UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

In the Matter of: }

} File No. OIG-509

OIG-509 }

WITNESS: Number 28

PAGES: 1 through 42

PLACE: Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, Northeast
Washington, D.C. 20549

DATE: Tuesday, April 21, 2009

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 12:45 p.m.

Diversified Reporting Services, Inc.

(202) 467-9200
APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission:

H. DAVID KOTZ, Inspector General
HEIDI STEIBER, Investigator
DAVID WITHERSPOON
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
(202) 551-6037

DAVID FIELDER, ESQ.
Office of the Inspector General
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 "F" Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
(202) 551-5401

On behalf of the Witness:
STEWART MAYHEW, PRO SE
PROCEEDINGS

MR. KOTZ: We are on the record at 12:45 p.m. It is April 21, 2009 at the United States Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General.

I am going to swear you in.

Whereupon,

STEWART MAYHEW

was called as a witness and, having been previously duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KOTZ:

Q Can you state and spell your full name for the record?

A Stewart Mayhew. S-t-e-w-a-r-t, M-a-y-h-e-w.

Q My name is David Kotz. I am the Inspector General for the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. I have my colleagues here with me: David Fielder, David Witherspoon, and Heidi Steiber. This is an investigation by the Office of Inspector General, case number OIG-509.

I am going to ask you certain questions and you will have to provide answer under oath. The court reporter will record and later transcribe everything that is said. Please provide verbal answers to the questions. A nod of the head or other non-verbal responses will not be able to be picked up by the court reporter. So the record will be
January 2000.

Q Until when?

A I came to visit the SEC in August 2002 and that was the last time I had lived at Georgia. I severed ties with the University in, I believe, August 2004. For my first two years working at the Commission I was a visiting academic scholar and I still retained a position at the University of Georgia.

Q What was your first position at the SEC in 2002?

A Visiting academic scholar, which is a contractor position. The nature of the position was I was still officially an employee of the University and worked as an on-site contractor.

Q Which division did you work for as a contractor?

A Office of Economic Analysis performing the same function as a financial economists, but a different title.

Q And that was until 2004?

A Yes.

Q What happened in 2004?

A In 2004 I resigned from Georgia and took a position at the SEC with a permanent contract. At that same time I was named assistant chief economist in the Office of Economic Analysis.

Q Was that an employee or contractor position at that time?
1 A That was an employee position.
2 Q Is that still the position you hold today?
3 A No. I am now deputy chief economist.
4 Q When did your position change from assistant chief economist to deputy?
5 A I believe in July 2008.
6 BY MS. STEIBER:
7 Q Have you written any books about options or articles about options?
8 A I have not written any books that have been published. I have written many academic articles that are published in academic journals on options. Some of them are option market structure, some of them are on empirical option pricing, some of them are on volatility estimation. That would include four articles in the Journal of Finance, which is probably the premiere journal in the field. Also in various other journals. Approximately 10 or 11 public published articles.
9 BY MR. KOTZ:
10 Q Who is your current supervisor?
11 A The chief economist, Jim Overdahl.
12 Q And who was your supervisor in the 2006 and 2007 timeframe before you became the deputy?
13 A Personal Privacy, who was the chief economist at that time.
Q This was for an enforcement case?
A He did not tell me that it was an enforcement case. He said it was questions from the enforcement division.
Q So he came to you because of your particular expertise?
A Because of my expertise on options.
Q So you were the person in that office who had that expertise?
A Yes.
Q You agreed and then what happened after that?
A He asked me if I was available to go to a meeting. I believe the meeting was on May 3rd. The meeting referred to on this. I told Bill, to the best of my recollection, that I was unable to make the meeting and I did not go to that meeting.
Q Do you know who that meeting was with?
A At the time I assumed that it was with the people that were cc'd on this email.
Q With the folks in New York? Was it a phone call or a personal meeting?
A I do not remember that Bill told me whether D.C. or New York staff.
Q So you could not make the meeting and the meeting went on without you.
A Yes, to the best of my recollection.
Q Then what happened?

A Then I got this email seen in Exhibit 3 on May 4th.

