I. INTRODUCTION


On March 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, the Commission designated a longer period within which to approve the proposed rule change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the

proposed rule change.\textsuperscript{5} On April 23, 2018, the Commission instituted proceedings under Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act\textsuperscript{6} to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed rule change.\textsuperscript{7} The comment period and rebuttal comment period for the Order Instituting Proceedings closed on May 18, 2018, and June 1, 2018, respectively. Finally, on July 18, 2018, the Commission extended the period for consideration of the proposed rule change to September 21, 2018.\textsuperscript{8} As of August 21, 2018, the Commission had received six comments on the proposed rule change.\textsuperscript{9}

This order disapproves the proposed rule change. Although the Commission is disapproving this proposed rule change, the Commission emphasizes that its disapproval does not rest on an evaluation of whether bitcoin, or blockchain technology more generally, has utility or value as an innovation or an investment. Rather, the Commission is disapproving this proposed rule change because, as discussed below, the Exchange has not met its burden under the Exchange Act and the Commission’s Rules of Practice to demonstrate that its proposal is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5), in particular the requirement that a national securities exchange’s rules be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.\textsuperscript{10} Among other things, the Exchange has offered no record


evidence to demonstrate that bitcoin futures markets are “markets of significant size.” That failure is critical because, as explained below, the Exchange has failed to establish that other means to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices will be sufficient, and therefore surveillance-sharing with a regulated market of significant size related to bitcoin is necessary to satisfy the statutory requirement that the Exchange’s rules be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.11

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSAL

The Exchange proposes to list and trade the Shares under NYSE Arca Rule 8.200-E, Commentary .02, which governs the listing and trading of Trust Issued Receipts on the Exchange.12 Each Fund will be a series of the Direxion Shares ETF Trust II (“Trust”), and the Trust and the Funds will be managed and controlled by Direxion Asset Management, LLC (“Sponsor”). Bank of New York Mellon will be the custodian and transfer agent for the Funds. U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC will serve as the administrator for the Funds, and Foreside Fund Services, LLC will serve as the distributor of the Shares (“Distributor”).13 According to the Notice, each Fund will create and redeem Shares in one or more Creation Units (a Creation Unit is a block of 50,000 Shares of a Fund).14

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11 See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
12 See NYSE Arca Rule 8.200-E, Commentary .02. NYSE Arca Rule 8.200-E permits the listing and trading of “Trust Issued Receipts,” defined as a security (1) that is issued by a trust which holds specific securities deposited with the trust; (2) that, when aggregated in some specified minimum number, may be surrendered to the trust by the beneficial owner to receive the securities; and (3) that pay beneficial owners dividends and other distributions on the deposited securities, if any are declared and paid to the trustee by an issuer of the deposited securities. Commentary .02 applies to Trust Issued Receipts that invest in any combination of investments, including cash; securities; options on securities and indices; futures contracts; options on futures contracts; forward contracts; equity caps, collars, and floors; and swap agreements.
13 See Notice, supra note 3, 83 FR at 3381.
14 See id. at 3384.
According to the Notice, the Funds will seek to obtain daily short, leveraged long, or leveraged short exposure (before fees and expenses) to the target benchmark, which is the lead-month bitcoin futures contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), the Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (“CBOE”), or any other U.S. exchange that subsequently trades bitcoin futures contracts (“Bitcoin Futures Contract”). Specifically, the 1.25X Bull Fund, the 1.5X Bull Fund, and the 2X Bull Fund will seek daily investment results (before fees and expenses) that are 125%, 150%, or 200%, respectively, of the daily return of the target benchmark. The 1X Bear Fund and the 2X Bear Fund will seek daily inverse investment results (before fees and expenses) that are -100% or -200%, respectively, of the daily return of the target benchmark.

According to the Notice, the target benchmark’s value will be calculated as the last sale price published by CME or CBOE, or any other U.S. exchange that subsequently trades bitcoin futures contracts, on or before 11:00 a.m. E.T. for the Bitcoin Futures Contract and may reflect trades occurring and published by CME, CBOE, or another U.S. exchange that subsequently trades bitcoin futures contracts outside the normal trading session for the Bitcoin Futures Contract. Each Fund will compute its NAV as of 11:00 a.m. E.T., or such earlier time that the NYSE may close.

According to the Notice, each Fund, under normal market conditions, will seek to achieve its daily investment objective by investing in the Bitcoin Futures Contract, swaps on the Bitcoin Futures Contract, or listed options on bitcoin or the Bitcoin Futures Contract (collectively, 

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15 See id. at 3381. Bitcoin Futures Contracts will be cash-settled. According to the Exchange, the “lead month” contract is the monthly contract with the earliest expiration date. See id. at 3381 n.6.

16 See id. at 3382.

17 See id.

18 See id. at 3381.

19 See id. at 3383.
“Bitcoin Financial Instruments”). The Funds’ investments in Bitcoin Financial Instruments will be used to produce economically “leveraged” or “inverse leveraged” investment results for the Funds.\textsuperscript{20} A Fund may invest in the listed options and swaps described above in a manner consistent with its investment objective in situations where the Sponsor believes that investing in such financial instruments is in the best interests of a Fund. In addition, a Fund may invest in swap contracts referencing the Bitcoin Futures Contract if the market for a specific bitcoin futures contract experiences emergencies or if position, price, or accountability limits (if any) are reached with respect to a specific bitcoin futures contract. Each trading day at the close of the U.S. equity markets, each Fund will position its portfolio to ensure that the Fund’s exposure to the target benchmark is consistent with the Fund’s investment objective.\textsuperscript{21} The Notice also states:

\begin{quote}
[U]nlike the futures markets for traditional physical commodities, the market for exchange-traded bitcoin futures contract[s] has limited trading history and operational experience and may be riskier, less liquid, more volatile and more vulnerable to economic, market and industry changes than more established futures markets. The liquidity of the market will depend on, among other things, the adoption of bitcoin and the commercial and speculative interest in the market for the ability to hedge against the price of bitcoin with exchange-traded bitcoin futures contracts.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

