UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940

INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-14993

In the Matter of

MIDDLECOVE CAPITAL, LLC, AND NOAH L. MYERS,
Respondents.

ORDER MAKING FINDINGS AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 15(b) AND 21C OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, SECTIONS 203(e), 203(f), AND 203(k) OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, AND SECTION 9(b) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

I.

On August 22, 2012, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) instituted administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), Sections 203(e), 203(f), and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) against MiddleCove Capital, LLC (“MiddleCove”) and Noah L. Myers (“Myers”) (collectively, “the Respondents”).

II.

Respondents have each submitted an Offer of Settlement (the “Offers”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 203(e), 203(f), and 203(k) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Order") as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offers, the Commission finds\(^1\) that:

**SUMMARY**

1. From approximately October 2008 to February 2011 (the “relevant period”), Noah Myers, the sole owner of MiddleCove Capital, LLC (“MiddleCove”), engaged in fraudulent trade allocation – “cherry-picking” – at MiddleCove. During the relevant period, MiddleCove was a registered investment adviser. Myers executed his cherry-picking scheme by unfairly allocating trades that had appreciated in value during the course of the day to his personal and business accounts and allocating trades that had depreciated in value during the day to the accounts of his advisory clients. He did this by purchasing securities in an omnibus account and delaying allocation of the purchases until later in the day (and sometimes the next day), after he saw whether the securities appreciated in value. When a security appreciated in value on the day of purchase, Myers would often sell the security and disproportionately allocate the purchase and the realized day-trading profit to his own accounts or accounts benefiting himself or his family members. In contrast, for securities that did not appreciate on the day of purchase, Myers would disproportionately allocate these purchases to his clients’ accounts and his clients would hold the position for more than one day. Myers carried out his cherry-picking scheme with regard to several securities, but was most active with an inverse and leveraged exchange traded fund (ETF). Myers finally ceased these practices in February 2011 when one of his employees threatened to contact the Commission. As a result of his fraud, Myers realized ill-gotten gains of approximately $460,000. Myers’s cherry-picking scheme also resulted in more than $2 million in client losses from his trading in the inverse and leveraged ETF. Neither MiddleCove nor Myers disclosed to clients that they were engaged in cherry-picking and that they would favor Myers’s accounts in the allocation of appreciated securities. In addition, Myers and MiddleCove failed to follow the policies stated in MiddleCove’s ADV concerning trade allocation.


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\(^1\) The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents’ Offers and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
RESPONDENTS

3. MiddleCove Capital, LLC (SEC File No. 801-68677), is a Connecticut limited liability company with its principal place of business in Centerbrook, Connecticut. It has been registered with the Commission as an investment adviser since 2008 when Myers formed MiddleCove. At its peak in 2011, when MiddleCove had two portfolio managers including Myers, MiddleCove managed approximately $129 million in client assets. MiddleCove is wholly owned and controlled by Myers. In mid-2011, one of MiddleCove’s portfolio managers left the firm after being there for approximately one year. As a result of his departure, MiddleCove’s assets under management declined by approximately one-half. MiddleCove currently has no employees other than Myers. As of September 31, 2011, MiddleCove managed approximately 350 client accounts and had approximately $53,000,000 under management. MiddleCove’s clients are individuals and families.

4. Noah L. Myers, age 41, resides in Lyme, Connecticut. Myers is the principal, chief investment officer, and sole owner of MiddleCove. Myers formed MiddleCove in early 2008 after a fourteen-year career at Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“Citigroup”). During the relevant time period, Myers was also a registered representative of Purshe Kaplan Sterling Investments, Inc. (“Purshe Kaplan”), a registered broker-dealer located in Albany, New York.

OTHER RELEVANT ENTITY

5. Purshe Kaplan Sterling Investments, Inc. (SEC File No. 8-46844), is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Albany, New York. Purshe Kaplan has been registered with the Commission as a broker-dealer since 1994. Myers was a registered representative of Purshe Kaplan during the relevant time period.

RESPONDENTS’ CONDUCT

The cherry-picking scheme.

6. Myers formed MiddleCove in February 2008, and, in April 2008, Myers began using an omnibus account (“master account”) at Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Charles Schwab”), the custodian for all of MiddleCove’s accounts, to place orders for his personal and client transactions. When he used the master account to purchase securities, Myers would place a block trade in the master account and then allocate the shares to his personal and client accounts.