To the best of my recollection, I spent approximately 20 minutes looking at these attached documents with the goal of answering a question from Bill as to whether this strategy would be likely to earn significantly high returns in excess of a market return.

Q And that strategy was Bernard Madoff's strategy?

A I presume it was. I was asked to opine as to whether the strategy described in the attachment, the split strike forward conversion strategy, could beat the market.

Based on what I read in the email, I presumed that was the strategy that Madoff was following.

Q And what did you conclude after your review?

A I concluded that was not a strategy that would be expected to earn significant returns in excess of the market.

Q And that took you 20 minutes to figure out?

A Yes. Prior to coming to the Commission I had been retained as a consultant by an investment advisor in Georgia who was interested in implementing a strategy similar to, but not identical to, this split strike forward conversion. I spent quite a bit of time analyzing that strategy for him and quite a bit of time trying to convince him that this was not a magic pill that would beat the market. I had done quite a bit of work on this basic type of strategy prior to this
Q Is it fair to say that you concluded that the strategy that Madoff was purporting to use was not actually the strategy that he was using?

A I was not asked to give an opinion on that. At the time I did not know anything about Madoff. At the time I was approached I did not even know that he was involved with asset management. I knew his reputation as a broker-dealer.

Q So all you were asked to do was look at the attachments to this email from Simona Suh dated May 4, 2006 12:38 p.m. and determine whether the strategy that was described in these attachments could actually beat the market?

A Yes. I did know that some of the details from the questions from the enforcement division involved Madoff and that the claim was that Madoff's returns were extremely high. I did know the context of the question was Madoff was claiming to earn high returns with this strategy.

Q So you determined that those high returns could not have been accomplished with this strategy?

A Basically, yes.

Q You then informed Mr. Dale of that?

A Yes.

Q And then what happened?

A To the best of my recollection I continued to talk
with Bill Dale about Madoff in general and described some of
the innovations that he had done earlier with respect to
payment forwarded flow as a broker-dealer. I described him
as very clever, very knowledgeable about how markets worked.

Q Why would you provide that information to Mr. Dale?

A I provided that information to him because I
thought that there was a chance that if Madoff was earning
extremely high returns, that perhaps it was due to some other
type of clever activity he may be doing involving his
broker-dealer business. Perhaps illegal, but I did not have
any specific ideas about what Madoff may be doing other than
he may be doing something illegal or abusive that would
channel money away from brokerage clients to investment
clients.

Q Were you ever made aware of the possibility or the
allegation that Madoff was engaged in a Ponzi scheme?

A No.

BY MS. STEIBER:

Q Did anyone provide you with the Harry Markolopos
complaint?

A Not until after the Madoff scandal had broken in
2008.

Q So then at that point you read the Harry Markolopos
complaint?

A I scanned it quickly when I first received it and
then subsequently read it.

(SEC Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification.)

BY MR. KOTZ:

Q  Let me show you another document. We are going to mark this as Exhibit 4. This is an email from Simona Suh to Anthony Vance and you on 5/9/06 at 2:43 p.m. This is five days after the previous email. Do you remember receiving a spreadsheet from Peter Lamoore?

A  I do not recall this email.

Q  Do you recall doing any additional work other than the one that you described in your review of the documents attached to the May 4, 2006 email?

A  What was the question? Do I recall doing any additional work? I do not recall doing any additional work.

Q  I am going to give you a few minutes to look at that.

A  Now that I am looking at it I have a very vague recollection from three years ago of seeing this. I believe I must have not saved this in my saved documents folder. I did not notice this when I was reviewing for this meeting.

Q  But you think you might have actually received this document?

A  I probably did because I see my name as listed here.
Q But you are pretty sure that you did not do any analysis of the spreadsheet?

A I am pretty sure that I did not attempt to compute -- do any more than maybe a cursory analysis. I do not believe there would be any new insights that I would be able to gain from doing an analysis of this spreadsheet.

Q Do you know if there were any further requests made of your office from enforcement related to the Madoff matter?

A I am not aware of any other requests.

