SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

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Unless otherwise noted, each of the following individual Members of the Commission voted affirmatively upon each action of the Commission shown in the file:

MARY JO WHITE, CHAIR
ELISSE B. WALTER, COMMISSIONER
LUIS A. AGUILAR, COMMISSIONER
TROY A. PAREDES, COMMISSIONER
DANIEL M. GALLAGHER, COMMISSIONER

33 DOCUMENTS
ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, SECTIONS 203(e) AND 203 (k) OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") against UBS O'Connor, LLC ("UBS O'Connor" or "Respondent").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Advisers Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order"), as set forth below.
III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:

Summary

1. These proceedings arise out of violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M (“Rule 105”) by UBS O’Connor, a Chicago, Illinois based registered investment adviser and manager of nine funds. UBS O’Connor violated Rule 105 sixteen times between January 2009 and March 2011 in connection with certain short sales it effected within the Rule 105 restricted period and subsequent purchases of the securities in firm commitment public offerings.

Respondent

2. UBS O’Connor, a Delaware Limited Liability Company located in Chicago, Illinois, has been registered with the Commission as an investment adviser since May 19, 2000. UBS O’Connor is a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS AG, a Swiss banking corporation headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland. UBS O’Connor is an investment adviser to nine funds, each organized in the Cayman Islands. As of March 2012, UBS O’Connor had over $6 billion in assets under management.

Background

3. Rule 105 of Regulation M makes it unlawful for a person to purchase equity securities from an underwriter, broker, or dealer participating in a public offering if that person sold short the security that is the subject of the offering during the restricted period defined in the rule, absent an exception. Rule 105 defines the restricted period as the shorter of the period: (1) beginning five business days prior to the pricing of the offered securities and ending with such pricing; or (2) beginning with the initial filing of such registration statement or notification on Form 1-A or Form 1-E and ending with the pricing. 17 CFR §242.105.1.

1. Specifically, Rule 105 states:
(a) Unlawful Activity. In connection with an offering of equity securities for cash pursuant to a registration statement or a notification on Form 1-A (§239.90 of this chapter) or Form 1-E (§239.200 of this chapter) filed under the Securities Act of 1933 (“offered securities”), it shall be unlawful for any person to sell short (as defined in §242.200(a)) the security that is the subject of the offering and purchase the offered securities from an underwriter or broker or dealer purchasing equity securities in the offering if such short sale was effected during the period (“Rule 105 restricted period”) that is the shorter of the period:
   (1) Beginning five business days before the pricing of the offered securities and ending with such pricing; or
   (2) Beginning with the initial filing of such registration statement or notification on Form 1–A or Form 1–E and ending with the pricing.

UBS O’CONNOR’S STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

5. At the time the violations occurred, UBS O’Connor managed its funds through different portfolio management teams, called “Aggregation Units.” Each Aggregation Unit specialized in a different investment area or trading strategy. A particular Aggregation Unit team made investment decisions for a specified portion of any given fund’s total assets. Multiple Aggregation Units could purchase and sell securities on behalf of the same fund.

6. In addition, several of the Aggregation Units made investment decisions for more than one fund at a time.

7. During the period in which the sixteen Rule 105 violations occurred, UBS O’Connor’s Rule 105 Policies and Procedures permitted an Aggregation Unit to direct a fund to purchase equity securities in firm commitment public offerings even though a different Aggregation Unit had directed the same fund to short the security during the Rule 105 restricted period. UBS O’Connor’s Policies and Procedures were based on the mistaken belief that each Aggregation Unit qualified for the Rule 105 “separate accounts” exception.

UBS O’CONNOR’S VIOLATIONS OF RULE 105 OF REGULATION M

8. With respect to the sixteen firm commitment public offerings, funds managed by UBS O’Connor shorted securities within five days of the pricing of a firm commitment public offering and subsequently purchased equity securities in the offering. For each of the sixteen violations, one Aggregation Unit gave the direction to short while another Aggregation Unit gave the direction to purchase equity securities in the firm commitment public offering. The sixteen firm commitment public offerings were:

a. Newmont Mining Corporation’s January 2009 public offering;
b. Micron Technology, Inc.’s April 2009 public offering;
c. Kimco Realty Corporation’s April 2009 public offering;
d. Regency Centers Corporation’s April 2009 public offering;
e. CommScope Inc.’s May 2009 public offering;
f. Terex Corporation’s May 2009 public offering;
g. Steel Dynamic Inc.’s June 2009 public offering;
h. JetBlue Airways Corp’s June 2009 public offering;
i. Bemis Co. Inc.’s July 2009 public offering;
j. Phototronics Inc.’s September 2009 public offering;
k. GMX Resources, Inc.’s October 2009 public offering;
l. Synovus Financial Corporation’s April 2010 public offering;
m. PPL Corporation’s June 2010 public offering;
n. Molina Healthcare, Inc.'s August 2010 public offering;
o. Stillwater Mining Co.'s December 2010 public offering; and

9. With respect to these sixteen firm commitment public offerings, certain UBS O'Connor Aggregation Units directed funds to sell short the respective securities during the Rule 105 restricted period while other Aggregation Units directed the funds to purchase the equity securities in the public offering.

10. For example, on May 28, 2009, consistent with UBS O'Connor’s procedures at the time, the UBS O'Connor employee responsible for announcing firm commitment public offerings within the firm (“Firm Commitment Public Offering Manager”), notified all portfolio managers, traders, and compliance personnel that Terex Corporation’s (“Terex”) firm commitment public offering would price that evening. UBS O'Connor’s Compliance Department thereafter sent an email that all Aggregation Units could direct the purchase of equity securities in the firm commitment public offering except for the Global Convertible Securities Aggregation Unit (“CONV Aggregation Unit”), which had directed UBS O'Connor’s Global Multi Strategy Alpha Master Limited Fund (“GLEA”) to sell short 125,000 shares of Terex stock that morning at an average price of $13.66. All UBS O'Connor portfolio managers had access to the information that GLEA had a short position in Terex.

11. That afternoon, the head of the CONV Aggregation Unit (“Head of CONV”) who at times also made trading decisions for the Tactical Trading Strategy Aggregation Unit (“TTS Aggregation Unit”), sent the Firm Commitment Public Offering Manager an email stating: “Please put in for 350,000 [Terex] shares under $13 (your discretion to do better).” The Head of CONV requested this trade for the TTS Aggregation Unit. The CONV Aggregation Unit that he managed had previously directed GLEA to sell short Terex stock. Even though the Head of CONV had requested 350,000 shares in the public offering for the TTS Aggregation Unit, there was a shortage of shares offered in the firm commitment public offering, and the TTS Aggregation Unit only received 1,473 shares - which were allocated to GLEA. Two other Aggregation Units also directed the purchase of equity securities in the offering and allocated a total of 130,655 shares of Terex stock to GLEA. These Aggregation Unit portfolio managers had access to information that GLEA had sold short within five days of the pricing of the firm commitment public offering. GLEA received a total of 132,128 shares at $13 a share through the firm commitment public offering. Thus, one Aggregation Unit directed GLEA to short Terex within five days of the pricing of a firm commitment public offering, while a different Aggregation Unit directed GLEA to purchase Terex shares in the Terex firm commitment public offering.

12. UBS O'Connor made a profit for GLEA of $82,550.61 on its Terex short sales during the applicable restricted period. In addition, UBS O'Connor generated an impermissible benefit of $4,156.22 for GLEA on the remaining 7,128 shares it purchased in the firm commitment public offering.

13. As another example, on the morning of July 22, 2009, the Firm Commitment Public Offering Manager notified all traders and portfolio managers that Bemis Company, Inc. (“Bemis”)
planned a firm commitment public offering, which would price early the next morning. During the relevant restricted period, the Fundamental Market Neutral Long/Short Strategy Aggregation Unit ("FT Aggregation Unit") had directed GLEA to short 210,902 Bemis shares at an average price of $26.70 a share. Also during the restricted period the FT Aggregation Unit directed UBS O'Connor's Global Fundamental Market Neutral Long/Short Master Limited Fund ("FRLS") to short 341,198 shares of Bemis at an average price of $26.70 a share. Later in the day on July 22nd, a compliance officer stated that the FT Aggregation Unit could not direct the purchase of equity securities in the Bemis firm commitment public offering.

14. The Fundamental Long/Short Equity and TTS Aggregation Units made the decision to direct the purchase of shares in the Bemis July 23, 2009 firm commitment public offering, which resulted in GLEA and FRLS being allocated 215,995 and 56,795 shares, respectively. These funds purchased the firm commitment public offering shares at $26 a share. Thus, UBS O'Connor effected short sales for GLEA and FRLS in Bemis within five days of the pricing of Bemis's firm commitment public offering and directed the purchase of Bemis shares in the firm commitment public offering for those same funds.

15. UBS O'Connor generated a profit for GLEA and FRLS of $172,302.61 on the Bemis short sales during the applicable restricted period. In addition, UBS O'Connor generated an impermissible benefit of $51,478.87 for the funds on the remaining 5,093 shares purchased in the firm commitment public offering.

THE SEPARATE ACCOUNTS EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY

16. UBS O'Connor explained that its Rule 105 Policies and Procedures in place at the time of the firm commitment public offerings set forth in paragraph 8 above were based on the mistaken belief that the Aggregation Units qualified for the Rule 105 separate accounts exception. 17 C.F.R. §242.105(b)(2). UBS O'Connor's incorrect assessment of the applicability of the separate accounts exception resulted in its violations of Rule 105.

17. Subsection (b)(2) of Rule 105 provides that the rule does "not prohibit the purchase of the offered security in an account of a person where such person sold short during the Rule 105 restricted period in a separate account, if decisions regarding securities transactions for each account are made separately and without coordination of trading or cooperation among or between the accounts." 17 C.F.R. §242.105(b)(2).

18. In the Amended Rule 105 adopting release, the Commission listed the following indicia of separateness: (1) The accounts have separate and distinct investment and trading strategies and objectives; (2) Personnel for each account do not coordinate trading among or between the accounts; (3) Information barriers separate the accounts, and information about securities positions or investment decisions is not shared between accounts; (4) Each account maintains a separate profit and loss statement; (5) There is no allocation of securities between or among accounts; and (6) Personnel with oversight or managerial responsibility over multiple accounts in a single entity or affiliated entities, and account owners of multiple accounts, do not have authority to execute trades in individual securities in the accounts and in fact, do not execute
trades in the accounts, and do not have the authority to pre-approve trading decisions for the accounts and in fact, do not pre-approve trading decisions for the accounts. Short Selling in Connection with a Public Offering, Rel. No. 34-56206, 72 Fed. Reg. 45094, 45098-99.

19. UBS O’Connor incorrectly determined that the separate accounts exception applied to its structure and practices. Its structure and practices made the separate accounts exception inapplicable. For example, UBS O’Connor’s Aggregation Units did not have their own trading accounts. The Aggregation Units did not hold any securities or other assets themselves. Rather, all the funds held assets and securities. UBS O’Connor investors did not invest in the Aggregation Units - they invested in the funds. Similarly, the funds did not invest in the Aggregation Units. The Aggregation Unit portfolio managers made the investment decisions regarding what securities a particular fund would buy or sell. Brokerage accounts were in the name of each fund, not the Aggregation Unit.

20. UBS O’Connor explained that it did not believe it had to maintain a policy that prohibited portfolio managers of separate Aggregation Units from communicating with each other in order to qualify for the separate accounts exception. UBS O’Connor had a “culture of information sharing.” Each manager and trader could access trades and positions placed by other Aggregation Units and could also see positions at the fund level. Managers from different Aggregation Units frequently communicated with each other in weekly meetings, informally in the office and through email. Details about the firm commitment public offerings were often the subject of discussion at the weekly meetings in which portfolio managers from all Aggregation Units were in attendance.

21. UBS O’Connor placed no restrictions on what could be discussed among the various Aggregation Unit teams. With respect to the firm commitment public offerings, all portfolio managers, regardless of the trading directed or contemplated by their Aggregation Unit, could ascertain which Aggregation Units (and funds) had short positions and which Aggregation Units could - and planned to - direct the purchase of equity securities in the firm commitment public offering. Therefore, it was possible that a portfolio manager could direct a short sale for the benefit of a fund in a stock with knowledge that another Aggregation Unit, as part of that Unit’s separate investment strategy, planned to direct the same fund to purchase shares in the firm commitment public offering. This conduct resulted in violations of Rule 105 when the short sales took place during the restricted period.

22. Finally, several Aggregation Unit traders and portfolio managers worked with more than one Aggregation Unit at a time. On occasion, some of these portfolio managers participated in the decision by one Aggregation Unit to direct a fund to sell short a security and also participated in another Aggregation Unit’s decision to direct the fund’s purchase of shares in the same security’s firm commitment public offering, resulting in both positions being allocated to the same fund. This conduct resulted in violations of Rule 105 when the short sales took place during the restricted period.
23. The separate accounts exception was inapplicable and, therefore, UBS O’Connor violated Rule 105 by directing the funds it managed to short securities during the restricted period and allowing them to purchase shares in sixteen firm commitment public offerings.

24. With respect to each of the sixteen firm commitment public offerings identified above, UBS O’Connor “purchased the offered securities from an underwriter or broker or dealer participating in the offering” after having sold short the same security “during the period beginning five business days before the pricing of the offered securities and ending with such pricing.” 17 C.F.R. § 242.105(a). As a result of this conduct, UBS O’Connor willfully violated Rule 105 of Regulation M under the Exchange Act.

25. As a result of its violations of Rule 105, UBS O’Connor generated a profit for certain of its funds of $2,168,473 on the shares sold short. In addition, UBS O’Connor generated an impermissible benefit of $1,619,116 for the funds from the remaining shares purchased in firm commitment public offerings.

Violations

26. As a result of the foregoing, UBS O’Connor willfully violated Rule 105 of Regulation M of the Exchange Act. ²

UBS O’Connor’s Remedial Efforts

27. During the course of investigation by the staff of the Commission and in response to questions raised by the staff regarding the applicability of the separate accounts exception, UBS O’Connor stated that it had revised its Rule 105 Policy and Procedures in order to comply with Rule 105. UBS O’Connor also stated that it had required every trader and portfolio manager to take an examination regarding the new Policy and Procedures.

28. In determining to accept this Offer, the Commission considered the remedial acts undertaken by Respondent UBS O’Connor and cooperation afforded the Commission staff.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent UBS O’Connor’s Offer.

Accordingly, pursuant to 21C of the Exchange Act and Sections 203(e) and 203 (k) of the Advisers Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

² A willful violation of the securities laws means merely “that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing.” Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949)). There is no requirement that the actor “also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.” Id. (quoting Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
A. Respondent UBS O’Connor cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M of the Exchange Act.

B. Respondent UBS O’Connor is censured.

C. Respondent shall, within 20 days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of $3,787,590, prejudgment interest of $369,766, and a civil penalty of $1,140,000 to the United States Treasury. If any payment is not made by the date the payment is required by this Order, the entire outstanding balance of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties, plus any additional interest accrued pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600 or pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3717, shall be due and payable immediately, without further application. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying UBS O’Connor as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Robert J. Burson, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 175 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 900, Chicago, IL 60622.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

June 3, 2013

In the Matter of

3CI Complete Compliance Corp.
AHPC Holdings, Inc.
American Utilicraft Corp.
Austin Farms Inc.
BancPro, Inc.
Baxley Federal Savings Bank
CBR Brewing Co., Inc.
Centerpoint Bank (Bedford, NH)
China Renyuan International, Inc.
Compass Plastics & Technologies, Inc.
Devonshire Consolidated, Inc.
Edge Business Services Corp.
Egghead.com, Inc.
Environmental Corp. of America
Environmental Fiber Technologies, Inc.
Extreme Motorsports of California, Inc.
Fidelity First Financial Corp.
Fortune Market Media, Inc.
Franklin Ophthalmic Instruments Co., Inc.
Futurebiotics, Inc.
Geneva Financial Corp.
Globalnet Systems Ltd.
Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc.
Imaging Center Inc. (The)
InAmerica, Inc.
IndieMV Media Group, Inc.
Integrated Bio Energy Resources, Inc.
Interactive Brand Development, Inc.
ISI Technology Corp.
Isomet Corp.
Matinee Media Corp.
MediaBay, Inc.
Metricom, Inc.
Midnight Holdings Group, Inc.
Municipal Insurance Co. of America
Myriad Entertainment & Resorts, Inc.
Oxford Capital Corp.
PanAmerican BanCorp
Pennsylvania Warehousing & Safe Deposit Co.

ORDER OF SUSPENSION OF TRADING
Pipejoin Technologies, Inc.
Pogo! Products, Ltd.
PopMail.com, Inc.
Premium Energy Corp.
Relax Investments, Ltd.
Riptide Worldwide, Inc.
Rocket City Enterprises, Inc.
Rocketinfo, Inc.
Ronco Corp.
Silver Star Energy, Inc.
Sound Health Solutions, Inc.
Sovereign Exploration Associates International, Inc.
Sports Concepts, Inc.
Sports Media, Inc.
TMT Capital Corp.
UniMark Group, Inc. (The)
Verdant Brands, Inc.
Viking Power Services, Inc.
Vinings Investment Properties Trust
Washington Life Insurance Co. of America
Wi-Tron, Inc.
Zone Mining Ltd.

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of 3CI Complete Compliance Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. 3CI Complete Compliance Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol "TCCC."

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of AHPC Holdings, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. AHPC Holdings, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol "GLOV."

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of American Utilicraft Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. American Utilicraft Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol "AMUC."
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Austin Farms Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Austin Farms Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “AUF.R.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of BancPro, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. BancPro, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “BCPO.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Baxley Federal Savings Bank because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Baxley Federal Savings Bank is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “BAXF.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of CBR Brewing Co., Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. CBR Brewing Co., Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “CBRAF.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Centerpoint Bank (Bedford, NH) because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Centerpoint Bank (Bedford, NH) is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “CPOB.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of China Renyuan International, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. China Renyuan International, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “CRNY.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Compass Plastics & Technologies, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Compass Plastics & Technologies, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “CPTI.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Devonshire Consolidated, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Devonshire Consolidated, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “DVNO.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Edge Business Services Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Edge Business Services Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “EGBS.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Egghead.com, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Egghead.com, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “EGHDQ.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Environmental Corp. of America because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Environmental Corp. of America is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “ECAM.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Environmental Fiber Technologies, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Environmental Fiber
Technologies, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “EVFB.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Extreme Motorsports of California, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Extreme Motorsports of California, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “EMOC.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Fidelity First Financial Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Fidelity First Financial Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “FFIRD.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Fortune Market Media, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Fortune Market Media, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “FTMK.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Franklin Ophthalmic Instruments Co., Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Franklin Ophthalmic Instruments Co., Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “FKLN.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Futurebiotics, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Futurebiotics, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “VITK.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Geneva Financial Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Geneva Financial Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “GNVN.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Globalnet Systems Ltd. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Globalnet Systems Ltd. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “ISDN.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “IFBV.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Imaging Center Inc. (The) because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Imaging Center Inc. (The) is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “TIGC.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of InAmerica, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. InAmerica, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “INAX.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of IndieMV Media Group, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. IndieMV Media Group, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “IDMV.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Integrated Bio Energy Resources, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Integrated Bio Energy Resources, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “IBIE.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Interactive Brand Development, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Interactive Brand Development, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “IBDI.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of ISI Technology Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. ISI Technology Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “ISYL.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Isomet Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Isomet Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “IOMT.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Matinee Media Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Matinee Media Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “MNEM.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of MediaBay, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. MediaBay, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “MBAY.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Metricom, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Metricom, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “MCOMQ.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Midnight Holdings Group, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Midnight Holdings Group, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “MHGI.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Municipal Insurance Co. of America because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Municipal Insurance Co. of America is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “MPAL.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Myriad Entertainment & Resorts, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Myriad Entertainment & Resorts, Inc., Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “MYRA.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Oxford Capital Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Oxford Capital Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “OXFO.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of PanAmerican BanCorp because questions have
arisen as to its operating status, if any. PanAmerican BanCorp is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “PABN.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Pennsylvania Warehousing & Safe Deposit Co. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Pennsylvania Warehousing & Safe Deposit Co. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “PAWH.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Pipejoin Technologies, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Pipejoin Technologies, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “PPJN.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Pogo! Products, Ltd. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Pogo! Products, Ltd. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “PGOI.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Popmail.com, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Popmail.com, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “POPM.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Premium Energy Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Premium Energy Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “PPTL.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Relax Investments, Ltd. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Relax Investments, Ltd. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “RLXI.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Riptide Worldwide, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Riptide Worldwide, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “RTWW.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Rocket City Enterprises, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Rocket City Enterprises, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “RCTY.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Rocketinfo, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Rocketinfo, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “RKTI.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Ronco Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Ronco Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “RNCP.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Silver Star Energy, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Silver Star Energy, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “SVSE.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Sound Health Solutions, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Sound Health Solutions, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “SHSO.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Sovereign Exploration Associates International, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Sovereign Exploration Associates International, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “SVXA.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Sports Concepts, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Sports Concepts, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “SCPT.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Sports Media, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Sports Media, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “SPTS.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of TMT Capital Corp. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. TMT Capital Corp. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “TMTP.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of UniMark Group, Inc. (The) because questions
have arisen as to its operating status, if any. UniMark Group, Inc. (The) is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “UNMG.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Verdant Brands, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Verdant Brands, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “VERD.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Viking Power Services, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Viking Power Services, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “VKPW.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Vinings Investment Properties Trust because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Vinings Investment Properties Trust is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “VIPPS.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Washington Life Insurance Co. of America because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Washington Life Insurance Co. of America is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “WLIA.”

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Wi-Tron, Inc. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Wi-Tron, Inc. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “WTRO.”
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of Zone Mining Ltd. because questions have arisen as to its operating status, if any. Zone Mining Ltd. is quoted on OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc. under the ticker symbol “ZMNL.”

The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the securities of the above-listed companies.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the securities of the above-listed companies is suspended for the period from 9:30 a.m. EDT on June 3, 2013, through 11:59 p.m. EDT on June 14, 2013.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15349

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 15(b) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING
REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

In the Matter of

THOMAS RUBIN,
Respondent.

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Thomas Rubin ("Rubin" or "Respondent").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission's jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings, and the findings contained in Section III.2 below, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission finds that:
1. Rubin was the CEO and 70% owner of Westcap Securities, Inc. ("Westcap") from July 2001 to December 2008. Rubin, age 44, is a resident of Lake Forest, California.

2. On May 21, 2013, a final judgment was entered by consent against Rubin, permanently enjoining him from future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, in the civil action entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thomas Rubin et al., Civil Action Number Case No. SACV11-01466 JVS MLGx, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

3. The Commission's complaint alleged that, from at least early 2006 through late 2007, Rubin and an entity he controlled, engaged in a continuing series of schemes with others to conduct unlawful unregistered offerings and/or fraudulently manipulate the market for the common stock of four microcap companies – Advanced Growing Systems, Inc., Bluefire Ethanol Fuels, Inc., Mattman Specialty Vehicles, Inc. and Straight Up Brands, Inc. The Commission's complaint alleged Rubin personally engaged in various manipulative activities including coordinated and matched trading activity. Moreover, the Commission's complaint alleged that Rubin took advantage of the manipulated markets for certain of the above-described issuers by selling shares he had received in these issuers for substantial profits.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Rubin's Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act that Respondent Rubin be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization;

with the right to apply for reentry after ten (10) years to the appropriate self-regulatory organization, or if there is none, to the Commission.

Any reapplication for association by the Respondent will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order;
and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Kevin M. O'Neill
Deputy Secretary
I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Christopher Scott ("Scott" or "Respondent").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings, and the findings contained in Section III.2 below, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:
1. Scott was the CCO and registered representative at Westcap Securities, Inc. ("Westcap") from November 2002 to March 2007. Scott, age 38, is a resident of Laguna Niguel, California.

2. On May 21, 2013, a final judgment was entered by consent against Scott, permanently enjoining him from future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, in the civil action entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thomas Rubin et al., Civil Action Number Case No. SACV11-01466 JVS MLGx, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

3. The Commission’s complaint alleged that, from at least early 2006 through late 2007, Scott and an entity he controlled, engaged in a continuing series of schemes with others to conduct unlawful unregistered offerings and/or fraudulently manipulate the market for the common stock of four microcap companies – Advanced Growing Systems, Inc., Bluefire Ethanol Fuels, Inc., Mattman Specialty Vehicles, Inc. and Straight Up Brands, Inc. The Commission’s complaint alleged Scott personally engaged in various manipulative activities including coordinated and matched trading activity. Moreover, the Commission’s complaint alleged that Scott took advantage of the manipulated markets for certain of the above-described issuers by selling shares he had received in these issuers for substantial profits.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Scott’s Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act that Respondent Scott be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization;

with the right to apply for reentry after five (5) years to the appropriate self-regulatory organization, or if there is none, to the Commission.

Any reapplication for association by the Respondent will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order;
and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

Kevin M. O'Neill
By: Kevin M. O'Neill
Deputy Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
(Release No. 34-69699; File No. SR-NSCC-2013-805)  
June 5, 2013  
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Securities Clearing Corporation; Notice of Filing of Advance Notice, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, to Require that All Locked-in Trade Data Submitted to It for Trade Recording be Submitted in Real-time  

Pursuant to Section 806(e)(1) of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 ("Clearing Supervision Act")\(^1\) and Rule 19b-4(n)(1)(i)\(^2\) thereunder, notice is hereby given that on April 30, 2013, the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") an advance notice described in Items I, II and III below, which Items have been prepared primarily by NSCC. On May 14, 2013, NSCC filed Amendment No. 1 to the advance notice.\(^3\) The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the advance notice from interested persons.

I. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Advance Notice

NSCC is proposing to modify its Rules to require that all locked-in trade data submitted to NSCC for trade recording be submitted in real-time, as defined below, and to prohibit pre-netting and other practices that prevent real-time trade submission.

II. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Advance Notice

In its filing with the Commission, NSCC included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the advance notice and discussed any comments it received on the advance notice.

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\(^1\) 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(1).


\(^3\) In Amendment No. 1, NSCC modified Exhibit 5 to the original advance notice filing to correct a typographical error in the text of its Rules & Procedures ("Rules") related to the advance notice.
The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. NSCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections (A), (B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of these statements.  

(A) Clearing Agency’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Advance Notice

Proposal Overview

NSCC is proposing to modify its Rules to require that all locked-in trade data submitted to NSCC for trade recording be submitted in real-time, and to prohibit pre-netting and other practices that prevent real time trade submission.

According to NSCC, the majority of all transactions processed at NSCC are submitted on a locked-in basis by self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") (including national and regional exchanges and marketplaces), and Qualified Special Representatives ("QSRs"). Currently NSCC data reveals that almost all exchanges and some QSRs submit trades executed on their respective markets in real-time, representing approximately 91% of the locked-in trades submitted to NSCC today. The proposed rule change would require that all locked-in trades

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4 The Commission has modified the text of the summaries prepared by NSCC.

5 The term “real-time,” when used with respect to trade submission, will be defined in Procedure XIII (Definitions) of NSCC’s Rules as the submission of such data on a trade-by-trade basis promptly after trade execution, in any format and by any communication method acceptable to NSCC.

6 QSRs are NSCC Members that either (i) operate an automated execution system where they are always the contra side of every trade, (ii) are the parent or affiliate of an entity operating such an automated system, where they are the contra side of every trade, or (iii) clear for a broker-dealer that operates such a system and the subscribers to the system acknowledge the clearing Member’s role in the clearance and settlement of these trades.

7 One executing market with very low trade volume does not yet submit trades in real-time.
submitted for trade recording by SROs and QSRs be submitted to NSCC in real-time.\(^8\)

NSCC is also proposing to prohibit practices that preclude real-time submission, such as “pre-netting.” NSCC states that typically, pre-netting is done on a bilateral basis between a QSR and its customer, both NSCC Members. According to NSCC, any pre-netting practices – whether in the form of “summarization” (i.e., technique in which the clearing broker nets all trades in a single CUSIP by the same correspondent broker into fewer submitted trades), “compression” (i.e., technique to combine submissions of data for multiple trades to the point where the identity of the party actually responsible for the trades is masked), netting, or any other practice that combines two or more trades prior to their submission to NSCC (collectively, “pre-netting”) – prevent the submission to NSCC of transactions on a trade-by-trade basis, and cause submitting firms to delay submission of their trades. According to NSCC, these practices disrupt NSCC’s ability to accurately monitor market and credit risks as they evolve during the trading day. Therefore, NSCC’s proposal will prohibit pre-netting activity on the part of entities submitting original trade data on a locked-in basis.\(^9\) The rules of NSCC’s affiliate Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”) currently prohibit such activity, and this proposed rule change

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\(^8\) NSCC is not at this time modifying Procedure III (Trade Recording Service (Interface Clearing Procedures)) of its Rules, so files submitted to NSCC by The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) relating to option exercises and assignments (Procedure III, Section D – Settlement of Option Exercises and Assignments) will not be required to be submitted in real-time. OCC’s process of assigning option assignments is and will continue to be an end-of-day process.

\(^9\) Trades executed in the normal course of business between a Member that clears for other broker-dealers, and its correspondent, or between correspondents of the Member, which correspondent(s) is not itself a Member and settles such obligations through such clearing Member (i.e., “internalized trades”) are not required to be submitted to NSCC and shall not be considered to violate the “pre-netting” prohibition.
would align NSCC’s trade submission rules with those of FICC.\textsuperscript{10}

NSCC does not expect the proposed rule changes to impact trade volumes significantly. According to NSCC, the majority of trades are currently being submitted to NSCC in real-time on a trade-by-trade basis, and NSCC is operationally capable of managing trade volumes that are multiple times larger than the historical peak volumes. NSCC’s trade capture application, Universal Trade Capture, provides contract information to Members in real-time. Receipt of trade data in real-time will enable NSCC to record, and report to Members, trade data as it is received by the marketplaces, thereby promoting intra-day reconciliation of transactions at the Member level.

In the wake of recent industry disruptions, industry participants have been focused on developing controls to address the risks that arise from technology issues. NSCC believes that technology issues that could potentially cause significant disruptions and losses have become more likely in the securities markets that have leveraged technology advances to move to higher frequency trading environment. A comment letter submitted to the Commission in advance of its Technology and Trading Roundtable, held in October 2012, and signed by a number of industry participants including SROs, broker-dealers, and buy-side firms, supported this proposed rule.

\textsuperscript{10} See, e.g., GSD Rule 11 (Netting System), Section 3 (“All trade data required to be submitted to the Corporation under this Section must be submitted on a trade-by-trade basis with the original terms of the trades unaltered. A Member or any of its Affiliates may not engage in the Pre-Netting of Trades prior to their submission to the Corporation in contravention of this section. In addition, a Member or any of its Affiliates may not engage in any practice designed to contravene the prohibition against the Pre-Netting of Trades.”), http://dtcc.com/legal/rulesproc/FICC-Government_Security_Division_Rulebook.pdf. See also Order Granting Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Trade Submission Requirements and Pre-Netting, Release No. 34-51908 (June 22, 2005), 70 FR 37450 (June 29, 2005).
change as a crucial component of the industry controls that could increase market transparency and ultimately mitigate risks associated with high-frequency trading and related technology.\textsuperscript{11}

As a central counterparty, NSCC contributes to market stability by interposing itself between counterparties to financial transactions and thereby reducing the risk faced by market participants. NSCC believes the proposed rule change will align NSCC's Rules with the trend in risk mitigation to move towards real-time trade submission and processing. NSCC believes the proposal will also support NSCC's critical role in maintaining financial stability by reducing the operational risk that results from locked-in trade data not being submitted to NSCC in real-time, particularly from firms that delay trade submission so as to pre-net their data. For example, receipt of locked-in trade data on a real-time basis will permit NSCC's risk management processes to monitor trades closer to trade execution on an intra-day basis, and identify and manage any issues relating to excessive risk exposure earlier in the day. According to NSCC, it will also be able to provide safe storage for real-time trade data, mitigating the risk that an event that occurs after trade execution and disrupts trade input will significantly delay completion of those trades or may even cause trade data to be lost.

While the proposed rule change will require some QSRs to enhance their trade submission systems, and could cause increased fees for those NSCC Members that pre-net their trade data so as to reduce clearance fees, NSCC believes the significant risk mitigation benefits of this proposal outweigh any temporary burdens or increased costs that may result. As a user-owned industry utility and a registered clearing agency, NSCC believes it must appropriately allocate the costs of its services in order to maintain a fee schedule that is fair and equitable.

among its participants. According to NSCC, enabling Members to persist in pre-netting practices permits those participants to evade paying their fair share of NSCC’s costs, rendering NSCC’s fee schedule, as currently applied, inequitable to the firms for whom trades are submitted in real-time without any pre-netting. Further, over the past few years, NSCC has adjusted its fee schedule to give more weight to “value transacted” and less weight to “units processed,” which NSCC believes will reduce the impact of this rule change on Members’ fees.

Implementation Timeframe

If the Commission approves this proposed rule change, Members will be advised of the implementation date through issuance of an NSCC Important Notice. The proposed rule change will not be implemented earlier than seven (7) months from the date of Commission approval.

Proposed Rule Changes

NSCC proposes to amend Rule 7 (Comparison and Trade Recording Operation), Procedures II (Trade Comparison and Recording Service), IV (Special Representative Service) and XIII (Definitions) of its Rules in order to require that all locked-in trades submitted for trade recording by SROs and QSRs be submitted on a real-time basis, and to make clear that locked-in trade data from SROs and QSRs must be submitted on a trade-by-trade basis, in the original form in which they are executed, and that pre-netting and similar practices are prohibited.

In light of these proposed changes, Addendum N (Interpretation of the Board of Directors: Locked-In Data From Qualified Special Representatives) of NSCC’s Rules will be deleted, as it will be no longer relevant.

(B) Clearing Agency’s Statement on Comments on the Advance Notice Received from Members, Participants, or Others

While written comments relating to the proposed rule change have not yet been solicited with respect to this filing, the proposed rule changes described herein were the subject of a prior
rule filing that was filed with the Commission in 2006 as File No. SR-NSCC-2006-04 ("2006
Filing"). NSCC received a number of public comments to the 2006 Filing. NSCC submitted a
public response to each of the comments in 2006. The 2006 Filing was officially withdrawn on
December 29, 2011.

(C) Advance Notices Filed Pursuant to Section 806(e) of the Payment, Clearing and
Settlement Supervision Act

Description of Change

NSCC is proposing to amend its Rules in order to require that all locked-in trade data
submitted to NSCC for trade recording be submitted promptly after trade execution (or in real-
time), and to prohibit pre-netting and other practices that prevent real-time trade submission.
The proposed rule change is described in detail above.

Anticipated Effect on and Management of Risk

As described above, the proposed rule change is designed to reduce the operational,
market, and credit risk to both NSCC and its Members that results from locked-in trade data not
being submitted to NSCC in real-time. The risk-mitigating effects of this proposal are described
in detail above.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Advance Notice and Timing for Commission
Action

The clearing agency may implement the proposed change pursuant to Section
806(e)(1)(G) of the Clearing Supervision Act if it has not received an objection to the

13 Response Letter from NSCC dated Aug. 18, 2006 (http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-
proposed change within 60 days of the later of (i) the date that the Commission received the advance notice or (ii) the date the Commission receives any further information it requested for consideration of the notice. The clearing agency shall not implement the proposed change if the Commission has any objection to the proposed change.

The Commission may extend the period for review by an additional 60 days if the proposed change raises novel or complex issues, subject to the Commission providing the clearing agency with prompt written notice of the extension. A proposed change may be implemented in less than 60 days from the date of receipt of the advance notice, or the date the Commission receives any further information it requested, if the Commission notifies the clearing agency in writing that it does not object to the proposed change and authorizes the clearing agency to implement the proposed change on an earlier date, subject to any conditions imposed by the Commission. The clearing agency shall post notice on its website of proposed changes that are implemented.

The proposal shall not take effect until all regulatory actions required with respect to the proposal are completed.¹⁵

¹⁵ NSCC also filed the proposals contained in this advance notice as a proposed rule change under Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 19b-4 thereunder. 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1); 17 CFR 240.19b-4. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, generally not later than 45 days after the date of publication of the proposed rule change in the Federal Register or such longer period up to 90 days if the Commission determines that a longer period is appropriate and publishes the reasons for such determination or the self-regulatory organization consents the Commission will either: (i) by order approve or disapprove the proposed rule change or (ii) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved. 17 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(A). See Release No. 34-69571 (May 14, 2013), 78 FR 29408 (May 20, 2013).
IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the advance notice is consistent with the Clearing Supervision Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments:

- Use the Commission’s Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
- Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File No. SR-NSCC-2013-805 on the subject line.

Paper Comments:

- Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File No. SR-NSCC-2013-805. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s Internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the advance notice that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the advance notice between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filings also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of NSCC and on NSCC’s website at
http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/legal/rule_filings/2013/nscc/SR-NSCC-2013-805.pdf  All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File No. SR-NSCC-2013-805 and should be submitted on or before [insert date 15 days from publication in the Federal Register].

By the Commission.  

Kevin M. O'Neill  
Deputy Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 210, 230, 239, 270, 274 and 279

Release No. 33-9408, IA-3616; IC-30551; File No. S7-03-13

RIN 3235-AK61

Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") is proposing two alternatives for amending rules that govern money market mutual funds (or "money market funds") under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The two alternatives are designed to address money market funds' susceptibility to heavy redemptions, improve their ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from such redemptions, and increase the transparency of their risks, while preserving, as much as possible, the benefits of money market funds. The first alternative proposal would require money market funds to sell and redeem shares based on the current market-based value of the securities in their underlying portfolios, rounded to the fourth decimal place (e.g., $1.0000), i.e., transact at a "floating" net asset value per share ("NAV"). The second alternative proposal would require money market funds to impose a liquidity fee (unless the fund's board determines that it is not in the best interest of the fund) if a fund's liquidity levels fell below a specified threshold and would permit the funds to suspend redemptions temporarily, i.e., to "gate" the fund under the same circumstances. Under this proposal, we could adopt either alternative by itself or a combination of the two alternatives. The SEC also is proposing additional amendments that are designed to make money market funds more resilient by increasing the diversification of their portfolios, enhancing their stress
testing, and increasing transparency by requiring money market funds to provide additional 
information to the SEC and to investors. The proposal also includes amendments requiring 
investment advisers to certain unregistered liquidity funds, which can resemble money market 
funds, to provide additional information about those funds to the SEC.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before [insert date 90 days after publication in 
Federal Register].

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments:

- Use the Commission's Internet comment form 
  (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or

- Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number S7-03-13 on the 
  subject line; or

- Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov). Follow the 
  instructions for submitting comments.

Paper Comments:

- Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and 
  Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-03-13. This file number should be included on 
the subject line if e-mail is used. To help us process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s 
Internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments are also available for 
website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE, 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 am and 3:00 pm.
All comments received will be posted without change; we do not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Adam Bolter, Senior Counsel; Brian McLaughlin Johnson, Senior Counsel; Kay-Mario Vobis, Senior Counsel; Amanda Hollander Wagner, Senior Counsel; Thoreau A. Bartmann, Branch Chief; or Sarah G. ten Siethoff, Senior Special Counsel, Investment Company Rulemaking Office, at (202) 551-6792, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-8549.


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I. INTRODUCTION

Money market funds are a type of mutual fund registered under the Investment Company Act and regulated under rule 2a-7 under the Act. Money market funds pay dividends that reflect prevailing short-term interest rates, generally are redeemable on demand, and, unlike other investment companies, seek to maintain a stable net asset value per share ("NAV"), typically

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2 Money market funds are also sometimes called "money market mutual funds" or "money funds."
$1.00.\(^3\) This combination of principal stability, liquidity, and payment of short-term yields has made money market funds popular cash management vehicles for both retail and institutional investors. As of February 28, 2013, there were approximately 586 money market funds registered with the Commission, and these funds collectively held over $2.9 trillion of assets.\(^4\)

Money market funds seek to maintain a stable share price by limiting their investments to short-term, high-quality debt securities that fluctuate very little in value under normal market conditions.\(^5\) They also rely on exemptions provided in rule 2a-7 that permit them to value their portfolio securities using the “amortized cost” method of valuation and to use the “penny-rounding” method of pricing.\(^6\) Under the amortized cost method, a money market fund’s portfolio securities generally are valued at cost plus any amortization of premium or accumulation of discount, rather than at their value based on current market factors.\(^7\) The penny rounding method of pricing permits a money market fund when pricing its shares to round the fund’s net asset value to the nearest one percent (i.e., the nearest penny).\(^8\) Together, these valuation and pricing techniques create a “rounding convention” that permits a money market

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\(^3\) See generally Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of Current Price Per Share by Certain Open-End Investment Companies (Money Market Funds), Investment Company Act Release No. 13380 (July 11, 1983) [48 FR 32555 (July 18, 1983)] (“1983 Adopting Release”). Most money market funds seek to maintain a stable net asset value per share of $1.00, but a few seek to maintain a stable net asset value per share of a different amount, e.g., $10.00. For convenience, throughout this Release, the discussion will simply refer to the stable net asset value of $1.00 per share.

\(^4\) Based on Form N-MFP data. SEC regulations require that money market funds report certain portfolio information on a monthly basis to the SEC on Form N-MFP. See rule 30b1-7.

\(^5\) Throughout this Release, we generally use the term “stable share price” to refer to the stable share price that money market funds seek to maintain and compute for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchases of fund shares.

\(^6\) Money market funds use a combination of the two methods so that, under normal circumstances, they can use the penny rounding method to maintain a price of $1.00 per share without pricing to the third decimal point like other mutual funds, and the amortized cost method so that they need not strike a daily market-based NAV. See infra text accompanying nn.163, 177.

\(^7\) See rule 2a-7(a)(2). See also infra note 10.

\(^8\) See rule 2a-7(a)(20).
fund to sell and redeem shares at a stable share price without regard to small variations in the
value of the securities that comprise its portfolio.9 Other types of mutual funds not regulated by
rule 2a-7, must calculate their daily NAVs using market-based factors (with some exceptions)
and do not use penny rounding.10 We note, however, that banks and other companies also make
wide use of amortized cost accounting to value certain of their assets.11

In exchange for the ability to rely on the exemptions provided by rule 2a-7, the rule

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9 When the Commission initially established its regulatory framework allowing money market funds to
maintain a stable share price through use of the amortized cost method of valuation and/or the penny
rounding method of pricing (so long as they abided by certain risk limiting conditions), it did so
understanding the benefits that stable value money market funds provided as a cash management vehicle,
particularly for smaller investors, and focusing on minimizing inappropriate dilution of assets and returns
for shareholders. See Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Matter of
InterCapital Liquid Asset Fund, Inc. et al., 3-5431, Dec. 28, 1978, at 1533 (Statement of Martin Lybecke,
Division of Investment Management at the Securities and Exchange Commission) (stating that Commission
staff had learned over the course of the hearings the strong preference of money market fund investors to
have a stable share price and that with the right risk limiting conditions the Commission could limit the
likelihood of a deviation from that stable value, addressing Commission concerns about dilution); 1983
Adopting Release, supra note 3, at nn.42-43 and accompanying text ("[T]he provisions of the rule impose
obligations on the board of directors to assess the fairness of the valuation or pricing method and take
appropriate steps to ensure that shareholders always receive their proportionate interest in the money
market fund."). At that time, the Commission was persuaded that deviations to an extent that would cause
material dilution generally would not occur given the risk limiting conditions of the rule. See id., at nn.41-
42 and accompanying text (noting that testimony from the original money market fund exemptive order
hearings alleged that the risk limiting conditions, short of extraordinarily adverse conditions in the market,
should ensure that a properly managed money market fund should be able to maintain a stable price per
share and that rule 2a-7 is based on that representation).

10 For a mutual fund not regulated under rule 2a-7, the Investment Company Act and applicable rules
generally require that it price its securities at the current net asset value per share by valuing portfolio
instruments at market value or, if market quotations are not readily available, at fair value as determined in
good faith by the fund's board of directors. See section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Act and rules 2a-4 and 22c-1.
The Commission, however, has stated that it would not object if a mutual fund board of directors
determines, in good faith, that the value of debt securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less is
their amortized cost, unless the particular circumstances warrant otherwise. See Valuation of Debt
Instruments by Money Market Funds and Certain Other Open-End Investment Companies, Investment
In this regard, the Commission has stated that the "fair value of securities with remaining maturities of 60
days or less may not always be accurately reflected through the use of amortized cost valuation, due to an
impairment of the credit worthiness of an issuer, or other factors. In such situations, it would appear to be
incumbent upon the directors of a fund to recognize such factors and take them into account in determining
'fair value.'" Id.

11 See FASB ASC paragraph 320-10-35-1c indicating investments in debt securities classified as held-to-
maturity shall be measured subsequently at amortized cost in the statement of financial position. See also
Vincent Ryan, FASB Exposure Draft Alarms Bank CFOs (June 2, 2010) available at
imposes important conditions designed to limit deviations between the fund’s $1.00 share price and the market value of the fund’s portfolio. It requires money market funds to maintain a significant amount of liquid assets and to invest in securities that meet the rule’s credit quality, maturity, and diversification requirements. For example, a money market fund’s portfolio securities must meet certain credit quality requirements, such as posing minimal credit risks. The rule also places limits on the remaining maturity of securities in the fund’s portfolio to limit the interest rate and credit spread risk to which a money market fund may be exposed. A money market fund generally may not acquire any security with a remaining maturity greater than 397 days, and the dollar-weighted average maturity of the securities owned by the fund may not exceed 60 days and the fund’s dollar-weighted average life to maturity may not exceed 120 days. Money market funds also must maintain sufficient liquidity to meet reasonably foreseeable redemptions, and generally must invest at least 10% of their portfolios in assets that can provide daily liquidity and invest at least 30% of their portfolios in assets that can provide weekly liquidity. Finally, rule 2a-7 also requires money market funds to diversify their portfolios by generally limiting the funds to investing no more than 5% of their portfolios in any one issuer and no more than 10% of their portfolios in securities issued by, or subject to guarantees or demand features (i.e., puts) from, any one institution.

Rule 2a-7 also includes certain procedural requirements overseen by the fund’s board of directors. These include the requirement that the fund periodically calculate the market-based

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12 See rule 2a-7(c)(2), (3), (4), and (5).
13 See rule 2a-7(a)(12), (c)(3)(ii).
14 Rule 2a-7(c)(2).
15 See rule 2a-7(c)(5). The 10% daily liquid asset requirement does not apply to tax exempt funds.
16 See rule 2a-7(c)(4).
value of the portfolio ("shadow price")\textsuperscript{17} and compare it to the fund’s stable share price; if the deviation between these two values exceeds ¼ of 1 percent (50 basis points), the fund’s board of directors must consider what action, if any, should be initiated by the board, including whether to re-price the fund’s securities above or below the fund’s $1.00 share price (an event colloquially known as "breaking the buck").\textsuperscript{18}

Different types of money market funds have been introduced to meet the differing needs of money market fund investors. Historically, most investors have invested in "prime money market funds," which hold a variety of taxable short-term obligations issued by corporations and banks, as well as repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial paper.\textsuperscript{19} "Government money market funds" principally hold obligations of the U.S. government, including obligations of the U.S. Treasury and federal agencies and instrumentalities, as well as repurchase agreements collateralized by government securities. Some government money market funds limit themselves to holding only U.S. Treasury obligations or repurchase agreements collateralized by U.S. Treasury securities and are called "Treasury money market funds." Compared to prime funds, government and Treasury money market funds generally offer greater safety of principal but historically have paid lower yields. "Tax-exempt money market funds" primarily hold obligations of state and local governments and their instrumentalities, and pay interest that is generally exempt from federal income tax for individual taxpayers.

\textsuperscript{17} See rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A).

\textsuperscript{18} See rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A) and (B). Regardless of the extent of the deviation, rule 2a-7 imposes on the board of a money market fund a duty to take appropriate action whenever the board believes the extent of any deviation may result in material dilution or other unfair results to investors or current shareholders. Rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(C). In addition, the money market fund can use the amortized cost or penny-rounding methods only as long as the board of directors believes that they fairly reflect the market-based net asset value per share. See rule 2a-7(c)(1).

In the analysis that follows, we begin by reviewing the role of money market funds and the benefits they provide investors. We then review the economics of money market funds. This includes a discussion of several features of money market funds that, when combined, can create incentives for fund shareholders to redeem shares during periods of stress, as well as the potential impact that such redemptions can have on the fund and the markets that provide short-term financing.\(^20\) We then discuss money market funds’ experience during the 2007-2008 financial crisis against this backdrop. We next analyze our 2010 reforms and their impact on the heightened redemption activity during the 2011 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and U.S. debt ceiling impasse.

Based on these analyses as well as other publicly available analytical works, some of which are contained in the report responding to certain questions posed by Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes and Gallagher ("RSFI Study")\(^21\) prepared by staff from the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation ("RSFI"), we propose two alternative frameworks for additional regulation of money market funds. Each alternative seeks to preserve the ability of money market funds to function as an effective and efficient cash management tool for investors, but also address certain features in money market funds that can make them susceptible to heavy redemptions, provide them with better tools to manage and mitigate potential contagion from high levels of redemptions, and increase the transparency of their risks. We are also proposing amendments that would apply under each alternative that would result in additional changes to

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\(^20\) Throughout this Release, we generally refer to “short-term financing markets” to describe the markets for short-term financing of corporations, banks, and governments.

money market fund disclosure, diversification limits, and stress testing, among other reforms.\textsuperscript{22}

II. BACKGROUND

A. Role of Money Market Funds

The combination of principal stability, liquidity, and short-term yields offered by money market funds, which is unlike that offered by other types of mutual funds, has made money market funds popular cash management vehicles for both retail and institutional investors, as discussed above. Retail investors use money market funds for a variety of reasons, including, for example, to hold cash for short or long periods of time or to take a temporary "defensive position" in anticipation of declining equity markets. Institutional investors commonly use money market funds for cash management in part because, as discussed later in this Release, money market funds provide efficient diversified cash management due both to the scale of their operations and their expertise.\textsuperscript{23}

Money market funds, due to their popularity with investors, have become an important source of financing in certain segments of the short-term financing markets, as discussed in more detail in section III.E.2 below. Money market funds’ ability to maintain a stable share price contributes to their popularity. Indeed, the $1.00 stable share price has been one of the fundamental features of money market funds. As discussed in more detail in section III.A.7 below, the funds’ stable share price facilitates the funds’ role as a cash management vehicle, provides tax and administrative convenience to both money market funds and their shareholders, and enhances money market funds’ attractiveness as an investment option.

Rule 2a-7, in addition to facilitating money market funds’ maintenance of stable share

\textsuperscript{22} We note that we have consulted and coordinated with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regarding this proposed rulemaking in accordance with section 1027(i)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

\textsuperscript{23} See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
prices, also benefits investors by making available an investment option that provides an efficient and diversified means for investors to participate in the short-term financing markets through a portfolio of short-term, high quality debt securities. Many investors likely would find it impractical or inefficient to invest directly in the short-term financing markets, and some investors likely would not want the relatively undiversified exposure that can result from investing in those markets on a smaller scale or that could be associated with certain alternatives to money market funds, like bank deposits. Although other types of mutual funds can and do invest in the short-term financing markets, investors may prefer money market funds because the risk the funds may undertake is limited under rule 2a-7 (and because of the funds’ corresponding ability to maintain a stable share price).

Therefore, although rule 2a-7 permits money market funds to use techniques to value and price their shares not permitted to other mutual funds (or not permitted to the same extent), the rule also imposes additional protective conditions on money market funds. These additional conditions are designed to make money market funds’ use of the pricing techniques permitted by rule 2a-7 consistent with the protection of investors, and more generally, to make available an

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24 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Harvard Business School Professors Samuel Hanson, David Scharfstein, & Adi Sunderam (Jan. 8, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter”) (explaining that prime money market funds, by providing a way for investors to invest in the short-term financing markets indirectly, “provides MMF investors with a diversified pool of deposit-like instruments with the convenience of a single deposit-like account,” and that, “[g]iven the fixed costs of managing a portfolio of such instruments, MMFs provide scale efficiencies for small-balance savers (e.g., households and small and mid-sized nonfinancial corporations) along with a valuable set of transactional services (e.g., check-writing and other cash-management functions).”).

25 Id. See also, e.g., Comment Letter of Investment Company Institute (Jan. 24, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter”) (explaining that although bank deposits are an alternative to money market funds, “corporate cash managers and other institutional investors do not view an undiversified holding in an uninsured (or underinsured) bank account as having the same risk profile as an investment in a diversified short-term money market fund subject to the risk-limiting conditions of Rule 2a-7”).

26 See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (“The regulatory regime established by Rule 2a-7 has proven to be effective in protecting investors’ interests and maintaining their confidence in money market funds.”).
investment option for investors that seek an efficient way to obtain short-term yields. These conditions thus reflect the differences in the way money market funds operate and the ways in which investors use money market funds compared to other types of mutual funds.

We recognize, and considered when developing the reform proposals we are putting forward today, that money market funds are a popular investment product and that they provide many benefits to investors and to the short-term financing markets. Indeed, it is for these reasons that we are proposing reforms designed to make the funds more resilient, as discussed throughout this Release, while preserving, to the extent possible, the benefits of money market funds. These reform proposals may, however, make money market funds less attractive to certain investors as discussed more fully below.

B. Economics of Money Market Funds

The combination of several features of money market funds can create an incentive for their shareholders to redeem shares heavily in periods of financial stress, as discussed in greater detail in the RSFI Study. We discuss these factors below, as well as the harm that can result from heavy redemptions in money market funds.

1. Incentives Created by Money Market Funds’ Valuation and Pricing Methods

Money market funds are unique among mutual funds in that rule 2a-7 permits them to use the amortized cost method of valuation and the penny-rounding method of pricing. As discussed above, these valuation and pricing techniques allow a money market fund to sell and redeem shares at a stable share price without regard to small variations in the value of the securities that comprise its portfolio, and thus to maintain a stable $1.00 share price under most conditions.

Although the stable $1.00 share price calculated using these methods provides a close approximation to market value under normal market conditions, differences may exist because
market prices adjust to changes in interest rates, credit risk, and liquidity. We note that the vast majority of money market fund portfolio securities are not valued based on market prices obtained through secondary market trading because the secondary markets for most portfolio securities such as commercial paper, repos, and certificates of deposit are not actively traded. Accordingly, most money market fund portfolio securities are valued largely through “mark-to-model” or “matrix pricing” estimates.\textsuperscript{27} The market value of a money market fund’s portfolio securities also may experience relatively large changes if a portfolio asset defaults or its credit profile deteriorates.\textsuperscript{28} Today differences within the tolerance defined by rule 2a-7 are reflected only in a fund’s shadow price, and not the share price at which the fund satisfies purchase and redemption transactions.

Deviations that arise from changes in interest rates and credit risk are temporary as long as securities are held to maturity, because amortized cost values and market-based values converge at maturity. If, however, a portfolio asset defaults or an asset sale results in a realized capital gain or loss, deviations between the stable $1.00 share price and the shadow price become permanent. For example, if a portfolio experiences a 25 basis point loss because an issuer defaults, the fund’s shadow price falls from $1.0000 to $0.9975. Even though the fund has not

\textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 24 (“secondary markets for commercial paper and other private money market assets such as CDs are highly illiquid. Therefore, the asset prices used to calculate the floating NAV would largely be accounting or model-based estimates, rather than prices based on secondary market transactions with sizable volumes.”); Institutional Money Market Funds Association, The Use of Amortised Cost Accounting by Money Market Funds, available at http://www.immfa.org/assets/files/IMMFA%20The%20use%20of%20amortised%20cost%20accounting%20by%20MMF.pdf (noting that “investors typically hold money market instruments to maturity, and so there are relatively few prices from the secondary market or broker quotes,” that as a result most money market funds value their assets using yield curve pricing, discounted cash flow pricing, and amortized cost valuation, and surveying several money market funds and finding that only U.S. Treasury bills are considered “level one” assets under the relevant accounting standards for which traded or quoted prices are generally available).

\textsuperscript{28} The credit quality standards in rule 2a-7 are designed to minimize the likelihood of such a default or credit deterioration.
broken the buck, this reduction is permanent and can only be rebuilt internally in the event that
the fund realizes a capital gain elsewhere in the portfolio, which generally is unlikely given the
types of securities in which money market funds typically invest.\footnote{It is important to understand that, in practice, a money market fund cannot use future portfolio earnings to rebuild its shadow price because Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code effectively forces money market funds to distribute virtually all of their earnings to investors. These restrictions can cause permanent reductions in shadow prices to persist over time, even if a fund’s other portfolio securities are otherwise unimpaired.}

If a fund’s shadow price deviates far enough from its stable $1.00 share price, investors
may have an economic incentive to redeem money market fund shares.\footnote{The value of this economic incentive is determined in part by the volatility of the fund’s underlying assets, which is, in turn, affected by the volatility of interest rates, the likelihood of default, and the maturities of the underlying assets. Since the risk limiting conditions imposed by rule 2a-7 require funds to hold high quality assets with short maturities, the volatility of the underlying assets is very low (which implies that the corresponding value of this economic incentive is low), except when the fund is under stress.} For example, investors
may have an incentive to redeem shares when a fund’s shadow price is less than $1.00.\footnote{We recognize that, absent the fund breaking the buck, arbitraging fluctuations in a money market fund’s shadow price would require some effort and may not be compelling in many cases given the small dollar value that could be captured. \textit{See, e.g.}, Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28807 (June 30, 2009) [74 FR 32688 (July 8, 2009)] (“2009 Proposing Release”), at nn.304-305 and accompanying text (discussing how to arbitrage around price changes from rising interest rates, investors would need to sell money market fund shares for $1.00 and reinvest the proceeds in equivalent short-term debt securities at then-current interest rates).} If investors redeem shares when the shadow price is less than $1.00, the fund’s shadow price will
decline even further because portfolio losses are spread across a smaller asset base. If enough
shares are redeemed, a fund can “break the buck” due, in part, to heavy investor redemptions and
the concentration of losses across a shrinking asset base. In times of stress, this reason alone
provides an incentive for investors to redeem shares ahead of other investors: early redeemers
get $1.00 per share, whereas later redeemers may get less than $1.00 per share even if the fund
experiences no further losses.

To illustrate the incentive for investors to redeem shares early, consider a money market
fund that has one million shares outstanding and holds a portfolio worth exactly $1 million.
Assume the fund’s stable share price and shadow price are both $1.00. If the fund recognizes a $4,000 loss, the fund’s shadow price will fall below $1.00 as follows:

\[
\frac{\$996,000}{1,000,000 \text{ shares}} = \$0.996/\text{share}
\]

If investors redeem one quarter of the fund’s shares (250,000 shares), the redeeming shareholders are paid $1.00. Because redeeming shareholders are paid more than the shadow price of the fund, the redemptions further concentrate the loss among the remaining shareholders. In this case, the amount of redemptions is sufficient to cause the fund to “break the buck.”

\[
\frac{\$996,000 - \$250,000}{1,000,000 \text{ shares} - 250,000 \text{ shares}} = \frac{\$746,000}{750,000 \text{ shares}} = \$0.9947/\text{share}
\]

This example shows that if a fund’s shadow price falls below $1.00 and the fund experiences redemptions, the remaining investors have an incentive to redeem shares to potentially avoid holding shares worth even less, particularly if the fund re-prices its shares below $1.00. This incentive exists even if investors do not expect the fund to incur further portfolio losses.

As discussed in greater detail in the RSFI Study and as we saw during the 2007-2008 financial crisis as further discussed below, money market funds, although generally able to maintain stable share prices, remain subject to credit, interest rate, and liquidity risks, all of which can cause a fund’s shadow price to decline below $1.00 and create an incentive for investors to redeem shares ahead of other investors.\(^{32}\) Although defaults are very low probability events, the resulting losses will be most acute if the default occurs in a position that is greater

\[^{32}\text{See generally RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 4.A.}\]
than 0.5% of the fund’s assets, as was the case in the Reserve Primary Fund’s investment in Lehman Brothers commercial paper in September 2008.\textsuperscript{33} As discussed further in section III.J of this Release, we note that money market funds hold significant numbers of such larger positions.\textsuperscript{34}

2. \textit{Incentives Created by Money Market Funds’ Liquidity Needs}

The incentive for money market fund investors to redeem shares ahead of other investors also can be heightened by liquidity concerns. Money market funds, by definition and like all other mutual funds, offer investors the ability to redeem shares upon demand.

A money market fund has three sources of internal liquidity to meet redemption requests: cash on hand, cash from investors purchasing shares, and cash from maturing securities. If these internal sources of liquidity are insufficient to satisfy redemption requests on any particular day, money market funds may be forced to sell portfolio securities to raise additional cash.\textsuperscript{35} Since the secondary market for many portfolio securities is not deeply liquid (in part because most money market fund securities are held to maturity), funds may have to sell securities at a discount from their amortized cost value, or even at fire-sale prices,\textsuperscript{36} thereby incurring additional

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} See generally infra section II.C.
\item \textsuperscript{34} FSOC, in formulating possible money market reform recommendations, solicited and received comments from the public (FSOC Comment File, File No. FSOC-2012-0003, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#/docketDetail;D=FSOC-2012-0003), some of which have made similar observations about the concentration and size of money market fund holdings. See, e.g., Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 24 (noting that “prime MMFs mainly invest in money-market instruments issued by large, global banks” and providing information about the size of the holdings of “the 50 largest non-government issuers of money market instruments held by prime MMFs as of May 2012”).
\item \textsuperscript{35} Although the Act permits a money market fund to borrow money from a bank, such loans, assuming the proceeds of which are paid out to meet redemptions, create liabilities that must be reflected in the fund’s shadow price, and thus will contribute to the stresses that may force the fund to “break the buck.” See section 18(f) of the Investment Company Act.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Money market funds normally meet redemptions by disposing of their more liquid assets, rather than selling a pro rata slice of all their holdings, which typically include less liquid securities such as certificates of deposit, commercial paper, or term repurchase agreements (“repo”). See Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 24 (“MMFs forced to liquidate commercial paper and bank certificates
\end{itemize}

\end{footnotesize}
losses that may have been avoided if the funds had sufficient liquidity.37 This, itself, can cause a fund’s portfolio to lose value. In addition, redemptions that deplete a fund’s most liquid assets can have incremental adverse effects because they leave the fund with fewer liquid assets, making it more difficult to avoid selling less liquid assets, potentially at a discount, to meet further redemption requests.

3. Incentives Created by Imperfect Transparency, including Sponsor Support

Lack of investor understanding and complete transparency concerning the risks posed by particular money market funds can exacerbate the concerns discussed above. If investors do not know a fund’s shadow price and/or its underlying portfolio holdings (or if previous disclosures of this information are no longer accurate), investors may not be able to fully understand the degree of risk in the underlying portfolio.38 In such an environment, a default of a large-scale

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37 The RSFI Study examined whether money market funds are more resilient to redemptions following the 2010 reforms and notes that, “As expected, the results show that funds with a 30 percent [weekly liquid asset requirement] are more resilient to both portfolio losses and investor redemptions” than those funds without a 30 percent weekly liquid asset requirement. RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 37.

38 See, e.g., RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 31 (stating that although disclosures on Form N-MFP have improved fund transparency, “it must be remembered that funds file the form on a monthly basis with no interim updates,” and that “[t]he Commission also makes the information public with a 60-day lag, which may cause it to be stale”); Comment Letter of the Presidents of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks (Feb. 12, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter”) (stating that “[e]ven more frequent and timely disclosure may be warranted to increase the transparency of MMMFs’ and noting that “[d]uring times of stress, [...] uncertainty regarding portfolio composition could heighten investors’ incentives to redeem in between reporting periods [of money market funds’ portfolio information], as they will not be able to determine if their fund is exposed to certain stressed assets”); see also infra section III.H where we request comment on whether we should require
commercial paper issuer, such as a bank holding company, could accelerate redemption activity across many funds because investors may not know which funds (if any) hold defaulted securities and initiate redemptions to avoid potential rather than actual losses in a “flight to transparency.”

Since many money market funds hold securities from the same issuer, investors may respond to a lack of transparency about specific fund holdings by redeeming assets from funds that are believed to be holding highly correlated positions.

Money market funds’ sponsors on a number of occasions have voluntarily chosen to provide financial support for their money market funds for various reasons, including to keep a fund from re-pricing below its stable value, but also, for example, to protect the sponsors’ reputations or brands. Considering that instances of sponsor support are not required to be disclosed outside of financial statements, and thus were not particularly transparent to investors, voluntary sponsor support has played a role in helping some money market funds maintain a stable value and, in turn, may have lessened investors’ perception of the risk in money market funds. Even those investors who were aware of sponsor support could not be assured it would

money market funds to file Form N-MFP more frequently.

See Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 453 (2012) (“A small piece of news that brings to investors’ minds the previously unattended risks catches them by surprise and causes them to drastically revise their valuations of new securities and to sell them....When investors realize that the new securities are false substitutes for the traditional ones, they fly to safety, dumping these securities on the market and buying the truly safe ones.”).

See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Based on Form N-MFP data as of February 28, 2013, there were 27 different issuers whose securities were held by more than 100 prime money market funds.

Rule 17a-9 currently allows for discretionary support of money market funds by their sponsors and other affiliates.

See, e.g., Comment Letter of Occupy the SEC (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Occupy the SEC FSOC Comment Letter”) (“The current strategies for maintaining a stable NAV—rounding and discretionary fund sponsor support—both serve to conceal important market signals of mounting problems within the fund’s portfolio.”). See also Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 38 (warning that “[g]iven the perception of stability that discretionary support creates, this practice may attract investors that are not willing to accept the underlying risks in MMFs and who therefore are more prone to run in times of potential stress.”)
be available in the future.\textsuperscript{43} Instances of discretionary sponsor support were relatively common during the financial crisis. For example, during the period from September 16, 2008 to October 1, 2008, a number of money market fund sponsors purchased large amounts of portfolio securities from their money market funds or provided capital support to the funds (or received staff no-action assurances in order to provide support).\textsuperscript{44} Commission staff provided no-action assurances to 100 money market funds in 18 different fund groups so that the fund groups could enter into such arrangements.\textsuperscript{45} Although a number of advisers to money market funds obtained staff no-action assurances in order to provide sponsor support, several did not subsequently

\textsuperscript{43} See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, \textit{Roundtable on Money Market Funds and Systemic Risk}, unofficial transcript (May 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/mmf-risk/mmf-risk-transcript-051011.htm ("Roundtable Transcript") (Bill Stouten, Thrivent Financial) ("I think the primary factor that makes money funds vulnerable to runs is the marketing of the stable NAV. And I think the record of money market funds and maintaining the stable NAV has largely been the result of periodic voluntary sponsor support. I think sophisticated investors that understand this and doubt the willingness or ability of the sponsor to make that support know that they need to pull their money out before a declining asset is sold."); (Lance Pan, Capital Advisors Group) ("over the last 30 or 40 years, [investors] have relied on the perception that even though there is risk in money market funds, that risk is owned somehow implicitly by the fund sponsors. So once they perceive that they are not able to get that additional assurance, I believe that was one probable cause of the run"); see also Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 38 (stating that “[i]lthough [sponsor support] creates a perception of stability, it may not truly provide stability in times of stress. Indeed, events of 2008 showed that sponsor support cannot always be relied upon."); infra section III.F.1.


