ORAL STATEMENT OF ARTHUR LEVITT, CHAIRMAN U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CONCERNING H.R. 718, THE "MARKETS AND TRADING REORGANIZATION AND REFORM ACT" BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 30, 1995 Chairman Baker and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to appear today to testify on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding H.R. 718, the "Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act" introduced by Chairman Leach and Congressman Wyden, which would merge the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC. In most fundamental respects, the markets for stocks, stock options, and stock index futures are closely linked. The economic forces that affect these markets, the investment banks and institutional investors that are their major participants, and the trading strategies used by market participants, are all interrelated. Indeed, the United States is the only country with developed capital markets that divides the regulation of equity securities from the regulation of futures on stock indexes. The Merger Bill would end this anomaly by merging the SEC and the CFTC into a new agency, the Markets and Trading Commission. Mr. Chairman, as you may know, I came to the Commission after a long career in the securities industry, and that experience has inevitably served to shape my views. I well recall the difficulties that arise when one is subject to regulation by several different entities -- state regulators, federal regulators, self-regulatory organizations, and others, all with their own rules, regulations, and priorities. I know the costs, in time, in resources, and, most importantly, in effectiveness. Let me begin, then, by admitting that I come to this issue with a bias in favor of eliminating redundancies. In a perfect world, I would -- wherever possible -- rather have one regulator than two, three, four, or five. At the same time, my brief period in government service has enabled me to appreciate the difficulties involved, once you have a working system in place, in dismantling that system and erecting a new one to replace it. A merger of the two agencies would seem to make sense not only from a business standpoint, but from a "good government" perspective as well. It would streamline and consolidate the regulatory oversight of the securities and commodities markets. It would provide a mechanism to address questions for the agencies and for the markets regarding the jurisdiction of the two agencies. It would reduce some of the administrative costs of the current system. On paper, a merger has many advantages and seems fairly straightforward. But when we consider some of the circumstances in the actual day-to-day world in which we propose to effect it, I must confess that it becomes somewhat less appealing. Let me attempt to explain why: When I arrived at the Commission almost two years ago, I outlined four key objectives: reforming our municipal debt market; raising professional standards among brokers; enhancing investor protections; and internationalizing our markets. Since that day, the Commission has worked hard to stay on that course, and as you know, Mr. Chairman, we've made great progress. To take just one example, we banned the pernicious practice of "pay-to-play" in our municipal debt markets, something that many people said could never be done. While I generally favor a merger, I am reluctant to devote the Commission's time and energy to an issue that might divert us from our central priority of protecting the interests of investors. Having sketched my general thoughts about a CFTC-SEC merger, let me now speak more specifically about the bill in question. The Commission has three concerns about this particular legislation: First, it would create an agency with less independence than the SEC or the CFTC. I have outlined this potential impact of the legislation in an attachment to my written testimony. The question of independence is of such crucial importance that, should Congress actually decide, in the final analysis, to proceed with a merger, I would advise that it do so through legislation that preserves and strengthens the independence of the two agencies when combined. Our second concern is that the merger bill could impede the resulting Commission with what seem to be unnecessary restrictions and inconsistencies. The Merger Bill anticipates that the new agency will be subject to divided congressional oversight by both the SEC's and the CFTC's current oversight committees. The bill would also create a Federal Financial Markets Coordinating Council. In my judgment, a merger of the SEC and the CFTC would not necessitate the creation of such a Council. Further, this new Council would be duplicative of other coordinating bodies, particularly with respect to the activities of the President's Working Group. Our third and final concern has to do with costs and benefits. No one should underestimate the commitment of time, money, and resources that a merger will entail, both for Congress and for the two agencies. This factor should be carefully considered as the Committee decides whether to proceed with any merger legislation. Mr. Chairman, to sum up, there are costs and inefficiencies associated with our bifurcated regulatory system. A merger would certainly help address some of the weaknesses in that system. But at the same time, there have been significant improvements in SEC-CFTC coordination that have helped to reduce those costs and will serve as a framework for ongoing coordination. Congress must weigh the time and resources necessary to merge the agencies against the potential benefits. We are grateful to the Committee for the attention they have brought to this important issue. We remain prepared to assist you in any way possible. # # #