UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), for its claims against the Defendant, Dynegy Inc., alleges as follows:

SUMMARY

1. This matter involves Dynegy's materially misleading use of special-purpose entities ("SPEs") and pre-arranged, "wash" or "round-trip" energy transactions.
    
2. In a series of transactions code-named "Project Alpha" ("Alpha"), Dynegy used SPEs to report as cash flow from operations what was in actuality nothing more than a loan. Specifically, Dynegy implemented Alpha to enhance cash flow from operations by $300 million in 2001, and to achieve an Alpha-linked $79 million tax benefit.
    
3. Dynegy failed to disclose the financing transactions underlying Alpha, and failed to otherwise clarify that the $300 million Alpha-related cash flow enhancing Dynegy's 2001 Statement of Cash Flows derived from financing, not operations. These omissions by Dynegy were materially misleading.
    
4. Moreover, even when Dynegy admitted Alpha's existence following an April 3, 2002 newspaper article, Dynegy's then - now former - Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") claimed falsely that Alpha's primary purpose was to ensure a stable supply of gas, and Dynegy continued to assert that its obtaining a long-term gas supply was a principal purpose of Alpha. It was not until Dynegy filed its Form 8-K that Dynegy acknowledged that Alpha's principal purposes were to minimize the gap between Dynegy's reported net income and reported operating cash flow and to realize an associated tax benefit.
    
5. Dynegy announced that it would reverse Alpha's impact by restating its 2001 financial statements. According to Dynegy, the restatement will include, at least, the following: 1) reclassification of the cash flow associated with Alpha as deriving from financing activities, rather than operations - reducing, as a consequence, Dynegy's cash flow from operations in 2001 by 37%; 2) consolidation in Dynegy's financial statements of a certain SPE with Dynegy; and 3) reduction of Dynegy's 2001 net income by 12% - the amount of the purported $79 million tax benefit.
    
6. Alpha's impact on Dynegy's financial statements was especially significant because the Statement of Cash Flows has historically been considered immune from cosmetic tampering.
    
7. In addition, Dynegy issued materially misleading information to the investing public about the amount of trading on its electronic trading platform, Dynegydirect.
    
8. On November 15, 2001, Dynegy entered into two massive "round-trip" electricity transactions - simultaneous, pre-arranged buy-sell trades at the same price, terms and volume, in which neither Dynegy nor its trading counterparty earned a profit or incurred a loss.
    
9. In a January 2002 press release, Dynegy included the volume from one of these trades in a discussion of an increase in trading traffic on Dynegydirect. Information in this press release was included in a February 19, 2002 prospectus supplement of Dynegy Holdings Inc ("Dynegy Holdings").
    
10. In an April 2002 press release, Dynegy included the results of these trades in its reported energy trading volume and in its first quarter 2002 revenues and cost of sales. Copies of the textual portion of this press release were e-mailed to Dynegy's employees, who were offerees pursuant to an ongoing registration statement with the Commission.
     
11. In both instances, Dynegy failed to disclose that the resulting increases were materially attributable to the round-trip trades. Because the round-trip trades lack economic substance, Dynegy's press releases were materially misleading.
     
12. Based on the conduct described herein, Dynegy violated Section 17(a), of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), and Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§78j(b), 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B), and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, and 13b2-1, thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§240.10b-5, 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13, and 240.13b2-1.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. The Commission is an agency of the United States of America established by Section 4(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §77d(a).
     
14. The Commission brings this action pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by Section 20(d) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77t(d), and Sections 21(d)(3) and 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78u(d)(3) and 78aa.
     
15. This Court has jurisdiction over this action, and venue is proper, pursuant to Sections 20(d) and 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§77t(d) and 77v(a), and Sections 21(d)(3) and 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78u(d) and 78aa.
     
16. Venue is proper because Dynegy conducts business and maintains its corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas. In addition, many of the actions giving rise to the Commission's allegations occurred in Houston, Texas..

DEFENDANT

17. Dynegy Inc. is an Illinois corporation with its headquarters in Houston, Texas. The common stock of Dynegy is registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Dynegy produces and delivers energy, including natural gas, electricity, natural gas liquids and coal, to customers in North America, the United Kingdom and Continental Europe. In addition to energy production and delivery, energy trading is a key component of Dynegy's business..

OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES

18. ABG Gas Supply LLC ("ABG Supply") is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in New York, New York. It is a special-purpose entity sponsored by Dynegy. Dynegy has no direct or indirect ownership interest in ABG Supply, nor is Dynegy affiliated with any of ABG Supply's owners.
     
19. ABG Holding LLC ("ABG Holding") is a Delaware limited liability company. It is the immediate parent company of ABG Supply. ABG Holding is a special-purpose entity sponsored by a member of the syndicate of lenders involved in Alpha. Dynegy has no ownership interest in ABG Holding.
     
20. NGAI Funding LLC ("NGAI Funding") is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in San Francisco, California. It is a special-purpose entity sponsored by Dynegy. Dynegy has no ownership interest in NGAI Funding.
     
21. DMT Supply LP ("DMT Supply") is a Delaware limited partnership and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dynegy..

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Background

22. Energy trading is a prominent part of Dynegy's business. Accounting rules require Dynegy and other energy traders to utilize "mark-to-market" accounting. Under these rules, energy traders must record today the value of contracts for the future delivery of gas, electricity and other commodities.
     
23. Under this "mark-to-market" accounting, the total contract values are recorded as assets (or liabilities) on the balance sheet. Likewise, an increase (decrease) in a contract's value is recorded as unrealized gain (loss) and reflected as net income on the income statement, even though it generates no current cash flow.
     
24. By 2000, some energy analysts following Dynegy had noticed the widening gap between Dynegy's net income and operating cash flow. Some analysts viewed this widening gap as possible evidence that Dynegy's energy contracts were overvalued, and that Dynegy's liquidity and access to capital were potentially impaired.

Dynegy's Use of Special Purpose Entities

25. In late 2000, Dynegy began exploring means of narrowing the gap between its net income and operating cash flow. After months of high-level discussion, meetings and document exchanges among Dynegy's independent auditor-consultant ("auditor-consultant") and other outside consultants, Alpha emerged as the chosen strategy for accomplishing Dynegy's purpose of narrowing that gap, while at the same time securing for Dynegy an Alpha-linked tax benefit.
     
26. In its final form, Alpha embodied both a basis-shifting tax structure marketed to Dynegy by its auditor-consultant, and a "pre-paid" natural gas transaction.
     
27. Internal Dynegy documents make clear that one of Alpha's principal purposes was to address the "disconnect . . . between book and cash earnings" and to improve "quality of earnings" - i.e., to create the appearance that Dynegy's operations were generating far more cash than they actually were.
     
28. In 2001, Dynegy recorded $300 million in operating cash flow from Alpha. The $300 million was 37% of Dynegy's reported cash flow from operations in 2001. In addition, through Alpha, Dynegy recorded a tax savings in 2001 of $79 million, or 12% of its net income.
     
29. The lengths to which Dynegy went to reap Alpha's accounting and tax benefits are best conveyed by Alpha's inordinate complexity and its $35.8 million cost.
     
30. Alpha can be conceptualized as a flow-through matrix involving two SPEs, three interconnected loans, a gas purchase agreement, hedging transactions, and a transfer of basis and intended tax benefit.
     
31. The first Alpha "loan" was effected through a capital contribution made by an SPE, NGAI Funding, to a limited partnership, DMT Supply - a trading partnership established to conduct natural gas trades with another SPE, ABG Supply. NGAI Funding received in return for its capital contribution a 99%, 9-month term limited partnership interest in DMT Supply; Dynegy held a 1% general partnership and remainder interest in DMT Supply. NGAI Funding borrowed $310 million from a syndicate of lenders and, of that amount, contributed $307 million to DMT Supply's capitalization. By making the $307 million capital contribution to DMT Supply, NGAI Funding created $307 million in initial tax basis.
     
32. The second Alpha "loan" was from DMT Supply to Dynegy in the amount of $300 million and payable by Dynegy upon demand of DMT Supply. When NGAI Funding's interest in the partnership expired at the end of the first nine months of the Alpha transaction, its $307 million tax basis migrated to a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dynegy as the sole limited partner with the remainder interest in DMT Supply.
     
33. Through this tax basis shift, Dynegy planned to save $79 million in taxes and increase its net income by an equal amount in 2001. Under this second loan arrangement, Dynegy is required to repay the "demand" loan to DMT Supply - noting however, that by that time, DMT Supply will be wholly owned by Dynegy.
     