\textsuperscript{45} Our staff estimated that during the period from August 2007 to December 31, 2008, almost 20% of all money market funds received some support (or staff no-action assurances concerning support) from their money managers or their affiliates. We note that not all of such support required no-action assurances from Commission staff (for example, fund affiliates were able to purchase defaulted Lehman Brothers securities from fund portfolios under rule 17a-9 under the Investment Company Act without the need for any no-action assurances). See, e.g., http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/im-noaction.shtml#money.
provide the support because it was no longer necessary.\textsuperscript{46}

The 2007-2008 financial crisis is not the only instance in which some money market funds have come under strain, although it is unique in the amount of money market funds that requested or received sponsor support.\textsuperscript{47} Interest rate changes, issuer defaults, and credit rating downgrades can lead to significant valuation losses for individual funds. Table 1 documents that since 1989, in addition to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 11 events were deemed to have been sufficiently negative that some fund sponsors chose to provide support or to seek staff no-action assurances in order to provide support.\textsuperscript{48} The table indicates that these events potentially affected 158 different money market funds. This finding is consistent with estimates provided by Moody’s that at least 145 U.S. money market funds received sponsor support to maintain either price stability or share liquidity before 2007.\textsuperscript{49} Note that although these events affected money market funds and their sponsors, there is no evidence that these events caused systemic problems, most likely because the events were isolated either to a single entity or class of security. Table 1 is consistent with the interpretation that outside a crisis period, these events did not propagate risk more broadly to the rest of the money market fund industry. However, a caveat that prevents making a strong inference about the impact of sponsor support on investor behavior from Table 1 is that sponsor support generally was not immediately disclosed, and was

\textsuperscript{46} See, e.g., Comment Letter of The Dreyfus Corporation (Aug. 7, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (stating that no-action relief to provide sponsor support “was sought by many money funds as a precautionary measure”).

\textsuperscript{47} See Moody’s Sponsor Support Report, supra note 44.

\textsuperscript{48} The table does not comprehensively describe every instance of sponsor support of a money market fund or request for no-action assurances to provide support, but rather summarizes some of the more notable instances of sponsor support.

\textsuperscript{49} See Moody’s Sponsor Support Report, supra note 44, noting in particular 13 funds requiring support in 1990 due to credit defaults or deterioration at MNC Financial, Mortgage & Realty Trust, and Drexel Burnham; 79 funds requiring support in 1994 due to the Orange County bankruptcy and holdings of certain floating rate securities when interest rates increased; and 25 funds requiring support in 1999 after the credit of certain General American Life Insurance securities deteriorated.
not required to be disclosed by the Commission, and so investors may have been unaware that their money market fund had come under stress.50

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Money Market Funds From 2013 ICI Mutual Fund Fact Book51</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Money Market Funds Supported by Affiliate or for which No-Action Assurances Obtained</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Default of Integrated Resources commercial paper (rated A-2 by Standard &amp; Poor’s until shortly prior to default)52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Default of Mortgage &amp; Realty Trust commercial paper (rated A-2 by Standard &amp; Poor’s until shortly prior to default)53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>MNC Financial Corp. commercial paper downgraded from being a second tier security.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mutual Benefit Life Insurance (&quot;MBLI&quot;) seized by state insurance regulators, causing it to fail to honor put obligations after those holding securities with these features put the obligations on masse to MBLI.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 Note that we are proposing changes to our rules and forms to require more comprehensive and timely disclosure of such sponsor support. See infra sections III.F.1 and III.G.

51 The estimated total numbers of money market funds are from Table 38 of the Investment Company Institute's 2013 Fact Book, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf. The numbers of money market funds are as of the end of the relevant year, and not necessarily as of the date that any particular money market fund received support (or whose sponsor received no-action assurances in order to provide support).


53 See Laing, supra note 52; Forsyth, supra note 52; Jasen, supra note 52.


55 At the time of its seizure, MBLI debt was rated in the highest short-term rating category by Standard & Poor’s. See 1993 Proposing Release, supra note 54, at n.28 and accompanying text. The money market fund sponsors either repurchased the MBLI-backed instruments from the funds at their amortized cost or obtained a replacement guarantor in order to prevent shareholder losses. Id.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Money Market Funds From 2013 ICI Mutual Fund Fact Book</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Money Market Funds Supported by Affiliate or for which No-Action Assurances Obtained</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1994 | 963                                                          | 40                                                                              | Rising interest rates damaged the value of certain adjustable rate securities held by money market funds.  
56   |
| 1994 | 963                                                          | 43                                                                              | Orange County, California bankruptcy.  
57   |
| 1997 | 1,103                                                        | 3                                                                               | Mercury Finance Corp. defaults on its commercial paper. |
| 1999 | 1,045                                                        | 25                                                                              | Credit rating downgrade of General American Life Insurance Co. triggered a wave of demands for repayment on its funding contracts, leading to liquidity problems and causing it to be placed under administrative supervision by state insurance regulators.  
58   |
| 2001 | 1,015                                                        | 6                                                                               | Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Southern California Edison Co. commercial paper went from being first tier securities to defaulting in a 2-week period.  
59   |
| 2007 | 805                                                          | 51                                                                              | Investments in SIVs. |
| 2008 | 783                                                          | 109                                                                             | Investments in Lehman Brothers, America International Group, Inc. ("AIG") and other financial sector debt securities. |
| 2010 | 652                                                          | 3                                                                               | British Petroleum Gulf oil spill affects price of BP debt securities held by some money market funds. |
| 2011 | 632                                                          | 3                                                                               | Investments in Eksportfinans, which was downgraded from being a first tier security to junk-bond status. |

It also is important to note that, as discussed above, fund sponsors may provide financial support for a number of different reasons. Sponsors may support funds to protect their reputations and their brands or the credit rating of the fund.  
60   Support also may be used to keep a

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59 See Aaron Lucchetti & Theo Francis, Parents Take on Funds' Risks Tied to Utilities, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2001), at C1; Lewis Braham, Commentary: Money Market Funds Enter the Danger Zone, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 8, 2001).

60 See, e.g., Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, How Safe are Money Market Funds?, 128 Q. J. ECON. (forthcoming Aug. 2013) ("Kacperczyk & Schnabl") ("...fund sponsors with more non-money market fund business expect to incur large costs if their money market funds fail. Such costs are typically reputational..."
fund from breaking a buck or to increase a fund’s shadow price if its sponsor believes investors avoid funds that may have low shadow prices. We note that the fact that no-action assurances were obtained or sponsor support was provided does not necessarily mean that a money market fund would have broken the buck without such support or assurances.

Finally, the government assistance provided to money market funds during 2007-2008 financial crisis, discussed in more detail below, may have contributed to investors’ perceptions that the risk of loss in money market funds is low.\(^{61}\) If investors perceive money market funds as having an implicit government guarantee in times of crisis, any potential instability of a money market fund’s NAV could be mis-estimated. Investors will form expectations about the likelihood of a potential intervention to support money market funds, either by the U.S.

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\(^{61}\) See, e.g. Marcin Kasperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, Money Market Funds: How to Avoid Breaking the Buck, in REGULATING WALL ST: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Víral V. Acharya, et al., eds., 2011), at 313 (“Given that money market funds provide both payment services to investors and refinancing to financial intermediaries, there is a strong case for the government to support money market funds during a financial crisis by guaranteeing the value of money market fund investments. As a result of such support, money market funds have an ex ante incentive to take on excessive risk, similarly to other financial institutions with explicit or implicit government guarantees....after the [government] guarantees were provided in September 2008 [to money market funds], most investors will expect similar guarantees during future financial crises....”). But see Comment Letter of Fidelity (Apr. 26, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Fidelity April 2012 PWG Comment Letter”) (citing a survey of Fidelity’s retail customers in which 75% of responding customers did not believe that money market funds are guaranteed by the government and 25% either believed that they were guaranteed or were not sure whether they were guaranteed). We note that investor belief that money market funds are not guaranteed by the government does not necessarily mean that investors do not believe that the government will support money market funds if there is another run on money market funds.
government or fund sponsors. To the extent these forecasts are based on inaccurate information, investor estimates of potential losses will be biased.

4. Incentives Created by Money Market Funds Investors' Desire to Avoid Loss

In addition to the incentives described above, other characteristics of money market funds create incentives to redeem in times of stress. Investors in money market funds have varying investment goals and tolerances for risk. Many investors use money market funds for principal preservation and as a cash management tool, and, consequently, these funds can attract investors who are unable or unwilling to tolerate even small losses. These investors may seek to minimize possible losses, even at the cost of forgoing higher returns.\(^{62}\) Such investors may be very loss averse for many reasons, including general risk tolerance, legal or investment restrictions, or short-term cash needs.\(^{63}\) These overarching considerations may create incentives for money market investors to redeem and would be expected to persist, even if valuation and pricing incentives were addressed.

The desire to avoid loss may cause investors to redeem from money market funds in times of stress in a “flight to quality.” For example, as discussed in the RSFI Study, one explanation for the heavy redemptions from prime money market funds and purchases in government money market fund shares during the financial crisis may be a flight to quality, given that most of the assets held by government money market funds have a lower default risk.

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\(^{62}\) See, e.g., Comment Letter of Investment Company Institute (Apr. 19, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (“ICI Apr 2012 PWG Comment Letter”) (enclosing a survey commissioned by the Investment Company Institute and conducted by Treasury Strategies, Inc. finding, among other things, that 94% of respondents rated safety of principal as an “extremely important” factor in their money market fund investment decision and 64% ranked safety of principal as the “primary driver” of their money market fund investment).

\(^{63}\) See, e.g., Comment Letter of County Commissioners Assoc. of Ohio (Dec. 21, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“County governments in Ohio operate under legal constraints or other policies that limit them from investing in instruments without a stable value.”).
than the assets of prime money market funds.\footnote{One study documented that investors redirected assets from prime money market funds into government money market funds during September 2008. See Russ Wermers et al., \textit{Runs on Money Market Funds} (Jan. 2, 2013), available at http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/cfp/pdfs_docs/papers/WermersMoneyFundRuns.pdf ("Wermers Study"). Another study found that redemption activity in money market funds during the financial crisis was higher for riskier money market funds. See Cross Section, supra note 60.}

5. \textit{Effects on Other Money Market Funds, Investors, and the Short-Term Financing Markets}

The analysis above generally describes how potential losses may create shareholder incentives to redeem at a specific money market fund. We now discuss how stress at one money market fund can be positively correlated across funds in at least two ways. Some market observers have noted that if a money market fund suffers a loss on one of its portfolio securities—whether because of a deterioration in credit quality, for example, or because the fund sold the security at a discount to its amortized-cost value—other money market funds holding the same security may have to reflect the resultant discounts in their shadow prices.\footnote{See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, \textit{Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes}, 126 Q. J. ECON. 557 (May 2011); \textit{Fire Sales}, supra note 36; Markus Brunnermeier et al., \textit{The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation}, in \textit{GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY} 11 (2009).} Any resulting decline in the shadow prices of other funds could, in turn, lead to a contagion effect that could spread even further.\footnote{For example, \textit{supra} Table 1, which identifies certain instances in which money market fund sponsors supported their funds or sought staff no-action assurances to do so, tends to show that correlated holdings across funds resulted in multiple funds experiencing losses that appeared to motivate sponsors to provide support or seek staff no-action assurances in order to provide support.} For example, a number of commenters have observed that many money market fund holdings tend to be highly correlated, making it more likely that multiple money market funds will experience contemporaneous decreases in share prices.\footnote{See, e.g., Comment Letter of Better Markets, Inc. (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Better Markets FSOC Comment Letter") (agreeing with FSOC’s analysis and stating that “MMFs tend to have similar exposures due to limits on the nature of permitted investments. As a result, losses creating instability and a crisis of confidence in one MMF are likely to affect other MMFs at the same time."); Comment Letter of Robert Comment (Dec. 31, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Robert Comment FSOC Comment Letter") (discussing correlation in money market funds’ portfolios and stating, among other things, that “now that bank-issued money market instruments have come to comprise half the
As discussed above, in times of stress if investors do not wish to be exposed to a distressed issuer (or correlated issuers) but do not know which money market funds own these distressed securities at any given time, investors may redeem from any money market funds that could own the security (e.g., redeeming from all prime funds). A fund that did not own the security and was not otherwise under stress could nonetheless experience heavy redemptions which, as discussed above, could themselves ultimately cause the fund to experience losses if it does not have adequate liquidity.

As was experienced during the financial crisis, the potential for liquidity-induced contagion may have negative effects on investors and the markets for short-term financing of corporations, banks, and governments. This is in large part because of the significance of money market funds' role in such short-term financing markets. Indeed, money market funds had experienced steady growth before the financial crisis, driven in part by growth in the size of institutional cash pools, which grew from under $100 billion in 1990 to almost $4 trillion just before the 2008 financial crisis. Money market funds' suitability for cash management

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68 See, e.g., Wermers Study, supra note 64 (based on an empirical analysis of data from the 2008 run on money market funds, finding that, during 2008, “[f]unds that cater to institutional investors, which are the most sophisticated and informed investors, were hardest hit,” and that “investor flows from money market funds seem to have been driven both by strategic externalities...and information.”).

69 See infra Panels A, B, and C in section III.E for statistics on the types and percentages of outstanding short-term debt obligations held by money market funds.


71 See Pozsar, supra note 70, at 5-6. These institutional cash pools can come from corporations, bank trust departments, securities lending operations of brokerage firms, state and local governments, hedge funds,
operations also has made them popular among corporate treasurers, municipalities, and other institutional investors, some of whom rely on money market funds for their cash management operations because the funds provide diversified cash management more efficiently due both to the scale of their operations and their expertise. 72 For example, according to one survey, approximately 19% of organizations’ short-term investments were allocated to money market funds (and, according to this observer, this figure is down from almost 40% in 2008 due in part to the reallocation of cash investments to bank deposits following temporary unlimited Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation deposit insurance for non-interest bearing bank transaction accounts, which recently expired). 73

and other private funds. The rise in institutional cash pools increased demand for investments that were considered to have a relatively low risk of loss, including, in addition to money market funds, Treasury bonds, insured deposit accounts, repurchase agreements, and asset-backed commercial paper. See Ben S. Bernanke, Carol Bertaut, Laurie Pounder DeMarco & Steven Kamin, International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1014 (Feb. 2011); Pozsar, supra note 70; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 70; Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo A. Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market, J. Fin. (forthcoming 2013) (“Covitz”). The incentive among these cash pools to search for alternate “safe” investments was only heightened by factors such as limits on deposit insurance coverage and historical bans on banks paying interest on institutional demand deposit accounts, which limited the utility of deposit accounts for large pools of cash. See Pozsar, supra note 70; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Fall 2010), at 262-263 (“Gorton Shadow Banking”).

72 See, e.g., Roundtable Transcript, supra note 43 (Travis Barker, Institutional Money Market Funds Association) (“[money market funds are] there to provide institutional investors with greater diversification than they could otherwise achieve’); (Lance Pan, Capital Advisors Group) (noting diversification benefits of money market funds and investors’ need for a substitute to bank products to mitigate counterparty risk); (Kathryn L. Hewitt, Government Finance Officers Association) (“Most of us don’t have the time, the energy, or the resources at our fingertips to analyze the credit quality of every security ourselves. So we’re in essence, by going into a pooled fund, hiring that expertise for us...it gives us diversification, it gives us immediate cash management needs where we can move money into and out of it, and it satisfies much of our operating cash investment opportunities.”); (Brian Reid, Investment Company Institute) (“there’s a very clear stated demand out there on the part of investors for a non-bank product that creates a pooled investment in short-term assets...banks can’t satisfy this because an undiversified exposure to a single bank is considered to be far riskier....”); (Carol A. DeNale, CVS Caremark) (“I think that it would be very small investment [in] deposits in banks. I don’t think there’s—you know, the ratings of some of the banks would make me nervous, also; [sic] they’re not guaranteed. I’m not going to put a $20 million investment in some banks.”).

73 See 2012 Association for Financial Professionals Liquidity Survey, at 15, available at http://www.afponline.org/liquidity (subscription required) (“2012 AFP Liquidity Survey”). The size of this allocation to money market funds is down substantially from prior years. For example, prior AFP Liquidity
Money market funds’ size and significance in the short-term markets, together with their features that can create an incentive to redeem as discussed above, have led to concerns that money market funds may contribute to systemic risk. Heavy redemptions from money market funds during periods of financial stress can remove liquidity from the financial system, potentially disrupting the secondary market. Issuers may have difficulty obtaining capital in the short-term markets during these periods because money market funds are focused on meeting redemption requests through internal liquidity generated either from maturing securities or cash from subscriptions, and thus may be purchasing fewer short-term debt obligations. To the extent that multiple money market funds experience heavy redemptions, the negative effects on the short-term markets can be magnified. Money market funds’ experience during the 2007-2008 financial crisis illustrates the impact of heavy redemptions, as we discuss in more detail below.

Heavy redemptions in money market funds may disproportionately affect slow-moving shareholders because, as discussed further below, redemption data from the 2007-2008 financial crisis show that some institutional investors are likely to redeem from distressed money market

Surveys show higher allocations of organizations’ short-term investments to money market funds: almost 40% in the 2008 survey, approximately 25% in the 2009 and 2010 surveys, and almost 30% in the 2011 survey. This shift has largely reflected a re-allocation of cash investments to bank deposits, which rose from representing 25% of organizations’ short-term investment allocations in the 2008 Association for Financial Professionals Liquidity Survey, available at http://www.afponline.org/pub/pdf/2008_Liquidity_Survey.pdf (“2008 AFP Liquidity Survey”), to 51% of organizations’ short-term investment allocations in the 2012 survey. The 2012 survey notes that some of this shift has been driven by the temporary unlimited FDIC deposit insurance coverage for non-interest bearing bank transaction accounts (which expired at the end of 2012) and the above-market rate that these bank accounts are able to offer in the low interest rate environment through earnings credits. See 2012 AFP Liquidity Survey, this note. As of August 14, 2012, approximately 66% of money market fund assets were held in money market funds or share classes intended to be sold to institutional investors according to iMoneyNet data. All of the AFP Liquidity Surveys are available at http://www.afponline.org.

See supra text preceding and accompanying n.35. Although money market funds also can build liquidity internally by retaining (rather than investing) cash from investors purchasing shares, this is not likely to be a material source of liquidity for a distressed money market fund experiencing heavy redemptions.
funds more quickly than other investors and to redeem a greater percentage of their prime fund holdings. Slower-to-redeem shareholders may be harmed because, as discussed above, redemptions at a money market fund can concentrate existing losses in the fund or create new losses if the fund must sell assets at a discount. In both cases, redemptions leave the fund’s portfolio more likely to lose value, to the detriment of slower-to-redeem investors. Retail investors—who tend to be slower moving—also could be harmed if market stress begins at an institutional money market fund and spreads to other funds, including funds composed solely or primarily of retail investors.

C. The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis

There are many possible explanations for the redemptions from money market funds during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Regardless of the cause (or causes), money market funds’ experience in the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrates the harm that can result from such rapid heavy redemptions in money market funds. As explained in the RSFI study, on September 16, 2008, the day after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. announced its bankruptcy,

75 This likely is because some institutional investors generally have more capital at stake, sophisticated tools, and professional staffs to monitor risk. See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at nn.46-48 and 178 and accompanying text.

76 See, e.g., RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 10 (“Investor redemptions during the 2008 financial crisis, particularly after Lehman’s failure, were heaviest in institutional share classes of prime money market funds, which typically hold securities that are illiquid relative to government funds. It is possible that sophisticated investors took advantage of the opportunity to redeem shares to avoid losses, leaving less sophisticated investors (if co-mingled) to bear the losses.”).

77 As discussed further below, retail money market funds experienced a lower level of redemptions in 2008 than institutional money market funds, although the full predictive power of this empirical evidence is tempered by the introduction of the Treasury Department’s temporary guarantee program for money market funds, which may have prevented heavier shareholder redemptions among generally slower moving retail investors. See infra n.91.

78 See generally RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 3.

79 See generally RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 3. See also 2009 Proposing Release supra note 31, at section I.D; infra section I.D.2 (discussing the financial distress in 2011 caused by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and U.S. debt ceiling impasse and money market funds’ experience during that time).
The Reserve Fund announced that as of that afternoon, its Primary Fund—which held a $785 million (or 1.2% of the fund's assets) position in Lehman Brothers commercial paper—would "break the buck" and price its securities at $0.97 per share. At the same time, there was turbulence in the market for financial sector securities as a result of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near failure of American International Group ("AIG"), whose commercial paper was held by many prime money market funds. In addition to Lehman Brothers and AIG, there were other stresses in the market as well, as discussed in greater detail in the RSFI Study.

Redemptions in the Primary Fund were followed by redemptions from other Reserve money market funds. Prime institutional money market funds more generally began experiencing heavy redemptions. During the week of September 15, 2008, investors withdrew approximately $300 billion from prime money market funds or 14% of the assets in those funds. During that time, fearing further redemptions, money market fund managers began to retain cash rather than invest in commercial paper, certificates of deposit, or other short-term instruments. Commenters have stated that money market funds were not the only investors in

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80 See also 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at n.44 and accompanying text. We note that the Reserve Primary Fund's assets have been returned to shareholders in several distributions made over a number of years. We understand that assets returned constitute approximately 99% of the fund's assets as of the close of business on September 15, 2008, including the income earned during the liquidation period. Any final distribution to former Reserve Primary Fund shareholders will not occur until the litigation surrounding the fund is complete. See Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In Re The Reserve Primary Fund Sec. & Derivative Class Action Litig., No. 08-CV-8060-PGG (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010).

81 See generally RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 3.

82 See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at Section I.D.

83 See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 3.

84 See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP, at 62 (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmmwg.pdf ("ICI REPORT") (analyzing data from iMoneyNet). The latter figure describes aggregate redemptions from all prime money market funds. Some money market funds had redemptions well in excess of 14% of their assets. Based on iMoneyNet data (and excluding the Reserve Primary Fund), the maximum weekly redemptions from a money market fund during the 2008 financial crisis was over 64% of the fund's assets.

the short-term financing markets that reduced or halted investment in commercial paper and other riskier short-term debt securities during the 2008 financial crisis.\textsuperscript{86} Short-term financing markets froze, impairing access to credit, and those who were still able to access short-term credit often did so only at overnight maturities.\textsuperscript{87}

Figure 1, below, provides context for the redemptions that occurred during the financial crisis. Specifically, it shows daily total net assets over time, where the vertical line indicates the date that Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, September 15, 2008. Investor redemptions during the 2008 financial crisis, particularly after Lehman’s failure, were heaviest in institutional share classes of prime money market funds, which typically hold securities that are less liquid and of lower credit quality than those typically held by government money market funds. The figure shows that institutional share classes of government money market funds, which include Treasury and government funds, experienced heavy inflows.\textsuperscript{88} The aggregate level of retail investor redemption activity, in contrast, was not particularly high during September and October 2008, as shown in Figure 1.\textsuperscript{89}

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25.

\textsuperscript{87} See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at nn.51-53 & 65-68 and accompanying text (citing to minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, news articles, Federal Reserve Board data on commercial paper spreads over Treasury bills, and books and academic articles on the financial crisis).

\textsuperscript{88} As discussed in section III.A.3, government money market funds historically have faced different redemption pressures in times of stress and have different risk characteristics than other money market funds because of their unique portfolio composition, which typically has lower credit default risk and greater liquidity than non-government portfolio securities typically held by money market funds.

\textsuperscript{89} We understand that iMoneyNet differentiates retail and institutional money market funds based on factors such as minimum initial investment amount and how the fund provider self-categorizes the fund.
On September 19, 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") announced a temporary guarantee program ("Temporary Guarantee Program"), which would use the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund to support more than $3 trillion in shares of money market funds, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System authorized the temporary extension of credit to banks to finance their purchase of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market funds. These programs successfully slowed redemptions in prime money market funds and provided additional liquidity to money market funds. The disruptions to the short-term markets detailed above could have continued for a longer period of time but for these programs.

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90 See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at nn.55-59 and accompanying text for a fuller description of the various forms of governmental assistance provided to money market funds during this time.

91 Treasury used the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund to fund the Temporary Guarantee Program, but legislation has since been enacted prohibiting Treasury from using this fund again for guarantee programs for money market funds. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 131(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5236 (2008). The $50 billion Exchange Stabilization Fund was never drawn upon by money market funds under this program and the Temporary Guarantee Program expired on September 18, 2009. The Federal Reserve Board also established the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility ("AMLF"), through which credit was extended to U.S. banks and bank holding companies to finance...
D. Examination of Money Market Fund Regulation since the Financial Crisis

1. The 2010 Amendments

In March 2010, we adopted a number of amendments to rule 2a-7. These amendments were designed to make money market funds more resilient by reducing the interest rate, credit, and liquidity risks of fund asset portfolios. More specifically, the amendments decreased money market funds’ credit risk exposure by further restricting the amount of lower quality securities that funds can hold. The amendments, for the first time, also require that money market funds maintain liquidity buffers in the form of specified levels of daily and weekly liquid assets. These liquidity buffers provide a source of internal liquidity and are intended to help funds

purchases of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) from money market funds, and it may have mitigated fire sales to meet redemptions requests. See Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, 68 J. Fin. 715 (Apr. 2013) (“Our results suggest that the AMLF provided an important source of liquidity to MMMFs and the ABCP market, as it helped to stabilize MMMF asset flows and to reduce ABCP yields.”). The AMLF expired on February 1, 2010. Given the significant decline in money market investments in ABCP since 2008, reopening the AMLF would provide little benefit to money market funds today. For example, ABCP investments accounted for over 20% of Moody’s-rated U.S. prime money market fund assets at the end of August 2008, but accounted for less than 10% of those assets by the end of August 2011. See Moody’s Investors Service, Money Market Funds: ABCP Investments Decrease, Dec. 7, 2011, at 2. Form N-MFP data shows that as of February 28, 2013, prime money market funds held 6.9% of their assets in ABCP.


93 Specifically, the amendments placed tighter limits on a money market fund’s ability to acquire “second tier” securities by (1) restricting a money market fund from investing more than 3% of its assets in second tier securities (rather than the previous limit of 5%), (2) restricting a money market fund from investing more than 1/2 of 1% of its assets in second tier securities issued by any single issuer (rather than the previous limit of the greater of 1% or $1 million), and (3) restricting a money market fund from buying second tier securities that mature in more than 45 days (rather than the previous limit of 397 days). See rule 2a-7(c)(3)(ii) and (c)(4)(i)(C). Second tier securities are eligible securities that, if rated, have received other than the highest short-term term debt rating from the requisite NRSROs or, if unrated, have been determined by the fund’s board of directors to be of comparable quality. See rule 2a-7(a)(24) (defining “second tier security”); rule 2a-7(a)(12) (defining “eligible security”); rule 2a-7(a)(23) (defining “requisite NRSROs”).

94 The requirements are that, for all taxable money market funds, at least 10% of assets must be in cash, U.S. Treasury securities, or securities that convert into cash (e.g., mature) within one day and, for all money market funds, at least 30% of assets must be in cash, U.S. Treasury securities, certain other Government securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, or securities that convert into cash within one week. See rule 2a-7(c)(5)(ii) and (iii).
withstand high redemptions during times of market illiquidity. Finally, the amendments reduce
money market funds' exposure to interest rate risk by decreasing the maximum weighted average
maturities of fund portfolios from 90 to 60 days.\footnote{The 2010 amendments also introduced a weighted average life requirement of 120 days, which limits the money market fund’s ability to invest in longer-term floating rate securities. See rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii) and (iii).}

In addition to reducing the risk profile of the underlying money market fund portfolios, the reforms increased the amount of information that money market funds are required to report to the Commission and the public. Money market funds are now required to submit to the SEC monthly information on their portfolio holdings using Form N-MFP.\footnote{See rule 30b1-7.} This information allows the Commission, investors, and third parties to monitor compliance with rule 2a-7 and to better understand and monitor the underlying risks of money market fund portfolios. Money market funds are now required to post portfolio information on their websites each month, providing investors with important information to help them make better-informed investment decisions and helping them impose market discipline on fund managers.\footnote{See rule 2a-7(c)(12).}

Finally, money market funds must undergo stress tests under the direction of the board of directors on a periodic basis.\footnote{See rule 2a-7(c)(10)(v).} Under this stress testing requirement, each fund must periodically test its ability to maintain a stable NAV per share based upon certain hypothetical events, including an increase in short-term interest rates, an increase in shareholder redemptions, a downgrade of or default on portfolio securities, and widening or narrowing of spreads between yields on an appropriate benchmark selected by the fund for overnight interest rates and commercial paper and other types of securities held by the fund. This reform was intended to
provide money market fund boards and the Commission a better understanding of the risks to which the fund is exposed and give fund managers a tool to better manage those risks.\footnote{See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.C.3.}

2. \textit{The Eurozone Debt Crisis and U.S. Debt Ceiling Impasse of 2011}

One way to evaluate the efficacy of the 2010 reforms is to examine redemption activity during the summer of 2011. Money market funds experienced substantial redemptions during this time as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and impasse over the U.S. debt ceiling unfolded. As a result of concerns about exposure to European financial institutions, prime money market funds began experiencing substantial redemptions.\footnote{See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 32.} Assets held by prime money market funds declined by approximately $100 billion (or 6\%) during a three-week period beginning June 14, 2011.\footnote{Id.} Some prime money market funds had redemptions of almost 20\% of their assets in each of June, July, and August 2011, and one fund lost 23\% of its assets during that period after articles began to appear in the financial press that warned of \textit{indirect} exposure of money market funds to Greece.\footnote{Id.} Figures 2 and 3 below show the redemptions from prime money market funds during this time, and also show that investors purchased shares of government money market funds in late June and early July in response to these concerns, but then began redeeming government money market fund shares in late July and early August, likely as a result of concerns about the U.S. debt ceiling impasse and possible ratings downgrades of government securities.\footnote{See also id. at 33.}
While it is difficult to isolate the effects of the 2010 amendments, these events highlight the potential increased resilience of money market funds after the reforms were adopted. Most significantly, no money market fund had to re-price below its stable $1.00 share price. As discussed in greater detail in the RSFI Study, unlike September 2008, money market funds did
not experience significant capital losses that summer, and the funds’ shadow prices did not
deviate significantly from the funds’ stable share prices; also unlike in 2008, money market
funds in the summer of 2011 had sufficient liquidity to satisfy investors’ redemption requests,
which were made over a longer period than in 2008, suggesting that the 2010 amendments acted
as intended to enhance the resiliency of money market funds.\textsuperscript{104} The redemptions in the summer
of 2011 also did not take place against the backdrop of a broader financial crisis, and therefore
may have reflected more targeted concerns by investors (concern about exposure to the Eurozone
and U.S. government securities as the debt ceiling impasse unfolded). Money market funds’
experience in 2008, in contrast, may have reflected a broader range of concerns as reflected in
the RSFI Study, which discusses a number of possible explanations for redemptions during the
financial crisis.\textsuperscript{105}

Although money market funds’ experiences differed in 2008 and the summer of 2011, the
heavy redemptions money market funds experienced in the summer of 2011 appear to have
negatively affected the markets for short-term financing. Academics researching these issues
have found, as detailed in the RSFI Study, that “creditworthy issuers may encounter financing
difficulties because of risk taking by the funds from which they raise financing”; “local branches
of foreign banks reduced lending to U.S. entities in 2011”; and that “European banks that were
more reliant on money funds experienced bigger declines in dollar lending.”\textsuperscript{106} Thus, while such

\textsuperscript{104} Id. at 33-34.
\textsuperscript{105} Id. at 7-13.
\textsuperscript{106} See id. at 34-35 ("It is important to note, however, investor redemptions has a direct effect on short-term
funding liquidity in the U.S. commercial paper market. Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) report that
creditworthy issuers may encounter financing difficulties because of risk taking by the funds from which
they raise financing." Similarly, Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2012) finds U.S. branches of foreign banks
reduced lending to U.S. entities in 2011, while Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2012) document European
banks that were more reliant on money funds experienced bigger declines in dollar lending.") (internal
citations omitted); Sergey Chernenko & Adi Sunderam, \textit{Frictions in Shadow Banking: Evidence from the}
redemptions often exemplify rational risk management by money market fund investors, they can also have certain contagion effects on the short-term financing markets.

3.  *Our Continuing Consideration of the Need for Additional Reforms*

When we proposed and adopted the 2010 amendments, we acknowledged that money market funds' experience during the 2007-2008 financial crisis raised questions of whether more fundamental changes to money market funds might be warranted.  

107 We solicited and received input from a number of different sources analyzing whether or not additional reforms may be necessary, and we began to solicit and evaluate potential options for additional regulation of money market funds to address these vulnerabilities. In the 2009 Proposing Release we requested comment on certain options, including whether money market funds should be required to move to the "floating net asset value" used by all other mutual funds or satisfy certain redemptions in-kind.  

108 We received over 100 comments on this aspect of the 2009 Proposing Release.  

109 In adopting the 2010 amendments, we noted that we would continue to explore more significant regulatory changes in light of the comments we received.  

110 At the time, we stated that we had not had the opportunity to fully explore possible alternatives and analyze the potential costs, benefits, and consequences of those alternatives.

Our subsequent consideration of money market funds has been informed by the work of

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108 See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section III.A.


110 See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at section I.
the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which published a report on money market fund reform options in 2010 (the “PWG Report”). We solicited comment on the features of money market funds that make them susceptible to heavy redemptions and potential options for reform both through our request for comment on the PWG Report and by hosting a May 2011 roundtable on Money Market Funds and Systemic Risk (the “2011 Roundtable”).

The potential financial stability risks associated with money market funds also have attracted the attention of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), which has been tasked with monitoring and responding to threats to the U.S. financial system and which superseded the PWG. On November 13, 2012, FSOC proposed to recommend that we implement one or a combination of three reforms designed to address risks to financial companies and markets that money market funds may pose. The first option would require

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113 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) established the FSOC: (A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace; (B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and (C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system. The ten voting members of the FSOC include the Treasury Secretary (who serves as Chairman of the FSOC), the Chairmen of the Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration Board, the Directors of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Comptroller of the Currency, and an independent insurance expert appointed by the President of the United States. See Dodd-Frank Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 §§ 111 - 112 (2010).

114 See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, Financial Stability Oversight Council [77 FR 69455 (Nov. 19, 2012)] (the “FSOC Proposed Recommendations”). Under section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act, if the FSOC determines that the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale,
money market funds to use floating NAVs. The second option would require money market funds to have a NAV buffer with a tailored amount of assets of up to 1% (raised through various means) to absorb day-to-day fluctuations in the value of the funds' portfolio securities and allow the funds to maintain a stable NAV. The NAV buffer would be paired with a requirement that 3% of a shareholder's highest account value in excess of $100,000 during the previous 30 days—a "minimum balance at risk" ("MBR")—be made available for redemption on a delayed basis. These requirements would not apply to certain money market funds that invest primarily in U.S. Treasury obligations and repurchase agreements collateralized with U.S. Treasury securities. The third option would require money market funds to have a risk-based NAV buffer of 3%. This 3% NAV buffer potentially could be combined with other measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the buffer and potentially increasing the resiliency of money market funds, and thereby justifying a reduction in the level of the required NAV buffer. Finally, in addition to proposing to recommend these three reform options, FSOC requested comment on other potential reforms, including standby liquidity fees and temporary restrictions on redemptions ("gates"), which would be implemented during times of market stress to reduce money market concentration, or interconnectedness of a financial activity or practice conducted by bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading among bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies, the financial markets of the United States, or low-income, minority or under-served communities, the FSOC may provide for more stringent regulation of such financial activity or practice by issuing recommendations to primary financial regulators, like the Commission, to apply new or heightened standards or safeguards. FSOC has proposed to issue a recommendation to the Commission under this authority concerning money market funds. If FSOC issues a final recommendation to the Commission, the Commission, under section 120, would be required to impose the recommended standards, or similar standards that FSOC deems acceptable, or explain in writing to FSOC why the Commission has determined not to follow FSOC's recommendation.

115 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at section V.A.
116 See id. at section V.B.
117 See id. at section V.C.
funds' vulnerability to runs.\footnote{See id. at section V.D.}

In its proposed recommendation FSOC stated that the Commission, "by virtue of its institutional expertise and statutory authority, is best positioned to implement reforms to address the risk that [money market funds] present to the economy," and that if the Commission "moves forward with meaningful structural reforms of [money market funds] before [FSOC] completes its Section 120 process, [FSOC] expects that it would not issue a final Section 120 recommendation."\footnote{See id. at section III.B.} We strongly agree that the Commission is best positioned to consider and implement any further reforms to money market funds, and we have considered FSOC's analysis of its proposed recommended reform options and the public comments that FSOC has received in formulating the money market reforms we are proposing today.

The RSFI Study, discussed throughout this Release, also has informed our consideration of the risks that may be posed by money market funds and our formulation of today's proposals. The RSFI Study contains, among other things, a detailed analysis of our 2010 amendments to rule 2a-7 and some of the amendments' effects to date, including changes in some of the characteristics of money market funds, the likelihood that a fund with the maximum permitted weighted average maturity ("WAM") would "break the buck" before and after the 2010 reforms, money market funds' experience during the 2011 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the U.S. debt-ceiling impasse, and how money market funds would have performed during September 2008 had the 2010 reforms been in place at that time.\footnote{See generally RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 4.}

In particular, the RSFI Study found that under certain assumptions the expected probability of a money market fund breaking the buck was lower with the additional liquidity
required by the 2010 reforms. The fact that no fund experienced a credit event during that time also contributed to the evidence that funds’ were able to withstand relatively heavy redemptions while maintaining a stable $1.00 share price. Finally, using actual portfolio holdings from September 2008, the RSFI Study analyzed how funds would have performed during the financial crisis had the 2010 reforms been in place at that time. While funds holding 30% weekly liquid assets are more resilient to portfolio losses, funds will “break the buck” with near certainty if capital losses of the fund’s non-weekly liquid assets exceed 1%. The RSFI Study concludes that the 2010 reforms would have been unlikely to prevent a fund from breaking the buck when faced with large credit losses like the ones experienced in 2008. The inferences that can be drawn from the RSFI Study lead us to conclude that while the 2010 reforms were an important step in making money market funds better able to withstand heavy redemptions when there are no portfolio losses (as was the case in the summer of 2011), they are not sufficient to address the incentive to redeem when credit losses are expected to cause fund’s portfolios to lose value or when the short-term financing markets more generally are expected to, or do, come under stress. Accordingly, we preliminarily believe that the alternative reforms proposed in this Release could lessen money market funds’ susceptibility to heavy redemptions, improve their ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from high levels of redemptions, and increase the transparency of their risks, while preserving, as much as

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121 *Id.* at 30.

122 *Id.* at 34.

123 *Id.* at 38, Table 5. In fact, even at capital losses of only 0.75% of the fund’s non-weekly liquid assets and no investor redemptions, funds are already more likely than not (64.6%) to “break the buck.” *Id.*

124 To further illustrate the point, the RSFI Study noted that the Reserve Primary Fund “would have broken the buck even in the presence of the 2010 liquidity requirements.” *Id.* at 37.
possible, the benefits of money market funds.

III. DISCUSSION

We are proposing alternative amendments to rule 2a-7, and related rules and forms, that would either (i) require money market funds (other than government and retail money market funds)\textsuperscript{125} to “float” their NAV per share or (ii) require that a money market fund (other than a government fund) whose weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets be required to impose a liquidity fee of 2% on all redemptions (unless the fund’s board determines that the liquidity fee is not in the best interest of the fund). Under the second alternative, once the money market fund crosses this threshold, the fund’s board also would have the ability to temporarily suspend redemptions (or “gate”) the fund for a limited period of time if the board determines that doing so is in the fund’s best interest.\textsuperscript{126} We discuss each of these alternative proposals in this section, along with potential tax, accounting, operational, and economic implications. We also discuss a potential combination of our floating NAV proposal and liquidity fees and gates proposal, as well as the potential benefits, drawbacks, and operational issues associated with such a potential combination. We also discuss various alternative approaches that we have considered for money market fund reform.

In addition, we are proposing a number of other amendments that would apply under

\textsuperscript{125} Our proposed exemptions for government and retail money market funds (including our proposed definition for a retail money market fund) are discussed in sections III.A.3 and III.A.4, respectively. The exemptive amendments we are proposing are within the Commission’s broad authority under section 6(c) of the Act. Section 6(c) authorizes the Commission to exempt by rule, conditionally or unconditionally, any person, security, or transaction (or classes of persons, securities, or transactions) from any provision of the Act “if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions” of the Act. 15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c). For the reasons discussed throughout this Release, the Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments to rules 2a-7, 12d3-1, 18f-3, and 22e-3 meet these standards.

\textsuperscript{126} In the text of the proposed rules and forms below we refer to our floating NAV alternative as “Alternative 1,” and our liquidity fees and gates alternative as “Alternative 2.”
either alternative proposal to enhance the disclosure of money market fund operations and risks. Certain of our proposed disclosure requirements would vary depending on the alternative proposal adopted (if any) as they specifically relate to the floating NAV proposal or the liquidity fees and gates proposal. In addition, we are proposing additional disclosure reforms to improve the transparency of risks present in money market funds, including daily website disclosure of funds’ daily and weekly liquid assets and market-based NAV per share and historic instances of sponsor support. We also are proposing to establish a new current event disclosure form that would require funds to make prompt public disclosure of certain events, including portfolio security defaults, sponsor support, a fall in the funds’ weekly liquid assets below 15% of total assets, and a fall in the market-based price of the fund below $0.9975.

We are proposing to amend Form N-MFP to provide additional information relevant to assessing the risk of funds and make this information public immediately upon filing. In addition, we are proposing to require that a large liquidity fund adviser that manages a private liquidity fund provide security-level reporting on Form PF that are substantially the same as those currently required to be reported by money market funds on Form N-MFP.\footnote{See infra section III.I.}

Our proposed amendments also would tighten the diversification requirements of rule 2a-7 by requiring consolidation of certain affiliates for purposes of the 5% issuer diversification requirement, requiring funds to presumptively treat the sponsors of asset-backed securities ("ABSs") as guarantors subject to rule 2a-7’s diversification requirements, and removing the so-called “twenty-five percent basket."\footnote{The “twenty-five percent basket” currently allows money market funds to only comply with the 10% guarantee concentration limit with respect to 75% of the fund’s total assets. See infra section III.I.} Finally, we are proposing to amend the stress testing provision of rule 2a-7 to enhance how funds stress test their portfolios and require that money
market funds stress test against the fund’s level of weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of total assets.

We note finally that we are not rescinding our outstanding 2011 proposal to remove references to credit ratings from two rules and four forms under the Investment Company Act, including rule 2a-7 and Form N-MFP, under section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, and on which we welcome additional comments. The Commission intends to address this matter at another time and, therefore, this Release is based on rule 2a-7 and Form N-MFP as amended and adopted in 2010.

A. Floating Net Asset Value

Our first alternative proposal—a floating NAV—is designed primarily to address the incentive of money market fund shareholders to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress based on the fund’s valuation and pricing methods, as discussed in section II.B.1 above. It should also improve the transparency of pricing associated with money market funds. Under this alternative, money market funds (other than government and retail money market funds) would

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129 See References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and Forms, Investment Company Act Release No. 29592 (Mar. 3, 2011) [76 FR 12896 (Mar. 9, 2011)] (proposing to also eliminate references to credit ratings from rule 5b-3 and Forms N-1A, N-2, and N-3, and establish new rule 6a-5 to replace a reference to credit ratings in section 6(a)(5) that the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated).

130 See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92. We note that after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, our staff issued a no-action letter assuring money market funds and their managers that, in light of section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, the staff would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission under section 2(a)(41) of the Act and rules 2a-4 and 22c-1 thereunder if a money market fund board did not designate NRSROs and did not make related disclosures in its SAI before the Commission had completed its review of rule 2a-7 required by the Dodd-Frank Act and made any modifications to the rule. See SEC Staff No-Action Letter to the Investment Company Institute (Aug. 19, 2010). This staff guidance remains in effect until such time as the Commission or its staff indicate otherwise.

131 The definitions of government and retail money market funds, as considered exempt under our proposals from certain proposed reforms, are discussed in sections III.A.3 and III.A.4. These funds would also price their portfolio securities using market-based factors, but would continue to be able to maintain a stable price per share through the use of the penny rounding method of pricing.
be required to "float" their net asset value. This proposal would amend rule 2a-7 to rescind certain exemptions that have permitted money market funds to maintain a stable price by use of amortized cost valuation and penny-rounding pricing of their portfolios. As a result, the money market funds subject to this reform would sell and redeem shares at prices that reflect the value using market-based factors of their portfolio securities and would not penny round their prices. In other words, the daily share prices of these money market funds would "float," which means that each fund's NAV would fluctuate along with changes, if any, in the value using market-based factors of the fund's underlying portfolio of securities. Money market funds would only be able to use amortized cost valuation to the extent other mutual funds are able to do so—where the fund's board of directors determines, in good faith, that the fair value of debt securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less is their amortized cost, unless the particular circumstances warrant otherwise.

132 References to rule 2a-7 as amended under our floating NAV proposal will be "proposed (FNAV) rule"; similarly, references to rule 2a-7 as amended under our liquidity fees and gates proposal discussed in section III.B will be "proposed (Fees & Gates) rule."

133 We also propose to amend rule 18f-3(c)(2)(i) to replace the phrase "that determines net asset value using the amortized cost method permitted by § 270.2a-7" with "that operates in compliance with § 270.2a-7" because money market funds would not use the amortized cost method to a greater extent than mutual funds generally under either of our core reform proposals.

134 We have not previously proposed, but have sought comment on requiring money market funds to use a floating NAV. See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.A. The floating NAV alternative on which we seek comment today is informed by the comments we received in response to the 2009 comment request, as well as relevant comments submitted in response to: (i) the PWG Report and (ii) the FSOC Proposed Recommendations.

135 See infra note 27 for a discussion of how money market funds generally value their portfolio securities using market-based factors based on estimates from models rather than trading inputs.

136 See 1977 Valuation Release, supra note 10. In this regard, the Commission has stated that the "fair value of securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less may not always be accurately reflected through the use of amortized cost valuation, due to an impairment of the creditworthiness of an issuer, or other factors. In such situations, it would appear to be incumbent on the directors of a fund to recognize such factors and take them into account in determining 'fair value.'" Id. Accordingly, this guidance effectively limits the use of amortized cost valuation to circumstances where it is the same as valuation based on market factors. Some commenters voiced concern about allowing an exemption for money market funds with remaining maturities of 60 days or less. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 38. However, we believe that these commenters misunderstood Commission guidance in
Under this approach, the “risk limiting” provisions of rule 2a-7 would continue to apply to money market funds.\textsuperscript{137} Accordingly, mutual funds that hold themselves out as money market funds would continue to be limited to investing in short-term, high-quality, dollar-denominated instruments. We would, however, rescind rule 2a-7’s provisions that relate to the maintenance of a stable value for these funds, including shadow pricing, and would adopt the other reforms discussed in this Release that are not related to the discretionary standby liquidity fees and gates alternative, as discussed in section III.B below.

We also propose to require that all money market funds, other than government and retail money market funds, price their shares using a more precise method of rounding.\textsuperscript{138} The proposal would require that each money market fund round prices and transact in its shares at the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.00 target share price (\textit{i.e.}, $1.0000) or an equivalent level of precision if a fund prices its shares at a different target level (\textit{e.g.}, a fund with a $10 target share price would price its shares at $10.000). Depending on the degree of fluctuation, this precision would increase the observed sensitivity of a fund’s share price to changes in the market values of the fund’s portfolio securities, and should better inform shareholders of the floating nature of the fund’s value. Finally, we propose a relatively long compliance date of 2 years to provide time for money market funds converting to a floating NAV on a permanent basis to make system modifications and time for funds to respond to redemption requests. The extended compliance date would also allow shareholders time to understand the

\textsuperscript{137} See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(d) (risk-limiting conditions).

\textsuperscript{138} See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c) (share price). We discuss our proposed amendment to share pricing in \textit{infra} section III.A.2.
implications of any reforms, determine if a floating NAV money market fund is an appropriate investment, and if not, redeem their shares in an orderly fashion.

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 had significant impacts on investors, money market funds, and the short-term financing markets. The floating NAV alternative is designed to respond, at least in part, to the contagion effects from heavy redemptions from money market funds that were revealed during that crisis. As discussed in greater detail below, although it is not possible to state with certainty what would have happened if money market funds had operated with a floating NAV at that time, we expect that if a floating NAV had been in place, it could have mitigated some of the heavy redemptions that occurred due to the stable share price. Many factors, however, contributed to these heavy redemptions, and we recognize that a floating NAV requirement is a targeted reform that may not ameliorate all of those factors.

Under a floating NAV, investors would not have had the incentive to redeem money market fund shares to benefit from receiving the stable share price of a fund that may have experienced losses, because they would have received the actual market-based value of their shares. The transparency provided by the floating NAV alternative might also have reduced redemptions during the crisis that were a result of investor uncertainty about the value of the securities owned by money market funds because investors would have seen fluctuations in money market fund share prices that reflect market-based factors.

Of course, a floating NAV would not have prevented redemptions from money market funds that were driven by certain other investing decisions, such as a desire to own higher quality assets than those that were in the portfolios of prime money market funds, or not to be invested in securities at all, but rather to hold assets in another form such as in insured bank deposits. The floating NAV alternative is not intended to deter redemptions that constitute rational risk
management by shareholders or that reflect a general incentive to avoid loss. Instead, it is designed to increase transparency, and thus investor awareness, of money market fund risks and dis-incentivize redemption activity that can result from informed investors attempting to exploit the possibility of redeeming shares at their stable share price even if the portfolio has suffered a loss.

1. **Certain Considerations Relating to the Floating NAV Proposal**

   a. **A Reduction in the Incentive to Redeem Shares**

As discussed above, when a fund's shadow price is less than the fund's $1.00 share price, money market fund shareholders have an incentive to redeem shares ahead of other investors in times of fund and market stress. Given the size of institutional investors' holdings and their resources for monitoring funds, institutions have both the motivation and ability to act on this incentive. Indeed, as discussed above and in the RSFI Study, institutional investors redeemed shares more heavily than retail investors from prime money market funds in both September 2008 and June 2011.

Some market observers have suggested that the valuation and pricing techniques permitted by rule 2a-7 may exacerbate the incentive to redeem in money market funds if investors expect that the value of the fund's shares will fall below $1.00.\(^{139}\) Our floating NAV

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\(^{139}\) See, e.g., Roundtable Transcript, supra note 43. (Bill Stouten, Thrivent Financial) ("I think the primary factor that makes money funds vulnerable to runs is the marketing of the stable value."); (Gary Gensler, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")) ("But one thing comes along with the money market funds, which is the stable value, or if I can say as an old market guy, it's a 'free put.' You can put back an instrument and get 100 cents on the dollar. And it's that free put that I think causes some structural challenges."); Comment Letter of Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) ("Richmond Fed PWG Comment Letter"). *See also supra* section II.B (discussing the structural features of money market funds that can make them vulnerable to runs); Statement 309 of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, *Systemic Risk and Money Market Mutual Funds* (Feb. 14, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619), ("If fund valuations were marked to market immediately using the full NAV approach—as required for other types of mutual funds—this type of run [the September 2008 run on money market funds] would not have occurred, and there would not have been a strong economic incentive for money market mutual funds to liquidate positions."); Gorton Shadow Banking, *supra* note 71, at 269-
proposal is designed to lower this risk by reducing investors’ incentive to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress. Under our floating NAV proposal, money market funds would transact at share prices that reflect current market-based factors (not amortized cost or penny rounding) and thus investor incentives to redeem early to take advantage of transacting at a stable value are ameliorated.\[140\]

b. Improved Transparency

Our floating NAV proposal also is designed to increase the transparency of money market fund risk. Money market funds are investment products that have the potential for the portfolio to deviate from a stable value. Although many investors understand that money market funds are not guaranteed, survey data shows that some investors are unsure about the amount of risk in money market funds and the likelihood of government assistance if losses occur.\[141\]

Similarly, many institutional investors use money market funds for liquidity purposes and are extremely loss averse; that is, they are unwilling to suffer any losses on money market fund investments.\[142\] Money market funds’ stable share price, combined with the practice of fund

270 (explaining that money market funds’ ability to transact at a stable $1.00 per share distinguishes them from other mutual funds, allows them to compete with bank demand deposits, and “may have instilled a false sense of security in investors who took the implicit promise as equivalent to the explicit insurance offered by deposit accounts”).

As discussed supra in Section II, we recognize that incentives other than those created by money market fund’s stable share price exist for money market fund shareholders to redeem in times of stress, including avoidance of loss and the tendency of investors to engage in flights to quality, liquidity, and transparency.

See Fidelity April 2012 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 61. For example, 41% of the retail customers surveyed said they either would expect the government to protect money market funds’ stable values in times of crisis (10%) or were unsure about whether the government would do so (31%). 47% of the retail customers thought money market funds present comparable risks to “bank products,” which in context appears to refer to insured deposits, 12% thought money market funds posed less risk than bank products, while 36% of the retail customers thought money market funds posed more risk than bank products.

See, e.g., Roundtable Transcript, supra note 43 (Lance Pan, Capital Advisors Group) (“I would like to add that money fund investors do view money funds as liquidity vehicles, not as investment vehicles. What I mean by that is they will take zero loss, and they’re loss averse as opposed to risk averse. So to the extent that they own that risk [i.e., investors, rather than fund sponsors, may be exposed to a loss], at a certain point they started to own that risk, then the run would start to develop.”); Comment Letter of Treasury
management companies providing financial support to money market funds when necessary, may have implicitly encouraged investors to view these funds as “risk-free” cash. However, the stability of money market fund share prices has been due, in part, to the willingness of fund sponsors to support the stable value of the fund. As discussed in section II.B.3 above, sponsor support has not always been transparent to investors, potentially causing investors to underestimate the investment risk posed by money market funds. As a result, money market fund investors, who were not accustomed to seeing their funds lose value, may have increased their redemptions of shares when values fell in recent times.

Our floating NAV proposal is designed to increase the transparency of risks present in money market funds. By making gains and losses a more regular and observable occurrence in money market funds, a floating NAV could alter investor expectations by making clear that money market funds are not risk free and that the funds’ share price will fluctuate based on the value of the funds’ assets. Investors in money market funds with floating NAVs should become more accustomed to, and tolerant of, fluctuations in money market funds’ NAVs and

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Strategies, Inc. (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) ("The added risk [in The Reserve Primary Fund resulting from its taking on more risk] produced higher yields, and as a result attracted substantial 'hot money' from highly sophisticated, institutional investors. These investors were fully knowledgeable of the risks they were taking, and assumed they would be the first to be able to sell their investments if the Reserve Fund’s bet on a government bailout of Lehman Brothers failed.").

See also, e.g., Better Markets FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 11-12 ("a fluctuating NAV would correct the basic misconception among many investors that their investment is guaranteed").

See, e.g., PWG Report, supra note 111, at 10 ("Investors have come to view MMF shares as extremely safe, in part because of the funds’ stable NAVs and sponsors’ record of supporting funds that might otherwise lose value. MMFs’ history of maintaining stable value has attracted highly risk-averse investors who are prone to withdraw assets rapidly when losses appear possible."); Comment Letter of Capital Advisers (Apr. 2, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (stating that institutional money market fund investors ‘derive their risk-free assumptions from the fact that very few (a total of two) funds have experienced losses and in all other ‘near miss’ instances fund sponsors have provided voluntary capital or liquidity support to cover potential losses’ and that the ‘Treasury Department further reinforced these assumptions when it announced the Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds on September 29, 2008’)

For a more detailed discussion of a floating NAV and investors’ expectations, see PWG Report, supra note 111, at 19-22; 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section III.A.
thus may be less likely to redeem shares in times of stress. The proposal would also treat money
market fund shareholders more equitably than the current system by requiring redeeming
shareholders to receive the fair value of their shares.\footnote{See, e.g., Comment Letter of Deutsche Investment Management Americas Inc. (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in
File No. 4-619) ("Deutsche PWG Comment Letter") (noting that a "variable NAV fund...will treat all
investors fairly during times of stress"; that "large and sudden redemptions runs [are] a phenomenon
exacerbated by the fact that amortized cost accounting rules can embed realized losses in the fund that are
not reflected in the NAV"; and that "[t]o avoid having to absorb these embedded losses, investors have the
incentive to redeem early"); Comment Letter of TDAM USA Inc. (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-
11-09) (agreeing that "requiring money market funds to issue and redeem their shares at market value, or to
float their NAVs, would in certain respects advance shareholder fairness").}

To further enhance transparency, we also are proposing to require a number of new
disclosures related to fund sponsor support (see section III.F below). As discussed further in
section III.E below, investors unwilling to bear the risk of a floating NAV would likely move to
other products, such as government or retail money market funds (which we propose would be
exempt from our floating NAV proposal and permitted to maintain a stable price).

We seek comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- Do commenters agree that floating a money market fund’s NAV would lessen the
  incentive to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress that can result from use
  of amortized cost valuation and penny rounding pricing by money market funds
today?
- What would be the effect of the other incentives to redeem that would remain under a
  floating NAV with basis point pricing requirement?
- Would floating a money market fund’s NAV provide sufficient transparency to cause
  investors to estimate more accurately the investment risks of money market funds?
  Do commenters believe that daily disclosure of shadow prices on fund websites
would accomplish the same goal without eliminating the stable share price at which
fund investors purchase and redeem shares? Why or why not? Is daily disclosure of a fund’s shadow price without transacting at that price likely to lead to higher or lower risks of large redemptions in times of stress? If the enhanced disclosure requirements proposed elsewhere in this Release were in place, what would be the incremental benefit of the enhanced transparency of a floating NAV?

- Are there other places to disclose the shadow price that would make the disclosure more effective in enhancing transparency?

- If the fluctuations in money market funds’ NAVs remained relatively small even with a $1.0000 share price, would investors become accustomed only to experiencing small gains and losses, and therefore be inclined to redeem heavily if a fund experienced a loss in excess of investors’ expectations?

- Would investors in a floating NAV money market fund that appears likely to suffer a loss be less inclined to redeem because the loss would be shared pro rata by all shareholders? Would a floating NAV make investors in a fund more likely to redeem at the first sign of potential stress because any loss would be immediately reflected in the floating NAV?

- Would floating NAV money market funds treat non-redeeming shareholders, and particularly slower-to-redeem shareholders, more equitably in times of stress?

- To the extent that some investors choose not to invest in money market funds due to the prospect of even a modest loss through a floating NAV, would the funds’ resiliency to heightened redemptions be improved?

- Would money market fund sponsors voluntarily make cash contributions or use other available means to support their money market funds and thereby prevent their NAVs
from actually floating?\textsuperscript{147} Would larger fund sponsors or those sponsors with more access to capital have a competitive advantage over other fund sponsors?

c. \textit{Redemptions During Periods of Illiquidity}

We recognize that a floating NAV may not eliminate investors' incentives to redeem fund shares, particularly when financial markets are under stress and investors are engaging in flights to quality, liquidity, or transparency.\textsuperscript{148} As discussed above, the RSFI Study noted that the incentive for investors to redeem ahead of other investors is heightened by liquidity concerns—when liquidity levels are insufficient to meet redemption requests, funds may be forced to sell portfolio securities into illiquid secondary markets at discounted or even fire-sale prices.\textsuperscript{149} Because the potential cost of liquidity transformation is not reflected in market-based pricing until after the redemption has occurred, this liquidity pressure may create an additional incentive for investors to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress.\textsuperscript{150} In addition, market-based pricing does not capture the likely increasing illiquidity of a fund's portfolio as it sells its more

\textsuperscript{147} In section III.A.5.a we discuss the economic implications of sponsor support under our floating NAV proposal. We are not proposing any changes that would prohibit fund sponsors from supporting money market funds under our floating NAV proposal. Our proposal also includes new disclosure requirements related to sponsor support. See infra section III.F.

\textsuperscript{148} See, e.g., PWG Report, supra note 111, at 20 ("To be sure, a floating NAV itself would not eliminate entirely MMFs' susceptibility to runs. Rational investors still would have an incentive to redeem as fast as possible the shares of any MMF that is at risk of depleting its liquidity buffer before that buffer is exhausted, because subsequent redemptions may force the fund to dispose of less-liquid assets and incur losses."); 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at 106 ("We recognize that a floating net asset value would not necessarily eliminate the incentive to redeem shares during a liquidity crisis—shareholders still would have an incentive to redeem before the portfolio quality deteriorated further from the fund selling securities into an illiquid market to meet redemption demands."). See also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{149} See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that most money market fund portfolio securities are held to maturity, and secondary markets in these securities are not deeply liquid).

\textsuperscript{150} Although we recognize that managers of certain other mutual funds, and not just money market funds, generally sell the most liquid portfolio securities first to satisfy redemptions that exceed available cash, non-money market mutual funds generally are not as susceptible to heightened redemptions as are money market funds for a variety of reasons, including that non-money market mutual funds generally are not used for cash management.
liquid assets first during a period of market stress to defer liquidity pressures as long as possible. As discussed in section II.D.1 above, our 2010 amendments, including new daily and weekly liquid asset requirements, strengthened the resiliency of money market funds to both portfolio losses and investor redemptions as compared with 2008. We note, however, that other financial intermediaries that engage in maturity transformation, including banks, also have liquidity mismatches to some degree.

We request comment on the incentive to redeem that exists in a liquidity crisis.

- Do commenters believe that a floating NAV is sufficient to address the incentive to redeem caused by liquidity concerns in times of market stress? Would other tools, such as redemption gates or liquidity fees, also be necessary?

- Do commenters believe that money market funds as currently structured present unique risks as compared with other mutual funds, all of which may face some degree of liquidity pressure during times of market stress? Would the floating NAV proposal suffice to address those risks?

- Did the 2010 amendments, including new daily and weekly liquid asset requirements, address sufficiently the incentive to redeem in periods of illiquidity?

\[ d. \]

**Empirical Evidence in Other Floating NAV Cash Management Vehicles**

Commenters have cited to the fact that some floating value money market funds in other jurisdictions and U.S. ultra-short bond mutual funds also suffered heavy redemptions during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.\(^{151}\) These commenters suggest, therefore, that money market fund

floating NAVs would likely not stop investors from redeeming shares. One qualification in considering these experiences is that many of the European floating NAV products that experienced heavy shareholder redemptions were priced and managed differently than our proposal and that U.S. ultra-short bond mutual funds are not subject to rule 2a-7’s risk-limiting conditions.\footnote{152}

Europe, for example, has several different types of money market funds, all of which can take on more risk than U.S. money market funds as they are not currently subject to regulatory restrictions on their credit quality, liquidity, maturity, and diversification as stringent as those imposed under rule 2a-7, among other differences in regulation.\footnote{153} One commenter observed that the financial crisis was first felt in Europe when “so-called ‘enhanced money market funds,’” which used the ‘money market’ fund label in their marketing strategies while taking on more risk.

\footnote{152}{Many European floating NAV money market funds, not all of which suffered heavy redemptions, price their shares differently than floating NAV money market funds would under our proposal by accumulating rather than distributing dividends. The shares of accumulating dividend funds therefore generally will exceed one euro, and a loss in these funds would be a small reduction in the excess value above one euro as opposed to a drop in value below a single euro. This kind of floating NAV money market fund may not have affected shareholders’ expectations of and tolerance for losses to the same extent as would our proposal. See, e.g., Deutsche PWG Comment Letter, supra note 146 (stating that “drawing parallels to the return or redemption experiences within [European money market funds and ultra-short bond funds] and those in the proposed variable NAV rule 2a-7 money market funds is not entirely accurate due to the differences in the duration of time and the magnitude of the redemption experiences” and noting that (i) “the variable NAV structure prevalent in many European money market funds is based on a system of accumulating dividends, not the use of a mark to market accounting system” and (ii) “one of the weaknesses addressed through the European Fund and Asset Management Association (“EFAMA”) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) in the European style of money market funds was the lack of standardization in the definition of money market funds and the broad investment policies across EU member states”). See also Witmer, supra note 36.}

\footnote{153}{For a discussion of the regulation of European money market funds, see infra Table 2, notes E and H; Common Definition of European Money Market Funds (Ref. CESR/10-049).}
than traditional money market funds, [ran] into problems.”¹⁵⁴ The difficulties experienced by these funds, the commenter asserted, “created confusion for investors about the definition, classification and risk characteristics of money market funds.”¹⁵⁵ In contrast, French monétaire funds, which are managed more conservatively than “enhanced money market funds” and thus resemble more closely the floating NAV money market funds contemplated by our proposal, generally did not experience heavy redemptions.¹⁵⁶ The experience of French monétaire funds would be consistent with another commenter’s observation that “one could reach the opposite conclusion that a variable NAV structure can, and in fact has, operated as intended during times of market stress in a manner consistent with minimizing systemic risk.”¹⁵⁷

U.S. ultra-short bond funds also experienced redemptions in this period. U.S. ultra-short bond funds are not subject to rule 2a-7’s risk-limiting conditions and although their NAVs float, pose more risk of loss to investors than most U.S. money market funds, including floating NAV money market funds under our proposal.¹⁵⁸ One reason that investors redeemed shares in ultra-short bond funds during the 2007-2008 financial crisis may have been because they did not fully understand the riskiness or liquidity of ultra-short bond funds. That some ultra-short bond funds experienced heavy redemptions during the financial crisis, therefore, does not necessarily

¹⁵⁴ See EFAMA PWG Comment Letter, supra note 151 (emphasis in original).

¹⁵⁵ Id. (noting that “[i]n a matter of weeks, EUR 70 billion were redeemed from these [enhanced money market] funds, predominantly by institutional investors; around 15-20 suspended redemptions for a short period, and 4 of them were [definitively] closed”).


¹⁵⁷ Deutsche PWG Comment Letter, supra note 146 (emphasis in original).

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., Witmer, supra note 36, at 23 (noting that ultra-short bond funds in the U.S. and enhanced money market funds in Europe both maintain a floating NAV structure, but are not subject to the same liquidity, credit, and maturity restrictions as money market funds).
suggest that investors in the floating NAV money market funds contemplated by our proposal also would experience redemptions in a financial crisis. Empirical analysis in this area also yields different opinions.\(^{159}\)

Having pointed out these differences, we recognize that the data is consistent with certain commenters’ view that other incentives may lead to heavy redemptions of floating NAV funds in times of stress.\(^{160}\) We seek comment on the performance of other floating NAV investment products during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

- Do commenters agree with the preceding discussion of what may have caused investors to heavily redeem shares in some floating value money market funds in other jurisdictions and in U.S. ultra-short bond funds during the 2007-2008 financial crisis? Are there other possible factors that we should consider?