Q You provided some information to Mr. Dale and you followed up giving him some insight about Mr. Madoff's other operations. Did you have any further communications with Mr. Dale about that?

A I believe I had one follow up conversation in the hallway asking what happened. He said that he met with them and provided feedback to them. He did not tell me much detail beyond that.

Q When Mr. Dale said to you that he provided feedback, he was referring to your analysis of the fact that the split strike forward conversion strategy as described in attachment to Simona Suh's May 4, 2006 email could not have generated those returns?

A I assume that he passed on that opinion.

Q But he did not indicate to you what happened subsequently?
A No.

Q Could you go back to Exhibit 3? Can you tell us what was it exactly in your review of these documents, the description of split strike conversion forward, as attached to the May 4, 2006 email from Simona Suh -- what was it that made you come to that conclusion?

A This is a very easy strategy to implement. Anybody could implement it. There are certain principals that we strongly believe as trained financial economists that it is not easy to beat the market. It is not easy to generate high returns. In order for a person to generate returns that consistently beat the market, they need to have some access to superior information.

Simply following a mechanistic trading strategy involving securities that anybody could trade, just as a matter of principal, it cannot be used to consistently beat the market.

Q And the specific strategy that was described in this document as the split strike forward conversion strategy was not a strategy you determined --

A The document here provides only a limited description of the split strike forward conversion strategy. It does not provide a complete description of the strategy. I use the name of the strategy to infer what the strategy was because it is fairly obvious for someone in option pricing
what it would be. Forward conversion strategy is basically buying a stock or an index, writing a covered call, and buying a protected put at the same time.

Generally, that would be done with call option and the put option having the same strike price. The effect of writing a call option and buying a put option is equivalent to taking the short side of a forward contract. If you are long on a forward or a stock and short at the same time, the risk completely cancels out and that is a strategy that has no risk.

If the call and put option prices are incorrect or not efficient, then you, relative to the stock price, could do this strategy and lock in an arbitrage profit. There are so many people out there trying to do this that the prices of these contracts adjust very quickly and eliminate any profits from doing that strategy, beyond the transaction costs of implementing the strategy.

Q Is it fair to say that after you reviewed the documents attached to Simona Suh's May 4, 2006 email you determined that there had to be another explanation as to how one could achieve the returns that were described, other than this strategy?

A The answer to that is a little bit complicated. There are certain strategies that have the characteristic that I would describe as extreme negative skewness. These
are strategies that can go for a long time generating apparent excess returns, but every period running the risk of a catastrophe. This type of strategy is one that sometimes hedge funds follow. When they follow a strategy that has this type of return pattern they can go for a fairly long time appearing to beat the market.

From an economic perspective, it is similar to a strategy of writing insurance policies. You can go year after year writing insurance policies and keeping the premiums and making a profit, but every period you run the risk that here will be an earthquake and you will have huge claims and you will have a big loss.

Hedge funds and other investors can follow this type of strategy that will appear to beat the market. Exposed after the fact it does beat the market for a certain amount of time, but then it crashes. An example of this might be some of the strategies followed by long term capital management, which were able to beat the market for a long time, but then when there was a national financial crisis they lost everything.

To get back to answering your question. First of all, I did not see any data on Madoff's returns so I did not know for sure that there were excess returns. Having been told there were excess returns, I would conclude that there are one of two possibilities. Either the excess returns were
not generated by this strategy and must have been generated by some other strategy, or perhaps that they were not true excess returns.

There could have been what appeared to be excess returns, but were actually just analogous to collecting insurance premiums. Earning excess returns every period, but taking on huge risk. If you lever up then you can generate substantial returns that way.

BY MR. FIELDER:

Q Do you recall characteristics of the excess returns where Madoff was reportedly cheating as they were represented to you? Do you recall if they told you the duration, how many years, he had been achieving excess returns?

A No one told me any details about the magnitude of the excess returns or the duration.

BY MR. KOTZ:

Q Anything about the consistency of the returns?

A I do not recall. It is possible that Bill could have mentioned to me that the returns were highly consistent. This is a common attribute of this type of strategy that I was describing a moment ago. You can generate high, consistent returns if you bear this extreme crash risk every period.

Q Let's say there was a market correction during that time period. When the tech bubble burst how would that
affect that strategy?

A There are many different strategies out there that potentially could have this extreme negative skewness. Some of those strategies are not dependent on the direction of the market. For example, long term capital management. Many of their bets were not on the direction of the market, but bets on the credit spread. That is the difference between the yield of high credit quality bond and a low credit quality bond.

They were betting that those yields would converge. For a long time they were basically right, but then the yields suddenly diverged dramatically and they lost a lot of money. It is not simply a question of the direction of the market. I do not recall today the extent to which I had these thoughts three years ago, but this is my general way of thinking about these types of problems.

Q You said that you did have a chance to read Harry Markopolos's complaint.

A Recently, yes.

Q What were your observations on that?

A I do not have any formal analysis of his complaint. I do think some of the language in the report was exaggerated. I think that for the most part the red flags that he raises in there were ones that would justify investigation.
BY MS. STEIBER:

Q Would it have been helpful for you in your analysis to understand more about some of the issues related to Madoff?

A Yes.

(SEC Exhibit No. 5 was marked for identification.)

BY MR. KOTZ:

Q Let me show you a copy of the complaint. We are going to mark it as Exhibit 5. It says, "The world's largest hedge fund is a fraud. November 7, 2005 submission to the SEC. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC." If you turn to page 9 of this complaint you will see the first paragraph. "Some time ago during different market conditions I ran a study using the Black-Scholes market option pricing model to analyze the value of front running with the goal of putting a monetary value on front running where the insider knew the customer's order and traded ahead of it."

He talks a little bit about that study. He says at the end of that paragraph, "The SEC should be able to duplicate these results." Could the SEC have duplicated these results? Could this kind of study have been done?

A Yes. In fact, when he was chief economist, ran a similar type of study in his preparation for commenting on Regulation MNS. It was not in enforcement
context at all. It was not specifically in the context of front running. The technical aspect of this analysis is not easy, but it is something that I could do, or several other people in OEA could do.

BY MS. STEIBER:

Q Did anyone ever ask you to duplicate these results or run the analysis?

A No.

Q Do you know of anyone else in OEA ever trying to duplicate these results or run this analysis discussed in that red flag?

A I do not believe anyone has. This is a comment that he is making about a hypothetical front running strategy that he imagines Madoff might have been doing. This is an analysis of how profitable it could be to do some other type of abuse, which turned out he was not doing.

Q But you were capable of --

A I would have been capable of replicating this type of study. It seems very simple, in fact. It looks like he is just using the Black-Scholes pricing model to compute what is the value of an option with one minute to expiration.

BY MR. KOTZ:

Q In reviewing Harry Markopolos's complaint, you see that he alleges that Bernard Madoff is running a Ponzi scheme.
A Yes.

Q Is there anything you could have done with this complaint to determine whether the allegation is correct?

A I do not think I could have definitively determined that this allegation is correct. That would have required inspection. As an economist I am not involved in inspections. If I had been given this at the time, I suspect I would have commented on it for enforcement. The most important fact, I think, is I did not know how big his operation was. I did not know that he was managing so many assets.

BY MS. STEIBER:

Q Why would that have made a difference?

A If I had known that then I would not have believed it possible to generate high returns on such a large asset base by pilfering assets away from the brokerage customers. I had presumed that it was a relatively small portfolio. If you have a really large broker-dealer operation and you abuse your customers and pilfer money away from them to benefit your asset clients, you could enhance your returns.

If you are doing it with a huge base of billions and billions of dollars that would have an insignificant impact on your returns so you could not generate real returns that way. I would have also simply recommended to enforcement or OC or whoever asked me, that they should
investigate this carefully because this type of strategy would not be capable of earning extreme returns. I think that I was turned off a little bit by some of the tone and self-grandizing language in the report. Many of the basic red flags are ones that I think would be of concern. I do not think there is a lot of analysis that I could do that would ultimately prove that it is a Ponzi scheme.

