

Timothy C. Davidson

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Office of the Secretary  
United States Securities and Exchange Commission  
100 F Street N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20549-9303

### Comments

**Admin. Proc. File Nos. 3-11445, 3-11446, 3-11447,  
3-11448, 3-11449, 3-11558, 3-11559 (“NYSE Fraud”)  
FUND ADMINISTRATOR’S PROPOSED FAIR FUND DISTRIBUTION PLAN**

#### **Preface:**

I, Timothy C Davidson, was a trader at Sea Carriers and traded for the Empire account from January 2001 to December 2002. During those two years I traded 459,541,476 shares for the Empire account.

The SEC and Fund Administrator have made a good *start* in the process of identification of “injured customers.” Specifically, the Administrator states he is in the process of identifying “injured customers” by ascertaining the person or entity whose name and address is shown on the books of a clearing member as the owner of an account defrauded by NYSE specialists. In certain cases, however, the impact of the NYSE Fraud materially and adversely affected persons or entities beyond the actual “owners” of security accounts now being identified by the Fund Administrator.

The securities account opened at Spear, Leeds & Kellogg (SLK) by R. Allan Martin in the name of Empire Programs is a case in point (Empire Programs has been named by Federal Judge Robert Sweet as co-lead plaintiff in the class action lawsuit against the NYSE and its member firms). Mr. Martin/Empire had a joint venture (“joint venture” is the precise term R. Allan Martin used to describe the arrangement) with Sea Carriers, whereby Empire Programs provided trading capital, and Sea Carriers and its independent traders/contractors, designed and executed the trading strategy.

Having named Empire Programs as co-lead plaintiff in the class action lawsuit, Judge Sweet determined that Empire Programs has the largest financial interest in the matter of the NYSE Fraud. As such, it is reasonable to assume that Empire is likely to be paid the largest sum of money compared to any of the other “injured customers” identified by the Fund Administrator. *Because of the magnitude of this account and the likelihood that*

***Empire's reimbursement will be the largest distribution of the Fair Fund, this matter warrants special consideration by the SEC and Fund Administrator.***

The terms of the Empire Programs/Sea Carriers joint venture were straightforward. On a monthly basis, 20-25% (and in some cases more than 25%) of Net Trading Profits (that is trading profits less commissions and SEC fees) were paid out to Sea Carriers independently contracted traders. Joint venture expenses (which included but were not limited to utility costs, office rent, data costs...) were then deducted from the remaining Net Trading Profits, if any. Any amount remaining was split 50% to Empire Programs, 50% to Sea Carriers.

Mr. Martin, in his May 12, 2004 Declaration in connection with Empire's Lead Plaintiff Motion filed in US District Court stated, "Empire and Empire alone owns its claims herein..." (the "claims herein" being any disbursements of reimbursement of losses, prejudgment interest, and/or penalties). As a result of Mr. Martin's claims, Sea Carriers filed a lawsuit against Empire Programs in the US District Court, Southern District of NY (Index No. 04-CV-7395). Among other things, Sea Carriers has petitioned Judge Sweet to block any payments to Empire Programs by the Fund Administrator.

To summarize the arrangement between Empire, Sea Carriers and its independent traders, every \$100 (of disgorgement amounts, prejudgment interest, and/or penalty amounts) should be allocated as follows:

\$25 payout for the independent traders of Sea Carriers  
\$37.50 to Sea Carriers  
\$37.50 to Empire

Based upon Mr. Martin's May 12, 2004 Declaration in connection with Empire's Lead Plaintiff Motion stating, "Empire and Empire alone owns its claims herein..." (the "claims herein" being any disbursements of reimbursement of losses, prejudgment interest, and/or penalties), Mr. Martin's formula is:

\$0 payout for the independent traders of Sea Carriers  
\$0 to Sea Carriers  
\$100.00 to Empire

The NYSE Fraud diminished Net Trading Profits generated by the Empire Programs/Sea Carriers joint venture. As such, it adversely affected not only Empire Programs, but it also adversely affected Sea Carriers and its traders that it had independently contracted. Sea Carriers and its independent traders were all compensated based solely upon performance. The actual performance was diminished by the NYSE Fraud, and therefore the amount that Sea Carriers and its independent traders earned was also diminished.