- Do commenters agree with the distinctions we identified between money market funds under our proposed floating NAV and money market funds in other jurisdictions and U.S. ultra-short bond funds? Are there similarities or differences we have not identified?

- Do commenters believe that the risk limiting requirements of rule 2a-7 would deter heavy redemptions in money market funds with a floating NAV because of the restrictions on the underlying assets?

- Do commenters believe that money market funds attract very risk averse

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\(^{159}\) See, e.g., Witmer, *supra* note 36 (empirically testing whether floating NAVs (as compared with constant NAVs) provide a benefit in reducing run-like behavior by examining flow and withdrawal behavior (from 2006 through 2011) of money market mutual funds in the United States and Europe and concluding that the variable NAV fund structure is less susceptible to run-like behavior relative to constant NAV money market funds). *But see* Comment Letter of Jeffrey Gordon (Feb. 28, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Gordon FSOC Comment Letter”).

investors? If so, are these investors more or less likely to rapidly redeem in times of stress to avoid even small losses?

2. Money Market Fund Pricing

We are proposing that money market funds, other than government and retail money market funds, price their shares using a more precise method of valuation that would require funds to price and transact in their shares at an NAV that is calculated to the fourth decimal place for shares with a target NAV of one dollar (e.g., $1.0000). Funds with a current share price other than $1.00 would be required to price their shares at an equivalent level of precision (e.g., a fund with a $10 target share price would price its shares at $10.000). The proposed change to money market fund pricing under our floating NAV proposal would change the rounding convention for money market funds—from penny rounding (i.e., to the nearest one percent) to “basis point” rounding (to the nearest 1/100th of one percent). “Basis point” rounding is a significantly more precise standard than the 1/10th of one percent currently required for most mutual funds. For the reasons discussed below, we believe that our proposal provides the level

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161 See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c). In its proposed recommendations the FSOC proposed that money market funds re-price their shares to $100.00, which is the mathematical equivalent of our $1.0000 proposed share price. See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 31. FSOC commenters generally opposed the $100.00 per share re-pricing, stating that the Investment Company Act does not require that a registered investment company offer its shares at a particular price. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Re: Alternative One) (Jan. 25, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Federated Investors Alternative 1 FSOC Comment Letter”); ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25. While our proposed pricing is mathematically the same as that proposed by the FSOC, pricing fund shares using $1.00 extended to four decimal places reduces other potential costs, including, for example, the possibility that funds would require corporate actions (e.g., reverse stock splits) to re-price their shares at $100.00. Our proposed pricing does not mandate that funds establish a particular share price, but rather amends the precision by which a fund prices its shares.

162 Money market funds are permitted to use penny rounding under rule 2a-7(c) and therefore, a money market fund priced at $1.00 per share may round its NAV to the nearest penny.

163 Currently, money market funds priced at $1.00 may round their NAV to the nearest penny ($1.00). See rule 2a-7(c). Mutual funds other than money market funds must calculate the fund’s NAV to the nearest 1/10th of 1% (i.e., for funds with shares priced at $1.00, the funds should price their shares to the third decimal place, or $1.000). See 1977 Valuation Release, supra note 10. Many mutual funds typically price their shares at an initial NAV of $10 and round their NAV to the nearest penny. See rule 2a-4. Because
of precision necessary to convey the risks of money market funds to investors.

Market-based valuation with penny rather than “basis point” rounding effectively provides the same rounding convention as exists in money market funds today—the underlying valuation based on market-based factors may deviate by as much as 50 basis points before the fund breaks the buck. Accordingly, it is unlikely to change investor behavior.

A $1.0000 share price, however, would reflect small fluctuations in value more than a $1.00 price, which may more effectively inform investor expectations. For example, the value of a $1.00 per share fund’s portfolio securities would have to change by 50 basis points for investors to currently see a one-penny change in the NAV; under our proposal, the share price at which investors purchase and redeem shares would reflect single basis point variations. We do not anticipate significant operational difficulties or overly burdensome costs arising from funds pricing shares using “basis point” rounding: A number of money market funds recently elected to voluntarily report daily shadow NAVs at this level of precision. "Basis point" rounding should enhance many of the potential advantages of having a

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164 We expect that floating $100.00 NAVs (which is the mathematical equivalent of our proposed $1.0000 NAV) would change by a penny or more during all but the shortest investment horizons. Commission staff compared reported shadow prices on Form N-MFP between November 2010 and March 2012 over consecutive one-, three-, and six-month periods. Staff estimated that there would have been no penny change over a one-month period in 98% of the months using a $10.00 NAV but only 69% of the months using a $100 NAV. Staff estimated that there would have been no penny change over a three-month period in 98% of the time using a $10 NAV but only 59% of the time using a $100.00 NAV. Staff estimates that there would have been no penny change over a six-month period in 96% of the time using a $10 NAV but only 43% of the time using a $100.00 NAV. No money market fund had a support agreement in place during this time period.

165 Many large fund complexes have begun (or plan) to disclose daily money market fund market valuations (i.e., shadow prices) of at least some of their money market funds, rounded to four decimal places (“basis point” rounding), for example, BlackRock, Fidelity Investments, and J.P. Morgan. See, e.g., Money Funds' New Openness Unlikely to Stop Regulation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2013).
floating NAV. It should allow funds to reflect gains and losses more precisely. In addition, it should help reduce incentives for investors to redeem shares ahead of other investors when the shadow price is less than $1.0000 as investors would sell shares at a more precise and equitable price than under the current rules. At the same time, it should help reduce penalties for investors buying shares when shadow prices are less than $1.0000. “Basis point” rounding should therefore help stabilize funds in times of market stress by deterring redemptions from investors that would otherwise seek to take advantage of less precise pricing to redeem at a higher value than a more precise valuation would provide and thus dilute the value of the fund for remaining shareholders.

Our proposed amendment to require that money market funds use “basis point” rounding should provide shareholders with sufficient price transparency to better understand the tradeoffs between risk and return across competing funds, and become more accustomed to fluctuations in market value of a fund’s portfolio securities.166 It should allow them to appreciate that some money market funds may experience greater price volatility than others, and thus that there are variations in the risk profiles of different money market funds.

We also considered whether to require that money market funds price to three decimal places (for a fund with a target share price of $1.000), as other mutual funds do. We are concerned, however, that such “10 basis point” rounding may not be sufficient to ensure that investors do not underestimate the investment risks of money market funds, particularly if funds manage themselves in such a way that their NAVs remain constant or nearly constant. Fund investment managers may respond to a floating NAV with “10 basis point” rounding by

166 Similar to other mutual funds, our proposed pricing of money market fund shares would continue to allow shareholders to purchase and redeem fractional shares, and therefore would not affect the ability of shareholders to purchase and redeem shares with round or precise dollar amounts as they do today.
managing their portfolios more conservatively to avoid volatility that would require them to
price fund shares at something other than $1.000. It is possible that managers would be able to
avoid this volatility for quite some time, even with a floating NAV.\textsuperscript{167} Although a floating NAV
with "basis point" rounding may discourage risk taking in funds, a floating NAV with "10 basis
point" rounding may mask small deviations in the market-based value of the fund’s portfolio
securities.

We seek comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- What level of precision in calculating a fund’s share price would best convey to
  investors that floating NAV funds are different from stable price funds? Is “basis
  point” rounding too precise? Would “10 basis point rounding” ($1.000 for a fund
  with a $1.00 target share price) provide sufficient price transparency? Or another
  measure?

- Would requiring funds to price their shares at $1.000 per share effectively alter
  investor expectations regarding a fund’s NAV gains and losses? Would this in
  turn make investors less likely to redeem heavily when faced with potential or
  actual losses?

- Would “basis point” rounding better reflect gains and losses? Would it help
  eliminate incentives for investors to redeem shares ahead of other investors when
  prices are less than $1.000?

\textsuperscript{167} See, e.g., PWG Report, supra note 111, at 22 (“Investors’ perceptions that MMFs are virtually riskless may
change slowly and unpredictably if NAV fluctuations remain small and rare. MMFs with floating NAVs,
at least temporarily, might even be more prone to runs if investors who continue to see shares as essentially
risk-free react to small or temporary changes in the value of their shares.”); Comment Letter of Federated
Investors, Inc. (May 19, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (stating that “managers would employ all
manner of techniques to minimize the fluctuations in their funds’ NAVs” and, therefore, “[i]nvestors
would then expect the funds to exhibit very low volatility, and would redeem their shares if the volatility
exceeded their expectations”).
• Should we require that all money market funds price their shares at $1.0000, including those funds that currently price their shares at an initial value other than $1.00? Do commenters agree that, regardless of a fund’s initial share price, under our proposal all money market funds would be required to price fund shares to an equivalent level of precision (e.g., “basis point” rounding)?

• What would be the cost of implementing “basis point” rounding? Would funds require corporate actions or shareholder approval to price fund shares at $1.0000? What operational changes and related costs would be involved?

3. Exemption to the Floating NAV Requirement for Government Money Market Funds

We are proposing an exemption to the floating NAV requirement for government money market funds—money market funds that maintain at least 80% of their total assets in cash, government securities, or repurchase agreements that are collateralized fully.\textsuperscript{168} We believe that a government money market fund that maintains 80% of its total assets in cash and government securities fits within the typical risk profile of government money market funds as understood by investors, and is the portfolio holdings test used today for determining the accuracy of a fund’s name.\textsuperscript{169} Under the proposal, government money market funds would not be subject to the basis point rounding aspect of the floating NAV requirement and instead would be permitted to use the

\textsuperscript{168} Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(2).

\textsuperscript{169} For example, some government money market funds limit themselves to holding mostly Treasury securities and Treasury repos and are referred to as “Treasury money market funds.” To comply with the investment company names rule, funds that hold themselves out as Treasury money market funds must hold at least 80% of their portfolio assets in U.S. Treasury securities and for Treasury repos. See rule 35d-1 (a materially deceptive and misleading name of a fund (for purposes of section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act (Unlawful representations and names)) includes a name suggesting that the fund focuses its investments in a particular type of investment or in investments in a particular industry or group of industries, unless, among other requirements, the fund has adopted a policy to invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of the value of its assets in the particular type of investments or industry suggested by the fund’s name).
penny rounding method of pricing fund shares to maintain a stable price.\textsuperscript{170} 

As discussed above, government money market funds face different redemption pressures and have different risk characteristics than other money market funds because of their unique portfolio composition.\textsuperscript{171} The securities primarily held by government money market funds typically have even a lower credit default risk than commercial paper and are highly liquid in even the most stressful market scenario.\textsuperscript{172} The primary risk that these funds bear is interest rate risk; that is, the risk that changes in interest rates result in a change in the market value of portfolio securities. Even the interest rate risk of government money market funds, however, is generally mitigated because they typically hold assets that have short maturities and hold those assets to maturity.\textsuperscript{173}

Nonetheless, it is possible that a government money market fund could undergo such stress that it results in a significant decline in a fund’s shadow price. Government money market funds may invest up to 20% of their portfolio in non-government securities, and a credit event in that 20% portion of the portfolio or a shift in interest rates could trigger a drop in the shadow price, thereby creating incentives for shareholders to redeem shares ahead of other investors.

Despite these risks, we believe that requiring government money market funds to float their NAV may be unnecessary to achieve policy goals.\textsuperscript{174} As discussed below, shifting to a

\textsuperscript{170} As discussed in greater detail below, money market funds that take advantage of an exemption to the floating NAV requirement would not be able to use the amortized cost method of valuation, but would instead be required to only use the penny rounding method of pricing to facilitate a stable price per share.


\textsuperscript{172} See, e.g., RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 8-9; Comment Letter of Vanguard (Jan. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter”).

\textsuperscript{173} See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (“Given the short duration of [government] money market fund portfolios, any interest rate movements have a modest and temporary effect on the value of the fund’s securities”).

\textsuperscript{174} Many commenters have agreed with this position, suggesting that a floating NAV proposal should exempt
floating NAV could impose potentially significant costs on both a fund and its investors. In light of the evidence of investor behavior during previous crises, it does not appear that government money market funds are as susceptible to the risks of mass investor redemptions as other money market funds. Investors have frequently noted the benefits of having a stable money market fund option, and exempting government money market funds from a floating NAV would allow us to preserve this option at a minimal risk. On balance, we believe the benefits of retaining a stable share price money market fund option and the relative safety in a government money market fund’s 80% bucket appropriately counterbalances the risks associated with the 20% portion of a government money market fund’s portfolio that may be invested in securities other than cash, government securities, or repurchase agreements.

Under the proposal, funds taking advantage of the government fund exemption (as well as funds using the retail exemption discussed in the next section) would no longer be permitted to use the amortized cost method of valuation to facilitate a stable NAV, but would continue to be able to use the penny rounding method of pricing. While today virtually all money market funds use both amortized cost valuation and penny rounding pricing together to maintain a stable value, either method alone effectively provides the same 50 basis points of deviation from a fund’s shadow price before the fund must “break the buck” and re-price its shares. Accordingly, government money market funds. See, e.g., Comment Letter of The Dreyfus Corporation (Feb. 11, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter”); Comment Letter of Northern Trust (Feb. 14, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Northern Trust FSOC Comment Letter”); ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25.

See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 12-13 (examining the change in daily assets of different types of money market funds and highlighting abnormally large inflows into institutional and retail government funds during September 2008).

175 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Allegheny Conference on Community Development (Jan. 4, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Many nonprofit institutions are required, by law or by investment policy, to invest cash only in products offering a stable value”); Comment Letter of New Jersey Association of Counties (Dec. 21, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“We thus strongly support maintaining the ability of money market funds to offer a stable $1.00 per-share value”).
today the principal benefit from money market funds being able to use amortized cost valuation in addition to basis point rounding is that it alleviates the burden of the money market fund having to value each portfolio security each day using market factors. However, as described in section III.F.3 below, we are proposing that all money market funds be required to disclose on a daily basis their share price with portfolios valued using market factors and applying basis point rounding. As a result, money market funds—including those exempt from the floating NAV requirement—would have to value their portfolio assets using market factors instead of amortized cost each day. Accordingly, in line with this increased transparency on the valuation of money market funds’ portfolios, and in light of the fact that this increased transparency renders penny rounding alone an equal method of achieving price stability in money market funds, we are proposing that the government exemption permit penny rounding pricing alone and not also amortized cost valuation for all portfolio securities.

The government money market fund exemption to the floating NAV requirement would not be limited solely to Treasury money market funds, but also would extend to money market funds that invest at least 80% of their portfolio in cash, “government securities” as defined in section 2(a)(16) of the Act, and repurchase agreements collateralized with government securities. Allowable securities would include securities issued by government-sponsored entities such as the Federal Home Loan Banks, government repurchase agreements, and those issued by other “instrumentalities” of the U.S. government. It would exclude, however, securities issued by state and municipal governments, which do not generally share the same credit and liquidity

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177 Rule 2a-7 currently requires a money market fund’s board of directors to review the amount of deviation between the fund’s market-based NAV per share and the fund’s amortized cost per share “periodically.” Rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A)(2).

178 Section 2(a)(16) of the Investment Company Act.
traits as U.S. government securities.\textsuperscript{179}

Today, government money market funds hold approximately $910 billion in assets, or around 40\% of all money market fund assets.\textsuperscript{180} Fund groups that wish to focus on offering stable price products could offer government and retail money market funds. We also note that our proposed retail money market fund exemption discussed in the next section would likely cover most municipal (or tax-exempt) funds, because the tax advantages that these funds offer are only enjoyed by individuals and thus most of these funds could continue to offer a stable share price.\textsuperscript{181} Similarly, investors who prefer a stable price fund or are unable to invest in a floating NAV fund could choose to invest in government money market funds. These investors could continue to use these money market funds as a cash management tool without incurring any costs or other effects associated with floating NAV investment vehicles.

We request comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- Do commenters agree with our assumption that money market funds with at least 80\% of their total assets in cash, government securities, and government repos are unlikely to suffer losses due to credit quality problems correct? Is our assumption that they are unlikely to be subject to significant shareholder redemptions during a financial crisis correct?

- Should government money market funds be exempt from the floating NAV requirement? Why or why not? Are there other risks, such as interest rate or

\textsuperscript{179} See, e.g., RSFI Study, \textit{supra} note 21; Schwab FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 171 ("There may be slightly higher risk in municipal money market funds, but these funds tend to be more liquid than most prime funds.").

\textsuperscript{180} Based on iMoneyNet data.

\textsuperscript{181} We note that there are some tax-exempt money market funds that self-classify as institutional funds to private reporting services such as iMoneyNet. We understand that these funds' shareholder base typically is comprised of omnibus accounts, with underlying individual investors.
liquidity risks, about which we should be concerned if we adopt this proposed exemption to the floating NAV requirement? If so, what are they and how should they be addressed?

- Would the costs imposed on government money market funds if we required them to price at a floating NAV be different from the costs discussed below?

- Are the proposed criteria for qualifying for the government money market funds exemption to the floating NAV requirement appropriate? Should government money market funds be required to hold more or fewer than 80% of total assets in cash, government securities, and government repos? If so, what should it be and why?

- What kinds of risks are created by exempting government money market funds from a floating NAV requirement where the funds are permitted to maintain 20% of their portfolio in securities other than cash, government securities, and government repos? Should there be additional limits or requirements on the 20%? Would investors have incentives to redeem shares ahead of other investors if they see a material downgrade in securities held in the 20% basket? Would such an incentive create a significant risk of runs?

- Is penny rounding sufficient to allow government money market funds to maintain a stable price? Should we also permit these funds to use amortized cost valuation? If so, why? Should we permit money market funds to continue using amortized cost valuation for certain types of securities, such as government securities? Why?

- If the Commission does not adopt this exemption, how many investors in
government money market funds might reallocate assets to non-government money market fund alternatives? How many assets in government money market funds might be reallocated to alternatives? To what non-government money market fund alternatives are these investors likely to reallocate their investments?

- Should we provide other exemptions to the floating NAV requirement based on the characteristics of a fund’s portfolio assets, such as funds that hold heightened daily or weekly liquid assets? If so, why and what threshold should we use?

- Should money market funds that invest primarily in municipal securities be exempted from the floating NAV requirement? Why or why not? To what extent would such funds expect to qualify for the retail exemption?

4. Exemption to the Floating NAV Requirement for Retail Money Market Funds

a. Overview

We are also proposing to exempt money market funds that are limited to retail investors from our floating NAV proposal by allowing them to use the penny rounding method of pricing instead of basis point rounding.\textsuperscript{182} Under this proposal, retail funds would still generally be required to value portfolio securities using market-based factors rather than amortized cost. As discussed in detail below, retail investors historically have behaved differently from institutional investors in a crisis, being much less likely to make large redemptions quickly in response to the first sign of market stress. Thus, prime money market funds that are limited to retail investors in general have not been subject to the same pressures as institutional or mixed funds.\textsuperscript{183} Under the

\textsuperscript{182} Much like under the government fund proposal, funds that take advantage of the retail exemption would not be able to use the amortized cost method of valuation to facilitate a stable NAV for the same reasons as discussed in section III.A.3 above.

\textsuperscript{183} See, e.g., Comment Letter of United Services Automobile Association (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File
proposed exemption, we would define a retail fund as a money market fund that does not permit a shareholder to redeem more than $1 million in a single business day. We would permit retail funds to continue to maintain a stable price. As of February 28, 2013, funds that self-report as retail money market funds currently hold nearly $695 billion in assets, which is approximately 26% of all assets held in money market funds.\textsuperscript{184}

As noted above in section II, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, institutional prime money market funds had substantially greater redemptions than retail prime money market funds.\textsuperscript{185} For example, approximately 4-5% of prime retail money market funds had outflows of greater than 5% on each of September 17, 18, and 19, 2008, compared to 22-30% of prime institutional money market funds.\textsuperscript{186} Similarly, in late June 2011, institutional prime money market funds experienced heightened redemptions in response to concerns about their potential exposure to the Eurozone debt crisis, whereas retail prime money market funds generally did not experience a similar increase.\textsuperscript{187} Studies of money market fund redemption patterns in times of

\textsuperscript{184} No. FSOC-2012-0003 ("USAA FSOC Comment Letter") ("Retail MMMFs do not need additional or more stringent regulation to prevent runs because retail investors are inherently (and historically) less likely to cause runs.").

\textsuperscript{185} Based on iMoneyNet data. Of these assets, approximately $497 billion are held by prime money market funds and another $198 billion are in government funds. Because we are proposing to exempt government funds from the floating NAV requirement, the proposed retail exemption would only be relevant to the investors holding the $497 billion in retail prime funds.

\textsuperscript{186} See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 8. We note that the RSFI Study used a definition of retail fund based on fund self-classification, which does not entirely correspond with the definition of retail fund that we are proposing today.

\textsuperscript{187} Based on iMoneyNet data. iMoneyNet classifies retail and institutional money market funds according to who is eligible to purchase fund shares, minimum initial investment amount in the fund, and to whom the fund is marketed. However, as discussed infra, there is currently no regulatory distinction that reliably distinguishes these types of investors, and the iMoneyNet method uses a different method of classification than the method we are proposing.

\textsuperscript{187} Based on iMoneyNet data. Retail money market funds suffered net redemptions of less than 1% between June 14, 2011 and July 5, 2011, and only 27 retail money market funds had redemptions in excess of 5% during that period (and of those funds only 7 had redemptions in excess of 10% during this period), far fewer redemptions than those incurred by institutional funds.
market stress also have noted this difference. As discussed above, institutional shareholders tend to respond more quickly than retail shareholders to potential market stresses because generally they have greater capital at risk and may be better informed about the fund through sophisticated tools to monitor and analyze the portfolio holdings of the funds in which they invest.

Given the tendency of retail investors to continue to hold money market fund shares in times of market stress, it appears to be unnecessary to impose a floating NAV requirement on retail funds to address the risk that a fund would be unable to manage heavy redemptions in times of crisis. We understand that funds designed for retail investors generally do not have a concentrated shareholder base and are therefore less likely to experience large and unexpected redemptions that would put a strain on the fund’s liquidity. Some commenters have therefore suggested providing an exemption for retail funds to preserve the current benefits of money market funds for these investors, and as a consequence, reduce the macroeconomic effects that may be associated with a floating NAV requirement. A retail exemption may also reduce the

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188 See, e.g., RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 8; Cross Section, supra note 60, at 9 (noting that institutional prime money market funds suffered net redemptions of $410 billion (or 30% of assets under management) in the four weeks beginning September 10, 2008, based on iMoneyNet data, while retail prime money market funds suffered net redemptions of $40 billion (or 5% of assets under management) during this same time period); Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 60, at 31; Wermers Study, supra note 64.

189 See Comment Letter of Reich & Tang (Feb. 14, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Reich & Tang FSOC Comment Letter”) (“As a general rule, retail investors’ use of money market funds tends to be stable and countercyclical.... This is in direct contrast to the general behavior of institutional investors.”).

190 See Comment Letter of John M. Winters (Dec. 18, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Winters FSOC Comment Letter”) (“Retail MMFs and institutional government MMFs do not have a liquidity problem due to the nature of the investor type or portfolio securities....”).

191 See, e.g., USAA FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 183 (“Bifurcation would allow retail MMFs to continue to play the same vital role they do today, provide retail investors with professional investment management services, portfolio diversification and liquidity, while also acting as a key provider of financing in the broader capital markets”); Reich & Tang FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 189 (“A departure of this nature would diminish and endanger the benefits [of MMFs] to retail investors and cause these same individuals to seek potentially less appropriate or riskier alternatives.”). See also infra section III.E.
operational burdens of implementing a floating NAV, because retail funds and their intermediaries may not need to undertake the operational costs of transitioning systems or managing potential tax and accounting issues associated with a floating NAV. However, other commenters have opposed a retail exemption, citing the difficulty of distinguishing retail and institutional investors, operational issues, and other concerns.\textsuperscript{192}

In 2009, similar considerations led us to propose lower requirements for the amount of daily and weekly liquid assets that retail money market funds would need to hold compared with institutional funds.\textsuperscript{193} We noted that retail prime money market funds experienced significantly fewer outflows when compared with institutional prime money market funds in the fall of 2008.\textsuperscript{194} Although we have not adopted that proposal, in part because we recognize significant difficulties in distinguishing retail from institutional funds for purposes of that reform, we continue to consider whether retail and institutional money market funds should be subject to different requirements.

It is important to note that some commenters on our 2009 money market fund reforms proposal suggested that not all retail and institutional shareholders behave the same way as their peers.\textsuperscript{195} Also, although retail shareholders during recent financial crises have not redeemed from

\textsuperscript{192} See, e.g., Comment Letter of Invesco Ltd. (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Invesco FSOC Comment Letter") ("While we acknowledge that the disruptions experienced by MMFs during the 2008 financial crisis were largely attributable to prime MMF redemptions by large investors, we believe that efforts to characterize MMFs or their investors as either “institutional” or “retail” are misplaced and impractical due to the difficulty of establishing a litmus test that can be used consistently to identify those investors most likely to trigger a MMF run."); Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Federated Investors Feb. 15 FSOC Comment Letter").

\textsuperscript{193} In 2009, we proposed to define a retail money market fund as a money market fund that was not an institutional fund, and to define an institutional fund as a money market fund whose board of directors, considering a number of factors, determines that is “intended to be offered to institutional investors." See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.C.2.

\textsuperscript{194} Id. at n.185 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{195} See, e.g., Comment Letter of Invesco AIM Advisors, Inc. (Sept. 4, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09)
money market funds in large numbers in response to market stress, this does not necessarily mean that in the future they will not eventually exhibit increased redemption activity if stress on one or more money market funds persists.\textsuperscript{196} Empirical analyses of retail money market fund redemptions during the 2007-2008 financial crisis show that at least some retail investors eventually began redeeming shares.\textsuperscript{197} The introduction of the Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program on September 19, 2008 (a few days after institutional prime money market funds experienced heavy redemptions) may have prevented shareholder redemptions from accelerating in retail money market funds. Commenters on the FSOC Proposed Recommendations also have questioned whether the behavior of retail investors during the 2008 crisis should be regarded as definitive.\textsuperscript{198}

The evidence, however, suggests that retail investors tend to redeem shares slowly in times of fund and market stress or do not redeem shares at all. As indicated in the RSFI study, such lower redemptions may be more readily managed without adverse effects on the fund, in part because of the Commission’s enhanced liquidity requirements adopted in 2010.\textsuperscript{199} However,

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\item[196] See, e.g., Comment Letter of HSBC Global Asset Management Ltd (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOCE-2012-0003) (“HSBC FSOC Comment Letter”) (“Whilst the credit crisis of 2008 is an important data point to compare investor behavior, there are other data points in history that show that retail investors do “run” from investments (banks, other types of mutual fund) during times of market crisis.”).

\item[197] See, e.g., Cross Section, supra note 60, at 25-26 (finding that net redemptions from retail prime money market funds in September 2008 indicates that higher risk money market funds did have greater net outflows but only late in the run and that outflows from retail money market funds peaked later than those from institutional funds); Wermers Study, supra note 64, at 3 (analysis of money market fund redemption data from the 2007-2008 financial crisis showed that “prime institutional funds exhibited much larger persistence in outflows than retail funds, although retail investors also exhibited some run-like behavior.”).

\item[198] See, e.g., Federated Investors Feb 15 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192 (“The oft-repeated point that some funds labeled “institutional” experienced higher redemptions than some funds labeled “retail” during the financial crisis is not sufficient. Many so-called institutional funds experienced the same or even lower levels of redemptions as so-called [retail money market] funds during the period of high redemptions during the financial crisis, and many funds included both retail and institutional investors.”).

\item[199] See supra section II.D.2 for a discussion of how these enhanced liquidity requirements were more effective
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we recognize that by providing a retail exemption to the floating NAV, we would be leaving in place for those investors the existing incentive to redeem that can result from the use of a stable price, and some retail investors could potentially benefit from redeeming shares ahead of other retail investors in times of fund and market stress.\footnote{See Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174 ("Thus while it can be expected that different kinds of prime money market funds may experience different levels of redemption activity, it may not be the case that different kinds of prime money market funds have different credit risk profiles.").}

The retail exemption would take the same form as the government exemption in allowing these money market funds to price using penny rounding instead of basis point rounding. For the reasons described in section III.A.3 above, we do not believe that allowing continued use of amortized cost valuation for all securities in these funds’ portfolios is appropriate given that these funds will be required to value their securities using market factors on a daily basis due to new website disclosure requirements described in section III.F.3 and given that penny rounding otherwise achieves the same level of price stability.

We request comment on whether we should provide a retail money market fund exemption to the floating NAV.

- Are we correct in our understanding that retail investors are less likely to redeem money market fund shares in times of market stress than institutional investors? Or are they just slower to participate in heavy redemptions?
- Does the evidence showing that retail investors behave differently than institutional investors justify a retail exemption? Is this difference in behavior likely to continue in the future?
• Would a retail exemption reduce the operational effects of implementing the floating NAV requirement, such as systems changes and tax and accounting issues? If so, to what extent and how?

• If the Commission does not adopt an exemption to the floating NAV requirement for retail funds, how many investors in retail prime money market funds might reallocate assets to non-prime money market fund alternatives? How many assets in retail prime money market funds might be reallocated to alternatives? To what non-prime money market alternatives are retail investors likely to reallocate their investments?\textsuperscript{201}

• Are we correct that retail investors would prefer an exemption from the floating NAV requirement? Would they instead prefer to invest in floating NAV funds? If so, why?

• Is penny rounding sufficient to allow retail money market funds to maintain a stable price? Should we also permit these funds to use amortized cost valuation? If so, why?

• Should we consider requiring retail funds that rely on an exemption from the floating NAV requirement to be subject to the liquidity fees and gates requirement described in section III.B?

\textit{b. Operation of the Retail Fund Exemption}

The operational challenges of implementing an exemption for retail investor funds are numerous and complex. Currently, many money market funds are owned by both retail and

\textsuperscript{201} See infra section III.E.
institutional investors, although many are separated into retail and institutional share classes.\textsuperscript{202} With the retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement, funds with separate share classes for different types of investors (as well as funds that mix different types of investors together) that wish to offer a stable price would need to reorganize, offering separate money market funds to retail and institutional investors.\textsuperscript{203} We recognize that any distinction could result in "gaming behavior" whereby investors having the general attributes of an institution might attempt to fit within the confines of whatever retail exemption we craft.\textsuperscript{204}

It can be difficult to distinguish objectively between retail and institutional money market funds, given that funds generally self-report this designation, there are no clear or consistent criteria for classifying funds and there is no common regulatory or industry definition of a retail investor or a retail money market fund.\textsuperscript{205} Many of the issues that we discuss below regarding distinguishing between types of investors were raised by our 2009 proposed money market fund reforms in which we proposed to establish different liquidity requirements for institutional and

\textsuperscript{202} Several of the largest prime money market funds have both institutional and retail share classes. For example, see Vanguard Money Market Reserves, Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund Investor Shares (VMMXX), Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (Dec. 28, 2012); Vanguard Money Market Reserves, Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund Institutional Shares (VMRXX), Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (Dec. 28, 2012); J.P. Morgan Money Market Funds, JPMorgan Prime Money Market Fund Institutional Class Shares (JINXX), Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (July 1, 2012); J.P. Morgan Money Market Funds, JPMorgan Prime Money Market Fund Morgan Class Shares (VMVXX), Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (July 1, 2012).

\textsuperscript{203} Alternatively, funds might choose to be treated as institutional (and not eligible for the proposed retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement).

\textsuperscript{204} See Comment Letter of BlackRock, Inc. (Dec. 13, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter") ("A two-tiered approach to MMFs based on a distinction between "retail" and "institutional" funds would be difficult to implement and may lead to gaming behavior by investors."); HSBC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 196 ("There are also practical challenges such as defining and identifying different types of investors and preventing the "gaming" of any regulation.").

\textsuperscript{205} Commenters have suggested a number of ways to distinguish retail funds from institutional funds. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Fidelity Investments, Comments on Response to Questions Posed by Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher, (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/mms-response/mms-response.shtml ("Fidelity RSFI Comment Letter"); Schwab FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 171. All of these methods involve some degree of subjectivity and risk of over or under inclusion.
retail money market funds. Many commenters then asserted that distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds would be difficult given the extent to which shares of money market funds are held by investors through omnibus accounts and other financial intermediaries.

Some commenters at the time, however, suggested possible approaches we might take. We have since received more comments suggesting other methods for distinguishing between investor types. The daily redemption limit method we are proposing today is an objective criterion intended to encourage self-identification of retail investors, because we understand that institutional investors generally would not be able to tolerate such redemption limits and they would accordingly self-select into institutional money market funds designed for them, while we anticipate that the limit would not constrain how most retail investors typically use money market funds. We also discuss several alternate methods we could use to make such a distinction below.

i. Daily Redemption Limit

We are proposing to define a retail money market fund as a money market fund that

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206 We proposed but did not adopt a requirement that a money market fund’s board determine at least once each calendar year whether the fund is an institutional fund based on the nature of the record owner of the fund’s shares, minimum initial investment requirements, and cash flows from purchases and redemptions. See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at nn.195-197 and accompanying text.

207 See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at nn.220-228 and accompanying text. Many commenters also expressed concern with requiring fund boards to make such a determination. See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at n.222 and accompanying text. See also section III.A.4.b of this Release.

208 For example, one commenter suggested that we treat as institutional a fund that has any class that offers same-day liquidity to shareholders. Comment Letter of Fidelity Investments (Aug. 24, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (“Fidelity 2009 Comment Letter”). We expressed concern regarding this proposal and whether institutional investors would be willing to migrate to funds that offer next-day liquidity to avoid the more restrictive requirements. See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92. We expressed similar concerns about others’ suggestion that retail funds be distinguished based on minimum initial account sizes or maximum expense ratios. See, e.g., Comment Letter of HighMark Capital Management, Inc. (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09); Comment Letter of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (“T. Rowe Price 2009 Comment Letter”).

209 See, e.g., Fidelity RSFI Comment Letter, supra note 205; Schwab FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 171.
restricts a shareholder of record from redeeming more than $1,000,000 in any one business day.\textsuperscript{210} We believe that this approach would be relatively simple to implement, since it would only require a retail money market fund to establish a one-time, across-the-board redemption policy,\textsuperscript{211} and unlike other approaches discussed below, it would not depend on a fund’s ability to monitor the dollar amounts invested in shareholders’ accounts, shareholder concentrations, or other shareholder characteristics. A daily redemption limitation approach also should reduce the risk that a retail fund will experience heavier redemption requests than it can effectively manage in a crisis, because it will limit the total amount of redemptions a fund can experience in a single day, allowing the fund time to better predict and manage its liquidity.\textsuperscript{212}

A redemption limitation approach to defining retail funds should also lead institutions to self-select into institutional floating money market funds, since retail money market funds with redemption limitations would typically not meet their operational needs.\textsuperscript{213} This incentive to self-select may help mitigate (but cannot eliminate) “gaming” by investors with institutional characteristics who otherwise might be tempted to try and invest in stable price retail funds, compared to the other methods of distinguishing investors discussed below. Even if an institutional investor purchased shares in a stable price fund, the institutional investor would be subject to the $1 million daily redemption limit. Retail investors rarely need the ability to

\textsuperscript{210} See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3).

\textsuperscript{211} The proposed retail exemption would provide exemptive relief from the Investment Company Act and its rules to permit a retail money market fund to restrict daily redemptions as provided for in the proposed rule. See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3)(iii).

\textsuperscript{212} See USAA FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 183 (“This approach would reduce large money movement from retail MMFs in any given day, and therefore retail MMFs would be less likely to experience large scale runs resulting from a lack of liquidity.”).

\textsuperscript{213} See id. (noting that if the Commission were to define a fund as retail through a daily redemption limitation approach “[l]arge individual investors and institutions will self-select into institutional MMFs because retail MMFs will not meet their operational needs.”).
redeem such a significant amount on a daily basis, and if they do anticipate needing to make large redemptions quickly, they would be able to choose to invest in a government money market fund, a floating NAV fund, or plan to make several redemptions over time.

Applying the daily redemption limitation method to omnibus accounts may pose difficulties. In order for the fund to impose its redemption limit policies on the underlying shareholders, intermediaries with omnibus accounts would need to provide some form of transparency regarding underlying shareholders, such as account sizes of underlying shareholders (showing that each was below the $1 million redemption limit). Alternatively, the fund could arrange with the intermediary to carry out the fund’s policies and impose the redemption limitation, or else impose redemption limits on the omnibus account as a whole. We discuss omnibus account issues further below.

We have selected $1,000,000 as the appropriate daily redemption threshold because we expect that such a daily limit is high enough that it should continue to make money market funds a viable and desirable cash management tool for retail investors, but is low enough that it should not suit the operational needs of institutions. We recognize that typical retail investors rarely make redemptions that approach $1,000,000 in a single day. Nonetheless, retail investors’ net worth and investment choices can differ significantly, and they may on occasion engage in large transactions. For example, a retail investor may make large redemption requests when closing out their account, rebalancing their investment portfolio, paying their tax bills, or making a large purchase such as the down payment on a house. In selecting the appropriate redemption limit, we sought to find a threshold that is low enough that institutions would self-select out of

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The staff understands that for at least one large fund group, significantly less than 1% of the number of redemption transactions in money market funds intended for retail investors exceed $1,000,000, and that more than 97% of retail transactions were under $25,000. Nonetheless, the fund group received redemption request exceeding $250,000 from some retail investors on a daily basis.
retail funds, but high enough that it would not impose unnecessary burdens on retail investors, even when they engage in atypical redemptions. One commenter suggested a lower redemption threshold of $250,000, but we are concerned that such a threshold may be too low to meet the cash management needs of retail investors that engage in occasional large transactions. We also considered a higher threshold, such as a $5,000,000 daily redemption limit instead, but are concerned that such a higher limit might not provide sufficient limitation on heightened redemptions in times of stress.

As mentioned previously, setting an appropriate redemption threshold for retail money market funds is complicated by the fact that retail investors may, however, on occasion need to redeem relatively large amounts from a money market fund, for example, in connection with the purchase of a home, and that some institutions may have small enough cash balances that they may find that a $1,000,000 daily redemption threshold still suits their operational needs. A retail fund’s prospectus and advertising materials would need to provide information to shareholders about daily redemption limitations to shareholders. This should provide sufficient information to potential investors, both retail and institutional, to allow them to make informed decisions about whether investing in the fund would be appropriate. Any money market fund that takes advantage of the retail exemption would also need to effectively describe that it is intended for retail investors. Retail investors who may need to make large (i.e., in excess of $1,000,000) immediate redemptions would thus know that they should not invest in a retail money market

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215 See USAA FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 183 (suggesting that a $250,000 cap on daily redemptions is a natural dollar limit because it is consistent with rule 18F-1 (exemption for mutual funds that allows funds to commit to pay certain redemptions in cash, rather than in-kind) and the current FDIC account guarantee limit).

216 Prospectus disclosure regarding any restrictions on redemptions is currently required by Form N-1A, and we do not believe that any amendments to the current disclosure requirements would be necessary to require additional fund disclosure regarding the daily redemption restrictions of the proposed retail exemption. See Item 6 and Item 11(c)(1) of Form N-1A.
fund with daily redemption limitations, and that they should instead use an alternate cash
management tool. Alternatively, since it is likely that retail investors would have advance notice
of the need to redeem in excess of the fund’s limits, they could manage the redemption request
over a period of several days.

We request comment on our proposed method of distinguishing between retail and
institutional money market funds based on a daily redemption limitation of $1,000,000.

- Would a daily redemption limit effectively distinguish retail from institutional
money market funds? Are we correct in assuming that institutional investors
would self-select out of retail funds with such redemption limits? Would a daily
redemption limit help reduce the risk that a fund might not be able to manage
heavy shareholder redemptions in times of stress? Would this method of
distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds appropriately
reflect the relative risks faced by these two types of funds?

- If we classify funds as retail or institutional based on an investor’s permitted daily
redemptions, should we limit a retail fund investor’s daily redemptions to
$1,000,000, or some other dollar amount such as $250,000 or $5,000,000?
Should we provide a means to increase the dollar amount limit to keep pace with
inflation? If so, what method should we use?

- How large are institutional investors’ typical account balances and daily
redemptions? Would institutional investors be willing to break large investments
into smaller pieces so they can spread them across multiple retail funds?

- Are current disclosure requirements sufficient to inform current and potential
shareholders of the operations and risks of redemption limitations? Should we
consider additional disclosure requirements? If so, what kinds of disclosures should be required?

- We ask commenters to provide empirical justification for any comments on a redemption limitation approach to distinguishing retail and institutional money market funds. We also request that commenters with access to shareholder redemption data provide us with detailed information about the size of individual redemptions in normal market periods but especially in September 2008 and summer 2011.

- In particular, we request that commenters submit data on the size and frequency of retail and institutional redemptions in money market funds today, including breakdowns of the typical number and dollar volume of transactions in funds intended for retail and institutional shareholders. We also request empirical data on the size and frequency of retail investors outlier redemption activity, such as when closing out their accounts or making other atypical transactions.

- Should the exemption have a weekly redemption limit as an alternative to, or in addition to, the daily redemption limit? If so, what should that limit be?

We have discussed above why we believe a daily redemption limit may effectively distinguish between retail and institutional investors and may also serve to help a retail fund manage the redemption requests it receives. In some cases, retail investors may still want to redeem more than $1 million in a single day. To help accommodate such requests, but at the same time allow a retail fund to effectively manage its redemptions, a retail exemption also could include a provision permitting an investor to redeem in excess of the fund’s daily redemption limit, provided the investor gives advance notice of their intent to redeem in excess of the limit.
Permitting higher redemptions with advance notice may serve the interests of retail investors, while also giving a fund manager sufficient time to prepare to meet the redemption request without adverse consequences to the fund. We request comment on whether we should include a provision allowing retail funds to permit redemption requests in excess of their daily limit if the investor provides advance notice.

- Should we include a provision permitting retail investors to redeem more than the daily redemption limit if they gave advance notice? How frequently are retail investors likely to need to redeem more than the daily redemption limit, and also know that they would need to make such a redemption in advance? Would such an advance notice provision encourage “gaming behavior,” for example if an institution invested in a retail fund and gave notice that every Friday it would redeem a large position to make payroll? Should we be concerned with such “gaming behavior” provided that the fund was given sufficient notice that it could effectively manage the redemptions?

- If we were to include an advance notice provision, what should the terms be? Should a retail investor be permitted to redeem any amount provided that they gave sufficient notice? A limited amount, such as $5 or $10 million? How much advance notice would be required, 2 days, 5 days, more or less? Should the amount that an investor be permitted to redeem be tied to the amount of advance notice given? For example, should an investor be permitted to redeem $3 million in a single day if they give 3 days’ notice, but $10 million in a single day if they gave 10 days’ notice?

- Should an advance notice provision include requirements regarding the method
of how the notice is submitted to the fund, or for fund recordkeeping of the notices it receives? Should such a provision include requirements on intermediary communications, (for example, if the notice is provided to the intermediary rather than the fund, should we require that the advance notice clock begin counting once the fund receives the notice, not when it is given to the intermediary) or should it leave such details to be worked out between the parties?

- What operational costs would be associated with providing such an advance notice provision? Would funds be able to effectively communicate to investors the terms of such an advance notice provision?

We note that most money market funds that invest in municipal securities (tax-exempt funds) are intended for retail investors, because the tax advantages of those securities are only applicable to individual investors, and accordingly, a retail exemption would likely result in most such funds seeking to qualify for the proposed exemption. Our 2010 reforms exempted tax-exempt funds from the requirement to maintain 10% daily liquid assets because, at the time, we understood that the supply of tax-exempt securities with daily demand features was extremely limited.\(^{217}\) Because tax-exempt money market funds are not required to maintain 10% daily liquid assets, these funds may be less liquid than other retail money market funds, which could raise concerns that tax-exempt retail funds might not be able to manage even the lower level of redemptions expected in a retail fund. Based on information received through Form N-MFP, we now understand that many tax-exempt funds can and do maintain more than 10% of their portfolio in daily liquid assets, and thus complying with a 10% daily liquid asset

\(^{217}\) See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at nn.240-243 and accompanying text; rule 2a-7(c)(5)(ii).
requirement may be feasible for these funds. We request comment on whether we should require tax-exempt funds that wish to take advantage of the proposed retail exemption to also meet the 10% daily liquid asset requirements.

- Would tax-exempt funds that rely on the proposed retail exemption be able to manage redemptions in time of stress without such a daily liquid asset requirement? What level of daily liquid assets do tax-exempt money market funds typically maintain today? Should we require tax-exempt money market funds to meet the daily liquid asset requirement if they are to rely on the proposed retail exemption to the floating NAV?

There are different ways a money market fund could comply with the exemption’s daily redemption limitation if a shareholder seeks to redeem more than $1 million on any given day notwithstanding the fund’s policy not to honor such requests. The fund could treat the entire order as not in “good order” and reject the order in its entirety. Alternatively, the fund could treat the order as a request to redeem $1 million and reject the remainder of the order (or treat it as if it were received on the next business day). Any of those approaches would allow the money market fund to meet the daily redemption limitation and neither would provide an incentive for a shareholder to submit a redemption request in excess of $1 million on any one day. A fund would also need to disclose how it handles such excessive redemption requests in its prospectus. We request comment on these approaches.

- Should we specify in rule 2a-7 the way that a money market fund must comply

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218 Based on a review of Form N-MFP filings, we understand that as of the end of February 2013, 51% of tax-exempt funds maintain daily liquid assets in excess of 10%, and that another 29% maintain daily liquid assets of between 5% and 10% of their portfolios. The average daily liquid assets held across all tax-exempt funds was approximately 9.9% of their total portfolios.

219 See Item 6 and Item 11(c)(1) of Form N-1A.
with the exemption's daily redemption limitation? Is either of the ways we discuss above easier or less costly to implement than the other?

- Are there any other approaches, other than the ones discussed above, that funds may use to meet the daily redemption limitation? If so, what are the benefits and costs of those alternatives?

ii. Omnibus Account Issues

Today, most money market funds do not have the ability to look through omnibus accounts to determine the characteristics and redemption patterns of their underlying investors. An omnibus account may consist of holdings of thousands of small investors in retirement plans or brokerage accounts, just one or a few institutional accounts, or a mix of the two. Omnibus accounts typically aggregate all the customer orders they receive each day, net purchases and redemptions, and they often present a single buy and single sell order to the fund. Because the omnibus account holder is the shareholder of record, to qualify as a retail fund under a direct application of our daily redemptions limitation proposal, a fund would be required to restrict daily redemptions by omnibus accounts to no more than $1,000,000. Because omnibus accounts can represent hundreds or thousands of beneficial owners and their transactions, they would often have daily activity that exceeds this limit. This combined activity would result in omnibus accounts often having daily redemptions that exceed the limit even though no one beneficial owner's transaction exceeds the limit.220 Accordingly, to implement a retail exemption, our proposal needs to also address retail investors that purchase money market shares through omnibus accounts.

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220 See, e.g., Invesco FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192 ("These [omnibus] accounts, due to their size, might well be regarded as 'institutional' despite the fact that the aggregate of assets belong largely to investors who would be considered 'retail' if they invested in the MMF directly.").
To address this issue, the proposed retail exemption would also permit a fund to allow a shareholder of record to redeem more than $1,000,000 in a single day, provided that the shareholder of record is an “omnibus account holder”\(^{221}\) that similarly restricts each beneficial owner in the omnibus account to no more than $1,000,000 in daily redemptions.\(^{222}\) Under the proposed exemption, a fund would not be required to impose its redemption limits on an omnibus account holder, provided that the fund has policies and procedures reasonably designed to allow the conclusion that the omnibus account holder does not permit any beneficial owner from “directly or indirectly” redeeming more than $1,000,000 in a single day.\(^{223}\)

The restriction on “direct or indirect” redemptions is designed to manage issues related to “chains of intermediaries,” such as when an investor purchases fund shares through one intermediary, for example, an introducing broker or retirement plan, which then purchases the fund shares through a second intermediary, such as a clearing broker.\(^{224}\) The proposed exemption would require that a retail fund’s policies and procedures be reasonably designed to allow the conclusion that the fund’s redemption limit is applied to beneficial owners all the way down any chain of intermediaries. If a fund cannot reasonably conclude that such policies are enforced by intermediaries at each step of the chain, then the fund must apply its redemption limit at the aggregate omnibus account holder level (or rely on a cooperating intermediary to apply the

\(^{221}\) Omnibus account holder would be defined in the proposed rule as “a broker, dealer, bank, or other person that holds securities issued by the fund in nominee name.” See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3) (ii).

\(^{222}\) See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3) (ii).

\(^{223}\) See id.

\(^{224}\) For purposes of imposing redemption limitations on beneficial owners, we would expect that funds seek to ensure as part of their policies and procedures that an intermediary would make reasonable efforts consistent with applicable regulatory requirements to aggregate multiple accounts held with it that are owned by a single beneficial owner. We would not expect that a fund would seek to ensure that an intermediary reasonably be able to identify that a single beneficial owner owns fund shares through multiple accounts if the shareholder has an account with the intermediary, and also owns shares through another intermediary that does not already share account information with the first intermediary.
fund's redemption limits to any uncooperative intermediaries further down the chain).

Accordingly, to redeem more than $1,000,000 daily, a fund's policies and procedures must be
designed to conclude that an omnibus account holder that is the shareholder of record with the
fund reasonably concludes that all beneficial owners in the omnibus account, even if invested
through another intermediary, comply with the redemption limit. If the fund cannot reasonably
conclude that intermediaries that have omnibus accounts with it also do not permit beneficial
owners to redeem more than $1,000,000 in a single day, the fund's policies must be reasonably
designed to allow the conclusion that the omnibus account holder applies the fund's redemption
limit to the other intermediaries' transactions on an aggregate level.\textsuperscript{225}

We note that the challenges of managing implementation of fund policies through
omnibus accounts are not unique to a retail exemption. For example, funds frequently rely on
intermediaries to assess, collect, and remit redemption fees charged pursuant to rule 22c-2 on
beneficial owners that invest through omnibus accounts. Funds and intermediaries face similar
issues when managing compliance with other fund policies, such as account size limits,
breakpoints, rights of accumulation, and contingent deferred sales charges.\textsuperscript{226} Service providers
also offer services designed to facilitate compliance and evaluation of intermediary activities.

The proposed rule would not require retail money market funds to enter into explicit
agreements or contracts with omnibus account holders at any stage in the chain, but would
instead allow funds to manage these relations in whatever way that best suits their circumstances.
We would expect that in some cases, funds may enter into agreements with omnibus account
holders to reasonably conclude that their policies are complied with. In other cases, funds may

\textsuperscript{225} See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3)(ii).

\textsuperscript{226} Under rule 38a-1, funds are required to have policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violation of the federal securities laws by the fund and certain service providers.
have sufficient transparency into the activity of omnibus account holders, or use other verification methods (such as certifications), that funds could reasonably conclude that their policies are being followed without an explicit agreement. If a fund could not verify or reasonably conclude that an omnibus account holder is applying the redemption limit to underlying beneficial owner transactions, we would expect that a fund would treat that omnibus account holder like any other shareholder of record, and impose the $1,000,000 daily redemption limit on that omnibus account. Retail money market funds will need to monitor compliance and implement policies and procedures to address the implications of potential exceptions, for example, if an intermediary improperly permitted a redemption in excess of the fund’s limits. Finally, the rule would also prohibit a fund from allowing an omnibus account holder to redeem more than $1,000,000 for its own account in a single day. 227 This restriction is intended to prevent an omnibus account holder from exceeding the fund’s redemption limits under the exemption when trading for its own account.

As proposed, the omnibus account holder provision does not provide for any different treatment of intermediaries based on their characteristics and instead applies the redemption limits equally to all beneficial owners. However, in some circumstances such treatment may not be consistent with the intent of the exemption. For example, an intermediary with investment discretion, such as a defined-contribution pension plan that allows the plan sponsor to remove a money market fund from its offerings, could unilaterally liquidate in one day a quantity of fund shares that greatly exceeds the fund’s redemption limit, even if no one beneficial owner had an account balance that exceeds the limit. Intermediaries might also pose different risks, for example, the risks associated with a sweep account might be different than the risks posed by a

227 See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3)(ii).
retirement plan. Also, certain intermediaries may not be able to offer funds with redemption restrictions to investors, even if the underlying beneficial owners are retail investors. We understand that identical treatment of intermediaries under the proposal may not precisely reflect the risks of intermediaries with different characteristics, but recognize that this is a cost of our attempt to keep the retail exemption simple to implement.

A shareholder may own fund shares through multiple accounts, either directly with a fund, or through an intermediary. In some cases, such as when one account is held directly with a fund and another account is held through an intermediary, the fund would not be able to identify that the same shareholder has multiple accounts with the fund, and may not be able to effectively restrict that shareholder from redeeming fund shares from those accounts, that in aggregate, may exceed the proposed daily redemption limit. The proposed retail exemption would not restrict such redemptions, because the shareholder with multiple accounts would not be a “shareholder of record” for all of the accounts. In other cases, a fund may be able to identify that a shareholder holds multiple accounts with the fund, such as if a shareholder owns fund shares in an account held directly with the fund, and also owns shares through an individual retirement account (“IRA”) held with the fund. In those cases, the shareholder with multiple accounts would be the shareholder of record for both accounts, and the fund should be able to identify the shareholder as such. If a fund receives redemption orders exceeding the $1,000,000 limit from a shareholder of record through multiple accounts in a single day, the fund would need to aggregate the redemption requests from all accounts held by that shareholder of record, and impose the daily redemption limit on the shareholder of record’s total redemptions,

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228 See id. An intermediary would be the shareholder of record for the omnibus accounts they hold.

229 We note that we do not expect funds to collapse such accounts, but rather match such accounts where there is reasonably available identifying information on hand at the fund or its transfer agent that the accounts have the same record owner.
We request comment on the proposed treatment of omnibus account holders under the retail exemption to the floating NAV alternative.

- Does our proposed treatment of omnibus accounts under the retail exemption appropriately address the operation of such accounts? What types of policies and procedures would funds develop to confirm that omnibus account holders are able to reasonably prevent beneficial owners that invest through the account from violating a retail money market fund’s redemption limit policies and procedures?

- The proposed rule does not require funds to enter into agreements with omnibus account holders, nor does it prescribe any other mechanism for requiring a fund to verify that its redemption limits are effectively enforced. Should we require such agreements? What difficulties would arise in implementing such agreements? Instead of agreements, should we consider prescribing some other type of verification or compliance procedure to prevent a fund’s limit from being breached, such as certifications from omnibus account holders?

- Should the rule require a fund to obtain periodic certifications regarding the redemptions of beneficial owners in an omnibus account? If so, should we require a specific periodicity of certifications, such as every month, or every quarter?

- Should we differentiate between intermediaries that invest through omnibus accounts? For example, should we require that an intermediary that has

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230 Similar issues may arise if a shareholder holds an account jointly with another person, such as a spouse. A fund’s policies and procedures should establish methods of managing redemptions from joint accounts.
investment discretion over a number of beneficial owners' accounts be treated as a single beneficial owner for purposes of the daily redemption limit? Should we treat certain intermediaries differently than others, perhaps allowing higher or unlimited redemptions for investors who invest through certain types of intermediaries such as retirement plans? What operational difficulties would arise if we were to provide for such differential treatment of intermediaries?

- Can funds accurately identify multiple accounts in a fund that are owned by a single shareholder of record? If not, what costs would be incurred in building such systems? How should the redemption limit apply to accounts that are owned by multiple investors? Should we be concerned about investors opening accounts through multiple intermediaries and multiple accounts in an attempt to circumvent the daily redemption limits?

As discussed above, we understand that today many money market funds are unable to determine the characteristics or redemption patterns of their shareholders that invest through omnibus accounts. This lack of transparency can not only hinder a fund from effectively applying a retail exemption but can also lead to difficulties in managing the liquidity levels of a fund's portfolio, if a fund cannot effectively anticipate when it is likely to receive significant shareholder redemptions through examination of its shareholder base. We request comment on whether we should consider requiring additional transparency into money market fund omnibus accounts to enable funds to understand better their respective shareholder base and relevant redemption patterns.

- Should we consider any other methods of generally providing more transparency into omnibus accounts for money market funds so that funds could better manage
their portfolios in light of their respective shareholder base? If so, what methods should we consider?

c. **Consideration of Other Distinguishing Methods**

As discussed above, as part of the retail exemption that we are proposing today, we are proposing a method of distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds based on daily redemption limits. This is not the only method by which we could attempt to distinguish types of funds. Below we discuss several alternate methods of making such a distinction, and request comment on whether we should adopt one of these methods instead.

i. **Maximum Account Balance**

A different method of distinguishing retail funds would be to define a retail fund as a fund that does not permit account balances of more than a certain size. For example, we could define a fund as retail if the fund does not permit investors to maintain accounts with a balance that exceeds $250,000, $1,000,000, $5,000,000, or some other amount.\(^{231}\) If an investor’s account balance were to exceed the threshold dollar amount, the fund could automatically direct additional investments to shares of a government money market fund or a fund subject to the floating NAV requirement.\(^{232}\) Such an approach would require a retail fund to update the disclosure in its prospectus and advertising materials to inform investors how their investments would be handled in such circumstances. Much like the redemption limitation method, omnibus accounts may pose difficulties that would need to be addressed through certifications,

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\(^{231}\) A variation on this approach might prohibit further investment in a retail fund at the end of a calendar quarter if the average account size exceeds a threshold dollar amount during the quarter.

\(^{232}\) If a fund were part of a fund group that does not include an affiliated institutional fund, the fund would not allow further investments from an investor whose account balance reaches (or, if the account receives dividends or otherwise increases in value, exceeds) the threshold amount.
transparency, or some other manner. A maximum account balance approach may also create operational issues in other ways, such as managing what happens if a buy and hold investor’s account exceeded the limits due to appreciation in value. Determining the proper maximum account balance that would effectively distinguish between retail and institutional investors may also prove difficult.

Defining a retail fund based on the maximum permitted account balance would be relatively simple to explain to investors through disclosure in the fund’s prospectus and advertising materials. This approach could, however, disadvantage funds that do not have an affiliated government or institutional money market fund into which investors’ “spillover” investments in excess of the maximum amount could be directed and could encourage “gaming behavior,” if institutional investors were to open multiple accounts through different intermediaries with balances under the maximum amount in order to evade any maximum investment limit we might set.

We request comment on the approach of distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds based on investors’ account balances:

- If we were to classify funds as retail or institutional based on an investor’s account balance, what maximum account size would appropriately distinguish a retail account from an institutional account: $250,000, $1,000,000, $5,000,000, or some other dollar amount? Would this method of distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds appropriately reflect the relative risks faced

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233 We also expect that there may be significant differences in costs depending on how such an exemption was structured, and that it could be significantly less costly to test whether an investor investing through an omnibus account has exceeded a maximum account balance periodically rather than on a trade-by-trade basis. See also infra section III.A.4.d for a discussion of operational costs of the retail exemption.

234 See BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 204; Federated Investors Feb. 15 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192.
by these two types of funds? How would funds or other parties, such as intermediaries and omnibus accountholders, be able to enforce account balance limitations?

- Would shareholders with institutional characteristics be likely to open multiple retail money market fund accounts under the maximum amount, for example by going through intermediaries, to circumvent the account size requirement, and if so, would retail funds be subject to greater risk during periods of stress? What disclosure would be necessary to inform current and potential shareholders of the operations and risks of account balance limitations?

- We ask commenters to provide empirical justification for any comments on an account balance approach to distinguishing retail and institutional money market funds. We also request information on composition and distribution of individual account sizes to assist the Commission in considering this approach.

ii. Shareholder Concentration

Another approach to distinguishing retail and institutional money market funds might be to base the distinction on the fund's shareholder concentration characteristics. Under this approach, a fund would be able to qualify for a retail exemption if the fund's largest shareholders owned less than a certain percentage of the fund. This type of "concentration" method of distinguishing funds would be a test for identifying funds whose shareholders are more concentrated, and thus have a limited number of shareholders whose redemption choices could affect the fund more significantly during periods of stress. A heavily concentrated fund may indicate that the fund has a smaller number of large shareholders, who are likely institutions. In addition, funds whose shareholders are less concentrated, and thereby that are less subject to
heavy redemption pressure from a limited number of investors, may be able to withstand stress more effectively and thus could maintain a stable price.

Commenters have suggested several methods for defining the appropriate concentration level for a fund. One test for determining if a fund is institutional might be whether the top 20 shareholders own more than 15% of the fund’s assets, or the top 100 shareholders own more than 25% of fund assets, or some other similar measure. Another method to test concentration might be to define a fund as institutional if any shareholder owns more than 0.1% of the fund, or 1% of the fund, or some other percentage.

Distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds based on shareholder concentration could more accurately reflect the relative risks that funds face than distinguishing retail and institutional money market funds based on the maximum balance of shareholders’ accounts, since an individual shareholder’s account value does not necessarily reflect the risks of concentrated heavy redemptions. However it may be less accurate at distinguishing types of investors (and at reducing the risks of heavy redemptions associated with certain types of investors) than the redemption limitation discussed above, because the redemption limitation would likely cause investors to self-select into the appropriate fund.

One benefit of the concentration method of distinguishing retail funds is that it may lessen operational issues related to omnibus accounts. If funds were required to count an intermediary with omnibus accounts as one shareholder for concentration purposes (e.g., like any other shareholder), there may be no need for transparency into omnibus accounts. However, if

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235 See Fidelity RSFI Comment Letter, supra note 205. This commenter suggested that the test would apply regardless of whether underlying shareholders are individuals or institutions.

236 See Schwab FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 171.

237 See supra note 235.
we did not require such treatment of omnibus accounts, this concentration method would raise
the same issues associated with managing omnibus accounts as the other methods discussed
above.

This concentration method of distinguishing retail funds would also pose a number of
difficulties in implementation and operation. For example, it may be over-inclusive and a fund
may be wrongly classified as an institutional money market fund if many of its large
shareholders of record are intermediaries or sweep accounts,\textsuperscript{238} even though the underlying
beneficial owners may be retail investors. The method may also create difficulties for funds that
have limited assets or investors (for example, new funds with only a few investors), because
those small and start-up funds may have a concentrated investor base even though their investors
may be primarily retail.\textsuperscript{239} Similarly, this method may not effectively distinguish retail and
institutional money market funds if the fund is so large that even institutional accounts do not
trigger the concentration limits. An institutional fund that is not heavily concentrated may be
subject to the same risks as a more concentrated fund, because institutional investors tend to be
more sensitive to changing market conditions.

Finally, this method could create significant operational issues for funds if shareholder
concentration levels were to change temporarily, or to fluctuate periodically.\textsuperscript{240} For example, if
we were to provide a retail exemption that depended on a fund’s top 20 investors not owning
more than 15% of the fund, this would require a fund to constantly monitor the size of its

\textsuperscript{238} See, e.g., Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174 (noting that sweep accounts behaved more like
retail accounts rather than institutional ones during the 2008 financial crisis).

\textsuperscript{239} See Invesco FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192 (“Proposals to designate as “institutional” any account
holding more than a given percentage of a MMF would provide an unfair competitive advantage to larger
funds, which could continue to classify larger investors as “retail.”).

\textsuperscript{240} See Schwab FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 171 (discussing issues related to temporary changes in
ownership percentages that may cause violations of such a concentration test).
investor base and reject investments that would push the fund over the concentration limit in real time. Constant monitoring and order rejection may be costly and difficult to implement, not only for the fund but also for the affected shareholders who may have their purchase orders rejected unexpectedly by the fund. Shareholders may also have issues understanding whether a fund is institutional or retail, and because concentration may frequently change, it may be difficult to provide clear guidelines regarding whether a shareholder could or could not invest in a fund.

We request comment on the approach of distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds based on shareholder concentration:

- If we classify funds as retail or institutional based on shareholder concentration, what thresholds should we use? Would criteria such as whether the top 20 investors make up more than 15% of the fund, or some other threshold, effectively distinguish between types of funds? Would such a concentration test pose operational difficulties? How would funds enforce such limits? How should funds treat omnibus accounts if they were to use such a test?

- Would investors who are likely to redeem shares when market-based valuations fall below the stable price per share be willing and able to spread their investment across enough funds to avoid being too large in any one of them?

- Would shareholder concentration limits result in further consolidation in the industry, as funds seek to grow in order to accommodate large investors?

- We ask commenters to provide empirical justification for any comments on a shareholder concentration approach to distinguishing retail and institutional money market funds.

iii. Shareholder Characteristics
Money market funds could also look at certain characteristics of the investors, such as whether they use a social security number or a taxpayer identification number to register their accounts or whether they demand same-day settlement, to distinguish between retail and institutional money market funds. Such a characteristics test could be used either alone, or in combination with one of the other methods discussed above to distinguish retail funds. However, this approach also has significant drawbacks. While institutional money market funds primarily offer same-day settlement and retail money market funds primarily do not, this is not always the case.\textsuperscript{241} Likewise, social security numbers do not necessarily correlate to an individual, and taxpayer identification numbers do not necessarily correlate to a business. For instance, many businesses are operated as pass-through entities for tax purposes. In addition, funds may not be aware of whether their investors have a SSN or a TIN if the investments are held through an omnibus account.

The Commission requests comment on shareholder characteristics that could effectively distinguish between types of investors, as well as other methods of distinguishing between retail and institutional money market funds.

- What types of shareholder characteristics would effectively distinguish between types of investors? Social security numbers and/or taxpayer identification numbers? Whether the fund provides same-day settlement? Some other characteristic(s)?

\textsuperscript{241} Some institutional money market funds do not offer same-day settlement. See, e.g., Money Market Obligations Trust, Federated New York Municipal Cash Trust (FNTXX), Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (Feb. 28, 2013) (stating that redemption proceeds normally are wired or mailed within one business day after receiving a request in proper form). Some retail money market funds do offer same-day settlement. See, e.g., Dreyfus 100\% U.S. Treasury Money Market Fund (DUSXX), Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (May 1, 2012) (stating that if a redemption request is received in proper form by 3:00 p.m., Eastern time, the proceeds of the redemption, if transfer by wire is requested, ordinarily will be transmitted on the same day).
• Besides the approaches discussed above, are there other ways we could effectively distinguish retail from institutional money market funds? Should we combine any of these approaches? Should we adopt more than one of these methods of distinguishing retail funds, so that a fund could use the method that is lowest cost and best fits their investor base?