The Exchange represents that trading in the Shares of each Fund will be subject to the existing trading surveillances administered by the Exchange, as well as cross-market surveillances administered by FINRA on behalf of the Exchange, which are designed to detect violations of Exchange rules and applicable federal securities laws.\textsuperscript{23} The Exchange asserts that these procedures are adequate to properly monitor Exchange trading of the Shares in all trading

\begin{footnotes}
20 See id. at 3381–82.
21 See id. at 3382.
22 See id. at 3383.
23 See id. at 3385.
\end{footnotes}
sessions and to deter and detect violations of Exchange rules and federal securities laws applicable to trading on the Exchange.\textsuperscript{24}

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Applicable Standard for Review

The Commission must consider whether the Exchange’s proposal is consistent with Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5), which requires, in relevant part, that the rules of a national securities exchange be designed “to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” and “to protect investors and the public interest.”\textsuperscript{25} Under the Commission’s Rules of Practice, the “burden to demonstrate that a proposed rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations issued thereunder … is on the self-regulatory organization [‘SRO’] that proposed the rule change.”\textsuperscript{26}

The description of a proposed rule change, its purpose and operation, its effect, and a legal analysis of its consistency with applicable requirements must all be sufficiently detailed and specific to support an affirmative Commission finding,\textsuperscript{27} and any failure of an SRO to provide this information may result in the Commission not having a sufficient basis to make an affirmative finding that a proposed rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the applicable rules and regulations.\textsuperscript{28} Moreover, “unquestioning reliance” on an SRO’s

\textsuperscript{24} See id.

\textsuperscript{25} 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).

\textsuperscript{26} Rule 700(b)(3), Commission Rules of Practice, 17 CFR 201.700(b)(3).

\textsuperscript{27} See id.

\textsuperscript{28} See id.
representations in a proposed rule change is not sufficient to justify Commission approval of a proposed rule change.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{B. Preventing Fraudulent and Manipulative Practices}

1. Applicable Legal Standard

To approve the Exchange’s proposal to list the Shares, the Commission must be able to find that the proposal is, consistent with Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5), “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.”\textsuperscript{30} As the Commission recently explained in an order disapproving a listing proposal for the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust (“Winklevoss Order”), although surveillance-sharing agreements are not the exclusive means by which an exchange-traded product (“ETP”) listing exchange can meet its obligations under Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5), such agreements are a widely used means for exchanges that list ETPs to meet their obligations, and the Commission has historically recognized their importance.\textsuperscript{31}

The Commission has therefore determined that, if the listing exchange for an ETP fails to establish that other means to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices will be sufficient, the listing exchange must enter into a surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated market of significant size because “[s]uch agreements provide a necessary deterrent to manipulation because they facilitate the availability of information needed to fully investigate a manipulation if it were to occur.”\textsuperscript{32} Accordingly, a surveillance-sharing agreement with a


regulated market of significant size is required to ensure that, in compliance with the Exchange Act, the proposal is “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.” 33 In this context, the Commission has interpreted the terms “significant market” and “market of significant size” to include a market (or group of markets) as to which (a) there is a reasonable likelihood that a person attempting to manipulate the ETP would also have to trade on that market to successfully manipulate the ETP, so that a surveillance-sharing agreement would assist the ETP listing market in detecting and deterring misconduct, and (b) it is unlikely that trading in the ETP would be the predominant influence on prices in that market. 34 Thus, a surveillance-sharing agreement must be entered into with a “significant market” to assist in detecting and deterring manipulation of the ETP, because someone attempting to manipulate the ETP is reasonably likely to also engage in trading activity on that “significant market.”

Although the Winklevoss Order applied these standards to a commodity-trust ETP based on bitcoin, the Commission believes that these standards are also appropriate for an ETP based on bitcoin futures. When approving the first commodity-futures ETP, the Commission specifically noted that “[i]nformation sharing agreements with primary markets trading index components underlying a derivative product are an important part of a self-regulatory organization’s ability to monitor for trading abuses in derivative products.” 35 And the Commission’s approval orders for commodity-futures ETPs consistently note the ability of an ETP listing exchange to share surveillance information either through surveillance-sharing agreements

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34 See Winklevoss Order, supra note 31, 83 FR at 37594. This definition is illustrative and not exclusive. There could be other types of “significant markets” and “markets of significant size,” but this definition is an example that will provide guidance to market participants. See id.

agreements or through membership by the listing exchange and the relevant futures exchanges in
the Intermarket Surveillance Group. 36 While the Commission in those orders did not explicitly