7. Prior to October 2008, Myers was relatively inactive in his own accounts as compared to his client accounts. However, Myers began day-trading his own accounts in October 2008 and actively traded his own accounts over the next two years. From October 2008 to February 2011, Myers allocated approximately $60 million in securities purchased in the master account to his personal and business accounts, compared to approximately $200 million in securities purchased in the master account and allocated to MiddleCove’s clients. Myers’s personal trading activity, including his day-trading, slowed considerably after a MiddleCove employee confronted Myers in late 2010 about his cherry-picking scheme.
8. From October 2008 to February 2011, Myers engaged in a cherry-picking scheme to misappropriate profitable transactions to his personal and business accounts. Myers made block purchases of securities in the master account sometime during the trading day before the 4 P.M. close of the U.S. stock market. After making a purchase, Myers delayed allocating it until he knew whether there was a gain or loss on the trade on the day of purchase. During the relevant time period, approximately 65% of the purchases that Myers allocated to his clients were not allocated until after 4 P.M. on the day of the purchase. On some occasions, Myers would even wait until the next day to allocate a purchase and then mark the allocated trade “As Of” the day it was purchased in the market. This timing difference made it possible for Myers to selectively allocate profitable trades to his own accounts. If the security increased in price on the day of purchase, Myers would often sell the security on the same day he purchased it (a “day trade”) and disproportionately allocate the day-trade profit to his personal and business accounts. However, if the security’s price did not increase on the day of purchase, Myers disproportionately allocated the purchase to his clients’ accounts.

9. Myers’s scheme often involved purchasing a security in the master account for consecutive days over several weeks, or even months, and then allocating the security depending on its performance. If it increased in value on the day of purchase, he disproportionately allocated the security to his own accounts. If the security decreased in value on the day of purchase, Myers disproportionately allocated it to his clients’ accounts. Thus, the securities on which Myers was disproportionately making money were the same securities on which his clients were disproportionately losing money. In fact, during the relevant time period, when Myers allocated a trade to his own accounts, he had almost always allocated the same security to his clients’ accounts on a different trading day within one month of the allocation to his own accounts. The only consistent difference in whether Myers allocated a security to his own accounts or his clients’ accounts was whether the security appreciated in value on the day it was purchased. The scheme is identified.

10. Charles Schwab had an internal program that flagged Myers’s accounts as potentially receiving favorable allocation of profitable day trades. A MiddleCove employee investigated Myers’s trading patterns after he received a call from an employee of Charles Schwab in November 2010. The Schwab employee indicated that Schwab had flagged the allocation of MiddleCove’s block trades as potentially giving profitable trades to an account that benefited Myers. As a result of the call, the MiddleCove employee analyzed Myers’s trade allocation for a stock (Research in Motion or RIMM) and a leveraged ETF (ProShares UltraShort Financials or SKF). From his analysis of Myers’s trade allocation of these two securities, the employee suspected that Myers was cherry-picking trades in favor of his own account at the expense of his clients. Specifically, the employee believed, based on his review of Myers’s trade allocation, that Myers was allocating trades that lost money at the end of the day to clients instead of himself and that the performance for Myers’s accounts was much more profitable than his clients’ accounts.

11. Following the MiddleCove employee’s analysis of Myers’s cherry-picking scheme, all four of MiddleCove’s employees confronted Myers about his trade allocation in mid-December, 2010. As a result of the confrontation, Myers agreed to use a trading method that
required Myers to place all of his client trades through a certain Charles Schwab trade application, and to use a different method for his own trades.

12. On February 18, 2011, the same MiddleCove employee who had analyzed Myers’s trading in November noticed Myers had allocated a day trade profit to himself using the Charles Schwab trade application that Myers had agreed to only use for clients’ trades. The employee confronted Myers and threatened to report Myers to the Commission if he did not re-allocate the trade, and Myers agreed to re-allocate the trade to a client. After this confrontation, Myers stopped cherry-picking and did relatively little trading in his own accounts.

13. Commission examination staff interviewed Myers in November 2011 about his own securities trading. Myers admitted that he had a day-trading strategy in one of his personal accounts that was profitable about 95% of the time, but he did not offer a plausible explanation for his stellar day-trading performance.

Myers profited at his clients’ expense.

