

Two of these commenters reasoned that, as issuers are prohibited from engaging in general solicitation activities in Rule 506(b) offerings, their existing investors did not purchase securities in offerings that used general solicitation, and any future investments by these investors would be based on their pre-existing relationship with the issuers, and not as a result of general solicitation.⁹⁸ Therefore, a grandfather provision would be appropriate because the purpose of the verification mandate in Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act is to require the verification of the accredited investor status of only prospective purchasers who come to the issuer “as a result of” the issuer’s general solicitation activities.⁹⁹ One commenter stated that, for existing investors, a “reaffirmation representation” of accredited investor status received shortly before or simultaneously with any subsequent investment should be sufficient for Rule 506(c) purposes.¹⁰⁰

3. Final Rule Amendment

After considering the comments and as directed by Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act, we are adopting as a condition of new Rule 506(c) the requirement that issuers take “reasonable steps to verify” that purchasers of the offered securities are accredited investors. This requirement is separate from and independent of the requirement that sales be limited to accredited investors, and must be satisfied even if all purchasers happen to be accredited investors.¹⁰¹ We are also including in Rule 506(c) a non-

⁹⁸ See letters from MFA (Sept. 28, 2012); Tannenbaum Helpern.

⁹⁹ See letter from Tannenbaum Helpern.

¹⁰⁰ See letter from Pepper Hamilton.

¹⁰¹ This will avoid diminishing the incentive for issuers to undertake the reasonable verification steps envisioned by the statute.

exclusive list of methods that issuers may use to satisfy the verification requirement. As discussed above, a number of commenters urged the Commission to provide greater certainty for issuers that the verification requirement has been satisfied by providing a non-exclusive list of methods for verifying the accredited investor status of purchasers in Rule 506(c) offerings. Upon further consideration, we have concluded that a general requirement that issuers take “reasonable steps to verify” that the purchasers are accredited investors, combined with a non-exclusive list of verification methods that are deemed to meet this requirement, would maintain the flexibility of the verification standard while providing additional clarity and certainty that this requirement has been satisfied if one of the specified methods is used. We have specified methods for verifying the accredited investor status of natural persons because we believe that the potential for uncertainty and the risk of participation by non-accredited investors is highest in offerings involving natural persons as purchasers.

a. Principles-Based Method of Verification

Under Rule 506(c), issuers are required to take reasonable steps to verify the accredited investor status of purchasers. Consistent with the Proposing Release, whether the steps taken are “reasonable” will be an objective determination by the issuer (or those acting on its behalf), in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of each purchaser and transaction. Among the factors that issuers should consider under this facts and circumstances analysis are:

- the nature of the purchaser and the type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to be;
 - the amount and type of information that the issuer has about the purchaser;
- and

- the nature of the offering, such as the manner in which the purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering, and the terms of the offering, such as a minimum investment amount.

As noted in the Proposing Release, these factors are interconnected and are intended to help guide an issuer in assessing the reasonable likelihood that a purchaser is an accredited investor – which would, in turn, affect the types of steps that would be reasonable to take to verify a purchaser’s accredited investor status. After consideration of the facts and circumstances of the purchaser and of the transaction, the more likely it appears that a purchaser qualifies as an accredited investor, the fewer steps the issuer would have to take to verify accredited investor status, and vice versa. For example, if the terms of the offering require a high minimum investment amount and a purchaser is able to meet those terms, then the likelihood of that purchaser satisfying the definition of accredited investor may be sufficiently high such that, absent any facts that indicate that the purchaser is not an accredited investor, it may be reasonable for the issuer to take fewer steps to verify or, in certain cases, no additional steps to verify accredited investor status other than to confirm that the purchaser’s cash investment is not being financed by a third party.

Regardless of the particular steps taken, because the issuer has the burden of demonstrating that its offering is entitled to an exemption from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act,¹⁰² it will be important for issuers and

¹⁰² SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (“Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation, imposition of the burden of proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption seems to us fair and reasonable.”).

their verification service providers to retain adequate records regarding the steps taken to verify that a purchaser was an accredited investor.

Nature of the Purchaser. In determining the reasonableness of the steps to verify accredited investor status, an issuer should consider the nature of the purchaser of the offered securities. The definition of “accredited investor” in Rule 501(a) includes natural persons and entities that come within any of eight enumerated categories in the rule, or that the issuer reasonably believes come within one of those categories, at the time of the sale of securities to that natural person or entity. Some purchasers may be accredited investors based on their status, such as:

- a broker or dealer registered pursuant to Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”);¹⁰³ or
- an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”) or a business development company as defined in Section 2(a)(48) of that Act.¹⁰⁴

Some purchasers may be accredited investors based on a combination of their status and the amount of their total assets, such as:

- a plan established and maintained by a state, its political subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality of a state or its political subdivisions, for the benefit of its employees, if such plan has total assets in excess of \$5 million;¹⁰⁵ or

¹⁰³ See 17 CFR 230.501(a)(1).

¹⁰⁴ See id.

¹⁰⁵ See id.

- an Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 501(c)(3) organization, corporation, Massachusetts or similar business trust, or partnership, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, with total assets in excess of \$5 million.¹⁰⁶

Natural persons may be accredited investors based on either their net worth or their annual income, as follows:

- a natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, exceeds \$1 million, excluding the value of the person’s primary residence;¹⁰⁷ or
- a natural person who had an individual income in excess of \$200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of \$300,000 in each of those years, and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.¹⁰⁸

As Rule 501(a) sets forth different categories of accredited investors, an issuer should recognize that the steps that will be reasonable to verify whether a purchaser is an accredited investor will vary depending on the type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to be. For example, the steps that may be reasonable to verify that an entity is an accredited investor by virtue of being a registered broker-dealer – such as by going to FINRA’s BrokerCheck website¹⁰⁹ – will necessarily differ from the steps that may be reasonable to verify whether a natural person is an accredited investor.

¹⁰⁶ See 17 CFR 230.501(a)(3).

¹⁰⁷ See 17 CFR 230.501(a)(5).

¹⁰⁸ See 17 CFR 230.501(a)(6).

¹⁰⁹ This website is available at: <http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/>.

As we stated in the Proposing Release, the verification of natural persons as accredited investors may pose greater practical difficulties as compared to other categories of accredited investors, particularly for natural persons claiming to be accredited investors based on the net worth test. These practical difficulties likely will be exacerbated by privacy concerns about the disclosure of personal financial information. As between the net worth test and the income test for natural persons, we recognize that commenters have suggested that it might be more difficult for an issuer to obtain information about the assets and liabilities that determine a person’s net worth – particularly the liabilities – than it would be to obtain information about a person’s annual income,¹¹⁰ although there could be privacy concerns with respect to either test. The question of what type of information would be sufficient to constitute reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status under the particular facts and circumstances will also depend on other factors, as described below.

Information about the Purchaser. The amount and type of information that an issuer has about a purchaser can also be a significant factor in determining what additional steps would be reasonable to take to verify the purchaser’s accredited investor status. The more information an issuer has indicating that a prospective purchaser is an accredited investor, the fewer steps it may have to take, and vice versa.¹¹¹ Examples of the types of information that issuers could review or rely upon – any of which might,

¹¹⁰ See letters from NASAA (stating that “[v]erification of net worth is more challenging because an individual could provide proof of assets but not liabilities.”); P. Sigelman (Sept. 28, 2012).

¹¹¹ If an issuer has actual knowledge that the purchaser is an accredited investor, then the issuer will not have to take any steps at all.

depending on the circumstances, in and of themselves constitute reasonable steps to verify a purchaser's accredited investor status – include, without limitation:

- publicly available information in filings with a federal, state or local regulatory body – for example, without limitation:
 - the purchaser is a named executive officer of an Exchange Act registrant, and the registrant's proxy statement discloses the purchaser's compensation; or
 - the purchaser claims to be an IRC Section 501(c)(3) organization with \$5 million in assets, and the organization's Form 990 series return filed with the Internal Revenue Service discloses the organization's total assets;¹¹²
- third-party information that provides reasonably reliable evidence that a person falls within one of the enumerated categories in the accredited investor definition – for example, without limitation:
 - the purchaser is a natural person and provides copies of pay stubs for the two most recent years and the current year; or
 - specific information about the average compensation earned at the purchaser's workplace by persons at the level of the purchaser's seniority is publicly available; or

¹¹² Such an organization is required to make the Form 990 series returns available for public inspection. See Internal Revenue Service, Public Disclosure and Availability of Exempt Organizations Returns and Applications: Documents Subject to Public Disclosure, available at: <http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Public-Disclosure-and-Availability-of-Exempt-Organizations>Returns-and-Applications:-Documents-Subject-to-Public-Disclosure> (last reviewed or updated April 28, 2013).

- verification of a person’s status as an accredited investor by a third party, provided that the issuer has a reasonable basis to rely on such third-party verification.¹¹³

Nature and Terms of the Offering. The nature of the offering – such as the means through which the issuer publicly solicits purchasers – may be relevant in determining the reasonableness of the steps taken to verify accredited investor status. An issuer that solicits new investors through a website accessible to the general public, through a widely disseminated email or social media solicitation, or through print media, such as a newspaper, will likely be obligated to take greater measures to verify accredited investor status than an issuer that solicits new investors from a database of pre-screened accredited investors created and maintained by a reasonably reliable third party. We believe that an issuer will be entitled to rely on a third party that has verified a person’s status as an accredited investor, provided that the issuer has a reasonable basis to rely on such third-party verification. We do not believe that an issuer will have taken reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status if it, or those acting on its behalf, required only

¹¹³ For example, in the future, services may develop that verify a person’s accredited investor status for purposes of new Rule 506(c) and permit issuers to check the accredited investor status of possible investors, particularly for web-based Rule 506 offering portals that include offerings for multiple issuers. This third-party service, as opposed to the issuer itself, could obtain appropriate documentation or otherwise take reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status. Several commenters, in fact, have recommended that the Commission take action to facilitate the ability of issuers to rely on third parties to perform the necessary verification. See letters from NASAA (July 3, 2012) (recommending that the Commission allow an issuer to obtain the necessary verification through registered broker-dealers, provided that there are independent liability provisions for failure to adequately perform the verification); Massachusetts Securities Division (July 2, 2012) (urging the Commission to adopt as a safe harbor or best practice the use of an independent party, such as a broker-dealer, bank, or other financial institution, that would verify the accredited investor status of purchasers). One commenter, however, expressed concerns that some of the websites that currently offer lists of accredited investors could be used to facilitate fraud, noting that some offer lists based on “ethnicity, gender, and lifestyle – presumably to make [it] easier for scammers to relate to marks – and ominously, ‘seniors.’” Letter from I. Moscovitz and J. Maxfield (June 27, 2012).

that a person check a box in a questionnaire or sign a form, absent other information about the purchaser indicating accredited investor status.

The terms of the offering will also affect whether the verification methods used by the issuer are reasonable. We continue to believe that there is merit to the view that a purchaser's ability to meet a high minimum investment amount could be a relevant factor to the issuer's evaluation of the types of steps that would be reasonable to take in order to verify that purchaser's status as an accredited investor. By way of example, the ability of a purchaser to satisfy a minimum investment amount requirement that is sufficiently high such that only accredited investors could reasonably be expected to meet it, with a direct cash investment that is not financed by the issuer or by any third party, could be taken into consideration in verifying accredited investor status.

Commenters suggested a number of alternative approaches to implementing the verification mandate. Some commenters urged us to adopt a requirement that prescribes specific methods of verification that issuers must use, either because they believed such methods are needed for issuers seeking clarity on how to comply with this condition of Rule 506(c)¹¹⁴ or because they believed that such methods are needed to maintain investor protection.¹¹⁵ We have decided not to take such an approach. As we stated in the Proposing Release, we believe that, at present, requiring issuers to use specified methods of verification will be impractical and potentially ineffective in light of the numerous ways in which a purchaser can qualify as an accredited investor, as well as the potentially wide range of verification issues that may arise, depending on the nature of

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., letter from Handler Thayer, LLP.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., letters from AARP; CII.

the purchaser and the facts and circumstances of a particular Rule 506(c) offering. We are also concerned that a prescriptive rule that specifies required verification methods could be overly burdensome in some cases, by requiring issuers to follow the same steps, regardless of their particular circumstances, and ineffective in others, by requiring steps that, in the particular circumstances, would not actually verify accredited investor status.

We believe that the approach we are adopting appropriately addresses the concerns underlying the verification mandate by obligating issuers to take reasonable steps to verify that the purchasers are accredited investors, but not requiring them to follow uniform verification methods that may be ill-suited or unnecessary to a particular offering or purchaser in light of the facts and circumstances. We also expect that such an approach will give issuers and market participants the flexibility to adopt different approaches to verification depending on the circumstances, to adapt to changing market practices, and to implement innovative approaches to meeting the verification requirement, such as the development of reliable third-party databases of accredited investors and verification services. In addition, we anticipate that many practices currently used by issuers in connection with existing Rule 506 offerings will satisfy the verification requirement for offerings pursuant to Rule 506(c).

b. Non-Exclusive Methods of Verifying Accredited Investor Status

In addition to adopting a principles-based method of verification, we are including in Rule 506(c) four specific non-exclusive methods of verifying accredited investor status for natural persons that, if used, are deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c); provided, however, that none of these methods will be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement if the issuer or its agent has knowledge that the purchaser is not

an accredited investor.¹¹⁶ While the principles-based method of verification is intended to provide an issuer with the flexibility to address the particular facts and circumstances surrounding its offering, we appreciate the view of some commenters that the final rule should include a non-exclusive list of specific verification methods for natural persons that may be relied upon by those issuers seeking greater certainty that they satisfy the rule’s verification requirement.¹¹⁷ Accordingly, we are adding a non-exclusive list of specific verification methods to supplement our principles-based framework for verifying accredited investor status.¹¹⁸ Issuers are not required to use any of the methods discussed below, and can apply the reasonableness standard directly to the specific facts and circumstances presented by the offering and the investors.¹¹⁹

First, in verifying whether a natural person is an accredited investor on the basis of income, an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) by reviewing copies of any Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) form that reports income, including, but not limited to, a Form W-2 (“Wage and Tax Statement”), Form 1099 (report of various types of income), Schedule K-1 of Form 1065 (“Partner’s Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc.”), and a copy of a filed Form 1040 (“U.S. Individual

¹¹⁶ Because an issuer must have a reasonable belief that the purchaser is an accredited investor, the issuer could not form such reasonable belief if it has knowledge that the purchaser is not an accredited investor. See Section II.C of this release for a discussion of the reasonable belief standard in the definition of accredited investor in Rule 501(a).

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., letters from ACA (Sept. 27, 2012 and Dec. 11, 2012); Investor Advisory Committee; MFA (Sept. 28, 2012).

¹¹⁸ Information and documentation collected for these verification purposes may be subject to federal and/or state privacy and data security requirements. See, e.g., Regulation S-P [17 CFR 248.1 - 248.30] (implementing notice requirements and restrictions on a financial institution’s ability to disclose nonpublic personal information about customers); Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), Release No. 34-42974 (June 22, 2000) [65 FR 40334 (June 29, 2000)].

¹¹⁹ We expect that many issuers will conduct Rule 506(c) offerings in reliance on the principles-based method of verification, in light of its flexibility and efficiency.

Income Tax Return”),¹²⁰ for the two most recent years, along with obtaining a written representation from such person that he or she has a reasonable expectation of reaching the income level necessary to qualify as an accredited investor during the current year. In the case of a person who qualifies as an accredited investor based on joint income with that person’s spouse, an issuer would be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) by reviewing copies of these forms for the two most recent years in regard to, and obtaining written representations from, both the person and the spouse.

Second, in verifying whether a natural person is an accredited investor on the basis of net worth, an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) by reviewing one or more of the following types of documentation, dated within the prior three months,¹²¹ and by obtaining a written representation from such person that all liabilities necessary to make a determination of net worth have been disclosed. In the case of a person who qualifies as an accredited investor based on joint net worth with that person’s spouse, an issuer would be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) by reviewing such documentation in regard to, and obtaining representations from, both the person and the spouse. For assets: bank statements, brokerage statements and other statements of securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax assessments and appraisal reports issued by independent third parties are deemed to be satisfactory; and

¹²⁰ A person could provide a redacted version of an Internal Revenue Service form so as to disclose only information about annual income and to avoid disclosure of personally identifiable information, such as a Social Security number, or other information that would not be relevant to the determination of a person’s annual income.