• We ask commenters to provide empirical justification for any comments on a shareholder characteristics approach to distinguishing retail and institutional money market funds.

d. Economic Effects of the Proposed Retail Exemption

In addition to the costs and benefits of a retail exemption discussed above, implementing any retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement may have effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. A retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement could make retail money market funds more attractive to investors than floating NAV funds without a retail exemption, assuming that retail investors prefer such funds. If so, we anticipate a retail exemption could reduce the impact we expect on the number of funds and assets under management, discussed in section III.E below. However, these positive effects on capital formation could be reversed to the extent that the costs funds incur in implementing a retail exemption are passed on to shareholders, or shareholders give up potentially higher yields. As discussed above, a retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement could involve operational costs, with the extent of those costs likely being higher for funds sold primarily through intermediaries than for funds sold directly to investors. These operational costs, depending on their magnitude, might affect capital formation and also competition (depending on the different ability of funds to absorb these costs).
A retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement could have negative effects on competition by benefitting fund groups with large percentages of retail investors, especially where those retail investors invest directly in the funds rather than through intermediaries, relative to other funds.\(^{242}\) A retail exemption could have a negative effect on competition to the extent that it favors fund groups that already offer separate retail and institutional money market funds and thus might not need to reorganize an existing money market fund into two separate funds to implement the exemption. On the other hand, as discussed above, we believe that the majority of money market funds currently are owned by both retail and institutional investors (although many funds are separated into retail and institutional classes), and therefore relatively few funds would benefit from this competitive advantage. Fund groups that can offer multiple retail funds will have a competitive advantage over those that cannot if investors with large liquidity needs are willing to spread their investments across multiple retail funds to avoid the redemption threshold.

A retail exemption may promote efficiency by tying the floating NAV requirement to the shareholders that are most likely to redeem from a fund in response to deviations between its stable share price and market-based NAV per share. However, to the extent that a retail exemption fails to distinguish effectively institutional from retail shareholders, it may have negative effects on efficiency by permitting “gaming behavior” by shareholders with institutional characteristics who nonetheless invest in retail funds. It may also negatively affect fund efficiency to the extent that, to take advantage of a retail exemption, a fund that currently

\(^{242}\) Fund groups with large percentages of retail investors, and in particular, direct investors, may be better positioned to satisfy growing demand if we were to adopt the proposed retail exemption to our floating NAV proposal. See Invesco FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192 (“Imposing a distinction between ‘retail’ versus ‘institutional’ funds would therefore unduly favor those MMF complexes with a preponderance of direct individual investors or affiliated omnibus account platforms over those with a more diverse investor basis and those with using unaffiliated intermediaries.”).
separates institutional and retail investors through different classes instead would need to create separate and distinct funds, which may be less efficient. The costs of such a re-organization are discussed in this Release below.

We request comment on the effects of a retail exemption to the floating NAV proposed on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

- Would implementing a retail exemption have an effect on efficiency, competition, or capital formation? Which methods of distinguishing retail and institutional investors discussed above, if any, would result in the most positive effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation?

- Would the floating NAV proposal have less of a negative impact on capital formation with a retail exemption than without? Would it provide competitive advantages to fund groups that have large percentages of retail investors, especially where those retail investors invest directly in the funds rather than through intermediaries, relative to other funds that have lower percentages of retail investors?

- Would a retail exemption better promote efficiency by tying the floating NAV requirement to institutional shareholders instead of retail shareholders? Why or why not?

The qualitative costs and benefits of any retail exemption to the floating NAV proposal are discussed above. Because we do not know how attractive such funds would be to retail investors, we cannot quantify these qualitative benefits or costs. However, we can quantify the operational costs that money market funds, intermediaries, and money market fund service providers might incur in implementing and administering the retail exemption to the floating
NAV requirement that we are proposing today.²⁴³

Although we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate²⁴⁴ of the potential costs associated with a retail exemption, our staff has estimated the ranges of hours and costs that may be required to perform activities typically involved in making systems modifications, implementing fund policies and procedures, and performing related activities. These estimates include one-time and ongoing costs to establish separate funds if necessary, modify systems and related procedures and controls, update disclosure in a fund’s prospectus and advertising materials to reflect any investment or redemption restrictions associated with the retail exemption, as well as ongoing operational costs. All estimates are based on the staff’s experience and discussions with industry representatives. We first discuss the different categories of operational costs that might be incurred in implementing a retail exemption, and then we provide a total cost estimate that captures all of the categories of costs discussed below. We expect that only funds that determine that the benefits of taking advantage of the proposed retail exemption would be justified by the costs would take advantage of it and bear these costs. Otherwise, they would incur the costs of implementing a floating NAV generally.

Many money market funds are currently owned by both retail and institutional investors, although they are often separated into retail and institutional share classes. A fund relying on the

²⁴³ The costs estimated in this section would be spread amongst money market funds, intermediaries, and money market fund service providers (e.g., transfer agents). For ease of reference, we refer only to money market funds and intermediaries in our discussion of these costs. As with other costs we estimate in this Release, our staff has estimated the costs that a single affected entity would incur. We anticipate, however, that many money market funds and intermediaries may not bear the estimated costs on an individual basis. The costs of systems modifications, for example, likely would be allocated among the multiple users of the systems, such as money market fund members of a fund group, money market funds that use the same transfer agent, and intermediaries that use systems purchased from the same third party. Accordingly, we expect that the cost for many individual entities may be less than the estimated costs.

²⁴⁴ We are using the term “point estimate” to indicate a specific single estimate as opposed to a range of estimates.
proposed retail exemption would need to be structured to accept only retail investors as determined by the daily redemption limit, and thus any money market fund that currently has both retail and institutional shareholders would need to be reorganized into separate retail and institutional money market funds. One-time costs associated with this reorganization would include costs incurred by the fund's counsel to draft appropriate organizational documents and costs incurred by the fund's board of directors to approve such documents. One-time costs also would include the costs to update the fund's registration statement and any relevant contracts or agreements to reflect the reorganization, as well as costs to update prospectuses and to inform shareholders of the reorganization. Funds and intermediaries may also incur one-time costs in training staff to understand the operation of the fund and effectively implement the redemption restrictions.

The daily redemption limitation method of distinguishing retail and institutional investors that we are proposing today would also require funds to have policies and procedures reasonably designed to allow the conclusion that omnibus account holders apply the fund's redemption limits to beneficial owners invested through the omnibus accounts. Adopting such policies and procedures and building systems to implement them would also involve one-time costs for funds and intermediaries. Funds could either conclude that their policies are enforced by obtaining information regarding underlying investors in omnibus accounts (transparency), or use some other sort of method to reasonably verify that omnibus account holders are implementing the fund's redemption policies, such as entering into an agreement or getting certifications from the omnibus account holder. In preparing the following cost estimates, the staff assumed that funds would generally rely on financial intermediaries to implement redemption policies without undergoing the costs of entering into an agreement, because funds and intermediaries would
typically take the approach that is the least expensive. However, some funds may undertake the costs of obtaining an explicit agreement despite the expense. Our staff estimates that the one-time costs necessary to implement the retail exemption to the floating NAV proposal, including the various organizational, operational, training, and other costs discussed above, would range from $1,000,000 to $1,500,000 for each fund that chooses to take advantage of the retail exemption.245

Funds that choose to take advantage of the retail exemption would also incur ongoing costs. These ongoing costs would include the costs of operating two separate funds (retail and institutional) instead of separate classes of a single fund, such as additional transfer agent, accounting, and other similar costs. Funds and intermediaries would also incur ongoing costs related to enforcing the daily redemption limitation on an ongoing basis and monitoring to conclude that the limits are being effectively enforced. Other ongoing costs may include systems maintenance, periodic review and updates of policies and procedures, and additional staff training. Accordingly, our staff estimates that money market funds and intermediaries administering a retail exemption likely would incur ongoing costs of 20%-30% of the one-time

Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) planning, coding, testing, and installing system modifications; (ii) drafting, integrating, and implementing related procedures and controls; and (iii) preparing training materials and administering training sessions for staff in affected areas. Our staff’s estimates of these operational and related costs, and those discussed throughout this Release, are based on, among other things, staff experience implementing, or overseeing the implementation of, systems modifications and related work at mutual fund complexes, and included analyses of wage information from SIFMA’s Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2012, see infra note 996, for the various types of professionals staff estimates would be involved in performing the activities associated with our proposals. The actual costs associated with each of these activities would depend on a number of factors, including variations in the functionality, sophistication, and level of automation of existing systems and related procedures and controls, and the complexity of the operating environment in which these systems operate. Our staff’s estimates generally are based on the use of internal resources because we believe that a money market fund (or other affected entity) would engage third-party service providers only if the external costs were comparable, or less than, the estimated internal costs. The total operational costs discussed here include the costs that are “collections of information” that are discussed in section IV of this Release.
costs, or between $200,000 and $450,000 per year.246

- Are the staff’s cost estimates too high or too low, and, if so, by what amount and why? Are there operational or other costs associated with segregating retail investors other than those discussed above?

- Do commenters believe that the proposed retail exemption would involve expenses beyond those estimated? To what extent would the costs vary depending on how a retail exemption is structured? Which of the staff’s assumptions would most significantly affect the costs? Has our staff identified the assumptions that most significantly influence the cost of a retail exemption?

- What kinds of ongoing activities would be required to administer the proposed retail exemption to the floating NAV requirement, and to what extent? Would it be less costly for some funds (e.g., those that are directly sold to investors) to make use of a retail investor exemption? If so, how much would those funds save?

5. Effect on Other Money Market Fund Exemptions

a. Affiliate Purchases

Rule 17a-9 provides an exemption from section 17(a) of the Act to permit affiliated persons of a money market fund to purchase portfolio securities from the fund under certain circumstances, and it is designed to provide a means for an affiliated person to provide liquidity to the fund and prevent it from breaking the buck.247 Under our floating NAV proposal,

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246 We recognize that adding new capabilities or capacity to a system (including modifications to related procedures and controls and related training) will entail ongoing annual maintenance costs and understand that those costs generally are estimated as a percentage of the initial costs of building or modifying a system.

247 Absent a Commission exemption, section 17(a)(2) of the Act prohibits any affiliated person or promoter of
however, money market funds’ share prices would “float,” and funds thus could not “break the buck.” Notwithstanding the inability of funds to “break the buck” under our floating NAV proposal, for the reasons discussed below, we propose to retain rule 17a-9 with the amendments, discussed below, for all money market funds (including government and retail money market funds that would be exempt from our floating NAV proposal).

Funds with a floating NAV would still be required to adhere to rule 2a-7’s risk-limiting conditions to reduce the likelihood that portfolio securities experience losses from credit events and interest rate changes. Even with a floating NAV and limited risk, as specified by the provisions of rule 2a-7, money market funds face potential liquidity, credit and reputational issues in times of fund and market stress and the resultant incentives for shareholders to redeem shares.

In normal market conditions, that shareholders may request immediate redemptions from a fund with a portfolio that does not hold securities that mature in the same time frame generally is no cause for concern because funds typically can sell portfolio securities to satisfy shareholder redemptions without negatively affecting prices. In times of crisis when the secondary markets

or principal underwriter for a fund (or any affiliated person of such a person), acting as principal, from knowingly purchasing securities from the fund. For convenience, in this Release, we refer to all of the persons who would otherwise be prohibited by section 17(a)(2) from purchasing securities of a money market fund as “affiliated persons.” “Affiliated person” is defined in section 2(a)(3) of the Act.

Rule 17a-9, as adopted in 1996, provides an exemption from section 17(a) of the Act to permit affiliated persons of a money market fund to purchase a security from a money market fund that is no longer an eligible security (as defined in rule 2a-7), provided that the purchase price is (i) paid in cash; and (ii) equals the greater of amortized cost of the security or its market price (in each case including accrued interest). See Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 21837 (Mar. 21, 1996) [61 FR 13956 Mar. 28, 1996]) (the “1996 Adopting Release”). As part of the 2010 money market fund reforms (discussed in supra section II.D.1), we expanded the exemptive relief in rule 17a-9 to permit affiliates to purchase from a money market fund (i) a portfolio security that has defaulted, but that continues to be an eligible security (subject to the purchase conditions described); and (ii) any other portfolio security (subject to the purchase conditions described above), for any reason, provided the affiliated person remits to the fund any profit it realizes from the later sale of the security (“clawback provision”). See rule 17a-9(a), (b).
for portfolio assets become illiquid, funds might be unable to sell sufficient assets without causing large price movements that affect not only the non-redeeming shareholders but also investors in other funds that hold similar assets. Therefore, to provide fund sponsors with flexibility to protect shareholder interests, we are proposing to allow fund sponsors to continue to support money market fund operations through, for example, affiliate purchases (in reliance on rule 17a-9), provided such support is thoroughly and consistently disclosed.248

As exists today, money market fund sponsors that have a greater capacity to support their funds may have a competitive advantage over other fund sponsors that do not. The value of this competitive advantage depends on the extent to which fund sponsors choose to support their funds and may be reduced by the proposed enhanced disclosure requirements discussed in this Release which may disincentivize fund sponsors from supporting their funds. The value of potential sponsor support also will depend on whether investors view support as good news (because, for example, the sponsor stands behind the fund) or bad news (because, for example, the sponsor does not adequately monitor the portfolio manager). The decision to leave rule 17a-9 in place should not, in our opinion, impose any additional costs on money market funds, their shareholders, or others, or change the effects on efficiency or capital formation. We recognize, however, that permitting sponsor support (through rule 17a-9 transactions) may allow money market fund sponsors to prevent their fund from deviating from its stable share price, potentially undercutting our goal to increase the transparency of money market fund risks.

248 Commenters have noted the importance of sponsor support under rule 17a-9 as a tool that funds can use as a support mechanism. See, e.g., Comment Letter of U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Jan. 23, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("U.S. Chamber Jan. 23, 2013 FSOC Comment Letter"), Federated Investors Alternative 1 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 161. We are proposing amendments to require that money market funds disclose the circumstances under which a fund sponsor may offer any form of support to the fund (e.g., capital contributions, capital support agreements, letters of indemnity), any limits on such support, past instances of support provided to the fund, and public notification to the Commission regarding current instances of support provided. See infra section III.F for a more detailed discussion.
We request comment on retaining the rule 17a-9 exemption.

- Do commenters believe affiliated person support is important to funds, investors, or the securities markets even under our floating NAV proposal? Do commenters agree with our assumptions that liquidity concerns are likely to remain significant even with a floating NAV and that fund sponsors should continue to have this flexibility to protect shareholder interests? We note that rule 17a-9 was established and then expanded in 2010, in the context of stable values. If money market funds are required to float their NAVs, should we limit further the circumstances under which fund sponsors or advisers can use rule 17a-9? If so, how?

- Does permitting affiliated purchases for floating NAV money market funds reduce the transparency of fund risks that our floating NAV proposal is designed, in part, to achieve? If so, does the additional disclosure we are proposing mitigate such an effect? Are there additional ways we can mitigate such an effect?

- Should we allow only certain types of support or should we prohibit certain types of support? For example, should we allow sponsors to purchase under rule 17a-9 only liquidity-impaired assets, or should we prohibit sponsors from purchasing defaulted securities? Why or why not? If yes, what types of support should be permitted and what types should be prohibited? Why?

- Would the ability of fund sponsors to support the NAV of floating funds affect the way in which money market funds are structured and marketed? If so, how? Would it affect the competitive position of fund sponsors that are more or less likely to have available capital to support their funds?
- Do commenters agree that our proposed amendment would not impose additional costs on funds or shareholders or impact efficiency or capital formation?

- Instead of retaining 17a-9, should we instead repeal the rule and thereby prohibit certain types of sponsor support of money market funds? If so, why?

b. Suspension of Redemptions

Rule 22e-3 exempts money market funds from section 22(e) of the Act to permit them to suspend redemptions and postpone payment of redemption proceeds to facilitate an orderly liquidation of the fund.\(^{249}\) Rule 22e-3 replaced temporary rule 22e-3T.\(^{250}\) Rule 22e-3 is designed to allow funds to suspend redemptions before actually breaking the buck, reduce the vulnerability of investors to the harmful effects of heavy redemptions on funds, and minimize the potential for disruption to the securities markets.\(^{251}\) Rule 22e-3 currently requires that a fund's board of directors, including a majority of disinterested directors, determine that the deviation between the fund's amortized cost price per share and the market-based net asset value per share may result in material dilution or other unfair results before it suspends redemptions.\(^{252}\) We recognize that, under our floating NAV proposal, money market funds (including those exempt from the floating NAV requirement) generally would no longer be able to use amortized cost

\(^{249}\) Rule 22e-3(a)(1).

\(^{250}\) Rule 22e-3 was first adopted as an interim final temporary final shortly after the Temporary Guarantee Program was established. See Temporary Exemption for Liquidation of Certain Money Market Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 28487 (Nov. 20, 2008) [73 FR 71919 (Nov. 26, 2008)] (establishing rule 22e-3T to facilitate compliance for those money market funds that elected to participate in the Temporary Guarantee Program and were therefore required to promptly suspend redemptions if the fund broke the buck). The temporary rule expired on expired October 18, 2009. Id. See also infra section II.C (discussing the Temporary Guarantee Program).

\(^{251}\) See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at section II.H (noting that the rule is designed only to facilitate the permanent termination of the fund in an orderly manner). See also rule 22e-3(a)(2) (requiring the fund's board to irrevocably approve the fund's liquidation).

\(^{252}\) Rule 22e-3(a)(1).
valuation for their portfolio holdings. Instead, government and retail money market funds would use the penny rounding method of pricing to maintain a stable share price and other money market funds would have a floating NAV per share. Accordingly, for all money market funds, the current threshold under rule 22e-3 for suspending redemptions would need modification to conform to the new regulatory regime.

As discussed above, we recognize that our floating NAV proposal, in conjunction with our other proposals, may not be sufficient to eliminate the incentive for shareholders to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress. As such, floating NAV money market funds may still face liquidity issues that could force them to want to suspend redemptions and liquidate. Commenters have noted the benefits of rule 22e-3, including that the rule prevents a lengthy and disorderly liquidation process, like that experienced by the Reserve Primary Fund. Therefore, despite a floating NAV fund’s inability to break a buck, we believe the benefits of rule 22e-3 should be preserved. Accordingly, under our proposed amendment, all floating NAV money market funds would be permitted to suspend redemptions, when, among other requirements, the fund, at the end of a business day, has less than 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets.

As discussed below in our discussion of the liquidity fees and gates alternative proposal, we believe that when a fund’s weekly liquid assets are at least 50% below the minimum required weekly liquidity (i.e., weekly liquid assets have fallen from 30% to 15%), the fund is under sufficient stress to warrant that the fund’s board be permitted to suspend redemptions in light of a

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253 As discussed above, money market funds would continue to be permitted to use amortized cost to value portfolio securities with a remaining maturity of 60 days or less.


255 See proposed (FNAV) rule 22e-3(a) (requiring that the fund’s board, including a majority of directors who are not interested persons of the fund, irrevocably has approved the liquidation of the fund).
decision to liquidate the fund (and therefore facilitate an orderly liquidation).

Government money market funds and retail money market funds, which would be exempt from the floating NAV requirement, would be able to suspend redemptions and liquidate if either (1) the fund, at the end of a business day, has less than 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets or (2) the fund’s price per share as computed for purposes of distribution, redemption, and repurchase is no longer equal to its stable share price or the fund’s board (including a majority of disinterested directors) determines that such a change is likely to occur.256 This would allow those funds to suspend redemptions and liquidate if the fund came under liquidity stress or if the fund was about to “break the buck.”

Because money market funds already comply with rule 22e-3, we do not believe that retaining the rule in the context of our floating NAV proposal would impose any additional costs on money market funds, their shareholders, or others, nor have any effects on competition, efficiency, or capital formation.257

We request comment on this proposed amendment.

- Do commenters believe that the ability to suspend redemptions (under the circumstances we propose) would be important to floating NAV funds, their investors, and the securities markets?

- Would this ability be important to a retail or government money market fund even though we are proposing to exempt these funds from the floating NAV requirement, in part, because they are less likely to face heavy redemptions in

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256 See id.

257 The Commission considered rule 22e-3’s costs, benefits, and effects on competition, efficiency, and capital formation, which this amendment would preserve, when it adopted the rule. See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at sections II.H, V, and VI.
times of stress?

- Is it appropriate to allow a money market fund to suspend redemptions and liquidate if its level of weekly liquid assets falls below 15% of its total assets? Is there a different threshold based on daily or weekly assets that would better protect money market fund shareholders? What is that threshold, and why is it better? Is there a threshold based on different factors that would better protect money market fund shareholders? What are those factors, and why are they better? If so, is such suspension then appropriate only in connection with liquidation, or should it be broader?

- Is our conclusion correct that it will impose no costs nor have any effects on competition, efficiency, or capital formation?

6. *Tax and Accounting Implications of Floating NAV Money Market Funds*

   a. *Tax Implications*

Money market funds' ability to maintain a stable value per share simplifies tax compliance for their shareholders. Today, purchases and sales of money market fund shares at a stable $1.00 share price generate no gains or losses, and money market fund shareholders therefore generally need not track the timing and price of purchase and sale transactions for capital gains or losses.

   i. *Realized Gains and Losses*

If we were to require some money market funds to use floating NAVs, taxable investors in those money market funds, like taxable investors in other types of mutual funds, would experience gains and losses. Shareholders in floating NAV money market funds, therefore, could owe tax on any gains on sales of their money market fund shares, could have tax benefits
from any losses, and would have to determine those amounts. Because it is not possible to predict the timing of shareholders’ future transactions and the amount of NAV fluctuations, we are not able to estimate the amount of any increase or decrease in shareholders’ tax burdens. But, given the relatively small fluctuations in value that we anticipate would occur in floating NAV money market funds and our proposed exemption of certain funds from the floating NAV requirement, any changes in tax burdens likely would be minimal.

Commenters also have asserted that taxable investors in floating NAV money market funds, like taxable investors in other types of mutual funds, would be required to track the timing and price of purchase and sale transactions to determine the amounts of gains and losses realized. For mutual funds other than stable-value money market funds, tax rules now generally require the funds or intermediaries to report to the IRS and the shareholders certain information about sales of shares, including sale dates and gross proceeds. If the shares sold were acquired after January 1, 2012, the fund or intermediary must also report cost basis and whether any gain or loss is long or short term. These new basis reporting requirements and the pre-2012 reporting requirements are collectively referred to as “information reporting.”

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258 In its proposed recommendation, the FSOC recognized the potential increased tax-compliance burdens associated with a floating NAV for both money market funds and shareholders. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 33-34.

259 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Investment Company Institute (Feb. 16, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (“ICI Feb 2012 PWG Comment Letter”) (enclosing a submission by the Investment Company Institute Working Group on Money Market Fund Reform Standing Committee on Investment Management International Organization of Securities Commissions) (“To be sure, investors already face these burdens [tracking purchases and sales for tax purposes] in connection with investments in long-term mutual funds. But most investors make fewer purchases and sales from long-term mutual funds because they are used for long-term saving, not cash management.”).

260 Regulations exclude sales of stable-value money market funds from this reporting obligation. See 26 CFR 1.6045–1(c)(3)(vi).

261 The new reporting requirements (often referred to as “basis reporting”) were instituted by section 403 of the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (Division B of Pub. L. No. 110–343) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 6045(g), 6045A, and 6045B); see also 26 CFR 1.6045–1; Internal Revenue Service Form 1099-B.
funds and intermediaries, however, are not currently required to make reports to certain shareholders (including most institutional investors). The regulations call these shareholders “exempt recipients.”

We understand, based on discussions by our staff with staff at the Treasury Department and the IRS, that, by operation of the current tax regulations, if our floating NAV proposal is adopted, money market funds that float their NAV per share would no longer be excluded from the information reporting requirements currently applicable to mutual funds and intermediaries. Because retail money market funds would not be required to use floating NAVs, the vast majority of floating NAV money market fund shareholders are expected to be exempt recipients (with respect to which information reporting is not required). Such exempt recipients would thus be required to track gains and losses, similar to the current treatment of exempt recipient holders of other mutual fund shares. If there are any money market fund shareholders for which information reporting is made, those shareholders would be able to make use of such reports in determining and reporting their tax liability. We also understand that the Treasury Department and the IRS are considering alternatives for modifying forms and guidance (1) to include net information reporting by the funds of realized gains and losses for sales of all mutual fund shares; and (2) to allow summary income tax reporting by shareholders.

We anticipate that these modifications, if effected, could reduce burdens and costs to shareholders when reporting annual realized gains or losses from transactions in a floating NAV.

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262 See 26 CFR 1.6045–1(c)(3).
263 See supra note 260.
264 For 2012, the IRS allowed certain taxpayers to include summary totals in their Federal income tax returns, adding "Available upon request" where transaction details might otherwise have been required. See 2012 Instructions for Form 8949—Sales and Other Dispositions of Capital Assets, p. 3, col. 1, “Exception 2,” available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8949.pdf.
money market fund. We recognize that if these modifications are not made, the tax reporting effects of a floating NAV could be quite burdensome for money market fund investors that typically engage in frequent transactions. Regardless of the applicability of net information reporting or of summary income tax reporting, however, all shareholders of floating NAV money market funds would be required to recognize and report taxable gains and losses with respect to redemptions of fund shares, which does not occur today with respect to shares of stable-value money market funds.\textsuperscript{265}

We request comment on the burdens of tax compliance for money market fund shareholders (the impact on funds is discussed in the operational costs section below).

- If any shareholders of a floating NAV money market fund are not exempt recipients (and thus receive the information reporting that other non-exempt-recipient shareholders of other mutual funds currently receive), how difficult would it be for those shareholders to use that information to determine and report taxable gains and losses? Would it be any more difficult for floating NAV money market fund shareholders than other mutual fund shareholders? What kinds of costs, by type and amount, would be involved?

- In the case of floating NAV fund shareholders that are exempt recipients (which are not required recipients of information reporting), what types and amounts of costs would those shareholders incur to track their share purchases and sales and report any taxable gains or losses?

\textsuperscript{265} Money market funds also would incur costs in gathering and transmitting this information to money market fund shareholders that they would not incur absent our proposal, but these costs are discussed in the operational costs discussed below.
• As discussed above, mutual funds and intermediaries are not required to provide information reporting for exempt recipients, including virtually all institutional investors. Do mutual funds and intermediaries provide this information to shareholders even if tax law does not require them to do so? If not, would money market funds and intermediaries be able to use their existing systems and processes to access this information if investors request it as a result of our floating NAV proposal? Would doing so involve systems modifications or other costs in addition to those we estimate in section III.A.7, below? Would institutions or other exempt recipients find it useful or more efficient to receive this information from funds rather than to develop it themselves?

• Would exempt-recipient investors continue to invest in floating NAV funds if there continues to be no information reporting with respect to them?

• Would exempt-recipient investors invest in floating NAV money market funds if there is no administrative relief related to summary reporting of capital gains and losses, as discussed above? What would be the effect on the utility of floating NAV money market funds if the anticipated administrative relief is not provided? Would investors be able to use floating NAV money market funds in the same way or for the same purposes absent the anticipated administrative relief?

ii. Wash Sales

In addition to the tax obligations that may arise through daily fluctuations in purchase and redemption prices of floating NAV money market funds (discussed above), special “wash sale” rules apply when shareholders sell securities at a loss and, within 30 days before or after the sale,
buy substantially identical securities. 

Generally, if a shareholder incurs a loss from a wash sale, the loss cannot be deducted, and instead must be added to the basis of the new, substantially identical securities, which effectively postpones the loss deduction until the shareholder recognizes gain or loss on the new securities. Because many money market fund investors automatically reinvest their dividends (which are often paid monthly), virtually all redemptions by these investors would be within 30 days of a dividend reinvestment (i.e., purchase). Under the wash sale rules, the losses realized in those redemptions would be disallowed in whole or in part until an investor disposed of the replacement shares (or longer, if that disposition is also a wash sale). We understand that the Treasury Department and IRS are actively considering administrative relief under which redemptions of floating NAV money market fund shares that generate losses below a de minimis threshold would not be subject to the wash sale rules. We recognize, however, that money market funds would still incur operational costs to establish systems with the capability of identifying wash sale transactions, assessing whether they meet the de minimis criterion, and adjusting shareholder basis as needed when they do not.

We request comment on the tax implications related to our floating NAV proposal.

- Would investors continue to invest in floating NAV money market funds absent administrative relief from the Treasury Department and IRS relating to wash sales? What would be the effect on the utility of floating NAV money market funds if the anticipated administrative relief is not provided? Would investors be able to use floating NAV money market funds in the same way or for the same purposes absent the anticipated administrative relief?

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266 See 26 U.S.C. 1091.
267 Id.
268 These operational costs are discussed in infra section III.A.7.
b. Accounting Implications

If we were to adopt our floating NAV proposal, some money market fund shareholders may question whether they would be able to treat their fund shares as “cash equivalents” on their balance sheets. We understand that classifying money market fund investments as cash equivalents is important because, among other things, investors may have debt covenants that mandate certain levels of cash and cash equivalents.269

Current U.S. GAAP defines cash equivalents as “short-term, highly liquid investments that are readily convertible to known amounts of cash and that are so near their maturity that they present insignificant risk of changes in value because of changes in interest rates.”270 In addition, U.S. GAAP includes an investment in a money market fund as an example of a cash equivalent.271 Notwithstanding, some shareholders may be concerned given this guidance came before money market funds using floating NAVs.272

Except as noted below, the Commission believes that an investment in a money market fund with a floating NAV would meet the definition of a “cash equivalent.” We believe the adoption of floating NAV alone would not preclude shareholders from classifying their investments in money market funds as cash equivalents because fluctuations in the amount of cash received upon redemption would likely be insignificant and would be consistent with the concept of a ‘known’ amount of cash. The RSFI Study supports our belief by noting that floating NAV money market funds are not likely to experience significant fluctuations in

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269 In addition, some corporate investors may perceive cash and cash equivalents on a company’s balance sheet as a measure of financial strength.

270 See Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification ("FASB ASC") paragraph 305-10-20.

271 Id.

272 See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25.
value. The floating NAV requirement is also not expected to change the risk profile of money market fund portfolio investments. Rule 2a-7's risk-limiting conditions should result in fluctuations in value from changes in interest rates and credit risk being insignificant.

As is the case today with stable share price money market funds, events may occur that give rise to credit and liquidity issues for money market funds and shareholders would need to reassess if their investments continue to meet the definition of a cash equivalent. For example, during the financial crisis, certain money market funds experienced unexpected declines in the fair value of their investments due to deterioration in the creditworthiness of their assets and as a result, portfolios of money market funds became less liquid. Investors in these money market funds would have needed to determine whether their investments continued to meet the definition of a cash equivalent. If events occur that cause shareholders in floating NAV money market funds to determine their shares are not cash equivalents, the shares would need to be classified as investments, and shareholders would have to treat them either as trading securities or available-for-sale securities.274

Do commenters believe using a floating NAV would preclude money market funds from being classified as cash equivalents under GAAP?

- Would shareholders be less likely to invest in floating NAV money market funds if the shares held were classified for financial statement purposes as an “investment” rather than “cash and cash equivalent?”
- Are there any other accounting-related costs or burdens that money market fund shareholders would incur if we require money market funds to use floating NAVs?

273 See RSFI Study, supra note 21.
274 See FASB ASC paragraph 320-10-25-1.
c. Implications for Local Government Investment Pools

We also recognize that many states have established local government investment pools ("LGIPs"), money market fund-like investment pools that invest in short-term securities, that are required by law or investment policies to maintain a stable NAV per share. The Government Accounting Standards Board ("GASB") states that LGIPs that are operated in a manner consistent with rule 2a-7 (i.e., a "2a7-like pool") may use amortized cost to value securities (and presumably, facilitate maintaining a stable NAV per share). Our floating NAV proposal, if adopted, may have implications for LGIPs. In order to continue to manage LGIPs, state statutes and policies may need to be amended to permit the operation of investment pools that adhere to rule 2a-7 as we propose to amend it. Because we are unable to predict how various state legislatures and other market participants will react to our floating NAV proposal, we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate of the impact on LGIPs or the potential effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. We note, however, that it is possible that states could amend their statutes or policies to permit the operation of LGIPs that comply with rule 2a-7 as we propose to amend it. We request comment.

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275 LGIPs tend to emulate typical money market funds by maintaining a stable NAV per share through investments in short-term securities. See infra III.E.1, Table 2, note N.


278 See, e.g., Comment Letter of American Public Power Assoc., et al., File No. FSOC-2012-0003 (Feb. 13, 2013) ("If the SEC rules are changed to adopt a daily floating NAV, states would have to alter their own statutes in order to comply, as many state statutes cite rule 2a-7 as the model for their management of the LGIPs").
on this aspect of our proposal.

- Would our floating NAV proposal affect LGIPs as described above? Are there other ways in which LGIPs would be affected? If so, please describe.

- Are there other costs that we have not considered?

- How do commenters think states and other market participants would react to our floating NAV proposal? Do commenters believe that states would amend their statutes or policies to permit LGIPs to have a floating NAV per share provided the fund complies with rule 2a-7, as we propose to amend it? If so, what types and amounts of costs would states incur? If not, would there be any effect on efficiency, competition, or capital formation?

7. Operational Implications of Floating NAV Money Market Funds

Money market funds (or their transfer agents) are required under rule 2a-7 to have the capacity to redeem and sell fund shares at prices based on the funds’ current net asset value per share pursuant to rule 22c-1 rather than $1.00, i.e., to transact at the fund’s floating NAV.279 Intermediaries, although not subject to rule 2a-7, typically have separate obligations to investors with regard to the distribution of proceeds received in connection with investments made or assets held on behalf of investors.280 Prior to adopting these amendments to rule 2a-7, the ICI submitted a comment letter detailing the modifications that would be required to permit funds to transact at the fund’s floating NAV.281 Accordingly, we expect that money market funds and

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279 See rule 2a-7(c)(13). See also 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at nn.362-363.


281 See, e.g., Comment Letter of the Investment Company Institute (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-
transfer agents already have laid the foundation required to use floating NAVs.

We recognize, however, that funds, transfer agents, intermediaries, and others in the distribution chain may not currently have the capacity to process transactions at floating NAVs constantly, as would be required under our proposal. Accordingly, we expect that sub-transfer agents, fund accounting departments, custodians, intermediaries, and others in the distribution chain would need to develop and overlay additional controls and procedures on top of existing systems in order to implement a floating NAV on a continual basis. In each case, the controls and procedures for the accounting systems at these entities would have to be modified to permit those systems to calculate a money market fund’s floating NAV each business day and to communicate that value to others in the distribution chain on a permanent basis. In addition, we understand that, under our floating NAV proposal, money market funds and other recordkeepers would incur additional costs to track portfolio security gains and losses, provide “basis reporting,” and monitor for potential wash-sale transactions, as discussed above in section III.A.6. We believe, however, that funds, in many cases, should be able to leverage existing systems that track this information for other mutual funds.

11-09 ("ICI 2009 Comment Letter") (describing the modifications that would be necessary if the Commission adopted the requirement, currently reflected in rule 2a-7(c)(13), that money market funds (or their transfer agents) have the capacity to transact at a floating NAV, to: (i) fund transfer agent recordkeeping systems (e.g., special same-day settlement processes and systems, customized transmissions, and reporting mechanisms associated with same-day settlement systems and proprietary systems used for next-day settlement); (ii) a number of essential ancillary systems and related processes (e.g., systems changes for reconciliation and control functions, transactions accepted via the Internet and by phone, modifying related shareholder disclosures and phone scripts, education and training for transfer agent employees and changes to the systems used by fund accountants that transmit net asset value data to fund transfer agents); and (iii) sub-transfer agent/recordkeeping arrangements (explaining that similar modifications likely would be needed at various intermediaries).

Even though a fund complex’s transfer agent system is the primary recordkeeping system, there are a number of additional subsystems and ancillary systems that overlay, integrate with, or feed to or from a fund’s primary transfer agent system, incorporate custom development, and may be proprietary or vendor dependent (e.g., print vendors to produce trade confirmations). See ICI Operational Impacts Study at 20, supra note 280. The systems of sub-transfer agents and other parties may also require modifications related to our floating NAV proposal.
We understand that the costs to modify a particular entity’s existing controls and procedures would vary depending on the capacity, function and level of automation of the accounting systems to which the controls and procedures relate and the complexity of those systems’ operating environments. Procedures and controls that support systems that operate in highly automated operating environments would likely be less costly to modify while those that support complex operations with multiple fund types or limited automation or both would be more costly to change. Because each system’s capabilities and functions are different, an entity would likely have to perform an in-depth analysis of our proposed rules to calculate the costs of modifications required for its own system. While we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the potential costs of modifying procedures and controls, we expect that each entity would bear one-time costs to modify existing procedures and controls in the functional areas that are likely to be impacted by our proposal. Our staff has estimated that the one-time costs of implementation for an affected entity would range from $1.2 million (for entities requiring less extensive modifications) to $2.3 million (for entities requiring more extensive modifications). Staff also estimates that the annual costs to keep procedures and controls current and to provide continuing training would range from 5% to 15% of the one-time costs.

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283 See, e.g., ICI Operational Impacts Study at 37, supra note 280 (noting that the modifications necessary to transact at a floating NAV would “require in some cases minor and other instances major modifications—depending on the complexity of the systems and the types of intermediaries and investors” involved).

284 See, e.g., id. at 41 (reporting that half of the respondents in its survey reported that their transfer agent systems “already had the capability to process money market trades” at a floating value, while the other respondents would need to modify their transfer agent systems to comply with the requirement to have the capacity to transact at a floating NAV).

285 Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) drafting, integrating, and implementing procedures and controls; (ii) preparation of training materials; and (iii) training. See also supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs).

286 As noted throughout this Release, we recognize that adding new capabilities or capacity to a system
We anticipate, however, that many money market funds, transfer agents, custodians, and intermediaries in the distribution chain may not bear the estimated costs on an individual basis and therefore experience economies of scale. For example, the costs would likely be allocated among the multiple users of affected systems, such as money market funds that are members of a fund group, money market funds that use the same transfer agent or custodian, and intermediaries that use systems purchased from the same third party. Accordingly, we expect that the cost for many individual entities that would have to process transactions at floating NAVs may be less than the estimated costs.

We request comment on this analysis and our range of estimated costs to money market funds, transfer agents, custodians, and intermediaries.

- To what extent would transfer agents, fund accounting departments, custodians, and intermediaries need to develop and implement additional controls and procedures or modify existing ones under our floating NAV proposal?
- To what extent do intermediaries, as a result of their separate obligations to investors regarding distribution of proceeds, have the capacity to process (on a continual basis) transactions at a fund’s floating NAV?
- Do money market funds and others expect they would incur costs in addition to those we estimate above or that they would incur different costs? If so, what are these costs?
- Would the costs incurred by money market funds and others in the distribution chain discussed above be passed on to retail (and other) investors in the form of

(including modifications to related procedures and controls) will entail ongoing annual maintenance costs and understand that those costs generally are estimated as a percentage of initial costs of building or expanding a system.
higher fees?

- If a number of money market funds already report daily shadow prices using “basis point” rounding, are there additional operational costs that funds would incur to price their shares to four decimal places? If so, please describe. Are there means by which these operational costs can be reduced while still providing sufficient price transparency?

- Do all funds have the ready capability to price their shares to four decimal places? For those funds that do so already, we seek comment on the costs involved in developing this capability. For funds that do not have the capability, what types and amounts of costs would be incurred?

- What type of ongoing maintenance and training would be necessary, and to what extent? Do commenters agree that such costs would likely range between 5% and 15% of one-time costs? If not, is there a more accurate way to estimate these costs?

- To what extent would money market funds or others experience economies of scale?

- We request that intermediaries and others provide data to support the costs they expect they would incur and an explanation of the work they have already undertaken as a result of rule 2a-7’s current requirement that money market funds (or their transfer agents) have the capacity to transact at a floating NAV.

In addition, funds would incur costs to communicate with shareholders the change to a floating NAV per share. Although funds (and their intermediaries that provide information to beneficial owners) already have the means to provide shareholders the values of their money
market fund holdings, our staff anticipates that they would incur additional costs associated with
programs and systems modifications necessary to provide shareholders with access to that
information online, through automated phone systems, and on shareholder statements under our
floating NAV proposal and to explain to shareholders that the value of their money market funds
shares will fluctuate.\textsuperscript{287}

Our staff anticipates that these communication costs would vary among funds (or their
transfer agents) and fund intermediaries depending on the current capabilities of the entity’s
website, automated or manned phone systems, systems for processing shareholder statements,
and the number of investors. We believe that money market funds themselves would need to
perform an in-depth analysis of our proposed rules in order to estimate the necessary systems
modifications. While we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of
the potential costs of systems modifications, our staff has estimated that the costs for a fund (or
its transfer agent) or intermediary that may be required to perform these activities would range
from $230,000 to $490,000.\textsuperscript{288} Staff also estimates that funds (or their transfer agents) and their
intermediaries would have ongoing costs to maintain automated phone systems and systems for
processing shareholder statements, and to explain to shareholders that the value of their money
market fund shares will fluctuate, and that these costs would range from 5\% to 15\% of the one-
time costs.\textsuperscript{289} We request comment on this aspect of our proposal.

\textsuperscript{287} Staff expects these costs would include software programming modifications, as well as personnel costs
that would include training and scripts for telephone representatives to enable them to respond to investor
inquiries.

\textsuperscript{288} Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) project assessment and
development; (ii) project implementation and testing; and (iii) written and telephone communication. See
also supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs).

\textsuperscript{289} As noted throughout this Release, we recognize that adding new capabilities or capacity to a system will
entail ongoing annual maintenance costs and understand that those costs generally are estimated as a
percentage of initial costs of building or expanding a system.
Do commenters agree with our estimated range of costs to funds (or their transfer agents) and fund intermediaries to communicate with shareholders the change to a floating NAV per share? If not, we request detailed estimates of the types and amounts of costs.

Money market funds’ ability to maintain a stable value also facilitates the funds’ role as a cash management vehicle and provides other operational efficiencies for their shareholders. Money market fund shareholders generally are able to transact in fund shares at a stable value known in advance. This permits money market fund transactions to settle on the same day that an investor places a purchase or sell order, and allows a shareholder to determine the exact value of his or her money market fund shares (absent a liquidation event) at any time. These features have made money market funds an important component of systems for processing and settling various types of transactions.

Commenters have asserted that money market funds with floating NAVs would be incompatible with these systems because, among other things, transactions in shares of these money market funds, like other types of mutual fund transactions, would generally not settle on

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291 See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (noting how same-day settlement is vitally important to many investors and describing how such same-day settlement is facilitated by a stable NAV). We note, however, that not all money market fund transactions settle on the same day. See, e.g., ICI 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 281 (describing the systems and processes involved to permit same-day settlement and those involved for next-day settlement).

292 See, e.g., Comment Letter of John D. Hawke (Dec. 15, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Hawke Dec 2011 PWG Comment Letter”) (identifying various types of systems, including among others trust accounting systems at bank trust departments; corporate payroll processing systems and processing systems used to manage corporations’ cash balances; processing systems used by federal, state, and local governments to manage their cash balances; and municipal bond trustee cash management systems).
the same day that an order is placed, and the value of the shares of these money market funds could not be determined precisely before that day’s NAV had been calculated. Requiring money market funds to use floating NAVs, the commenters assert, would require money market fund shareholders and service providers to reprogram their systems or manually reconcile transactions, increasing staffing costs. Others have asserted that similar considerations could affect features that are particularly appealing to retail investors, such as ATM access, check writing, electronic check payment processing services and products, and U.S. Fedwire transfers. We note that we are proposing an exemption for retail funds which we expect would significantly alleviate any such concerns about the costs of altering those features, because funds that take advantage of the retail exemption would be able to maintain a stable price, and

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293 Hawke Dec 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 292 (“The net result of a floating NAV would be to make Money Funds not useful to hold the large, short-term cash balances used in these automated transaction processing systems across a wide variety of businesses and applications.”); Comment Letter of Cachematrix Holdings LLC (Dec. 12, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Cachematrix PWG Comment Letter”) (“A stable share price is critical to same-day and next-day processing, shortened settlement times, float management, and mitigation of counterparty risk among firms.”); Comment Letter of State Street Global Advisors (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (“[T]he stable NAV simplifies transaction settlement, which permits money market funds to offer shareholders same day settlement options, as well as ATM access, check writing, and ACH/Fedwire transfers.”).

294 See, e.g., Hawke Dec 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 292 (stating that “[m]anual processing [required to reconcile the day-to-day fluctuations in the value of money market funds with a floating NAV] would mean more staffing requirement, more costs associated with staffing the function, and errors and delays in completing the process” and that reprogramming systems would “take many years and hundreds of millions of dollars to complete across a wide range of businesses and applications for which stable value money funds currently are used to hold short-term liquidity”); Cachematrix PWG Comment Letter, supra note 293 (“[A]n entire industry has programmed accounting, trading and settlement systems based on a stable share price. The cost for each bank to retool their sub-accounting systems to accommodate a fluctuating NAV could be in the millions of dollars. This does not take into account the costs that each bank would then pass on to the thousands of corporations that use money market trading systems.”).

295 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Fidelity Investments (Feb. 14, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“Fidelity FSOC Comment Letter”). ([B]roker-dealers offer clients a variety of features that are available generally only to accounts with a stable NAV, including ATM access, check writing, and ACH and Fedwire transfers. A floating NAV would force MMFs that offer same day settlement on shares redeemed through wire transfers to shift to next day settlement or require fund advisers to modify their systems to accommodate floating NAV MMFs.”); Edward Jones FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 290; ICI Feb 2012 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 259 (“[E]limination of the stable NAV for money market funds would likely force brokers and fund sponsors to consider how or whether they could continue to provide such services to money market fund investors.”).
accordingly, such features would be unaffected. Nonetheless, not all funds with these features may choose to take advantage of the proposed retail exemption, and therefore, some funds may need to make additional modifications to continue offering these features. We have included estimates of the costs to make such modifications below. We seek comment on the extent to which these features may be affected by our proposal and the proposed retail exemption.

- Would money market funds and financial intermediaries continue to provide the retail-focused services discussed above if we were to require money market funds to use floating NAVs? If not, why not?

- Would investors reduce or eliminate their money market fund investments if these services were no longer available or if the cost of these services increases?

Commenters also assert that requiring money market funds to use floating NAVs would extend the settlement cycle from same-day settlement to next-day settlement, which would expose parties to transactions to increased risk (e.g., during a day in which a transaction to be paid by proceeds from a sale of money market fund shares is still open, one party to the transaction could default).296 But a money market fund with a floating NAV could still offer same-day settlement. The fund could price its shares each day and provide redemption proceeds that evening. Indeed, we are aware of two floating NAV money market funds that normally

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296 See, e.g., Hawke Dec 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 292 (“Both parties would carry the unsettled transaction as an open position for one extra day and each party would be exposed for that time to the risk that its counterparty would default during the extra day, or that the bank holding the cash overnight (or over the weekend) would fail. For a bank involved in making a payment in anticipation of an incoming funds transfer as part of these processing systems, this change from same-day to next-day processing of money fund redemptions would turn intra-day overdraws into overnight overdraws, resulting in much greater default and funding risks to the bank. This extra day’s float would mean more risk in the system and a larger average float balance that each party must carry and finance.”); Cachematrix PWG Comment Letter, supra note 293 (“A stable share price is critical to same-day and next-day processing, shortened settlement times, float management, and mitigation of counterparty risk among firms.”).
operate this way.\textsuperscript{297} Alternatively, funds could price their shares periodically (e.g., at noon and 4 p.m. each day) to provide same-day settlement.\textsuperscript{298} We recognize that pricing services may incur operational costs to modify their systems (and pass these costs along to funds) to provide pricing multiple times each day and seek comment on the nature and amounts of these costs.

- Do commenters expect to incur the types of costs described above (e.g., increased staffing costs to manually reconcile transactions)? Are there additional costs we have not identified?
- What kinds of costs, specifically, do commenters expect to incur? What kinds of employee costs would be involved?
- Would an extended settlement cycle impose costs on money market fund investors? If so, what kinds of costs and how much?
- Would money market funds extend the settlement cycle or would they exercise either of those other options?
- Would exercising either of the two options discussed above impose costs on money market funds? If so, how much? Are there options that we have not identified that money market funds could use to provide same-day settlement?
- Would extending the settlement cycle cause investors to leave or not invest in

\textsuperscript{297} See, e.g., the prospectus for the DWS Variable NAV Money Fund, dated December 1, 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/863209/00000880531101627/nb120111ict-vnm.txt (“If the fund receives a sell request prior to the 4:00 p.m. Eastern time cut-off, the proceeds will normally be wired on the same day. However, the shares sold will not earn that day’s dividend.”); prospectus for the Northern Funds, dated December 7, 2012, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916620/000119312512495705/d449473d485apos.htm (“Redemption proceeds normally will be sent or credited on the next Business Day or, if you are redeeming your shares through an authorized intermediary, up to three Business Days, following the Business Day on which such redemption request is received in good order by the deadline noted above, unless payment in immediately available funds on the same Business Day is requested.”).

\textsuperscript{298} We understand that pricing vendors may not provide continual pricing throughout the day. Instead, money market funds could establish periodic times at which the fund would price its shares.
money market funds?

- Do commenters agree that a delay in settlement for some money market fund transactions could expose parties to the transactions to increased counterparty risk? To what extent would this occur, and how does the nature of this risk differ from counterparty risk that arises in other aspects of a money market fund shareholder’s business?

- Do commenters agree that money market funds generally could still offer same-day settlement if required to use a floating NAV?

- Do fund pricing services have the capacity to provide pricing multiple times each day? If not, what types and amounts of costs would pricing services incur to develop this capacity? Would pricing services pass these costs down to funds?

- Are the money market funds that currently same-day settle with a floating NAV representative of what a broader industry of floating NAV money market funds could achieve? Are there additional costs or complications in conducting such same-day settlement for larger funds than smaller funds?

In addition to money market funds and other entities in the distribution chain, each money market fund shareholder would also likely be required to perform an in-depth analysis of our floating NAV proposal and its own existing systems, procedures, and controls to estimate the systems modifications it would be required to undertake. Because of this, and the variation in systems currently used by institutional money market fund shareholders, we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the potential costs of systems modifications. Nevertheless, our staff has attempted to describe the types of activities typically involved in making systems modifications and estimated a range of hours and costs that may be required to
perform these activities. In addition, the Commission requests from commenters information regarding the potential costs of system modifications for money market fund shareholders.

Our staff has prepared ranges of estimated costs, taking into account variations in the functionality, sophistication, and level of automation of money market fund shareholders' existing systems and related procedures and controls, and the complexity of the operating environment in which these systems operate. In deriving its estimates, our staff considered the need to modify systems and related procedures and controls related to recordkeeping, accounting, trading, cash management, and bank reconciliations, and to provide training concerning these modifications.

Staff estimates that a shareholder whose systems (including related procedures and controls) would require less extensive or labor-intensive modifications would incur one-time costs ranging from $123,000 to $253,000. Staff estimates that a shareholder whose systems (including related procedures and controls) would require more extensive or labor-intensive modifications would incur one-time costs ranging from $1.4 million to $2.9 million. In addition, staff estimates the annual maintenance costs to these systems and procedures and controls, and the costs to provide continuing training, would range from 5% to 15% of the one-time implementation costs. We request comment on our analysis and the nature and extent of the costs money market fund shareholders anticipate they would incur as a result of our floating

\[299\] Some money market fund shareholders do not use systems and would not use them under this proposal (e.g., many retail investors), and these shareholders of course would not incur any systems modifications costs.

\[300\] Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) planning, coding, testing, and installing system modifications; (ii) drafting, integrating, implementing procedures and controls; (iii) preparation of training materials; and (iv) training. See also supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff's estimates of operational and related costs).

\[301\] Id.

\[302\] See supra note 286.
NAV proposal.

- Are shareholder systems in fact unable to accommodate a floating NAV, even if the NAV typically fluctuates very little (a fraction of a penny) on a day-to-day basis?

- If shareholder systems are unable to accommodate a floating NAV, what kinds of programming costs would shareholders incur in reprogramming the systems and how do they compare to our staff's estimates above?

- Do shareholders have other systems they use to manage their investments that fluctuate in value? If so, could these systems be used for money market funds? If not, why not?

- How much would it cost to adapt existing shareholder systems (currently used to accommodate investments that fluctuate in value) to accommodate money market funds with floating NAVs and how do these costs compare to our staff's estimates above?

8. Disclosure Regarding Floating NAV

We are proposing disclosure-related amendments to rule 482 under the Securities Act\(^3\) and Form N-1A in connection with the floating NAV alternative. We anticipate that the proposed rule and form amendments would provide current and prospective shareholders with

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\(^3\) Rule 482 applies to advertisements or other sales materials with respect to securities of an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act that is selling or proposing to sell its securities pursuant to a registration statement that has been filed under the Investment Company Act. See rule 482(a). This rule describes the information that is required to be included in an advertisement, including a disclosure statement that must be used on money market fund advertisements. See rule 482(b).

Our proposal would also affect fund supplemental sales literature (i.e., sales literature that is preceded or accompanied by a statutory prospectus). Rule 34b-1 under the Investment Company Act prescribes the requirements for supplemental sales literature. Because rule 34b-1(a) cross-references the requirements of rule 482(b)(4), any changes made to that provision will affect the requirements for fund supplemental sales literature.
information regarding the operations and risks of this reform alternative. In keeping with the enhanced disclosure framework we adopted in 2009, the proposed amendments are intended to provide a layered approach to disclosure in which key information about the proposed new features of money market funds would be provided in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used) with more detailed information provided elsewhere in the statutory prospectus and in the statement of additional information ("SAI").

a. Disclosure Statement

The move to a floating NAV would be designed to change the investment expectations and behavior of money market fund investors. As a measure to achieve this change, we propose to require that each money market fund, other than a government or retail fund, include a bulleted statement disclosing the particular risks associated with investing in a floating NAV money market fund on any advertisement or sales material that it disseminates (including on the fund website). We also propose to include wording designed to inform investors about the primary risks of investing in money market funds generally in this bulleted disclosure statement. While money market funds are currently required to include a similar disclosure statement on their advertisements and sales materials, we propose amending this disclosure statement to emphasize that money market fund sponsors are not obligated to provide financial support, and

304 See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 28584 (Jan. 13, 2009) [74 FR 4546 (Jan. 26, 2009)] (“Summary Prospectus Adopting Release”) at paragraph preceding section III (adopting rules permitting the use of a summary prospectus, which is designed to provide key information that is important to an informed investment decision).

305 See supra note 303. Rule 482(b)(4) (which currently requires a money market fund to include following disclosure statement on its advertisements and sales materials: An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Although the Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible to lose money by investing in the Fund).
that money market funds may not be an appropriate investment option for investors who cannot
tolerate losses.\textsuperscript{306}

Specifically, we would require floating NAV money market funds to include the following bulleted disclosure statement on their advertisements and sales materials:

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- You should not invest in the Fund if you require your investment to maintain a stable value.
- The value of shares of the Fund will increase and decrease as a result of changes in the value of the securities in which the Fund invests. The value of the securities in which the Fund invests may in turn be affected by many factors, including interest rate changes and defaults or changes in the credit quality of a security's issuer.
- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.
- The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.\textsuperscript{307}

We also propose to require a substantially similar bulleted disclosure statement in the summary

\textsuperscript{306} See infra note 607 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which discretionary sponsor support has the potential to confuse money market fund investors); supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that survey data shows that some investors are unsure about the amount of risk in money market funds and the likelihood of government assistance if losses occur).

\textsuperscript{307} See proposed (FNAV) rule 482(b)(4)(f). If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the fund, the fund would be permitted to omit the last bulleted sentence from the disclosure statement for the term of the agreement. See Note to paragraph (b)(4), proposed (FNAV) rule 482(b)(4).
section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used).\textsuperscript{308}

With respect to money market funds that are not government or retail funds, we propose to remove current requirements that money market funds state that they seek to preserve the value of shareholder investments at $1.00 per share.\textsuperscript{309} This disclosure, which was adopted to inform investors in money market funds that a stable net asset value does not indicate that the fund will be able to maintain a stable NAV,\textsuperscript{310} will not be relevant once funds are required to “float” their net asset value.

As discussed above, the floating NAV proposal would provide exemptions to the floating NAV requirement for government and retail money market funds.\textsuperscript{311} Accordingly, the proposed amendments to rule 482 and Form N-1A would require government and retail money market funds to include a bulleted disclosure statement on the fund’s advertisements and sales materials and in the summary section of the fund’s statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used) that does not discuss the risks of a floating NAV, but that would be designed to inform investors about the risks of investing in money market funds generally.\textsuperscript{312} We propose to require each government and retail fund to include the following bulleted disclosure statement in the summary section of its statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus,

\textsuperscript{308} See proposed (FNAV) Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(A) of Form N-1A. Item 4(b)(1)(ii) currently requires a money market fund to include the following statement in its prospectus: An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Although the Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible to lose money by investing in the Fund.

\textsuperscript{309} See Item 4(b)(1)(ii) of Form N-1A; proposed (FNAV) Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(A) of Form N-1A.


\textsuperscript{311} See supra sections III.A.3 and III.A.4 and proposed (FNAV) rules 2a-7(c)(2) and (c)(3).

\textsuperscript{312} See supra notes 305 - 306 and accompanying text.
if used), and on any advertisement or sales material that it disseminates (including on the fund website):

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.
- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.
- The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.\footnote{See proposed (FNAV) rule 482(b)(4)(ii) and proposed (FNAV) item 4(b)(1)(ii)(B) of Form N-1A; see also supra notes 305 and 308 (discussing the current corresponding disclosure requirements for money market funds). If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the fund, the fund would be permitted to omit the last bulleted sentence from the disclosure statement that appears on a fund advertisement or fund sales material, for the term of the agreement. See Note to paragraph (b)(4), proposed (FNAV) rule 482(b)(4). Likewise, if an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the fund, and the term of the agreement will extend for at least one year following the effective date of the fund’s registration statement, the fund would be permitted to omit the last bulleted sentence from the disclosure statement that appears on the fund’s registration statement. See Instruction to proposed (FNAV) item 4(b)(1)(ii) of Form N-1A.}{13}
- The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.\footnote{See supra section II.B.3.}{14}

The proposed disclosure statements are intended to be one measure to change the investment expectations and, therefore, the behavior of money market fund investors. The risk-limiting conditions of rule 2a-7 and past experiences of money market fund investors have created expectations of a stable, cash-equivalent investment. As discussed above, one reason for such expectation may have been the role of sponsor support in maintaining a stable net asset value for money market funds.\footnote{See supra section II.B.3.}{15} In addition, we are concerned that investors, under the floating
NAV proposal, will not be fully aware that the value of their money market fund shares will increase and decrease as a result of the changes in the value of the underlying portfolio securities. In proposing the disclosure statement, we have taken into consideration investor preferences for clear, concise, and understandable language. We also considered whether language that was stronger in conveying potential risks associated with money market funds would be effective for investors. In addition, we considered whether the proposed disclosure statement should be limited to only money market fund advertisements and sales materials, as discussed above. Although we acknowledge that the summary section of the prospectus must contain a discussion of key risk factors associated with a floating NAV money market fund, we believe that the importance of the disclosure statement merits its placement in both locations, similar to how the current money market fund legend is required in both money market fund advertisements and sales materials and the summary section of the prospectus.

We request comment on the disclosure statements proposed to be required on any money market fund advertisements or sales materials, as well as in the summary section of a

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315 See Fidelity FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 295 (finding, from its study, that 81% of its retail money market fund investors understood that securities held by these funds have some small day-to-day fluctuations). However, the study did not address the extent to which these investors understood that these fluctuations could impact the value of their shares of money market funds, rather than the value of the underlying portfolio securities.


318 See supra notes 305 and 308.

319 In the questions that follow, we use the term “disclosure statement” to mean the new disclosure statement that we propose to require floating NAV funds to incorporate into their prospectuses and advertisements and sales materials or, alternatively and as appropriate, the new disclosure statement that we propose to require government or retail funds to incorporate into their prospectuses and advertisements and sales materials.
fund's statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used).

- Would the disclosure statement proposed to be used by floating NAV funds adequately alert investors to the risks of investing in a floating NAV fund, and would investors understand the meaning of each part of the proposed disclosure statement? Will investors be fully aware that the value of their money market fund shares will increase and decrease as a result of the changes in the value of the underlying portfolio securities? If not, how should the proposed disclosure statement be amended?

- Would the disclosure statement proposed to be used by government and retail money market funds, which are not subject to the floating NAV requirement, adequately alert investors to the risks of investing in those types of funds, and would investors understand the meaning of each part of the proposed disclosure statement? If not, how should the proposed disclosure statement be amended?

- Would different shareholder groups or different types of funds benefit from different disclosure statements? For example, should retail and institutional investors receive different disclosure statements, or should funds that offer cash management features such as check writing provide different disclosure statements from funds that do not? Why or why not? If yes, how should the disclosure statement be tailored to different shareholder groups and fund types?

- Will the proposed disclosure statement respond effectively to investor preferences for clear, concise, and understandable language?

- Would the following variations on the proposed disclosure statement be any more or less useful in alerting shareholders to the risks of investing in a floating NAV
fund (as applicable) and/or the risks of investing in money market funds generally?

- Removing or amending the following bullet point in the proposed disclosure statement: “The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.”

- Removing or amending the following bullet point in the proposed disclosure statement: “The value of the securities in which the Fund invests may in turn be affected by many factors, including interest rate changes and defaults or changes in the credit quality of a security’s issuer.”

- Amending the final bullet point in the proposed disclosure statement to read: “Your investment in the Fund therefore may experience losses.”

- Amending the final bullet point in the proposed disclosure statement to read: “Your investment in the Fund therefore may experience gains or losses.”

- Would investors benefit from requiring the proposed disclosure statement also to be included on the front cover page of a money market fund’s prospectus (and on the cover page or beginning of any summary prospectus, if used)?

- Would investors benefit from any additional types of disclosure in the summary section of the statutory prospectus or on the prospectus’ cover page? If so, what else should be included?

- Should we provide any instruction or guidance in order to highlight the proposed
disclosure statement on fund advertisements and sales materials (including the fund’s website) and/or lead investors efficiently to the disclosure statement?\textsuperscript{320}

For example, with respect to the fund’s website, should we instruct that the proposed disclosure statement be posted on the fund’s home page or be accessible in no more than two clicks from the fund’s home page?

\textit{b. Disclosure of Tax Consequences and Effects on Fund Operations}

The proposed requirement that money market funds transition to a floating NAV would entail certain additional tax- and operations-related disclosure, which disclosure requirements would not necessitate rule and form amendments.\textsuperscript{321} As discussed above, if we were to require certain money market funds to use a floating NAV, taxable investors in money market funds, like taxable investors in other types of mutual funds, may experience taxable gains and losses.\textsuperscript{322} Currently, funds are required to describe in their prospectuses the tax consequences to shareholders of buying, holding, exchanging, and selling the fund’s shares.\textsuperscript{323} Accordingly, we expect that, pursuant to current disclosure requirements, floating NAV money market funds would include disclosure in their prospectuses about the tax consequences to shareholders of buying, holding, exchanging, and selling the shares of the floating NAV fund. In addition, we expect that a floating NAV money market fund would update its prospectus and SAI disclosure regarding the purchase, redemption, and pricing of fund shares, to reflect any procedural changes.

\textsuperscript{320} Such instruction or guidance would supplement current requirements for the presentation of the disclosure statement required by rule 482(b)(4). \textit{See supra} note 305; rule 482(b)(5).

\textsuperscript{321} Prospectus disclosure regarding the tax consequences of these activities is currently required by Form N-1A. \textit{See Item 11(f)} of Form N-1A.

\textsuperscript{322} \textit{See supra} section III.A.6 (discussing the tax and economic implications of floating NAV money market funds).

\textsuperscript{323} \textit{See Item 11(f)} of Form N-1A.
resulting from the fund’s use of a floating NAV.\textsuperscript{324} As discussed below, if we were to adopt the floating NAV alternative, the compliance date would be 2 years after the effective date of the adoption with respect to any amendments specifically related to the floating NAV proposal, including related amendments to disclosure requirements.\textsuperscript{325}

We request comment on the disclosure that we expect floating NAV money market funds would include in their prospectuses about the tax consequences to shareholders of buying, holding, exchanging, and selling the shares of the fund, as well as the effects (if any) on fund operations resulting from the transition to a floating NAV.

- Should Form N-1A or its instructions be amended to more explicitly require any of the disclosure we discuss above, or any additional disclosure, to be included in a fund’s prospectus and/or SAI?

- Is there any additional information about a floating NAV fund’s operations that shareholders should be aware of that is not discussed above? If so, would such additional information already be covered under existing Form N-1A requirements, or would we need to make any amendments to the form or its instructions?

c. Disclosure of Transition to Floating NAV

A fund must update its registration statement to reflect any material changes by means of a post-effective amendment or a prospectus supplement (or “sticker”) pursuant to rule 497 under

\textsuperscript{324} We expect that a money market fund would include this disclosure (as appropriate) in response to, for example, Item 11 (“Shareholder Information”) and Item 23 (“Purchase, Redemption, and Pricing of Shares”) of Form N-1A.

\textsuperscript{325} See infra section III.N.1.
the Securities Act.\textsuperscript{326} We would expect that, to meet this requirement, at the time that a stable NAV money market fund transitions to a floating NAV (or adopts a floating NAV in the course of a merger or other reorganization),\textsuperscript{327} it would update its registration statement to include relevant related disclosure, as discussed in this section of the Release, by means of a post-effective amendment or a prospectus supplement. We request comment on this requirement.

- Besides requiring a fund that transitions to a floating NAV to update its registration statement by filing a post-effective amendment or prospectus supplement, should we also require that, when a fund transitions to a floating NAV, it must notify shareholders individually about the risks and operational effects of a floating NAV on the fund, such as a separate mailing or email notice? Would shareholders be more likely to understand and appreciate these risks and operational effects (disclosure of which would be included in the fund's registration statement, as discussed above) if they were to receive such individual notification? If so, what information should this individual notification include? What would be an appropriate time frame for this notification? How would such notification be accomplished, and what costs would be incurred in providing such notification?

d. \textit{Request for Comment on Money Market Fund Names}

As discussed above, our floating NAV proposal would provide exemptions to the floating NAV requirements for government money market funds and retail money market funds. We

\textsuperscript{326} See 17 CFR 230.497.
\textsuperscript{327} See infra section III.N.
request comment on whether we should require new terminology in money market fund names to reduce the risk of investor confusion that might result from permitting some types of funds to maintain a stable price, while requiring others types of funds to use a floating NAV.

- Given that, under our floating NAV proposal, some funds’ share prices would increase and decrease as a result of changes in the value of the securities in which the fund invests, should we require new terminology in money market fund names to reduce any risk of investor confusion that might result from both stable price money market funds and floating NAV money market funds using the same term “money market fund” in their names? For example, should we require money market funds to use either the term “stable money market fund” or “floating money market fund,” as appropriate, in their names? Why or why not?

**e. Economic Analysis**

The floating NAV proposal makes significant changes to the nature of money market funds as an investment vehicle. The proposed disclosure requirements in this section are intended to communicate to shareholders the nature of the risks that follow from the floating NAV proposal. In section III.E, we discussed how the floating NAV proposal might affect shareholders’ use of money market funds and the resulting effects on the short-term financing markets. The factors and uncertain effects of those factors discussed in that section would influence any estimate of the incremental effects that the proposed disclosure requirements might have on either shareholders or the short-term financing markets. However, we believe that the proposed disclosure will better inform shareholders about the changes, which should result in

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328 See rule 2a-7(b)(3) (setting forth the conditions for a fund to use a name that suggests that it is a money market fund or the equivalent, including using terms such as “cash,” “liquid,” “money,” “ready assets,” or similar terms in a fund’s name).
shareholders making investment decisions that better match their investment preferences. We expect that this will have similar effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation as those that are outlined in section III.E rather than introduce new effects. We further believe that the effects of the proposed disclosure requirements will be small relative to the effects of the floating NAV proposal. The Commission staff cannot estimate the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time because of uncertainty about how increased transparency may affect different investors’ understanding of the risks associated with money market funds.\textsuperscript{329} We request additional data from commenters below to enable us to effectively calculate these effects.

We anticipate that all money market funds would incur costs to update their registration statements, as well as their advertising and sales materials (including the fund website), to include the proposed disclosure statement, and that floating NAV funds additionally would incur costs to update their registration statements to incorporate tax- and operations-related disclosure relating to the use of a floating NAV. We expect these costs generally would be incurred on a one-time basis. Our staff estimates that the average costs for a floating NAV money market fund to comply with these proposed disclosure amendments would be approximately $1,480 and that the compliance costs for a government or retail money market fund would be approximately $592.\textsuperscript{330} Each money market fund in a fund group might not incur these costs individually.

\textsuperscript{329} Likewise, uncertainty regarding how the proposed disclosure may affect different investors’ behavior would make it difficult for the SEC staff to measure the quantitative benefits of the proposed requirements. With respect to the proposed disclosure statement, there are many possible permutations on specific wording that would convey the specific concerns identified in this Release, and the breadth of these permutations makes it difficult for SEC staff to test how investors would respond to each wording variation.

\textsuperscript{330} Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to amending the fund’s disclosure statement and updating the fund’s advertising and sales materials. See supra note 245(discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs). The costs associated with these activities are all paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra section IV.A.7.

We expect the new required disclosure would add minimal length to the current required prospectus disclosure, and thus would not increase the number of pages in, or change the printing costs of, a fund’s
We request comment on this economic analysis:

- Are any of the proposed disclosure requirements unduly burdensome, or would they impose any unnecessary costs?
- We request comment on the staff’s estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements.
- We request comment on our analysis of potential effects of these proposed disclosure requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

9. **Transition**

The PWG Report suggests that a transition to a floating NAV could itself result in significant redemptions.\(^{331}\) Money market fund investors could seek to redeem shares ahead of other investors to avoid realizing losses when their money market funds switch to a floating NAV. Investors may anticipate their funds’ NAVs per share being less than $1.00 when the switch occurs or they may fear their funds might incur liquidity costs from heavy redemptions resulting from the behavior of other investors.

To avoid large numbers of preemptive redemptions by shareholders and allow sufficient time for funds and intermediaries to cost-effectively adapt to the new requirements, we propose to delay compliance with this aspect of the proposed rules for a period of 2 years from the effective date of our proposed rulemaking. Accordingly, money market funds subject to our floating NAV proposal could continue to price their shares as they do today for up to 2 years

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\(^{331}\) PWG Report, *supra* note 111, at 22. Other commenters have voiced additional concern that redemptions as a result of the transition to a floating NAV could be destabilizing to the financial markets. *See, e.g.*, ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, *supra* note 25; Comment Letter from American Association of State Colleges and Universities (Jan. 21, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619).
following this date. On or before the compliance date, all stable value money market funds not
exempted from the floating NAV proposal would convert to a floating NAV. However, we note
that, under our floating NAV proposal, investors who prefer a stable price product also could
invest in a government or retail money market fund. We request comment on the proposed
transition.

If we were to adopt the floating NAV proposal, money market funds and their
shareholders would have 2 years to understand the implications of and implement our reform.
We believe this would benefit money market funds and their shareholders by allowing money
market funds to make this transition at the optimal time and potentially not at the same time as
all other money market funds (which may be more likely to have a disruptive effect on the short-
term financing markets, and thus not be perceived as optimal by funds). It would also provide
time for investors such as corporate treasurers to modify their investment guidelines or seek
changes to any statutory or regulatory constraints to which they are subject to permit them to
invest in a floating NAV money market fund or other investments as appropriate.

Giving fund shareholders ample time to dispose of their investments in an orderly fashion
also should benefit money market funds and their other shareholders because it would give funds
additional time to respond appropriately to the level and timing of redemption requests.\textsuperscript{332} We
recognize, however, that shareholders might still preemptively redeem shares at or near the time
that the money market fund converts from a stable value to a floating NAV if they believe that

\textsuperscript{332} Comment Letter of Thrivent Mutual Funds (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Any change [to a
floating NAV] could be implemented with sufficient advanced notice to allow institutional investors to
modify their investment guidelines to permit investment in a floating NAV fund, where appropriate. A
mass exodus assumes that investors have a clear alternative, which they do not, and come to the same
collection in tandem, which is improbable given the lack of clear alternatives.”); Richmond Fed PWG
Comment Letter, supra note 139 (“If informed well ahead of a change [to a floating NAV], investors are
more likely to move gradually, mitigating the disruption.”). In addition, a relatively long compliance
period would provide money market funds sufficient time to modify and/or establish the systems necessary
to transact permanently at a floating NAV.
the market value of their shares will be less than $1.00. We expect, however, that money market fund sponsors would use the relatively long compliance period to select an appropriate conversion date that would minimize this risk. We therefore expect that providing shareholders, funds, and others a relatively long time to assess the effects of the regulatory change if adopted would mitigate the risk that the transition to a floating NAV, itself, could prompt significant redemptions.\(^{333}\)

We considered an even longer transition period, including the 5-year period in FSOC’s proposed floating NAV recommendation.\(^{334}\) FSOC’s proposed recommendation, however, would have required money market funds to re-price their shares at $100 per share, and would have grandfathered existing money market funds (which could continue to maintain a stable value) but required investments after a specified date to be made in floating NAV money market funds. Money market fund sponsors therefore would have had to take a corporate action to re-price their shares and, if they chose to rely on the grandfathering, to form new floating NAV money market funds to accept new investments after the specified date. Money market funds and others in the distribution chain may be better able to implement basis point rounding as we propose, and therefore may not need a 5-year transition period. Indeed, some commenters on FSOC’s proposed recommendation, which could require a longer transition period than our proposal, supported a 2-year transition period.\(^{335}\)

\(^{333}\) In its proposal, FSOC suggested a transition period of 5 years. FSOC Proposed Recommendations, \textit{supra} note 114, at 31.

\(^{334}\) See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, \textit{supra} note 114, at 31 (“To reduce potential disruptions and facilitate the transition to a floating NAV for investors and issuers, existing MMFs could be grandfathered and allowed to maintain a stable NAV for a phase-out period, potentially lasting five years. Instead of requiring these grandfathered funds to transition to a floating NAV immediately, the SEC would prohibit any new share purchases in the grandfathered stable-NAV MMFs after a predetermined date, and any new investments would have to be made in floating-NAV MMFs.”).

\(^{335}\) See BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 204 (“We agree that a transition period is extremely
We request comment on our proposed compliance date.

- Would our proposed transition period mitigate operational or significant redemption risks that could result from requiring money market funds to use floating NAVs?

- If not, how much time would be sufficient to allow money market fund shareholders that do not wish to remain in a money market fund with a floating NAV to identify alternatives without posing operational or significant redemption risk?

- Do commenters agree that a compliance period of 2 years is sufficient to address operational issues associated with converting funds to floating NAVs? Should the compliance period be shorter or longer? Why? Would a 5-year transition period, consistent with FSOC’s proposed floating NAV recommendation, be more appropriate?

- Do fund sponsors anticipate converting (at an appropriate time) existing stable value money market funds to floating NAV funds or would sponsors establish new funds? If sponsors expect to establish new funds, are there costs other than those we describe below (related to a potential grandfathering provision)?

- Are there other measures we could take that would minimize the risks that could arise from investors seeking preemptively to redeem their shares in advance of a fund’s adoption of a floating NAV?

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important to avoid market disruption. Assuming existing funds are grandfathered as CNAV funds and no new shares are purchased, a transition period of two years from the effective date of a new rule should suffice.”); HSBC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 196 (“[W]e believe a 2-3 year transition period should be sufficient for the industry, investors and regulators to prepare for any required changes to products, systems etc.”). But see U.S. Chamber Jan. 23, 2013 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 248 (suggesting a transition period of up to 5 years could be necessary).
• Should we provide a grandfathering provision, in addition to, or in lieu of, a relatively long compliance date? If we adopted a grandfathering provision, how long should the grandfathering period last? Would a grandfathering provision better achieve our objective of facilitating an orderly transition?

B. Standby Liquidity Fees and Gates

As an alternative to the floating NAV proposal discussed above, we are proposing to continue to allow money market funds to transact at a stable share price under normal conditions but to (1) require money market funds to institute a liquidity fee in certain circumstances and (2) permit money market funds to impose a gate in certain circumstances. In particular, this fees and gates alternative proposal would require that if a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets fell below 15% of its total assets (the “liquidity threshold”), the fund must impose a liquidity fee of 2% on all redemptions unless the board of directors of the fund (including a majority of its independent directors) determines that imposing such a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund. The board may also determine that a lower fee would be in the best interest of the fund.336

We also are proposing that when a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of total assets, the money market fund board would also have the ability to impose a temporary suspension of redemptions (also referred to as a “gate”) for a limited period of time if the board determines that doing so is in the fund’s best interest. Such a gate could be imposed, for example, if the liquidity fees were not proving sufficient in slowing redemptions to a manageable level.

336 We would not require, but would permit, government funds to impose fees and gates, as discussed below. Unlike under the floating NAV alternative, we are not proposing to exempt retail funds from our fees and gates proposal. See infra section III.B.5 of this Release.
Under this option, rule 2a-7 would continue to permit money market funds to use the penny rounding method of pricing so long as the funds complied with the conditions of the rule, but would not permit use of the amortized cost method of valuation. We would eliminate the use of the amortized cost method of valuation for money market funds under the fees and gates alternative for the same reasons we are proposing to do so under the retail and government exemptions to the floating NAV alternative. We do not believe that allowing continued use of amortized cost valuation for all securities in money market funds’ portfolios is appropriate given that these funds will already be valuing their securities using market factors on a daily basis due to new website disclosure requirements and given that penny rounding otherwise achieves the same level of price stability.

As previously discussed, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 exposed contagion effects from heavy redemptions in money market funds that had significant impacts on investors, funds, and the markets. We have designed the fees and gates alternative to address certain of these issues.

Although it is impossible to know what exactly would have happened if money market funds had operated with fees and gates at that time, we expect that if money market funds were armed with such tools, they would have been able to better manage the heavy redemptions that occurred and to limit the spread of contagion, regardless of the reason for the redemptions.

During the crisis, some investors redeemed at the first sign of market stress, and could do so without bearing any costs even if their actions imposed costs on the fund and the remaining shareholders. As discussed in greater detail below, if money market funds had imposed liquidity fees during the crisis, it could have resulted in those investors re-assessing their redemption decisions because they would have been required to pay for the costs of their redemptions.

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337 See section III.A.3 and III.A.4 of this Release.
Based on the level of redemption activity that occurred during the crisis, we expect that many money market funds would have faced liquidity pressures sufficient to cross the liquidity thresholds we are proposing today that would trigger the use of fees and gates. If funds therefore had imposed fees, this might have caused some investors to choose not to redeem because the direct costs of the liquidity fee may have been more tangible than the uncertain possibility of potential future losses. In addition, funds that imposed fees would likely have been able to better manage the impact of the redemptions that investors submitted, and any contagion effects may have been limited, because the fees would have helped offset the costs of the liquidity provided to redeeming shareholders, and any excess could have been used to repair the NAV of the fund, if necessary. Regardless of the incentives to redeem, a liquidity fee would make redeeming investors pay for the costs of liquidity and, even if investors redeem from a fund, gates can directly respond to a run by halting redemptions.

If a fund had been able to impose a redemption gate at the time, it also would have been able to stop mounting redemptions and possibly generate additional internal liquidity in the fund while the gate was in place. However, fees and gates do not address all of the factors that may lead to heavy redemptions in money market funds. For example, they do not eliminate the incentive to redeem in times of stress to receive the $1.00 stable share price before the fund breaks the buck, or prevent investors from seeking to redeem to obtain higher quality securities, better liquidity, or increased transparency. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed above, they provide tools that should serve to address many of the types of issues that arose during the crisis by allocating more explicitly the costs of liquidity and stopping runs.

As discussed in section III.C, we also request comment on whether we should combine

See infra nn 361 and 362 and accompanying text.
this option with our floating NAV alternative. This reform would be intended to achieve our
goals of preserving the benefits of stable share price money market funds for the widest range of
investors and the availability of short-term financing for issuers, while enhancing investor
protection and risk transparency, making funds more resilient to mass redemptions, and
improving money market funds' ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from high
levels of redemptions, as further discussed below.

1. Analysis of Certain Effects of Liquidity Fees and Gates

As discussed in the RSFI Study and in section II above, shareholders may redeem money
market fund shares for several reasons under stressed market conditions.\textsuperscript{339} One of these
incentives relates to the current rounding convention in money market fund valuation and pricing
that can allow early redeeming shareholders to redeem for $1.00 per share, even when the
market-based NAV per share of the fund is lower than that price. As discussed in section III.A
above, the floating NAV proposal is principally focused on mitigating this incentive by causing
redeeming shareholders to receive the market value of redeemed shares. However, as the RSFI
Study details, there are a variety of other factors that may motivate shareholders to redeem assets
from money market funds in times of stress. Adverse economic events or financial market
conditions can cause shareholders to engage in flights to quality, liquidity, or transparency (or
combinations thereof).\textsuperscript{340} When money market funds may have to absorb, suddenly, high levels
of redemptions that are expected to be in excess of the fund's internal sources of liquidity,

\textsuperscript{339} See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 2-4.

\textsuperscript{340} See id. at 7-14; Qi Chen et al., Payoff Complementarities and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Mutual
Fund Outflows, 97 J. Fin. ECON. 239-262 (2010). Prime money market funds can be particularly
susceptible to redemptions in a flight to quality, liquidity or transparency because they hold similar
portfolios and thus can present a correlated risk of loss of quality or loss of liquidity (and particularly when
the financial system is strained because most of their non-governmental assets are short-term debt
obligations of large banks.) See infra section III.J. See also Harvard Business School FSOC Comment
Letter, supra note 24; Angel FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 60.
investors may expect that fund managers will deplete the fund’s most liquid assets first to meet redemptions and may have to sell securities at a loss (because of transitory liquidity costs) or even “fire sale” prices. Accordingly, shareholder redemptions during such periods can impose expected future liquidity costs on the money market fund that are not reflected in a $1.00 share price based on current amortized cost valuation.

Because the circumstances under which liquidity becomes expensive historically have been infrequent, we expect that liquidity fees only will be imposed when the fund’s board of directors considers the fund’s liquidity costs to be at a premium and the liquidity fee, if imposed, will apply only to those shareholders who redeem and cause the fund to incur that cost. Under normal market conditions, fund shareholders would continue to enjoy unfettered liquidity for money market fund shares. As such, liquidity fees are designed to preserve the current benefits of principal stability, liquidity, and a market yield under most market conditions, but reduce the likelihood that “when markets are dislocated, costs that ought to be attributed to a redeeming

341 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Americans for Financial Reform (Feb. 20, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003); BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 204; Philip E. Strahan & Basak Tanyeri, Once Burned, Twice Shy: Money Market Fund Responses to a Systemic Liquidity Shock, Boston College Working Paper (July 2012) (finding that in response to the September 2008 run on money market funds, the funds first responded by selling their safest and most liquid holdings). See also Stephan Jank & Michael Wedow, Sturm und Drang in Money Market Funds: When Money Market Funds Cease to be Narrow, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 20/2008 (finding that German money market funds enhanced their yield by investing in less liquid securities in the lead up to the 2007-2008 subprime crisis, but then experienced runs during the crisis, while more liquid money market funds functioned as a safe haven). We note that other mutual funds also may tend to deplete their most liquid assets first to meet redemptions, but the incentive to redeem because of the potential for declining fund liquidity may be stronger in money market funds because of their use as a cash management vehicle and the resulting heightened sensitivity to potential losses.

shareholder are externalized on remaining shareholders and on the wider market.\textsuperscript{343}

In addition to liquidity fees, our proposal also would allow money market funds to impose redemption gates after the liquidity threshold is reached. Our proposal on liquidity fees and gates, however, could affect shareholders by potentially limiting the full, unfettered redeemability of money market fund shares under certain conditions, a principle embodied in the Investment Company Act.\textsuperscript{344} Currently, a money market fund generally can suspend redemptions only\textsuperscript{345} after obtaining an exemptive order from the Commission or in accordance with rule 22e-3, which requires the fund’s board of directors to determine that the fund is about to “break the buck” (specifically, that the extent of deviation between the fund’s amortized cost price per share and its current market-based net asset value per share may result in material dilution or other unfair results to investors).\textsuperscript{346} Under our proposal, a money market fund board could decide to temporarily suspend redemptions once it had crossed the same thresholds that can trigger the imposition of a liquidity fee.\textsuperscript{347} The fund could use such a gate to assess the viability of the fund, to create a “circuit breaker” giving time for a market panic to subside, or to create “breathing


\textsuperscript{344} Section III.B.3 \textit{infra} discusses the rationale for the exemptions from the Investment Company Act and related rules proposed to permit money market funds to impose standby liquidity fees and gates.

\textsuperscript{345} There are limited exceptions specified in section 22(e) of the Act in which a money market fund (and any other mutual fund) may suspend redemptions, such as (i) for any period (A) during which the New York Stock Exchange is closed other than customary week-end and holiday closings or (B) during which trading on the New York Stock Exchange is restricted, or (ii) during any period in which an emergency exists as a result of which (A) disposal by the fund of securities owned by it is not reasonably practical or (B) it is not reasonably practical for the fund to determine the value of its net assets. The Commission also has granted orders in the past allowing funds to suspend redemptions. \textit{See, e.g.,} In the Matter of The Reserve Fund, Investment Company Act Release No. 28386 (Sept. 22, 2008) [73 FR 55572 (Sept. 25, 2008)] (order); Reserve Municipal Money-Market Trust, et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 28466 (Oct. 24, 2008) [73 FR 64993 (Oct. 31, 2008)] (order).

\textsuperscript{346} Rule 22e-3(a)(1).

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{See} proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii).
room" to permit more fund assets to mature and provide internal liquidity to the fund. In the 2009 Proposing Release, we requested comment on whether we should include a provision in rule 22e-3 that would permit fund directors to temporarily suspend redemptions during certain exigent circumstances. Many commenters on our 2009 Proposing Release supported our permitting such a temporary suspension of redemptions.

We are proposing a combination of liquidity fees and gates because we believe that liquidity fees and gates, while both aimed at helping funds better and more systematically manage high levels of redemptions, do so in different ways and thus with somewhat different tradeoffs. Liquidity fees are designed to reduce shareholders' incentives to redeem when it is abnormally costly for the fund to provide liquidity by requiring redeeming shareholders to bear at least some of the liquidity costs of their redemption (rather than transferring those costs to remaining shareholders). To the extent that liquidity fees paid exceed such costs, they also

See, e.g., Angel FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 60 ("gates that limit MMMF redemptions to the natural maturity of the MMMF portfolios can prevent the forced selling of assets and transform a disorderly run into an orderly walk to quality"); ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (noting that a gate provides time for the fund to rebuild its liquidity as portfolio securities mature).

Being able to impose a temporary suspension of redemptions to calm instances of heightened redemptions had been recommended by an industry report. ICI 2009 REPORT, supra note 56, at 85–89 (recommending that the Commission permit a fund’s directors to suspend temporarily the right of redemption if the board, including a majority of its independent directors, determines that the fund’s net asset value is “materially impaired”).

See, e.g., Comment Letter of Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (Sept. 4, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) ("Schwab 2009 Comment Letter"); Comment Letter of the Dreyfus Corporation (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) ("Dreyfus 2009 Comment Letter"); Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09); T. Rowe Price 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 208. One commenter opposed the Commission permitting a temporary suspension of redemptions. See Comment Letter of Fund Democracy and the Consumer Federation of America (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (stating that such a “free time-out provision would increase incentives to run for the exits before the fund is closed and virtually guarantee that, once the fund was reopened, a flood of redemptions will follow. The provision provides a potential escape valve that will reduce fund managers’ incentives to protect the fund’s NAV. The provision provides virtually no benefit to shareholders while serving primarily to protect fund managers’ interests.

See, e.g., Wells Fargo FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 342 (stating that a standby liquidity fee would “provide an affirmative reason for investors to avoid redeeming from a distressed fund” and “those who choose to redeem in spite of the liquidity fee will help to support the fund’s market-based NAV and thus
can help increase the fund's net asset value for remaining shareholders which would have a restorative effect if the fund has suffered a loss. As one commenter has said, a liquidity fee can "provide a strong disincentive for investors to make further redemptions by causing them to choose between paying a premium for current liquidity or delaying liquidity and benefitting from the fees paid by redeeming investors." This explicit pricing of liquidity costs in money market funds could offer significant benefits to such funds and the broader short-term financing market in times of potential stress by lessening both the frequency and effect of shareholder redemptions. Unlike liquidity fees, gates are designed to halt a run by stopping redemptions long enough to allow (1) fund managers time to assess the appropriate strategy to meet redemptions, (2) liquidity buffers to grow organically as securities mature, and (3) shareholders to assess the level of liquidity in the fund and for any shareholder panic to subside. We also note that gates are the one regulatory reform discussed in this Release and the FSOC Proposed Recommendations that definitively stops a run on a fund (by blocking all redemptions).

Fees and gates also may have different levels of effectiveness under different stress scenarios. For example, we expect that liquidity fees will be able to reduce the harm to non-redeeming shareholders and the broader markets when a fund faces heavy redemptions during periods in which its true liquidity costs are less than the fund's imposed liquidity fee. Redemptions during this time will increase the value of the fund, which, in turn, will stabilize the

reduce or eliminate the potential harm associated with the timing of their redemptions to other remaining investors").

352 See ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25.

353 We note that investors owning securities directly—as opposed to through a money market fund—naturally bear these liquidity costs. They bear these costs both because they bear any losses if they have to sell a security at a discount in times of stress to obtain their needed liquidity and because they directly bear the risk of a less liquid investment portfolio if they sell their most liquid holdings first to obtain needed liquidity.
fund to the extent remaining shareholders' incentive to redeem shares is decreased. However, it
is possible that liquidity fees might not be fully effective during periods of systemic crises
because, for example, shareholders might choose to redeem from money market funds
irrespective of the level of a fund's true liquidity costs and imposition of the liquidity fee. 354 In
those cases, gates could function as useful circuit breakers, allowing the fund time to rebuild its
own internal liquidity and shareholders to pause to reconsider whether a redemption is
warranted.

Finally, research in behavioral economics suggests that liquidity fees may be particularly
effective in dampening a run because, when faced with two negative options, investors tend to
prefer possible losses over certain losses, even when the amount of possible loss is significantly
higher than the certain loss. 355 Unlike gates, when a liquidity fee is imposed, investors would
make an economic decision over whether to redeem. Therefore, under this behavioral economic
theory, investors fearing that a money market fund may suffer losses may prefer to stay in the
money market fund and avoid payment of the liquidity fee (despite the possibility that the fund
might suffer a future loss) rather than redeem and lock in payment of the liquidity fee.

We are proposing a combination of fees and gates, with a fee as the initial default but
with an optional ability for a fund's board to replace the fee with a gate, or impose a gate
immediately, in each case as the board deems best for the fund. 356 We are proposing this
structure as the initial default (rather than imposing a gate as the default) because we believe that
a fee has the potential to be less disruptive to fund shareholders and the short-term financing

354 See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 7-14 (discussing different possible explanations for why shareholders
may redeem from money market funds in times of stress).


356 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2).
markets because a fee allows fund shareholders to continue to transact in times of stress (although at a cost). At the same time, if the board determines that a fee is insufficient to protect the interests of non-redeeming shareholders, it still has the option of imposing a gate (and perhaps later lifting the gate, but keeping in place the fee).

Many participants in the money market fund industry have expressed support for imposing some form of a liquidity fee or gate on redeeming money market fund investors when the fund comes under stress as a way of reducing, in a targeted fashion, the fund’s susceptibility to heavy redemptions. Liquidity fees and gates are known to be able to reduce incentives to


358 See, e.g., BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 204; J.P. Morgan FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174; Comment Letter of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) (Jan. 14, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“SIFMA FSOC Comment Letter”); Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172. See also David M. Gaffen & Joseph R. Fleming, *Dodd-Frank and Mutual Funds: Alternative Approaches to Systemic Risk*, *BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS* (Jan. 2011) (“The alternative suggested here is that, during a period of illiquidity, as declared by a money market fund’s board (or, alternatively, the SEC or another designated federal regulator), a money market fund may impose a redemption fee on a large share redemption approximately equal to the cost imposed by the redeeming shareholder and other redeeming shareholders on the money market fund’s remaining shareholders....The redemption fee causes the large redeeming shareholder to internalize the cost of the negative externality that the redemption otherwise would impose on non-redeeming shareholders.”). But see, e.g., Comment Letter of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the IOSCO Consultation Report on Money Market Fund Systemic Risk Analysis and Reform Options (May 24, 2012), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD392.pdf (“Imposing a liquidity fee is akin to implementing a variable NAV, and as such, would preclude a number of companies from investing in money market mutual funds. Although the liquidity fee may not be imposed until the fund’s portfolio falls below a specified threshold or when there is a high volume of redemptions, corporate treasurers have an obligation to ensure that “a dollar in will be a dollar out” and therefore, will not risk investing cash in an investment product that may not return 100 cents on the dollar.”); Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. on the IOSCO Consultation Report on Money Market Fund Systemic Risk Analysis and Reform Options (May 25, 2012) available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD392.pdf (“Federated believes that liquidity fees...are simply a different way to break the dollar...and would generate large preemptive redemptions from MMFs”).
redeem, and they have been used successfully in the past by certain non-money market fund cash management pools to stem redemptions during times of stress.

We recognize that the prospect of a fund imposing a liquidity fee or gate could raise a concern that shareholders will engage in preemptive redemptions if they fear the imminent imposition of fees or gates (either because of the fund’s situation or because such redemption restrictions have been triggered in other money market funds). We expect the opportunity for

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preemptive redemptions will decrease as a result of the amount of discretion fund boards would have in imposing liquidity fees and gates, because shareholders would not be able to accurately predict when, and under what circumstances, fees and gates may be imposed. Shareholders also might rationally choose to follow other shareholders’ redemptions even when those other shareholders’ decisions are not necessarily based on superior private information. General stress in the short-term markets or fears of stress at a particular fund could trigger redemptions as shareholders try to avoid the fee.

While we acknowledge that liquidity fees may not always preclude redemptions, fees are designed so that as redemptions begin to increase, if liquidity costs exceed the prescribed threshold for imposing a fee and the fund imposes a fee, the run will be halted. The fees, once imposed, should both curtail the level of redemptions, and fees paid by those that do redeem should, at least partially, cover liquidity costs incurred by funds and may even potentially repair the NAV of any funds that have suffered losses. One circumstance under which liquidity fees would not self-correct is if the amount of the fee is less than or exactly equal to the fund’s


realized liquidity costs. Gates would not be self-correcting in the event of realized portfolio losses, but they can help the fund preserve assets and generate more internal liquidity as assets mature. Some commenters have considered whether liquidity fees and gates might precipitate a run. For example, some commenters have expressed their view that a liquidity fee or gate would not accelerate a run, stating that such redemptions would likely trigger the fee or gate and that, once triggered, the fee or gate would then lessen or halt redemptions. Even if investors have an incentive to redeem, their redemptions eventually will cause a fee or gate to come down and halt the run.

Under this proposal, money market funds would have the benefit of being able to use the penny rounding method of pricing for their portfolios. As discussed further below in section III.F.4 and III.F.5, they would also have to provide much fuller transparency of the market-based NAV per share of the funds and the marked-based value of the funds’ portfolio securities. This increased transparency is designed to allow better shareholder understanding of deviations between the fund’s value using market-based factors and its stable price. It also is aimed at helping investors better understand any risk involved in money market fund investments as a

364 See, e.g., HSBC EC Letter, supra note 156 (“Some commentators have objected that a trigger-based liquidity fee would cause investors to seek to redeem prior to the imposition of the fee. We disagree with this argument, which misunderstands the cause of investor redemptions... A liquidity fee would be imposed as a consequence of investors’ loss of confidence/flight to quality. It could not, therefore, be the cause of investors’ loss of confidence/flight to quality.”) (emphasis in original); J.P. Morgan FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 342 (standby liquidity fees “do not prevent an initial run, but they do provide a useful tool to slow a run after one has begun”); SIFMA FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 358 (“the operation of the proposed gate and liquidity fee themselves will stem any exodus and dampen its effect”); Wells Fargo FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 342 (“To the extent that investor redemptions made for the purpose of avoiding a liquidity fee have the effect of accelerating a run... the redemption gate and liquidity fee apply an equally strong countermeasure. First, the redemption gate would halt the run, and second, the ensuing imposition of liquidity fees would either cause further redemption activity to cease or monetize further redemptions into transactions that are accretive, rather than dilutive, to a fund’s market-to-market NAV. The redemption gate and liquidity fee operate to effectively reverse and repair any accelerated redemption activity the existence of the liquidity fee might otherwise induce. Redemption gates and liquidity fee mechanisms applying to all other money market funds would also mitigate any contagion risk.”).
result of rule 2a-7's rounding convention. However, retaining these valuation and pricing methods for money market funds does not eliminate the ability of investors to redeem ahead of other investors from a money market fund that is about to “break the buck” and consequently may permit those early redeemers to receive $1.00 per share instead of its market value as discussed in section III.A above. Nevertheless, in times of fund or market stress the fund is likely to impose either liquidity fees or gates, which will limit the ability of redeeming shareholders to receive more than their pro-rata share of the market-based value of the fund’s assets.

Requiring that boards impose liquidity fees absent a finding that the fee is not in the best interest of the fund, and permitting them to impose gates once the fund has crossed certain thresholds could offer advantages to the fund in addition to better and more systematically managing liquidity and redemption activity. They could provide fund managers with a powerful incentive to carefully monitor shareholder concentration and shareholder flow to lessen the chance that the fund would have to impose liquidity fees or gates in times of market stress (because larger redemptions are more likely to cause the fund to breach the threshold). Such a requirement also could encourage portfolio managers to increase the level of daily and weekly liquid assets in the fund, as that would tend to lessen the likelihood of a liquidity fee or gate being imposed.\footnote{See, e.g., Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172 (a standby liquidity fee along with daily disclosure of the fund’s liquidity levels “will serve as an effective tool to force investment advisors, particularly those managing funds with highly concentrated shareholder bases, to manage their funds with adequate liquidity to prevent the [standby liquidity fee] from ever being triggered”).} Further, because our proposal provides the board discretion not to impose the liquidity fee (or to impose a lower liquidity fee) and gives boards the option to impose gates, the boards of directors can impose fees or gates when the board determines that it is in the best interest of the fund to do so.
The prospect of facing fees and gates when a fund is under stress serves to make the risk of investing in a money market fund more transparent and to better inform and sensitize investors to the inherent risks of investing in money market funds. Fees and gates also could encourage shareholders to monitor and exert market discipline over the fund to reduce the likelihood that either the imposition of fees or gates will become necessary in that fund. An additional benefit to the board’s determination of liquidity fees and gates is that they create an incentive for money market fund managers to better and more systemically manage redemptions in all market conditions.

Our proposal on liquidity fees and gates, however, could affect shareholders by potentially limiting the full, unfettered redeemability of money market fund shares under certain conditions, a principle embodied in the Investment Company Act. Thus, this alternative, if adopted, could result in some shareholders redeeming their money market fund shares and moving their assets to alternative products (or government money market funds) out of concern that the potential imposition of a liquidity fee or gate could make investment in a money market fund less attractive due to less certain liquidity. We also recognize that the imposition of a

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366 See, e.g., Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172 (a standby liquidity fee “will encourage advisors and investors to self-police to avoid triggering the fee”).

367 See, e.g., HSBC 2011 Liquidity Fees Letter, supra note 343 (a liquidity fee “will result in more effective pricing of risk (in this case, liquidity risk)...and] act as a market-based mechanism for improving the robustness and fairness” of money market funds); BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 204 (“A fund manager will focus on managing both assets and liabilities to avoid triggering a gate. On the liability side, a fund manager will be incented to know the underlying clients and model their behavior to anticipate cash flow needs under various scenarios. In the event a fund manager sees increased redemption behavior or sees reduced liquidity in the markets, the fund manager will be incented to address potential problems as early as possible.”)

368 Section III.B.3 infra discusses the rationale for the exemptions from the Investment Company Act and related rules proposed to permit money market funds to impose standby liquidity fees and gates.

369 See infra section III.E for a discussion of the potential effects on money market fund investments and capital formation as a result of this alternative, if adopted. See also Comment Letter of Fidelity (Feb. 3, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (finding in a survey of their retail money market fund customers that 43% would stop using a money market fund with a 1% non-refundable redemption fee charged if the fund’s
gate may affect the efficiency of money market fund shareholders’ investment allocations and
have corresponding impacts on capital formation if the redemption restriction prevents
shareholders from moving cash invested in money market funds to other investment alternatives
that might be preferable at the time.

We request comment on our discussion of the economic basis and tradeoffs for this
alternative.

- Would our proposal on liquidity fees and gates achieve our goals of preserving
the benefits of stable share price money market funds for the widest range of
investors and the availability of short-term financing for issuers while enhancing
investor protection and risk transparency, making funds more resilient to mass
redemptions and improving money market funds’ ability to manage and mitigate
potential contagion from high levels of redemptions? Are there other benefits that
we have not identified and discussed?

- Would a liquidity fee provide many of the same potential benefits as the proposed
floating NAV? If not, what are the differences in potential benefits? Would it
result in a more effective pricing of liquidity risk into the funds’ share prices and
a fairer allocation of that cost among shareholders? Would a liquidity fee that
potentially restores the fund’s shadow price reduce some remaining shareholders
incentive to redeem?

NAV per share fell below $0.9975 and 27% would decrease their use of such a fund); Federated IOSCO
Comment Letter, supra note 358 (stating that they anticipate “that many investors will choose not to invest
in MMFs that are subject to liquidity fees, and will redeem existing investments in MMFs that impose a
liquidity fee” but noting that “[s]hareholder attitudes to redemption fees on MMFs are untested”). But see
HSBC EC Letter, supra note 156 (“A liquidity fee [triggered by a fall in the fund’s market-based NAV]
should also be acceptable to investors, because it can be rationalized in terms of investor protection. (When
we’ve presented the case for a liquidity fee in these terms to our investors, they have generally been
receptive.”).
• Would the prospect of a fee or gate encourage investors to limit their concentration in a particular fund? Would an appropriately structured threshold for liquidity fees and gates provide an incentive for fund managers to monitor shareholder concentration and flows as well as portfolio composition to minimize the possibility of a fund applying a fee or gate? Would it encourage better board monitoring of the fund? Would it encourage shareholders to monitor and exert appropriate discipline over the fund? Would shareholders underestimate whether a fee or gate would ever be imposed by the board? How would the prospect of a fee or gate affect shareholder behavior?

• How will the liquidity fees or gates affect the fund’s portfolio choices? Will it affect the way funds manage their weekly liquid assets?

• Funds currently have the ability to delay the payment of redemption proceeds for up to seven days. Are there considerations that make funds hesitant to impose this delay that would also make funds hesitant to impose fees or gates? What are those factors?

• Would the expected imposition of a liquidity fee or gate increase redemption activity as the fund’s liquidity levels near the threshold? Would the prospect of a liquidity fee or gate create an incentive to redeem during times of potential stress by shareholders fearing that such a fee or gate might be imposed, thus inciting a run? If so, do commenters agree that in such a case the redemptions would trigger a fee or gate and slow or halt redemptions? If not, are there ways in which we could modify our proposed threshold for liquidity fees and gates such that a run

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370 See section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act.
could not arise without triggering fees or gates? What information would be needed for investors to reliably predict that a fund is on the verge of imposing fees or gates? Would the necessary information be readily available under our proposal?

- Are some types of shareholders more likely than other types of shareholders to attempt to redeem in anticipation of the imposition of the fee or gate? Are there ways that we could reduce the risk of pre-emptive redemptions? Would imposition of a fee or gate as a practical matter lead to liquidation of that fund? If so, should this be a concern?

- Is penny rounding sufficient to allow government money market funds to maintain a stable price? Should we also permit these funds to use amortized cost valuation? If so, why?

- Should we prohibit advisers to money market funds from charging management fees while the fund is gated? How might this affect advisers' incentives to make recommendations to the board when it is considering whether to not impose a liquidity fee or gate?

We note that we are not proposing to repeal or otherwise modify rule 17a-9 (permitting sponsors to support money market funds through portfolio purchases in some circumstances) under this proposal. Therefore, money market fund sponsors would be able to continue to support the money market funds they manage by purchasing securities from money market fund portfolios at their amortized cost value (or market price, if greater). Instead, we are requiring greater and more timely disclosure of any sponsor support of a money market fund, as further described in section III.F.1 below. We note that some sponsors could use such support to
prevent a money market fund from breaching a threshold that would otherwise require the board to consider imposition of a liquidity fee. Such support could benefit fund shareholders by preventing them from incurring the costs or loss of liquidity that a liquidity fee or gate may entail. However, because such support would be discretionary, its possibility may create uncertainty about whether fund investors will have to bear the costs and burdens of a liquidity fee or gate in times of stress, which could lead to unpredictable shareholder behavior and inefficient shareholder allocation of investments if their expectations of risk turn out to be misplaced. Our continuing to permit sponsor support of money market funds, albeit with greater transparency,\textsuperscript{371} also could favor money market fund groups with a well-capitalized sponsor that is better able to provide discretionary support to its affiliated money market funds and thus avoid the imposition of fees or gates. Nonetheless, even the expectation of possible discretionary sponsor support may tend to slow redemptions. We request comment on the retention of rule 17a-9 under this proposal.

- Should we continue to allow this type of sponsor support of money market funds, given the enhanced transparency requirements? Would allowing sponsor support prevent or limit this proposal from achieving the goal of enhancing investor protection and improving money market funds’ ability to manage high levels of redemptions? If so, how? Should we instead prohibit sponsor support under this option? If so, why? If we prohibited sponsor support, how would this advance investor protection if such support would protect the value or liquidity of the fund? Should we modify rule 17a-9 to limit or condition sponsor support?

- Would sponsors provide support to prevent a money market fund from breaching

\textsuperscript{371} See infra section III.F.
a liquidity threshold? Would sponsors be more willing and able to provide support to stabilize the fund under the liquidity fees and gates proposal than they were to support money market funds before the 2007-2008 financial crisis? Why or why not?

As discussed further below, we also are proposing to require that money market funds disclose their market-based NAVs and levels of daily and weekly liquid assets on a daily basis on the funds' websites.372

2. Terms of the Liquidity Fees and Gates

We are proposing that if a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets fall or remain below 15% of its total assets at the end of any business day, the next business day it must impose a 2% liquidity fee on each shareholder’s redemptions, unless the fund’s board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) determines that such a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund or determines that a lower fee would be in the best interest of the fund.373 Any fee imposed would be lifted automatically once the money market fund’s level of weekly liquid assets had risen to or above 30%, and it could be lifted at any time by the board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) if the board determines to impose a different fee or if it determines that imposing the fee is no longer in the best interest of the fund.374

372 See infra section III.F.

373 Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(f). A “business day,” defined in rule 2a-7 as “any day, other than Saturday, Sunday, or any customary business holiday,” would end after 11:59 p.m. on that day. See rule 2a-7(a)(4). If the shareholder of record making the redemption was a direct shareholder (and not a financial intermediary), we would expect the fee to apply to that shareholder’s net redemptions for the day. In order to provide the money market fund flexibility, if a liquidity fee were in place for more than one business day, the fund’s board could vary the level of the liquidity fee (subject to the 2% limit) if the board determined that a different fee level was in the best interest of the fund. Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i)(A). The new fee level would take effect the next business day following the board’s determination. Id.

374 Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i)(B).
In addition, once the fund had crossed below the 15% threshold, the fund’s board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) would be able to temporarily suspend redemptions and gate the fund if the board determines that doing so is in the best interest of the fund.\textsuperscript{375} Any gate imposed also would be automatically lifted once the fund’s weekly liquid assets had risen back to or above 30% of its total assets (although the board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) could lift the gate earlier).\textsuperscript{376} Any money market fund that imposes a gate would need to lift that gate within 30 days and a money market fund could not impose a gate for more than 30 days in any 90-day period.\textsuperscript{377} Under this proposal, we also would amend rule 22e-3 to permit the suspension of redemptions and liquidation of a money market fund if the fund’s level of weekly liquid assets falls below 15% of its total assets.\textsuperscript{378}

\textit{a. Discretionary Versus Mandatory Liquidity Fees and Gates}

We are proposing a default liquidity fee that the money market fund’s board of directors can modify or remove if it is in the best interest of the fund, because this structure offers the possibility of achieving many of the benefits of both fully discretionary and automatic (regulatory mandated) redemption restriction triggers. A purely discretionary trigger allows a fund board the flexibility to determine when a restriction is necessary, and thus allows tailoring of the triggering of the fee to the market conditions at the time, and the specific circumstances of

\textsuperscript{375} The fund must reject any redemption requests it receives while the fund is gated. See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii).

\textsuperscript{376} Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii).

\textsuperscript{377} Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii). We also note that an adviser to a money market fund could seek an exemptive order from the Commission to allow for continued gating beyond 30 days if such gating would be necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of the Investment Company Act.

\textsuperscript{378} See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 22e-3.
the fund. However, a purely discretionary trigger creates the risk that a fund board may be reluctant to impose restrictions, even when they would benefit the fund and the short-term financing markets. They may not impose such restrictions out of fear that doing so signals trouble for the individual fund or fund complex (and thus may incur significant business and reputational effects) or could incite redemptions in other money market funds in anticipation that fees may be imposed in those funds as well. Fully discretionary triggers also provide shareholders with little advance knowledge of when such a restriction might be triggered and fund boards could end up applying them in a very disparate manner. Fully discretionary triggers also may present operational difficulties for fund managers who suddenly may need to implement a liquidity fee and may not have systems in place that can rapidly institute a fee whose trigger and size was previously unknown.

Automatic triggers set by the Commission may mitigate these potential concerns, but they create a risk of imposing costs on shareholders when funds are not truly distressed or when liquidity is not abnormally costly. Establishing thresholds that result in the imposition of a fee, unless the board makes a finding that such a fee is not in the best interest of the fund, balances these tradeoffs by providing some transparency to shareholders on potential fee or gate triggers and giving some guidance to boards on when a fee or gate might be appropriate. At the same time, it also allows boards to avoid imposing a fee or gate when it would be inappropriate in light of the circumstances of the fund and the conditions in the market.

Our proposed rule essentially creates a default liquidity fee of a pre-determined size, imposed when the fund's weekly liquid assets have dropped below a certain threshold. However, it provides the fund’s board flexibility to alter the default option—for example, by imposing a gate instead of a fee or by imposing a fee at a different threshold or imposing a lower
percentage fee—as long as it determines that doing so is in the best interest of the fund.

We request comment on our proposed default structure for the liquidity fees and gates.

- Should the imposition of a liquidity fee or gate be fully discretionary or should it have a completely automatic trigger? Why?

- Would a money market fund’s board of directors impose a fully discretionary fee or gate during times of stress on the money market fund despite its possible unpopularity with investors and potential competitive disadvantage for the fund or fund group if other funds are not imposing a liquidity fee or gate? On the other hand, would a fund’s board of directors be able to best determine when a fee or gate should be imposed rather than an automatic trigger?

- What operational complexities would be involved in a fully discretionary liquidity fee? Would fund complexes and their intermediaries be able to program systems in advance to accommodate the immediate imposition of a liquidity fee whose trigger and size were unknown in advance?

b. Threshold for Liquidity Fees and Gates

We are proposing that a liquidity fee automatically be imposed on money market fund redemptions if the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets, unless the fund’s board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) determines that a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund.379 We also are proposing that, once the fund has crossed below this threshold, the money market fund board also would have the ability to impose a temporary gate for a limited period of time provided that the board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) determines that imposing a gate is in the fund’s best

379 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i).
interest. Any fee or gate imposed would be automatically lifted when the fund’s weekly liquid assets had risen back to or above 30% of its total assets (although the board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) could lift the fee or gate earlier if the board determined it was in the best interest of the fund.

Our proposed 15% weekly liquid asset threshold is a default for money market funds imposing liquidity fees that requires the board to consider taking action. Fund boards of directors have the flexibility to impose a liquidity fee or gate if weekly liquid assets fall below this threshold (or they may determine not to impose a liquidity fee or gate at all), and can continue to reconsider their decision in light of new events as long as the fund is below this liquidity threshold. Several industry commenters have recommended basing imposition of a liquidity fee on the money market fund’s level of weekly liquid assets, with their proposed thresholds ranging from 7.5% to 15% of weekly liquid assets. As shown in the chart below, our staff’s analysis of Form N-MFP data shows that, between March 2011 and October 2012, there were two months in which funds reported weekly liquid assets below 15% (one fund in May 2011, and four funds in June 2011) and there were two months in which funds reported weekly liquid assets of at least 15% but below 20% (one fund in March 2011, and one fund in February 2012).

Fees and gates are a tool to mitigate problems in funds, so we selected a threshold that would indicate distress in a fund, but also one that few funds would cross in the ordinary course.

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380 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii).
381 Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2).
382 See infra text preceding n.385.
383 See, e.g., BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 204 (recommending an automatic trigger of 15% weekly liquid assets); ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (recommending an automatic trigger of between 7.5% and 15% weekly liquid assets); Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172 (recommending an automatic trigger of 15% weekly liquid assets).
of business, allowing funds and their boards to avoid the costs of frequent unnecessary consideration of fees and gates. The analysis below shows that if the triggering threshold was between 25-30% weekly liquid assets, funds would have crossed this threshold every month except one during the period, and if it was set at between 20-25% weekly liquid assets, some funds would have crossed it nearly every other month. However, the analysis shows that funds rarely cross the threshold of between 15-20% weekly liquid assets during normal operations, and that during the time period analyzed, there were only 2 months that had any funds below the 15% weekly liquid assets threshold.

**DISTRIBUTION OF WEEKLY LIQUID ASSETS IN PRIME MONEY MARKET FUNDS, MARCH 2011 -- OCTOBER 2012**

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For purposes of our analysis, the monthly distribution of prime money market funds with weekly liquid assets above 30% is not shown.
Because the data on liquidity is reported at the end of the month, it could be the case that more than four money market funds' level of weekly liquid assets fell below 15% on other days of the month during our period of study. However, this number may overestimate the percentage of funds that are expected to impose a fee or gate because we expect that funds would increase their risk management around their level of weekly liquid assets in response to the fees and gates requirement to avoid breaching the liquidity threshold. Using this information to inform our choice of the appropriate level for a weekly liquid asset threshold, we are proposing a 15% weekly liquid assets threshold to balance the desire to have such consideration triggered while the fund still had liquidity reserves to meet redemptions but also not set the trigger at a level that frequently would be tripped by normal fluctuations in liquidity levels that typically would not indicate a fund under stress.

We are proposing to require that any fee or gate be lifted automatically once the fund’s weekly liquid assets have risen back above 30% of the fund’s assets—the minimum currently mandated under rule 2a-7—and thus a fee or gate would appear to be no longer justified. We considered whether a fee or gate should be lifted automatically before the fund’s weekly liquid assets were completely restored to their required minimum—for example, once they had risen to 25%. However, we preliminarily believe that automatically removing such a restriction before the fund’s level of weekly liquid assets was fully replenished may result in a fund being unable to maintain a liquidity fee or gate to protect the fund even when the fund is still under stress and before stressed market conditions have fully subsided. We note that a fund’s board can always determine to lift a fee or gate before the fund’s level of weekly liquid assets is restored to 30% of its assets.

There are a number of factors that a fund’s board of directors may consider in
determining whether to impose a liquidity fee once the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% of its total assets. For example, it may want to consider why the level of weekly liquid assets has fallen. Is it because the fund is experiencing mounting redemptions during a time of market stress or is it because a few large shareholders unexpectedly redeemed for idiosyncratic reasons unrelated to current market conditions? Another relevant factor to the fund board may be whether the fall in weekly liquid assets has been accompanied by a fall in the fund’s shadow price. The fund board also may want to consider whether the fall in weekly liquid assets is likely to be very short-term. For example, will the fall in weekly liquid assets be cured in the next day or two when securities currently in the fund’s portfolio qualify as weekly liquid assets? Many money market funds “ladder” the maturities of their portfolio securities, and thus it could be the case that a fall in weekly liquid assets will be rapidly cured by the portfolio’s maturity structure.

We considered instead proposing a threshold based on the shadow price of the money market fund. For example, one money market fund sponsor has suggested that we require money market funds’ boards of directors to consider charging a liquidity fee on redeeming shareholders if the shadow price of a fund’s portfolio fell below a specified threshold.385 This commenter asserted that such a trigger would ensure that shareholders only pay a fee when redemptions would actually cause the fund to suffer a loss and thus redemptions clearly disadvantage remaining shareholders. However, we are concerned that a money market fund being able to impose a fee only when the fund’s shadow price has fallen by some amount below $1.00 in certain cases may come too late to mitigate the potential consequences of heavy

385 HSBC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 196 (suggesting setting the market-based NAV trigger at $0.9975).
redemptions and to fully protect investors. Heavy redemptions can impose adverse economic consequences on a money market fund even before the fund actually suffers a loss. They can deplete the fund’s most liquid assets so that the fund is in a substantially weaker position to absorb further redemptions or losses. In addition, our proposed threshold is a default trigger for the liquidity fee—the board is not required to impose a liquidity fee when the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15%. Thus, a board can take into account whether the money market fund’s shadow price has deteriorated in determining whether to impose a liquidity fee or gate when the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below the threshold. A threshold based on shadow prices also raises questions about whether and to what extent shareholders differentiate between realized (such as those from security defaults) and market-based losses (such as those from market interest rate changes) when considering a money market fund’s shadow price. If shareholders do not redeem in response to market-based losses (as opposed to realized losses), it may be inappropriate to base a fee on a fall in the fund’s shadow price if such a fall is only temporary. On the other hand, a temporary decline in the shadow price using market-based factors can lead to realized losses from a shareholder’s perspective if redemptions cause a fund with an impaired NAV to “break the buck.”

We also considered proposing a threshold based on the level of daily liquid assets rather than weekly liquid assets. We expect that a money market fund would meet heightened shareholder redemptions first by depleting the fund’s daily liquid assets and next by depleting its weekly liquid assets, as daily liquid assets tend to be the most liquid. Accordingly, basing this threshold on weekly liquid assets thus provides a deeper picture of the fund’s overall liquidity position, as a fund whose weekly liquid assets have fallen to 15% has likely depleted all of its daily liquid assets. In addition, a fund’s levels of daily liquid assets may be more volatile
because they are one of the first assets used to satisfy day-to-day shareholder redemptions, and thus more difficult to use as a gauge of true fund distress. Finally, as noted above, funds are able under the Investment Company Act to delay payment of redemption requests for up to seven days. Thus, substantial depletion of weekly liquid assets may be a better indicator of true fund distress. We also considered a trigger that would combine liquidity and market-based NAV thresholds but have preliminarily concluded that a single threshold would accomplish our goals without undue complexity and would be easier for investors to understand.

We request comment on our default threshold for liquidity fees and our threshold on when a money market fund’s board may impose a gate.

- What should be the trigger either for a default liquidity fee or for a board’s ability to impose a gate? Rather than our proposed trigger based on a fund’s level of weekly liquid assets, should it be based on the fund’s shadow price or its level of daily liquid assets? Should it be based on a certain fall in either the fund’s weekly liquid assets or shadow price? Why and what extent of a fall? Should it be based on some other factor? Should it be based on a combination of factors?

- If we considered a threshold based on the fund’s shadow price, do shareholders differentiate between realized and market-based losses (such as those from security defaults versus those from market interest rate changes) when considering a money market fund’s shadow price? If so, how does it affect their propensity to redeem shares when one or more funds have losses?

- Should we permit a fund board to impose a liquidity fee or gate even before a fund passes the trigger requiring the default fee to be considered if the board determines that an early imposition of a liquidity fee or gate would be in the best
interest of the fund? Would that reduce the benefits discussed above of having an automatic default trigger? What concerns would arise from permitting imposition of a fee or gate before a fund passes the thresholds we may establish?

- What extent of decline in weekly liquid assets should trigger consideration of a fee or gate and why? Should it be more or less than 15% weekly liquid assets, such as 10% or 20%?

- How do fund holdings of weekly liquid assets vary within the calendar month, between Form N-MFP filing dates? How do net shareholder redemptions vary within the calendar month, between Form N-MFP filing dates? How accurately can the fund forecast the net redemptions of its shareholders? When is the fund more likely to make forecasting errors?

- Should a liquidity fee or gate not be required until the fund suffers an actual loss in value? Why or why not and if so, how much of a loss in value?

- Is one type of threshold less susceptible to preemptive runs? If so, why?

- Are there other factors that a board might consider in determining whether to impose a fee or gate? Should we require that boards consider certain factors? If so, which factors and why?

c. **Size of Liquidity Fee**

We are proposing that the liquidity fee be set at a default rate of 2%, although a fund’s board could impose a lower liquidity fee (or no fee at all) if it determines that a lower level is in the best interest of the fund. Commenters have suggested that liquidity fee levels ranging from

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386 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i)(A).
1% to 3% could be effective. We selected a default fee of 2% because we believe that a liquidity fee set at this level is high enough that it may impose sufficient costs on redeeming shareholders to deter redemptions in a crisis, but is low enough to permit investors who wish to redeem despite the cost to receive their proceeds without bearing unwarranted costs. A 2% level should also permit a fund to recoup the costs of liquidity it may bear, while repairing the fund if it has incurred losses. We recognize that establishing any fixed fee level may not precisely address the circumstances of a particular fund in a crisis, and accordingly are proposing to make this 2% level a default, which a fund board may lower or eliminate in accordance with the circumstances of any individual fund.

We also considered whether we should require a liquidity fee with an amount explicitly tied to market indicators of changes in liquidity costs for money market funds. For example, one fund manager suggested that the amount of the liquidity fee charged could be based on the anticipated change in the market-based NAV of the fund’s portfolio from the redemption, assuming a horizontal slice of the fund’s portfolio was sold to meet the redemption request. This firm asserted that such a liquidity fee would proportionately target the extent that the redemption was causing a material disadvantage to remaining investors in the fund and it would be clear to investors how the fee would advance investor protection.

387 See, e.g., Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172 (recommending a fee of between 1 and 3%); BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 204 (recommending a standby liquidity fee of 1%); ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (recommending a 1% fee).

388 See, e.g., Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172 (“We believe a fee in this amount [1-3%] will serve as an adequate deterrent to investors who may attempt to flee a fund out of fear, but would still allow those investors who have a need to access their cash the ability to redeem a portion of their holdings.”); ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (“A liquidity fee set at this level [1%] would discourage redemptions, but allow the fund to continue to provide liquidity to investors.... Investors truly in need of liquidity would have access to it, but at a pre-determined cost.”).

389 See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (“Insofar as investors choose to redeem, the fee would benefit remaining shareholders by mitigating liquidation costs and potentially rebuilding NAVs.”).

390 HSBC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 196.
There may be a number of drawbacks to such a “market-sized” liquidity fee, however. First, it does not provide significant transparency in advance to shareholders of the size of the liquidity fee they may have to pay in times of stress. It could also reduce the fees’ efficacy in stemming redemptions if investors fear that the fee might go up in the future. This lack of transparency may hinder shareholders’ ability to make well-informed decisions. It also may be difficult for money market funds to rapidly determine precise liquidity costs in times of stress when the short-term financing markets may be generally illiquid. Indeed, our staff gave no-action assurances to money market funds relating to valuation during the 2008 financial crisis because determining pricing in the then-illiquid markets was so difficult. We also understand that a liquidity fee that is not fixed in advance and indeed may change from day-to-day may be considerably more difficult and expensive for money market funds to implement and administer from an operational perspective. Such a fee would require real-time inputs of pricing factors into fund systems that would need to be rapidly disseminated through chains of financial intermediaries in order to apply to daily redemptions from the large number of beneficial owners that hold money market fund shares through omnibus accounts. A floating fee would assume sale of a horizontal cross section of assets but we do not think that is how portfolio securities would be sold to meet redemptions.

These factors have led us to propose a default liquidity fee of a fixed size, but to allow the board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) to impose a

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See Investment Company Institute, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Oct. 10, 2008) (not recommending enforcement action through January 12, 2009, if money market funds used amortized cost to shadow price portfolio securities with maturities of 60 days or less in accordance with Commission interpretive guidance and noting: “You state that under current market conditions, the shadow pricing provisions of rule 2a-7 are not working as intended. You believe that the markets for short-term securities, including commercial paper, may not necessarily result in discovery of prices that reflect the fair value of securities the issuers of which are reasonably likely to be in a position to pay upon maturity. You further assert that pricing vendors customarily used by money market funds are at times not able to provide meaningful prices because inputs used to derive those prices have become less reliable indicators of price.”).
smaller-sized liquidity fee if it determines that such a smaller fee would be in the best interest of the fund.\textsuperscript{392} We preliminarily believe that such a default may provide the best combination of directing boards of directors to a liquidity fee size that may be appropriate in many stressed market conditions, but providing flexibility to boards to lower the size of that liquidity fee if it determines that a smaller fee would better and more fairly estimate and allocate liquidity costs to redeeming shareholders. Some factors that boards of directors may want to consider in determining whether to impose a smaller-sized liquidity fee than 2% include the shadow price of the money market fund at the time, relevant market indicators of liquidity stress in the markets, changes in spreads for portfolio securities (whether based on actual sales, dealer quotes, pricing vendor mark-to-model or matrix pricing, or otherwise), changes in the liquidity profile of the fund in response to redemptions and expectations regarding that profile in the immediate future, and whether the money market fund and its intermediaries are capable of rapidly putting in place a fee of a different amount. We are not proposing to allow fund boards to impose a larger liquidity fee than 2% because we understand that, even in “fire sales” or other crisis situations, money market funds typically have not realized haircuts greater than 2% when selling portfolio securities, and believe that investors should not face unwarranted costs when redeeming their shares. In addition, the staff has noted in the past that fees greater than 2% raise questions regarding whether a fund’s securities remain “redeemable.”\textsuperscript{399} If a fund continues to be under

\textsuperscript{392} See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i).

\textsuperscript{393} Section 2(a)(32) of the Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(32)] defines the term "redeemable security" as a security that entitles the holder to receive approximately his proportionate share of the fund’s net asset value. The Division of Investment Management informally took the position that a fund may impose a redemption fee of up to 2% to cover the administrative costs associated with redemption, “but if that charge should exceed 2 percent, its shares may not be considered redeemable and it may not be able to hold itself out as a mutual fund.” See John P. Reilly & Associates, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 12, 1979). This position is currently reflected in our rule 23c-3(b)(1) under the Act [17 CFR 270.23c-3(b)(1)], which permits a maximum 2% repurchase fee for interval funds and rule 22c-2(a)(1)(i) [17 CFR 270.22c-2(a)(1)(i)] which similarly permits a maximum 2% redemption fee to deter frequent trading in mutual funds.
stress even with a 2% liquidity fee, the fund board may consider imposing a redemption gate or liquidating the fund pursuant to rule 22e-3.

We request comment on our proposed default size for the liquidity fee.

- What should be the amount of the liquidity fee? Should it be a default amount, a fixed amount, or an amount directly tied to the cost of liquidity in times of stress? If as proposed, we adopt a default fee, should it be 2%, 1%, or some other level? Should we give boards discretion to impose a higher fee if the board determines that it is in the best interest of the fund? Commenters are requested to please provide data to support your suggested fee level.

- If the amount of the liquidity fee is tied to the cost of liquidity at the time of the redemption, how would that amount be determined? Would a liquidity fee that changes depending on market circumstances provide shareholders with sufficient transparency on the size of the fee to be able to affect their purchase and redemption behavior? If the size of the liquidity fee changed depending on market circumstances, would money market funds be able to determine readily the amount of the liquidity fee during times of market dislocation? Would such a fee affect one type of investor more than another type of investor?

- Is a flat, fixed liquidity fee preferable to a variable fee that might be higher than the flat fee? Will the fund’s ability to choose a lower liquidity fee result in any conflicts of interest between redeeming shareholders, non-redeeming shareholders, and the investment adviser?

- How should we weigh the risk that a flat liquidity fee may be higher or lower than the actual liquidity costs to the money market fund from the redemption, against
the risk that a market-based liquidity fee may not provide sufficient advance transparency to shareholders and may be difficult to set appropriately in a crisis?

- How difficult would it be for money market funds and various intermediaries in the distribution chain of money market fund shares to handle from an operational perspective a liquidity fee that varied?

\[d. \text{ Default of Liquidity Fees}\]

Our proposal provides that a liquidity fee be imposed once a non-government money market fund’s weekly liquid assets has fallen below 15% of its total assets (which is one-half of its required 30% minimum), unless the board of directors determines that such a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund. After the fund has crossed that 15% liquidity threshold, the board could also impose a gate. Based on this default choice, the implicit ordering of redemption restrictions thus would be a liquidity fee, and if that fee is not sufficiently slowing redemptions, a gate (although once the liquidity fee threshold was crossed, a board would be able to immediately impose a gate instead of a fee). We proposed a liquidity fee, rather than a gate, as the default because we believe that a fee has the potential to be less disruptive to fund shareholders and the short-term financing markets because a fee allows fund shareholders to continue to transact in times of stress (although at a cost). Some industry commenters instead have suggested that money market funds impose a gate first.\textsuperscript{394} Such a pause in redemption activity could provide time for any spike in redemptions to subside before redemptions were allowed with a fee. We request comment on liquidity fees being the default under this proposal.

- Should the implicit ordering in the proposed rule be reversed, with a default of the

\textsuperscript{394} See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25; Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172.
fund imposing a gate once the fund has crossed the weekly liquid asset threshold, unless or until the board determines to re-open with a liquidity fee? Why?

- Should there be a different threshold for consideration of a gate if we adopted a gate as the default? Why or why not? Should a gate be mandatory under certain circumstances? If so, under what circumstances? Should any mandatory gate have a pre-specified window? If so, how long should that gate be imposed?

e. Time Limit on Gates

We are proposing that a money market fund board must lift any gate it imposes within 30 days and that a board could not impose a gate for more than 30 days in any 90-day period. As noted above, a fund board could only impose a gate if it determines that the gate is in the best interest of the fund, and we would expect the board would lift the gate as soon as it determines that a gate is no longer in the best interest of the fund. This time limitation for the gate is designed to balance protecting the fund in times of stress while not unduly limiting the redeemability of money market fund shares, given the strong preference embodied in the Investment Company Act for the redeemability of open-end investment company shares.\(^{395}\) We understand that investors use money market funds for cash management, and that lack of access to their money market fund investment for a long period of time can impose substantial costs and hardships.\(^{396}\) Indeed, many shareholders in The Reserve Primary Fund informed us about these


\(^{396}\) See, e.g., Comment Letter of Thrivent Financial for Lutherans (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Thrivent FSOC Comment Letter") ("The proposed liquidity fees reduce the simplicity, reduce the liquidity for the majority of shareholders, increase the potential for losses, and as a result, dramatically alter the product. Money market funds' intended purpose is to be a liquidity product, but if the product is only liquid for the first 15% of investors that redeem, then it is no longer a liquidity product for the remaining 85%.").
costs and hardships during that fund’s lengthy liquidation.\footnote{See Kevin McCoy, Primary Fund Shareholders Put in a Bind, USA Today, Nov. 11, 2008, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perifunds/2008-11-11-market-fund-side_N.htm (discussing hardships faced by Reserve Primary Fund shareholders due to having their shareholdings frozen, including a small business owner who almost was unable to launch a new business, and noting that “Ameriprise has used ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ of its own liquidity for temporary loans to clients who face financial hardships while they await final repayments from the Primary Fund”); John G. Taft, STEWARDSHIP: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LOST CULTURE OF WALL STREET (2012), at 2 (“Now that the Reserve Primary Fund had suspended redemptions of Fund shares for cash, our clients had no access to their cash. This meant, in many cases, that they had no way to settle pending securities purchase and therefore no way to trade their portfolios at a time of historic market volatility. No way to make minimum required distributions from retirement plans. No way to pay property taxes. No way to pay college tuition. It meant bounced checks and, for retirees, interruption of the cash flow distributions they were counting on to pay their day-to-day living expenses.”).}

These concerns motivated us to propose a time period that would not freeze shareholders’ money market fund investments for an excessively long period of time. On the other hand, we do want to provide some time for stressed market conditions to subside, for portfolio securities to mature and provide internal liquidity to the fund, and for potentially distressed fund portfolio securities to recover or be held to maturity. As of February 28, 2013, 43% of prime money market fund assets had a maturity of 30 days or less.\footnote{Based on Form N-MFP data, with maturity determined in the same manner as it is for purposes of computing the fund’s weighted average life.} Accordingly, within a 30-day window for a gate, a substantial amount of a money market fund’s assets could mature and provide cash to the fund to meet redemptions when the fund re-opened. We also note that some commenters suggested a 30-day time limit on any gate.\footnote{See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25.} Balancing all of these factors led us to propose a 30-day time limit for any gate imposed. So that this 30-day time limit could not be circumvented, for example, by reopening the fund on the 29th day for a day before re-imposing the gate for potentially another 30-day period, we also are proposing that the fund cannot impose a gate for more than 30 days in any 90-day period. The 30-day limit is a maximum, and a money market fund board likely would need to meet regularly during any period in which a redemption
gate is in place and would lift the gate promptly when it determines that the gate is no longer in
the best interest of the fund. 400

- Does a 30-day limit appropriately balance these objectives? Should there be a
  shorter time limit, such as 10 days? Should there be a longer time limit, such as
  45 days? Why?

- Will our proposed limit on the number of days a fund can be gated in any 90-day
  period effectively prevent “gaming” of the 30-day gate limitation? Should it be a
  shorter window or larger window? 60 days? 120 days?

- Should we impose additional restrictions on a money market fund’s use of a gate?
  Should we, for example, require the board of directors of a money market fund
  that has imposed a gate to meet each day or week that the gate is in place, and
  permit the gate to remain in place only if the board makes specified findings at
  these meetings? We could provide that a gate may only remain in place if the
  board, including a majority of the independent directors, finds that lifting the gate
  and meeting shareholder redemptions could result in material dilution or other
  unfair results to investors or existing shareholders. Would requiring the board to
  make such a finding to continue to use a gate help to prevent a fund from
  imposing a gate for longer than is necessary or appropriate? Would a different
  required finding better achieve this goal? Would fund boards be able to make
  such findings accurately, particularly during a crisis when a board may be more
  likely to impose a gate? Would such a requirement deter fund boards from

400 The fund’s board may also consider permanently suspending redemptions in preparation for fund
liquidation under rule 22e-3 if the fund approaches the 30 day gating limit.
keeping a gate in place when doing so may be in the best interest of the fund?

f.  

Application of Liquidity Fees to Omnibus Accounts

For beneficial owners holding mutual fund shares through omnibus accounts, we understand that, with respect to redemption fees imposed to deter market timing of mutual fund shares, financial intermediaries generally impose any redemption fees themselves to record or beneficial owners holding through that intermediary.\textsuperscript{401} We understand that they do so often in accordance with contractual arrangements between the fund or its transfer agent and the intermediary. We would expect any liquidity fees to be handled in a similar manner, although we understand that some money market fund sponsors will want to review their contractual arrangements with their funds' financial intermediaries and service providers to determine whether any contractual modifications would be necessary or advisable to ensure that any liquidity fees are appropriately applied to beneficial owners of money market fund shares. We also understand that some money market fund sponsors may seek certifications or other assurances that these intermediaries and service providers will apply any liquidity fees to the beneficial owners of money market fund shares. We also recognize that money market funds and their transfer agents and intermediaries will need to engage in certain communications regarding a liquidity fee.

We request comment on the application of liquidity fees and gates to shares held through omnibus accounts.

- Do commenters agree with our view that liquidity fees likely will be handled by intermediaries in a manner similar to how they currently impose redemption fees?

\textsuperscript{401} See rule 22c-2. Our understanding of how financial intermediaries handle redemption fees in mutual funds is based on Commission staff discussions with industry participants and service providers.
If not, how would liquidity fees be applied to shares held through financial intermediaries? Is our understanding correct that financial intermediaries generally apply any liquidity fees themselves to record or beneficial owners holding through that intermediary? Would they do so based on existing contractual arrangements or would funds make contractual modifications? What cost would be involved in any contractual modifications?

- Would funds in addition or instead seek certifications from financial intermediaries that they will apply any liquidity fees? What cost would be involved in any such certifications?

- What other methods might money market funds use to gain assurances that financial intermediaries will apply any liquidity fees appropriately? At what costs? Will some intermediaries not offer prime money market funds to avoid operational costs involved with fees and gates?

3. **Exemptions to Permit Liquidity Fees and Gates**

The Commission is proposing exemptions from various provisions of the Investment Company Act to permit a fund to institute liquidity fees and gates.\(^{402}\) In the absence of an exemption, imposing gates could violate section 22(c) of the Act, which generally prohibits a mutual fund from suspending the right of redemption or postponing the payment of redemption proceeds for more than seven days, and imposing liquidity fees could violate rule 22c-1, which (together with section 22(c) and other provisions of the Act) requires that each redeeming shareholder receive his or her pro rata portion of the fund’s net assets. The Commission is proposing to exercise its authority under section 6(c) of the Act to provide exemptions from

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\(^{402}\) See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c).
these and related provisions of the Act to permit a money market fund to institute liquidity fees and gates notwithstanding these restrictions. As discussed in more detail below, we believe that such exemptions do not implicate the concerns that Congress intended to address in enacting these provisions, and thus they are necessary and appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the Act.

We do not believe that gates would conflict with the purposes underlying section 22(c), which was designed to prevent funds and their investment advisers from interfering with the redemption rights of shareholders for improper purposes, such as the preservation of management fees. The board of a money market fund would impose gates to benefit the fund and its shareholders by making the fund better able to handle substantial redemptions, as discussed above.

We also propose to provide exemptions from rule 22c-1 to permit a money market fund to impose liquidity fees because a money market fund would impose liquidity fees to benefit the fund and its shareholders by providing a more systematic allocation of liquidity costs. Remaining shareholders also may benefit if the fees help repair any decline in the fund's shadow price or lead to an increased dividend paid to remaining fund shareholders. The amount of

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403 15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c). In order to clarify the application of liquidity fees and gates to variable contracts, we also would amend rule 2a-7 to provide that, notwithstanding section 27(i) of the Act, a variable contract sold by a registered separate account funding variable insurance contracts or the sponsoring insurance company of such account may apply a liquidity fee or gate to contract owners who allocate all or a portion of their contract value to a subaccount of the separate account that is either a money market fund or that invests all of its assets in shares of a money market fund. See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iv). Section 27(i)(2)(A) makes it unlawful for any registered separate account funding variable insurance contracts or the sponsoring insurance company of such account to sell a variable contract that is not a "redeemable security."


405 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c) (providing that, notwithstanding rule 22c-1, among other provisions, a money market fund may impose a liquidity fee under the circumstances specified in the proposed rule).
additional fees that the fund might collect in this regard would be only to further the purpose of the provision and could only be imposed under circumstances of stress on the fund.

A gate would also be similarly limited. It could only be imposed for a limited period of time and only under circumstances of stress on the fund. This aspect of gates, therefore, is akin to rule 22e-3, which also provides an exemption from section 22(e) to permit money market fund boards to suspend redemptions of fund shares in order to protect the fund and its shareholders from the harmful effects of a run on the fund, and to minimize the potential for disruption to the securities markets.\textsuperscript{406} We are proposing to permit money market funds to be able to impose fees and gates because they may provide substantial benefits to money market funds and the short-term financing markets for issuers, as discussed above. However, because we recognize that fees and gates may impose hardships on investors who rely on their ability to freely redeem shares (or to redeem shares without paying a fee), we also have proposed limitations on when and for how long money market funds could impose these restrictions.\textsuperscript{407}

We request comment on our proposed amendments allowing money market funds to institute fees and gates.

- Would the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 provide sufficient exemptive relief to permit a money market fund to institute fees or gates with both the requirements of rule 2a-7 and the Investment Company Act? Are there other provisions of the Investment Company Act from which the Commission should consider providing an exemption?

\textsuperscript{406} See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at text following n.379.

\textsuperscript{407} See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2). Cf. 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at text following n.379 ("Because the suspension of redemptions may impose hardships on investors who rely on their ability to redeem shares, the conditions of [rule 22e-3] limit the fund's ability to suspend redemptions to circumstances that present a significant risk of a run on the fund and potential harm to shareholders.")
4. Amendments to Rule 22e-3

Under this proposal, we also would amend rule 22e-3 to permit (but not require) the permanent suspension of redemptions and liquidation of a money market fund if the fund’s level of weekly liquid assets falls below 15% of its total assets.408 This will allow a money market fund that imposes a fee or a gate, but determines that it would not be in the best interest of the fund to continue operating, to permanently suspend redemptions and liquidate. As such, it will provide an additional tool to fund boards of directors to manage a fund in the best interest of the fund when that fund comes under stress regarding its liquidity buffers. It will allow fund boards to suspend redemptions and liquidate a fund that the board determines would be unable to stay open (or, if gated, re-open) without further harm to the fund, and prevents such a fund from waiting until its shadow price has declined so far that it is about to “break the buck.”

We considered whether a money market fund’s level of weekly liquid assets should have to fall further than the 15% threshold that allows the imposition of fees and gates for the fund to be able to permanently suspend redemptions and liquidate. A permanent suspension of redemptions could be considered more draconian because there is no prospect that the fund will re-open—instead the fund will simply liquidate and return money to shareholders. Accordingly, one could consider a lower weekly liquid asset threshold than 15% justified. However, we believe such considerations must be balanced against the risk that might be caused by establishing a lower threshold for enabling a permanent suspension of redemptions. For example, a fund with a fee or gate in place might know (based on market conditions or discussions with its shareholders or otherwise) that upon lifting the fee or gate it will experience a severe run. We would not want to force such a fund to lift the fee or re-open and weather

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408 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 22e-3.
enough of that run to deplete its weekly liquid assets below a lower threshold. We preliminarily believe this risk is great enough to warrant allowing money market funds to suspend redemptions permanently once the fund's weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets.

As under existing rule 22e-3, a money market fund also would still be able to suspend redemptions and liquidate if it determines that the extent of the deviation between its shadow price and its market-based NAV per share may result in material dilution or other unfair results to investors or existing shareholders. Accordingly, a money market fund that suffers a default would still be able to suspend redemptions and liquidate before that credit loss lead to redemptions and a fall in its weekly liquid assets.

We request comment on our proposed amendments to rule 22e-3 under this proposal.

- Is it appropriate to allow a money market fund to suspend redemptions and liquidate if its level of weekly liquid assets falls below 15% of its total assets? Is there a different threshold based on daily or weekly assets that would better protect money market fund shareholders?

- Should a fund's ability to suspend redemptions and liquidate be tied only to adverse deviations in its shadow price? If so, is our current standard under rule 22e-3 appropriate or is there a different level of shadow price decline that should trigger a money market fund's ability to suspend redemptions and liquidate?

5. **Exemptions from the Liquidity Fees and Gates Requirement**

We are proposing that government money market funds (including Treasury money market funds) be exempt from any fee or gate requirement but that these funds be permitted to impose such a fee or gate under the regime we have described above if the ability to impose such

\[409\] See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 22e-3.
fees and gates were disclosed in the fund’s prospectus. This exemption is based on a similar analysis to our proposed exemption of government money market funds from the floating NAV proposal and also on our desire to facilitate investor choice by providing a money market fund investment option for an investor who was unwilling or unable to invest in a money market fund that could impose liquidity fees or gates in times of stress.

As discussed in the RSFI Study, government money market funds historically have experienced inflows, rather than outflows, in times of stress due to flights to quality, liquidity, and transparency. The assets of government money market funds tend to appreciate in value in times of stress rather than depreciate. Accordingly, the portfolio composition of government money market funds means that these funds are less likely to need to use these restrictions. We also expect that some money market fund investors may be unwilling or unable to invest in a money market fund that could impose a fee or gate. For example, there could be some types of investors, such as sweep accounts, that may be unwilling or unable to invest in a money market fund that could impose a gate because such an investor requires the ability to immediately redeem at any point in time, regardless of whether the fund or the markets are distressed. Accordingly, exempting government money market funds from the fees and gates requirement would allow fund sponsors to offer a choice of money market fund investment products that

\[410\] See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii).

\[411\] See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 6-13.

\[412\] Government money market funds tend to attract significant inflows of investments during times of broader market distress, which can appreciate their value. See, e.g., figure 1 in supra section 1.B (showing that during the 2008 Lehman crisis institutional share classes of government money market funds, which include Treasury and government funds, experienced heavy inflows). Also see, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (noting government money market funds attracted an inflow of $192 billion during the week following the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008); HSBC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 196 ("As evidenced during the credit crisis of 2008, Treasury and government funds benefitted from a "flight to quality" during these systemic events"); Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174 (noting its institutional government and institutional Treasury money market funds generally experienced high levels of net inflows during 2008).
meet differing liquidity needs, while minimizing the risk of adverse contagion effects from heavy
money market fund redemptions. Based on our evaluation of these considerations and tradeoffs,
and the more limited risk of heavy redemptions in government money market funds, we
preliminarily believe that on balance it is preferable to exempt these funds from this potential
requirement, but permit them to use liquidity fees and gates if they choose.

We note that Treasury money market funds generally would be exempt from any
liquidity fees and gates requirement because at least 80% of their assets generally must be
Treasury securities and overnight repurchase agreements collateralized with Treasury securities,
each of which is a weekly liquid asset. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely for a Treasury money
market fund to breach the 15% weekly liquid asset threshold that would allow imposition of a fee
or gate. Most government money market funds similarly always would have at least 15%
weekly liquid assets because of the nature of their portfolio, but it is possible to have a
government money market fund with below 15% weekly liquid assets. We also note that
government money market funds and Treasury money market funds do not necessarily have the
same risk profile. For example, government money market funds generally have a much higher
portion of their portfolios invested in securities issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the
Federal Home Loan Banks and thus a higher exposure to the home mortgage market than
Treasury money market funds. We note that this exemption would not apply to tax-exempt (or
municipal) money market funds. As discussed above, because tax-exempt money market funds
are not required to maintain 10% daily liquid assets, these funds may be less liquid than other
money market funds, which could raise concerns that tax-exempt retail funds might not be able
to manage even the lower level of redemptions expected in a retail money market fund. In
addition, municipal securities typically present greater credit and liquidity risk than government securities and thus could come under pressure in times of stress.

We request comment on our proposed exemption of government money market funds from the proposed liquidity fees and gates requirement.

- Is this exemption appropriate, particularly in light of the redemptions from government funds in late June and early July 2011? Why or why not?
- Is it appropriate to give government money market funds the option to have the ability to impose fees and gates so long as they disclose the option to investors? Why or why not? What factors might lead a government fund to exercise this option?
- Should the exemption for government money market funds be extended to municipal money market funds? Why or why not?

We also considered whether there should be other exemptions from the proposed liquidity fees and gates requirement. For example, as discussed in section III.A.4 above, we are proposing an exemption for retail money market funds from any floating NAV requirement. We noted in that section how retail money market funds experienced fewer redemptions during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and thus may be less likely to suffer heavy redemptions in the future. However, unlike with government money market funds, a retail prime money market fund generally is subject to the same credit and liquidity risk as an institutional prime money market fund. In addition, a floating NAV requirement affects a shareholder’s experience with a money market fund on a daily basis. Given the costs and burdens associated with a floating NAV requirement, and the potential limited benefit to retail shareholders on an ongoing basis given that they are less likely to engage in heavy redemptions, a retail exemption might be more
appropriate on balance under a floating NAV requirement than under a liquidity fees and gates requirement. In contrast, a fee or gate requirement would not affect a money market fund unless the fund's weekly liquid assets fell below 15% of its total assets—*i.e.*, unless it came under stress. Exempting retail money market funds from this requirement thus could leave only institutional (and not retail) shareholders protected when the money market fund in which they have invested comes under stress. Given that such an exemption would merely relieve them in normal times of the costs and burden on those investors created by the prospect that the fund could impose a fee or gate if someday it came under stress, we preliminarily believe that a retail exemption may not be warranted for this alternative. We also considered methods of exempting some retail investors from a fee or gate requirement. For example, we could exempt small redemption requests, such as those below $10,000, or $100,000 per day, from any fee or gate requirement. Such small redemptions are less likely to materially impact the liquidity position of the fund. This type of exemption could retain the benefits of fees and gates for retail money market funds generally while providing some relief from the burdens for investors with smaller redemption needs. However, we are concerned that granting such exemptions could complicate the fees and gates requirement both as an operational matter and in terms of ease of shareholder understanding without providing substantial benefits.

We also have considered whether irrevocable redemption requests submitted at least a certain period in advance should be exempt as the fund should be able to plan for such liquidity demands and hold sufficient liquid assets. However, we are concerned that shareholders could try to "game" the fee or gate requirement through such exemptions, for example, by redeeming a certain amount every week and then reinvesting the redemption proceeds immediately if the cash is not needed. We also are concerned that allowing such an exception would add significantly to
the cost and complexity of this requirement, as fund groups would need to be able to separately track which shares are subject to a fee or gate and which are not.

We request comment on other potential exemptions from the proposed liquidity fees and gates requirement.

- Should retail money market funds (including tax-exempt money market funds) or retail investors be exempt from any liquidity fee or gate provision? Should there be an exemption for small redemption requests, such as redemptions below $10,000? If so, below what level? If a retail money market fund crossed the thresholds we are proposing for board consideration of a fee or gate, is there a reason not to allow the fund’s board to protect the fund and its shareholders through the use of a liquidity fee or gate? Would investors “game” such exemptions?

- Should we create an exemption for shareholders that submit an irrevocable redemption request at least a certain period in advance of the needed redemption? Why or why not? With what period of advance notice? For each of these exemptions, could funds track the shares that are not subject to the fee or gate? What operational costs would be involved in including such an exemption? Would shareholders “game” such exemptions?

- Would further exemptions undermine the goal of the liquidity fee or gate in deterring or stopping heavy redemptions? Why or why not? Would exemptions from the fee or gate proposal make it more difficult or costly to implement or operationalize? How would any such difficulties compare to the benefits that could be obtained from such exemptions?
6. **Operational Considerations Relating to Liquidity Fees and Gates**

Money market funds and others in the distribution chain (depending on how they are structured) likely would incur some operational costs in establishing or modifying systems to administer a liquidity fee or gate. These costs likely would be incurred by, or spread amongst, a fund’s transfer agents, sub-transfer agents, recordkeepers, accountants, portfolio accounting departments, and custodian. Money market funds and others also may be required to develop procedures and controls, and may incur other costs, for example to update systems necessary for confirmations and account statements to reflect the deduction of a liquidity fee from redemption proceeds. Money market funds and their intermediaries may need to establish new, or modify existing, systems or procedures that would allow them to administer temporary gates. Money market fund shareholders also might be required to modify their own systems to prepare for possible future liquidity fees, or manage gates, although we expect that only some shareholders would be required to make these changes.\(^{413}\) They also may modify contracts or seek certifications from financial intermediaries that they will apply any liquidity fee.

These costs would vary depending on how a liquidity fee or gate is structured, including its triggering event, as well as on the capabilities, functions, and sophistication of the fund’s and others’ current systems. These factors will vary among money market funds, shareholders, and others, and particularly because we request comment on a number of ways in which we could structure a liquidity fee or gate requirement, we cannot ascertain at this stage the systems and other modifications any particular money market fund or other affected entity would be required to make to administer a liquidity fee or manage a gate. Indeed, we believe that money market

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\(^{413}\) Many shareholders use common third party-created systems and thus would not each need to modify their systems.
funds and other affected entities themselves would need to engage in an in-depth analysis of this alternative in order to estimate the costs of the necessary systems modifications. While we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the potential costs of systems modifications needed to administer a liquidity fee or gate, our staff has estimated a range of hours and costs that may be required to perform activities typically involved in making systems modifications.\textsuperscript{414} In estimating these hours and costs, our staff considered the need to modify the systems described above.

If a money market fund determines that it would only impose a flat liquidity fee of a fixed percentage known in advance (e.g., it would only impose the default 2% liquidity fee) and have the ability to impose a gate, our staff estimates that a money market fund (or others in the distribution chain) would incur one-time systems modification costs (including modifications to related procedures and controls) that ranges from $1,100,000 to $2,200,000.\textsuperscript{415} Our staff estimates that the one-time costs for entities to communicate with shareholders (including systems costs related to communications) about the liquidity fee or gate would range from $200,500 to $340,000.\textsuperscript{416} In addition, we estimate that the costs for a shareholder mailing would range between $1.00 and $3.00 per shareholder.\textsuperscript{417} We also recognize that adding new

\textsuperscript{414} Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) planning, coding, testing, and installing system modifications; (ii) drafting, integrating, and implementing related procedures and controls; and (iii) preparing training materials and administering training sessions for staff in affected areas. \textit{See also supra} note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs).

\textsuperscript{415} Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) project planning and systems design; (ii) systems modification, integration, testing, installation, and deployment; (iii) drafting, integrating, implementing procedures and controls; and (iv) preparation of training materials. \textit{See also supra} note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs).

\textsuperscript{416} Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) modifying the website to provide online account information and (ii) written and telephone communications with investors. \textit{See also supra} note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs).

\textsuperscript{417} Total costs of the mailing for individual funds would vary significantly depending on the number of
capabilities or capacity to a system will entail ongoing annual maintenance costs and understand that those costs generally are estimated as a percentage of initial costs of building or expanding a system. Our staff estimates that the costs to maintain and modify these systems required to administer a liquidity fee and the ability to administer a standby gate (to accommodate future programming changes), to provide ongoing training, and to administer the liquidity fee or gate on an ongoing basis would range from 5% to 15% of the one-time costs. Our staff understands that if a fund board imposes a liquidity fee whose amount could vary, the cost could exceed this range, but because such costs depend on to what extent the fee might vary, we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate of how much more a varying fee might cost to implement.

Although our staff has estimated the costs that a single affected entity would incur, we anticipate that many money market funds, transfer agents, and other affected entities may not bear the estimated costs on an individual basis. Instead, the costs of systems modifications likely would be allocated among the multiple users of the systems, such as money market fund members of a fund group, money market funds that use the same transfer agent or custodian, and intermediaries that use systems purchased from the same third party. Accordingly, we expect that the cost for many individual entities may be less than the estimated costs due to economies of scale in allocating costs among this group of users.

Moreover, depending on how a liquidity fee or gate is structured, mutual fund groups and other affected entities already may have systems that could be adapted to administer a liquidity fee or gate at minimal cost, in which case the costs may be less than the range we estimate above. For example, some money market funds may be part of mutual fund groups in which one shareholders that receive information from the fund by mail (as opposed to electronically).
or more funds impose deferred sales loads or redemption fees under rule 22c-2, both of which require the capacity to administer a fee upon redemptions and may involve systems that could be adapted to administer a liquidity fee.

Our staff estimates that a money market fund shareholder whose systems (including related procedures and controls) required modifications to account for a liquidity fee or gate would incur one-time costs ranging from $220,000 to $450,000.418 Our staff estimates that the costs to maintain and modify these systems and to provide ongoing training would range from 5% to 15% of the one-time costs.

We request comment on our estimate of operational costs associated with the liquidity fees and gates alternative.

- Do commenters agree with our estimates of operational costs?
- Are there operational costs in addition to those we estimate above? What systems would need to be reprogrammed and to what extent? What types of ongoing maintenance, training, and other activities to administer the liquidity fee or gate would be required, and to what extent?
- Are our estimates too high or too low and, if so, by what amount? To what extent would the estimate vary based on the event that would trigger the imposition of a liquidity fee or the manner in which the fee would be calculated once triggered? To what extent would the estimate vary based on how the gate is structured?
- To what extent would money market funds or others experience the economies of

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418 Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) project planning and systems design; (ii) systems modification, integration, testing, installation; and (iii) drafting, integrating, implementing procedures and controls. See also supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff's estimates of operational and related costs).
scale that we identify?

7. **Tax Implications of Liquidity Fees**

We understand that liquidity fees may have certain tax implications for money market funds and their shareholders. Similar to the liquidity fee we are proposing today, rule 22c-2 allows mutual funds to recover costs associated with frequent mutual fund share trading by imposing a redemption fee on shareholders who redeem shares within seven days of purchase. We understand that for tax purposes, shareholders of these mutual funds generally treat the redemption fee as offsetting the shareholder’s amount realized on the redemption (decreasing the shareholder’s gain, or increasing the shareholder’s loss, on redemption).\(^{419}\) Consistent with this characterization, funds generally treat the redemption fee as having no associated tax effect for the fund. We understand that our proposed liquidity fee, if adopted, would be treated for tax purposes consistently with the way that funds and shareholders treat redemption fees under rule 22c-2.\(^{420}\)

If, as described above, a liquidity fee has no direct tax consequences for the money

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\(^{419}\) Cf. 26 CFR 1.263(a)-2(e) (commissions paid in sales of securities by persons who are not dealers are treated as offsets against the selling price). See also Investment Income and Expenses (Including Capital Gains and Losses), IRS Publication 550, at 44 ("fees and charges you pay to acquire or redeem shares of a mutual fund are not deductible. You can usually add acquisition fees and charges to your cost of the shares and thereby increase your basis. A fee paid to redeem the shares is usually a reduction in the redemption price (sales price)."), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p550.pdf.

\(^{420}\) Referring to IRS guidance in a different context, one commenter suggested that our proposed liquidity fee also might be characterized for tax purposes as an investment expense for the shareholder and income to the fund. See ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, *supra* note 25. This commenter noted that, if the fund were required to treat the liquidity fee as ordinary income, the fund would have to distribute the income to avoid liability for the corporate level income tax and a 4% excise tax on the amount retained. In that case, the fund would not realize all of the benefit the liquidity fee is designed to provide. *Id.* (citing IRS Revenue Procedure 2009-10 as supporting the position that the fee received by the fund should be treated as a capital gain because it is being used to offset capital losses incurred by the fund on its portfolio in order to pay the redeeming shareholder and noting that because the capital gain would offset the capital loss, the fund would not have an additional distribution requirement). This commenter suggests that the IRS provide guidance to this effect (noting that in Revenue Procedure 2009-10, which provided only temporary administrative guidance, the IRS took this position with respect to amounts paid to a money market fund by the fund’s adviser to prevent the fund from breaking the buck). *Id.* See also Arrowsmith et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
market fund, that tax treatment would allow the fund to use 100% of the fee to repair a market-based price per share that was below $1.0000. If redemptions involving liquidity fees cause the money market fund’s shadow price to reach $1.0050, however, the fund may need to distribute to the remaining shareholders sufficient value to prevent the fund from breaking the buck (and thus rounding up to $1.01 in pricing its shares).\textsuperscript{421} We understand that any such distribution would be treated as a dividend to the extent that the money market fund has sufficient earnings and profits. Both the fund and its shareholders would treat these additional dividends the same as they treat the fund’s routine dividend distributions. That is, the additional dividends would be taxable as ordinary income to shareholders and would be eligible for deduction by the funds.

In the absence of sufficient earnings and profits, however, some or all of these additional distributions would be treated as a return of capital. Receipt of a return of capital would reduce the recipient shareholders’ basis (and thus could decrease a loss, or create or increase a gain for the shareholder in the future when the shareholder redeems the affected shares).\textsuperscript{422} Thus, in the event of any return of capital distributions, the shareholders, the fund, and other intermediaries might become subject to tax-payment or tax-reporting obligations that do not affect stable NAV funds currently operating under rule 2a-7.\textsuperscript{423}

Finally, we understand that the tax treatment of a liquidity fee may impose certain operational costs on money market funds and their financial intermediaries and on shareholders. Either fund groups or their intermediaries would need to track the tax basis of money market

\textsuperscript{421} See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(g)(2).

\textsuperscript{422} If the payment of liquidity fees forces a money market fund to make a return of capital distribution to avoid re-pricing its shares above $1.00, this could also create tax consequences for remaining shareholders in the fund.

\textsuperscript{423} See the discussion above of the additional obligations that would be created by gains and losses recognized with respect to floating NAV funds.
fund shares as the basis changed due to any return of capital distributions, and shareholders would need to report in their annual tax filings any gains\textsuperscript{424} or losses upon the sale of affected money market fund shares. We are unable to quantify any of the tax and operational costs discussed in this section because we are unable to predict how often liquidity fees will be imposed by money market funds and how often redemptions subject to liquidity fees would cause the funds to make return of capital distributions to the remaining shareholders.

We request comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- If liquidity fees cause the fund’s shadow price to exceed $1.0049, will that result cause the fund to make a special distribution to current shareholders?
- Do money market funds and other intermediaries already have systems in place to track and report the variations in basis, and the gains and losses that might result from imposing liquidity fees? If not, what costs would be expected to be incurred to establish this capability? In light of the fact that it may be necessary to establish new systems to track this information, how does the cost of these new systems compare with the costs that would be incurred to accommodate floating NAVs?

8. \textit{Disclosure Regarding Liquidity Fees and Gates}

In connection with the liquidity fees and gates alternative, we are also proposing alternate disclosure-related amendments to rule 2a-7, rule 482 under the Securities Act,\textsuperscript{425} and Form N-1A. We anticipate that the proposed rule and form amendments would provide current and prospective shareholders with information regarding the operations and risks of this reform.

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\textsuperscript{424} Redemptions subject to a liquidity fee would almost always result in losses, but gains are possible if a shareholder received a return of capital distribution with respect to some shares and the shareholder later redeemed the shares for $1.0000 each.

\textsuperscript{425} \textit{See supra} note 303.
alternative, as well as current and historical information regarding the imposition of fees and gates. In keeping with the enhanced disclosure framework we adopted in 2009, the proposed amendments are intended to provide a layered approach to disclosure in which key information about the proposed new features of money market funds would be provided in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used) with more detailed information provided elsewhere in the statutory prospectus and in the SAI.

a. Disclosure Statement

The Commission’s liquidity fees and gates alternative proposal would permit funds to charge liquidity fees and impose redemption restrictions on money market fund investors. As a measure to achieve this reform, we propose to require that each money market fund (other than government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption for government money market funds from any fee or gate requirements), include a bulleted statement, disclosing the particular risks associated with investing in a fund that may impose liquidity fees or redemption restrictions, on any advertisement or sales material that it disseminates (including on the fund website). We also propose to include wording designed to inform investors about the primary general risks of investing in money market funds in this bulleted disclosure statement. While money market funds are currently required to include a similar disclosure statement on their advertisements and sales materials, we propose amending this disclosure statement to emphasize that money market fund sponsors are not obligated to provide financial support, and that money market funds may not be an appropriate investment

426 See Summary Prospectus Adopting Release, supra note 304, at paragraph preceding section III.

427 See id. Rule 482(b)(4) currently requires a money market fund to include to following disclosure statement on its advertisements and sales materials: An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Although the Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible to lose money by investing in the Fund.
option for investors who cannot tolerate losses.\textsuperscript{428}

Specifically, we would require each money market fund (other than government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption for government money market funds from any fee or gate requirements) to include the following bulleted disclosure statement on their advertisements and sales materials:

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.
- The Fund may impose a fee upon sale of your shares when the Fund is under considerable stress.
- The Fund may temporarily suspend your ability to sell shares of the Fund when the Fund is under considerable stress.
- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.
- The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.\textsuperscript{429}

\textsuperscript{428} See infra note 607 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which discretionary sponsor support has the potential to confuse money market fund investors); supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that survey data shows that some investors are unsure about the amount of risk in money market funds and the likelihood of government assistance if losses occur).

\textsuperscript{429} See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 482(b)(4)(i). Rule 482(b)(4) currently requires a money market fund to include to following disclosure statement on its advertisements and sales materials: An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Although the Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible to lose money by investing in the Fund.

If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the fund, the fund would be permitted to omit
We also propose to require a substantially similar bulleted disclosure statement in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used). \textsuperscript{430}

As discussed above, the liquidity fees and gates proposal would exempt government money market funds from any fee or gate requirement, but a government money market fund would be permitted to charge liquidity fees and impose gates if the ability to charge liquidity fees and impose gates were disclosed in the fund’s prospectus. Accordingly, the proposed amendments to rule 482 and Form N-1A would require government money market funds that have chosen to rely on this exemption to include a bulleted disclosure statement on the fund’s advertisements and sales materials and in the summary section of the fund’s statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used) that does not include disclosure of the risks of liquidity fees and gates, but that includes additional detail about the risks of investing in money market funds generally. We propose to require each government money market fund that relies on the exemption to include the following bulleted disclosure statement in the summary section of its statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used), and on any advertisement or sales material that it disseminates (including on the fund website):

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.
- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit

\textsuperscript{430} See proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(A) of Form N-1A. Item 4(b)(1)(ii) currently requires a money market fund to include the following statement in its prospectus: An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Although the Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, it is possible to lose money by investing in the Fund.
Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

- The Fund's sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.\textsuperscript{431}

The proposed disclosure statements are intended to be one measure to change the investment expectations of money market fund investors, including the expectation that a money market fund is a stable, riskless investment.\textsuperscript{432} In addition, we are concerned that investors, under the liquidity fees and gates proposal, will not be fully aware of potential restrictions on fund redemptions. In proposing the disclosure statement, we have taken into consideration investor preferences for clear, concise, and understandable language and have also considered whether language that was stronger in conveying potential risks associated with money market funds would be effective for investors.\textsuperscript{433} In addition, we considered whether the proposed disclosure statement should be limited to only money market fund advertisements and sales materials, as discussed above. Although we acknowledge that the summary section of the prospectus must contain a discussion of key risk factors associated with a money market fund, we believe that the importance of the disclosure statement merits its placement in both locations, similar to how the

\textsuperscript{431} See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 482(b)(4)(ii) and proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(B) of Form N-1A. If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the fund, the fund would be permitted to omit this bulleted sentence from the disclosure statement that appears on a fund advertisement or fund sales material, for the term of the agreement. See Note to paragraph (b)(4), proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 482(b)(4).

Likewise, if an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the fund, and the term of the agreement will extend for at least one year following the effective date of the fund's registration statement, the fund would be permitted to omit this bulleted sentence from the disclosure statement that appears on the fund's registration statement. See Instruction to proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 4(b)(1)(ii) of Form N-1A.

\textsuperscript{432} See supra section II.B.3.

\textsuperscript{433} See supra notes 316 and 317.
current money market fund legend is required in both money market fund advertisements and sales materials and the summary section of the prospectus.\textsuperscript{434}

We request comment on the proposed disclosure statement.\textsuperscript{435}

- Would the proposed disclosure statement adequately alert investors to the risks of investing in a money market fund, including a fund that could impose liquidity fees or gates under certain circumstances? Would investors understand the meaning of each part of the proposed disclosure statement? If not, how should the proposed disclosure statement be amended? Would the following variations on the proposed disclosure statement be any more or less useful in alerting shareholders to potential investment risks?

  o Removing or amending the following bullet in the proposed disclosure statement: “The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.”

  o Including additional disclosure of the possibility that a temporary suspension of redemptions could become permanent if the board determines that the fund should liquidate.

  o Including additional disclosure to the effect that retail shareholders should not invest all or most of the cash that they might need for routine

\textsuperscript{434} See supra notes 429 and 430.

\textsuperscript{435} In the questions that follow, we use the term “disclosure statement” to mean the new disclosure statement that we propose to require money market funds other than those exempted from the fees and gates requirements to incorporate into their prospectuses and advertisements and sales materials or, alternatively and as appropriate, the new disclosure statement that we propose to require government funds (that choose to rely on the rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements) to incorporate into their prospectuses and advertisements and sales materials.
expenses (e.g., mortgage payments, credit card bills, etc.) in any one money market fund, on account of the possibility that the fund could impose a liquidity fee or suspend redemptions.

- Amending the final bullet in the proposed disclosure statement to read: “Your investment in the Fund therefore may experience losses.”

- Will the proposed disclosure statement respond effectively to investor preferences for clear, concise, and understandable language?

- Would investors benefit from requiring this disclosure statement also to be included on the front cover page of a non-government money market fund’s prospectus (and on the cover page or beginning of any summary prospectus, if used)?

- Should we provide any instruction or guidance in order to highlight the proposed disclosure statement on fund advertisements and sales materials (including the fund’s website) and/or lead investors efficiently to the disclosure statement?\footnote{Such instruction or guidance would supplement current requirements for the presentation of the disclosure statement required by rule 482(b)(4). \textit{See supra} note 429; rule 482(b)(5).}

For example, with respect to the fund’s website, should we instruct that the proposed disclosure statement be posted on the fund’s home page or be accessible in no more than two clicks from the fund’s home page?

\subsubsection*{Disclosure of the Effects of Liquidity Fees and Gates on Redemptions}

Currently, funds are required to disclose any restrictions on fund redemptions in their registration statements.\footnote{\textit{See Item 11(c)(1) and Item 23 of Form N-1A.}} We expect that, to comply with these requirements, money market
funds (besides government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements) would disclose in the registration statement the effects that the potential imposition of fees and/or gates may have on a shareholder’s ability to redeem shares of the fund. We believe that this disclosure would help investors understand the potential effect of their redemption decisions during periods that the fund experiences stress, and to evaluate the full costs of redeeming fund shares—one of the goals of this rulemaking. Specifically, we would expect money market funds to briefly explain in the prospectus that if the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% of its total assets, the fund will impose a liquidity fee of 2% on all redemptions, unless the board of directors of the fund (including a majority of its independent directors) determines that imposing such a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund or determines that a lesser fee would be in the best interest of the fund. We also would expect money market funds to briefly explain in the prospectus that if the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% of its total assets, the fund board would be able to impose a temporary suspension of redemptions for a limited period of time and/or liquidate the fund. We also would expect money market funds to disclose in the prospectus that information about the historical occasions on which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% of its total assets, or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or redemption restrictions, appears in the funds’ SAI (as applicable).

In addition, we would expect money market funds to incorporate additional disclosure in the prospectus or SAI, as the fund determines appropriate, discussing the operations of fees and

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438 See supra note 351 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which standby liquidity fees can provide a disincentive for money market fund investors to redeem their shares during times of stress).

439 See infra section III.B.8.d.
This could include disclosure regarding the following:

- Means of notifying shareholders about the imposition and lifting of fees and/or gates (e.g., press release, website announcement);

- Timing of the imposition and lifting of fees and gates, including an explanation that if a fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets at the end of any business day, the next business day it must impose a 2% liquidity fee on shareholder redemptions unless the fund’s board of directors determines otherwise, and an explanation of the 30-day limit for imposing gates;

- Use of fee proceeds by the fund, including any possible return to shareholders in the form of a distribution;

- The tax consequences to the fund and its shareholders of the fund’s receipt of liquidity fees; and

- General description of the process of fund liquidation if the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15%, and the fund’s board of directors determines that the fund would be unable to stay open (or, if gated, re-open) without further harm to the fund.

Prospectus disclosure regarding any restrictions on redemptions is currently required by Item 11(c)(1) of Form N-1A. However, we believe that funds could determine that more detailed disclosure about the operations of fees and gates, as further discussed in this section, would appropriately appear in a fund’s SAI, and that this more detailed disclosure is responsive to Item 23 of Form N-1A (“Purchase, Redemption, and Pricing of Shares”). In determining whether to include this disclosure in the prospectus or SAI, money market funds should rely on the principle that funds should limit disclosure in prospectuses generally to information that is necessary for an average or typical investor to make an investment decision. Detailed or highly technical discussions, as well as information that may be helpful to more sophisticated investors, dilute the effect of necessary prospectus disclosure and should be placed in the SAI. See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 23064 (Mar. 13, 1998) [63 FR 13916 (Mar. 23, 1998)], at section I. Based on this principle, we anticipate that funds would generally consider the disclosure topics covered by the first two bullets on the above list (means of notifying shareholders of fees and gates and the timing of the imposition and removal of fees and gates) to be appropriate prospectus disclosure.

See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
We request comment on the disclosure that we expect funds to include in their registration statements regarding the operations and effects of liquidity fees and redemption gates.

- Would the disclosure that we discuss above adequately assist money market fund investors in understanding the potential effect of their redemption decisions, and in evaluating the full costs of redeeming fund shares? Should we require funds to include this disclosure in their prospectuses and/or SAIs? Should we require funds to include any additional prospectus and SAI disclosure discussing, in detail, the operations and effects of fees and redemption gates? In particular, should we require funds to include any additional details about the fund's liquidation process? Alternatively, should any of the proposed prospectus and SAI disclosure not be required, and if so, why not?

- Should we require any information about the basic operations and effects of fees and redemption gates to be disclosed in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and any summary prospectus, if used)?

- Should we require disclosure to investors of the particular risks associated with buying fund shares when the fund or market is stressed, especially when the fund is imposing either a liquidity fee or a gate?

- Should Form N-1A or its instructions be amended to more explicitly require any of the proposed disclosure to be included in a fund’s prospectus and/or SAI? If so, how should it be amended?

\footnote{Disclosure about the process of fund liquidation might include, for example, disclosure regarding any fees, including advisory fees, that the adviser will collect during the liquidation process.}
c. Disclosure of the Imposition of Liquidity Fees and Gates

If we were to adopt a reform alternative involving liquidity fees and gates, we believe that it would be important for money market funds (other than government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements) to inform existing and prospective shareholders when: (i) the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets; (ii) the fund’s board of directors imposes a liquidity fee pursuant to rule 2a-7; or (iii) the fund’s board of directors temporarily suspends the fund’s redemptions pursuant to rule 2a-7 or permanently suspends redemptions pursuant to rule 22e-3.

This information would be important for shareholders to receive, as it could influence prospective shareholders’ decision to purchase shares of the fund, as well as current shareholders’ decision or ability to sell fund shares. To this end, we are proposing an amendment to rule 2a-7 that would require a fund to post prominently on its website certain information that the fund would be required to report to the Commission on Form N-CR regarding the imposition of liquidity fees, suspension of fund redemptions, and the removal of liquidity fees and/or resumption of fund redemptions. The amendment would require a fund to include this website disclosure on the same business day as the fund files an initial report with the Commission in response to any of the events specified in Parts E, F, and G of Form N-CR.

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443 See infra section III.G.
444 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v); proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E, F, and G; see also infra section III.G (discussing the proposed Form N-CR requirements). With respect to the events specified in Part E of Form N-CR (imposition of a liquidity fee) and Part F of Form N-CR (suspension of fund redemptions), a fund would be required to post on its website only the preliminary information required to be filed on Form N-CR on the first business day following the triggering event. See Instructions to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E and F.
445 A fund must file an initial report on Form N-CR in response to any of the events specified in Parts E, F, or G within one business day after the occurrence of any such event. We believe that funds should disclose these events within one business day following the event because it is particularly important to provide shareholders with information that could directly affect their redemption of fund shares, and that could be a material factor in determining whether to purchase or redeem fund shares, as soon as reasonably possible.
and, with respect to any such event, to maintain this disclosure on its website for a period of not less than one year following the date on which the fund filed Form N-CR concerning the event.\footnote{See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v). We believe that the one-year minimum time frame for website disclosure is appropriate because this time frame would effectively oblige a fund to post the required information in the interim period until the fund files an annual post-effective amendment updating its registration statement, which update would incorporate the same information. \textit{See infra} notes 450 and 451 and accompanying text. Although a fund would inform prospective investors of any redemption fee or gate currently in place by means of a prospectus supplement (\textit{see infra} note 449 and accompanying text), the prospectus supplement would not inform shareholders of any fees or gates that were imposed, and then were removed, during the previous 12 months.}

We believe that this website disclosure would provide greater transparency to shareholders regarding occasions on which a fund’s weekly liquid assets drop below 15% of the fund’s total assets, as well as the imposition of liquidity fees and suspension of fund redemptions, because many investors currently obtain important information about the fund on the fund’s website.\footnote{For example, fund investors may access the fund’s proxy voting guidelines, and proxy vote report, as well as the fund’s prospectus, SAI, and shareholder reports if the fund uses a summary prospectus, on the fund website.} We understand that investors have, in past years, become accustomed to obtaining money market fund information on funds’ websites.\footnote{\textit{See, e.g.}, 2010 Adopting Release, \textit{supra} note 92 (adopting amendments to rule 2a-7 requiring money market funds to disclose information about their portfolio holdings each month on their websites); SIFMA FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 358 (noting that some industry participants now post on their websites portfolio holdings-related information beyond that which is required by the money market reforms adopted by the Commission in 2010, as well as daily disclosure of market value per share); \textit{see also infra} note 659 (discussing recent decisions by a number of money market fund firms to begin reporting funds’ daily shadow prices on the fund website).} While we believe that it is important to have a uniform, central place for investors to access the required disclosure, we note that nothing in this proposal would prevent a fund from supplementing its Form N-CR filing and website posting with complementary shareholder communications, such as a press release or social media update disclosing a fee or gate imposed by the fund.

A fund currently must update its registration statement to reflect any material changes by means of a post-effective amendment or a prospectus supplement (or "sticker") pursuant to rule...
497 under the Securities Act. We would expect that, to meet this requirement, promptly after a money market fund imposes a redemption fee or gate, it would inform prospective investors of any fees or gates currently in place by means of a prospectus supplement.

We request comment on the proposed requirement for money market funds to inform existing and prospective shareholders, on the fund’s website and in the fund’s registration statement, of any present occasion in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets, the fund’s board imposes a liquidity fee, or the fund’s board temporarily suspends the fund’s redemptions.

- Should any more, any less, or any other information be required to be posted on the fund’s website than that disclosed on Form N-CR?
- As proposed, should we require this information to be posted “prominently” on the fund’s website? Should we provide any other instruction as to the presentation of this information, in order to highlight the information and/or lead investors efficiently to the information, for example, should we require that the information be posted on the fund’s home page or be accessible in no more than two clicks from the fund’s home page?
- Should this information be posted on the fund’s website for a longer or shorter period than one year following the date on which the fund filed Form N-CR to disclose any of the events specified in Part E, F, or G of Form N-CR?
- Besides requiring a money market fund that imposes a liquidity fee or gate to file a prospectus supplement and include related disclosure on the fund’s website, should we also require the fund to notify shareholders individually about the

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See 17 CFR 230.497.
effects of the fee or gate? Should we require a fund to engage in any other supplemental shareholder communications, such as issuing a press release or disclosing the fee or gate on any form of social media that the fund uses?

- How will the disclosure of the imposition of a fee or gate affect the willingness of current or prospective investors to purchase shares of the fund? How will this disclosure affect investors’ purchases and redemptions in other funds? How will it affect other market participants? Will these effects differ based on the number of funds that concurrently impose fees and/or gates?

d. Historical Disclosure of Liquidity Fees and Gates

We also believe that money market funds’ current and prospective shareholders should be informed of post-compliance-period historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or redemption gates. While we recognize that historical occurrences are not necessarily indicative of future events, we anticipate that current and prospective fund investors could use this information as one factor to compare the risks and potential costs of investing in different money market funds.

We are therefore proposing an amendment to Form N-1A to require money market funds (other than government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements) to provide disclosure in their SAIs regarding any occasion during the last 10 years (but not before the compliance period) on which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15%, and with respect to each such occasion, whether the fund’s board of directors determined to impose a liquidity fee and/or suspend the fund’s redemptions. With respect to each occasion, we propose requiring funds to disclose: (i) the

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{450}} \]

\text{See proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(1) of Form N-1A. We believe that the proposed 10-year look-}
length of time for which the fund’s weekly liquid assets remained below 15%; (ii) the dates and length of time for which the fund’s board of directors determined to impose a liquidity fee and/or temporarily suspend the fund’s redemptions; and (iii) a short discussion of the board’s analysis supporting its decision to impose a liquidity fee (or not to impose a liquidity fee) and/or temporarily suspend the fund’s redemptions.\textsuperscript{451} We would expect that this disclosure could include (as applicable, and taking into account considerations regarding the confidentiality of board deliberations) a discussion of the following factors relating to the board’s decision to impose a liquidity fee and/or suspend redemptions: the fund’s shadow price; relevant market indicators of liquidity stress in the markets; changes in spreads for portfolio securities; the fund’s future liquidity profile (taking into account predicted redemptions and other expectations); the fund’s ability to apply any collected fees quickly to rebuild fund liquidity; and the predicted time for portfolio securities to mature and provide internal liquidity to the fund, and for potentially distressed portfolio securities to mature or recover. The required disclosure would permit current and prospective shareholders to assess, among other things, any patterns of stress experienced by the fund, as well as whether the fund’s board has previously imposed fees and/or redemption gates in light of significant drops in portfolio liquidity. This disclosure also would provide investors with historical information about the board’s past analytical process in determining how to handle liquidity issues when the fund experiences stress, which could influence an investor’s decision to purchase shares of, or remain invested in, the fund. In addition, the required disclosure may encourage portfolio managers to increase the level of daily and weekly

\textsuperscript{451} See instructions to proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(1) of Form N-1A.
liquid assets in the fund, as that would tend to lessen the likelihood of a liquidity fee or gate being needed, and the fund being required to disclose the fee or gate to current and prospective investors.\textsuperscript{452}

We request comment on the proposed requirement for money market funds to include SAI disclosure regarding the historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or redemption gates.

- Would the proposed disclosure requirement assist current and prospective fund investors in comparing the risks and potential costs of investing in different money market funds, and would retail investors as well as institutional investors benefit from the proposed disclosure? Would the proposed requirement to include a short discussion of the board’s analysis supporting its decision whether to impose a fee or suspend redemptions result in meaningful and succinct disclosure? Should any more, any less, or any other disclosure be required to be included in the fund’s SAI? Should the disclosure instead be required in the prospectus?

- Keeping in mind the compliance period we propose,\textsuperscript{453} should the “look-back” period for this historical disclosure be longer or shorter than 10 years?

- Should the proposed SAI disclosure be permitted to be incorporated by reference in a fund’s registration statement, on account of the fact that funds will have previously disclosed the information proposed to be required in this SAI

\textsuperscript{452} See supra note 365.

\textsuperscript{453} See infra section III.N.
disclosure on Form N-CR?\textsuperscript{454} 

- Should we require this historical disclosure to be included anywhere else, for example, on the fund’s website?

\textit{e. Prospectus Fee Table}

Under the proposed liquidity fees and gates alternative, a liquidity fee would only be imposed when a fund experiences stress (\textit{i.e.}, we believe that shareholders would not pay the liquidity fee in connection with their typical day-to-day transactions with the fund under normal conditions and many funds may never need to impose the fee). Because funds are anticipated to rarely, if at all, impose this fee,\textsuperscript{455} we do not believe that the prospectus fee table, which is intended to help shareholders compare the costs of investing in different mutual funds, should include the proposed liquidity fee.\textsuperscript{456} Therefore, we propose clarifying in the instructions to Item 3 of Form N-1A ("Risk/Return Summary: Fee Table") that the term "redemption fee," for purposes of the prospectus fee table, does not include a liquidity fee that may be imposed in accordance with rule 2a-7.\textsuperscript{457} As discussed above, we do believe that shareholders should be able to compare the extent to which money market funds have historically imposed liquidity fees, and to this end, we have proposed SAI amendments requiring this disclosure.\textsuperscript{458} Also, as previously discussed, funds would disclose in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, any summary prospectus, if used) that they may impose a liquidity fee, and also

\textsuperscript{454} See proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E, F, and G.

\textsuperscript{455} See supra text following note 383.

\textsuperscript{456} Instruction 2(b) to Item 3 of Form N-1A currently defines "redemption fee" to include any fee charged for any redemption of the Fund's shares, but does not include a deferred sales charge (load) imposed upon redemption.

\textsuperscript{457} See instruction 2(b) to proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 3 of Form N-1A.

\textsuperscript{458} See supra notes 450 and 451 and accompanying text.
would include a detailed description of the size of the fees, and when the fees might be imposed, elsewhere in the statutory prospectus. ⁴⁵⁹

We request comment on the proposed Form N-1A instruction that would clarify that, for purposes of the prospectus fee table, the term “redemption fee” does not include a liquidity fee imposed in accordance with rule 2a-7.

- Would shareholders find it instructive for funds to disclose the proposed liquidity fee in the prospectus fee table? Why or why not? If we were to require money market funds to include liquidity fees in the fee table, how should the fee table account for the contingent nature of liquidity fees and inform investors that liquidity fees will only be imposed in certain circumstances? Should the possibility of a liquidity fee be disclosed in a footnote of the fee table? Should a cross-reference to the fund’s SAI disclosure regarding historical occasions on which the fund has imposed liquidity fees be disclosed in a footnote of the fee table?

- Would the proposed SAI amendments requiring disclosure of the historical occasions on which the fund has imposed liquidity fees be an effective way for shareholders to compare the extent to which money market funds have historically imposed liquidity fees, and analyze the probability that a fund will impose such fees in the future?

f. Economic Analysis

The liquidity fees and gates proposal makes significant changes to the nature of money market funds as an investment vehicle. The proposed disclosure requirements in this section are

⁴⁵⁹ See supra notes 429, 431 and 440 and accompanying text.
intended to communicate to shareholders the nature of the risks that follow from the liquidity fees and gates proposal. In section III.B, we discussed why we are unable to estimate how the liquidity fees and gates proposal will affect shareholders' use of money market funds or the resulting effects on the short-term financing markets because we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate. For similar reasons, we are unable to estimate the incremental effects that the proposed disclosure requirements will have on either shareholders or the short-term financing markets. However, we believe that the proposed disclosure will better inform shareholders about the changes, which should result in shareholders making investment decisions that better match their investment preferences. We expect that this will have similar effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation as those outlined in section III.E rather than to introduce new effects. We further believe that the effects of the proposed disclosure requirements will be small relative to the liquidity fees and gates proposal. The Commission staff has not measured the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time because of uncertainty about how increased transparency may affect different investors' understanding of the risks associated with money market funds.\textsuperscript{460} Where it is relevant, we request the data needed to make these calculations below.

We anticipate that money market funds would incur costs to amend their registration statements, and to update their advertising and sales materials (including the fund website), to include the proposed disclosure statement. We also anticipate that money market funds (besides government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption

\textsuperscript{460} Likewise, uncertainty regarding how the proposed disclosure may affect different investors' behavior makes it difficult for the SEC staff to measure the quantitative benefits of the proposed requirements. With respect to the proposed disclosure statement, there are many possible permutations on specific wording that would convey the specific concerns identified in this Release, and the breadth of these permutations makes it difficult for SEC staff to test how investors would respond to each wording variation.
from the fees and gates requirements) would incur costs to (i) amend their registration statements to incorporate disclosure regarding the effects of fees and gates on redemptions; (ii) include disclosure of the post-compliance-period historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or gates; and (iii) update the prospectus fee table. These funds also would incur costs to disclose current instances of liquidity fees or gates on the fund’s website. These costs would include initial, one-time costs, as well as ongoing costs. Our staff estimates that the average one-time costs for a money market fund (except government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements) to comply with these proposed disclosure amendments would be approximately $1,480, and that the average one-time compliance costs for a government money market fund that has chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements would be approximately $592.\footnote{Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to amending the fund’s disclosure statement and updating the fund’s advertising and sales materials. See supra note 245(discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs). The costs associated with these activities are all paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra section IV.B.7.} Ongoing compliance costs include the costs for money market funds periodically to update disclosure in their registration statements regarding historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed fees or gates, and also to disclose current instances of any of these events on the fund’s website. Because the required registration statement and website disclosure overlaps with the information that a fund must disclose on Form N-CR when the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15%, or the fund
imposes or removes a fee or gate,\textsuperscript{462} we anticipate that the costs a fund will incur to draft and finalize the disclosure that will appear in its registration statement and on its website will largely be incurred when the fund files Form N-CR, as discussed below in section III.G.3. In addition, we estimate that a fund (besides a government money market fund that has chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fees and gates requirements) would incur average annual costs of $296\textsuperscript{463} to review and update the historical disclosure in its registration statement (plus printing costs), and costs of $207\textsuperscript{464} each time that it updates its website to include the required disclosure.

We request comment on this economic analysis:

- Are any of the proposed disclosure requirements unduly burdensome, or would they impose any unnecessary costs?
- We request comment on the staff's estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements.
- We request comment on our analysis of potential effects of these proposed disclosure requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

\textit{9. Alternative Redemption Restrictions}

\textit{a. Stand-alone Liquidity Fees or Stand-alone Gates}

We are proposing that money market fund boards of directors be permitted to institute liquidity fees or gates (and potentially one followed by the other). This proposal is designed to provide money market funds with multiple tools to manage heightened redemptions in the best

\textsuperscript{462} See proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E, F, and G.

\textsuperscript{463} The costs associated with updating the fund's registration statement are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in \textit{infra} section IV.B.7.

\textsuperscript{464} The costs associated with updating the fund's website are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in \textit{infra} section IV.B.1.g.iv.
interest of the fund and to mitigate potential contagion effects on the short-term financing markets for issuers.

We also have considered whether we should permit these money market funds to institute only liquidity fees or only gates. As discussed above, fees and gates can accomplish somewhat different objectives and have somewhat different tradeoffs and effects on shareholders and the short-term financing markets for issuers. For shareholders valuing principal preservation in their evaluation of money market fund investments, a gate may be preferable to a liquidity fee particularly if the fund expects to rebuild liquidity through maturing assets. In contrast, shareholders preferring liquidity over principal preservation may prefer a liquidity fee because it allows full liquidity of that investor’s money market fund shareholdings—it just imposes a greater cost for that liquidity if the fund is under stress. 465

Because fees and gates can accomplish somewhat different objectives and one may be better suited to one set of market circumstances than the other, we preliminarily believe that providing funds with the ability to use either tool, as the board determines is in the best interest of the fund, is a better approach to preserve the benefits of money market funds for investors and the short-term financing markets for issuers, enhance investor protection, and improve money market funds’ ability to manage and mitigate high levels of redemptions. It also may better allow funds to tailor the redemption restrictions they employ to their experience with the preferences and behavior of their particular shareholder base and to adapt the restriction they institute as they or the industry gains experience over time employing such restrictions. We

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request comment on stand-alone liquidity fees or stand-alone gates.

- Should we adopt rule amendments that would just permit money market funds to institute liquidity fees or just permit these money market funds to institute a gate? Why might it be preferable to allow only a fee or only a gate? If we allowed only a fee or only a gate, should there be different parameters or restrictions around when the fee or gate could be imposed or lifted than what we have proposed? If so, what should they be and why?

b. Partial Gates

We are proposing to permit money market funds to institute a complete gate in certain circumstances—a temporary suspension of redemptions. Some have suggested that we allow money market funds to impose partial gates in times of stress. For example, once the money market fund had crossed the 15% weekly liquid asset threshold, we could permit the board of directors (including a majority of its independent directors) to limit redemptions by any particular shareholder to a certain percentage of their shareholdings, to a certain percentage of the fund’s outstanding shares, or to a certain dollar amount per day. Those limited redemptions would not be charged a liquidity fee.

A partial gate can operate to prevent “fire sales” of assets in the fund and provide some liquidity to investors while allowing time for the fund to satisfy the remaining portion of redemptions requests under better market conditions or with internally generated liquidity. It can act as a gradual brake on redemptions, reducing them to the extent that they no longer impact the fund’s value or liquidity. In doing so, they can have a less severe impact on fund shareholders.

See, e.g., HSBC EC Letter, supra note 156 (stating that a money market fund should be able to limit the total number of shares that the fund is required to redeem on any trading day to 10% of the shares in issue, that any such gate be applied pro rata to redemption requests, and that any redemption requests not met be carried over to the next business day and so forth until all redemption requests have been met).
because they know they will be able to redeem without cost at least a certain portion of their investment on any particular day, even in times of stress. A partial gate could be imposed in lieu of a liquidity fee or could be combined with a liquidity fee (e.g., once the fund imposed a partial gate, a shareholder could redeem 10% of their shareholdings at no cost and the rest of their shareholdings by paying a liquidity fee). Similarly, we could consider adopting a partial gate in lieu of our full gate proposal or as an additional tool that would be available to fund boards on the same terms as a full gate is available.

On the other hand, a partial gate may not impose a substantial enough deterrent on redemption activity in times of stress to effectively reduce the contagion impact of heavy redemptions on remaining investors and the short-term financing markets. For example, in 2007 when a Florida local government investment pool suspended redemptions in response to a run, it re-opened with a combined partial gate and liquidity fee—local governments could take out the greater of 15% of their holdings or $2 million without penalty, and the remainder of any redemptions were subject to a 2% redemption fee.467 We understand that only a few investors redeemed more than what was allowed without a fee, but that investors redeemed most of what was allowed under the partial gate without triggering the redemption fee.468 We also are concerned that a partial gate would operate in substantially the same manner as an exemption from the fee or gate requirement for small withdrawals, discussed above in section III.B.5, and thus may be subject to many of the same drawbacks in terms of operational costs and added complexity compared to our liquidity fees and gates proposal.

467 See David Evans and Darrell Preston, Florida Investment Chief Quits; Fund Rescue Approved, Bloomberg (Dec. 4, 2007).

468 See, e.g., Neil Weinberg, Florida Fund Meltdown: Bad to Worse, Forbes (Dec. 6, 2007) (noting that investors withdrew $1.2 billion from the $14 billion pool after it re-opened, while depositing only $7 million, but that only 3 out of about 1,700 participants in the pool chose to pay the redemption fee to withdraw additional assets).
We request comment on whether we should require or permit partial gates in certain circumstances.

- Should we allow partial gates? If so, why? Under what conditions and of what nature? Should they limit each shareholder’s redemptions to a certain percentage of his or her shareholdings (e.g., 10% or 25%), to a certain percentage of the fund’s outstanding shares (e.g., 1% or 5%), or to a certain dollar amount per day (e.g., $10,000 or $50,000)? If so, what percentage or dollar amount and why?

- How would partial gates affect shareholder redemption decisions compared to our proposal of liquidity fees and full gates? Would they achieve our goals of preserving the benefits of money market funds for investors and the short-term financing markets for issuers, while mitigating the risk of runs, enhancing investor protection and improving money market funds’ ability to manage and mitigate high levels of redemptions to the same extent as our proposed liquidity fees and gates? Why or why not?

- If we allowed partial gates, should they be allowed in addition to liquidity fees and full gates or in lieu of fees or full gates? What operational and other costs would be involved if we allowed partial gates in addition to or in lieu of fees and/or full gates?

\[c. \quad \textit{In-Kind Redemptions}\]

In 2009, we requested comment on requiring that funds satisfy redemption requests in excess of a certain size through in-kind redemptions.\textsuperscript{469} We also requested comment on this type of

\textsuperscript{469} See 2009 Proposing Release, \textit{supra} note 31, at section III.B. An in-kind redemption occurs when a shareholder’s redemption request to a fund is satisfied by distributing to that shareholder portfolio assets of that fund instead of cash.
of redemption restriction when we requested comment on the PWG Report. In-kind redemptions might lessen the effect of large redemptions on remaining money market fund shareholders, and they would ensure that the redeeming investors bear part of the cost of their liquidity needs. During the 2008 financial crisis, one money market fund stated that it would honor certain large redemptions in-kind in an attempt to decrease the level of redemptions in that fund.

In both instances, almost all commenters addressing this potential reform option opposed it. Most commenters believed that requiring in-kind redemptions would be technically unworkable due to the complex valuation and operational issues that would be imposed on both the fund and on investors receiving portfolio securities. They also asserted that required in-

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470 See PWG Report, supra note 111, at section 3.c (discussing requiring that money market funds satisfy certain redemptions in-kind).


472 But see Comment Letter of Forward Management (Aug. 21, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (supporting in-kind redemption requirement); Comment Letter of the American Bar Association (Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities) (Sept. 9, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (same). In addition, two PWG Report commenters expressed concern that redemptions in-kind would be technically unworkable, but were open to further examination of this option. See Comment Letter of Invesco Advisers, Inc. (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“We have previously expressed our concern that requiring money market funds to satisfy redemptions in-kind under certain circumstances would likely be technically unworkable and could result in disrupting, rather than stabilizing, markets. While we continue to harbor these concerns, we would be supportive in principle of a mandatory in-kind redemption requirement if these technical challenges could be addressed successfully in a partnership with regulatory authorities.”); Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Jan. 7, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Federated Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter”) (“we have identified some of the major problems associated with redemption in-kind and included these in our comment letter to the Commission on the recent money market fund reforms . . . . At the appropriate time, we would be willing to meet with the Commission or its staff to review our analysis of the issues raised in responding to such events and to discuss approaches to resolving these issues.”).

473 See, e.g., Comment Letter of BlackRock Inc. (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“BlackRock PWG Comment Letter”); Comment Letter of The Dreyfus Corporation (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Dreyfus PWG Comment Letter”); Comment Letter of Investment Company Institute (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter”); Comment Letter of Fidelity Investments (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter”). For example, the BlackRock PWG Comment Letter stated that some shareholders cannot receive and hold direct investments in money market assets and some portfolio securities, such as repurchase agreements and Eurodollar time deposits, are OTC contracts and cannot be transferred to retail or to multiple investors. The Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter added that advisers may only be able to transfer the most
kind redemptions could result in disrupting, rather than stabilizing, markets if redeeming shareholders needing liquidity were forced to sell into declining markets.\textsuperscript{474} Several commenters stated that investors would dislike the prospect of receiving redemptions in-kind and would structure their holdings to avoid the requirement, but would nevertheless still collectively engage in redemptions if the money market funds were to come under stress with similar adverse consequences for the funds and the short-term financing markets.\textsuperscript{475}

These comments led us to believe that requiring in-kind redemptions would create operational difficulties that could prevent funds from operating fairly to investors in practice and that it would not necessarily mitigate money market funds’ susceptibility to runs and related adverse effects on the short-term financing markets and capital formation. Thus, we expect that the liquidity fees and gates approach described above would better achieve our goals of preserving the benefits of money market funds for investors and the short-term financing markets for issuers while enhancing investor protection and improving money market funds’ ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from high levels of redemptions. Liquidity fees and gates also may be easier to implement than required in-kind redemptions. We request comment on whether we are correct in our analysis of the relative merits and costs of in-kind redemptions as compared to the other forms of redemption restrictions described in this Release as well as any

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\textsuperscript{474} See, e.g., Comment Letter of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, L.P. (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“a potential result of forced in-kind redemptions is simply to transfer the selling responsibility from presumably sophisticated and experienced asset managers to a disparate group of investors who do not necessarily have any reason to know how to dispose of these securities effectively”); Comment Letter of SVB Asset Management (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619); Comment Letter of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619).

\textsuperscript{475} See, e.g., ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Richmond Fed PWG Comment Letter, supra note 139; Comment Letter of Wells Fargo Funds Management, LLC (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Wells Fargo PWG Comment Letter”).

\end{footnotesize}
others that money market funds could seek to impose.

We also request comment on all the redemption restriction alternatives discussed in this Release.

- Are there other alternatives that we should consider? Do commenters agree with our discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the various alternatives? Do commenters agree with our discussion of their potential benefits and costs and other economic effects?

C. Potential Combination of Standby Liquidity Fees and Gates and Floating Net Asset Value

Today, we are proposing two alternative methods of reforming money market funds. Although these two proposals are designed to achieve many of the same goals, by their nature they would do so to different degrees and with different tradeoffs. As discussed above, our first alternative would require money market funds (other than government and retail funds) to adopt floating NAVs. This proposal is designed primarily to address the incentive for shareholders to redeem shares ahead of other investors in times of fund and market stress. It also is intended to improve the transparency of funds’ investment risks through more transparent valuation and pricing methods. It makes explicit the risk and reward relation for money market funds. We recognize, however, that the proposal does not necessarily address shareholders’ incentive to redeem from money market funds due to their liquidity risk or for other reasons as discussed below. In times of severe market stress when the secondary markets for funds’ assets become illiquid, investors may still have incentives to redeem shares before their fund’s liquidity dries up. It also may not alter money market fund shareholders’ incentive to redeem in times of market stress when investors are engaging in flights to quality, liquidity, and transparency and the related contagion effects from such high levels of redemptions.
Our second proposal, which requires funds to impose liquidity fees unless the fund’s board determines that it would not be in the best interest of the fund and permits them to impose gates in certain circumstances, is primarily focused on helping money market funds manage heightened redemptions and reducing shareholders’ incentive to redeem under stress. It also could improve the transparency of funds’ liquidity risks through a more transparent and systematic allocation of liquidity costs. In doing so, it addresses a principal drawback of our floating NAV proposal by imposing a cost on redemptions in times of market stress that may incorporate not just investment risk but also liquidity risk. The prospect of facing liquidity fees and gates will give the additional benefit of better informing and sensitizing investors to the risks of investing in money market funds. We recognize, however, that our liquidity fees and gates proposal does not entirely eliminate the incentive of shareholders to redeem when the fund’s shadow price falls below a dollar. Moreover, it does not eliminate the lack of valuation transparency in the pricing of money market funds and any corresponding lack of shareholder appreciation of money market fund valuation risks.