**Summary of Comments Regarding – "Injured Customers"**

1. The class of “Injured Customers” in the Fund Administrator’s Proposed Distribution Plan should be changed to include certain injured persons other than account parties and Nominees identified by Clearing Members, and these additional injured persons (“Derivative Claimants”) should be eligible to receive distributions of compensatory Disgorgement Amounts, with prejudgment interest.
2. Derivative Claimants should be eligible to receive distributions of penalties and consequential damages, whether Derivative Claimants receive compensatory Disgorgement Amounts or not.
3. If the Plan is not changed to accommodate the two requests above, language in the Commission’s final order should nevertheless:
  - Maintain jurisdiction over this matter even after the fund Administrator has made all distributions.
  - Issue an express finding that the Specialist Firms’ trading violations have injured persons besides account parties—specifically, third parties positioned to benefit (or lose) from transactions involving the Specialist Firms and the account parties.
  - Make Injured Customers acknowledge, as a precondition to their receipt of distributions, their legal obligation to share distributions with third party beneficiaries of the transactions at issue; and
  - Permit Derivative Claimants to seek further SEC review if such Injured Customers do not so share the distributions received.

### **Discussion of “Injured Customers”**

1. The class of “Injured Customers” should include certain injured persons other than account parties.

The class of “Injured Customers” should be broadened for three reasons. First, this interpretation is consistent with the stated goals of the Fair Fund. Second, some Injured Customers have expressed a subversive intention not to share distributions with other parties whom Violative Transactions affect. Third, the nature of the entity comprising an Injured Customer might give the partner of an Injured Customer a direct pro rata interest in distribution proceeds.

First, according to the Commission, Fair Fund distributions aspire to redress injuries arising “as a result of the Specialist Firms’ trading

violations.”<sup>1</sup> The current Distribution Plan therefore limits the class of claimants to “the customers who were injured as a result of” Violative Transactions.<sup>2</sup> Without any stated legal justification, however, the Plan interprets “Injured Customers” to include only account parties identified by Clearing Members or Nominees.<sup>3</sup> This interpretation clashes with the Commission’s stated intent, because Violative Transactions were the proximate cause of substantial economic injuries beyond those to account parties. The Plan acknowledges that “one transaction could represent a block of trades from more than one Injured Customer.”<sup>4</sup> Thus, if a Clearing Member identifies “multiple Injured Customers” for one transaction, the Fund Administrator allocates the Disgorgement Amount “to each Injured Customer pro rata.”<sup>5</sup> If, however, a Violative Transaction caused an Injured Customer in turn to injure multiple Derivative Claimants, and a Derivative Claimant therefore loses investors, the Plan unreasonably fails to allocate compensatory distributions pro rata to each injured Derivative Claimant. Such a failure unequally treats persons who are similarly situated.

Second, the Distribution Plan should not make it easy for Injured Customers to subvert the Commission’s intent by withholding distributions from other parties whom Violative Transactions affect. Perhaps the Fund Administrator has assumed that consequential injuries are matters to be resolved between an Injured Customer and a Derivative Claimant—not between them and the Commission. As shown by the example of Empire, however, some Injured Customers have already decided, if possible, not to share their distributions with Derivative Claimants. Empire’s statements exemplify a problem that will only worsen if the Commission does not speak to the issue.

Third, the Plan fails to recognize that the nature of the entity comprising an Injured Customer might give the partner of an Injured Customer a direct pro rata interest in distribution proceeds. The Uniform Partnership Act, for example, rebuttably presumes property purchased with partnership funds to be partnership property, notwithstanding the name in which title is held.<sup>6</sup> The current Plan’s simplistic method ignores such complexities, thereby fostering unfairness.

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<sup>1</sup> Notice of Proposed Distribution Plan and Opportunity for Comment at 2.

<sup>2</sup> Fund Administrator’s Proposed Fair Fund Distribution Plan at 4.

<sup>3</sup> Fund Administrator’s Proposed Fair Fund Distribution Plan at 5.

<sup>4</sup> Fund Administrator’s Proposed Fair Fund Distribution Plan at 5.

<sup>5</sup> Fund Administrator’s Proposed Fair Fund Distribution Plan at 6.

<sup>6</sup> “Property is presumed to be partnership property if purchased with partnership assets, even if not acquired in the name of the partnership or of one or more partners with an indication in the instrument transferring title to the property of the person’s capacity as a partner or of the existence of a partnership.” Uniform Partnership Act § 204(c) (1997), posted at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa97fa.htm> (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). The Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 has been adopted in every state except Louisiana.

2. Derivative Claimants should be eligible to receive distributions of penalties and consequential damages.

By definition, “consequential damages” arise not from the immediate act of the party, but in consequence of such act—such as if a person throws a log into the public streets and another falls upon it and becomes injured by the fall.<sup>7</sup> Violative Transactions in the current matter triggered a chain of effects that resulted in numerous consequential damages. Injuries to Derivative Claimants fall under the heading of “consequential damages,” both because Injured Customers passed their losses on to Derivative Claimants and because Derivative Claimants suffered further financial harm as a result of their injured track record.

Similarly, by definition, a “penalty” punishes a person for the commission of a crime.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, the essential element of the penalties in this matter is the fact that they deprive the Specialists of certain monies—not the fact that Injured Customers receive them. Distributions of penalties will therefore penalize the Specialists just as much if Derivative Claimants receive them as if Injured Customers receive them.

#### **Summary of Comments on the Proposed Distribution Plan:**

1. All distributions of any kind (disgorgement amounts plus prejudgment interest and/or any related penalty amounts) to Empire Programs, Inc., (3 Kenwood Road, Saddle River, New Jersey, 07458, R. Allen Martin, President) should be deposited into an escrow account to be overseen by Judge Robert Sweet, US District Court, Southern District of NY.
2. All distributions for Empire Programs, Inc., should be accompanied with a detailed itemization of each Violative Transaction, and include the following information for each of the Violative Transactions:

Prejudgment Interest Amount  
Clearing member number  
Clearing member name  
Trade date  
Security symbol  
Firm mnemonics  
Branch and sequence codes  
Turn around code  
Transaction type  
Number of shares

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<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary: Pocket Edition, ed. Bryan A. Garner (West Group 1996) at 163.

<sup>8</sup> See *id.* at 475.

Time of trade  
The Specialist Firm  
The Disgorgement Amount  
The Execution Price  
The CUSIP number  
The principal/agency code  
Violation Type – front running, negative obligation...

3. The Fund Administrator should immediately and without delay make available (on a computer file) an up to date listing of all Violative Transactions identified as those to be disbursed to Empire Programs, Inc, along with a complete breakdown per Violative Transaction as described in Comment #2. This listing of Violative Transactions for Empire Programs should be updated at least once a week, reflecting any additional information that the Administrator receives from Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, Empire Program, Inc.'s only clearing and execution broker.
4. On the top of page 4 of his proposed Distribution Plan, the Administrator described that a “retroactive surveillance” was conducted by the NYSE to identify Violative Transactions. The Administrator also indicated that the surveillance used, “ certain time parameters.” The specific particulars of the “retroactive surveillance” that was conducted should be disclosed to the public, in its entirety and without ambiguity as to methods/parameters, scope... **Public disclosure of this information, however, should not delay for one second the distribution of funds to the NYSE Fraud victims (noting the exception for freezing all distributions to Empire Programs).**
5. The delay in reimbursing damages caused by the NYSE Fraud has only exacerbated the financial devastation to some of the NYSE Fraud victims. The SEC and Fund Administrator should take all actions necessary to set as a number one priority the immediate reimbursement of damages to all the victims. Specifically, Goldman Sachs/Spear, Leeds & Kellogg should be given an order by the SEC to complete its entire submission to the Fund Administrator within 7 days, or face a \$100,000 per day fine until Fund Administrator's request for information is completely fulfilled. Furthermore, the SEC and Fund Administrator should streamline their future interactions so as to allow the actual reimbursement of damages to occur as soon as possible.