¹²¹ A person could provide redacted versions of these documents so as to disclose only information about the amounts of assets and liabilities and to avoid disclosure of personally identifiable information, such as a Social Security number, or other information that would not be relevant to the determination of a person’s net worth.

for liabilities: a consumer report (also known as a credit report) from at least one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies is required.¹²² Commenters did not provide examples of any other type of documentation that would, in our view, adequately evidence liabilities.¹²³ We recognize that it will be difficult for an issuer to determine whether it has a complete picture of a natural person’s liabilities, and therefore, for purposes of this method, consistent with the suggestions of some commenters, we are requiring a consumer report and a written representation from such person that all liabilities necessary to make a determination of net worth have been disclosed.

Third, an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) by obtaining a written confirmation from a registered broker-dealer, an SEC-registered investment adviser, a licensed attorney, or a certified public accountant that such person or entity has taken reasonable steps to verify that the purchaser is an accredited investor within the prior three months and has determined that such purchaser is an accredited investor.¹²⁴ While third-party confirmation by one of these parties will be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c), depending on the circumstances, an issuer may be entitled to rely on the verification of accredited investor status by a person or entity other than one of these parties, provided that any such third party takes

¹²² We note that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) [15 U.S.C. 1681 *et seq.*] requires each of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies to provide a person with a free copy of his or her consumer report, upon request, once every 12 months. In addition, the FCRA permits third parties to access individual consumer reports with the written permission of the individual.

¹²³ One commenter suggested that the Commission “require the issuer to obtain a list of liabilities from the investor, which would include a sworn statement that all material liabilities are disclosed.” Letter from NASAA. Another commenter noted that liabilities can be cross checked against UCC 1 filings, bankruptcy information on Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), and credit reports. *See* letter from P. Sigelman (Sept. 28, 2012).

¹²⁴ For purposes of this method, a licensed attorney must be in good standing under the laws of the jurisdictions in which the attorney is admitted to practice law, and a certified public accountant must be in good standing under the laws of the place of the accountant’s residence or principal office.

reasonable steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors and has determined that such purchasers are accredited investors, and the issuer has a reasonable basis to rely on such verification.

Fourth, with respect to any natural person who invested in an issuer's Rule 506(b) offering as an accredited investor prior to the effective date of Rule 506(c) and remains an investor of the issuer, for any Rule 506(c) offering conducted by the same issuer, the issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) with respect to any such person by obtaining a certification by such person at the time of sale that he or she qualifies as an accredited investor.

We are including the first three methods in our non-exclusive list of methods that are deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) because we believe that there will likely be few instances in which they would not constitute reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status. With respect to the verification method for the income test, there are numerous penalties for falsely reporting information in an Internal Revenue Service form, and these forms are filed with the Internal Revenue Service for purposes independent of investing in a Rule 506(c) offering. Similarly, we believe that the various forms of documentation set forth in the verification method for the net worth test ordinarily are generated for reasons other than to invest in a Rule 506(c) offering (with the possible exception of appraisal reports) and, in combination with a consumer report and a written representation from the investor regarding his or her liabilities, constitute sufficiently reliable evidence that such person's net worth exceeds \$1 million, excluding the value of the person's primary residence. With respect to the third-party verification method, we have included written confirmations from certain third parties in our non-

exclusive list of verification methods because these third parties are subject to various regulatory and/or licensing requirements. Registered broker-dealers¹²⁵ and SEC-registered investment advisers¹²⁶ are regulated by the Commission; and in the United States, attorneys and certified public accountants are licensed at the state level and are subject to rules of professional conduct¹²⁷ as well as, to the extent they appear or practice before the Commission in any way, to the Commission's Rules of Practice.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Registered broker-dealers are subject to a comprehensive system of oversight by the Commission as well as FINRA. In particular, registered broker-dealers, among other things, must maintain and preserve specified books and records, develop effective supervisory policies and controls, and comply with FINRA rules regarding registration and qualification requirements for their associated persons as well as general and specific conduct rules. In addition, registered broker-dealers are subject to examinations by both FINRA and Commission staff.

¹²⁶ An investment adviser must register with the Commission unless it is prohibited from registering under Section 203A of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 USC 80b-3a] (the "Advisers Act") or is exempt from registration under Advisers Act Section 203 [15 USC 80b-3]. Investment advisers that are prohibited from registering with the Commission instead may be subject to regulation by the states, but the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act continue to apply to them. See Advisers Act Sections 203A(b) and 206 [15 USC 80b-3(a), 15 USC 80b-6]. SEC-registered investment advisers are subject to examinations by Commission staff.

¹²⁷ Attorneys are subject to state standards for professional competence and ethical conduct, such as those based on the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted by most states in the United States. For example, Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person or failing to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client. Accountants are also subject to state standards for professional competence and ethical conduct, such as those based on the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct ET 201.01, 202.01; see also, e.g., The Uniform Accountancy Act (5th ed. 2007), available at: http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/State/StateContactInfo/uaa/DownloadableDocuments/UAA_Fifth_Edition_January_2008.pdf.

The Commission recognizes that there may be particular considerations a certified public accountant would need to take into account to comply with applicable professional standards for attestation engagements to provide a report that constitutes a confirmation in the context of this rule.

¹²⁸ See Rule 102(e) of the Rules of Practice [17 CFR 201.102(e)] (The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing and practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter: (i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or (ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or (iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.).

We are including the fourth method in our non-exclusive list of methods that are deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c) because we acknowledge that existing accredited investors who purchased securities in an issuer's Rule 506(b) offering prior to the effective date of Rule 506(c) would presumably participate in any subsequent offering by the same issuer conducted pursuant to Rule 506(c) based on their pre-existing relationships with the issuer. Accordingly, for these existing investors who were accredited investors in a Rule 506(b) offering prior to the effective date of Rule 506(c), a self-certification at the time of sale that he or she is an accredited investor will be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in Rule 506(c). This provision does not extend to existing investors in an issuer who were not accredited investors in a Rule 506(b) offering that was conducted prior to the effective date of Rule 506(c).

While we have not adopted the recommendations of commenters who believe that even more prescriptive verification requirements are needed, we do recognize the general concern regarding possible misuse of the new Rule 506(c) exemption to sell securities to those who are not qualified to participate in the offering. We will closely monitor and study the development of verification practices by issuers, securities intermediaries and others by undertaking a review of whether such practices are, in fact, resulting in the exclusion of non-accredited investors from participation in these offerings, and the impact of compliance with this verification requirement on investor protection and capital formation.

C. Reasonable Belief that All Purchasers Are Accredited Investors

In the Proposing Release, we noted that a number of commenters had raised concerns that the language of Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act could be interpreted as precluding the use of the "reasonable belief" standard in the definition of "accredited

investor” in Rule 501(a) in determining whether a purchaser is an accredited investor, such that an issuer’s determination as to whether a purchaser is an accredited investor is subject to an absolute, rather than a “reasonable belief,” standard.¹²⁹ In their view, issuers may be more reluctant to use general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings if their determinations as to whether a purchaser is an accredited investor are subject to an absolute standard. Other commenters had interpreted the difference in the statutory language used in Section 201(a)(1) and Section 201(a)(2)¹³⁰ as indicating Congress’ intent that the Commission “raise the ‘reasonable belief’ standard for Rule 506 offerings....”¹³¹

Commenters on the Proposing Release were divided on the Commission’s interpretation that the reasonable belief standard in Rule 501(a) applies to offerings under Rule 506(c). Several commenters supported this interpretation;¹³² and other commenters opposed this interpretation.¹³³

¹²⁹ See, e.g., letters from ABA Fed. Reg. Comm. (Apr. 30, 2012); BlackRock (May 3, 2012); NYCBA (May 4, 2012); W. Sjostrom, Jr. (Apr. 14, 2012).

¹³⁰ Section 201(a)(2) of the JOBS Act, which calls for amendments to Rule 144A, specifically refers to a “reasonable belief” standard as to whether a purchaser is a QIB, whereas Section 201(a)(1) does not mention a similar “reasonable belief” standard with respect to the amendments to Rule 506.

¹³¹ Letter from Fund Democracy (May 24, 2012). See also letter from Massachusetts Securities Division (July 2, 2012).

¹³² See letters from ABA Fed. Reg. Comm. (stating that it “strongly support[s] the continued inclusion of the reasonable belief standard in the accredited investor definition, whether the offering is conducted under Rule 506(b) without general solicitation, or under Rule 506(c) with general solicitation”); IAA; MFA (Sept. 28, 2012) (stating that “[e]liminating the ‘reasonable belief’ standard in the definition of accredited investor would preclude issuers from relying on Rule 506(c)” and that, if this were the case, “[i]ssuers would not engage in general solicitation and Section 201 would fail in its intended purposes to modernize the securities laws”); NSBA; NYCBA; P. Rutledge.

¹³³ See letters from AFL-CIO and AFR (stating that “the legislative record reflects unmistakable congressional intent that securities sold through general solicitation and advertising under Rule 506 be sold only to accredited investors, not individuals issuers reasonably believe to be accredited investors”); Sen. Levin (stating that the “Proposed Rule also creates, with no statutory basis, an alternative to the ‘reasonable steps’ requirement in the statute by stating that issuers may engage in a general solicitation or advertising so long as they ‘reasonably believe’ that the investors to be addressed will be accredited”); Consumer

We are reaffirming the view that we expressed on this issue in the Proposing Release. In our view, the difference in the language between Section 201(a)(1) and Section 201(a)(2) reflects only the differing manner in which the reasonable belief standard was included in the respective rules at the time they were adopted, and does not represent a Congressional intent to eliminate the existing reasonable belief standard in Rule 501(a) or for Rule 506 offerings.¹³⁴ We note that the definition of accredited investor remains unchanged with the enactment of the JOBS Act and includes persons that come within any of the listed categories of accredited investors, as well as persons that the issuer reasonably believes come within any such category.

Further, as discussed in the Proposing Release, we continue to recognize that a person could provide false information or documentation to an issuer in order to purchase securities in an offering made under new Rule 506(c). Thus, even if an issuer has taken reasonable steps to verify that a purchaser is an accredited investor, it is possible that a person nevertheless could circumvent those measures.¹³⁵ If a person who does not meet

Federation (stating that a reasonable belief standard “is in direct conflict with the statutory mandate that all investors in offerings sold through general solicitation and advertising be accredited investors and that the Commission specify methods issuers must follow to ensure that this is the case”); Fund Democracy (arguing that “Congress intentionally chose not to make such [a reasonable belief] exception to the mandate that Rule 506 purchasers be accredited investors”).

¹³⁴ Both Rule 506 and Rule 144A currently provide for a reasonable belief standard regarding the eligibility of an investor to participate in an offering under the respective rules, but they reach that result in different ways. For Rule 506, the Commission chose to include the reasonable belief standard within the Rule 501(a) definition of “accredited investor”; for Rule 144A, the Commission chose to include the standard as a condition, in paragraph (d)(1), to the use of the exemption.

¹³⁵ We note that several federal courts have been unsympathetic to attempts by investors who represented that they were accredited investors at the time of the sale of securities to subsequently disavow those representations in order to pursue a cause of action under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that Rule 505 was unavailable because the plaintiffs “specifically warranted and represented in the subscription agreement ... that they were accredited investors”); Goodwin Properties, LLC v. Acadia Group, Inc., No. 01-49-P-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9975 (D. Me. 2001) (noting that the plaintiffs “provided the defendants with reason to believe that they were accredited investors as defined by 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)” and stating that

the criteria for any category of accredited investor purchases securities in a Rule 506(c) offering, we believe that the issuer will not lose the ability to rely on Rule 506(c) for that offering, so long as the issuer took reasonable steps to verify that the purchaser was an accredited investor and had a reasonable belief that such purchaser was an accredited investor at the time of sale.¹³⁶

D. Form D Check Box for Rule 506(c) Offerings

Form D is the notice of an offering of securities conducted without registration under the Securities Act in reliance on Regulation D.¹³⁷ Under Rule 503 of Regulation D, an issuer offering or selling securities in reliance on Rule 504, 505 or 506 must file a notice of sales on Form D with the Commission for each new offering of securities no later than 15 calendar days after the first sale of securities in the offering. Form D is currently organized around 16 numbered “items” or categories of information. The information required to be provided in a Form D filing includes basic identifying information, such as the name of the issuer of the securities and the issuer’s year and place of incorporation or organization; information about related persons (executive

therefore “[t]hey cannot now disavow those representations in order to support their claims against the defendants”); Faye L. Roth Revocable Trust v. UBS Painewebber Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (stating that the plaintiffs “cannot disavow their representations that they were accredited investors” and concluding that there was no material dispute that the offering complied with Regulation D).

¹³⁶ Our views regarding an issuer’s ability to maintain the exemption for a Rule 506(c) offering notwithstanding the fact that not all purchasers meet the criteria for any category of accredited investor are consistent with our views regarding the effect of attempts by prospective investors to circumvent the requirement in Regulation S that offers and sales be made only to non-U.S. persons. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Release No. 33-7516 (Mar. 23, 1998) [63 FR 14806 (Mar. 27, 1998)] (“In our view, if a U.S. person purchases securities or investment services notwithstanding adequate procedures reasonably designed to prevent the purchase, we would not view the Internet offer after the fact as having been targeted at the United States, absent indications that would put the issuer on notice that the purchaser was a U.S. person.”).

¹³⁷ Form D also applies to offerings conducted using the Section 4(a)(5) exemption. The Commission adopted Form D when it adopted Regulation D in 1982. Release No. 33-6389 (adopting Form D as a replacement for Forms 4(6), 146, 240 and 242).

officers, directors, and promoters); the exemption or exemptions being claimed for the offering; and factual information about the offering, such as the duration of the offering, the type of securities offered and the total offering amount.

1. Proposed Form Amendment

We proposed revising Form D to add a separate field or check box for issuers to indicate whether they are claiming an exemption under Rule 506(c). Item 6 of Form D currently requires the issuer to identify the claimed exemption or exemptions for the offering from among Rule 504's paragraphs and subparagraphs, Rule 505, Rule 506 and former Section 4(5), as applicable. Under the proposal, a new check box in Item 6 of Form D would require issuers to indicate specifically whether they are relying on the Rule 506(c) exemption. In addition, the current check box for "Rule 506" would be renamed "Rule 506(b)," and the current check box for "Section 4(5)" would be renamed "Section 4(a)(5)" to update the reference to former Section 4(5) of the Securities Act.

We explained in the Proposing Release that this revision would provide additional information needed to assist our efforts to analyze the use of general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings and the size of this offering market. The information would also help us to look into the practices that may develop to satisfy the verification requirement, which would assist us in assessing the effectiveness of various verification practices in identifying and excluding non-accredited investors from participation in Rule 506(c) offerings.

2. Comments on the Proposed Form Amendment

Most commenters who expressed a view on the proposed checkbox in Form D supported the addition of this checkbox for issuers to indicate whether they are relying on

securities, are “qualified purchasers,”¹⁴⁹ and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of its securities.

Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act directs the Commission to eliminate the prohibition against general solicitation for a new category of Rule 506 offerings, and makes no specific reference to private funds. Section 201(b) of the JOBS Act also provides that “[o]ffers and sales exempt under [Rule 506, as revised pursuant to Section 201(a)] shall not be deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of general advertising or general solicitation.” We historically have regarded Rule 506 transactions as non-public offerings for purposes of Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7).¹⁵⁰ As we stated in the Proposing Release and reaffirm here, the effect of Section 201(b) is to permit private funds to engage in general solicitation in compliance with new Rule 506(c) without losing either of the exclusions under the Investment Company Act.

A few commenters argued that Section 201(b) does not permit private funds to engage in general solicitation under proposed Rule 506(c) without losing their exclusions under the Investment Company Act.¹⁵¹ In our view, although Section 201(b) does not explicitly reference the meaning of “public offering” under the Investment Company Act, it clearly states that “[o]ffers and sales exempt under [Rule 506, as revised pursuant to

¹⁴⁹ See Section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(51)] and the rules thereunder. See also Rule 3c-5 under the Investment Company Act (excluding “knowledgeable employees” from the determination of whether all of the outstanding securities of the fund relying on Section 3(c)(7) are owned exclusively by qualified purchasers).

¹⁵⁰ See Release No. 33-6389 (noting that the “Commission regards rule 506 transactions as non-public offerings for purposes of the definition of ‘investment company’ in section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act”); Privately Offered Investment Companies, Release No. IC-22597 (Apr. 3, 1997) [62 FR 17512 (Apr. 9, 1997)], at n. 5 (noting that the “Commission believes that section 3(c)(7)’s public offering limitation should be interpreted in the same manner as the limitation in section 3(c)(1)”).

¹⁵¹ See letter from Fund Democracy (stating that “Section 201(b) refers only to Rule 506; it makes no reference to the meaning of ‘public offering’ under the Investment Company Act exemptions”). See also letter from AFL-CIO and AFR.

Section 201(a)] shall not be deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of general advertising or general solicitation” (emphasis added). As the Investment Company Act is a federal securities law, the effect of Section 201(b) is to permit offers and sales of securities under Rule 506(c) by private funds relying on the exclusions from the definition of “investment company” under Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act.

Some commenters expressed concerns about private funds engaging in general solicitation under proposed Rule 506(c).¹⁵² Other commenters, however, supported the removal of the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings with respect to private funds,¹⁵³ with some commenters stating that the removal of the ban would bring greater transparency to the private fund industry and allow managers of private funds to communicate more effectively with the public and prospective investors.¹⁵⁴

Some commenters who were concerned about private funds engaging in general solicitation recommended that we impose additional conditions on private funds that rely on Rule 506(c). In particular, a number of commenters believed that private funds engaging in general solicitation should be subject to some form of content and/or other restrictions, and suggested potential methods.¹⁵⁵ For example, some believed that, in

¹⁵² See, e.g., letters from A. La Rosa; A. Pierwola; AFL-CIO and AFR; C. Erickson; Consumer Federation; E. Guthrie; F. Urling; Fund Democracy; J. Clark; K. Pesson; M. Gessford; M. Trail; M. Zartler; R. Dunn; S. Johnston; W. Cunningham.

¹⁵³ See, e.g., letters from BlackRock; Dukas; Forum for U.S. Securities Lawyers in London; HFA; IAA; MFA (Sept. 28, 2012); NYCBA; SRC of NYSBA.

¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., letters from Dukas; HFA.

¹⁵⁵ See, e.g., letters from ICI; AFL-CIO and AFR; C. Corn; Sen. Levin (stating that “Congress did not contemplate removing the general solicitation ban – without retaining any limitations on forms of

order to engage in general solicitation, private funds should be held to performance and advertising standards that are analogous to mutual fund standards.¹⁵⁶ One of these commenters suggested that the Commission develop rules tailored to the ways private funds calculate and present investment performance, rather than extending mutual fund performance rules to private funds.¹⁵⁷ Some made other suggestions, such as requiring each private fund relying on Rule 506(c) to disclose that the private fund is not registered with the Commission and should not be confused with a registered fund, such as a mutual fund.¹⁵⁸ With respect to private funds sold through broker-dealers subject to FINRA's rules of conduct, some commenters believed that we should direct FINRA to require the

solicitation – for private investment vehicles”); Consumer Federation; D. Kronheim; D. Smith; Fund Democracy; G. Lavy; G. Morin; Investor Advisory Committee; IDC; J. Sanders; Rep. Waters; NASAA; P. Turney; Sens. Reed, Levin, Durbin, Harkin, Lautenberg, Franken and Akaka.

¹⁵⁶ See, e.g., letters from C. Corn; Sen. Levin (noting that “[a]lready, the Commission has determined that the manner and substance of solicitation and advertising for investments in registered investment companies deserves significant regulatory oversight. Many of those same concerns apply to investments in private investment vehicles. Accordingly, the Commission should impose analogous protections for investments in private funds.”); Consumer Federation (stating that “[s]hort of an outright prohibition on general solicitation and advertising by private funds, the Commission should at the very least adopt clear standards for the reporting of performance and fees by private funds, and delay their eligibility from engaging in general solicitation and advertising until such time as those standards are in place,” including a requirement to include in private fund advertisements “a clear, prominent warning that they are not mutual funds and carry special risks.”); D. Kronheim; D. Smith; Fund Democracy (noting that an alternative would be to “apply mutual fund advertising and valuation rules to hedge funds that engage in [general solicitation and advertising] (and, in any case, require standardized performance and fee reporting for all hedge funds), and require explicit, large-font disclaimers that hedge funds are not mutual funds and present special risks.”); G. Lavy; ICI (recommending content restrictions on private fund advertising at least as extensive as those currently applicable to mutual funds (e.g., disclaimers regarding the performance figures or measures displayed in any advertisement), with a prohibition on use of performance advertising until the Commission can develop a new rule regarding such advertising); IDC; NASAA (stating that “because the investment strategies of private funds are typically more opaque, risky, and illiquid than those of mutual funds, private fund advertisements should be subject to restrictions that are comparable to the rules for mutual funds.”); P. Turney.

¹⁵⁷ See letter from ICI (arguing that the antifraud provisions in Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-6(4)] and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder [17 CFR 275.206(4)-8] would not be enough to protect investors because these advertisements will be presented before accredited and non-accredited investors at the same time).

¹⁵⁸ See letters from ICI; IDC.

filing and review of private fund advertisements.¹⁵⁹

Finally, some commenters opposed the imposition of content and/or other restrictions for private funds.¹⁶⁰ They asserted that purchasers of the securities of a private fund that relies on Rule 506(c), must be, at a minimum, accredited investors and thus have met objective criteria demonstrating financial sophistication, which they believed eliminates the risk that other types of investors could be defrauded.¹⁶¹ A number of commenters pointed out that advertisements of private funds are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and suggested that liability under such provisions provides sufficient investor protections.¹⁶²

We have carefully considered commenters' suggestions and concerns. We are mindful of certain commenters' concerns that private funds engaging in general solicitation may raise certain investor protection issues. We also understand that other commenters believe that additional measures regarding private fund advertising are not necessary because the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws continue to apply. We will monitor and study the development of private fund advertising and

¹⁵⁹ See letters from AFL-CIO and AFR (stating that "FINRA already pre-reviews broker-dealer advertising; the same requirement should apply to general solicitation and advertising in Rule 506 offerings in light of the significant potential for abuse."); ICI (noting that "FINRA has developed an infrastructure to handle such filings and an expertise to substantively review them, and accordingly is best positioned to handle this task.").

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., letters from Verrill Dana LLP (stating that "[t]here is no suggestion in Section 201 that the Commission must distinguish between 'issuers that engage in operational businesses' and 'those that are merely investment vehicles'"); Artinvest (noting that for private funds managed by a registered commodity pool operator, the National Futures Association Rule 2-29 contains standards regarding marketing materials).

¹⁶¹ In general, private funds that pay performance fees to their managers are available only to "qualified clients" that have at least \$1 million in assets under management or that have a net worth of \$2 million (excluding the value of the client's primary residence). See Rule 205-3 under the Advisers Act [17 CFR 275.205-3]. See also letter from BlackRock.

¹⁶² See, e.g., letters from BlackRock; HFA; MFA (Mar. 22, 2013).

undertake a review to determine whether any further action is necessary.

We remind investment advisers to private funds that they are subject to Rule 206(4)-8 under the Advisers Act.¹⁶³ Rule 206(4)-8 provides that it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act, practice or course of business within the meaning of Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act for any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle¹⁶⁴ to “(1) [m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle; or (2) otherwise engage in any act, practice or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.”¹⁶⁵

As was stated by the Commission when it adopted Rule 206-4(8), “[t]he rule clarifies that an adviser’s duty to refrain from fraudulent conduct under the federal securities laws extends to the relationship with ultimate investors and that the Commission may bring enforcement actions under the Advisers Act against investment advisers who defraud investors or prospective investors in those pooled investment vehicles.”¹⁶⁶ We further stated that we “intend to employ all of the broad authority that Congress provided us in section 206(4) and direct it at adviser conduct affecting an

¹⁶³ 17 CFR 275.206(4)-8.

¹⁶⁴ Rule 206(4)-8 defines a pooled investment vehicle to mean any investment company as defined in Section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a)] or any company that would be an investment company under Section 3(a) of that Act but for the exclusion provided from that definition by either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of that Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1) or (7)].

¹⁶⁵ Id.

¹⁶⁶ Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Release No. IA-2628 (Aug. 3, 2007) [72 FR 44756 (Aug. 9, 2007)].

investor or potential investor in a pooled investment vehicle.”¹⁶⁷ Recently, for example, we have brought enforcement actions against private fund advisers and others for material misrepresentations to investors and prospective investors regarding fund performance, strategy, and investments, among other things.¹⁶⁸

We believe that investment advisers that have implemented appropriate policies and procedures regarding, among other things, the nature and content of private fund sales literature, including general solicitation materials, are less likely to use materials that materially mislead investors or otherwise violate the federal securities laws. Accordingly, we believe that investment advisers to private funds should carefully review any such policies and procedures that have been implemented to determine whether they are reasonably designed to prevent the use of fraudulent or materially misleading private fund advertising and make appropriate amendments to those policies and procedures, particularly if the private funds intend to engage in general solicitation activity.¹⁶⁹

F. Technical and Conforming Amendments

We proposed a number of technical and conforming amendments to Rules 502 and 506 of Regulation D. Under the proposal, we would amend various provisions in

¹⁶⁷ Id.

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., In the Matter of Oppenheimer Asset Management Inc. and Oppenheimer Alternative Investment Management, LLC, Release No. IA-3566 (Mar. 11, 2013); In the Matter of Sentinel Investment Management Corp., Release No. IA-3530 (Dec. 27, 2012); In the Matter of Weizhan Tang, Release No. IA-3482 (Oct. 5, 2012); In the Matter of Calhoun Asset Management, LLC, et al., Release No. IA-3428 (July 9, 2012); In the Matter of Belal K. Faruki, Release No. IA-3405 (May 17, 2012); In the Matter of GMB Capital Management LLC, et al., Release No. IA-3399 (Apr. 20, 2012).

¹⁶⁹ We remind investment advisers that are registered or required to be registered under Section 203 of the Advisers Act that they must adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act which include, but are not limited to, violations of Section 206 of the Advisers Act and the rules thereunder. They must also review, no less frequently than annually, the adequacy of the written policies and procedures and the effectiveness of the policies and procedures’ implementation. See CFR 275.206(4)-7.

Rule 502(b) to clarify that the references to sales to non-accredited investors under Rule 506, and the corresponding informational requirements, would be applicable to offerings under Rule 506(b) and not to offerings under Rule 506(c). We proposed to amend Rule 502(c) to clarify that Rule 502(c)'s prohibition against general solicitation would not apply to offerings under Rule 506(c). In addition, as Section 201(c) of the JOBS Act renumbered Section 4 of the Securities Act, we proposed to amend Regulation D and Rule 144A to update the references to Section 4. Finally, the proposal would update references to Section 2 of the Securities Act in these rules as some of the references have not been updated to reflect the current numbering scheme in Section 2. We received no comments regarding these technical and conforming amendments and are adopting these rule amendments as proposed.

III. FINAL AMENDMENT TO RULE 144A

Section 201(a)(2) of the JOBS Act directs the Commission to revise Rule 144A(d)(1) under the Securities Act to provide that securities sold pursuant to Rule 144A may be offered to persons other than QIBs, including by means of general solicitation, provided that securities are sold only to persons that the seller and any person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believe is a QIB. To implement the mandated rule change, we proposed amending Rule 144A(d)(1) to eliminate the references to “offer” and “offeree.” All of the commenters that expressed a view on the proposed amendment to Rule 144A(d)(1) stated that they supported the Commission’s proposal.¹⁷⁰ We are adopting the amendment as proposed. As amended, Rule 144A(d)(1) will require only that the securities be sold to a QIB or to a purchaser that the seller and any person acting

¹⁷⁰ See letters from IAA; SIFMA and FSR (Oct. 5, 2012); J. Johnson; OTC Markets Group Inc.

on behalf of the seller reasonably believe is a QIB.¹⁷¹ Under this amendment, resales of securities pursuant to Rule 144A can be conducted using general solicitation, so long as the purchasers are limited in this manner.¹⁷²

As a result of the Section 201(a)(2) mandate and the resulting Rule 144A revisions, we are also making technical and conforming revisions to the exceptions in Regulation M relating to transactions in Rule 144A securities, specifically Regulation M Rules 101(b)(10), 102(b)(7) and 104(j)(2). When adopted in 1996, the exceptions delineated in Rules 101(b)(10)(i), 102(b)(7)(i) and 104(j)(2)(i) were generally intended to permit transactions in securities eligible for resale under Rule 144A during a distribution of securities, provided that offers and sales of such securities were made solely to QIBs or persons reasonably believed to be QIBs in certain transactions exempt from registration.¹⁷³

As explained above, Section 201(a)(2) of the JOBS Act directs the Commission to revise Rule 144A to permit offers of securities to persons other than QIBs. As noted above, Rule 144A is being amended to eliminate references to “offer” and “offeree,” so that the amended rule will require only that securities be sold to a QIB or to a purchaser that the seller and any person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believes is a QIB.

¹⁷¹ Rule 144A(d)(1).

¹⁷² The general solicitation that is permitted in Rule 144A resales from the initial purchaser to the QIBs will not affect the availability of the Section 4(a)(2) exemption or Regulation S for the initial sale of securities by the issuer to the initial purchaser.

¹⁷³ See Anti-Manipulation Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, Release No. 34-38067 (Dec. 20, 1996) [62 FR 520 (Jan. 3, 1997)] at 530 (“As adopted, the exception permits transactions in Rule 144A securities during a distribution of such securities, provided that sales of such securities within the United States are made solely to: qualified institution buyers (‘QIBs’), or persons reasonably believed to be QIBs, in transactions exempt from registration under the Securities Act.... The exception covers both the Rule 144A security being distributed and any reference security.”).

In order to conform the language in Regulation M to Rule 144A, as amended, we are conforming the Regulation M exceptions by similarly eliminating the references to “offered” and “offerees.” We believe that these conforming modifications do not result in any substantive change to the Regulation M exceptions and are consistent with the purpose of the exceptions.

As a transition matter, for an ongoing Rule 144A offering that commenced before the effective date of the amendment to Rule 144A(d)(1), offering participants will be entitled to conduct the portion of the offering following the effective date of the amendment to Rule 144A(d)(1) using general solicitation, without affecting the availability of Rule 144A for the portion of the offering that occurred prior to the effective date of the amended rule.

IV. INTEGRATION WITH OFFSHORE OFFERINGS

In the Proposing Release, we noted that the mandate in Section 201(a) that the Commission amend Rule 506 and Rule 144A to permit the use of general solicitation in transactions under those rules has raised questions from some commenters¹⁷⁴ regarding the impact of the use of general solicitation on the availability of the Regulation S safe harbors for concurrent unregistered offerings inside and outside the United States.¹⁷⁵

The safe harbors are important when U.S. and non-U.S. companies engage in global

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., letters from ABA Fed. Reg. Comm. (Apr. 30, 2012); L. Neumann (June 12, 2012); NYCBA (May 4, 2012); SecuritiesLawUSA, PC (June 26, 2012); SIFMA (Apr. 27, 2012).

¹⁷⁵ Regulation S provides a safe harbor for offers and sales of securities outside the United States and includes an issuer and a resale safe harbor. Two general conditions apply to both safe harbors: (1) the securities must be sold in an offshore transaction and (2) there can be no “directed selling efforts” in the United States. Rule 902(c)(1) [17 CFR 230.902(c)(1)] broadly defines “directed selling efforts” as: any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for any of the securities offered in reliance on Regulation S. Such activity includes placing an advertisement in a publication “with a general circulation in the United States” that refers to the offering of securities being made in reliance upon Regulation S.

offerings of securities in which the U.S. portion of the offering is conducted in accordance with Rule 144A or Rule 506 and the offshore portion is conducted in reliance on Regulation S.

We expressed our view on this issue in the Proposing Release, which we are reaffirming in this release.¹⁷⁶ Concurrent offshore offerings that are conducted in compliance with Regulation S will not be integrated with domestic unregistered offerings that are conducted in compliance with Rule 506 or Rule 144A, as amended. As explained in the Proposing Release, we believe that our view is consistent with the historical treatment of concurrent Regulation S and Rule 144A/Rule 506 offerings.¹⁷⁷

V. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

A. Background

The amendment to Form D contains a “collection of information” requirement within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (“PRA”).¹⁷⁸ We published a notice requesting comment on the collection of information requirement in the Proposing Release for the rule and form amendments. We submitted that requirement to

¹⁷⁶ All of the commenters who expressed a view on our interpretation supported it and encouraged us to reiterate it in this release. See letters from ABA Fed. Reg. Comm; Forum for U.S. Securities Lawyers in London; IAA; IPA; NYCBA.

¹⁷⁷ See Offshore Offers and Sales, Release No. 33-6863 (Apr. 24, 1990) [55 FR 18306 (May 2, 1990)] (stating that “[o]ffshore transactions made in compliance with Regulation S will not be integrated with registered domestic offerings or domestic offerings that satisfy the requirements for an exemption from registration under the Securities Act.”). In addressing the offshore transaction component of the Regulation S safe harbor, the Commission also stated, “Offers made in the United States in connection with contemporaneous registered offerings or offerings exempt from registration will not preclude reliance on the safe harbors.” Id. at n. 36. Likewise, in addressing directed selling efforts, the Commission stated, “Offering activities in contemporaneous registered offerings or offerings exempt from registration will not preclude reliance on the safe harbors.” Id. at n. 47. See also Rule 500(g) of Regulation D [17 CFR 230.500(g)] (formerly Preliminary Note No. 7 to Regulation D) (“Regulation S may be relied upon for such offers and sales even if coincident offers and sales are made in accordance with Regulation D inside the United States.”).

¹⁷⁸ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.

the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) for review and approval in accordance with the PRA and its implementing regulations.¹⁷⁹ The title of this requirement is: “Form D” (OMB Control No. 3235-0076).¹⁸⁰

We adopted Regulation D and Form D as part of the establishment of a series of exemptions for offerings and sales of securities under the Securities Act. The Form D filing is required to be made by issuers as a notice of sales without registration under the Securities Act based on a claim of exemption under Regulation D or Section 4(a)(5) of the Securities Act. The Form D filing is required to include basic information about the issuer, certain related persons, and the offering. This information is needed for implementing the exemptions and analyzing their use. The information collection requirements related to the filing of Form D with the Commission are mandatory to the extent that an issuer elects to make an offering of securities in reliance on the relevant exemption. Responses are not confidential. The hours and costs associated with preparing and filing forms and retaining records constitute reporting and cost burdens imposed by the collection of information requirements. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

As discussed above, we proposed to amend Form D to add a check box to indicate an offering relying on the Rule 506(c) exemption. In the Proposing Release, we requested comment on our PRA burden hour and cost estimates and the analysis used to derive such estimates. One commenter responded to our request for comment on the

¹⁷⁹ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d); 5 CFR 1320.11.

¹⁸⁰ Form D was adopted under the authority of Sections 2(a)(15), 3(b), 4(a)(2), 19(a) and 19(c)(3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(15), 77c(b), 77d(a)(2), 77s(a) and 77s(c)(3)].

PRA analysis and stated that it believed that the cost estimates in the PRA and economic analysis are too low.¹⁸¹

B. Revisions to PRA Reporting and Cost Burden Estimates

Consistent with the PRA analysis in the Proposing Release, we believe that the addition of a check box on Form D to indicate that an issuer is relying on the Rule 506(c) exemption for its offering will have a negligible effect on the paperwork burden of the form. Form D already contains a check box for each basis of exemption claimed under Regulation D; this change simply conforms the form to the new rule amendment. Accordingly, we estimate that under the amendment to Form D, the burden for responding to the collection of information in Form D will be substantially the same as before the amendment to Form D. We believe, however, that the amendment to Rule 506 could increase the number of Form D filings that are made with the Commission because we expect issuers may conduct more Rule 506 offerings.

The table below shows the current total annual compliance burden, in hours and in costs, of the collection of information pursuant to Form D. For purposes of the PRA, we estimate that, over a three-year period, the average burden estimate will be four hours per Form D filing. Our burden estimate represents the average burden for all issuers. This burden is reflected as a one hour burden of preparation on the issuer and a cost of \$1,200 per filing. In deriving these estimates, we assume that 25% of the burden of preparation is carried by the issuer internally and that 75% of the burden of preparation is

¹⁸¹ See letter from NSBA (stating that “the compliance cost estimates should include the time required by the issuer and their advisors to familiarize themselves with the rule and to comply with the additional verification requirements and the time and costs of investors to comply (for example, with a third-party verification requirement)”). For PRA purposes, we consider only the burden of responding to the collection of information in Form D; we do not consider any of the other costs, direct or indirect, of conducting a Rule 506(c) offering.

carried by outside professionals retained by the issuer at an average cost of \$400 per hour. The portion of the burden carried by outside professionals is reflected as a cost, while the portion of the burden carried by the issuer internally is reflected in hours.

Table 1. Estimated paperwork burden under Form D, pre-amendment to Rule 506

	Number of responses (A) ¹⁸²	Burden hours/form (B)	Total burden hours (C)=(A)*(B)	Internal issuer time (D)	External professional time (E)	Professional costs (F)=(E)*\$400
Form D	18,187	4	72,748	18,187	54,561	\$21,824,400

According to our Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”), in 2012, 16,067 companies made 18,187 new Form D filings. The annual number of new Form D filings rose from 13,764 in 2009 to 18,187 in 2012, an average increase of approximately 1,474 Form D filings per year, or approximately 10%. Assuming that the macroeconomic factors underlying this increase persist and the number of Form D filings continues to increase by 1,474 filings per year for each of the next three years, the average number of Form D filings in each of the next three years, absent the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation, would be approximately 21,135.

We anticipate that new paragraph (c) of Rule 506 could result in an even greater annual increase in the number of Form D filings than the 10% annual increase estimated above. As a reference point for the potential increase, we use the impact of another past rule change on the market for Regulation D offerings. In 1997, the Commission amended

¹⁸² We had previously estimated the number of responses to be 25,000, as reflected in OMB’s Inventory of Currently Approved Information Collections (available at: <http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.jsessionid=D37174B5F6F9148DB767D63DF6983A65>), but we are revising this estimate to reflect the number of new Form D filings made in 2012.

Rule 144(d) under the Securities Act¹⁸³ to reduce the holding period for restricted securities from two years to one year,¹⁸⁴ thereby increasing the attractiveness of Regulation D offerings to investors and to issuers. There were 10,341 Form D filings in 1996. This was followed by a 20% increase in the number of Form D filings in each of the subsequent three calendar years, reaching 17,830 by 1999. Although it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy the increase in the number of Rule 506 offerings following the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation for a new category of Rule 506 offerings, we assume for purposes of this analysis that there could be a similarly significant increase.

For purposes of the PRA and based on our analysis above, we estimate that the amendment to Rule 506 will result in a 20% increase in Form D filings relying on the Rule 506 exemption, or approximately 3,637 filings.¹⁸⁵ We also assume that the number of Form D filings will increase by approximately 3,637 in each year following the adoption of the rule.

Based on this increase, we estimate that the annual compliance burden of the collection of information requirements for the first year in which issuers will make Form D filings after the adoption of Rule 506(c) will be an aggregate of 21,824 hours of issuer personnel time and \$26,188,800 for the services of outside professionals per year.

¹⁸³ 17 CFR 230.144(d).

¹⁸⁴ See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, Release No. 33-7390 (Feb. 20, 1997) [62 FR 9242 (Feb. 28, 1997)].

¹⁸⁵ This number is based on the 18,187 new Form D filings that were made in 2012.

Table 2. Estimated paperwork burden under Form D, post-amendment to Rule 506

	Number of responses (A) ¹⁸⁶	Burden hours/form (B)	Total burden hours (C)=(A)*(B)	Internal issuer time (D)	External professional time (E)	Professional costs (F)=(E)*\$400
Form D	21,824	4	87,296	21,824	65,472	\$26,188,800

VI. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

A. Background

We are adopting amendments to Rule 506 and Rule 144A to implement the requirements of Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act.¹⁸⁷ Section 201(a)(1) directs the Commission to revise Rule 506 to provide that the prohibition against general solicitation contained in Rule 502(c) shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to Rule 506, as amended, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors. Section 201(a)(1) also provides that “such rules shall require the issuer to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors, using such methods as determined by the Commission.” Section 201(a)(2) of the JOBS Act directs the Commission to revise Rule 144A(d)(1) to provide that securities sold pursuant to Rule 144A may be offered to persons other than QIBs, including by means of general solicitation, provided that securities are sold only to persons that the seller and any person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believe are QIBs.

We are mindful of the costs imposed by and the benefits obtained from our rules.

¹⁸⁶ The information in this column is based on the 18,187 new Form D filings that were made in 2012, plus the additional 3,637 filings we estimate would be filed in the first year after the effectiveness of Rule 506(c).

¹⁸⁷ As explained above, the Commission in this release is adopting only those rule and form amendments that are specifically mandated by Section 201(a). Correspondingly, we analyze the economic impacts – including the benefits and costs – only of those rules and form amendments considered within the scope of this release.

The discussion below addresses the economic effects of the amendments to Rule 506, Rule 144A and Form D, including the likely benefits and costs of the amendments as well as the effect of the amendments on efficiency, competition and capital formation.¹⁸⁸ Some of the costs and benefits stem from the statutory mandate of Section 201(a), whereas others are affected by the discretion we have exercised in implementing this mandate. These two types of costs and benefits may not be entirely separable to the extent that our discretion is exercised to realize the benefits that we believe were intended by Section 201(a).

B. Economic Baseline

The baseline analysis that follows is in large part based on information collected from Form D filings submitted by issuers relying on Regulation D to raise capital. As we describe in more detail below, we believe that we do not have a complete view of the Rule 506 market, particularly with respect to the amount of capital raised. Currently, issuers are required to file a Form D within 15 days of the first sale of securities, and are required to report additional sales through amended filings only under certain conditions. In addition, issuers may not report all required information, either due to error or because they do not wish to make the information public. Commenters have suggested and we also have evidence that some issuers do not file a Form D for their offerings in

¹⁸⁸ Section 2(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77b(b)] requires the Commission, when engaging in rulemaking that requires it to consider whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

compliance with Rule 503.¹⁸⁹ Consequently, the analysis that follows is necessarily subject to these limitations in the current Form D reporting process.

1. Size of the Exempt Offering Market

Exempt offerings play a significant role in capital formation in the United States. Offerings conducted in reliance on Rule 506 account for 99% of the capital reported as being raised under Regulation D from 2009 to 2012, and represent approximately 94% of the number of Regulation D offerings.¹⁹⁰ The significance of Rule 506 offerings is underscored by the comparison to registered offerings. In 2012, the estimated amount of capital reported as being raised in Rule 506 offerings (including both equity and debt) was \$898 billion, compared to \$1.2 trillion raised in registered offerings.¹⁹¹ Of this \$898 billion, operating companies (issuers that are not pooled investment funds) reported raising \$173 billion, while pooled investment funds reported raising \$725 billion.¹⁹² The amount reported as being raised by pooled investment funds is comparable to the amount of capital raised by registered investment funds. In 2012, registered investment funds

¹⁸⁹ Many commenters asserted that non-compliance with Form D filing obligations is widespread. See, e.g., letters from Investor Advisory Committee (stating that “[i]t is generally acknowledged that a significant number of issuers do not currently file Form D...”); AARP (stating that “[s]imply adding a checkbox to a form that too often goes unfiled and then only after the fact is inadequate to the task at hand.”); AFL-CIO and AFR (stating that “many issuers today flout the Form D filing requirement for such offerings, further limiting the Commission’s ability to provide effective oversight”). See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General, Regulation D Exemption Process (Mar. 31, 2009) (“OIG Report”), available at: <http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2009/459.pdf> (stating that while the Commission staff “strongly encourage companies to comply with Rule 503, they are aware of instances in which issuers have failed to comply with Rule 503...”). Based on its analysis of the filings required by FINRA Rules 5122 and 5123 during the period of December 3, 2012 to February 5, 2013, DERA estimates that as many as 9% of the offerings represented in the FINRA filings for Regulation D or other private offerings that used a registered broker did not have a corresponding Form D.

¹⁹⁰ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

¹⁹¹ See id.

¹⁹² See id.

(which include money market mutual funds, long-term mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, closed-end funds and unit investment trusts) raised approximately \$727 billion.¹⁹³

In 2011, the estimated amount of capital (including both equity and debt) reported as being raised in Rule 506 offerings was \$849 billion compared to \$985 billion raised in registered offerings.¹⁹⁴ Of the \$849 billion, operating companies reported raising \$71 billion, while pooled investment funds reported raising \$778 billion.¹⁹⁵ More generally, when including offerings pursuant to other exemptions – Rule 144A, Regulation S and Section 4(a)(2) – significantly more capital appears to be raised through exempt offerings than registered offerings (Figure 1).¹⁹⁶


¹⁹³ In calculating the amount of capital raised by registered investment funds, we use the net amounts (plus reinvested dividends and reinvested capital gains), which reflect redemptions, and not gross amounts, by open-ended registered investment funds because they face frequent redemptions and do not have redemption restrictions and lock-up periods common among private funds. In addition, we use the new issuances of registered closed-end funds and the new deposits of registered unit investment trusts. See 2013 Investment Company Institute Factbook, available at: <http://www.icifactbook.org>.

¹⁹⁴ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

¹⁹⁵ See id.

¹⁹⁶ See id.


Figure 1: Capital Raised in U.S. Capital Markets during 2009-2012¹⁹⁷



At present, issuers are required to file a Form D not later than 15 days after the first sale of securities in a Regulation D offering and an amendment to the Form D only under certain circumstances. Since issuers are not required to submit a Form D filing when an offering is completed, and submit amendments only under certain circumstances, we have no definitive information on the final amounts raised. Figure 2, below, illustrates that at the time of the Form D filing, only 39% of offerings by non-pooled investment fund issuers were completed relative to the total amount sought. Separately, 70% of pooled investment funds state their total offering amount to be “Indefinite” in their Form D filings. As a result, the Form D filings of these pooled investment funds likely do not accurately reflect the total amount of securities offered or sold.

¹⁹⁷ The 2012 non-ABS Rule 144A offerings data is based on an extrapolation of currently available data through May 2012 from Sagient Research System’s Placement Tracker database. For more detail, see the Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

Figure 2: Amount Sold as Percentage of Total Offering Amount by Non-Pooled Investment Fund Issuers in Regulation D Offerings at the Time of Form D Filing: 2009-2012



2. Affected Market Participants

The amendments to Rule 506 we are adopting today will affect a number of different market participants. Issuers of securities in Rule 506 offerings include both reporting and non-reporting operating companies and pooled investment funds.

Investment advisers organize and sponsor pooled investment funds that conduct Rule 506 offerings. Intermediaries that facilitate Rule 506 offerings include registered broker-dealers, finders and placement agents. Investors in Rule 506 offerings include accredited investors (both natural persons and legal entities) and non-accredited investors who meet certain “sophistication” requirements. Each of these market participants is discussed in further detail below.

a. Issuers

Based on the information submitted in 112,467 new and amended Form D filings between 2009 and 2012, there were 67,706 new Regulation D offerings by 49,740 unique

issuers during this four-year period.¹⁹⁸ The size of the average Regulation D offering during this period was approximately \$30 million, whereas the size of the median offering was approximately \$1.5 million.¹⁹⁹ The difference between the average and median offering sizes indicates that the Regulation D market is comprised of many small offerings, which is consistent with the view that many smaller businesses are relying on Regulation D to raise capital, and a smaller number of much larger offerings.

Some information about issuer size is available from Item 5 in Form D, which requires issuers in Regulation D offerings to report their size in terms of revenue ranges or, in the case of certain pooled investment funds, net asset value ranges. All issuers can currently choose not to disclose this size information, however, and a significant majority of issuers that are not pooled investment funds declined to disclose their revenue ranges in the Forms D that they filed between 2009 and 2012. For those that did, most reported a revenue range of less than \$1 million (Figure 3).²⁰⁰ During the 2009-2011 period, approximately 10% of all public companies raised capital in Regulation D offerings; in 2012, approximately 6% of such companies did so.²⁰¹ These public companies tended to be smaller and less profitable than their industry peers, which illustrates the significance of the private capital markets to smaller companies, whether public or private.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.


¹⁹⁹ See id. A study of unregistered equity offerings by publicly-traded companies over the period 1980-1996 found that the mean offering amount was \$12.7 million, whereas the median offering amount was \$4.5 million. See Michael Hertzel, Michael Lemmon, James Linck and Lynn Rees, Long-Run Performance Following Private Placements of Equity, 57 *Journal of Finance* 2595 (2002).

²⁰⁰ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

²⁰¹ Id. (explaining the methodology of using listings in the Standard & Poor's Compustat database and the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Securities Prices database to determine which companies were public companies).

²⁰² Id.


Figure 3: Distribution of Non-Pooled Investment Fund Issuers in Regulation D Market by Revenue: 2009-2012



During this period, pooled investment funds conducted approximately 24% of the total number of Regulation D offerings and raised approximately 81% of the total amount of capital raised in Regulation D offerings.²⁰³ More than 75% of pooled investment funds declined to disclose their net asset value range.

²⁰³ Id.

Figure 4: Distribution of Pooled Investment Fund Issuers in Regulation D Market by Net Asset Value: 2009-2012



Between 2009 and 2012, approximately 66% of Regulation D offerings were of equity securities, and almost two-thirds of these were by issuers other than pooled investment funds.²⁰⁴ Non-U.S. issuers accounted for approximately 19% of the amount of capital raised in Regulation D offerings, indicating that the U.S. market is a significant source of capital for these issuers.²⁰⁵

Unlike in Regulation D offerings, issuers conducting Rule 144A offerings are not required to disclose information about their offerings to the Commission, which limits our ability to measure the size of the Rule 144A market. Based on transaction

²⁰⁴ Id.

²⁰⁵ Id.

information collected by third-party data providers,²⁰⁶ we can broadly characterize the Rule 144A market as being divided between ABS and non-ABS offerings. These sources indicate that, over the four-year period from 2009 to 2012, there were 3,510 non-ABS Rule 144A offerings by 1,965 unique issuers. During this period, the average non-ABS offering size was approximately \$526 million, while the median non-ABS offering size was \$350 million. These offering sizes are significantly larger than the average and median amounts of Regulation D offerings, as discussed above, indicating that the Rule 144A market, as compared to the Regulation D market, is characterized by much larger issues (which we presume correlate to larger issuers, as well) and, based on the number of Rule 144A offerings, far fewer issuers. Another significant difference from Regulation D offerings is the type of security offered. During this period, over 99% of the non-ABS offerings in the Rule 144A market were debt offerings,²⁰⁷ compared to 13% of Regulation D offerings.²⁰⁸

b. Investors

We have relatively little information on the types and number of investors in Rule 506 offerings. Form D currently requires issuers in Rule 506 offerings to provide information about the total number of investors who have already invested in the offering and the number of persons who do not qualify as accredited investors.²⁰⁹ In 2012,

²⁰⁶ These statistics are based on a review of data from Securities Data Corporation's New Issues database (Thomson Financial) and Sagient Research System's Placement Tracker database.

²⁰⁷ This statistic is based on a review of data from Securities Data Corporation's New Issues database (Thomson Financial) and Sagient Research System's Placement Tracker database.

²⁰⁸ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

²⁰⁹ See Item 14 of Form D. Form D does not require any other information on the types of investors, such as whether they are natural persons or legal entities.

approximately 153,000 investors participated in offerings by operating companies, while approximately 81,000 investors invested in offerings by pooled investment funds.²¹⁰ Because some investors participate in multiple offerings, these numbers likely overestimate the actual number of unique investors in these reported offerings. In offerings under Rule 506(b), both accredited investors and up to 35 non-accredited investors who meet certain sophistication requirements are eligible to purchase securities. In offerings under new Rule 506(c), only accredited investors will be eligible to purchase securities.


Information collected from Form D filings indicates that most Rule 506 offerings do not involve broad investor participation. More than two-thirds of these offerings have ten or fewer investors, while less than 5% of these offerings have more than 30 investors. Although Rule 506 currently allows for the participation of non-accredited investors who meet certain sophistication requirements, such non-accredited investors reportedly purchased securities in only 11% of the Rule 506 offerings conducted between 2009 and 2012.²¹¹ Only 8% of the offerings by pooled investment funds included non-accredited investors, compared to 12% of the offerings by other issuers.²¹²

²¹⁰ These numbers are based on initial Form D filings submitted in 2012.

²¹¹ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

²¹² Id.

Figure 5: Distribution of Regulation D Offerings by Number of Investors: 2009-2012



As stated above, between 2009 and 2012, the size of the median Regulation D offering, based on the information in Form D filings, was approximately \$1.5 million. The presence of so many relatively small offerings suggests that a sizable number of current investors in Rule 506 offerings are natural persons or legal entities in which all equity owners are natural persons. This is because smaller offerings may not provide sufficient scale for institutional investors to earn a sizable return. Institutional investors typically have a larger investible capital base and more formal screening procedures compared to investors who are natural persons, and the associated costs of identifying potential investments and monitoring their investment portfolio lead them to make larger

investments than natural persons.²¹³ As for whether natural persons investing in these offerings are accredited investors or non-accredited investors, almost 90% of the Regulation D offerings conducted between 2009 and 2012 did not involve any non-accredited investors.²¹⁴

While we do not know what percentage of investors in Rule 506 offerings are natural persons, the vast majority of Regulation D offerings are conducted without the use of an intermediary,²¹⁵ suggesting that many of the investors in Regulation D offerings likely have a pre-existing relationship with the issuer or its management because these offerings would not have been conducted using general solicitation. This category of investors is likely to be much smaller than the total number of eligible investors for Rule 506(c) offerings, which is potentially very large. We estimate that at least 8.7 million U.S. households, or 7.4% of all U.S. households, qualified as accredited investors in 2010, based on the net worth standard in the definition of “accredited investor” (Figure 6).²¹⁶


²¹³ See, e.g., George Fenn, Nellie Liang and Stephen Prowes, *The Economics of Private Equity Markets* (1998); Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg, *Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity*, 23 *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 121 (2009).

²¹⁴ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

²¹⁵ An analysis of all Form D filings submitted between 2009 to 2012 shows that approximately 11% of all new offerings reported sales commissions of greater than zero because the issuers used intermediaries. See Ivanov/Bauguess Study. We assume that the lack of a commission indicates the absence of an intermediary.

²¹⁶ This estimate is based on net worth and household data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Triennial Survey of Consumer Finances 2010. Our calculations are based on all 32,410 observations in the 2010 survey.


Figure 6: Number of U.S. Households that Qualify as Accredited Investors Based on 2010 Net Worth



Our analysis, however, leads us to believe that only a small percentage of these households are likely to participate in securities offerings, especially exempt offerings. First, as mentioned above, data from Form D filings in 2012 suggests that fewer than 234,000 investors (of which an unknown subset are natural persons) participated in Regulation D offerings, which is small compared to the 8.7 million households that qualify as accredited investors. Second, evidence suggests that only a small fraction of the total accredited investor population has significant levels of direct stockholdings. Based on an analysis of retail stock holding data for 33 million brokerage accounts in 2010, only 3.7 million accounts had at least \$100,000 of direct investments in equity securities issued by public companies listed on domestic national securities exchanges, while only 664,000 accounts had at least \$500,000 of direct investments in such equity

securities (Figure 7).²¹⁷ Assuming that investments in publicly-traded equity securities are a gateway to investments in securities issued in exempt offerings, and accredited investors with investment experience in publicly-traded equity securities are more likely to participate in an exempt offering than accredited investors who do not, the set of accredited investors likely to be interested in investing in Rule 506(c) offerings could be significantly smaller than the total accredited investor population.

Figure 7: Direct Stock Holdings of Retail Investors, 2010



Investors in Rule 144A offerings are QIBs, which comprise a broad range of U.S. entities, including mutual funds, pension funds, banks, savings and loan associations, investment companies, insurance companies and entities whose equity owners are all

²¹⁷ This analysis by DERA is based on the stock holdings of retail investors from more than 100 brokerage firms covering more than 33 million accounts during the period June 2010-May 2011.

QIBs.²¹⁸ As there is no obligation for issuers in Rule 144A offerings to publicly disclose the characteristics of their investors, the information available on the number and types of QIBs in the Rule 144A market is not broadly known, and is generally available only to those financial intermediaries who act as initial purchasers in the offerings.

c. Investment Advisers

As of December 2012, there were 10,870 Commission-registered investment advisers that filed Form ADV with the Commission, representing approximately \$50 trillion total assets under management.²¹⁹ The average investment adviser registered with the Commission has assets under management of approximately \$4.6 billion; the median size of assets under management for these registered investment advisers is \$258 million.

Approximately one-fourth of registered investment advisers (2,842) currently advise (or advised) private funds that filed Form D between 2002 and 2012, while another 1,250 registered investment advisers currently advise (or advised) private funds that did not file Form D during the same period. The registered investment advisers advising private funds that submitted Form D filings during this period had average assets under management of \$8.7 billion, while the ones advising private funds that did not submit Form D filings had average assets under management of \$8.6 billion.

Registered investment advisers that did not advise private funds (6,623) are considerably smaller, with average assets under management of \$2.1 billion.

²¹⁸ Non-U.S. investors generally do not participate in Rule 144A offerings; rather, they participate in Regulation S offerings. Issuers will frequently conduct side-by-side Rule 144A and Regulation S offerings.

²¹⁹ For the same time period, 2,303 exempt reporting advisers filed a Form ADV with the Commission. Certain investment advisers that are ineligible to register with the Commission may also be exempt from registration with any state.

d. Broker-Dealers

As of December 2012, there were 4,450 broker-dealers registered with the Commission who file on Form X-17A-5, with average total assets of approximately \$1.1 billion per broker-dealer. The aggregate total assets of these registered broker-dealers are approximately \$4.9 trillion. Of these registered broker-dealers, 410 are dually registered as investment advisers. The dually registered broker-dealers are larger (average total assets of \$6.4 billion) than those that are not dually registered. Among the dually registered broker-dealers, we identified 24 that currently have or have had private funds that submitted Form D filings between 2002 and 2012.

3. Current Practices

The extent of the economic impact of the amendments to Rule 506 will depend on the current practices of issuers and market participants in Rule 506 offerings. As issuers in the Regulation D market are not required to disclose in Form D how they formed a reasonable belief that the purchasers in their Rule 506 offerings are accredited investors or sophisticated investors and are not currently required to take reasonable steps to verify the accredited investor status of these purchasers, the Commission does not have any data on current verification practices used in such offerings, if any. Commenters, however, provided examples of current practices of how issuers collect information from a potential purchaser to form a reasonable belief that he or she is an accredited investor. One commenter suggested that a large number of issuers rely on lists of accredited investors created and maintained by a reliable third party, such as registered broker-

dealers,²²⁰ which would be consistent with the Commission’s view that an issuer would not contravene Rule 502(c)’s prohibition against general solicitation if the issuer or its agent has a pre-existing substantive relationship with the offerees.²²¹ Other commenters asserted that many issuers rely on the services of placement agents to obtain information about accredited investor status and to complete a Rule 506 transaction.²²² One commenter stated that the most common practice was a combination of an investor suitability questionnaire and investor self-certification.²²³ These commenters, however, did not provide data to allow for an estimate of the frequency of usage and the costs associated with these practices.

C. Analysis of the Amendment to Rule 506

Congress has mandated that we eliminate the prohibition against general solicitation for a subset of Rule 506 offerings.²²⁴ Below, we analyze the benefits and costs associated with the amendments to Rule 506 in light of the baseline discussed above. Because existing Rule 506 has always been subject to the prohibition against

²²⁰ See letter from J. McLaughlin.

²²¹ See Release No. 33-7856.

²²² See letters from SIFMA and FSR (Oct. 5, 2012); IAA.

²²³ See letters from NSBA; MFA (May 4, 2012) (noting that, in the hedge fund industry, a potential hedge fund investor must complete “a subscription document provided by the fund’s manager that provides a detailed description of, among other things, the qualification standards that a purchaser must meet under the federal securities laws”).

²²⁴ The legislative history of a bill that was introduced (but not adopted) at or around the time of the JOBS Act may be instructive with respect to how Congress viewed the effect of eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation in private offerings. In its report on a bill that would have amended Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act to permit the use of general solicitation, the House Committee on Financial Services stated that “regulations such as the prohibition of general solicitation and advertising in Regulation D Rule 506 offerings inhibit capital formation.” Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. Rep. 112-263, at 2 (2011). Accordingly, “[t]he legislation would allow companies greater access to accredited investors and to new sources of capital to grow and create jobs, without putting less sophisticated investors at risk.” Id.

general solicitation, there are significant data and informational limitations on our ability to quantify the economic impact of eliminating that prohibition in certain Rule 506 offerings. As discussed above, we do not believe that the Form D filings available on the Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) system present a complete view of the Rule 506 market, as there are some Rule 506 offerings for which a Form D is not filed and the information presented in the Forms D that are filed is not necessarily comprehensive.²²⁵ In addition, as discussed below, we believe that there are sufficient differences between Rule 504, as amended to permit general solicitation from 1992 to 1999, and Rule 506(c) such that it would not be useful to look to the Rule 504 market during that period to make meaningful predictions as to the type or magnitude of the effects of eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation for Rule 506(c) offerings. For example, the amount of capital that could be raised under Rule 504, as amended during this period, was capped at \$1 million over a 12-month period; the securities in a Rule 504 offering could be sold to an unlimited number of non-accredited investors; and the securities sold in Rule 504 offerings were not restricted securities for purposes of resale. We provide below a qualitative analysis of the potential costs and benefits of eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation in certain Rule 506 offerings, supplementing that analysis with quantification, where possible, based on existing data.

²²⁵ Because filing a Form D is not a condition for relying on Regulation D, commenters have noted that many issuers do not file a Form D when raising capital under Rule 506. Issuers are currently required to file an initial Form D within 15 days of the first sale of securities, but are required to report additional sales through amended filings only under certain conditions, which means that in many cases, the total amount of capital raised in a Regulation D offering is not reported on Form D. Finally, issuers do not report all required information, either due to error or because they do not wish to make the information public. For example, issuers have the option in Form D to decline to disclose their revenues or net asset values.

1. Benefits to Issuers

The elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation for a subset of Rule 506 offerings will enable issuers to solicit potential investors directly, through both physical (such as mailings, newspaper advertisements and billboards) and electronic (such as the Internet, social media, email and television) means. As a result, we anticipate that issuers will be able to reach a much greater number of potential investors than is currently the case, thereby increasing their access to sources of capital. We note that many commenters, including those representing small businesses, biotechnology companies and angel investors, stated that the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation will facilitate capital formation by allowing businesses, particularly early-stage companies, to solicit investments from a larger pool of investors.²²⁶ This could increase overall capital formation if issuers that previously did not raise capital from individual investors because it was too costly to solicit them through intermediaries now choose to solicit investors directly using general solicitation in accordance with Rule 506(c). Alternatively, if issuers use new Rule 506(c) in lieu of other methods of raising capital, such as registered offerings or unregistered non-Rule 506(c) offerings, then Rule 506(c) would replace one source of capital for another, thereby potentially improving the efficiency of capital flow through lower issuance costs, but not necessarily increasing the gross amount raised.

We believe that it is reasonable to conclude that allowing issuers to have wider access to accredited investors by eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation for a category of Rule 506 offerings will significantly improve their access to capital and

²²⁶ See, e.g., letters from BIO; NSBA.

potentially enhance capital formation and lower the issuance cost. Although the lack of available data on the economic impact of eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings precludes us from quantifying the magnitude of this effect, the Commission has some evidence of the effect of the availability of general solicitation on issuers' ability to raise capital based on information about the number of Rule 504 offerings from 1992 to 2001, which covers the period during which the prohibition against general solicitation was lifted for Rule 504,²²⁷ and subsequently reinstated in 1999.²²⁸ In particular, and as shown in the chart below, the number of Rule 504 offerings increased at an average annual rate of 10.6% from 1992 through 1999.²²⁹ In 2000, following the reinstatement of the ban, the number of Rule 504 offerings declined by almost 44%. This decline is coincident with the general market decline in 2000, including the collapse of the Internet bubble, which may have been the cause or at least a significant contributing factor to the rate of decline. During 2000, however, there was not a concurrent decline in either the number of Rule 505 offerings or the number of Rule 506 offerings. To the contrary, the number of Rule 506 offerings increased by about 54% in 2000, while the number of Rule 505 offerings remained largely unchanged (Figure 8). Declines in the numbers of Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings followed in 2001, when presumably both types of offerings were negatively affected by the general market decline, although Rule 504 offerings experienced a sharper decline (-35%) compared to Rule 506 offerings (-30%). While it is not possible to disentangle the


²²⁷ See Small Business Initiatives, Release No. 33-6949 (July 30, 1992) [57 FR 36442 (Aug. 13, 1992)].

²²⁸ See Release No. 33-7644.

²²⁹ This is based on an analysis of Form REGDEX filings on EDGAR.

broader market effects in 2000 from the reinstatement of the prohibition against general solicitation on the number of Rule 504 offerings, the steady increase in the number of Rule 504 offerings during the seven-year period following the elimination, in 1992, of the prohibition against general solicitation and the subsequent sharp decline in the number of Rule 504 offerings is consistent with the view that issuers' ability to generally solicit may enhance their ability to raise capital.

Figure 8: Number of New Regulation D Offerings: 1992-2001



The development of the venture capital (VC) industry in the United States may also be a relevant example to illustrate the potential for enhanced capital formation that may result from allowing issuers to have access to a wider range of investors. Under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, pension fund managers are subject to a “prudent man” standard of care in making investments.²³⁰ Prior to 1979, there was uncertainty under the U.S. Department of Labor’s then-existing interpretations

²³⁰ 29 U.S.C. 1104(a).

of this standard as to whether pension funds could invest in venture capital and start-up companies. In 1979, the Department clarified its interpretation of this standard by indicating that portfolio diversification is a factor in determining whether an investment is prudent, which indicated that pension funds would not be precluded from making investments in VC funds.²³¹ Following this regulatory change, the VC industry experienced substantial growth: VC commitments increased from \$218 million in 1978 (of which pension funds supplied approximately 15%) to \$3 billion in 1988 (of which pension funds supplied approximately 46%).²³²

We also anticipate that allowing issuers to solicit potential investors directly will lower the direct costs of Rule 506 offerings. Although none of the commenters provided data on direct cost savings, and although Form D filings do not present a complete view of the market, we do have estimates of the direct offering costs paid by issuers that use an intermediary to locate investors in Rule 506 offerings. An analysis of all Form D filings submitted between 2009 to 2012 shows that approximately 11% of all new Regulation D offerings reported sales commissions of greater than zero because the issuers used intermediaries.²³³ The average commission paid to these intermediaries was 5.9% of the offering size, with the median commission being approximately 5%. Accordingly, for a \$5 million offering, which was the median size of a Regulation D offering with a commission during this period, an issuer could potentially save up to \$250,000 if it solicits investors directly rather than through an intermediary, minus the cost of its own

²³¹ See 29 CFR 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i).

²³² See Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, *The Venture Capital Cycle* (2006); Paul Gompers, *The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital*, 23 *Business and Economic History* 1 (1994).

²³³ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

solicitation efforts and the cost associated with verifying accredited investor status.²³⁴ This potential benefit would likely be larger on a percentage basis for smaller offerings. During this four-year period, of the issuers that paid a commission in connection with a Regulation D offering, issuers raising up to \$1 million in capital paid on average a 6.5% commission, whereas issuers raising over \$50 million in capital paid on average a 1.9% commission.²³⁵

Even for issuers that do not currently use an intermediary, allowing issuers to generally solicit would likely lower the search costs associated with finding accredited investors who would be interested in a particular offering, thus enhancing economic efficiency.²³⁶ If lower search costs expand the pool of interested investors for offerings, there could be greater competition among investors, thereby lowering the costs of capital for issuers.²³⁷

The elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation would also reduce the uncertainty for issuers as to whether a Rule 506 offering can be completed in certain situations, and would eliminate the costs of complying with the prohibition.²³⁸ Under existing Rule 506, an inadvertent release of information about an offering to entities or persons with whom the issuer does not have a pre-existing substantive relationship has

²³⁴ We recognize that intermediaries can provide benefits to issuers in addition to locating investors. For example, an intermediary may be able to help an issuer obtain better pricing and terms or provide access to investors that can provide strategic or other advice to the issuer. An intermediary could also provide accreditation services. Unfortunately, we do not have data to quantify these benefits.

²³⁵ See Ivanov/Bauguess Study.

²³⁶ See, for example, Erik Sirri and Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 *Journal of Finance* 1589 (1998), for a similar argument with respect to investors in mutual funds.

²³⁷ For example, a study on offerings involving venture capitalists finds that increased competition among them results in higher valuations for issuers. See Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, Money Chasing Deals? The Impact of Fund Inflows on Private Equity Valuations, 55 *Journal of Financial Economics* 281 (2000).

²³⁸ See letter from MFA (May 4, 2012).

been viewed by some as raising questions about the issuer’s ability to rely on the exemption for the entire offering.²³⁹ In addition, some private funds have been reluctant to respond to press inquiries or to correct inaccurate reports due to concerns about these discussions being misconstrued as a general solicitation.²⁴⁰ Under Rule 506(c), any such uncertainty as to the availability of the exemption due to the public disclosure of information will be reduced. Nevertheless, there is no data available to quantify or estimate these effects.

2. Benefits to Investors

The elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings will likely increase the amount and types of information about issuers and offerings that are communicated to investors, which could also lead to more efficient pricing for the offered securities. In addition, accredited investors who previously have found it difficult to find investment opportunities in Rule 506 offerings may be able to find and potentially invest in a larger and more diverse pool of potential investment opportunities, which would result in a more efficient allocation of investments by accredited investors.²⁴¹ Thus, Rule 506(c) could increase capital formation and at the

²³⁹ See, e.g., letter from S. Lorne and J. McLaughlin (Aug. 5, 2008) on Release No. 33-8828 (stating that “[o]n occasion, the prohibition forces issuers to delay or even cancel offerings because of communications – sometimes inadvertent – that could be viewed in hindsight as a solicitation. The need to police communications by transaction participants, and to analyze and remedy inadvertent communications, also adds significantly to the cost of effecting private placements.”).

²⁴⁰ See, e.g., letters from D.E. Shaw & Co. (Apr. 3, 2006) on Exposure Draft of Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Release No. 33-8666 (Feb. 28, 2006); MFA (May 4, 2012).

²⁴¹ This benefit may not be applicable with respect to every issuer (e.g., certain private funds that offer their shares continuously at net asset value).

same time improve its allocative efficiency.²⁴² One commenter argued that we do not provide data to support the statements that accredited investors need new opportunities or cannot find new opportunities under the current rules prohibiting the use of general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings.²⁴³ While we do not have data to test the validity of these statements since general solicitation has heretofore been prohibited in Rule 506 offerings, economic theory suggests that expanding investors' opportunities for investment generally results in more efficient allocation of capital. For example, one seminal study suggests that if some investors have incomplete information and are not aware of all firms in the economy, risk sharing is incomplete and inefficient.²⁴⁴ Information that makes investors aware of the existence of these firms and enlarges the investor base leads to improved risk sharing and lower cost of capital.

With respect to private funds in particular, in the Proposing Release, we noted that eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation would allow accredited investors to gather information about private funds at relatively lower costs and to allocate their capital more efficiently.²⁴⁵ Increased information about private fund strategies, management fees and performance information would likely lead to greater competition among private funds for investor capital.

²⁴² Allocative efficiency is a condition that is reached when resources are allocated in a way that allows the maximum possible net benefit from their use. In this context, it means the right number of dollars from the right types of investors going to the most suitable investments on efficient terms.

²⁴³ See letter from Consumer Federation.

²⁴⁴ See Robert Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information, 42 *Journal of Finance* 483 (1987).

²⁴⁵ See, e.g., letter from MFA (May 4, 2012); and Managed Funds Association, Petition for Rulemaking on Rule 502 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, File No. 4-643 (Jan. 9, 2012) ("MFA Petition").

Some commenters noted that greater transparency about private funds' activities would benefit investors in these funds, and communications about these activities would be subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and FINRA regulations on the preparation of marketing materials.²⁴⁶ Other commenters believed that private funds engaging in general solicitation should be subject to form, content and/or other restrictions, such as performance and advertising standards that are analogous to the standards that are applicable to mutual funds in order to engage in general solicitation.²⁴⁷ One of the commenters suggested that the Commission develop a rule tailored to the ways private funds calculate and present performance, rather than extending mutual fund performance rules to private funds.²⁴⁸ With respect to private funds sold through broker-dealers subject to FINRA's rules of conduct, some commenters believed that we should direct FINRA to require the filing and review of private fund advertisements.²⁴⁹

While the lack of data does not allow us to quantify the costs and benefits of eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation under Rule 506(c) for private funds, we believe that the potential for an increase in fraudulent or deceptive issuer behavior due to the elimination of the prohibition may be limited to some extent by the competitive nature of the private funds industry as well as by the fact that there are often repeat interactions between private funds and their investors.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ See letters from IAA; BlackRock; MFA (Sept. 28, 2012).

²⁴⁷ See, e.g., letters from AFL-CIO and AFR; Sen. Levin; Consumer Federation; Fund Democracy; Investor Advisory Committee; ICI; IDC; Rep. Waters; NASAA; P. Turney; and Sens. Reed, Levin, Durbin, Harkin, Lautenberg, Franken and Akaka.

²⁴⁸ See letter from ICI.

²⁴⁹ Letters from AFL-CIO and AFR; ICI.

²⁵⁰ See, e.g., William Fung and David Hsieh, Hedge Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases, 58 Financial Analysts Journal 22 (2002); Rajarishi Nahata, Venture Capital Reputation and Investment

3. Costs

Eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation could result in heightened fraudulent activity in Rule 506(c) offerings because it will be easier for promoters of fraudulent schemes to reach potential investors through general solicitation. An increase in fraud would not only harm those investors who are defrauded, it would undermine investor participation in Rule 506(c) offerings and could negatively affect capital-raising by legitimate issuers – for example, by reducing investor participation in Rule 506(c) offerings – thereby inhibiting capital formation and reducing efficiency. One commenter was concerned that investors may confuse private funds with registered investment companies.²⁵¹ In such cases, fraud that occurs with private funds may cause investors to associate the wrongdoing with registered investment companies, and therefore refrain from investing in registered investment companies. In addition, some issuers with publicly-traded securities may use general solicitation for a purported Rule 506(c) offering to generate investor interest in the secondary trading markets, especially in the over-the-counter markets, which could be used by insiders to resell securities at inflated prices. This would impose costs to investors in these secondary markets, as well as investors in Rule 506(c) offerings, and could erode investor participation in Rule 506(c) offerings, thus potentially raising the cost of capital for issuers in this market. As discussed above, we cannot quantify these potential costs because the existence of the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings until now means that data on the economic impact of eliminating the prohibition is not available.

Performance, 90 *Journal of Financial Economics* 127 (2008); Douglas Cumming and Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around the World, 41 *Journal of International Business Studies* 727 (2010).

²⁵¹ See letters from ICI; ICI re: MFA Petition (Feb. 7, 2012).

Several commenters echoed concerns regarding the potential of fraud related to private funds in the Rule 506(c) market.²⁵² Empirical evidence on the extent of fraud involving private funds is not readily available. While a few economic studies suggest that certain hedge funds engage in various types of misreporting, such as misrepresenting past performance,²⁵³ delaying disclosure of returns²⁵⁴ and inflating returns at the end of the fiscal year in order to earn higher fees,²⁵⁵ these studies do not provide information about the extent or magnitude of any such misreporting activities. In a 2003 report, the Commission staff noted that there was no evidence that hedge funds were disproportionately involved in fraudulent activity and that the charges brought by the Commission in 38 enforcement actions against hedge fund advisers and hedge funds between 1999 and 2003 were similar to the charges against other types of investment advisers.²⁵⁶ Evidence on the extent of fraud involving other types of pooled investment funds also is sparse. A more recent study has identified 245 lawsuits (both federal and state) involving 200 venture capitalists as defendants between 1975 and 2007, and has shown that VC funds that are older and have a larger presence in terms of size and network are less likely to be sued.²⁵⁷

²⁵² See letters from Consumer Federation; Fund Democracy; IDC.

²⁵³ See Andrew Patton, Tarun Ramadorai, and Michael Streatfield, Change You Can Believe In? Hedge Fund Data Revisions (Duke University, Working Paper, 2013). But see letter from MFA (June 20, 2013) (questioning the reliability of the underlying data used in the study).

²⁵⁴ See George Aragon and Vikram Nanda, Strategic Delays and Clustering in Hedge Fund Reported Returns (Arizona State University, Working Paper, 2013).

²⁵⁵ See Vikas Agarwal, Naveen Daniel, and Narayanan Naik, Do Hedge Funds Manage Their Reported Returns?, 24 *Review of Financial Studies* 3282 (2011).

²⁵⁶ See Staff Report on Hedge Funds.

²⁵⁷ See Vladimir Atanasov, Vladimir Ivanov, and Kate Litvak, Does Reputation Limit Opportunistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence From Litigation Against VCs, 67 *Journal of Finance* 2215 (2012).

A number of commenters²⁵⁸ noted the Commission’s experience with the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation for Rule 504 offerings in 1992,²⁵⁹ and its subsequent reinstatement in 1999 as a result of heightened fraudulent activity.²⁶⁰ We do not believe that our experience with offerings conducted pursuant to Rule 504, as amended in 1992, is particularly instructive with respect to the potential incidence of fraud resulting from our implementation of Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act, for a number of reasons. In 1992, when we amended Rule 504 to eliminate the prohibition against general solicitation, we also provided that the securities issued in these Rule 504 offerings would not be “restricted securities” for purposes of resale pursuant to Rule 144 under the Securities Act.²⁶¹ As a result, a non-reporting company could sell up to \$1 million of immediately freely-tradable securities in a 12-month period and be subject only to the antifraud and civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws.

By 1998, we concluded that securities issued in these Rule 504 offerings facilitated a number of fraudulent secondary transactions in the over-the-counter markets, and that these securities were issued by “microcap” companies, characterized by thin capitalization, low share prices and little or no analyst coverage.²⁶² At that time, we stated that, while “we believe that the scope of abuse is small in relation to the actual

²⁵⁸ See letters from Consumer Federation; Fund Democracy; Sen. Levin.

²⁵⁹ See Release No. 33-6949.

²⁶⁰ See Release No. 33-7644.

²⁶¹ 17 CFR 230.144.

²⁶² Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the “Seed Capital” Exemption, Release No. 33-7541 (May 21, 1998) [63 FR 29168 (May 28, 1998)].

usage of the exemption, we also believe that a regulatory response may be necessary.”²⁶³

As the freely-tradable nature of the securities facilitated the fraudulent secondary transactions, we proposed to “implement the same resale restrictions on securities issued in a Rule 504 transaction as apply to transactions under the other Regulation D exemptions,” in addition to reinstating the prohibition against general solicitation.

Although we recognized that resale restrictions would have “some impact upon small businesses trying to raise ‘seed capital’ in bona fide transactions,” we believed that such restrictions were necessary so that “unscrupulous stock promoters will be less likely to use Rule 504 as the source of the freely tradable securities they need to facilitate their fraudulent activities in the secondary markets.”²⁶⁴

In contrast, issuers using Rule 506(c) can sell only to accredited investors, and the securities issued in these offerings are deemed to be “restricted securities” for purposes of resale under Rule 144. As a result, schemes involving price manipulation to defraud unknowing investors in the immediate resale of securities purchased directly from issuers (colloquially referred to as “pump and dump” schemes)²⁶⁵ are not the types of fraud we believe are likely to occur in Rule 506(c) offerings, given the holding period requirement in Rule 144(d) and other structural impediments, such as restricted transfer legends on stock certificates.