Amex-2005-059) (approval order noted that Amex’s “Information Sharing Agreement with the NYMEX and
the CBOT and [Amex’s] Memorandum of Understanding with the LME, along with the Exchange’s
participation in the ISG, in which the CBOT participates … create the basis for the Amex to monitor for
53582 (Mar. 31, 2006), 71 FR 17510, 17518 (Apr. 6, 2006) (SR-Amex-2005-127) (approval order noted that
Amex’s “comprehensive surveillance sharing agreements with the NYMEX and ICE Futures … create the basis
for the Amex to monitor for fraudulent and manipulative practices in the trading of the Units” and that “[s]hould
the USOF invest in oil derivatives traded on markets such as the Singapore Oil Market, the Exchange represents
that it will file a proposed rule change pursuant to Section 19(b) of the [Exchange] Act, seeking Commission
approval of [Amex’s] surveillance agreement with such market”); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54013
(June 16, 2006), 71 FR 36372, 36378–79 (June 26, 2006) (NYSE-2006-17) (approval order noted that NYSE’s
“comprehensive surveillance sharing agreements with the NYMEX, the Kansas City Board of Trade, ICE
Futures, and the LME … create the basis for the NYSE to monitor for fraudulent and manipulative trading
practices” and that “all of the other trading venues on which current Index components and CERFs are traded
are members of the ISG”); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54450 (Sept. 14, 2006), 71 FR 55230, 55236
(Sept. 21, 2006) (SR-Amex-2006-44) (approval order noted that “CME, where the futures contract for each of
the current Index components is traded, is a member of the ISG” and that in the event of new fund investments
in “foreign currency futures contracts traded on futures exchanges other than CME, [Amex] must have a CSSA
with that futures exchange or the futures exchange must be an ISG member”); Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 55029 (Dec. 29, 2006), 72 FR 806, 809–10 (Jan. 8, 2007) (SR-Amex-2006-76) (approval order noted that
Amex’s “Comprehensive Surveillance Sharing Agreement with the ICE Futures, LME, and NYMEX, … and
membership in the Intermarket Surveillance Group (‘ISG’) creates the basis for the Amex to monitor fraudulent
and manipulative practices in the trading of the Shares”); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 56880 (Dec. 3,
2007), 72 FR 69259, 69261 (Dec. 7, 2007) (SR-Amex-2006-96) (approval order noted that Amex has
“information sharing agreements with the InterContinental Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and
the New York Mercantile Exchange and may obtain market surveillance information from other exchanges,
including the Chicago Board of Trade, London Metals Exchange, and the New York Board of Trade through
19987, 19988 (Apr. 20, 2007) (SR-Amex-2006-112) (approval order noted that Amex “currently has in place an
Information Sharing Agreement with the NYMEX and ICE Futures” and that if “USNG invests in Natural Gas
Interests traded on other exchanges, the Amex represented that it will seek to enter into Information Sharing
FR 13599, 13601 (Mar. 13, 2008) (NYSEArca-2007-91) (approval order noted that NYSEArca “can obtain
market surveillance information, including customer identity information, with respect to transactions occurring
on the NYM, the Kansas City Board of Trade, ICE, and the LME, pursuant to its comprehensive information
sharing agreements with each of those exchanges” and that “[a]ll of the other trading venues on which current
Index components are traded are members of the ISG”); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 57838 (May 20,
2008), 73 FR 30649, 30652, (May 28, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2008-09) (approval order noted that NYSEArca
“may obtain information via the ISG from other exchanges who are members or affiliate members of the ISG,”
that NYSEArca “has an information sharing agreement in place with ICE Futures,” and that NYSEArca will file
a proposed rule change “if the Fund invests in EUAs … that constitute more than 10% of the weight of the Fund
where the principal trading market for such component is not a member or affiliate member of the ISG or where
the Exchange does not have a comprehensive surveillance sharing agreement with such market”); Securities
(approval order noted that “with respect to Fund components traded on exchanges, not more than 10% of the
weight of such components in the aggregate will consist of components whose principal trading market is not a
member of the Intermarket Surveillance Group or is a market with which [NYSEArca] does not have a
(footnote continued…)
undertake an analysis of whether the related futures markets were of “significant size,” the exchanges proposing commodity-futures ETPs on a single reference asset or benchmark generally made representations regarding the trading volume of the underlying futures markets.  

(...footnote continued)