We are considering addressing the limitations of the two proposals by combining them into a single reform package; that is, requiring money market funds (other than government money market funds and, regarding the floating NAV, retail money market funds) to both use a floating NAV and potentially impose liquidity fees or gates in times of fund and market stress.\footnote{As discussed in supra section III.A.4, retail money market funds would also be exempt from our proposed floating NAV requirement.} Doing so would address some of the drawbacks of each proposal individually, but would present other tradeoffs, as further discussed below.
1. Potential Benefits of a Combination

A combined reform approach could reduce investors’ incentive to quickly redeem assets from money market funds in a crisis, improve the transparency of funds’ investment and liquidity risks, and enhance money market funds’ ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from high levels of redemptions relative to either proposal alone. Under a combined approach, the floating NAV should reduce investors’ incentive to redeem early to avoid a market-based loss embedded in the fund’s portfolio because the fund would be transacting at the fair value of its portfolio at all times. Doing so should reduce the likelihood that investors engage in preemptive redemptions that could trigger the imposition of fees and gates.477 Requiring a fund to operate with a floating NAV with potential imposition of fees and gates in times of fund or market stress should thus reduce the risk that funds would face heavy redemptions. Early redeeming shareholders would be less likely to be able to exit the fund without bearing the cost of their redemptions, and thereby it will be less likely to concentrate losses for the remaining shareholders. At the same time, requiring a floating NAV fund to consider imposing liquidity fees or impose gates when the fund’s liquidity buffer comes under strain should enhance its ability to manage its liquidity risk before it results in portfolio losses.

The combination would provide a broader range of tools to a floating NAV money market fund to manage redemptions in a crisis, thereby avoiding “fire sales” of assets that would affect all shareholders and potentially the short-term financing markets for issuers. The combined approach also should further enhance the ability of money market funds to treat shareholders equitably, and could allow better management of funds’ portfolios in a crisis to

477 See supra section III.B.1 (discussing shareholders’ potential incentive to engage in preemptive redemptions in a stable price money market fund that can impose fees or gates).
minimize shareholder losses.

Requiring funds that can impose liquidity fees and gates to have a floating NAV provides fuller transparency of fund valuation and liquidity risk. This enhanced transparency may better inform investors to the risk profile of their money market fund investment, and may make investors less sensitive to fluctuations in a money market fund’s NAV. As a result of this familiarity with money market fund NAV fluctuations, investors may be less likely to redeem shares in times of fund and market stress because of the possibility that a fund’s NAV might change, and correspondingly reducing the chances that fees or gates may be triggered.478

Liquidity fees also can encourage funds to better and more systematically manage liquidity and redemption activity and encourage shareholders to monitor and exert market discipline over the fund to reduce the likelihood that the imposition of fees or gates will become necessary in that fund.

We request comment on the potential benefits of combining our two alternatives into a single proposal.

- Would combining the floating NAV alternative with the liquidity fees and gates alternative have the benefits we discuss above? Are there any other benefits that we have not discussed? If so, what would they be?

- Would combining the floating NAV alternative with only liquidity fees or only gates provide different benefits?

2. Potential Drawbacks of a Combination

Some drawbacks may result from combining the two proposals.479 One potential

478 See supra section III.A.1.

479 One commenter noted their opposition to combining redemption gates with a floating NAV, arguing that such a combination “acknowledges that the floating NAV does not resolve such first mover advantage.”
drawback is that combining a floating NAV with liquidity fees and gates does not preserve the benefits of stable price money market funds for investors as our liquidity fees and gates alternative does. Although any combination likely would include an exemption to the floating NAV requirement for government and retail money market funds, most other money market funds would have a floating NAV, thereby incurring the costs and operational issues associated with that proposal. As discussed more fully in the section on that alternative, some investors may be deterred from investing in a floating NAV fund for a variety of reasons. We have designed our liquidity fees and gates alternative in large part to preserve the benefits of stable price funds for those investors while enhancing investor protection and improving money market funds' ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from high levels of redemptions. Combining the proposals thus may not fully accomplish our goal of preserving the current benefits of money market funds.

Another drawback of combining the two proposals is that if a floating NAV significantly changes investor expectations regarding money market fund risk and their prospect of suffering losses, requiring funds with a floating NAV to also be able to impose standby liquidity fees and gates may be unnecessary to manage the risks of heavy redemptions in times of crisis. Because of the unique features of stable price money market funds, liquidity fees and gates may be necessary for a fund to ensure that all of its shareholders are treated the same, while also managing the risks of contagion from heavy redemptions. A fund with a floating NAV may not face these same risks and thus providing those funds with the ability to impose fees or gates may

See Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174.

See supra sections III.A.3 and III.A.4. In any combination, retail funds would likely be subject to fees and gates, although exempt from the floating NAV, and thus would not be exempt from both provisions as government funds likely would.
not be justified, particularly in light of the Investment Company Act’s expressed preference for full redemembility of open-end fund shares.\(^\text{481}\)

A last potential drawback is that although some investors may be comfortable investing in a money market fund that has either a floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates, some investors may not wish to invest in a fund that has both features because a fund that does not have a stable price and also may restrict redemptions may not be suitable as a cash management tool for such investors. The combination of our proposals may result in these investors looking to other investment alternatives that offer principal stability or that do not also have potential restrictions on redemptions. We discuss the potential effects of such a shift in section III.E below.

We request comment on the potential drawbacks of combining our two alternatives into a single proposal.

- Would combining the floating NAV alternative with the liquidity fees and gates alternative have the drawbacks we discuss above? Are there any other drawbacks that we have not discussed? If so, what would they be?
- Would combining the floating NAV alternative with only liquidity fees or only gates impose different costs?

3. Effect of Combination

As discussed above, each of the alternatives that we are proposing today achieves similar goals, in different ways, but they bear distinct costs. Accordingly, if we were to combine the two proposals, while there is the likelihood that a combination may in some ways improve on each alternative standing alone, the combination would impose two separate sets of costs on funds, investors, and the markets. We request comment on whether the benefit of combining the two

\(^{481}\) See 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(32) and 80a-22(e); see also supra note 395.
alternatives into a single reform would justify the drawbacks of imposing two distinct sets of costs and economic impacts.

- Should we combine the two alternatives as a single reform? What would be the advantages and drawbacks of such a combination? Would the benefits of combining the proposals justify requiring the two individual sets of costs associated with implementing the combined alternatives? Would the imposition of two sets of costs materially impact the decisions of money market fund sponsors on whether or not they would continue to offer the product?

4. *Operational Issues*

Combining the two alternatives into a single approach could pose certain operational issues and raise questions about how we should structure such a reform. These issues are discussed below.

a. *Fee Structure*

Under our liquidity fees and gates proposal, the board of directors of a money market fund would be required to impose a liquidity fee (unless they find that not doing so would be in the best interest of the fund) if the fund's weekly liquid assets fell below 15% of its total assets. The default liquidity fee would be 2% unless the board determined that a lesser fee would be in the best interest of fund shareholders.

The liquidity fees imposed by a floating NAV fund may serve different purposes than those of a stable price fund. A stable price fund board, for example, might use liquidity fees to recoup the costs associated with selling assets at distressed prices in an illiquid market to meet redemptions, as well as to help repair the fund’s NAV. In contrast, a floating NAV fund board might choose to impose liquidity fees only to recoup the costs associated with selling assets at distressed prices. This difference in the purpose served by liquidity fees raises questions about
the appropriate default size of a liquidity fee for the combined proposal, the appropriate thresholds for triggering imposition of the fee, and the thresholds for removing it.

We request comment on the structure of the default liquidity fee if applied to a floating NAV money market fund.

- Should we alter the default liquidity fee for the combined proposal? Should we specify a default fee for the combined proposal or merely require that a fee be based on the costs incurred by the fund selling assets to meet redemptions? We previously noted issues that can arise with variable liquidity fees.\footnote{See supra section III.B.2.c.} Would these issues be of concern in the context of a floating NAV fund?

- Should we contemplate different percentages for funds to consider before applying liquidity fees or gates to a floating NAV money market fund than weekly liquid assets falling below 15%? If so, what percentages should we consider. Should we consider a different threshold for automatic removal of liquidity fees other than recovery of a fund’s liquidity to 30% weekly liquid assets? If so, what should the threshold for removal be?

- Should a liquidity fee in a floating NAV fund be triggered by a different factor other than weekly liquid assets falling below 15%, such as a change in NAV? If so, should such a trigger be based on a relative percentage change in NAV over some time period or on an absolute change since a fund’s inception? For example, should a liquidity fee be triggered if a fund’s NAV falls by more than ¼ of 1% in a week? Alternatively, should a liquidity fee be triggered if a fund’s NAV falls by more than a certain number of basis points? If based on an absolute
number, what should the number be? A drop in NAV of more than 25 basis points from its initial starting price or another number? What types of issues do the two options present? What other types of thresholds should be considered? What issues would arise from using other thresholds?

b. Redemption gates

Under our liquidity fees and gates alternative, a fund would have the option of imposing temporary redemption gates if liquidity falls below the same threshold that it imposes liquidity fees. These redemption gates are designed to act as “circuit breakers” to halt redemptions, thereby allowing funds to minimize losses to all shareholders and reducing any associated contagion risks. Most of the concerns that redemption gates are designed to address in a stable price money market fund also apply to a floating NAV money market fund, and gates should be similarly useful in addressing them. Much like a stable price fund, a floating NAV fund may also face difficulties managing heavy redemptions in times of stress, and redemption gates may work to mitigate these difficulties. Gates, by halting redemptions, would provide “breathing room” for investors to take better stock of a situation. Conversely, redemption gates may not be in the interest of investors who rationally wish to redeem at the time, or who want immediate liquidity.

- Do redemption gates on a floating NAV fund pose any particular issues or provide any specific benefits different than those associated with gates in a stable price fund? If so, what are they?

- If we were to combine the two alternatives and permit redemption gates on a floating NAV fund, should the thresholds be the same as for imposing liquidity fees? If not, what should they be? Should they be tied to redemption activity?
Drops in NAV?

- Should the length of time permitted for redemption gates in a floating NAV fund be the same as that permitted under the standalone alternative? Should floating NAV funds be permitted to gate redemptions for a longer or shorter time? If so, why?

- If the proposals were combined, would a partial gate be appropriate?

c. Floating NAV Combined with only Liquidity Fees or only Gates

If we were to combine the alternatives, we could also do so in a partial manner, requiring money markets to maintain a floating NAV and combining it with standby liquidity fees standing alone. Similarly, we could instead require that a floating NAV fund be able to impose gates, but not liquidity fees. Combining a floating NAV with just liquidity fees or gates may simplify operational implementation of the combination and make money market funds more attractive to investors. On the other hand, such a limited combination may not achieve the goals of the proposed reform to the same extent as a full combination. We request comment on whether, if we were to combine the two alternatives, we should require a floating NAV fund to only have standby liquidity fees or gates, but not both.

- What advantages and disadvantages would result from such a limited combination?

- If we were to pursue a limited combination, which measure should we combine with the floating NAV? Liquidity fees or gates? Why?

d. Choice of Floating NAV or Liquidity Fees and Gates

Another way of combining the floating NAV and fees and gates alternatives discussed in this Release would be to require that money market funds (other than government money market
funds) choose to either transact with a floating NAV or be able to impose liquidity fees and gates in times of stress—in other words, each non-government money market fund would have to choose to apply either the floating NAV alternative or the liquidity fees and gates alternative. Providing such a choice may allow each money market fund to choose the reform alternative that is most efficient, cost-effective, and preferable to shareholders. This could enhance the efficiency of our reforms and minimize costs and competitive impacts. On the other hand, allowing such a choice may not achieve the goals of the proposed reform to the same extent as a full combination or mandating one alternative versus another. In addition, in making such a choice, the money market fund industry may not necessarily be incentivized to take into consideration the full likely effects of their decisions on the short-term financing markets, and thus capital formation, or the broader systemic effects of their choices. Funds would need to clearly communicate their choice of approaches to shareholders. We request comment on whether we should permit non-government money market funds to choose to apply either the floating NAV alternative or the fees and gates alternative.

- What advantages and disadvantages would result from permitting such a choice?
- Would permitting such a choice achieve our reform goals to the same extent as either our floating NAV proposal or our fees and gates proposal?
- Would this cause investor confusion because of a fragmentation in the market?
- How should a fund elect to make such a choice? At inception of the fund? Should a fund be permitted to switch elections?

\textit{e. Other Issues}

The combination of the two alternatives could create other operational issues. For example, we have previously discussed our understanding that a floating NAV fund would meet
the definition of a cash equivalent for accounting purposes, because it is unlikely to experience significant fluctuations in value.\textsuperscript{483} We would expect a fund that combines liquidity fees and gates with a floating NAV should not experience any additional volatility compared to a floating NAV fund alone. That said, in some circumstances, liquidity fees could effectively lower share value, by requiring the payment of fees upon redemption. It is also important to note that gates would potentially compromise liquidity. Nevertheless, we expect the value of floating NAV funds with liquidity fees and gates would be substantially stable and should continue to be treated as a cash equivalent under GAAP.\textsuperscript{484} We also do not expect that a combination of the two approaches would result in any novel tax issues that we have not previously discussed in the relevant sections above. We request comment on the implications of combining fees and gates with a floating NAV on tax and accounting issues.

- Would a money market fund that combines a floating NAV with liquidity fees and gates continue to be treated as a cash equivalent under GAAP? If not, why not?

- Would a combination of the alternatives create any additional accounting or any novel tax issues? If so, what would they be?

Under our floating NAV proposal we are proposing that a fund would be required to price to the fourth decimal place if they price their shares at one dollar (\textit{e.g.}, $1.0000), or to an equivalent level of precision if the fund uses another price level. We would require such a level of pricing precision, in part, to ensure that any fluctuations in a fund’s NAV are visible to

\textsuperscript{483} See supra section III.A.6.

\textsuperscript{484} Id.
investors. We would expect that the value of such transparency would be unchanged under a combined approach.

- Would such a level of pricing precision be appropriate for a fund that combines liquidity fees and gates with a floating NAV? If not, why not, and what level of pricing precision should be required instead?

As discussed above, we are proposing exemptions under each alternative. Under the floating NAV alternative, we are proposing an exemption for government and retail money market funds. Under the liquidity fees and gates alternative, we are proposing an exemption for government money market funds, but not retail funds. We would expect that a combined approach would also include these exemptions, considering that the reasons we are proposing the exemptions to the floating NAV remain the same in the context of a combined approach.

However, our liquidity fees and gates proposal treats government and retail funds differently, and provides an exemption to the liquidity fees and gates proposal for government money market funds, but not for retail funds. For the reasons discussed in the sections where we propose the exemptions, if we were to combine the proposals, we would expect to continue to offer the exemptions provided under each alternative, but would not extend them. Accordingly, a combined approach would likely provide an exemption to the floating NAV and to fees and gates for government money market funds, but would provide only an exemption to the floating NAV for retail funds, and not an exemption to fees and gates.

- If we were to combine the two alternatives, should we retain the proposed exemptions to the floating NAV requirement for government and retail money market funds? If not, why not?

See supra section III.A.2.
• Under a combined approach, should we also exempt retail funds from not only the floating NAV but also from the fees and gates requirements? If so, why?

We are also proposing to retain rules 17a-9 and 22e-3 under both of the alternatives we are proposing today, with certain amendments to account for operational differences to rule 22e-3’s triggering mechanism.486 If we were to combine the two alternatives into a single approach, we would expect to make the amendments to the triggering mechanisms of rule 22e-3 we are proposing today (which are the same under each alternative) and retain rule 17a-9 unchanged. As discussed above, we believe that funds would continue to find the ability to sell securities to affiliated persons under rule 17a-9 useful under both alternatives, as well as under a combined approach. We also expect that the amendments we are making to the triggering mechanism permitting a suspension of redemptions in preparation for a fund’s liquidation under rule 22e-3 would continue to be appropriate under a combined approach as well.

• Would a combined approach have any significant effects on our proposed treatment of rules 17a-9 and 22e-3? Would we need to make any other changes to those rules to accommodate such a combination?

Our floating NAV alternative includes a compliance period of 2 years to allow for funds to transition to a floating NAV without imposing unnecessary costs.487 We would expect that any combined approach would include a similar compliance period because funds would likely need a significant amount of time to implement a floating NAV. At the same time, we do not expect that implementing both alternatives would add substantially to the amount of time it would take to implement a floating NAV alone, and accordingly would expect to provide the same

486 We are proposing to change the trigger for use of rule 22e-3 under both alternatives to a reduction in a fund’s weekly liquid assets below 15%. See supra section III.A.5.b.

487 See supra section III.A.9.
compliance period if we were to combine the approaches.

- Should we provide the same compliance period under a combined approach? If not, should the compliance period be longer or shorter? Should we consider a grandfathering approach instead of or in addition to a compliance period?

Under both of the alternatives that we are proposing today, we are also including a variety of proposed disclosure improvements designed to improve transparency of fund risks and risk management, with the relevant disclosure tailored to each alternative. If we were to combine the two approaches, we would likely merge the disclosure reforms, and revise the disclosure requirements to take such a merger into account. We would not expect that a combined approach would require significant additional disclosure reforms not discussed under the two alternatives.

- Would a combined approach pose any new disclosure issues that are not currently contemplated in the discussion of disclosure reforms for each of the two alternatives? If so, what would those issues be? Would a combined approach result in any new or changed risks that investors should be informed of?

We do not expect that there would be any significant additional costs from combining the two approaches that are not previously discussed in the sections discussing the costs of the two alternatives above. It is likely that implementing a combined approach would likely save some percentage over the costs of implementing each alternative separately as a result of synergies and the ability to make a variety of changes to systems at a single time. We do not expect that combining the approaches would create any new costs as a result of the combination itself. Accordingly, we estimate that the costs of implementing a combined approach would at most be the sum of the costs of each alternative, but may likely be less.
We request comment on the costs of combining the two approaches.

- Would there be any new costs associated with combining the two approaches that are not already discussed separately under each alternative? If so, what would they be?
- Would there be a reduction in costs as a result of implementing both alternatives at the same time? If so, how much savings would there be?

D. Certain Alternatives Considered

In addition to the proposed reforms and alternatives described elsewhere in this Release, it is important to note that in coming to this proposal, we and our staff considered a number of additional alternative options for regulatory reform in this area. For example, we considered each option discussed in the PWG Report and the FSOC Proposed Recommendations. We currently are not pursuing certain of these other options because we believe, after considering the comments we received on the PWG Report and that FSOC received on the FSOC Proposed Recommendations and the economic analysis set forth in this Release, that they would not achieve our regulatory goals as well as what we propose today. We discuss below these options, and our principal reasons for not pursuing them further at this time.

I. Alternatives in the FSOC Proposed Recommendations

As discussed in section II.D.3 above, in November 2012, FSOC proposed to recommend that we undertake structural reforms of money market funds. FSOC proposed three alternatives for consideration, which, it stated, could be implemented individually or in combination. The first option—requiring that money market funds use a floating NAV—is part of our proposal. The other two options in the FSOC Proposed Recommendations each would require that money

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488 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at section V.A.
market funds maintain a NAV buffer. One option would require that most money market funds have a risk-based NAV buffer of up to 1% to absorb day-to-day fluctuations in the value of the funds’ portfolio securities and allow the funds to maintain a stable NAV and that this NAV buffer be combined with a “minimum balance at risk.” The required minimum size of a fund’s NAV buffer would be determined based on the composition of the money market fund’s portfolio according to the following formula:

- No buffer requirement for cash, Treasury securities, and repos collateralized solely by cash and Treasury securities (“Treasury repo”);
- A 0.75% buffer requirement for other daily liquid assets (or weekly liquid assets, in the case of tax-exempt money market funds); and
- A 1% buffer requirement for all other assets.

A fund whose NAV buffer fell below the required minimum amount would be required to limit its new investments to cash, Treasury securities, and Treasury repos until its NAV buffer was restored. A fund that completely exhausted its NAV buffer would be required to suspend redemptions and liquidate or could continue to operate with a floating NAV indefinitely or until it restored its NAV buffer.

A money market fund could use any funding method or combination of methods to build the NAV buffer, and could vary these methods over time. The FSOC Proposed Recommendations identified three funding methods that would be possible with Commission relief from certain provisions of the Investment Company Act: (1) an escrow account that a money market fund’s sponsor established and funded and that was pledged to support the fund’s

\[489\] Under the FSOC Proposed Recommendations, Treasury money market funds would not be subject to a NAV buffer or a minimum balance at risk. See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at sections V.B and V.C for a full discussion of these two alternatives. This section of the Release provides a summary based on those sections of the FSOC Proposed Recommendation.
stable share price; (2) the money market fund’s issuance of a class of subordinated, non-redeemable equity securities ("buffer shares") that would absorb first losses in the funds’ portfolios; and (3) the money market fund’s retention of some earnings that it would otherwise distribute to shareholders (subject to certain tax limitations).\textsuperscript{490} We believe that the first funding method would be the most likely approach for funding the buffer given the complexity of a fund offering a new class of buffer shares (and the uncertainty of an active, liquid market for buffer shares developing) and the tax limitations on the third method.\textsuperscript{491} We note, however, that we believe this funding method is the most expensive of the three because of the opportunity costs the fund’s sponsor will bear to the extent that the firms redirect this funding from other essential activities, as further discussed below.\textsuperscript{492}

The minimum balance at risk ("MBR") would require that the last 3% of a shareholder’s highest account value in excess of $100,000 during the previous 30 days (the shareholder’s MBR or "holdback shares") be redeemable only with a 30-day delay.\textsuperscript{493} All shareholders may redeem

\textsuperscript{490} See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at section V.B.

\textsuperscript{491} Under the Internal Revenue Code, each year, mutual funds, including money market funds, must distribute to shareholders at least 90% of their annual earnings or lose the ability to deduct dividends paid to their shareholders. See, e.g., Comment Letter of the Investment Company Institute (May 16, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619). We note that the retained earnings method is similar to how some money market funds paid for insurance that was provided by ICI Mutual Insurance Company from 1993 to 2003. This insurance covered losses on money market fund portfolio assets due to defaults and insolvencies but not from events such as a security downgrade or a rise in interest rates. Coverage was limited to $50 million per fund, with a deductible of the first 10 to 40 basis points of any loss. Premiums ranged from 1 to 3 basis points. See PWG Report, supra note 111, at n. 24 and accompanying text. Because of the tax disadvantages of this funding method, it would take a long time for a NAV buffer of any size to build, particularly in the current low interest rate environment.

\textsuperscript{492} This funding method also could have the greatest competitive impacts on the money market fund industry, as larger bank-affiliated sponsors would have less costly access to funding for the NAV buffer than independent asset management firm sponsors. See, e.g., Systemic Risk Council FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 363 ("Capital requirements would likely encourage money market fund consolidation—particularly toward larger bank-affiliated sponsors (who traditionally have, and can access, more capital than traditional, independent asset managers). If so, this could further concentrate systemic risk from these institutions, and create conflicts of interest in the short-term financing markets (as fewer money funds would control a larger share of the short-term lending markets.").

\textsuperscript{493} See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at section V.C.
97% of their holdings immediately without being restricted by the MBR. If the money market fund suffers losses that exceed its NAV buffer, the losses would be borne first by the MBRs of shareholders who have recently redeemed (i.e., their MBRs would be "subordinated"). The extent of subordination of a shareholder’s MBR would be approximately proportionate to the shareholder’s cumulative net redemptions during the prior 30 days—in other words, the more the shareholder redeems, the more their holdback shares become "subordinated holdback shares."

The last option in the FSOC Proposed Recommendations would require money market funds to have a risk-based NAV buffer of up to 3% (which otherwise would have the same structure as discussed above), and this larger NAV buffer could be combined with other measures.\textsuperscript{494} The alternative measures discussed in the FSOC Proposed Recommendations include more stringent investment diversification requirements (which are proposed or discussed in section III.J below), increased minimum liquidity levels (which we have not proposed), and more robust disclosure requirements (which are generally proposed in sections III.F and III.G below).\textsuperscript{495}

In the sections that follow, we discuss our evaluation of a NAV buffer requirement and an MBR requirement for money market funds. We also discuss comments FSOC received on these recommendations. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission is not pursuing these alternatives because we presently believe that the imposition of either a NAV buffer combined

\textsuperscript{494} See id, at section V.C.

\textsuperscript{495} The FSOC Proposed Recommendations asked the Commission to consider increasing minimum weekly liquidity requirements from 30% of total assets to 40% of total assets. The justification provided by FSOC was that most funds already have weekly liquidity in excess of this 40% minimum level. We do not consider this alternative for two reasons. There is no evidence that current liquidity requirements are inadequate. For example, the RSFI Study notes that the heightened redemption activity in the summer of 2011 did not place undue burdens on MMFs when they sold assets to meet redemption requests. No fund lost more than 50 basis points during this period nor did their shadow NAVs deviate significantly from amortized cost. See RSFI Study, supra note 21. Based on these considerations, we have preliminarily determined not to address additional minimum liquidity requirements.
with a minimum balance at risk or a stand-alone NAV buffer, while advancing some of our goals for money market fund reform, might prove costly for money market fund shareholders and could result in a contraction in the money market fund industry that could harm the short-term financing markets and capital formation to a greater degree than the proposals under consideration.

a. NAV Buffer

In considering a NAV buffer such as those recommended by FSOC as a potential reform option for money market funds, we considered the benefits that such a buffer could provide, as well as its costs. Our evaluation of what could be a reasonable size for a NAV buffer also factored into our analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of these options. A buffer can be designed to satisfy different potential objectives. A large buffer could protect shareholders from losses related to defaults, such as the one experienced by the Reserve Primary Fund following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. However, if complete loss absorption is the objective, a substantial buffer would be required, particularly given that money market funds can hold up to 5% of their assets in a single security.496

496 Even commenters in favor of a buffer showed concern that FSOC’s proposed buffer size of 1% or 3% may be inadequate. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 38, at 5 (“For a poorly diversified fund with portfolio assets that carry relatively more credit risk, a 3% (maximum) NAV buffer may not be sufficient.”); Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 24 (“For a well-diversified portfolio, we estimate that MMFs should hold 3 to 4% capital against unsecured paper issued by financial institutions, the primary asset held by MMFs. For more concentrated portfolios, we estimate that the amount of capital should be considerably higher.”); Better Markets FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67 (“The primary shortcoming of [FSOC’s proposed buffer] is its low level of 1 or 3 percent. [Any buffer] must be set at a level that is sufficient to cover all of these factors: projected and historical losses; additional costs in the form of liquidity damages or government backstops; and investor psychology in the face of possible financial shocks or crises. […] Historical examples alone…indicate that MMF losses have risen as high as 3.9 percent. This serves only as a floor regarding actual potential losses, clearly indicating that the necessary buffer must be substantially higher than 3.9 percent.”); Occupy the SEC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 42 (arguing that FSOC’s proposed buffer does not go far enough in accounting for potential risks in a fund’s portfolio. Instead, the approach should be a two-layer buffer, with a first layer of up to 3% depending on the portfolio’s credit rating and a second layer to be sized according to the concentration of the portfolio).
Alternatively, if a buffer were not intended for complete loss absorption, but rather
designed primarily to absorb day-to-day variations in the market-based value of money market
funds’ portfolio holdings under normal market conditions, this would allow a fund to hold a
significantly smaller buffer. Accordingly, the relatively larger buffers contemplated in the FSOC
Proposed Recommendations\textsuperscript{497} must have been designed to absorb daily price fluctuations as well
as relatively large security defaults.\textsuperscript{498} In fact, a 3\% buffer would accommodate all but extremely
large losses, such as those experienced during the crisis. However, a buffer that was designed to
absorb such large losses may be too high and too costly because the opportunity cost of this
capital would be borne at all times even though it was likely to be drawn upon to any degree only
rarely. Accordingly, a buffer of the size contemplated by either alternative in the FSOC
Proposed Recommendations appears to be too costly to be practicable.\textsuperscript{499}

\textit{i. Benefits of a NAV Buffer

\textsuperscript{497} While the second alternative in the FSOC Proposed Recommendation only includes a NAV buffer of up to
1\%, it was combined with a 3\% MBR, which would effectively provide the fund with a 4\% buffer before non-redeeming shareholders in the fund suffered losses.

\textsuperscript{498} For example, beginning in September 2008, money market funds that chose to participate in the Treasury
Temporary Guarantee Program were required to file with the Treasury their weekly shadow price if it was
below \$0.9975. Our staff has reviewed the data, and found that through October 17, 2008, only three funds
 carried losses larger than four percent, and only five funds carried losses larger than three percent.
Reported shadow prices excluded the value of any capital support agreements in place at the time, but in
some cases included sponsor-provided capital contributions to the fund. Not every money market fund that
applied to participate in the program reported shadow price data for every day during the period between
September 1, 2008 and October 17, 2008. \textit{See also Patrick E. McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at
Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market Funds,} at 31, Table 2 Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 564, July 2012 (providing additional statistical analysis of
shadow price information reported by money market funds filing under the Treasury Temporary Guarantee
Program). During that period there were over 800 money market funds based on Form N-SAR data.

\textsuperscript{499} There is another potential adverse effect of requiring large NAV buffers for money market funds to address
risk from systemic events. According to the FSOC Proposed Recommendations, outflows from
institutional prime money market funds following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy tended to be larger
among money market funds with sponsors that were themselves under stress, indicating that investors
redeemed shares when concerned about sponsors’ potential inability to support ailing funds. But these
sponsors were the ones most likely to need funding dedicated to the buffer for other purposes. As a result,
larger buffers may negatively affect other important activities of money market fund sponsors and cause
them to fail faster.
The FSOC Proposed Recommendations discusses a number of potential benefits that a NAV buffer could provide to money market funds and their investors, many of which we discuss below. It would preserve money market funds’ stable share price and potentially increase the stability of the funds, but would likely reduce the yields (and in the option that combines a 1% NAV buffer with an MBR, the liquidity) that money market funds currently offer to investors. Like our proposed reforms, the NAV buffer presents trade-offs between stability, yield, and liquidity.

In effect, depending on the size of the buffer, a buffer could provide various levels of coverage of losses due to both the illiquidity and credit deterioration of portfolio securities. Money market funds that are supported by a NAV buffer would be more resilient to redemptions and credit or liquidity changes in their portfolios than stable value money market funds without a buffer (the current baseline). As long as the NAV buffer is funded at necessary levels, each $1.00 in money market fund shares is backed by $1.00 in fund assets, eliminating the incentive of shareholders to redeem at $1.00 when the market-based value of their shares is worth less. This reduces shareholders’ incentive to redeem shares quickly in response to small losses or concerns about the quality and liquidity of the money market fund portfolio, discussed in section II.B above, particularly during periods when the underlying portfolio has significant unrealized capital losses and the fund has not broken the buck. As long as the expected effect on the portfolio from potential losses is smaller than the NAV buffer, investors would be protected—they would continue to receive a stable value for their shares.

A second benefit is that a NAV buffer would force money market funds to provide

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500 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at section V.B.

501 See, e.g., Occupy the SEC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 42.
explicit capital support rather than the implicit and uncertain support that is permitted under the current regulatory baseline. This would require funds to internalize some of the cost of the discretionary capital support sometimes provided to money market funds, and to define in advance how losses will be allocated. In addition, a NAV buffer could reduce fund managers’ incentives to take risk beyond what is desired by fund shareholders because investing in less risky securities reduces the probability of buffer depletion.  

Another potential benefit is that a NAV buffer might provide counter-cyclical capital to the money market fund industry. This is because once a buffer is funded it remains in place regardless of redemption activity. With a buffer, redemptions increase the relative size of the buffer because the same dollar buffer now supports fewer assets. As an example, consider a fund with a 1% NAV buffer that experiences a 25 basis point portfolio loss, which then triggers redemptions of 20% of its assets. The NAV buffer, as a proportion of fund assets and prior to any replenishment, will increase from 75 basis points after the loss to 93.75 basis points after the redemptions. This illustrates how the NAV buffer strengthens the ability of the fund to absorb further losses, reducing investors’ incentive to redeem shares. This result contrasts to the current regulatory baseline under rule 2a-7 where redemptions amplify the impact of losses by distributing them over a smaller investor base. For example, suppose a fund with a shadow price of $1.00 (i.e., no embedded losses) experiences a 25 basis point loss, which causes its shadow price to fall to $0.9975. If 20% of the fund’s shares are then redeemed at $1.00, its shadow price

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502 See, e.g., Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 24 (“Capital buffers also mean that there is an investor class that explicitly bears losses and has incentives to curb ex ante risk taking.”).

503 See, e.g., J.P. Morgan FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 342 (“Where capital support is utilized as a first loss position upon liquidation, the level of capital can be tied to a MMF’s highest asset levels. This can result in a structure whereby, as redemptions accelerate and cause the unrealized loss per share to increase further, the amount of capital support available per share increases accordingly, providing further capital support to the remaining shareholders that do not redeem their shares.”).
will fall to $0.9969, reflecting a loss which is 24% greater than the loss precipitating the redemptions.

Finally, by allowing money market funds to absorb small losses in portfolio securities without affecting their ability to transact at a stable price per share, a NAV buffer may facilitate and protect capital formation in short-term financing markets during periods of modest stress. Currently, money market fund portfolio managers are limited in their ability to sell portfolio securities when markets are under stress because they have little ability to absorb losses without causing a fund’s shadow NAV to drop below $1.00 (or embed losses in the fund's market-based NAV per share). As a result, managers tend to avoid trading when markets are strained, contributing to further illiquidity in the short-term financing markets in such circumstances. A NAV buffer should enable funds to absorb small losses and thus could reduce this tendency. Thus, by adding resiliency to money market funds and enhancing their ability to absorb losses, a NAV buffer may benefit capital formation in the long term. A more stable money market fund industry may produce more stable short-term financing markets, which would provide more reliability as to the demand for short-term credit to the economy.

ii. Costs of a NAV Buffer

There are significant ongoing costs associated with a NAV buffer. They can be divided into direct costs that affect money market fund sponsors or investors and indirect costs that impact capital formation. In addition, a NAV buffer does not protect shareholders completely from the possibility of heightened rapid redemption activity during periods of market stress, particularly in periods where the buffer is at risk of depletion. As the buffer becomes impaired (or if shareholders believe the fund may suffer a loss that exceeds the size of its NAV buffer), shareholders have an incentive to redeem shares quickly because, once the buffer fails, the fund
will no longer be able to maintain a stable value and shareholders will suddenly lose money on their investment.\textsuperscript{504} Such rapid severe redemptions could impair the fund's business model and viability.

Another possible implication of this facet of NAV buffers is that money market funds with buffers may avoid holding riskier short-term debt securities (like commercial paper) and instead hold a higher amount of low yielding investments like cash, Treasury securities, or Treasury repos. This could lead money market funds to hold more conservative portfolios than investors may prefer, given tradeoffs between principal stability, liquidity, and yield.\textsuperscript{505}

The most significant direct cost of a NAV buffer is the opportunity cost associated with maintaining a NAV buffer. Those contributing to the buffer essentially deploy valuable scarce resources to maintain a NAV buffer rather than being able to use the funds elsewhere. The cost of diverting funds for this purpose represents a significant incremental cost of doing business for those providing the buffer funding. We cannot provide estimates of these opportunity costs because the relevant data is not currently available to the Commission.\textsuperscript{506}

\textsuperscript{504} See, e.g., Systemic Risk Council FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 363 (stating that capital is difficult to set and is imperfect, that “[g]iven the lack of data and impossibility of modeling future events, even [a 3% NAV buffer] runs the risk of being too high, or too low to protect the system in the future” and that “too little capital could provide a false sense of security in a crisis”). See also infra note 512 and accompanying discussion.

\textsuperscript{505} But see, e.g., U.S. Chamber Jan. 23, 2013 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 248 (arguing that “a NAV buffer is likely to incentivize sponsors to reach for yield.”); Vanguard FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 172 (“Capital buffers are also likely to carry unintended consequences, as some funds may purchase riskier, higher-yielding securities to compensate for the reduction in yield. As a result, capital buffers are likely to provide investors with a false sense of security.”); Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Re: Alternative 3) (Jan. 25, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“If anything, creating a junior class of equity puts earnings pressure on an MMF to alter its balance sheet to decrease near-term liquid assets to generate investment returns available from longer-term, higher risk investments in order to either build capital through retained earnings or to compensate investors who have invested in the new class of subordinated equity capital of the MMF”).

\textsuperscript{506} The opportunity costs would represent the net present value of these forgone opportunities, an amount that cannot be estimated without relevant data about each firm’s productive opportunities.

However, a number of FSOC commenters have already cautioned that a NAV buffer could make money
The second direct cost of a NAV buffer is the equilibrium rate of return that a provider of funding for a NAV buffer would demand. An entity that provides such funding, possibly the fund sponsor, would expect to be paid a return that sets the market value of the buffer equal to the amount of the capital contribution. Since a NAV buffer is designed to absorb the same amount of risk regardless of its size, the promised yield increases with the relative amount of risk it is expected to absorb. This is a well-known leverage effect.\(^{507}\)

One could analogize a NAV buffer to bank capital by considering the similarities between money market funds with a NAV buffer and banks with capital. A traditional bank generally finances long-term assets (customer loans) with short-term liabilities (demand deposits). The Federal Reserve Board, as part of its prudential regulation, requires banks to adhere to certain minimum capital requirements.\(^{508}\) Bank capital, among other functions, provides a buffer that allows banks to withstand a certain amount of sudden demands for liquidity and losses without becoming insolvent and thus needing to draw upon federal deposit insurance or other aspects of the regulatory safety net for banks.\(^{509}\) The fact that the bank assets have a long maturity and are illiquid compared to the bank’s liabilities results in a maturity and

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market funds unprofitable. See, e.g., Angel FSOC Comment Letter, \(supra\) note 60 (stating that “in today’s low yield environment, even five basis points [of cost associated with a NAV buffer] would push most money market funds into negative yield territory.”); BlackRock FSOC Comment Letter, \(supra\) note 204 (“[A]ny capital over 0.75% will make the MMF product uncompetitive for sponsors to offer.”); Federated Investors Feb. 15 FSOC Comment Letter, \(supra\) note 192 (calculating that “prime MMFs would no longer be economically viable products” based on cost estimates provided by the ICI).

\(^{507}\) The leverage effect reflects the concept that higher leverage levels induce an equity holder to demand higher returns to compensate for the higher risk levels.

\(^{508}\) See the Federal Reserve Board’s website on Capital Guidelines and Adequacy, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforg/topicscapital.htm, for an overview of minimum capital requirements.

\(^{509}\) See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, 19 J. OF BANKING AND FIN. 393 (1995) (“Berger”) (“Regulators require capital for almost all the same reasons that other uninsured creditors of banks ‘require’ capital—to protect themselves against the costs of financial distress, agency problems, and the reduction in market discipline caused by the safety net.”).
liquidity mismatch problem that creates the possibility of a depositor run during periods of stress.\textsuperscript{510} Capital is one part of a prudential regulatory framework employed to deter runs in banks and generally protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. A money market fund with a NAV buffer has been described as essentially a “special purpose bank” where fund shareholders’ equity is equivalent to demand deposits and a NAV buffer is analogous to the bank’s capital.\textsuperscript{511} Since a NAV buffer is effectively a leveraged position in the underlying assets of the fund that is designed to absorb interest rate risk and mitigate default risk, a provider of buffer funding should demand a return that reflects the fund’s aggregate cost of capital plus compensation for the fraction of default risk it is capable of absorbing.

The effectiveness of a NAV buffer to protect against large-scale redemptions during periods of stress is predicated upon whether shareholders expect the decline in the value of the fund’s portfolio to be less than the value of the NAV buffer. Once investors anticipate that the buffer will be depleted, they have an incentive to redeem before it is completely depleted.\textsuperscript{512} In

\textsuperscript{510} More generally, banks are structured to satisfy depositors’ preference for access to their money on demand with businesses’ preference for a source of longer-term capital. However, the maturity and liquidity transformation provided by banks can also lead to runs. Deposit insurance, access to a lender of last resort, and other bank regulatory tools are designed to lessen the incentive of depositors to run. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON 401 (June 1983) (“Diamond & Dybvig”); Mark J. Flannery, Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window Lending, 28 JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 804 (1996); Jeffrey A. Miron, Financial Panics, the Seasonality of the Nominal Interest Rate, and the Founding of the Fed, 76 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 125 (1986); S. Bhattacharya & D. Gale, Preference Shocks, Liquidity, and Central Bank Policy, in NEW APPROACHES TO MONETARY ECONOMICS (eds., W. Barnett and K. Singleton, 1987).

\textsuperscript{511} See, e.g., Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Money Market Funds and Finance Companies: Are They the Banks of the Future?, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White, eds. 1993), at 173-214.

\textsuperscript{512} See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 38 (“The [FSOC] Proposal notes that a fund depleting its NAV buffer would be required to suspend redemptions and liquidate under rule 22e-3 or continue operating as a floating NAV fund. However, this sequence of events could be destabilizing. Investors in 3% NAV buffer funds may be quite risk averse, even more so than floating NAV MMF investors might be, given their revealed preference for stable NAV shares. If they foresee a possible conversion to floating NAV once the buffer is depleted, these risk-averse investors would have an incentive to redeem prior to conversion. If, on the other hand, investors foresee a suspension of redemptions, they would presumably have an even stronger incentive to redeem before facing a liquidity
this sense, a NAV buffer that is not sufficiently large is incapable of fully mitigating the possibility of a liquidity run. The drawback with increasing buffer size to address this risk, however, is that the opportunity costs of operating a buffer increase as the size of the buffer increases. Due to the correlated nature of portfolio holdings across money market funds, this could amplify market-wide run risk if NAV buffer impairment also is highly correlated across money market funds. The incentive to redeem could be further amplified if, as contemplated in the FSOC Proposed Recommendations, a NAV buffer failure would require a money market fund to either liquidate or convert to a floating NAV. If investors anticipate this occurring, some investors that value principal stability and liquidity may no longer view money market funds as viable investments.

As noted above, substantial NAV buffers may be able to absorb much, if not all, of the default risk in the underlying portfolio of a money market fund. This implies that any compensation for bearing default risk will be transferred from current money market fund shareholders to those financing the NAV buffer, effectively converting a prime money market fund into a fund that mimics the return of a Treasury fund for current money market fund shareholders. If fund managers are unable to pass through the yield associated with holding risky securities, like commercial paper, to money market fund shareholders, it is likely that they will reduce their investment in risky securities, such as commercial paper or short-term municipal securities.\(^3\) While lower yields would reduce, but not necessarily eliminate, the utility of the product to investors, it could have a negative impact on capital formation. Since the probability of breaking the buck is higher for a money market fund with riskier securities (e.g., a

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freeze when the NAV buffer is completely depleted.

\(^{3}\) But see supra note 505.
fund with a WAM of 90 days rather than one with a WAM of 60 days)\textsuperscript{514} and fund managers cannot pass through the higher associated yields, it is likely that managers will reduce investments in commercial paper because they cannot differentiate their funds on the basis of yield.

In addition, many investors are attracted to money market funds because they provide a stable value but have higher rates of return than Treasury securities. These higher rates of return are intended to compensate for exposure to greater credit risk and potential volatility than Treasury securities. As a result of funding the buffer, the returns to money market fund shareholders are likely to decline, potentially reducing demand from investors who are attracted to money market funds for their higher yield than alternative stable value investments.\textsuperscript{515}

Taken together, the demand by investors for some yield and the incentives for fund managers to reduce portfolio risk may impact competition and capital formation in two ways. First, investors seeking higher yield may move their funds to other alternative investment vehicles resulting in a contraction in the money market fund industry. In addition, fund managers may have an incentive to reduce the funds’ investment in commercial paper or short-term municipal securities in order to reduce the volatility of cash flows and increase the resilience of the NAV buffer. In both of these cases, there may be an effect on the short-term financing markets if the decrease in demand for short-term securities from money market funds results in an increase in the cost of capital for issuers of commercial paper and other securities.

\textsuperscript{514} See RSFI Study, \textit{supra} note 21, at 28-31.

\textsuperscript{515} See, \textit{e.g.}, Invesco FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 192 (“As a result of the ongoing ultra-low interest rate environment, MMF yields remain at historic lows.... A requirement to divert a portion of a MMF’s earnings in order to build a NAV buffer would result in prime MMF yields essentially equaling those of Treasury MMFs (which would not be required to maintain a buffer under the Proposal). Faced with the choice of equivalent yields but asymmetrical risks, logical investors would abandon prime funds for Treasury funds, potentially triggering the very instability that reforms are intended to prevent and vastly reducing corporate borrowers’ access to short-term financing.”).
b. Minimum Balance at Risk

As discussed above, under the second alternative in the FSOC Proposed Recommendations, a 1% capital buffer is paired with an MBR or a holdback of a certain portion of a shareholder’s money market fund shares. In the event of fund losses, this alternative effectively would create a “waterfall” with the NAV buffer bearing first losses, subordinated holdback shares bearing second losses, followed by non-subordinated holdback shares, and finally by the remaining shares in the fund (and then only if the loss exceeded the aggregate value of the holdback shares). This allocation of losses, in effect, would impose a “liquidity fee” on redeeming shareholders if the fund experiences a loss that exceeds the NAV buffer. The value of the holdback shares effectively provides the non-redeeming shareholders with an additional buffer cushion when the NAV buffer is exhausted.

i. Benefits of a Minimum Balance at Risk

An MBR requirement could provide some benefits to money market funds. First, it would force redeeming shareholders to pay for the cost of their liquidity during periods of severe market stress when liquidity is particularly costly. Such a requirement could create an incentive against shareholders participating in a run on a fund facing potential losses of certain sizes because shareholders will incur greater losses if they redeem. It thus may reduce the amount of less liquid securities that funds would need to sell in the secondary markets at unfavorable prices to satisfy redemptions and therefore may increase stability in the short-term financing markets.

Second, it would allocate liquidity costs to investors demanding liquidity when the fund

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516 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at section V.B.
517 See, e.g., Gordon FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 159 (“The Minimum Balance at Risk feature is a novel way to reduce MMF run risk by imposing some of the run costs on the users of MMFs.”).
itself is under severe stress. This would be accomplished primarily by making redeeming shareholders bear first losses when the fund first depletes its buffer and then the fund's value falls below its stable share price within 30 days after their redemption. Redeeming shareholders subject to the holdback are the ones whose redemptions may have contributed to fund losses if securities are sold at fire sale prices to satisfy those redemptions. If the fund sells assets to meet redemptions, the costs of doing so would be incurred while the redeeming investor is still in the fund because of the delay in redeeming his or her holdback shares. Essentially, investors would face a choice between redeeming to preserve liquidity and remaining invested in the fund to protect their principal.

Third, an MBR would provide the fund with 30 days to obtain cash to satisfy the holdback portion of a shareholder's redemption. This may give the fund time for distressed securities to recover when, for example, the market has acquired additional information about the ability of the issuer to make payment upon maturity. As of February 28, 2013, 43% of prime money market fund assets had a maturity of 30 days or less. 518 Thus, an MBR would provide time for potential losses in fund portfolios to be avoided since distressed securities could trade at a heavy discount in the market but may ultimately pay in full at maturity. This added resiliency could not only benefit the fund and its investors, but it also could reduce the contagion risk that a run on a single fund can cause when assets are correlated across the money market fund industry.

ii. Costs of a Minimum Balance at Risk

There are a number of drawbacks to an MBR requirement. It forces shareholders that redeem more than 97% of their assets to pay for any losses, if incurred, on the entire portfolio on

518 Based on Form N-MFP data, with maturity determined in the same manner as it is for purposes of computing the fund's weighted average life.
a ratable basis. Rather than simply delaying redemption requests, the contingent nature of the way losses are distributed among shareholders forces early redeeming investors to bear the losses they are trying to avoid.

As discussed in section II.B.2 above, there is a tendency for a money market fund to meet redemptions by selling assets that are the most liquid and have the smallest capital losses. Liquid assets are sold first because managers can trade at close to their non-distressed valuations—they do not reflect large liquidity discounts. Managers also tend to sell assets whose market-based values are close to or exceed amortized cost because realized capital gains and losses will be reflected in a fund’s shadow price. Assets that are highly liquid will not be sold at significant discounts to fair value. Since the liquidity discount associated with the sale of liquid assets is smaller than that for illiquid assets, shareholders can continue to immediately redeem shares at $1.00 per share under an MBR provided the fund is capable of selling liquid assets. Once a fund exhausts its supply of liquid assets, it will sell less liquid assets to meet redemption requests, possibly at a loss. If in fact, assets are sold at a loss, the stable value of the fund’s shares could be impaired, motivating shareholders to be the first to leave. Therefore, even with a NAV buffer and an MBR there continues to be an incentive to redeem in times of fund and market stress.519

The MBR, which applies to all redemptions without regard to the fund’s circumstances at the time of redemption, constantly restricts some portion of an investor’s holdings. Under the resulting continuous impairment of full liquidity, many current investors who value liquidity in money market funds may shift their investment to other short-term investments that offer higher

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519 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Dec. 17, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (“The data, analyses, surveys and other commentary in the SEC’s docket show convincingly that the MBR/capital proposal’s impact in reducing runs is speculative and unproven and in fact could and likely would precipitate runs under certain circumstances.”); Schwab FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 171 (“[I]t is not clear to us that holding back a certain percentage of a client’s funds would reduce run risk.”)
yields or fewer restrictions on redemptions. A reduction in the number of money market funds and/or the amount of money market fund assets under management as a result of any further money market fund reforms would have a greater negative impact on money market fund sponsors whose fund groups consist primarily of money market funds, as opposed to sponsors that offer a more diversified range of mutual funds or engage in other financial activities (e.g., brokerage). Given that money market funds’ largest commercial paper exposure is to issuances by financial institutions, a reduction in the demand of money market instruments may have an impact on the ability of financial institutions to issue commercial paper.

The MBR will introduce additional complexity to what to-date has been a relatively simple product for investors to understand. For example, requiring shareholders that redeem more than 97% of their balances to bear the first loss creates a cash flow waterfall that is complex and that may be difficult for retail investors to understand fully.

Implementing an MBR could involve significant operational costs. These would include costs to convert existing shares or issue new holdback and subordinated holdback shares and changes to systems that would allow recordkeepers to account for and track the MBR and allocation of unrestricted, holdback or subordinated holdback shares in shareholder accounts. We expect that these costs would vary significantly among funds depending on a variety of factors. In addition, funds subject to an MBR may have to amend or adopt new governing

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520 See supra Panel A in section III.E.

521 See, e.g., Wells Fargo FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 342 ("the MBR requirement would have the anticipated impact of driving investors and sponsors out of money market funds. We expect that the resulting contraction of assets in the money market fund industry would, in turn, have disruptive effects on the short-term money markets, decrease the supply of capital and/or raise the cost of borrowing for businesses, states, municipalities and other local governments that rely on money market funds, and jeopardize the fragile state of the economy and its long-term growth prospects.").

522 Several commenters have noted that the MBR would be confusing to retail investors. See, e.g., Fidelity FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 295; T. Rowe Price FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 290.
documents to issue different classes of shares with quite different rights: unrestricted shares, holdback shares, and subordinated holdback shares.\textsuperscript{523} The costs to amend governing documents would vary based on the jurisdiction in which the fund is organized and the amendment processes enumerated in the fund’s governing documents, including whether board or shareholder approval is necessary.\textsuperscript{524} The costs of obtaining shareholder approval, amending governing documents or changing domicile would depend on a number of factors, including the size and the number of shareholders of the fund.\textsuperscript{525}

Overall, the complexity of an MBR may be more costly for unsophisticated investors because they may not fully appreciate the implications. In addition, money market funds and their intermediaries (and money market fund shareholders that have in place cash management systems) could incur potentially significant operational costs to modify their systems to reflect a MBR requirement. We believe that an MBR coupled with a NAV buffer would turn money market funds into a more complex instrument whose valuation may become more difficult for investors to understand.

\textsuperscript{523} One commenter on the PWG Report suggested that the MBR framework may be achieved by issuing different classes of shares with conversion features triggered by shareholder activity. See Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Mar. 16, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) ("Federated March 2012 PWG Comment Letter"). Multiple class structures are common among funds offering different arrangements for the payment of distribution costs and related shareholder services. Funds have also developed the operational capacity to track and convert certain share classes to others based on the redemption activity of the shareholder. See Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, Investment Company Act Release No. 29367 (July 21, 2010) [75 FR 47064 (Aug. 4, 2010)], at section III.D.1.b.

\textsuperscript{524} See Federated Alternative 2 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 254 and Federated March 2012 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 523 (discussing certain applicable state law requirements).

\textsuperscript{525} Other factors may include the concentration of fund shares among certain shareholders, the number of objecting beneficial owners and non-objecting beneficial owners of street name shareholders, whether certain costs can be shared among funds in the same family, whether the fund employs a proxy solicitor and the services the proxy solicitor may provide, and whether the fund, in connection with sending a proxy statement to shareholders, uses the opportunity to have shareholders vote on other matters. Other matters that may be set forth in the proxy materials include the election of directors, a change in investment objectives or fundamental investment restrictions, and fund reorganization or re-domicile.
2. Alternatives in the PWG Report

a. Private Emergency Liquidity Facility

One option outlined in the PWG Report is a private emergency liquidity facility ("LF") for money market funds.\(^{526}\) One comment letter on the PWG Report proposed a structure for such a facility in some detail.\(^{527}\) Under this proposal, the LF would be organized as a state-chartered bank or trust company. Sponsors of prime money market funds would be required to provide initial capital to the LF in an amount based on their assets under management up to 4.9% of the LF’s total initial equity, but with a minimum investment amount. The LF also would charge participating funds commitment fees of 3 basis points per year on fund assets under management. Finally, at the end of its third year, the LF would issue to third parties time deposits paying a rate approximately equal to the 3-month bank CD rate. The LF would be designed to provide initially $7 billion in backup redemption liquidity to prime money market funds, $12.3 billion at the end of the first year, $30 billion at the end of five years, and $50-55 billion at the end of year 10 (these figures take into account the LF’s ability to expand its capacity by borrowing through the Federal Reserve’s discount window). The LF would be leveraged at inception, but would seek to achieve and maintain a minimum leverage ratio of 5%. Each fund would be able to obtain a maximum amount of cash from the LF. The LF would not provide credit support. It would not provide liquidity to a fund that had broken the buck or would “break the buck” after using the LF. There also would be eligibility requirements for money market fund access to the LF.

Participating funds would elect a board of directors that would oversee the LF, with  

\(^{526}\) See PWG Report, supra note 111, at 23-25.  

\(^{527}\) See ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.
representation from large, medium, and smaller money market fund complexes. The LF would have restrictions on the securities that it could purchase from funds seeking liquidity and on the LF’s investment portfolio. The LF would be able to pledge approved securities (less a haircut) to the Federal Reserve discount window. We note that the interaction with the Federal Reserve discount window (as well as the bank structure of the LF) means that the Commission does not have regulatory authority to create the LF.

An LF could lessen and internalize some of the liquidity risk of money market funds that contributes to their vulnerability to runs by acting as a purchaser of last resort if a liquidity event is triggered. It also could create efficiency gains by pooling this liquidity risk within the money market fund industry.528

Commenters on the PWG Report addressing this option generally supported the concept of the LF, stating that it would facilitate money market funds internalizing the costs of liquidity and other risks associated with their operations through the cost of participation. In addition, such a facility could reduce contagion effects by limiting the need for fire sales of money market fund assets to satisfy redemption pressures.529

However, several commenters expressed reservations regarding this reform option. For example, one commenter supported “the idea” of such a facility “in that it could provide an incremental liquidity cushion for the industry,” but noted that “it is difficult to ensure that [a liquidity facility] with finite purchasing capacity is fairly administered in a crisis..., [which] could lead to [money market funds] attempting to optimize the outcome for themselves, rather

528 The liquidity facility would function in a fashion similar to private deposit insurance for banks. For the economics of using a liquidity facility to stop runs, see Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 510.
529 See, e.g., ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Dreyfus PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Federated Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 472.
than working cooperatively to solve a systemic crisis.\textsuperscript{530} This commenter also stated that shared capital “poses the danger of increased risk-taking by industry participants who believe that they have access to a large collective pool of capital.”\textsuperscript{531} Another commenter, while “receptive to a private liquidity facility,” expressed concern that the facility itself might be vulnerable to runs if the facility raises funding through the short-term financing markets.\textsuperscript{532} This commenter also noted other challenges in designing such a facility, including governance issues and “the fact that because of its size, the liquidity facility would only be able to address the liquidity needs of a very limited number of funds and would not be able to meet the needs of the entire industry in the event of a run.”\textsuperscript{533} Another commenter expressed concerns that “the costs, infrastructure and complications associated with private liquidity facilities are not worth the minimal liquidity that would be provided.”\textsuperscript{534} Finally, another commenter echoed this concern, stating:

[a private liquidity facility] cannot possibly eliminate completely the risk of breaking the back without in effect eliminating maturity transformation, for instance through the imposition of capital and liquidity standards on the private facilities. Thus, in the case of a pervasive financial shock to asset values, [money market fund] shareholders will almost certainly view the presence of private facilities as a weak reed and widespread runs are likely to develop. In turn, government aid is likely to flow. Because shareholders will expect government aid in a pervasive financial crisis, shareholder and [money market

\textsuperscript{530} BlackRock PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.

\textsuperscript{531} Id. In the case of deposit insurance, bank capital is used to overcome the moral hazard problem of excessive risk taking. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 509; Michael C. Keeley & Frederick T. Furlong, A Reexamination of Mean-Variance Analysis of Bank Capital Regulation, 14 J. OF BANKING AND FIN. 69 (1990).

\textsuperscript{532} Wells Fargo PWG Comment Letter, supra note 475.

\textsuperscript{533} Id.

\textsuperscript{534} Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.
fund] investment decisions will be distorted. Therefore, we view emergency facilities as perhaps a valuable enhancement, but not a reliable overall solution either to the problem of runs or to the broader problem of distorted investment decisions.\footnote{Richmond Fed PWG Comment Letter, supra note 139.}

A private liquidity facility was also discussed at the 2011 Roundtable, where many participants made points and expressed concerns similar to those discussed above.\footnote{See, e.g., Roundtable Transcript, supra note 43 (Brian Reid, Investment Company Institute) (discussing the basic concept for a private liquidity facility as proposed by the Investment Company Institute and its potential advantages providing additional liquidity to money market funds when market makers were unwilling or unable to do so); (Paul Tucker, Bank of England) (discussing the potential policy issues involved in the Federal Reserve extending discount window access to such a facility); (Daniel K. Tarullo, Federal Reserve Board) (discussing the potential policy issues involved in the Federal Reserve extending discount window access to such a facility); (Jeffrey A. Goldstein, Department of Treasury) (questioning whether there were potential capacity issues with such a facility); (Sheila C. Bair, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (stating her belief that “the better approach would be to try to reduce or eliminate the systemic risk, as opposed to just kind of acknowledge it” and institutionalize a “bailout facility” in a way that would exacerbate moral hazard).}

We have considered these comments, and our staff has spent considerable time evaluating whether an LF would successfully mitigate the risk of runs in money market funds and change the economic incentives of market participants. We have determined not to pursue this option further for a number of reasons, foremost because we are concerned that a private liquidity facility would not have sufficient purchasing capacity in the event of a widespread run without access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and we do not have legal authority to grant discount window access to an LF. Access to the discount window would raise complicated policy considerations and likely would require legislation.\footnote{See, e.g., id. (Paul Tucker, Bank of England) (“As I understand it, this is a bank whose sole purpose is to stand between the Federal Reserve and the money market mutual fund industry. If I think about that as a central banker, I think ‘So, I’m lending to the money market mutual fund industry.’ What do I think about the regulation of the money market mutual fund industry? ...And the other thought I think I would have is... ‘If the money market mutual fund industry can do this, what’s to stop other parts of our economy doing this and tapping into the special ability of the central bank to create liquidity’...It’s almost to bring out the enormity of the idea that you have floated...it’s posing very big questions indeed, about who should have direct access and to the nature of the monetary economy.”)} In addition, such a facility would
not protect money market funds from capital losses triggered by credit events as the facility would purchase securities at the prevailing market price. Thus, we are concerned that such a facility without additional loss protection would not sufficiently prevent widespread runs on money market funds.

We also are concerned about the conflicts of interest inherent in any such facility given that it would be managed by a diverse money market fund industry, not all of whom may have the same interests at all times. Participating money market funds would be of different sizes and the governance arrangements would represent some fund complexes and not others. There may be conflicts relating to money market funds whose nature or portfolio makes them more or less likely to ever need to access the LF. The LF may face conflicts allocating limited liquidity resources during a crisis, and choosing which funds gain access and which do not. To be successful, an LF would need to be managed such that it sustains its credibility, particularly in a crisis, and does not distort incentives in the market to favor certain business models or types of funds.

These potential issues collectively created a concern that such a facility may not prove effective in a crisis and thus we would not be able to achieve our regulatory goals of reducing money market funds’ susceptibility to runs and the corresponding impacts on investor protection and capital formation. Combined with our lack of authority to create an LF bank with access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, these concerns ultimately have led us to not pursue this alternative.

b. Insurance

We also considered whether money market funds should be required to carry some form of public or private insurance, similar to bank accounts that carry Federal Deposit Insurance...
Corporation deposit insurance, which has played a central role in mitigating the risk of runs on banks. The Treasury’s Temporary Guarantee Program helped slow the run on money market funds in September 2008, and thus we naturally considered whether some form of insurance for money market fund shareholders might mitigate the risk of runs in money market funds and their detrimental impacts on investors and capital formation. Insurance might replace money market funds’ historical reliance on discretionary sponsor support, which has covered capital losses in money market funds in the past but, as discussed above, also contributes to these funds’ vulnerability to runs.

While a few commenters expressed some support for a system of insurance for money market funds, most commenters opposed this potential reform option. Commenters expressed concern that government insurance would create moral hazard and encourage excessive risk taking by funds. They also asserted that such insurance could distort capital


540 See, e.g., Richmond Fed PWG Comment Letter, supra note 139 (stating that insurance would be a second best solution for mitigating the risk of runs in money market funds after a floating net asset value because insurance premiums and regulation are difficult to calibrate correctly, so distortions would likely remain); Comment Letter of Paul A. Volcker (Feb. 11, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Volcker PWG Comment Letter”) (stating that money market funds wishing to retain a stable net asset value should reorganize as special purpose banks or “submit themselves to capital and supervisory requirements and FDIC-type insurance on the funds under deposit”).


542 See, e.g., American Bankers PWG Comment Letter, supra note 541; BlackRock PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Wells Fargo PWG Comment Letter, supra note 475.
flows from bank deposits or government money market funds into prime money market funds, and that this disintermediation could and likely would cause significant disruption to the banking system and the money market. For example, one commenter stated that:

"If the insurance program were partial (for example, capped at $250,000 per account), many institutional investors likely would invest in this partially insured product rather than directly in the market or in other cash pools because the insured funds would offer liquidity, portfolios that were somewhat less risky than other pools, and yields only slightly lower than alternative cash pools. Without insurance covering the full value of investors' account balances, however, there would still be an incentive for these investors to withdraw the uninsured portion of their assets from these funds during periods of severe market stress."\(^{544}\)

Commenters stated that with respect to private insurance, it has been made available in the past but the product proved unsuccessful due to its cost and in the future would be too costly.\(^{545}\) They also stated that they did not believe any private insurance coverage would have sufficient capacity.\(^{546}\)

Given these comments, combined with our staff's analysis of this option, and considering that we do not have regulatory authority to create a public insurance scheme for money market funds, we are not pursuing this option as it does not appear that it would achieve our goal, among

\(^{543}\) See, e.g., ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Wells Fargo PWG Comment Letter, supra note 475.

\(^{544}\) ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.

\(^{545}\) See, e.g., BlackRock PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Dreyfus PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Wells Fargo PWG Comment Letter, supra note 475; Winters PWG Comment Letter, supra note 541.

\(^{546}\) See, e.g., BlackRock PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Wells Fargo PWG Comment Letter, supra note 475; Winters PWG Comment Letter, supra note 541.
others, of materially reducing the contagion effects from heavy redemptions at money market funds without undue costs. We have made this determination based on money market fund insurance’s potential for creating moral hazard and encouraging excessive risk-taking by money market funds, given the difficulties and costs involved in creating effective risk-based pricing for insurance and additional regulatory structure to offset this incentive.\footnote{See, e.g., Yuk-Shee Chan et al., \textit{Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?}, 47 J. Fin. 227 (1992).} If insurance actually increases moral hazard and decreases corresponding market discipline, it may in fact increase rather than decrease money market funds’ susceptibility to runs. If the only way to counter these incentives was by imposing a very costly regulatory structure and risk-based pricing system our proposed alternatives potentially offer a better ratio of benefits to associated costs. Finally, we were concerned with the difficulty of creating private insurance at an appropriate cost and of sufficient capacity for a several trillion-dollar industry that tends to have highly correlated tail risk. All of these considerations have led us to not pursue this option further.

\textit{c. Special Purpose Bank}

We also evaluated whether money market funds should be regulated as special purpose banks. Stable net asset value money market fund shares can bear some similarity to bank deposits.\footnote{See \textit{supra} note 511 and accompanying text.} Some aspects of bank regulation could be used to mitigate some of the risks described in section II above.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} Money market funds could benefit from access to the special purpose bank’s capital, government deposit insurance and emergency liquidity facilities from the Federal Reserve on terms codified and well understood in advance, and thus with a clearer allocation of risks among market participants.

As the PWG Report noted, and as commenters reinforced, there are a number of
drawbacks to regulating money market funds as special purpose banks. While a few commenters expressed some support for this option,\textsuperscript{550} almost all commenters on the PWG Report addressing this possible reform option opposed it.\textsuperscript{551} Some commenters stated that the costs of converting money market funds to special purpose banks would likely be large relative to the costs of simply allowing more of this type of cash management activity to be absorbed into the existing banking sector.\textsuperscript{552} Others expressed concern that regulating money market funds as special purpose banks would radically change the product, make it less attractive to investors and thereby have unintended consequences potentially worse than the mitigated risk, such as leading sophisticated investors to move their funds to unregulated or offshore money market fund substitutes and thereby limiting the applicability of the current money market fund regulatory regime and creating additional systemic risk.\textsuperscript{553} For example, one of these commenters stated that transforming money market funds into special purpose banks would create homogeneity in the financial regulatory scheme by relying on the bank business model for all short-term cash investments and that “[g]iven the unprecedented difficulties the banking industry has experienced recently, it seems bizarre to propose that [money market funds] operate more like

\textsuperscript{550} See Volcker PWG Comment Letter, supra note 540 (“MMMFs that desire to offer their clients bank-like transaction services...and promises of maintaining a constant or stable net asset value (NAV), should either be required to organize themselves as special purpose banks or submit themselves to capital and supervisory requirements and FDIC-type insurance on funds under deposit.”); Winters PWG Comment Letter, supra note 541 (supporting it as the third best option, stating that “[a]s long as the federal government continues to be the only viable source of large scale back-up liquidity for MMMFs, it is intellectually dishonest to pretend that MMMFs are not the functional equivalent of deposit-taking banks. Thus, inclusion in the federal banking system is warranted.”).