34. In the gas purchase portion of Alpha, ABG Supply entered into a five-year trading contract (the "Gas Contract") with DMT Supply, commencing in April 2001. The purchase price of the gas under the Gas Contract was 86% variable and 14% fixed. Under the Gas Contract, DMT Supply bought natural gas from ABG Supply at below-market prices for the first nine months of the Gas Contract - for re-sale by DMT Supply on the open market at a profit. ABG Supply borrowed from various lenders (the third Alpha loan) to fund the losses it would incur over these first nine months of the Gas Contract.
     
35. DMT Supply allocated 99% of the profits generated during the first nine months of the Gas Contract to NGAI Funding and distributed cash of approximately $300 million to NGAI Funding, thereby enabling NGAI Funding to repay a portion of its loan payable to the syndicate of lenders. After this initial nine-month period, NGAI Funding ceased to hold an interest in DMT Supply, and Dynegy became DMT Supply's sole owner. For the remaining 51 months of the Gas Contract, DMT Supply will pay ABG Supply above-market prices for gas, incurring losses. As owner of DMT Supply, Dynegy will incur the losses generated during the latter 51 months of the Gas Contract.
     
36. Dynegy's classification of Alpha's $300 million cash flow as operations-based was materially misleading: in essence, the $300 million transaction was a loan to Dynegy, not the result of Dynegy's operations. Moreover, Dynegy's classification of the $300 million as cash flow from operations was inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP").
     
37. Alpha reduced by a significant amount the gap between Dynegy's net income and operational cash flow, thereby concealing from the investing public the true extent of this gap.
     
38. Furthermore, Dynegy failed to disclose the true financing nature of the $300 million Alpha-related cash flow, which Dynegy could have done by disclosing the complex financing transactions underlying Alpha. Instead of making this disclosure, Dynegy made no reference to the underlying transactions in its second and third quarter 2001 Forms 10-Q or its 2001 Form 10-K filed with the Commission, even though Alpha fell outside Dynegy's normal course of business.
     
39. Alpha first came to light on April 3, 2002, in a newspaper article critical of the transaction.
     
40. On April 9, 2002, Dynegy posted on its website a misleading letter to the "investment community" from its then - now former - CFO. In the letter, the CFO asserted that Dynegy had not entered into "any questionable transactions" although he acknowledged that Dynegy had executed Alpha. He further stated in the letter that a former Dynegy employee, who had disclosed Alpha to the press, had "seriously mischaracterized both the nature and disclosure of the transaction." Also misleading was the CFO's statement in the letter that the "primary purpose" of Alpha was "to secure [a] long-term natural gas supply." The statement was false: Alpha's primary purpose, as Dynegy was aware, was to enhance Dynegy's cash flow from operations and provide an Alpha-linked tax benefit. The letter was removed from Dynegy's website within two days of its posting.
     
41. The substance of Alpha was a $300 million loan to Dynegy. That loan was funded indirectly through contractually assured profits on the resale of gas at below-market prices in the first nine months of the Gas Contract. Dynegy's promise to repay the loan was embedded in its promise to pay above-market prices for the remaining term of the Gas Contract. Consequently, under Financial Accounting Standard 95 ("FAS 95"), the cash flow associated with Alpha should have been classified as cash flow from financing activities - not operations. Where certain cash receipts and payments may have aspects of different types of cash flow, "the appropriate classification shall depend on the activity that is likely to be the predominant source of cash flow for the item." (FAS 95, 24).
     
42. Dynegy's treatment of the Alpha cash flow as operating cash flow did not conform to GAAP for an additional reason: the equity investment in the SPE, ABG Supply, by its owners did not meet the requisite minimal exposure to the "substantive risks and rewards of ownership" during the entire term of the Gas Contract between ABG Supply and DMT Supply.
     
43. Accounting guidelines state that independent owners of an SPE must make a substantive capital investment in the SPE, and that a prescribed minimum portion of the investment must demonstrate the substantive risks and rewards of ownership during the entire term of the transaction. This minimum is 3% of the total capital invested in the SPE, but the appropriate level for any particular SPE depends on the prevailing facts and circumstances. Investments are not at risk if they are supported by a letter of credit or other form of guaranty on the initial investment or have a guaranteed return.
     
44. Rather than maintain the requisite 3% risk exposure, the owners of ABG Supply avoided all commodity price risk using hedging transactions entered into by ABG Supply or ABG Holding with a member of the lending syndicate. As a result, ABG Supply should have been consolidated in Dynegy's financial statements, and the $300 million loan to ABG Supply - covering its initial losses under the Gas Contract - should have been reflected by Dynegy, on a consolidated basis, as cash flow from financing.
     
45. Dynegy's auditor-consultant instructed Dynegy that improper hedging of the risk to the equity investment in ABG Supply would require consolidation of ABG Supply with Dynegy, requiring Dynegy to classify the Alpha-related cash flow as financing.
     
46. Dynegy knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that its presentation of its financial statements - without consolidating ABG Supply - was not in conformity with GAAP.
     
47. In April 2001, in connection with closing on Alpha, Dynegy obtained a letter from its auditor-consultant, pursuant to Statement on Auditing Standards 50 (the "SAS 50 letter"). In the SAS 50 letter, the auditor-consultant states that, based on specified assumptions, Dynegy's accounting for Alpha was in conformity with GAAP. One of these express assumptions was that ABG Supply would engage in certain hedging activities, but those hedging activities would not exceed the 3% limit. In paragraph 8 of the SAS 50 letter, the auditor-consultant states:

It is anticipated that ABG [ABG Supply] will enter into certain hedging transactions to minimize ABG's exposure to future price risk, consisting of fixed price and interest rate swaps. The unhedged fixed price exposure is in an amount sufficient to refute an assertion that ABG is a 'special purpose entity lacking economic substance…'

48. Certain representatives of Dynegy knew that the ABG Supply owners' equity-at-risk never reached the requisite minimum 3% threshold - due to hedging activity by the owners.
     
49. Internal Dynegy documents show that certain representatives of Dynegy were aware, as early as April 2001- when Alpha closed - that the residual 3% equity investment in ABG Supply would not be at risk because of the ABG Holding hedge.
     
50. Dynegy has acknowledged that it expected that this hedge would occur because the ABG Supply owners, as sophisticated investors, would not expose their investment to undue risk by failing to hedge.
     
51. Moreover, Dynegy knew, based on the SAS 50 letter, that it had a duty to retain sufficient equity at risk within ABG Supply, that it would have the burden of proving that fact, and that it would have to consolidate ABG Supply if at least 3% of its owners' equity did not remain "at risk" over the course of the Gas Contract. As stated in the SAS 50 letter:

The [Emerging Issues Task Force] believed that transactions would include documentation that would enable the lessee (in the transaction, DMT Partnership) to determine the lessor (in the Transaction, the equity investors in NGAI Funding and ABG) had maintained its minimum equity capital at risk. The SEC thus placed the burden of proving the presence of initial and continuing equity squarely upon the sponsor of the SPE, such as DMT Partnership in this Transaction.

52. In spite of the SAS 50 letter, Dynegy took no action to ensure that the equity investors did not hedge their minimum equity risk. Certain representatives of Dynegy knew that ABG Supply or its parent hedged its full exposure under the Gas Contract.
     
53. Therefore, consistent with the SAS 50 letter, Dynegy should have consolidated ABG Supply in Dynegy's financial statements. If ABG Supply had been consolidated, its $300 million borrowing from the lender to cover the below-market sale of natural gas to DMT Supply in the first nine months of the Gas Contract would not have been recorded as operating cash flow, but rather, as cash flow from financing. In addition, there would have been accompanying changes to Dynegy's balance sheet and income statement.
     
54. Dynegy did not adequately disclose to the investing public the basis for its increasing in its financial statements its net income in 2001 by $79 million. In conjunction with the SAS 50 letter, the auditor-consultant issued to Dynegy a tax opinion, dated April 6, 2001, regarding a large tax benefit associated with Alpha. The Internal Revenue Service requires that structured tax transactions, at a minimum, have some non-tax business justification. According to the tax opinion, Dynegy's desired accounting treatment of the Alpha cash flow - as flowing from operations, as opposed to financing - constituted the primary non-tax business justification for Alpha.
     
55. Consequently, when Dynegy publicly disclosed that it would restate its 2001 cash flow statement to reflect the Alpha cash flow as financing, rather than operating cash flow, the auditor-consultant withdrew its tax opinion. As a result, Dynegy announced that it would restate its 2001 income statement to eliminate the previously reported tax savings of $79 million, reducing Dynegy's 2001 net income by 12%, but that it would continue to report its original tax position to the Internal Revenue Service.