BY MR. KOTZ:
Q But there are things that OC and enforcement could do?
A Yes.
Q So you did not hear anything further about this investigation or about Madoff until December 2008; is that right?
A That is right, to the best of my recollection.
Q Bill Dale said to you that he had relayed the information. Did he give any indication that he was frustrated or unhappy that he was not going to be more involved in the matter?
A No. I do not think so. There are so many hundreds of investigations going on and so few economists to support that, that our general approach in OEA is to provide support when we are asked to and seek out opportunities to provide support. But to leave the main decisions about which cases
100 index and options on those equities, there would be some strategy that legitimately was generating returns that were such a correlation with the S&P 100?

A Yes. There are strategies that one could follow that would be uncorrelated with the S&P 500. If somebody were doing insider trading and had advance information about mergers and hedged all the market risk, they could have strategies that are uncorrelated with the market and earn these kinds of returns. If you are including illegal strategies in the mix, then I think there are possible ways that somebody could achieve this.

Q So one strategy would be insider trading that you identified. Would front running be a strategy that you think could generate these types of returns? I want to remind you of what you already pointed out in this document about the size of assets that he was managing.

A I do not think that front running or other types of abuse of broker-dealer information could generate returns on an asset base this large.

MR. KOTZ: The only thing else I wanted to ask you is if you could please, for the purpose of protecting the integrity of the investigation, not discuss what we discussed today with anybody.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MR. KOTZ: Thank you very much.
BY MS. STEIBER:

Q I want to show you a November 21, 2003 email from analyzing Madoff’s options trading. Can you just tell us what your impression of the analysis is?

MR. KOTZ: We are going to mark that as Exhibit 6.

THE WITNESS: This email describes trading volume and the S&P 100 options. It says OEX options transactions. That refers to S&P 100 options, which are traded on the CBOE.
This document is indicating that the trading volume in that market is not high enough to be consistent with a claim that a market participant is following a split strike conversion strategy using S&P 100 options on a huge scale. That is the gist of this email.

BY MS. STEIBER:

Q Were you provided this email?

A No.

BY MR. KOTZ:

Q Do you agree with the analysis in there?

A I have no way right now of double checking the numbers. I do not know if the numbers are right, but I do agree it is something that makes sense to look at. If somebody is saying they are doing a certain strategy it would
1 make sense to go out and look at the trading volume.
2 If the scale of the strategy they are claiming to
3 follow is significantly larger than the available liquidity
4 or volume in that market, then that would be a red flag that
5 they were not telling the truth.

BY MS. STEIBER:

Q Were you capable of doing this analysis? Was this
an especially difficult analysis to run?

A No. It looks to me like all they are doing is
looking at trading volumes on certain days. If I had
specific information about what Madoff’s purported strategy
was, then I could have easily looked up the volume data to do
this similar type of analysis.

Q If someone had claimed to be trading over the
counter, would you expect documentation to exist?

A Documentation?

Q Of options trading over the counter.

A Most over the counter volume is done with large
broker-dealers who provide the other side. I would certainly
expect documentation to exist at the counter-party. I would
expect any reputable investment advisor should keep
documentation on their side too.

Q Even if the broker-dealer happened to be in Europe
would you expect they would keep documentation?

A Yes, I would expect them to keep documentation.
This is not my area of expertise.

BY MR. FIELDER:

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not, if there had been over the counter options trades placed by Madoff with counter parties and had a volume that this email discussed would have been placed, would those counter parties continue to trade with Madoff if he had consistently placed bets with them?

A. That is kind of a strange question. It presupposes the fact pattern that I do not think is likely to be possible. I do not think the strategy that he said he was following actually would make money. If somehow Madoff or some other trader was able to stumble upon some really extremely profitable strategy and execute over the counter, then one of two things would happen as a result. Either the counter-party would lose money or the counter-party would have to be hedging.

If the counter-party was not hedging, then I would suspect that they would be losing money and they would not want to continue doing those types of trades. I do not know enough about the specific business of these to know how much risk they are willing to bear. My intuition is they would probably prefer to hedge if possible and not bear the risk themselves.

MR. KOTZ: Thank you.