14. During the relevant time period, trades that Myers made in his own accounts increased in value by an average of approximately 67 basis points (or .67 of one-percent) on the day that Myers purchased the security. This 67 basis-point increase resulted in approximately $408,000 in first-day profits for Myers’s own accounts. In contrast, during the relevant time period, trades that Myers allocated to his clients’ accounts decreased by approximately 32 basis points on the day that Myers purchased the security. This difference in return is highly statistically significant – the likelihood of Myers experiencing his first-day return (approximately 67 basis points) compared to the average first-day return for all of his and his clients’ purchases (approximately negative 32 basis points for his clients’ purchases and negative 9 basis points for his and his clients’ purchases combined) from a “lucky” allocation of trades is less than one in ten million. Similarly, approximately 74% of Myers’s trades had a profit on the first day compared to approximately 52% of his clients’ trades – the likelihood of observing a difference in profitability this large by chance is less than one in one trillion.

15. Myers realized approximately $138,000 in profits on his trades of SKF (the leveraged and inverse ETF discussed above) while his clients realized a net loss of approximately $2.2 million on their SKF trades. These losses were spread out among approximately 120 clients.

16. Myers’s cherry-picking scheme also resulted in significant investment losses for MiddleCove clients to whom Myers allocated shares of SKF. Many of the clients did not know what SKF was or that they had invested in a leveraged ETF, even when their investment in SKF was a significant part of their account value and they experienced significant losses because of it. Many of these clients were retired and/or were using their MiddleCove account as their source of funds for retirement and had limited willingness or ability to accept significant investment risk.

17. Leveraged and inverse ETFs like SKF are generally not designed to be held for more than one day. In June 2009, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) issued Notice to Members 09-31 reminding firms of their sales practice obligations relating to leveraged and inverse ETFs. SKF is a leveraged and inverse ETF designed to achieve daily investment
results corresponding to twice the inverse (opposite) of the daily performance of the Dow Jones U.S. Financials Index. The FINRA notice described how leveraged and inverse ETFs are designed to achieve their stated objectives on a daily basis, and, “[d]ue to the effect of compounding, their performance over longer periods of time can differ significantly from the performance (or inverse of the performance) of the underlying index or benchmark during the same period of time... This effect can be magnified in volatile markets.” With an inverse or a leveraged ETF, if the relevant benchmark moves 100 points in one direction on day one and returns to the original level on day two, an investment in the ETF held for both days will be negative even though the benchmark is flat. (If, on the other hand, the benchmark moved in the same direction on both days, an investor in the ETF would have even better performance than shorting the index or investing in the index on margin.) If the ETF is an inverse and leveraged ETF, as is the case with SKF, the loss would be more significant. For these and other reasons, the FINRA notice concluded that “While the customer-specific suitability analysis depends on the investor’s particular circumstances, inverse and leveraged ETFs typically are not suitable for retail investors who plan to hold them for more than one trading session, particularly in volatile markets.”

18. During the period of his cherry-picking scheme, approximately one-third of Myers’s one-day profits were from SKF trades. These profits came at the expense of approximately $2 million in client losses because Myers exposed his clients to the downside of this volatile security so that he could reap the rewards when SKF rose in value on the day of purchase. This scheme meant that Myers held SKF for more than one day in the accounts of several clients for whom such an investment was inappropriate. Moreover, at times, SKF was a considerable proportion of the holdings of his clients, further magnifying their investment risk. For example, Myers’s decision to use SKF as his tool for his cherry-picking scheme extended to:

- Investor A, age 84 and retired, invested all of her savings with MiddleCove. She described herself as conservative investor. Nonetheless, in September 2009, Myers established a $89,727.74 SKF position for this investor, which was 34.3% of her month-end account balance. The investor lost a net of $14,543 on SKF, and she had no idea what this security was.

- Investor B, age 77 and retired, had his retirement savings completely with MiddleCove. He viewed himself as “moderate risk” investor. In September 2009, Myers established a $251,196.95 SKF position for this investor in his only account, representing about 28% of the account. The investor lost a net of $59,483 on SKF.

- Investor C, age 70 and retired, was a client who described himself as unsophisticated. In September 2009, Investor C had approximately $239,288.89 of SKF, or approximately 87.7% of the account’s month end value. The investor had no knowledge of what SKF was, and he lost a net of $83,264 on SKF.

The scheme was contrary to MiddleCove’s Form ADV.