See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62213 (June 3, 2010), 75 FR 32828 (June 9, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-22) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) corn futures volume on Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”) for 2008 and 2009 (through November 30, 2009) was 59,934,739 contracts and 47,754,866 contracts, respectively, and as of March 16, 2010, CBOT open interest for corn futures was 1,118,103 contracts, and open interest for near month futures was 447,554 contracts; (ii) the corn futures contract price was $18.337.50 ($3.6675 per bushel and 5,000 bushels per contract), and the approximate value of all outstanding contracts was $20.5 billion; (iii) as of March 16, 2010, open interest in corn swaps cleared on CBOT was approximately 2,100 contracts, with an approximate value of $38.5 million; and (iv) the position limits for all months is 22,000 corn contracts, and the total value of contracts if position limits were reached would be approximately $403.5 million (based on the $18.337.50 contract price), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61954 (Apr. 21, 2010), 75 FR 22663, 22664 n.10 (Apr. 29, 2010)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63610 (Dec. 27, 2010), 76 FR 199 (Jan. 3, 2011) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-101) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) as of June 14, 2010, there was VIX futures contracts open interest on CFE of 88,366 contracts, with a contract price of $25.55 and value of open interest of $2,257,751,300; (ii) total CFE trading volume in 2009 in VIX futures contracts was 1,143,612 contracts, with average daily volume of 4,538 contracts; and (iii) total volume year-to-date (through May 31, 2010) was 1,399,709 contracts, with average daily volume of 13,458 contracts, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63317 (Nov. 16, 2010), 75 FR 71158, 71159 n.9 (Nov. 22, 2010)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63753 (Jan. 21, 2011), 76 FR 4963 (Jan. 27, 2011) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-110) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) natural gas futures volume on New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) for 2009 and 2010 (through October 29, 2010) was 47,864,639 contracts and 52,490,180 contracts, respectively; (ii) as of October 29, 2010, NYMEX open interest for natural gas futures was 794,741 contracts, and open interest for nearest month futures was 47,313 contracts; (iii) the contract price was $40,380 ($4.038 per MMBtu and 10,000 MMBtu per contract), and the approximate value of all (footnote continued…)
outstanding contracts was $32.1 billion; (iv) the position limits for all months is 12,000 natural gas contracts and the total value of contracts if position limits were reached would be approximately $484.56 million (based on the $40,380 contract price); and (v) as of October 29, 2010, open interest in natural gas swaps cleared on NYMEX was approximately 2,618,092 contracts, with an approximate value of $26.4 billion ($4,038 per MMBtu and 2,500 MMBtu per contract), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63493 (Dec. 9, 2010), 75 FR 78290, 78291 n.11 (Dec. 15, 2010); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63869 (Feb. 8, 2011), 76 FR 8799 (Feb. 15, 2011) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-119) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) WTI crude oil futures volume on NYMEX for 2009 and 2010 (through November 30, 2010) was 137,352,118 contracts and 156,155,620 contracts, respectively; (ii) as of November 30, 2010, NYMEX open interest for WTI crude oil was 1,342,325 contracts, and open interest for near month futures was 323,184 contracts; (iii) the position limits for all months is 20,000 WTI crude oil contracts and the total value of contracts if position limits were reached would be approximately $1.68 billion (based on the $84.11 contract price); and (iv) the contract price was $84.110 ($84.11 USD per barrel and 1,000 barrels per contract), and the approximate value of all outstanding contracts was $112.9 billion, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63625 (Dec. 30, 2010), 76 FR 807, 808 n.11 (Jan. 6, 2011)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65134 (Aug. 15, 2011), 76 FR 52034 (Aug. 19, 2011) (SR-NYSEArca-2011-23) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) as of January 31, 2011, there was VIX futures contracts open interest on CFE of 163,396 contracts with a value of open interest of $3,461,984,900; (ii) total CFE trading volume in 2010 in VIX futures contracts was 4,402,616 contracts, with average daily volume of 17,741 contracts; and (iii) total volume year-to-date (through January 31, 2011) was 779,493 contracts, with average daily volume of 38,975 contracts, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64470 (May 11, 2011), 76 FR 28493, 28494 n.12 (May 17, 2011)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65136 (Aug. 15, 2011), 76 FR 52037 (Aug. 19, 2011) (SR-NYSEArca-2011-24) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) natural gas futures volume on NYMEX for 2009 and 2010 (through December 31, 2010) was 47,864,639 contracts and 64,350,673 contracts, respectively; (ii) as of December 31, 2010, NYMEX open interest for all natural gas futures was 772,104 contracts, and the approximate value of all outstanding contracts was $35,664,257,310 [sic]; (iii) open interest as of December 31, 2010 for the near month contract was 166,757 contracts and the near month contract value was $7,345,645,850 ($4.405 per MMBtu and 10,000 MMBtu per contract); (iv) the position accountability limits for all months is 12,000 natural gas contracts and the total value of contracts if position accountability limits were reached would be approximately $528,600,000 million (based on the $4.405 contract price); and (v) as of December 31, 2010, open interest in natural gas swaps cleared on NYMEX was approximately 1,493,013 contracts, with an approximate value of $16,463,384,003 ($4.411 per MMBtu and 2,500 MMBtu per contract), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64464 (May 11, 2011), 76 FR 28483, 28484 n.11 (May 17, 2011)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65344 (Sept. 15, 2011), 76 FR 58549 (Sept. 21, 2011) (SR-NYSEArca-2011-48) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) wheat futures volume on CBOT for 2010 and 2011 (through April 29, 2011) was 23,058,783 contracts and 8,860,135 contracts, respectively; (ii) as of April 29, 2011, open interest for wheat futures was 456,851 contracts; (iii) the wheat contract price was $40,062.50 (801.25 cents per bushel and 5,000 bushels per contract), and the approximate value of all outstanding contracts was $18.3 billion; (iv) the position limits for all months was 6,500 wheat contracts and the total value of contracts if position limits were reached would be approximately $260.4 million (based on the $40,062.50 contract price); (v) soybean futures volume on CBOT for 2010 and 