²⁶³ Id. at 29169.

²⁶⁴ Id.

²⁶⁵ See, e.g., Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Sept. 22, 1997; SEC v. Huttoo, Litigation Release No. 15237 (Jan. 31, 1997), 63 SEC Docket 2383 (Mar. 4, 1997); SEC v. Spencer, Litigation Release No. 14856 (Mar. 29, 1996), 61 SEC Docket 1960 (Apr. 30, 1996), and Litigation Release No. 15042 (Sept. 12, 1996), 62 SEC Docket 2409 (Oct. 8, 1996).

The risks to investors of fraudulent offerings conducted under Rule 506(c) may be mitigated to some extent by the requirement that issuers sell only to accredited investors (and take reasonable steps to verify such status), who, by virtue of meeting the requirements of the definition, may be better able to assess their ability to take financial risks and bear the risk of loss than investors who are not accredited investors. Issuers will still be subject to the antifraud provisions under the federal securities laws, and the public nature of these solicitations may also facilitate detection of fraudulent activity in that the fraudulent nature of some offerings may be inferred from particular statements contained in solicitation materials, for example, representations of guaranteed high rates of return.

Several commenters asserted that satisfying the definition of accredited investor does not equate to financial sophistication and that it is questionable whether accredited investors will be better able to identify the financial risks of the offerings and detect fraudulent offerings as compared to non-accredited investors.²⁶⁶ They also noted that the income test and the net worth test have been significantly eroded by inflation. These commenters also stated that not all general solicitation activities are widely known or accessible, and that fraudulent offerings sold through telemarketing calls and email solicitations, for example, will be difficult if not impossible to detect until after significant damage has occurred.

4. Indirect Effects on Other Markets

Although Rule 506(c) will directly affect the private offering market, it could also have an indirect effect on other markets. The lower search costs associated with finding

²⁶⁶ See, e.g., letters from Consumer Federation; Fund Democracy.

Rule 506(c) offerings may cause some investors that currently invest in public equity and debt markets or other non-registered offering markets to reallocate capital to offerings made under Rule 506(c). If a significant number of investors make a greater proportion of their investments in Rule 506(c) offerings, such investor behavior may reduce the supply of capital and prices in the public equity and debt markets and in other non-registered offering markets. For example, issuers currently using the exemptions in Regulation A under the Securities Act²⁶⁷ and in Rules 504(b)(1)(i) through (iii) of Regulation D²⁶⁸ to solicit investors could prefer to rely on the exemption under Rule 506(c) because they would be able to raise unlimited amounts of capital under Rule 506(c) and state blue sky securities registration requirements do not apply to Rule 506(c) offerings.²⁶⁹ Although it is difficult to estimate how many of these issuers will choose to rely on Rule 506(c) in lieu of other available exemptions from registration, we believe that it is likely that Rule 506(c) will have a larger impact on issuers using Rule 504 rather than Regulation A because very few issuers have been using the Regulation A exemption in recent years.²⁷⁰ In addition, to the extent that accredited investors have invested in registered investment companies instead of private funds because of information asymmetry between private funds and registered investment companies, it is possible that registered investment companies' assets may decrease if these investors now transfer

²⁶⁷ 17 CFR 230.251 through 17 CFR 230.263.

²⁶⁸ 17 CFR 230.504(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

²⁶⁹ 17 CFR 230.251 through 17 CFR 230.263.

²⁷⁰ The Ivanov/Bauguess Study reported that 1,852 issuers relied on the Rule 504 exemption to raise capital between 2009 to 2012, and 20 issuers relied on Regulation A. The number of issuers using Regulation A to raise capital may increase once the Commission adopts rules implementing Title IV of the JOBS Act, which directs the Commission to adopt an exemption based on Regulation A to permit offerings of up to \$50 million.

their assets to private funds. Because we cannot predict how issuers will use the various exemptions from registration after the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings, we cannot quantify these potential effects.

5. Retention of Rule 506(b)

We believe that retaining existing Rule 506(b) will have benefits for both issuers and investors. It will allow issuers that do not wish to generally solicit in their private offerings to avoid the added expense of complying with the rules applicable to Rule 506(c) offerings. It will also allow issuers to continue selling privately to up to 35 non-accredited investors who meet existing Rule 506's sophistication requirements. The continued availability of Rule 506(b) may also be beneficial to investors with whom the issuer has a pre-existing substantive relationship and who do not wish to bear additional verification costs that may be associated with participation in Rule 506(c) offerings. All but one commenter supported the Commission's decision to retain Rule 506(b).²⁷¹

D. Verifying Accredited Investor Status in Rule 506(c) Offerings

As there is no information available to us on the costs currently incurred by issuers to form a reasonable belief that a purchaser in a Rule 506 offering is an accredited investor, we are unable to quantify the estimated costs and benefits of the verification requirement in Rule 506(c). Comments from the public on this issue also did not provide any estimates.

²⁷¹ See, e.g., letters from ABA Fed. Reg. Comm.; ACA (Sept. 27, 2012); CFIRA; IPA; Montgomery & Hansen; NSBA; NYCBA; S&C; SIFMA and FSR (Oct. 5, 2012). Only one commenter opposed retaining it. Letter from J. McLaughlin (stating that "[t]here is no basis in the statute for the Commission to continue to apply the prohibition to a set of offerings exempt under Rule 506, especially since the effect of maintaining a parallel rule may have the effect of discouraging some issuers from using general solicitation....").

The requirement in Rule 506(c) for issuers to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors will likely make it more difficult for issuers to sell securities to non-accredited investors. This, in turn, may reduce the likelihood that fraudulent offerings would be completed because those who are eligible to purchase are more likely to be able to protect their interests than investors who are not accredited investors. Issuers would also benefit from measures that improve the integrity and reputation of the Rule 506(c) market because the measures would facilitate investor participation, which could result in issuers having greater access to capital.

The verification requirement in Rule 506(c) would impose costs as well. Because the requirement is to take “reasonable” steps to verify, and not every conceivable step to verify, it is possible that some investors in Rule 506(c) will not be accredited investors, even if the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify their status as accredited investors. If so, then these investors will participate in offerings for which they are not qualified and that may not be appropriate for them, thereby resulting in a potentially inefficient allocation of capital for these investors. These investors could also face an additional cost in the form of heightened risk of significant losses on their investments, which they may not be able to manage or diversify in a way that accredited investors could.

In addition, some potential investors likely would have to provide more information to issuers than they currently provide, while issuers may have to apply a stricter and more costly process to determine accredited investor status than what they currently use. While commenters provided us with examples of the methods currently used by issuers in the Rule 506 market to collect information about purchasers, they did not provide any data on the costs of these methods. While it is reasonable to expect that

the costs associated with the verification requirement could be offset somewhat by its benefits, it is also reasonable to expect that some accredited investors who would participate in existing Rule 506(b) offerings would decline to participate in Rule 506(c) offerings in light of the verification requirement.

To the extent that issuers require investors to provide personally identifiable information (e.g., Social Security numbers, tax information, bank or brokerage account information) in order to verify their accredited investor status, these investors may be reluctant to do so in the context of making an investment in an issuer, particularly an issuer with which they may have no prior relationship.²⁷² In addition to concerns about maintaining personal privacy, investors may be concerned that their personally identifiable information could be stolen or accessed by third parties or used by unscrupulous issuers in various ways (e.g., identity theft), which could impose costs to investors that go well beyond the costs typically associated with investing. As a consequence, some potential investors may elect not to participate in Rule 506(c) offerings, thus impeding capital formation to some extent.

Our decision not to specify the verification methods that an issuer must use in taking reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status would provide issuers with the flexibility to use methods that are appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances of each offering and each purchaser. Such flexibility could mitigate the cost to issuers of complying with Rule 506(c) because it would allow them to select the most cost-effective verification method for each offering. We anticipate, however, that issuers or their verification service providers will document the particular verification methods used in

²⁷² See letter from SecondMarket Holdings, Inc. (May 25, 2012).

the event of any question being raised about the availability of the exemption. Although we do not specify the nature or extent of any such documentation, we acknowledge that it will create some cost.

On the other hand, the greater flexibility of the principles-based “reasonableness” verification method could result in less rigorous verification, thus allowing some unscrupulous issuers to more easily sell securities to purchasers who are not accredited investors and perpetrate fraudulent schemes, or it could create or promote legal uncertainty about the availability of Rule 506(c), which may cause some issuers to interpret “reasonable steps to verify” in a manner that is more burdensome than if specific verification methods were prescribed, thus incurring higher cost. We believe that the non-exclusive list of specific methods of verification we are including in Rule 506(c), as adopted, should help to mitigate the impact of these costs.

Some commenters suggested that using a flexible verification standard is optimal for issuers because it closely resembles current market practices which they believe have worked well in this market.²⁷³ Such flexibility will allow issuers to adopt different approaches based on the types of accredited investors, types of offerings and changing market practices. In contrast, other commenters questioned the benefits of the flexibility provided by the principles-based verification method and criticized the Commission for not quantifying the costs and benefits of currently used verification methods.²⁷⁴ They argued that the application of the reasonableness standard in the principles-based method

²⁷³ See letters from SIFMA and FSR (Oct. 5, 2012); and IAA.

²⁷⁴ See letters from Consumer Federation; Fund Democracy.

will lead to lax verification practices by issuers, which would lessen investor protection by allowing sales of securities to non-accredited investors.

Our decision to provide a non-exclusive list of specified methods that issuers can use to verify a purchaser's accredited investor status will provide legal certainty in those circumstances in which there is a question as to whether or not the steps taken are reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. Using a specified method would reduce issuers' verification costs to the extent that they would otherwise incur costs to analyze whether or not the steps they had taken or proposed to take satisfied the reasonableness standard in Rule 506(c). It could also reduce investors' costs, since the methods for verifying income and net worth rely mostly on documents prepared by third parties at no cost to the investors. On the other hand, some investors may be reluctant to provide the personal financial information required by the income and net worth methods; and with respect to the third-party method, it may be relatively costly to pay for the verification services of a lawyer or accountant as they may be concerned about professional liability. The grandfather method – which permits self-certification by existing investors who purchased securities as accredited investors in an issuer's Rule 506(b) offering before the effective date of Rule 506(c) – could result in investors that do not meet the definition of “accredited investor” participating in Rule 506(c) offerings because issuers conducting Rule 506(b) offerings are not required to take reasonable steps to verify the accredited investor status of their purchasers.

In addition, our non-exclusive list of specified verification methods could be mistakenly viewed by market participants as the required verification methods, in which compliance with at least one of the enumerated methods could be viewed, in the practical

application of the verification requirement, as necessary in all circumstances to demonstrate that the verification requirement has been satisfied, thereby eliminating the flexibility that Rule 506(c) is intended to provide.²⁷⁵ If issuers choose not to use verification methods different from those on the non-exclusive list, then some potential investors may limit their participation in the Rule 506(c) market, which may impede capital formation to some extent. Finally, even if a specified method has been used, thereby satisfying the verification requirement, there may be circumstances in which issuers may unreasonably overlook or disregard other information indicating that a purchaser is not, in fact, an accredited investor. This could lead to sales being made to persons who are not accredited investors. Because, as stated above, the Commission does not have data on current verification practices, we cannot quantify the effect of the new verification requirement in Rule 506(c).

E. Analysis of the Amendment to Rule 144A

We expect the potential benefits of the amendments to Rule 144A to be lower (i.e., less available) for issuers in Rule 144A offerings as compared to issuers in Rule 506(c) offerings because QIBs, which are the only permitted investors in Rule 144A offerings, are generally fewer in number, known by market participants, and better networked than accredited investors. Thus, as we noted in the Proposing Release, we believe that eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation for Rule 144A offerings is unlikely to dramatically increase issuers' access to QIBs in such offerings or to lower the cost of capital in Rule 144A offerings.

²⁷⁵ The use of any of the specified methods is optional. We expect that many issuers will conduct Rule 506(c) offerings in reliance on the principles-based method of verification, in light of its flexibility and efficiency.

We expect that there would be fewer potential occurrences of general solicitation-induced fraud in Rule 144A offerings, as compared to Rule 506(c) transactions, because Rule 144A offerings involve an intermediary that, as the initial purchaser of the securities, typically performs a due diligence investigation and assists the issuer in preparing the offering materials, thereby adding a layer of protection against fraud. Also, Rule 144A investors are generally large institutions, which are thought to be better able to identify fraudulent activities than smaller institutions and retail investors in general.

We also anticipate that eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation would significantly affect private trading systems by permitting information vendors to provide more information about Rule 144A securities. Indeed, because offers will be able to be made to the public, the information on private trading systems for Rule 144A securities could be made available to all investors, even though sales would be limited to QIBs.²⁷⁶ In addition, currently there is no public dissemination through Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (“TRACE”) of transactions in Rule 144A securities.²⁷⁷ Now that Rule 144A is being amended to permit offers to be made to persons other than QIBs, transaction information with respect to Rule 144A securities can be publicly disseminated. Such improvements in the information available to potential investors could enhance efficiency in the Rule 144A market.

²⁷⁶ Under the PORTAL Trading System developed by the Nasdaq Stock Market for trading Rule 144A securities, access is restricted to QIBs. Other privately developed Rule 144A trading systems, such as Portal Alliance, have similar restrictions.

²⁷⁷ See FINRA Rule 6750. There is mandatory reporting of over-the-counter trades in fixed income securities. On April 19, 2013, the FINRA Board of Governors announced that it has authorized FINRA to file with the Commission “proposed amendments to FINRA Rules 6750 and 7730 to provide for the dissemination of transactions in TRACE-eligible securities effected pursuant to Securities Act Rule 144A (Rule 144A transactions).” See Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and CEO, FINRA (Apr. 19, 2013), available at: <http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/CommunicationstoFirms/P244913>.

F. Additional Information Collection and Disclosures

We are amending Form D to add a new check box in Item 6 of Form D that will require an issuer to indicate whether it is relying on Rule 506(c) in conducting its offering. With this information, the Commission will be able to more effectively analyze the use of Rule 506(c). The marginal cost to issuers of providing this information is likely to be low because Form D already requires issuers to identify the exemption on which they are relying. Commenters generally supported the proposal to have a new check box in Item 6 of Form D as a way to identify Rule 506(c) offerings.²⁷⁸ One commenter, however, questioned the usefulness of the information provided by the new check box.²⁷⁹

Much of what we know about the size and characteristics of the private offering market comes from Form D filings. The information collected to date and described in this release illustrates and underscores the importance of the private offering market to the U.S. economy. The continued collection of this information following the elimination of the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506(c) and Rule 144A offerings will be an important tool in assessing the ongoing economic impact of the new rule amendments.

VII. FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS

This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (“FRFA”) has been prepared in accordance with Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.²⁸⁰ It relates to the

²⁷⁸ See letters from MFA (Sept. 28, 2012); SIFMA and FSR (Oct. 5, 2012); IAA.

²⁷⁹ See letter from Consumer Federation.

²⁸⁰ See 5 U.S.C. 603.

amendments to Rules 500, 501, 502 and 506 of Regulation D, Form D and Rule 144A that we are adopting in this release. An Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (“IRFA”) was prepared in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and included in the Proposing Release.

A. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Action

The primary reason for, and objective of, the amendments to Rule 502 and Rule 506 is to implement the statutory requirements of Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act, which directs the Commission to revise Rule 506 to provide that the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 502(c) shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to Rule 506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors. Consistent with the language in Section 201(a), the amendment to Rule 506 requires issuers to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers in any Rule 506 offering using general solicitation are accredited investors. The primary reason for, and objective of, the amendment to Form D is to assist our efforts to analyze the use of general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings and the size of this offering market.

The primary reason for, and objective of, the final amendment to Rule 144A is to implement the statutory requirements of Section 201(a)(2) of the JOBS Act, which directs the Commission to revise Rule 144A(d)(1) to provide that securities sold pursuant to Rule 144A may be offered to persons other than QIBs, including by means of general solicitation, provided that securities are sold only to persons that the seller and any person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believe are QIBs.

