be trying to get into that area and certainly over-promising. So those are some areas we're looking at.

MR. DONLEY: Yeah, I'll note, we just put out an alert on marijuana fraud companies last week, so we're on the same page.

So this week, many of you may know, is World Investor Week. And I know, Gerri, this is a coordinated effort between international regulators, state regulators, FINRA, the CFTC and other federal regulators. So it brings to mind how we can work better together. This is a question. We seem to all identify a common sort of suite of fraud. It does change every year. We sort of know the messages.

How can we work better or what channels should we be using to more narrowly target like these particular frauds?

MS. WALSH: We could learn a lot from our international colleagues. And I know Chris knows that

we're focused on trading and markets issues. We've
discussed the microcap space, some trading scams this
morning. What are the, say, top two or three types of
fraud that's focused on retail? You know, putting aside
you know, you look at the Commission's docket. You
know, half the docket is retail facing, not the FCP and
not the accounting but the core retail issues. What are
you seeing in the last 12 months?
MS. WALSH: Absolutely. And it's already been
alluded to by this panel and by previous panels. Pump

You mentioned types. And, you know, today

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12 and dumps. Pump and dumps of thinly traded securities, especially securities that used to be mining companies 13 14 and gambling companies in China and clean air and now, 15 all of a sudden, they're crypto. And I'm not entirely 16 sure that there's any one company that meets that five-17 part test that I just laid out but that's pretty much the 18 path that a lot of these thinly traded securities follow. 19 You know, going out in the field, talking to 20 investors, you know, people want to get in on the next 21 big thing. And I happened to be out in Hawaii -- don't 22 feel sorry for me but it was my first time -- and there 23 were a number of investors there who were saying, you 24 know, these sugar plantations are now going fallow and

25 we're hearing that cannabis might be coming in. How can

	Page 206		Page 208
1	from his involvement with NASAA, with the Canadian	1	Thank you so much. Apologies for the short
2	regulators and the Mexican regulators. And you and I	2	panel.
3	have had the opportunity to be part of IOSCO, the	3	MR. SABELLA: Yeah, thanks very much, Owen.
4	International Organization of Securities Commissions,	4	And thanks to everyone. And again, appreciate the shout
5	Standing Committee on Retail Investor Education.	5	out for World Investor Week, which I think hopefully will
6	And, you know, in Brazil, in Australia, in the	6	continue the important themes of this panel or this
7	U.K., in Canada right now, there's a big focus on how we	7	discussion at the end of the panel.
8	can harness the power of behavioral insights and	8	So with that, I know we're at time. So I would
9	behavioral economics, which Cromwell just mentioned	9	just like to close out by thanking expressing very
10	earlier, to better inform investor education and retail	10	deep gratitude to all the panelists for, you know, taking
11	protection. Some of that comes in the form of message	11	time out of your busy schedules to come down here in
12	testing. Some of it comes in the form of data gathering,	12	Washington on the only sunny day in September to visit
13	understanding who's at risk, you know, how big the	13	with us as we sit in this windowless room. So, thank
14	problem is. That's one of the big bugaboos is that we	14	you.
15	really don't have a good handle on we don't quantify	15	I think it's interesting. I mean, certainly
16	the harm caused by retail investment fraud and how many	16	from the Staff, we're absorbing a lot. There will
17	people are actually subjected to that. We're actually	17	obviously be a comment file made available for this
18	working with the Department of Justice to try to tease	18	roundtable for folks to submit further information. But
19	out some of those statistics in the National Crime	19	a lot to absorb across the board.
20	Victimization Survey.	20	Interesting, just from a personal perspective,
21	But those kinds of lessons, where we can learn	21	and like Michael, I take the disclaimer as well, just a
22	from one another and leverage one another's really	22	personal view. A lot of ecosystem challenges, it sounds
23	terrific tools. At FINRA, there was a team of us that	23	like, across the different areas, where the institutions
24	connected with the authorities in the Netherlands because	24	you represent are in the middle of a larger dynamic and
25	they've been doing a lot in using behavioral insights,	25	trying to maximize communication, decisionmaking, who
	Page 207		Page 209
1	Page 207	1	Page 209
1	not only for education but also for regulation. And what	1	holds the responsibility at which stage of the process,
2	not only for education but also for regulation. And what are the implications for FINRA, for the SEC, for state	2	holds the responsibility at which stage of the process, all for the benefit of the retail investor. It sounds
2 3	not only for education but also for regulation. And what are the implications for FINRA, for the SEC, for state securities regulators here in the United States? So	2 3	holds the responsibility at which stage of the process, all for the benefit of the retail investor. It sounds like it's something that you're all thinking about and
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1	PROOFREADER'S CERTIFICATE
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3	In the Matter of: ROUNDTABLE - COMBATTING RETAIL
4	INVESTOR FRAUD
5	File Number: OS-0926
6	Date: Wednesday, September 26, 2018
7	Location: Washington, D.C.
8	Location. washington, D.C.
9	This is to perfift that I Christian Deves (the
	This is to certify that I, Christine Boyce, (the
10	undersigned) do hereby swear and affirm that the attached
11	proceedings before the U.S. Securities and Exchange
12	Commission were held according to the record, and that
13	this is the original, complete, true and accurate
14	transcript, which has been compared with the reporting or
15	recording accomplished at the hearing.
16	
17	
18	
19	(Proofreader's Name) (Date)
20	
21	
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24	
25	
	Page 211
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1 2	
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