2011 (through April 29, 2011) was 36,962,868 contracts and 16,197,385 contracts, respectively; (vi) as of April 29, 2011, open interest for soybean futures was 572,959 contracts; (vii) the soybean contract price was $69,700.00 (1394 cents per bushel and 5,000 bushels per contract), and the approximate value of all outstanding contracts was $39.9 billion; (viii) the position limits for all months is 6,500 soybean contracts and the total value of contracts if position limits were reached would be approximately $453 million (based on the $69,700.00 contract price); (ix) sugar futures volume on ICE Futures for 2010 and 2011 (through April 29, 2011) was 27,848,391 contracts and 9,045,069 contracts, respectively; (x) as of April 29, 2011, open interest for sugar futures was $70,948 contracts; (xi) the sugar contract price was $24,920.00 (22.25 cents per pound and 112,000 pounds per contract), and the approximate value of all outstanding contracts was $14.2 billion; and (xii) the position limits for all months is 15,000 sugar contracts and the total value of contracts if position limits were reached would be approximately $373.8 million (based on the $24,920.00 contract price), Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 64967 (July 26, 2011), 76 FR 45885, 45886 n.10, 45888 n.20, 45890 n.24 (Aug. 1, 2011)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 66553 (Mar. 9, 2012), 77 FR 15440 (Mar. 15, 2012) (SR-NYSEArca-2012-04) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) as of December 30, 2011, open interest in AUD/USD futures contracts traded on CME was $11.56 billion, and AUD/USD futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 123,006 contracts; (ii) as of December 30, 2011, open interest in CAD/USD futures contracts traded on CME was $11.66 billion, and CAD/USD futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 89,667 contracts; (iii) as of December 30, 2011, open interest in CHF/USD futures contracts traded on CME was $4.99 billion, and CHF/USD futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 40,955 contracts; (iv) futures contracts based on the U.S. Dollar Index (“USDX”) were listed on November 20, 1985, and options on the USDX futures contracts began trading on September 3, 1986; (v) as of December 30, 2011, open interest in USDX futures contracts traded on ICE Futures was $5.44 billion, and USDX futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 30,341 contracts; (vi) as of December 30, 2011, open interest in EUR/USD futures contracts traded on CME was $46.12 billion, and EUR/USD futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 336,947 contracts; and (vii) as of December 30, 2011, open interest in JPY/USD futures contracts traded on CME was $25.75 billion, and JPY/USD futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 113,476 contracts, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 66180 (Jan. 18, 2012), 77 FR 3532, 3534–35 (Jan. 24, 2012); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68165 (Nov. 6, 2012), 77 FR 67707 (Nov. 13, 2012) (SR-NYSEArca-2012-102) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) gold and silver futures contracts traded on Commodity Exchange, Inc. (“COMEX”) are the global benchmark contracts and most liquid futures contracts in the world for each respective commodity; (ii) as of March 15, 2012, open interest in gold futures contracts and silver futures contracts traded on CME was $23.7 billion and $8.5 billion, respectively; (iii) gold futures contracts and silver futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 138,964 contracts and 63,913 contracts, respectively; (iv) CME constitutes the largest regulated foreign exchange marketplace in the world, with over $100 billion in daily liquidity; (v) as of March 15, 2012, open interest in Euro futures contracts and Yen futures contracts traded on CME and, for Dollar futures contracts, on ICE Futures, were $42.7 billion, $20.8 billion, and $4.8 billion, respectively; and (vi) Euro futures contracts, Yen futures contracts, and Dollar futures contracts had an average daily trading volume in 2011 of 325,103, 106,824, and 27,258 contracts, respectively, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67882 (Sept. 18, 2012), 77 FR 58881, 58883 n.10, 58883 n.14 (Sept. 24, 2012)); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81686 (Sept. 22, 2017), 82 FR 45643, 45646 (Sept. 29, 2017) (SR-NYSEArca-2017-05) (order approving the listing and trading of the Direxion Daily Crude Oil Bull 3x Shares and Direxion Daily Crude Oil Bear 3x Shares, citing to NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) the oil contract market was of significant size and liquidity, and had average daily volume of 650,000 contracts and daily open interest of 450,000 contracts; (ii) the Sponsor is registered as a commodity pool operator with the CFTC and is a member of the National Futures Association, and (iii) the CFTC has regulatory jurisdiction over the trading of futures contracts traded on U.S. markets); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 82390 (Dec. 22, 2017), 82 FR 61625 (Dec. 28, 2017) (SR-NYSEArca-2017-107) (notice of proposed rule change included NYSE Arca’s representations that: (i) freight futures liquidity has remained relatively constant, in lot terms, over the last five years with approximately 1.1 million lots trading annually; (ii) open interest currently stood at approximately 290,000 lots across all asset classes representing an estimated value of more than $3 billion, and, of such open interest, Capesize contracts accounted for approximately 50%, Panamax for approximately 40%, and Handymax for approximately 10%, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81681 (Sept. 22, 2017), 82 FR 45342, 45345 (Sept. 28, 2017)). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53582 (Mar. 31, 2006), 71 FR 17510 (Apr. 6, 2006) (SR-Amex-2005-127) (notice of proposed rule change included Amex’s representations that: (i) WTI light, sweet crude oil contract, listed and traded at NYMEX, trades in units of 42,000 gallons (1,000 barrels), and annual daily contract volume on NYMEX from 2001 through October 2005 was 149,028, 182,718, 181,748, 212,382 and 242,262, respectively; (ii) annual daily contract volume on ICE Futures for Brent crude contracts from 2001 through October 2005 was 74,011, 86,499, 96,767, 102,361 and 120,695 respectively; (iii) annual daily contract volume on NYMEX for heating oil futures from 2001 through October 2005 was 41,710, 42,781, 46,327, 51,745 and 52,334, respectively; (iv) annual daily contract volume on NYMEX for natural gas contracts from 2001 through October 2005 was 47,457, 97,431, 76,148, 70,048 and 77,149,
and the Commission was in each of those cases dealing with a large futures market that had been trading for a number of years before an exchange proposed an ETP based on those futures.\(^{38}\) And where the Commission has considered a proposed ETP based on futures that had only recently begun trading,\(^{39}\) the Commission specifically addressed whether the futures on which the ETP