B. Significant Issues Raised By Public Comments

In the Proposing Release, we requested comment on any aspect of the IRFA, including the number of small entities that would be subject to the proposed rule and

form amendments and the nature of the effects of the proposed amendments on small entities. We received one comment addressing the IRFA.²⁸¹ This commenter stated that the Commission failed in its IRFA to consider the alternative of eliminating Form D or significantly reducing the scope of information required to be disclosed on Form D. As Form D provides meaningful information about the Regulation D market, and our need for information about this market will only increase once Rule 506(c) is in effect, we are not considering eliminating Form D or significantly reducing the scope of information required to be disclosed on Form D.

C. Small Entities Subject to the Final Rule and Form Amendments

For purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, under our rules, an issuer, other than an investment company, is a “small business” or “small organization” if it has total assets of \$5 million or less as of the end of its most recent fiscal year and is engaged or proposing to engage in an offering of securities which does not exceed \$5 million.²⁸² For purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, an investment company is a small entity if it, together with other investment companies in the same group of related investment companies, has net assets of \$50 million or less as of the end of its most recent fiscal year.²⁸³

Rule 506(c) will affect small issuers (including both operating businesses and investment funds that raise capital under Rule 506) relying on this exemption from Securities Act registration. All issuers that sell securities in reliance on Regulation D are

²⁸¹ See letter from K. Bishop.

²⁸² 17 CFR 230.157.

²⁸³ 17 CFR 270.0-10(a).

required to file a Form D with the Commission reporting the transaction. For the year ended December 31, 2012, 16,067 issuers made 18,187 new Form D filings, of which 15,208 issuers relied on the Rule 506 exemption. Based on the information reported by issuers on Form D, there were 3,958 small issuers²⁸⁴ relying on the Rule 506 exemption in 2012. This number likely underestimates the actual number of small issuers relying on the Rule 506 exemption, however, because over 60% of issuers that are not pooled investment funds and over 80% of issuers that are pooled investment funds declined to report their amount of revenues in 2012.

The final amendment to Rule 144A will affect small entities that engage in Rule 144A offerings.²⁸⁵ Unlike issuers that use Regulation D, issuers conducting Rule 144A offerings are not required to file any form with the Commission. This lack of data significantly limits our ability to assess the number and the size of issuers that conduct Rule 144A offerings. Still, we are able to obtain some data on non-ABS Rule 144A offerings during the 2009 to 2012 period from two commercial databases.²⁸⁶ Based on these data, we identified 3,510 offerings involving 1,965 issuers from 2009 to 2012. We were able to obtain 2011 financial information for 598 of these issuers,²⁸⁷ of which only 11 issuers reported total assets of less than \$50 million.

²⁸⁴ Of this number, 3,627 of these issuers are not investment companies, and 331 are investment companies. We also note that issuers that are not investment companies disclose only revenues on Form D, and not total assets. Hence, we use the amount of revenues as a measure of issuer size.

²⁸⁵ While it may be theoretically possible for a small entity to meet one part of the definition of “qualified institutional buyer” (e.g., an “entity, all of the equity owners of which are qualified institutional buyers, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified institutional buyers”), we do not have any information to suggest that there are such small entities. Accordingly, the regulatory flexibility analysis in regard to Rule 144A is focused on small issuers that engage in Rule 144A offerings.

²⁸⁶ These databases are Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum Service and Sagient Research System’s Placement Tracker database.

²⁸⁷ Financial data for fiscal year 2011 was obtained from Compustat, a product of Standard and Poor’s.

D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements

The final amendment to Rule 506 will impose certain reporting and compliance requirements on issuers that engage in general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings. As discussed above, issuers taking advantage of Rule 506(c) to engage in general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings will be required to take reasonable steps to verify that the purchasers of the securities are accredited investors. The steps required will vary with the circumstances, but we anticipate that some potential investors may have to provide more information to issuers than they currently provide, while issuers may have to apply a stricter and more costly process to verify accredited investor status than what they currently use. We expect that the costs of compliance will vary depending on the size and nature of the offering, the nature and extent of the verification methods used, and the number and nature of purchasers in the offering. Rule 506(c) does not impose any recordkeeping requirements; however, we anticipate that issuers or their verification service providers will document the steps taken to verify that purchasers are accredited investors in Rule 506 offerings involving general solicitation because the issuer has the burden of demonstrating that its offering is entitled to an exemption from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. To promote legal certainty, we are including in Rule 506(c) a non-exclusive list of verification methods that in and of themselves will be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement.

The final amendment to Form D will also impose an information requirement with respect to Rule 506 offerings that use general solicitation. Each issuer submitting a Form D for a Rule 506 offering will be required to check a box on the form to indicate whether the issuer is relying on the Rule 506(c) exemption. We do not believe that this

revision to Form D will increase in any material way the time or information required to complete the Form D that must be filed with the Commission in connection with a Rule 506 offering.

The final amendment to Rule 144A contains no reporting, recordkeeping or compliance requirements for issuers that engage in Rule 144A offerings.

E. Duplicative, Overlapping or Conflicting Federal Rules

The Commission believes that there are no rules that duplicate, overlap or conflict with the final amendments to Rule 144A, Form D, and Rules 500, 501, 502 and 506 of Regulation D.

F. Significant Alternatives

The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs us to consider significant alternatives that would accomplish the stated objectives of our amendments, while minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities. In regard to the final amendment to Rule 144A and the final amendment to Rule 506 to remove the prohibition against general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings where all purchasers are accredited investors and issuers have taken reasonable steps to verify purchasers' accredited investor status, there are no significant alternatives to these amendments that would accomplish the stated objectives of Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act. Eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation for a subset of Rule 506 offerings is intended to assist small entities – and other entities – seeking to raise capital. Small entities are not required to use Rule 506(c) to raise capital and would do so presumably only if it would be useful to them.

In connection with the final amendment to Form D and the final amendment to Rule 506 that requires issuers to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of securities are accredited investors, the Commission considered the following alternatives:

(1) establishing different compliance or reporting standards that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) clarifying, consolidating or simplifying compliance requirements under the rule; (3) using design rather than performance standards; and (4) exempting small entities from coverage of all or part of the amendment to Rule 506.

With respect to using design rather than performance standards, we note that the “reasonable steps to verify” requirement in Rule 506(c) is a performance standard. We believe that the flexibility of a performance standard accommodates different types of offerings and purchasers without imposing overly burdensome methods that may be ill-suited or unnecessary to a particular offering or purchaser, given the facts and circumstances. The Commission is not adopting different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables for small entities under Rule 506(c). The particular steps necessary to meet the requirement to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors will vary according to the circumstances. Different compliance requirements for small entities may create the risk that the requirements may be too prescriptive or, alternatively, insufficient to verify a purchaser’s accredited investor status. Special requirements for small entities may also lead to investor confusion or reduced investor participation in Rule 506 offerings if they create the impression that small entities have a different standard of verification than other issuers of securities. As the verification requirement is intended to protect investors by limiting participation in unregistered offerings to those who are most able to bear the risk, we are of the view that a flexible standard applicable to all issuers better accomplishes the goal of investor protection that this requirement is intended to serve. At the same time, the non-exclusive

list of verification methods that we are including in the final rule will provide additional legal certainty to all issuers, including small entities. The Commission is not adopting a different reporting requirement for small entities because the additional information that will be required in Form D is minimal and should not be unduly burdensome or costly for small entities.

We similarly believe that it does not appear consistent with the objective of the final amendments or the considerations described above regarding investor confusion and investor participation to further clarify, consolidate or simplify the amendments for small entities. With respect to exempting small entities from coverage of these final amendments, we believe such an approach would be contrary to the requirements of, and the legislative intent behind, Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act, as evidenced by the plain language of the statute.

VIII. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND TEXT OF FINAL RULE AND FORM AMENDMENTS

The final amendments contained in this release are being adopted under the authority set forth in Sections 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2), 7, 17(a), 19 and 28 of the Securities Act, as amended, Sections 2, 3, 9(a), 10, 11A(c), 12, 13, 14, 15(c), 15(g), 17(a), 23(a) and 30 of the Exchange Act, as amended, Sections 23, 30 and 38 of the Investment Company Act, as amended, and Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act.²⁸⁸

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 230, 239 and 242

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

²⁸⁸ Although 15 U.S.C. 77d note is not an authority for the amendments in this release, it is being included in the instruction below for the general authority citation for Part 230 to ensure that the Code of Federal Regulations is correctly updated for purposes of the bad actor disqualification rule for Rule 506 offerings also published today. See Bad Actor Release.

For the reasons set out above, the Commission is amending Title 17, chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 230--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

1. The general authority citation for Part 230 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77b, 77b note, 77c, 77d, 77d note, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77r, 77s, 77z-3, 77sss, 78c, 78d, 78j, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o, 78o-7 note, 78t, 78w, 78ll (d), 78mm, 80a-8, 80a-24, 80a-28, 80a-29, 80a-30, and 80a-37, and Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 201(a), 126 Stat. 313 (2012), unless otherwise noted.

* * * * *

2. Amend § 230.144A by:

- a. In Preliminary Note 7, removing the reference to “section 4(2)” and adding in its place “section 4(a)(2)”;
- b. In paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A), removing the reference to “section 2(13)” and adding in its place “section 2(a)(13)”;
- c. In paragraph (b), removing the reference to “sections 2(11) and 4(1)” and adding in its place “sections 2(a)(11) and 4(a)(1)”;
- d. In paragraph (c), removing the references to “section 4(3)(C)”, “section 2(11)” and “section 4(3)(A)” and adding in their place “section 4(a)(3)(C)”, “section 2(a)(11)” and “section 4(a)(3)(A),” respectively;
- e. In paragraph (d)(1), first sentence, removing the phrase “offered or”; and
- f. In paragraph (d)(1), first sentence, removing the phrase “an offeree or” and adding in its place “a”.

3. Amend § 230.500(c) by:
 - a. Removing the reference to “section 4(2)” and adding in its place “section 4(a)(2)”; and
 - b. In the second sentence, adding “(b)” after “rule 506” and after “(§230.506”.
4. Amend § 230.501 by:
 - a. In paragraph (a)(1), removing the reference to “section 2(13)” and adding in its place “section 2(a)(13)”; and
 - b. In paragraph (g), removing the reference to “section 2(4)” and adding in its place “section 2(a)(4)”.
5. Amend § 230.502 by:
 - a. In paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2)(iv), (b)(2)(v) and (b)(2)(vii), removing the reference to “§ 230.506” and adding in its place “§ 230.506(b)”;
 - b. In paragraph (c), first sentence, adding the phrase “or § 230.506(c)” after the phrase “Except as provided in § 230.504(b)(1)”;
 - c. In paragraph (d), removing the reference to “section 4(2)” and adding in its place “section 4(a)(2)”; and
 - d. In paragraph (d), removing the reference to “section 2(11)” and adding in its place “section 2(a)(11).”
6. Amend § 230.506 by:
 - a. In paragraph (a), adding the phrase “or (c)” after the phrase “satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b)”;

b. In paragraph (a), removing the phrase “section 4(2)” and adding in its place “section 4(a)(2)”;

c. In the heading of paragraph (b), adding the phrase “in offerings subject to limitation on manner of offering” after the phrase “Conditions to be met”;

d. In the note following paragraph (b)(2)(i), removing the phrase “this section” and adding in its place “paragraph (b) of this section”; and

e. Adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:

§ 230.506 Exemption for limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount of offering.

* * * * *

(c) Conditions to be met in offerings not subject to limitation on manner of offering --(1) General conditions. To qualify for exemption under this section, sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of §§ 230.501 and 230.502(a) and (d).

(2) Specific conditions --(i) Nature of purchasers. All purchasers of securities sold in any offering under paragraph (c) of this section are accredited investors.

(ii) Verification of accredited investor status. The issuer shall take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of securities sold in any offering under paragraph (c) of this section are accredited investors. The issuer shall be deemed to take reasonable steps to verify if the issuer uses, at its option, one of the following non-exclusive and non-mandatory methods of verifying that a natural person who purchases securities in such offering is an accredited investor; provided, however, that the issuer does not have knowledge that such person is not an accredited investor:

(A) In regard to whether the purchaser is an accredited investor on the basis of income, reviewing any Internal Revenue Service form that reports the purchaser’s income

for the two most recent years (including, but not limited to, Form W-2, Form 1099, Schedule K-1 to Form 1065, and Form 1040) and obtaining a written representation from the purchaser that he or she has a reasonable expectation of reaching the income level necessary to qualify as an accredited investor during the current year;

(B) In regard to whether the purchaser is an accredited investor on the basis of net worth, reviewing one or more of the following types of documentation dated within the prior three months and obtaining a written representation from the purchaser that all liabilities necessary to make a determination of net worth have been disclosed:

(1) With respect to assets: bank statements, brokerage statements and other statements of securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax assessments, and appraisal reports issued by independent third parties; and

(2) With respect to liabilities: a consumer report from at least one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies; or

(C) Obtaining a written confirmation from one of the following persons or entities that such person or entity has taken reasonable steps to verify that the purchaser is an accredited investor within the prior three months and has determined that such purchaser is an accredited investor:

(1) A registered broker-dealer;

(2) An investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission;

(3) A licensed attorney who is in good standing under the laws of the jurisdictions in which he or she is admitted to practice law; or

(4) A certified public accountant who is duly registered and in good standing under the laws of the place of his or her residence or principal office.

(D) In regard to any person who purchased securities in an issuer's Rule 506(b) offering as an accredited investor prior to September 23, 2013, and continues to hold such securities, for the same issuer's Rule 506(c) offering, obtaining a certification by such person at the time of sale that he or she qualifies as an accredited investor.

Instructions to paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(A) through (D) of this section:

1. The issuer is not required to use any of these methods in verifying the accredited investor status of natural persons who are purchasers. These methods are examples of the types of non-exclusive and non-mandatory methods that satisfy the verification requirement in § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).

2. In the case of a person who qualifies as an accredited investor based on joint income with that person's spouse, the issuer would be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A) by reviewing copies of Internal Revenue Service forms that report income for the two most recent years in regard to, and obtaining written representations from, both the person and the spouse.

3. In the case of a person who qualifies as an accredited investor based on joint net worth with that person's spouse, the issuer would be deemed to satisfy the verification requirement in § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(B) by reviewing such documentation in regard to, and obtaining written representations from, both the person and the spouse.

PART 239 – FORMS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

7. The authority citation for Part 239 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 77sss, 78c, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o (d), 78o-7 note, 78u-5, 78w(a), 78ll, 78mm, 80a-2(a), 80a-3, 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-10, 80a-13, 80a-24, 80a-26, 80a-29, 80a-30, and 80a-37, unless otherwise noted.

8. Amend Form D (referenced in § 239.500) by:

a. In Item 6, removing the phrase “Rule 506” and adding in its place “Rule 506(b)” next to the appropriate check box, and removing the phrase “Securities Act Section 4(5)” and adding in its place “Securities Act Section 4(a)(5)” next to the appropriate check box;

b. In Item 6, adding a check box that reads “Rule 506(c)” after the newly redesignated Rule 506(b) check box; and

c. In the instruction “Who must file:”, removing the reference to “Section 4(5)” and adding in its place “Section 4(a)(5).”

(Note: The text of Form D does not, and the amendments will not, appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.)

PART 242--REGULATIONS M, SHO, ATS, AC, AND NMS AND CUSTOMER MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY FUTURES

9. The authority citation for Part 242 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77g, 77q(a), 77s(a), 78b, 78c, 78g(c)(2), 78i(a), 78j, 78k-1(c), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(b), 78o(c), 78o(g), 78q(a), 78q(b), 78q(h), 78w(a), 78dd-1, 78mm, 80a-23, 80a-29, and 80a-37.

10. Amend § 242.101 by:

a. In paragraph (b)(10) introductory text, removing the phrase “offered or”; and

b. In paragraph (b)(10)(i), removing the phrase “offerees or”.

11. Amend § 242.102 by:
 - a. In paragraph (b)(7) introductory text, removing the phrase “offered or”; and
 - b. In paragraph (b)(7)(i), removing the phrase “offerees or”.
12. Amend § 242.104 by:
 - a. In paragraph (j)(2) introductory text, removing the phrase “offered or”; and
 - b. In paragraph (j)(2)(i), removing the phrase “offerees or”.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

July 10, 2013