Dynegy's Round-Trip Transactions

56. Dynegy also overstated in public disclosures the amount of trading on its electronic trading platform, Dynegydirect.
     
57. On November 15, 2001, Dynegy entered into two massive round-trip trades of electricity with another energy trading company on Dynegydirect. The round-trip trades, in which Dynegy simultaneously bought and sold power at the same price, terms and volume, resulted in neither profit nor loss to either transacting party.
     
58. Dynegy conducted the trades on Dynegydirect, which Dynegy was developing with an eye toward its potential for rapid growth. Dynegy entered into the trades at the other party's request.
     
59. The two round-trip trades - the largest power trades, by volume, that Dynegy had ever conducted on Dynegydirect - required for their execution that Dynegy override the platform's normal volume limits.
     
60. The trades involved the simultaneous purchase and sale of 5000 megawatts of on-peak electricity at $34/mwh for calendar year 2002, and the simultaneous purchase and sale of 15,000 megawatts of on-peak electricity at $25.50 for December 2001 (a combined total of over 25 million megawatt hours of electricity).
     
61. Dynegy understood that the round-trip trades were not part of its ordinary business operations. Although Dynegy took some steps to ensure that the results of the round-trip trades were not publicly reported, Dynegy's failure to implement comprehensive safeguards caused Dynegy to disclose to the public certain results from its round-trip trades.
     
62. In a January 23, 2002 press release, Dynegy reported on Dynegydirect, for the fourth quarter of 2001, $13 billion in notional trading value (absolute value of all trading traffic), of which $1.7 billion was attributable to the round-trip trades.
     
63. Later, in an April 30, 2002 press release, Dynegy reported 89.7 million megawatt hours of electricity traded in the first quarter of 2002, of which approximately five million megawatt hours were the product of round-trip trades. In that same press release, Dynegy improperly reported $236 million in revenue (and $236 million in offsetting costs) from the round-trip trades.
     
64. Dynegy's disclosures of results attributable to the round-trip transactions conveyed a false picture of Dynegy's financial status and business activity.
     
65. Dynegy offered and sold its securities in registered offerings during 2001 and 2002.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Count One

Violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5

66. The Commission restates and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 63 of the complaint.
     
67. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), prohibits employing a fraudulent scheme or making material misrepresentations and omissions in the offer or sale of a security. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5, prohibit the same conduct, if committed in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
     
68. Dynegy's misrepresentations and omissions were committed in connection with purchases and sales of Dynegy securities on the secondary market, and violated, therefore Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
     
69. Because Dynegy offered and sold its securities in registered offerings during 2001 and 2002, Dynegy also violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a).
     
70. By reason of the foregoing, Dynegy violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.

Count Two

Violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act
and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13

71. The Commission restates and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 63 of the complaint.
     
72. Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78m(a) requires issuers such as Dynegy to file periodic reports with the Commission containing such information as the Commission prescribes by rule. Exchange Act Rule 13a-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.13a-1, requires issuers to file annual reports, and Exchange Act Rule 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. §240.13a-13, requires issuers to file quarterly reports. Under Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. §240.12b-20, the reports must contain, in addition to disclosures expressly required by statute and rules, such other information as is necessary to ensure that the statements made are not, under the circumstances, materially misleading.
     
73. By reason of the foregoing, Dynegy violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78m(a) and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. §§240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13.

Count Three

Violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B)
of the Exchange Act

74. The Commission restates and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 63 of the complaint.
     
75. Section 13(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires all issuers to make and keep books, records, and accounts that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect their transactions and dispositions of their assets.
     
76. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B) requires issuers to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.
     
77. By reason of the foregoing, Dynegy violated Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B).

Count Four

Violations of Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1

78. The Commission restates and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 63 of the complaint.
     
79. Rule 13b2-1 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §240.13b2-1, prohibits any person from, directly or indirectly, falsifying, or causing to be falsified, any accounting books, records or accounts of reporting public companies.
     
80. By reason of the foregoing, Dynegy violated Rule 13b2-1 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §240.13b2-1.

Prayer for Relief

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court:

I.
Penalties

Enter a Final Judgment ordering Dynegy to pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $3,000,000 (three million dollars), pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§77t(d), and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78u(d)(3).

II.
Further Relief

Grant such other and further relief as may be necessary and appropriate.

III.
Retention of Jurisdiction

Further, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court retain jurisdiction over this action in order to implement and carry out the terms of all orders and decrees that may hereby be entered, or to entertain any suitable application or motion by the Commission for additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court.