\[\text{(…footnote continued)}\]


\(^{39}\) The Exchange filed its proposal less than one month after bitcoin futures began trading on either CME or CBOE.
was based—which were futures on an index of well-established commodity futures—were illiquid or susceptible to manipulation.\footnote{At issue were futures on an index comprising futures on crude oil, Brent crude oil, natural gas, heating oil, gasoline, gas oil, live cattle, wheat, aluminum, corn, copper, soybeans, lean hogs, gold, sugar, cotton, red wheat, coffee, standard lead, feeder cattle, zinc, primary nickel, cocoa, and silver. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53659 (Apr. 17, 2006), 71 FR 21074, 21080 (Apr. 24, 2006) (SR-NYSE-2006-17) (notice of proposed rule change to list shares of iShares GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust). The Commission concluded that requirements of Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5) had been met because concerns about manipulation would be addressed by the arbitrage relationship between the new index futures and the existing component futures, as well as the ETP listing exchange’s comprehensive surveillance-sharing agreements not only with the market for the index futures, but also with the markets for the component futures. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54013 (June 16, 2006), 71 FR 36372, 36379 (June 26, 2006) (SR-NYSE-2006-17) (order approving listing of shares of iShares GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust). Additionally, the approval order for the ETP noted that, if the volume in any futures contract that was part of the reference index fell below a specified multiple of production of the underlying commodity, that contract’s weight in the index would decrease. See \textit{id.} at 36374.}

Accordingly, the Commission examines below whether the representations by the Exchange, and the comments received from the public, support a finding that the Exchange has entered into a surveillance-sharing agreement with a market of significant size relating to bitcoin, the asset underlying the proposed ETPs, or that alternative means of preventing fraud and manipulation would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5) that the proposed rule change be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.

2. Comments Received

One commenter states that the market for bitcoin derivatives other than bitcoin exchange-traded futures appears to be developing and that financial institutions are reportedly moving toward launching bitcoin-related trading desks and other operations. This commenter believes that the proposed offering of both long and short ETPs raises the possibility that market makers in bitcoin-related derivatives could make two-sided markets if interest in the long and short ETPs is similar in magnitude. The commenter further believes that interest outside of the bitcoin ETPs may be sufficient to motivate market makers to maintain bitcoin derivatives desks.\footnote{See NERA Letter, supra note 9, at 2.} In addition,
the commenter suggests that questions about bitcoin derivatives markets can be addressed through market depth analyses, discussions with potential bitcoin derivatives liquidity providers, and analyses of order and trade data across CME and CBOE to determine the plausibility of simultaneous liquidity collapses on both bitcoin future markets.42

This commenter states that a commonly cited factor mitigating possible susceptibility to manipulation is the securities exchanges’ own surveillance procedures, in addition to the futures exchanges’ surveillance procedures and market surveillance and oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). This commenter cites statements by the CFTC that it has the legal authority and means to police certain spot markets for fraud and manipulation through “heightened review” collaboration with exchanges, that exchanges will provide the CFTC surveillance team with trade settlement data upon request, and that the exchanges will enter into information-sharing agreements with spot market platforms and monitor trading activity on the spot markets. The commenter also states that the Gemini exchange has announced that it would use Nasdaq’s market surveillance system to monitor its marketplace.43

This commenter further asserts that market surveillance is generally a prerequisite to identifying potential market manipulation and discourages market manipulation. The commenter believes that the emergence of institutionalized market surveillance on both futures and spot markets is a positive sign for the long-term future of bitcoin markets.44 The commenter suggests that the Commission, in coordination with the CFTC, self-regulatory organizations, bitcoin futures exchanges, and bitcoin spot market platforms, could gather market surveillance data to

42 See id.
43 See id. at 4–5.
44 See id. at 5.
conduct an independent analysis of trade and settlement patterns and determine whether potentially manipulative trading practices occur on bitcoin spot and futures markets.\textsuperscript{45}

3. Analysis

Unlike previous proposals for bitcoin-based ETPs,\textsuperscript{46} the Exchange does not assert here that bitcoin prices or markets are inherently resistant to manipulation. Instead, the Exchange asserts that its existing surveillance procedures (including its ability to review activity by its members) and its ability to share surveillance information with U.S. futures exchanges are sufficient to meet the requirements of Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5).\textsuperscript{47} One commenter also asserts that the exchange’s own surveillance procedures, along with market surveillance and oversight by the CFTC, can mitigate manipulation.\textsuperscript{48}

While the Exchange would, pursuant to its listing rules, be able to obtain certain information regarding trading in the Shares and in the underlying bitcoin or any bitcoin derivative through registered market makers,\textsuperscript{49} this trade information would be limited to the activities of market participants who trade on the Exchange. Furthermore, neither the Exchange’s

\textsuperscript{45} See id.


\textsuperscript{47} See Notice, supra note 3, 83 FR at 3385.

\textsuperscript{48} See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. This commenter also suggests that the Commission—in coordination with the CFTC, SROs, futures markets, and bitcoin spot platforms—could gather market surveillance data to independently analyze whether manipulative practices occur on bitcoin spot and futures platforms. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. As noted above, however, it is the Exchange that bears the burden to demonstrate that its proposal is designed to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.” See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{49} See Notice, supra note 3, at 83 FR 3385 (“The Exchange is also able to obtain information regarding trading in the Shares, futures, the commodity underlying futures or options on futures through ETP [Exchange Trading Permit] Holders, in connection with such ETP Holders’ proprietary or customer trades which they effect through ETP Holders on any relevant market.”).
ability to surveil trading in the Shares nor its ability to share surveillance information with other securities exchanges trading the Shares would give the Exchange insight into the activity and identity of market participants who trade in bitcoin futures contracts or other bitcoin derivatives or who trade in the underlying bitcoin spot markets, where a substantial majority of trading, the Commission concluded in the Winklevoss Order, “occurs on unregulated venues overseas that are relatively new and that, generally, appear to trade only digital assets.”50 Thus, consistent with its determination in the Winklevoss Order,51 and with the Commission’s previous orders approving commodity-futures ETPs,52 the Commission believes that the Exchange must demonstrate that it has in place a surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated market of significant size related to bitcoin, because “[s]uch agreements provide a necessary deterrent to manipulation because they facilitate the availability of information needed to fully investigate a manipulation if it were to occur.”53

The Exchange represents that it is able to share surveillance information with CME and CBOE, which are bitcoin futures markets regulated by the CFTC, through membership in the Intermarket Surveillance Group.54 Nonetheless, the Commission must disapprove the proposal, because there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that CME’s and CBOE’s bitcoin futures markets are markets of significant size.