19. During the relevant time period, MiddleCove filed its Form ADV, Part II on April 29, 2009, and March 29, 2010. Items 12A, 12B, and 13A of the Form ADV, Part II stated, in pertinent part:
Transactions for each client generally will be effected independently, unless the Adviser decides to purchase or sell the same securities for several clients at approximately the same time. The Adviser may (but is not obligated to) combine or “batch” such orders to obtain best execution, to negotiate more favorable commission rates, or to allocate equitably among the Adviser's clients differences in prices and commissions or other transaction costs that might have been obtained had such orders been placed independently. Under this procedure, transactions will generally be averaged as to price and allocated among the Adviser’s clients pro rata to the purchase and sale orders placed for each client on any given day. To the extent that the Adviser determines to aggregate client orders for the purchase or sale of securities, including securities in which the Adviser's Advisory Affiliate(s) may invest, the Adviser shall generally do so in accordance with applicable rules promulgated under the Advisers Act and no-action guidance provided by the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Adviser shall not receive any additional compensation or remuneration as a result of the aggregation.

The same items in the ADV went on to list specific circumstances in which allocations may not be pro rata among accounts, none of which applied to the relevant trades. These statements, taken as a whole, were misleading because the statements conveyed the impression that batched trades would be allocated fairly and not unduly favor Myers or MiddleCove, and, when trades included securities in which the “Adviser’s Advisory Affiliate(s) may invest,” there would be extra layer of protection provided by a regulatory framework.

**VIOLATIONS**

20. As a result of the conduct described above, Myers and MiddleCove willfully violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, which prohibit fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, by knowingly or recklessly allocating profitable trades to Myers’s personal and business accounts at the expense of advisory clients. In addition, through this cherry-picking scheme and by failing to disclose the scheme, Myers and MiddleCove willfully violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which prohibit fraudulent conduct by an investment adviser with respect to advisory clients or prospective clients.

21. As a result of the conduct described above, MiddleCove willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act by filing misleading Forms ADV that willfully made material misstatements concerning MiddleCove’s trade allocation policies and procedures. By signing and causing to be filed on behalf of MiddleCove these misleading Forms ADV, Myers also willfully violated Section 207 of the Advisers Act.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents’ Offers.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Exchange Act, Sections 203(e), 203(f), and 203(k) of the Advisers Act, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

A. Respondents MiddleCove and Myers cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1), 206(2) and 207 of the Advisers Act.

B. The registration of MiddleCove as an investment adviser is hereby revoked.

C. Respondent Myers be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization;

barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock; and

prohibited from serving or acting as an employee, officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment company or affiliated person of such investment adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter.

D. Any reapplication for association by Respondent Myers will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but no limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against Respondent Myers, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

E. Respondents shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of $462,022 and prejudgment interest of $26,096 to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600. Respondents are jointly and severally liable for all payments required to be made by this paragraph. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

(1) Respondents may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will
provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;  
(2) Respondents may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or  
(3) Respondents may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

Enterprise Services Center  
Accounts Receivable Branch  
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341  
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard  
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying MiddleCove Capital, LLC and Noah L. Myers as Respondents in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Kevin M. Kelcourse, Assistant Director, Asset Management Unit, Boston Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 Arch Street, Suite 2300, Boston, MA 02110.

F. Respondents shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $300,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3717. Respondents are jointly and severally liable for all payments required to be made by this paragraph. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

(1) Respondents may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;  
(2) Respondents may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or  
(3) Respondents may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

Enterprise Services Center  
Accounts Receivable Branch  
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341  
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard  
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying MiddleCove Capital, LLC and Noah L. Myers as Respondents in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Kevin M. Kelcourse, Assistant Director, Asset Management Unit, Boston Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 Arch Street, Suite 2300, Boston, MA 02110.

2 The minimum threshold for transmission of payment electronically is $50,000.00 as of April 1, 2012. This threshold will be increased to $1,000,000 by December 31, 2012. For amounts below the threshold, respondents must make payments pursuant to option (2) or (3) above.
G. Such civil money penalty may be distributed pursuant to Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended (“Fair Fund distribution”). Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties pursuant to this Order shall be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Respondents agree that in any Related Investor Action, they shall not argue that they are entitled to, nor shall they benefit by, offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages by the amount of any part of Respondents’ payment of a civil penalty in this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Respondents agree that they shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this proceeding. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private damages action brought against either of the Respondents by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this proceeding.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary