Date: 04/29/2000 9:52 PM Mr. Jonathan Katz Secretary Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, DC Dear Mr. Katz: As a "fee-mostly" financial planner, I am concerned about two proposed rule changes I have read about under consideration by the SEC. One would allow representatives of major broker-dealers to avoid the disclosure rules that apply to investment advisors, and the other would change the disclosures required of investment advisors. The combined effect of the two rules would be very adverse to both the investing public and to equality in the marketplace. The first change has been called the "Merrill Lynch Rule" in the press. The large national firms have begun advertising themselves as if they were offering fee-only investment advisory services. If they want to do that, and offer those services, they should be subject to the same rules as others offering similar services, namely the rules applying to RIA's. They claim an exemption on the basis that such advisory business is "incidental" to their main business. While it may be a small part of their total gross revenue, the test of whether a practice is "incidental" should be its role in the relationship with their clients using the service. For those clients, the advisory services being advertised are not "incidental" -- they are central to the relationship, and indeed are the reason the relationship exists at all. If this were not the case, why are the airwaves, newspapers, and magazines full of how important is this new way of doing business. Those people are not advertising brokerage accounts, no matter what they might say in their filings with the SEC. I have been a financial planner and investment advisory representative for 15 years. I have worked with many people who were then or had been clients of major brokerage firms. My experience has been that they are rarely told, and even more seldom do they understand, how they are paying for the services and advice they receive. (I have never found a client who understands the brokerage firms' favorite tool, mutual fund B shares.) This is a serious failing, and the SEC should promote more disclosure, not less, from these firms toward their clients. One purpose of the RIA brochure rules is to assure that clients understand the potential conflicts and motivations of the people giving them advice. Clients need this protection at least as much from large firms that manufacture product, underwrite securities, offer custody services, and then deliver those products through "advisors" as they do from independent advisory firms. The second rule that concerns me is the proposed revision to the ADV language, and specifically the materials to be provided to clients. The language describing the changes suggests that all commissions create conflicts of interests of a different kind than any fees do. Paragraph after paragraph talks about how customers can be hurt if I'm advising them to own an in-house mutual fund, or receive soft dollars, or requiring them to use my firm for custody when most advisors don't require this, and on and on. There are two aspects of this line that concern me. First is the assumption that it's really dangerous for a client to work with an investment advisor, especially one who takes commissions. Many times the cumulative amount of annual asset-based fees are much greater than commissions paid once. Maybe the services provided justifiy those fees, but fees aren't always in the client's best interest. Every compensation system creates its own set of incentives and potentials for abuse. A good ADV form, coupled with good public information, can help clients decide what form of paying for help and advice would work best for them. Sometimes it can be asset-based fees, sometimes it can be commissions, sometimes it could be hourly fees. The second problem with these rules is the even bolder assumption that clients of big brokerage firms don't need any on these disclosures. Did the people who drafted the rules on the new ADV form talk to the people who drafted the Merrill Lynch exception? Read the two rules side-by-side, and tell me this is a regulatory scheme that makes sense and protects customers consistently. All of the problems customers are warned about in the ADV form apply in spades to the services provided under the new "fee-only advisory (oops, not really advisory) relationships" pushed by Merrill, MSDW, Pru, and the others. Call me cynical, but the wholesale promotion of "fee only" advice by the big brokerage firms suggests that fee-only advice by itself is not necessarily in the best interest of clients. It depends on who's giving the advice, and with what quality and attention. The key is the combination of what the clients receive, how (and how much) they pay, and what the rules and restrictions imposed on the account are -- not any single factor in isolation. So in conclusion, let everybody who wants to give advice to clients provide the same level of disclosure, and have that disclosure be comprehensive. A well-informed public will choose providers that meet their needs. Some will choose big firms, some want independents, some want to do it themselves. Some want to pay fees, some prefer commissions, or a mixture. The SEC should promote honesty and openness and fairness, and let the market determine which model is best. Thank you for your consideration of these views. Sincerely, Richard E. Vodra, CFP 6827 Montivideo Square Court Falls Church, VA 22043