50 See Winklevoss Order, supra note 31, 83 FR at 37580.
51 See id. at 37591 (finding that “traditional means” of surveillance were not sufficient in the absence of a surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated market of significant size related to the underlying asset).
52 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting previous commodity-futures ETPs where surveillance sharing in place between ETP listing exchange and underlying futures exchanges).
54 See https://www.isgportal.org/isgPortal/public/members.htm (listing the current members and affiliate members of the Intermarket Surveillance Group).
The Order Instituting Proceedings sought comment on whether the CME and CBOE bitcoin futures markets are markets of significant size, but the Exchange has not responded to any of the questions in the Order Instituting Proceedings, and the only analysis of the underlying futures markets the Exchange has provided in its proposed rule change are the generic statements that the market for bitcoin futures contracts “has limited trading history and operational experience” and that the liquidity of these markets will depend on the adoption of bitcoin and interest in the market for these futures. Thus, there is no basis in the record on which the Commission can conclude that the bitcoin futures markets are markets of significant size.

Publicly available data show that the median daily notional trading volume, from inception through August 10, 2018, has been 14,185 bitcoins on CME and 5,184 bitcoins on CBOE, and that the median daily notional value of open interest on CME and CBOE during the same period has been 10,145 bitcoins and 5,601 bitcoins, respectively. But while these futures contract figures are readily available, meaningful analysis of the size of the CME or CBOE markets relative to the underlying bitcoin spot market is challenging, because reliable data about the spot market, including its overall size, are unavailable.

The Commission also notes that in recent testimony CFTC Chairman Giancarlo characterized the volume of the bitcoin futures markets as “quite small.” Additionally, the

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55 See Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 7, 83 FR at 18605.
56 Notice, supra note 3, 83 FR at 3383; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57 These volume figures were calculated by Commission staff using data published by CME and CBOE on their websites.
58 See Winklevoss Order, supra note 31, 83 FR at 37601.
59 CFTC Chairman Giancarlo testified: “It is important to put the new Bitcoin futures market in perspective. It is quite small with open interest at the CME of 6,695 bitcoin and at Cboe Futures Exchange (Cboe) of 5,569 bitcoin (as of Feb. 2, 2018). At a price of approximately $7,700 per Bitcoin, this represents a notional amount of about $94 million. In comparison, the notional amount of the open interest in CME’s WTI crude oil futures was more than one thousand times greater, about $170 billion (2,600,000 contracts) as of Feb[.] 2, 2018 and the notional amount represented by the open interest of Comex gold futures was about $74 billion (549,000 contracts).”
President and COO of CBOE recently acknowledged in a letter to the Commission staff that “the current bitcoin futures trading volumes on Cboe Futures Exchange and CME may not currently be sufficient to support ETPs seeking 100% long or short exposure to bitcoin.” These statements reinforce the Commission’s conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to determine that the CME and CBOE bitcoin futures markets are markets of significant size.

Furthermore, according to the Notice, under normal market conditions, each Fund intends to obtain exposure to its target benchmark by investing in the Bitcoin Futures Contract as well as other Bitcoin Financial Instruments, which could be options on bitcoin or the Bitcoin Futures Contract and swaps on the Bitcoin Futures Contract. The Funds’ investments in Bitcoin Financial Instruments are used to produce economically “leveraged” or “inverse leveraged” investment results for the Funds. The Notice does not establish any limit on the Funds’ holdings of these other bitcoin-related derivatives; it provides no analysis of the size and liquidity of markets for those derivatives; and it does not discuss whether the Exchange has the ability to share surveillance information with the markets for these derivatives. Thus, as to what might be a substantial proportion of the Funds’ portfolios, the Commission is unable to conclude (…footnote continued)


61 See Notice, supra note 3, 83 FR at 3381; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.

62 See Notice, supra note 3, 83 FR at 3381–82.

63 The Commission also notes that the Exchange did not answer questions in the Order Instituting Proceedings regarding whether, with respect to the Funds that seek leveraged or leveraged-inverse returns, “trading of the Shares, hedging activity, or creation and redemption activity [would] affect the daily volume, volatility, or liquidity of the underlying Bitcoin Financial Instruments or of the spot bitcoin market any differently than a non-leveraged bitcoin futures exchange-traded product would.” Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 7, 83 FR at 18605.
that surveillance-sharing will be available, that the related markets are regulated, or that the related markets are of significant size.

While one commenter suggests that the market for bitcoin derivatives other than exchange-traded futures appears to be developing—and that the offering of long and short bitcoin ETPs “raises the possibility that market makers in Bitcoin derivatives could make two-sided markets if interest in both the long and short ETFs is similar in magnitude”\textsuperscript{64}—these speculative statements do not provide a basis for the Commission to conclude that the non-exchange-traded bitcoin derivatives market is now, or may eventually be, of significant size.

The Commission therefore concludes that Exchange has not demonstrated that it has entered into a surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated market of significant size related to bitcoin, or that, given the current absence of such an agreement, the exchange’s own surveillance procedures described above would, by themselves, be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5) that an exchange’s rules be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.\textsuperscript{65} While CME and CBOE are regulated markets for bitcoin derivatives, there is no basis in the record for the Commission to conclude that these markets are of significant size. Additionally, because bitcoin futures have been trading on CME and CBOE only since December 2017, the Commission has no basis on which to predict how these markets may grow or develop over time, or whether or when they may reach significant size.

Although the Exchange has not demonstrated that a regulated bitcoin futures market of significant size currently exists, the Commission is not suggesting that the development of such a

\textsuperscript{64} See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{65} See 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
market would automatically require approval of a proposed rule change seeking to list and trade shares of an ETP holding bitcoins as an asset. The Commission would need to analyze the facts and circumstances of any particular proposal and examine whether any unique features of a bitcoin futures market would warrant further analysis before approval.

C. Protecting Investors and the Public Interest

1. Comments Received

One commenter asserts that approval of the proposed ETPs would provide greater security in the cryptocurrency market, such as greater liquidity, transparency, and safe custody of assets.\(^\text{66}\) Another commenter asserts that promoting the adoption of bitcoin will allow “paradigms within the cryptocurrency ecosystem,” such as initial coin offerings, to “break up the stranglehold cartels have on accruing and owning capital, as the funding model becomes democratized.”\(^\text{67}\)

One commenter suggests that the Commission could address some of its concerns about the proposed ETPs by working with self-regulatory organizations, and in particular FINRA, to create bitcoin and cryptocurrency-related asset suitability requirements. In addition, this commenter suggests that targeted disclosure requirements could make investors aware of volatility, discourage retail investors from investing more than a small portion of their portfolio in cryptocurrency-related assets, and present historical scenarios to retail investors to demonstrate how an instrument such as a particular bitcoin ETP would have performed over time. This commenter believes that suitability requirements are less prescriptive than an effective ban on a class of product and that they could balance the Commission’s interest in protecting

\(^{66}\) See Santos Letter, supra note 9.
\(^{67}\) See David Letter, supra note 9.
retail investors against its interest in allowing cryptocurrency-related asset markets to continue to develop in regulated markets where the Commission can observe their performance closely.68

2. **Analysis**

The Exchange asserts that approval of the proposal would enhance competition among market participants, to the benefit of investors.69 One commenter asserts that approval of the proposal will provide greater security, transparency, and liquidity, as well as safe custody, for investors in cryptocurrencies.70 And one commenter suggests that the Commission should seek to protect investors through disclosure requirements or suitability standards, rather than disapproving a bitcoin-ETP proposal.71

The Commission acknowledges that, compared to trading in unregulated bitcoin spot markets, trading a bitcoin-based ETP on a national securities exchange may provide some additional protection to investors, but the Commission must consider this potential benefit in the broader context of whether the proposal meets each of the applicable requirements of the Exchange Act. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, the Commission must disapprove a proposed rule change filed by a national securities exchange if it does not find that the proposed rule change is consistent with the applicable requirements of the Exchange Act—including the requirement under Section 6(b)(5) that the rules of a national securities exchange be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.

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68 See NERA Letter, *supra* note 9, at 5–6.
69 See Notice, *supra* note 3, 83 FR at 3387.
70 See *supra* note 66 and accompanying text.
71 See *supra* note 68 and accompanying text. The Commission also notes that the Exchange did not respond to questions in the Order Instituting Proceedings seeking comment on how the Funds’ striking NAV as of 11:00 a.m. E.T. (five hours before the close of the regular trading session) would affect arbitrage, and what the potential effect on investors would be if the arbitrage mechanism were impaired. See Order Instituting Proceedings, *supra* note 7, 83 FR at 18605.
Thus, even if a proposed rule change would provide certain benefits to investors and the markets, the proposed rule change may still fail to meet other requirements under the Exchange Act. For the reasons discussed above, the Exchange has not met its burden of demonstrating an adequate basis in the record for the Commission to find that the proposal is consistent with Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5), and, accordingly, the Commission must disapprove the proposal.

D. Other Comments

Comment letters also addressed the intrinsic value of bitcoin\(^{72}\); the desire of individuals to invest in a bitcoin-based ETP\(^{73}\); the ways in which approval of the proposal would increase investor confidence\(^{74}\); the ways in which promoting the adoption of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies would ease inter-generational tension and wealth inequality and foster the confidence of younger generations in the economic system\(^{75}\); the Commission’s process for granting Exchange Act exemptive relief in connection with ETP approval\(^{76}\); and the potential impact of Commission approval of the proposed ETPs on the price of bitcoin.\(^{77}\) Ultimately, however, additional discussion of these tangential topics is unnecessary, as they do not bear on the basis for the Commission’s decision to disapprove the proposal.

E. Basis for Disapproval

The record before the Commission does not provide a basis for the Commission to conclude that the Exchange has met its burden under the Exchange Act and the Commission’s

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\(^{72}\) See Ahn Letter, supra note 9.

\(^{73}\) See Galt Letter, supra note 9; Santos Letter, supra note 9.

\(^{74}\) See David Letter, supra note 9; Santos Letter, supra note 9.

\(^{75}\) See David Letter, supra note 9.

\(^{76}\) See Williams Letter, supra note 9, at 1.

\(^{77}\) See Santos Letter, supra note 9.
Rules of Practice to demonstrate that its proposed rule change is consistent with Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5).\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{IV. CONCLUSION}

For the reasons set forth above, the Commission does not find, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, that the proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange, and in particular, with Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, that proposed rule change SR-NYSEArca-2018-02 is disapproved.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.\textsuperscript{79}

Brent J. Fields
Secretary

\textsuperscript{78} In disapproving the proposed rule change, the Commission has considered its impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. \textit{See} 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). \textit{See also supra} note 67 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{79} 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).