\textsuperscript{551} See, e.g., BlackRock PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; Comment Letter of the Institutional Money Market Funds Association (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619).

\textsuperscript{552} See, e.g., Richmond Fed PWG Comment Letter, supra note 139; ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.

\textsuperscript{553} See, e.g., Comment Letter of the Mutual Fund Directors Forum (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619); Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.
banks, which have absorbed hundreds of billions of dollars in government loans and
handouts. Some pointed to the differences between banks and money market funds as
justifying different regulatory treatment, and expressed concern that concentrating investors’
cash management activity in the banking sector could increase systemic risk.

The potential costs involved in creating a new special purpose bank regulatory
framework to govern money market funds do not seem justified. In addition, given our view that
money market funds have some features similar to banks but other aspects quite different from
banks, applying substantial parts of the bank regulatory regime to money market funds does not
seem as well tailored to the structure of and risks involved in money market funds compared to
the reforms we are proposing in this Release. After considering our lack of regulatory authority
to transform money market funds into special purpose banks as well as the views expressed in
these comment letters and our staff’s analysis of these matters and for the reasons set forth
above, we are not pursuing a reform option of transforming money market funds into special
purpose banks.

d. Dual Systems of Money Market Funds

We evaluated options that would institute a dual system of money market funds, where
either institutional money market funds or money market funds using a stable share price would
be subject to more stringent regulation than others. As discussed in the PWG Report, money
market fund reforms could focus on providing enhanced regulation solely for money market
funds that seek to maintain a stable net asset value, rather than a floating NAV. Enhanced

554 Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473.
555 See, e.g., Fidelity Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473; ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter,
supra note 473.
556 See PWG Report, supra note 111, at 29-32.
regulations could include any of the regulatory reform options discussed above such as mandatory insurance, a private liquidity facility, or special purpose bank regulation. Money market funds that did not comply with these enhanced constraints would have a floating NAV (though they would still be subject to the other risk limiting conditions contained in rule 2a-7).

There also may be other enhanced forms of regulation or other types of dual systems. For example, an alternative formulation of this regulatory regime would apply the enhanced regulatory constraints discussed above (e.g., a private liquidity facility or insurance) only to “institutional” money market funds, and “retail” money market funds would continue to be subject to rule 2a-7 as it exists today. We note that our proposals to exempt retail and government money market funds from any floating NAV requirement and to exempt government money market funds from any fees and gates requirement in effect creates a dual system.

These dual system regulatory regimes for money market funds could provide several important benefits. They attempt to apply the enhanced regulatory constraints on those aspects of money market funds that most contribute to their susceptibility to runs—whether it is institutional investors that have shown a tendency to run or a stable net asset value created through the use of amortized cost valuation that can create a first mover advantage for those investors that redeem at the first signs of potential stress. A dual system that imposes enhanced constraints on stable net asset value money market funds would allow investors to choose their preferred mixture of stability, risk, and return.

Because insurance, special purpose banks, and the private liquidity facility generally are beyond our regulatory authority to create, these particular dual options, which would impose one of these regulatory constraints on a subset of money market funds, could not be created under our current regulatory authority. Other options, such as requiring a floating NAV or liquidity
fees and gates only for some types of money market funds, however, could be imposed under our current authority and are indeed proposed.

Each of these dual systems generally has the same advantages and disadvantages as the potential enhanced regulatory constraints that would be applied, described above. In addition, for any two-tier system of money market fund regulation to be effective in reducing the risk of contagion effects from heavy redemptions, investors would need to fully understand the difference between the two types of funds and their associated risks. If they did not, they may indiscriminately flee both types of money market funds even if only one type experiences difficulty.\footnote{For example, when The Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck in September 2008, all money market funds managed by Reserve Management Company, Inc. experienced runs, even the Reserve U.S. Government Fund, despite the fact that the Reserve U.S. Government Fund had a quite different risk profile. See Press Release, A Statement Regarding The Reserve Primary and U.S. Government Funds (Sept. 19, 2008) available at http://www.primary-yieldplus-inliquidation.com/pdf/PressReleasePrimGovt2008_0919.pdf (“The U.S. Government Fund, which had approximately $10 billion in assets under management at the opening of business on September 15, 2008, has received redemption requests this week of approximately $6 billion.”).}

A dual system approach also would allow the Commission to tailor its reforms to the particular areas of the money market fund industry that are of most concern (e.g., funds operating with a stable NAV or institutional funds or accounts). Given the difficulties, drawbacks, and limitations on our regulatory authority associated with dual systems involving a special purpose bank, private liquidity facility and insurance, we are not pursuing creating a dual system of money market fund regulation involving these enhanced regulatory constraints at this time. However, as noted above, our current proposal would to some extent create a dual system of money market funds, and we request comment on other potential dual systems that are within our regulatory authority.
E. Macroeconomic Effects of the Proposals

In this section, we analyze the macro-economic consequences of our floating NAV and liquidity fees and gates proposals, as well as some of their effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. We also examine the potential implications of these proposals on current investments in money market funds and on the short-term financing markets. The baseline for these analyses (and all of our economic analysis in this Release) is money market fund investment and the short-term financing markets, as they exist today.

Our proposals should provide a number of benefits and positive effects on competition, efficiency, and capital formation. As discussed in detail earlier in this Release, we have designed both of our proposals to improve the transparency of money market funds' risks and lessen the incentives for investors to redeem shares in times of fund or market stress. The floating NAV proposal is designed to address the incentive created today by money market funds' stable values for shareholders to redeem fund shares when the funds' market-based NAVs are below their intended stable price. That proposal is also designed to reduce the likelihood that funds would experience heavy redemptions in times of stress, by acclimatizing investors to expect small fluctuations in the fund's share price over time, which could reduce the chances that investors will redeem in the face of market stress or stress on the money market fund. However, for those funds that do not qualify for the proposed retail or government exemptions to the floating NAV, this alternative would come at the cost of removing many of the benefits to investors that are the result of a fund being able to maintain a stable share price through the rounding conventions of

558 In supra sections III.A and III.B we discuss the specific benefits and costs associated with the two alternative reform proposals, and we discuss later in this Release the specific economic analysis of other aspects of our proposals. The specific operational costs of implementing the reform proposals are discussed in each respective section.

559 See Panels A, B and C later in this section for certain recent data regarding money market fund investment and the short-term financing markets.
rule 2a-7. A floating NAV also may not deter heavy redemptions from certain types of money
market funds (e.g., prime money market funds) in times of stress if shareholders engage in a
flight to quality, liquidity or transparency.

The liquidity fees and gates alternative would preserve the benefits of the stable price per
share that shareholders currently enjoy, but it would do so at the cost of potentially reducing (or
making more costly) shareholder liquidity in certain circumstances. The liquidity fees and gates
proposal is designed to protect fund shareholders that remain invested in a fund from bearing the
liquidity costs of shareholders that exit a fund when the funds’ liquidity is under stress.

Redeeming fund shareholders receive the benefits of a fund’s liquidity, which in times of stress
may have the effect of imposing costs on the shareholders remaining in the fund. The liquidity
fees and gates proposal would address this risk. The proposal also is designed to better position
a money market fund to withstand heavy redemptions. A fund’s board would be permitted to
impose a gate when the fund is under stress, which would provide time for a panic to subside; for
the fund’s portfolio securities to mature and provide internal liquidity to meet redemptions; and
for fund managers to assess the appropriate strategy to meet redemptions. Liquidity fees also
could lessen investors’ incentives to redeem and require investors to evaluate and price their
liquidity needs. The fees and gates proposal, however, would not fully eliminate the incentive to
quickly redeem in times of stress, because redeeming shareholders would retain an economic
advantage over shareholders that remain in a fund if they redeem when the costs of liquidity are
high, but the fund has not yet imposed a fee or gate. Also, by their nature, liquidity fees and
redemption gates, if imposed, increase costs on shareholders who seek to redeem fund shares.

Both of these proposals are intended, in different ways, to stabilize funds in times of
stress. Thus, the proposals are designed to reduce the likelihood and associated costs of any
contagion effects from heavy redemptions in money market funds to other money market funds, the short-term financing markets, and other parts of the economy. Nevertheless, we recognize that the expected benefits of the proposals may be accompanied by some adverse effects on the short-term financing markets for issuers, and may affect the level of investment in money market funds that would be subject to the proposals. The magnitude of these effects, including any effects on competition, efficiency, and capital formation, would depend on the extent to which investors reallocate their investments within the money market fund industry and on the extent to which investors reallocate their investments between money market funds and alternatives outside the money market fund industry. We anticipate that the adverse effects on investment in money market funds and the short-term financing markets for debt issuers would be small if either relatively little money is reallocated, or if the alternatives to which investors reallocate their cash invest in securities similar to those previously held by the money market funds.

Conversely, the effects on investment in money market funds and the short-term financing markets would be larger if a substantial amount of money is reallocated to alternatives and those alternatives invest in securities of a different type from those previously held by money market funds.

1. **Effect on Current Investment in Money Market Funds**

The popularity of money market funds today indicates they compete favorably with other investment alternatives. As of February 28, 2013, all money market funds had approximately $2.9 trillion in assets under management while government money market funds had approximately $929 billion under management.\(^{560}\) Money market funds that self-report as retail prime money market funds held approximately $497 billion in assets under management and tax-
exempt money market funds held approximately $277 billion in assets under management. We do not know how many of these funds would qualify for our proposed retail exemption from the floating NAV requirement.\textsuperscript{561}

If we were to adopt either of the alternatives we are proposing today, current money market fund investors would likely consider the tradeoffs involved of investing in a money market fund subject to our proposals. Investors may decide to remain invested in money market funds subject to either a floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates, or they may choose to invest in a money market fund that is exempt from our proposed reforms (such as a government money market fund, or for the floating NAV proposal, a retail fund), invest directly in short-term debt instruments, hold cash in a bank deposit account, invest in one of the few alternative diversified investments products that maintains a stable value (such as certain unregistered private funds), or invest in other products that fluctuate in value, such as ultra-short bond funds.

Money market funds under either of our proposals, like money market funds today, would compete against many investment alternatives for investors’ assets. Our proposals, by increasing transparency and reducing the incentive for investors to redeem shares ahead of other investors in times of stress, could increase the attractiveness of money market funds in the long term for investors who value this aspect of our reforms, potentially offsetting the loss of some money market fund investors that may occur in the short term if we were to adopt either proposal, and enhancing competition. The proposals could also increase competition as investors become more aware of certain aspects of the industry and funds respond to meet investors’ preferences. Our proposals also could increase allocative efficiency\textsuperscript{562} by not only increasing

\textsuperscript{561} Based on iMoneyNet data as of April 16, 2013.

\textsuperscript{562} Allocative efficiency refers to investors allocating their funds to the most suitable investments on efficient terms, taking all relevant factors into account.
transparency of the underlying risks of money market fund investing, but also by making it harder for one group of investors to impose disproportionate costs on another group.\textsuperscript{563} In particular, the floating NAV proposal requires investors to bear day-to-day losses and gains, and the liquidity fees and gates proposal requires investors to bear their liquidity costs when liquidity is particularly costly. Today, money market funds’ day-to-day market-based losses and gains and any liquidity costs generally are not borne by redeeming investors because investors buy and sell money market fund shares at their stable $1.00 share price absent a break-the-buck event. In addition, as discussed in section III.F below, our proposal would require that money market fund sponsors disclose their support of funds, which also would advance investor understanding of the risk of loss in money market funds and thus may advance allocative efficiency if investors make better investment decisions as a result.

If we were to adopt reforms to money market funds, investors may withdraw some of their assets from affected money market funds. We believe that investors may withdraw more assets under the floating NAV proposal than they would under the liquidity fees and gates alternative because the floating NAV proposal may have a more significant effect on investors’ day-to-day experience with and use of money market funds than the liquidity fees and gates alternative and because many investors place great value on principal stability in a money market

\textsuperscript{563} Some commenters have noted the potential for inequitable treatment of shareholders under the stable NAV model. See, e.g., Better Markets FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67 (stating that "an investor that succeeds in redeeming early in a downward spiral may receive more than they deserve in the sense that they liquidate at $1.00 per share even though the underlying assets are actually worth less. Without a sponsor contribution or other rescue, that differential in share value is paid by the shareholders remaining in the fund, who receive less not only due to declining asset values but also because early redeemers received more than their fair share of asset value."); Comment Letter of Wisconsin Bankers Association (Feb. 15, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (stating that “[a] floating NAV has the benefits of...reducing the possibilities for transaction activity that results in non-equitable treatment across all shareholders”). See also supra section II.B.1.
fund.\textsuperscript{564} It is important to note, however, that investors that hold shares of money market funds not subject to our proposed reform alternatives (such as government money market funds, or under our floating NAV proposal, retail money market funds) may not experience outflows if we were to adopt the proposed reforms to money market funds because those funds would continue to be able to maintain a stable price under our floating NAV proposal. These exempt funds may even experience inflows of assets if investors reallocate their investments to such stable price funds.

We understand that many money market fund investors value both price stability and share liquidity.\textsuperscript{565} Because of the exemptions to the alternatives that we are proposing, under either the floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposal, investors will still be able to invest in certain money market funds that can continue to offer both price stability and unrestricted liquidity. Investors that value yield over these two features will be able to invest in prime money market funds, or if they are able to accept the daily redemption limits, retail money market funds. The key change under this proposal is that investors will have to prioritize their preference for these characteristics as they make their investment decisions because under our proposal, money market funds not subject to an exemption will, depending on the alternative adopted, suffer some

\begin{flushright}
564 See, e.g., infra note 565 and accompanying discussion.
565 Many of the comments received by FSOC stressed the importance of price stability and liquidity to many investors. See, e.g., Steve Morgan FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 290 ("The stable share price and liquid access to investors' money are key features of MMFs."); Comment Letter of James White (Jan. 11, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Stability, convenience, and liquidity—including the stable share price and ability to access 100 percent of their money—are what draw investors to MMFs."); Comment Letter of The SPARK Institute (Jan. 18, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("Money market funds with a stable NAV serve important functions in the operation and administration of defined contribution retirement plans (e.g., 401(k) plans) as convenient, cost-effective, simple, stable and liquid cash management tools."); Comment Letter of Association for Financial Professionals (Jan. 22, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("For a large number of institutional investors, the potential of principal loss would preclude investing in floating NAV MMFs"); Comment Letter of Independent Directors Council (Jan. 23, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003); Invesco FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192.
\end{flushright}
diminution in principal stability, liquidity, or yield.

For those money market funds that would be required to use floating NAVs or to consider imposing liquidity fees and gates, there may be shifts in asset allocations not only among funds in the money market fund industry but also into alternative investment vehicles. We currently do not have a basis for estimating under either reform alternative the number of investors that might reallocate assets, the magnitude of the assets that might shift, or the likely investment alternatives because we do not know how investors will weigh the tradeoffs involved in reallocating their investments to alternatives. We request comment on these issues below.

As discussed in sections III.A and III.B above, we anticipate some institutional investors would not or could not invest in a money market fund that does not offer principal stability or that has restrictions on redemptions. We do expect that more institutional investors would be unwilling to invest in a floating NAV money market fund than a money market fund that might impose a fee or gate because a floating NAV would have a persistent effect on investors’ experience in a money market fund. These investors also may be unwilling to incur the operational and other costs and burdens discussed above that would be necessary to use floating NAV money market funds. One survey concluded, among other things, that if the Commission were to require money market funds to use floating NAVs, 79% of the 203 corporate, government, and institutional investors that responded to the survey would decrease their money market fund investments or stop using the funds.\textsuperscript{566} Similarly, a 2012 liquidity survey found that up to 77% of the 391 organizations that responded to the survey would be less willing to invest

\textsuperscript{566} See ICI Apr 2012 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 62. According to this survey, if the Commission were to require money market funds to use floating NAVs: (i) 21% of the surveyed respondents would continue using funds at the same level; and (ii) 79% would either decrease use or discontinue altogether. Treasury Strategies, which conducted the survey, estimates that “money market fund assets held by corporate, government and institutional investors would see a net decrease of 61%” based on its assessment of the survey responses.
in floating NAV money market funds, and/or would reduce or eliminate their money market fund holdings if the Commission were to require the funds to use floating NAVs.\footnote{67} We also understand that some institutional investors currently are prohibited by board-approved guidelines or internal policies from investing certain assets in money market funds that do not have a stable value per share.\footnote{68} Other investors, including state and local governments, may be subject to statutory or regulatory requirements that permit them to invest certain assets only in funds that seek to maintain a stable value per share.\footnote{69} In these instances, we anticipate monies would flow out of prime money market funds and into government money market funds or alternate investment vehicles. This would result in a contraction in the prime money market fund industry, thereby reducing the type and amount of money market fund investments available to investors and potentially harming the ability of money market funds to compete in several industries.

\footnote{67} See 2012 AFP Liquidity Survey, supra note 73, at 3 (201 corporate practitioner members of the Association for Financial Professionals and 190 corporate practitioners who are not members responded to the survey). See also, e.g., ICI Feb 2012 PGW Comment Letter, supra note 259 (describing a survey conducted by Treasury Strategies Inc., a survey conducted by Harris Interactive (commissioned by T. Rowe Price), and a survey conducted by Fidelity); Dreyfus 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 350 (opposing a floating NAV and stating that, after surveying 37 of its largest institutional money market fund shareholders (representing over $60 billion in assets) regarding a floating NAV, 67% responded that their business could not continue to invest in a floating NAV product and that they would have to seek an alternative investment option); Comment Letter of National Association of State Treasurers (Dec. 21, 2010) (available in File No. 4-619) (“Nat. Assoc. of State Treasurers PGW Comment Letter”) (opposing a floating NAV because, among other reasons, “a floating NAV would push investors to less regulated or non-regulated markets”); Comment Letter of the Association for Financial Professionals (Jan. 10, 2011) (available in File No. 4-619) (“AFP Jan. 2011 PGW Comment Letter”) (reporting results of a survey of its members reflecting that four out of five organizations would likely move at least some of their assets out of money market funds if the funds were required to use floating NAVs and providing details as to the likely destinations); Comment Letter of Federated Investors, Inc. (Feb. 24, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619) (stating that many state laws would preclude trust investments in money market funds with a floating NAV); Roundtable Transcript, supra note 43 (Carol A DeNale, CVS Caremark) (“I will not invest in a floating NAV product. [...] We will pull out of money market funds, and I think that is the consensus of the treasurers that I have talked to in different meetings that I’ve been in, in group panels.”).

\footnote{68} See, e.g., ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25; Wells Fargo FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 342; Comment Letter of County Commissioners Assoc. of Ohio (Dec. 21, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003); Comment Letter of the American Bankers Association (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09); Fidelity 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 208; Comment Letter of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, L.P. (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09); Comment Letter of Treasury Strategies, Inc. (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09).

\footnote{69} \textit{Id.}
respects affected by our proposal. The net effect of this contraction would depend upon the ability of investors to replicate the pre-reform characteristics of money market funds in alternative investments.

As of February 28, 2013, institutional prime money market funds manage approximately $974 billion in assets.\textsuperscript{570} As with government and retail funds, however, we do not have a basis for estimating the number of institutions that might reallocate assets, the amount of assets that might shift, or the likely alternatives under either of our proposals, because we do not know how many of these investors face statutory or other requirements that mandate investment in a stable value product or a product that will not restrict redemptions or how these investors would weigh the tradeoffs involved in switching their investment to various alternative products. We request comment on these issues below.

Investors that are unable or unwilling to invest in a money market fund subject to our proposed reforms would have a range of investment options, each offering a different combination of price stability, risk exposure, return, investor protections, and disclosure. For example, some current money market fund investors may manage their cash themselves and, based on our understanding of institutional investor cash management practices, many of these investors would invest directly in securities similar to those held by money market funds today. If so, our proposal would not have a large negative effect on capital formation. Any desire to self-manage cash, however, would likely be tempered by the expertise required to invest in a diversified portfolio of money market securities directly and the costs of investing in those securities given the economies of scale that would be lost when each investor has to conduct credit analysis itself for each investment (in contrast to money market funds which could spread

\textsuperscript{570} Based on iMoneyNet data.
their credit analysis costs for each security across their entire shareholder base). Additionally, these investors might find it difficult to find appropriate investments that match their specific cash flows available for investment.

Shifts from reformed money market funds to other investment alternatives that could result from our proposals likely would transfer certain risks from money market funds to other markets and institutions. Commenters have cited the fact that a shift of assets from money market funds to bank deposits, for example, would increase investors’ reliance on FDIC deposit insurance and increase the size of the banking sector, possibly increasing the concentration of risk in banks. As discussed in the RSFI Study, individual and business holdings in checking deposits and currency are large and have significantly increased in recent years relative to their holdings of money market fund shares. The 2012 AFP Liquidity Survey of corporate treasurers indicates that bank deposits accounted for 51% of the surveyed organizations’ short-term investments in 2012, which is up from 25% in 2008. Money market funds accounted for 19% of these organizations’ short-term investments in 2012, down from 30% just a year earlier, and down from almost 40% in 2008. This shift was likely motivated by the availability of unlimited FDIC insurance on non-interest bearing accounts between the end of 2010 and January

571 See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Jan. 23, 2013 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 248 (“Quite simply, it is more efficient and economical to pay the management fee for a MMMF than to hire the internal staff to manage the investment of cash.”).

572 See, e.g., Angel FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 60 (stating that “[m]any of the proposed reforms would seriously reduce the attractiveness of MMMFs,” which “could increase, not decrease, systemic risk as assets move to too-big-to-fail banks.”); Comment Letter of Jonathan Macey (Nov. 27, 2012) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (stating that a “reduced MMF industry may lead to the flow of large amounts of cash into [the banking system], especially through the largest banks, and increase pressure on the FDIC.”); Federated Investors Alternative 1 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 161 (“A floating NAV would accelerate the flow of assets to “Too Big to Fail” banks, further concentrating risk in that sector.”).

573 See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at figure 18.

574 See 2012 AFP Liquidity Survey, supra note 73.

575 See id., 2008 AFP Liquidity Survey, supra note 73.
2013. A further shift in assets from money market funds to bank deposits would increase this concentration.

As discussed in the RSFI Study, there are a range of investment alternatives that currently compete with money market funds. If we adopt either of our proposals, investors could choose from among at least the following alternatives: money market funds that are exempt from the proposed reforms; under the liquidity fees and gates proposal, money market funds that invest only in weekly liquid assets; bank deposit accounts; bank certificates of deposit; bank collective trust funds; local government investment pools ("LGIPs"); U.S. private funds; offshore money market funds; short-term investment funds ("STIFs"); separately managed accounts; ultra-short bond funds; short-duration exchange-traded funds; and direct investments in money market instruments. Each of these choices involves different tradeoffs, and money market fund investors that are unwilling or unable to invest in a money market fund under either of our proposals would need to analyze the various tradeoffs associated with each alternative.

The following table, taken from the RSFI Study, outlines the principal features of various cash alternatives to money market funds that exist today.

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577 See, e.g., ICI Feb 2012 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 259; Comment Letter of the Association for Financial Professionals et al. (Apr. 4, 2012) (available in File No. 4-619).
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
<th>Investment Risks</th>
<th>Redemption Restrictions</th>
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<th>Regulated</th>
<th>Restrictions on Investor Base</th>
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<td>Stable</td>
<td>Below benchmark up to depository insurance (&quot;DI&quot;) limit; above benchmark above DI limit</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Comparable to benchmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Floating NAV</td>
<td>Above benchmark</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>By contract</td>
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<td>Not stable</td>
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<td>Stable</td>
<td>Above benchmark</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Local government investment pools (&quot;LGIPs&quot;)</td>
<td>Stable (generally)</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Local government and public entities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-duration ETFs</td>
<td>Floating NAV; Market price(^o)</td>
<td>Above benchmark</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Above benchmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separately managed accounts (including wrap accounts)</td>
<td>Not stable</td>
<td>Above benchmark</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Above benchmark</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Investment minimum(^f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct investment in MMF instruments</td>
<td>Not stable</td>
<td>Comparable to benchmark but may vary depending on investment mix(^q)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Comparable to benchmark but may vary depending on investment mix</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some(^c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) For purposes of this table, investment risks include exposure to interest rate and credit risks. The column also indicates the general level of investment risk for the product compared with the baseline of prime money market funds and is generally a premium above the risk-free or Treasury rate.

\(^b\) The table entries reflect average yields in a normal interest rate environment. Certain cash management products, such as certificates of deposits ("CDs") and demand deposits, may be able to offer rates above the baseline in a low interest rate environment.

\(^c\) The current DI limit is $250,000 per owner for interest-bearing accounts. See Deposit Insurance Summary, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), available at http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis/.

\(^d\) Time deposits, or CDs, are subject to minimum early withdrawal penalties if funds are withdrawn within six days of the date of deposit or within six days of the immediately preceding partial withdrawal. See 12 CFR 204.2(c)(1)(i). Many CDs are also subject to early withdrawal penalties if withdrawn before maturity, although market forces, rather than federal regulation, impose such penalties. CDs generally have specific fixed terms (e.g., one-, three-, or six-month terms), although some banks offer customized CDs (e.g., with terms of seven days).

\(^f\) The vast majority of money market fund assets are held in U.S. and European money market funds. See Consultation Report of the IOSCO Standing Committee 5 (Apr. 27, 2012) ("IOSCO SC5 Report"), at App. B, §§ 2.1 - 2.36 (in 2011, of the assets invested in money market funds in IOSCO countries, approximately 61% were invested in U.S. money market funds and 32% were invested in European money market funds). Consequently, dollar-denominated European money market funds may provide a limited offshore money market fund alternative to U.S. money market funds. Most European stable value money market funds are a member of the Institutional Money Market Funds Association ("IMMFA"). According to IMMFA, as of March 1, 2013, there were approximately $236 billion U.S. dollar-denominated IMMFA money market funds. See www.immfa.org (this figure excludes accumulating NAV U.S. dollar-denominated money market funds). Like U.S. money market funds, European short-term money market funds must have a dollar-weighted average maturity of no more than 60 days and a dollar-weighted average life maturity of no more than 120 days, and their portfolio securities must hold one of the two highest short-term credit ratings and have a maturity of no more than 397 days. However, unlike U.S. money market funds, European short-term money market funds may either have a floating or fixed NAV. Compare Common Definition of European Money Market Funds (Ref. CESR/10-049) with rule 2a-7.

\(^f\) Most European money market funds are subject to legislation governing Undertakings for Collective Investment
in Transferable Securities ("UCITS"), which also covers other collective investments. See, e.g., UCITS IV Directive, Article 84 (permitting a UCITS to, in accordance with applicable national law and its instruments of incorporation, temporarily suspend redemption of its units); Articles L. 214-19 and L. 214-30 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (providing that under exceptional circumstances and if the interests of the UCITS units holders so demand, UCITs may temporarily suspend redemptions).

Section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act requires that any non-U.S. investment company that wishes to register as an investment company in order to publicly offer its securities in the U.S. must first obtain an order from the SEC. To issue such an order, the SEC must find that "by reason of special circumstances or arrangements, it is both legally and practically feasible to enforce the provisions of [the Act against the non-U.S. fund,] and that the issuance of [the] order is otherwise consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors." No European money market fund has received such an order. European money market funds could be offered to U.S. investors privately on a very limited basis subject to certain exclusions from investment company regulation under the Investment Company Act and certain exemptions from registration under the Securities Act. U.S. investors purchasing non-U.S. funds in private offerings, however, may be subject to potentially significant adverse tax implications. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1986 §§ 1291 through 1297. Moreover, as a practical matter, and in view of the severe consequences of violating the Securities Act registration and offering requirements, most European money market funds currently prohibit investment by U.S. Persons.

European money market funds may have a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity of up to six months and a dollar-weighted average life maturity of up to 12 months that are significantly greater than are permitted for U.S. money market funds. Compare Common Definition of European Money Market Funds (Ref. CESR/10-049) with rule 2a-7.

Private funds generally rely on one of two exclusions from investment company regulation by the Commission. Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act, in general, excludes from the definition of "investment company" funds whose shares are beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons where the issuer does not make or propose to make a public offering. Section 3(c) (7) of the Act places no limit on the number of holders of securities, as long as each is a "qualified purchaser" (as that term is defined in section 2(a)(51) of the Act) when the securities are acquired and the issuer does not make or propose to make a public offering. Most retail investors would not fall within the definition of "qualified purchaser." Moreover, such private funds also generally rely on the private offering exemption in section 4(2) of the Securities Act or Securities Act rule 506 to avoid the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. Rule 506 establishes "safe harbor" criteria to meet the private offering exemption. The provision most often relied upon by private funds under rule 506 exempts offerings made exclusively to "accredited investors" (as that term is defined in rule 501(a) under the Securities Act). Most retail investors would not fall within the definition of "accredited investor." Offshore private funds also generally rely on one of the two non-exclusive safe harbors of Regulation S, an issuer safe harbor and an offshore resale safe harbor. If one of the two is satisfied, an offshore private fund will not have to register the offer and sale of its securities under the Securities Act. Specifically, rules 903(a) and 904(a) of Regulation S provide that offers and sales must be made in "offshore transactions" and rule 902(b) provides that an offer or sale is made in an "offshore transaction" if, among other conditions, the offer is not made to a person in the United States. Regulation S is not available to offers and sales of securities issued by investment companies required to be registered, but not registered, under the Investment Company Act. See Regulation S Preliminary Notes 3 and 4.

Collective investment funds include collective trust funds and common trust funds managed by banks or their trust departments, both of which are a subset of short-term investment funds. For purposes of this table, short-term investment funds are separately addressed.

Collective trust funds are generally limited to tax-qualified plans and government plans, while common trust funds are generally limited to tax-qualified personal trusts and estates and trusts established by institutions.

STIFs are generally regulated by 12 CFR 9.18. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency recently reformed the rules governing STIFs subject to their jurisdiction to impose similar requirements to those governing money
market funds. See Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Treasury, Short-Term Investment Funds [77 FR 61229 (Oct. 9, 2012)].

Regarding all items in this row of the table, LGIPs generally are structured to meet a particular investment objective. In most cases, they are designed to serve as short-term investments for funds that may be needed by participants on a day-to-day or near-term basis. These local government investment pools tend to emulate typical money market mutual funds in many respects, particularly by maintaining a stable net asset value of $1.00 through investments in short-term securities. A few local government investment pools are designed to provide the potential for greater returns through investment in longer-term securities for participants’ funds that may not be needed on a near-term basis. The value of shares in these local government investment pools fluctuates depending upon the value of the underlying investments. Local government investment pools limit the nature of underlying investments to those in which its participants are permitted to invest under applicable state law. See http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/About-Municipal-Securities/Local-Government-Investment-Pools.aspx. Investors in local government investment pools may include counties, cities, public schools, and similar public entities. See, e.g., The South Carolina Local Government Investment Pool Participant Procedures Manual, available at http://www.treasurer.sc.gov/Investments/The%20South%20Carolina%20Local%20Government%20Investment%20Pool%20Participant%20Procedures%20Manual.pdf.

Although the performance of an exchange traded fund ("ETF") is measured by its NAV, the price of an ETF for most shareholders is not determined solely by its NAV, but by buyers and sellers on the open market, who may take into account the ETF’s NAV as well as other factors.

Many separately managed accounts have investment minimums of $100,000 or more.

Depending on the nature and scope of their investments, these investors may also face risks stemming from a lack of portfolio diversification.

Some money market fund instruments are only sold in large denominations or are only available to qualified institutional buyers. See generally rule 144A under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.144A(7)(a)(1)).

If we adopt the floating NAV proposal, investors that value principal stability would likely consider shifting investments to government money market funds (or retail money market funds), which would be permitted to continue to maintain stable prices under that proposal.

Similarly, if we adopt the alternative fees and gates proposal, investors that are unwilling to invest in a money market fund that might impose a liquidity fee or gate when liquidity is particularly costly might shift their investments to government money market funds. Investors that shifted their assets from prime money market funds to government money market funds would likely sacrifice yield under both proposals, but they would maintain the principal stability and liquidity of their assets. Investors in exempt retail money market funds would not have to face the same tradeoff. Alternatively, money market fund investors could reallocate assets to various bank products such as demand deposits or short-maturity certificates of deposit. FDIC
insurance would provide principal stability and liquidity irrespective of market conditions for
bank accounts whose deposits are within the insurance limits.

Today, interest-bearing accounts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts at
depository institutions are insured up to $250,000. Accordingly, institutions would be deterred
from moving their investments from money market funds to banks because their assets would
probably be above the current depository insurance limits which would expose them to
substantial counterparty risk. Nevertheless, these investors could gain full insurance coverage
if they are willing and able to break their cash holdings into sufficiently small pieces and spread
them across enough banks.

Investors in reformed money market funds that value principal stability would find most
other investment alternatives unattractive, including floating value enhanced cash funds, ultra-
short bond funds, short-duration ETFs, and collective investment funds. These alternatives
typically do not offer principal stability. These investments, however, might be attractive to
investors that value yield over principal stability and the lowest investment risk. To our
knowledge, none of these alternative investment products (except potentially enhanced cash
funds) may restrict redemptions in times of stress without obtaining relief from regulatory
restrictions.

578 See, e.g., Comment Letter of Crawford and Company (Jan. 14, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-
0003) (“Bank demand deposits...lack the diversification of MMFs and carry inherent counterparty risk.”);
ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473 (“The Report suggests that requiring money market
funds to float their NAVs could encourage investors to shift their liquid balances to bank deposits. We
believe that this effect is overstated, particularly for institutional investors. Corporate cash managers and
other institutional investors would not view an undiversified holding in an uninsured (or underinsured)
bank account as having the same risk profile as an investment in a diversified short-term money market
fund. Such investors would continue to seek out diversified investment pools, which may or may not
include bank time deposits.”).

579 Certain third party service providers offer such services. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper and Jessica Silver-
One practical constraint for many money market fund investors is that they may be precluded from investing in certain alternatives, such as STIFs, offshore money market funds, LGIPs, separately managed accounts, and direct investments in money market instruments, due to significant restrictions on participation. For example, STIFs are only available to accounts for personal trusts, estates, and employee benefit plans that are exempt from taxation under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. STIFs subject to regulation by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency also are subject to less stringent regulatory restrictions than rule 2a-7 imposes, and STIFs under the jurisdiction of other banking regulators may be subject to no restrictions at all equivalent to rule 2a-7. Accordingly, these funds pose greater risk than money market funds and thus may not be attractive alternatives to investors that highly value principal stability.

Offshore money market funds, which are investment pools domiciled and authorized outside the United States, can only sell shares to U.S. investors in private offerings. Few offshore money market funds offer their shares to U.S. investors in part because doing so could create adverse tax consequences. In addition, European money market funds can take on more risk than U.S. money market funds as they are not currently subject to regulatory restrictions on their credit quality, liquidity, maturity, and diversification as stringent as those imposed under rule 2a-7, among other differences in regulation.

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580 See Testimony of Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO of the Investment Company Institute, before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, on “Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms,” June 21, 2012.

581 For a discussion of the regulation of STIFs by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), see supra Table 2, note M. The OCC’s rule 9.18 governs STIFs managed by national banks and federal savings associations. Other types of banks may or may not follow the requirements of OCC rule 9.18, depending, for example, on state law requirements and federal tax laws. See Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Treasury, Short-Term Investment Funds, at n.6 and accompanying text [77 FR 61229 (Oct. 9, 2012)].

582 See supra this section, Table 2, explanatory notes G and I.

583 For a discussion of the regulation of European money market funds, see supra Table 2, notes E and H;
Some current money market fund investors may have self-imposed restrictions or fiduciary duties that limit the risks they can assume or that preclude them from investing in certain alternatives. They might be prohibited from investing in, for example, enhanced cash funds that are privately offered to institutions, wealthy clients, and certain types of trusts due to greater investment risk, limitations on investor base, or the lack of disclosure and legal protections of the type afforded them by U.S. securities regulations.\textsuperscript{584} Likewise, money market fund investors that can only invest in SEC-registered investment vehicles could not invest in LGIPs, which are not registered with the SEC (as states and local state agencies are excluded from regulation under the Investment Company Act). Many unregistered and offshore alternatives to money market funds—unlike registered money market funds in the United States today—are not prohibited from imposing gates or suspending redemptions.\textsuperscript{585} Other investment alternatives, such as bank CDs, also impose redemption restrictions. Investors placing a high value on liquidity would likely find the potential imposition of these restrictions unacceptable and thus not invest in them.

Both retail and institutional investors’ assessments of money market funds as reformed under our proposals and their attractiveness relative to alternatives may be influenced by investors’ views on the degree to which funds’ NAVs will change from day to day under our floating NAV proposal or the frequency with which fees and gates will be imposed under our liquidity fees and gates proposal. For example, managers of floating NAV funds could invest a

\textsuperscript{584} Common Definition of European Money Market Funds (Ref. CESR/10-049).

\textsuperscript{585} According to the 2012 AFP Liquidity Survey, supra note 73, only 21\% of respondents stated that enhanced cash funds were permissible investment vehicles under the organization’s short-term investment policy. In contrast, 44\% stated that prime money market funds were a permissible investment and 56\% stated that Treasury money market funds were a permissible investment.

\textsuperscript{585} See, e.g., supra this section, Table 2, explanatory note F.
large percentage of their holdings in very short-term or Treasury securities to minimize fluctuations in the funds' NAVs. Additionally, under our liquidity fees and gates proposal, we expect that funds would attempt to manage their liquidity levels in order to avoid crossing the threshold for applying liquidity fees or gates. One possible effect of each of these actions may be to lower the expected yield of the fund. Thus, we believe that, under our proposals, fund managers would be incentivized to mitigate the potential direct costs of the proposals for investors, and we further believe that they would be successful in so doing in all but the most extreme circumstances, but that this mitigation may come at a cost to fund yield and profitability as managers shift to shorter dated or more liquid securities.

Investors' demand for stability in the value of the money market fund investment could provide an incentive for sponsors to support their money market funds in the event a particular portfolio security would negatively affect the NAV of the fund (i.e., to prevent a fund's NAV from declining below a value the fund seeks to maintain under either our floating NAV proposal or our liquidity fees and gates proposal). Under our floating NAV proposal, sponsor support could permit prime money market funds (or other non-exempt money market funds) to continue to maintain a stable price. Under our liquidity fees and gates proposal, a sponsor could prevent the money market fund's weekly liquid assets from falling below the 15% threshold for applying liquidity fees and gates by giving the fund cash (for example, the sponsor could lift out some of the fund's non-weekly liquid assets or the sponsor could directly purchase fund shares) to invest in weekly liquid assets. We are proposing a number of new disclosure requirements regarding sponsor support to help shareholders understand whether a fund's stable price or liquidity was the result of careful portfolio management or sponsor support. Among other things, money market funds would be required to provide real-time notifications to both investors and the
Commission of new instances of sponsor support, a description of the nature of support, and the date and amount of support provided.  

As this analysis reflects, the economic implications of our floating NAV and liquidity fees and gates proposals depend on investors’ preferences, and the attractiveness of investment alternatives. For these and the other reasons discussed below, we believe that the survey data submitted by commenters reflecting that certain investors expect to reduce or eliminate their money market fund investments under the floating NAV alternative may not definitively indicate how investors might actually behave.

None of the surveys discussed above considered the exemptions we are proposing that would permit both government money market funds (under both proposals) and retail money market funds (under the floating NAV proposal) to continue to maintain a stable price without restrictions. In addition, none of the surveys addressed how investors would respond to our specific liquidity fees and gates proposal. Finally, the surveys did not consider how available alternatives to floating NAV money market funds might satisfy money market fund investors’ expressed desires for stable, liquid, and safe investments. Indeed, some commenters have suggested that the mass exodus from money market funds as a result of further reforms is unlikely and that money market fund investors may not necessarily seek out investment

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586 See infra section III.G; proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) Form N-CR, Part C (Provision of Financial Support to Fund).

587 See, e.g., Better Markets FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67 (in response to industry survey data reflecting intolerance for the floating NAV, stating that “it is difficult to predict the level of contraction that would actually result from instituting a floating NAV. […] The move to a floating NAV does not alter the fundamental attributes of MMFs with respect to the type, quality, and liquidity of the investments in the fund. […] It is therefore unrealistic to think that MMFs…will become extinct solely as a result of a move to a more accurate and transparent valuation methodology.”); Winters FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 190 (“[T]he feared migration to unregulated funds has not been quantified and is probably overstated.”); U.S. Chamber Jan. 23, 2013 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 248 (“No alternatives with the same multiple benefits are available to replace money market mutual funds.”).

588 See supra notes 566 and 567, and infra note 803 and accompanying text.
alternatives. Some alternatives to money market funds, commenters explain, would carry greater risks than the effect of our proposals on money market funds, would not be able to accommodate a sizeable portion of money market fund assets, or both. We also understand that at least one money market fund sponsor converted its non-U.S. stable value money market funds to funds with floating NAVs and found that its concern in advance of the conversion that the funds' mostly retail investors would redeem and reject the floating NAV funds proved to be unjustified.

We request comment on what effects our floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposals would have on current money market fund investments.

• Do commenters believe that the likely effect of either our floating NAV proposal or our liquidity fees and gates proposal would be to cause some investors to shift their money market fund investments to alternative products and thus reduce the amount of money market fund assets under management? If so, to what extent and why? To what extent would these shifts vary depending on whether the

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589 See, e.g., Winters FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 190 (stating that, with respect to the feared migration to unregulated funds, "the capacity for existing unregulated funds to take inflows is relatively small and the operators of such funds may not welcome a flood of hot money with riskless expectations."); ICI Jan 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 473 ("The Report suggests that requiring money market funds to float their NAVs could encourage investors to shift their liquid balances to bank deposits. We believe that this effect is overstated, particularly for institutional investors. Corporate cash managers and other institutional investors would not view an undiversified holding in an uninsured (or underinsured) bank account as having the same risk profile as an investment in a diversified short-term money market fund. Such investors would continue to seek out diversified investment pools, which may or may not include bank time deposits.").

590 See, e.g., Thrivent FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 396 ("Arguments for massive movements into vehicles such as cash enhanced funds, offshore money market funds and the like seem to assume that investors will behave irrationally. There would be no logical reason to move from highly regulated money market funds with a history of maintaining a close proximity to $1.00 per share net asset value to cash enhanced funds, which are much less regulated and likely to have a much more widely fluctuating NAV, nor to offshore money funds which have materially different guidelines, nor to stable value vehicles, the growth of which is limited by available supply of insured product with commensurate credit ratings.").

591 UBS IOSCO Comment Letter, supra note 357.
investor was retail or institutional and why?

• Would either of our proposals result in any reduction in the number of money
  market funds and/or consolidation of the money market industry? How many
  funds and what types of money market funds would leave the industry? What
  would be the effect on assets under management of different types of money
  market funds if we adopt either our floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates
  proposal?

• To what extent under each alternative would retail and institutional money market
  fund investors shift to investment alternatives, including managing their cash
  themselves?

• Would certain investment alternatives that have significant restrictions on their
  investor base be unavailable for current money market fund investors? If so,
  which alternatives and to what extent?

• Do commenters agree with our analysis of the likelihood that certain shareholders
  would seek out particular investment alternatives in the event we adopted either of
  our floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposals? For example, would
  institutional investors be unlikely to shift assets to bank deposits (because of
  depository insurance limits) or local government investment pools, short-term
  investment funds, or offshore money market funds (because of the significant
  investment restrictions)? Do commenters agree with our analysis with respect to
  some or all of these alternatives? Why or why not?

• Are there aspects of any investment alternatives other than operational costs
  discussed in sections III.A.7 and III.B.6 above or the factors we have identified in
this section that would affect whether money market fund investors would be likely to use other investment alternatives in lieu of money market funds under either of our proposals? We request that commenters differentiate between short-term effects that would occur as the industry transitions to one in which money market funds use floating NAVs or liquidity fees and gates and the long-term effects that would persist thereafter.

- Under each of the two proposals, what fraction of prime money market fund assets might be moved to government money market funds, retail funds, or to other alternatives (and to which alternatives)? How would these answers differ for retail investors and institutional investors?

- What would be the net effect of our proposal on competition in the money market fund industry?

As noted above, we understand that some institutional investors may be prohibited by board-approved guidelines or internal policies from investing certain assets in money market funds unless they have a stable value per share or do not have redemption restrictions, and we understand that other investors, including state and local governments, may be subject to statutory or regulatory requirements that permit them to invest certain assets only in funds that seek to maintain a stable value per share or that do not have any redemption restrictions.

- How would these guidelines and other constraints affect investors’ use of floating NAV money market funds or those that could impose fees or gates?

- Could institutional investors change their guidelines or policies to invest in either floating NAV money market funds or funds that could impose fees or gates, if appropriate? If not, why not? If so, what costs might institutional investors incur
to change these guidelines and policies?

- Do the guidelines or statutory or regulatory constraints precluding investment in floating NAV money market funds permit investments in investment products that can fluctuate in value, such as direct investments in money market instruments or Treasury securities?

2. **Effect on Current Issuers and the Short-Term Financing Markets**

Although we currently do not have estimates of the amount of assets money market fund investors might migrate to investment alternatives, we recognize that shifts from money market funds into other choices could affect issuers of short-term debt securities and the short-term financing markets. The effects of these shifts, including any effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation, would depend on the size of reallocations to investment alternatives and the nature of the alternatives, including whether the alternatives invest in the short-term financing markets or otherwise provide similar credit. We discuss these effects in detail and seek comment on them, including the effects of the proposal on the commercial paper markets and municipal financing.

The extent to which money market fund investors might choose to reallocate their assets to investment alternatives as a result of money market fund reforms would likely drive the effect on issuers and the short-term financing markets. As discussed in the RSFI Study, prime money market funds managed approximately $1.7 trillion as of March 31, 2012, holding approximately 57% of the total assets of all registered money market funds. The chart below provides information about prime (and other) money market funds as of December 31, 2012. Even a modest shift could represent a sizeable increase in other investments.
# Holdings of Money Market Funds

## Panel A. MMF Holdings in SB, December 31, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Treasury Debt</th>
<th>Treasury Repo</th>
<th>Govmt Agency Debt</th>
<th>Govmt Agency Repo</th>
<th>VRDNs</th>
<th>Other Municipal Debt</th>
<th>Financi al Co CP</th>
<th>A BCP</th>
<th>Non-Financi al Co CP</th>
<th>CDs</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>143.39</td>
<td>53.46</td>
<td>155.90</td>
<td>143.92</td>
<td>55.33</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>221.64</td>
<td>121.98</td>
<td>77.13</td>
<td>524.14</td>
<td>250.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>303.54</td>
<td>118.56</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>63.38</td>
<td>41.81</td>
<td>251.26</td>
<td>149.06</td>
<td>220.43</td>
<td>60.50</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>10.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All MMF</strong></td>
<td><strong>510.31</strong></td>
<td><strong>213.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>407.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>294.36</strong></td>
<td><strong>275.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>222.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>124.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.76</strong></td>
<td><strong>524.86</strong></td>
<td><strong>261.33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Panel B. MMF Holdings as Percentage of Total Amortized Cost of MMFs by Type of Fund, December 31, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Treasury Debt</th>
<th>Treasury Repo</th>
<th>Govmt Agency Debt</th>
<th>Govmt Agency Repo</th>
<th>VRDNs</th>
<th>Other Municipal Debt</th>
<th>Financi al Co CP</th>
<th>A BCP</th>
<th>Non-Financi al Co CP</th>
<th>CDs</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>8.18%</td>
<td>3.05%</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>8.21%</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>12.65%</td>
<td>6.96%</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>29.91%</td>
<td>14.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>71.67%</td>
<td>27.99%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.85%</td>
<td>5.18%</td>
<td>31.11%</td>
<td>18.45%</td>
<td>27.29%</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All MMF</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.11%</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.17%</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.65%</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.87%</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.24%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.17%</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.45%</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.19%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.81%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.59%</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.76%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Panel C. MMF Holdings as Percentage of Amounts Outstanding, December 31, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Treas Debt + Repos) % of Govmt Agency Debt as % of (VRDN+ Other Muni as % of CP) as</th>
<th>(VRDN+ Muni as % of CP) as</th>
<th>Non-Fincl Co CP as</th>
<th>CDs as % of Savings and Time</th>
<th>CDs as % of Savings and Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>8.82%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>18.66%</td>
<td>25.95%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>5.31%</td>
<td>5.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All MMF</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.37%</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.52%</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.40%</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.30%</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.42%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data on money market fund holdings is derived from Form N-MFP as of December 31, 2012. Data on outstanding Treasury debt, government agency debt, certificates of deposit and municipal debt comes from the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S. for Q4, 2012. Data on commercial paper (not seasonally adjusted) is derived from the Federal Reserve Board's Commercial Paper release for December 2012. VRDNs are Variable Rate Demand Notes; Fnc1 Co CP is Financial Company Commercial Paper; and ABCP is Asset-Backed Commercial Paper.

Because prime money market funds' holdings are large and their investment strategies differ from some investment alternatives, a shift by investors from prime money market funds to investment alternatives could affect the markets for short-term securities. The magnitude of the effect will depend on not only the size of the shift but also the extent to which there are portfolio investment differences between prime money market funds and the chosen investment alternatives. If, for example, investors in prime money market funds were to choose to manage
their cash directly rather than invest in alternative cash management products, they might invest in securities that are similar to those currently held by prime funds. In this case, the effects on issuers and the short-term financing markets would likely be minimal.592

If, however, capital flowed from money market funds, which traditionally have been large suppliers of short-term capital, to bank deposits, which tend to fund longer-term lending and capital investments, issuers and the short-term financing markets may be affected to a greater extent. Similarly, if capital flowed from prime money market funds to government money market funds because government money market funds are exempt from further reforms, issuers that primarily issue to prime funds (and thus the short-term financing markets) would be affected. To put these potential shifts in context, on December 31, 2012, prime money market funds held approximately 46% of financial-company commercial paper outstanding and approximately 9% of Treasury bills outstanding, whereas Treasury money market funds held approximately 19% of Treasury bills outstanding but no financial company commercial paper.593 A shift, therefore, from prime money market funds to Treasury money market funds could decrease demand for commercial paper and adversely affect financial commercial-paper issuers (in terms of the rate they must offer on their short-term debt securities), and could increase demand (thus lowering borrowing costs) in the market for government securities.

Historically, money market funds have been a significant source of financing for issuers of commercial paper, especially financial commercial paper, and for issuers of short-term municipal debt.594 A shift by investors from prime money market funds to investment

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592 The preference for this alternative, however, may be tempered by the cost to investors of managing cash on their own. See, e.g., supra note 571 and accompanying text.

593 See supra Panel C.

594 Based on Form N-MFP data, non-financial company commercial paper, which includes corporate and non-
alternatives could cause a decline in demand for financial commercial paper and municipal debt, reducing these firms’ and municipalities’ access to capital from money market funds and potentially creating shortages of short-term financing for such firms and municipalities.\(^{595}\) If, however, money market fund investors shift capital to investment alternatives that demand the same assets as prime money market funds, the net effect on the short-term financing markets would be small.

As discussed in the RSFI Study, the 2008-2012 increase in bank deposits coupled with the contraction of the money market funds presents an opportunity to examine how capital formation can be affected by a reallocation of capital among different funding sources.

According to Federal Reserve Board flow of funds data, money market funds’ investments in commercial paper declined by 45% or $277.7 billion from the end of 2008 to the end of 2012. Contemporaneously, funding corporations reduced their holdings of commercial paper by 99% or $357.7 billion.\(^{596}\) The end result was a contraction of more than 40% or $647.5 billion in the financial business commercial paper, is a small fraction of overall money market holdings. In addition, commercial paper financing by non-financial businesses is a small portion (one percent) of their overall credit market instruments. According to Federal Reserve Board flow of funds data, as of December 31, 2012 non-financial company commercial paper totaled $130.5 billion compared with $12,694.2 billion of total credit market instruments outstanding for these entities. As such, we do not anticipate a significant effect on the market for non-financial corporate fund raising. Federal Reserve Board flow of funds data is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf.

\(^{595}\) See, e.g., Comment Letter of Associated Oregon Industries (Jan. 18, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (stating that if the proposed reforms “drive investors out of money market funds, the flow of short-term capital to businesses will be significantly disrupted.”); U.S. Chamber Jan. 23, 2013 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 248 (stating that “any changes [that make MMFs] a less attractive investment will impact the overall costs for issuers in the commercial paper market resulting from a reduced demand in commercial paper.”); Comment Letter of N.J. Municipal League (Jan. 23, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (stating that “money market funds hold more than half of the short-term debt that finances state and municipal governments for public projects,” which could force local governments to “limit projects and staffing, spend more on financing... or increase taxes” if such financing was no longer available.); Comment Letter of Government Finance Officers Association, et al. (Feb. 13, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) (stating that with respect to FSOC’s floating NAV proposal, “changing the fundamental feature of MMMFs... would dampen investor demand for municipal securities and therefore could deprive state and local governments and other borrowers of much-needed capital.”).

\(^{596}\) The Federal Reserve flow of funds data defines funding corporations as “funding subsidiaries, custodial
amount of commercial paper outstanding. Analysis of Form N-MFP data from November 2010 through March 2013 indicates that financial company commercial paper and asset-backed commercial paper comprise most of money market funds’ commercial paper holdings.\textsuperscript{597}

Although the decline in funds’ commercial paper holdings was large, it is important to place commercial paper borrowing by financial institutions into perspective by considering its size compared with other funding sources. As with non-financial businesses, financial company commercial paper is a small fraction (3.2\%) of all credit market instruments.\textsuperscript{598} We have also witnessed the ability of issuers, especially financial institutions, to adjust to changes in markets. Financial institutions, for example, dramatically reduced their use of commercial paper from $1,125.8 billion at the end of 2008 to $449.2 billion at the end of 2012 after regulators encouraged them to curtail their reliance on short-term wholesale financing.\textsuperscript{599} As such, we believe that financial institutions, as well as other firms, would be able to identify over time alternate short-term financing sources if the amount of capital available for financial commercial paper declined in response to money market fund rule changes. Alternatively, commercial paper accounts for reinvested collateral of securities lending operations, Federal Reserve lending facilities, and funds associated with the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP).”

\textsuperscript{597} In addition, according to the RSFI Study, supra note 21, “as of March 31, 2012, money market funds held $1.4 trillion in Treasury debt, Treasury repo, Government agency debt, and Government agency repo as its largest sector exposure, followed by $659 billion in financial company commercial paper and CDs, its next largest sector exposure.”

\textsuperscript{598} According to the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data as of December 31, 2012, commercial paper outstanding was $449.2 billion compared with $13,852.2 billion of total credit market instruments outstanding for financial institutions.

issuers may have to offer higher yields in order to attract alternate investors, potentially hampering capital formation for issuers. The increase in yield, however, may increase demand for these investments which may mitigate, to some extent, the potential adverse capital formation effects on the commercial paper market.

Municipalities also could be affected if our proposals caused the money market fund industry to contract. As shown in Panel C of the table immediately above, money market funds held approximately 9% of outstanding municipal debt securities as of December 31, 2012. Between the end of 2008 and the end of 2012, money market funds decreased their holdings of municipal debt by 34% or $172.8 billion.\textsuperscript{600} Despite this reduction in holdings by money market funds, municipal issuers increased aggregate borrowings by over 4% between the end of 2008 and the end of 2012. Municipalities were able to fill the gap by attracting other investor types. Other types of mutual funds, for example, increased their municipal securities holdings by 61% or $238.6 billion. Depository institutions have also increased their funding of municipal issuers during this time period by $141.2 billion as investors have shifted their assets away from money market funds into bank deposit accounts. Life insurance companies almost tripled their municipal securities holdings from $47.1 billion at the end of 2008 to $121 billion at the end of 2012. It would have been difficult to model in 2008 which investors would step into the municipal debt market to take the place of withdrawing money market funds and, for the same reasons, it is difficult now to predict what may happen to the municipal debt markets as a result of our proposal.

To make their issues attractive to alternative lenders, municipalities lengthened the terms of some of their debt securities. Most municipal debt securities held by money market funds are

\textsuperscript{600} The statistics in this paragraph are based on the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds data.
variable rate demand notes ("VRDNs"), in which long-term municipal bonds are transformed into short-term instruments through the use of third-party credit and/or liquidity enhancements, such as letters of credit and standby bond purchase agreements from financial institutions. Declines in the creditworthiness of these credit and liquidity enhancement providers have reduced the amount of VRDNs outstanding from approximately $371 billion in December 2010 to approximately $264 billion in December 2012.\textsuperscript{601} We believe that this downward trend is likely to continue irrespective of changes in the money market fund industry because of potential downgrades to the financial institutions providing these services and potential bank regulatory changes, which may increase the cost of providing such guarantees.\textsuperscript{602}

Additionally, our floating NAV proposal has an explicit exemption for retail funds that will permit sponsors to offer retail funds that seek to maintain a stable price and invest in municipal securities. We expect that the net investment in municipal money market funds will not change in response to the floating NAV proposal because we understand that few institutional investors invest in retail funds today and believe that most retail investors would not object to the daily $1,000,000 redemption limit. Investment in retail money market funds may in fact increase, if investors see stable price retail funds as an attractive cash management tool compared to other alternatives.


\textsuperscript{602} See, e.g., Moody's Downgrades U.S. Muni Obligations Backed by Banks and Securities Firms with Global Capital Markets Operations (June 22, 2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-US-muni-obligations-backed-by-banks-and-securities--PR_248937; Chris Reese, Money Market Funds’ Investments Declining, Reuters (Oct. 24, 2011) (stating that supplies of VRDNs have been constrained and that the "decline in issuance can be attributed to low interest rates, challenges of budget shortfalls at state and local governments and knock-on effects from European banking concerns"); Dan Seymour, Liquidity Fears May Be Overblown, BOND BUYER (Jan. 31, 2011).
Both the floating NAV proposal and the requirement of increased disclosure under each alternative regarding the fund’s market-based value and liquidity as well as any sponsor support or defaults in portfolio securities, among other matters, should improve informational efficiency. The floating NAV alternative as well as the proposed shadow NAV disclosure requirement under the liquidity fees and gates alternative provide greater transparency to shareholders regarding the daily market-based value of the fund. This should improve investors’ ability to allocate capital efficiently across the economy. Under the liquidity fees and gates proposal, if a fund imposes a liquidity fee or redemption gate, this may hamper allocative efficiency and hence capital formation to the extent that investors are unable to reallocate their assets to their preferred use while the fee or gate is in place.

Our proposals may or may not affect competition within the short-term financing markets. On the one hand, the competitive effects are likely to be small or negligible if shareholders either remain in money market funds or move to alternatives that, in turn, invest in similar underlying assets. On the other hand, the effects may be large if investors reallocate (whether directly or through intermediaries) their investments into substantively different assets. In that case, issuers are likely to offer higher yields to attract capital, whether from the smaller money market fund industry or from other investors. Either way, issuers that are unable to offer the required higher yield may have difficulties raising their required capital, at least in the short-term financing markets.

We request comment on what effects our proposals would have on issuers and the short-term financing markets for issuers. In particular, we request that commenters discuss whether the effects would be different between the floating NAV alternative and the liquidity fees and gates alternative and to provide analysis of the magnitude of the difference.
• How would either reform proposal affect issuers in the short-term financing markets, whether through a smaller money market fund industry or through fewer highly risk-averse investors holding money market funds shares?

• Would either reform proposal result in increased stability in money market funds and hence enhance stability in the short-term financing markets and the willingness of issuers to rely on short-term financing because the issuers would be less exposed to volatility in the availability of short-term financing from money market funds?

• What effect would either proposal have on the issuers of commercial paper and short-term municipal debt? How would either proposal affect the market for short-term government securities?

• What would be the long-term effect from either alternative on the economy?

Please include empirical data to support any conclusions.

We expect that yields in prime money market funds under the floating NAV alternative could be higher than yields under our fees and gates alternative. Under the fees and gates proposal, prime money market funds would have an incentive to closely manage their weekly liquid assets, which they could do by holding larger amounts of such assets, which tend to have comparatively low yields. If so, this would provide a competitive advantage for issuers that are able and willing to issue assets that qualify as weekly liquid assets, and it might result in the overall short-term financing markets being tilted toward shorter-term issuances. We believe that prime money market funds under this proposal would not meet the increased demand for weekly liquid assets solely by increasing their investments in Treasury securities because investors that want the risk-return profile that comes from Treasury securities would probably prefer to invest
in Treasury funds, which would be exempt from key aspects of either of our provisions of the proposal. Under the floating NAV proposal, prime money market funds might not have an incentive to reduce portfolio risk if the relatively more risk-averse investors avoid prime money market funds and invest in government money market funds or retail funds, which would continue to maintain a stable price. If so, this would provide a competitive advantage for issuers of higher-yielding 2a-7-eligible assets. The potential differing portfolio composition of money market funds under our two reform proposals, therefore, could have an effect on issuers and the short-term financing markets through differing levels of money market fund demand for certain types of portfolio securities.

We request comment on this aspect of our proposal and how the effect on money market fund yields, short-term debt security issuers, and the short-term financing markets would differ depending on which alternative we adopted.

We request comment on our assumptions, expectations, and estimates described in this section.

- Are they correct?
- Do commenters agree with our analyses of certain effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation that may arise from our floating NAV and liquidity fees and gates proposals? Do commenters agree with our analysis of potential additional implications of these proposals on current investments in money market funds and on the short-term financing markets?
- Are there alternative assumptions, expectations, or estimates that we have not discussed? If so, what are they and how would they affect our analyses?
- Are there any other economic effects associated with our proposed alternatives
that we have not discussed? Please quantify and explain any assumptions used in response to these questions (and any others) to the extent possible.

- What would have been the effect on money market funds, investors, the short-term financing markets, and capital formation if our floating NAV proposal or our liquidity fees and gates proposal had been in place in 2007 and 2008?

F. Amendments to Disclosure Requirements

We are proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 and Form N-1A that would require money market funds to provide additional disclosure in certain areas to provide greater transparency regarding money market funds, so that investors have an opportunity to better evaluate the risks of investing in a particular fund and that the Commission and other financial regulators obtain important information needed to administer their regulatory programs. As discussed in more detail below, these amendments would require enhanced registration statement and website disclosure\(^{603}\) about: (i) any type of financial support provided to a money market fund by the fund’s sponsor or an affiliated person of the fund; (ii) the fund’s daily and weekly liquidity levels; and (iii) the fund’s daily current NAV per share, rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of funds with a $1.0000 share price or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price (e.g., $10.0000 or $100.00 per share). In addition, we are considering whether to require more frequent disclosure of money market funds’ portfolio holdings. We are also proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require stable price money market funds to calculate their current NAV per share (rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of funds with a $1.0000 share price or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price) daily, as a corollary to the proposed requirement for money market funds to disclose their

\(^{603}\) See supra note 448.
daily current NAV per share.

In addition, we are proposing a new rule\textsuperscript{604} that would require money market funds to file new Form N-CR with the Commission when certain events (such as instances of portfolio security default, sponsor support of funds, and other similar significant events) occur. The proposed Form N-CR filing requirements are discussed below at section III.G.

1. Financial Support Provided to Money Market Funds
   a. Proposed Disclosure Requirements

Throughout the history of money market funds, and in particular during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, money market fund sponsors and other fund affiliates have, on occasion, provided financial support to money market funds.\textsuperscript{605} Indeed, one study estimates that during the period from 2007 to 2011, direct sponsor support to money market funds totaled at least $4.4 billion, for 78 of the 314 funds the study reviewed.\textsuperscript{606} We continue to believe that sponsor support will provide fund sponsors with the flexibility to protect shareholder interests. Additionally, if we ultimately adopt the liquidity fees and gates alternative, sponsor support would allow sponsors the flexibility to prevent a money market fund from breaching the 15% weekly liquid asset threshold that would otherwise require the board to impose a liquidity fee (absent a board finding that doing so would not be in the fund’s best interest) and permit the board to impose a gate. However, we believe that if money market fund investors do not understand the nature and extent that the fund’s sponsor has discretionarily supported the fund,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{604} Proposed rule 30b1-8.
\textsuperscript{605} See, e.g., supra section II.B.3; see also RSFI Study, supra note 21, at notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
\end{flushleft}
they may not fully appreciate the risks of investing in the fund.607

For these reasons, we propose requiring money market funds to disclose current and historical instances of sponsor support. We believe that these disclosure requirements would clarify, to current and prospective money market fund investors as well as to the Commission, the frequency, nature, and amount of financial support provided by money market fund sponsors. We believe that the disclosure of historical instances of sponsor support would allow investors, regulators, and the fund industry to understand better whether a fund has required financial support in the past. Currently, when sponsor support is provided during circumstances in which a money market fund experiences stress but does not "break the buck," and sponsor support is not immediately disclosed, investors may be unaware that their money market fund has come under stress.608 The proposed historical disclosure would permit investors to understand whether, for instance, a fund’s sponsor or affiliate has provided financial support to help mitigate liquidity stress experienced by the fund, or has repurchased fund portfolio securities that have fallen in value. While we recognize that historical occurrences are not necessarily indicative of future events, the proposed disclosure also would permit investors to assess the sponsor’s past ability and willingness to provide financial support to the fund, which could reflect the sponsor’s financial position or management style.609 Finally, the proposed disclosure would provide greater

607 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114 (noting, for example, that "[w]hile MMF prospectuses must warn investors that their shares may lose value, the extensive record of sponsor intervention and its critical role historically in maintaining MMF price stability may have obscured some investors’ appreciation of MMF risks and caused some investors to assume that MMF sponsors will absorb any losses, even though sponsors are under no obligation to do so") (internal citations omitted). But see ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25, and Federated Investors Feb. 15 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192.

608 See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at text following note 25.

609 But see Moody’s Investors Service, “Sponsor Support Key to Money Market Funds” (Aug. 9, 2010), at 5-6 available at http://www.alston.com/files/docs/Moody's__report.pdf (suggesting that fund sponsors may be unwilling to provide sponsor support in future years).
information to regulators and the fund industry regarding the extent of financial support that money market funds receive from their sponsors and other affiliates, which could assist regulators in overseeing money market funds and administering their regulatory programs.

Accordingly, we are proposing amendments to Form N-1A that would require money market funds to provide SAI disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate. Specifically, the proposed amendments would require each money market fund to disclose any occasion during the last ten years on which an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, provided any form of financial support to the fund. With respect to each such occasion, the proposed amendments would require the fund to describe the nature of support, the amount of support, the date the support was provided, the security supported and its value on the date the support was initiated (if applicable), the reason for the support, the term of support (if applicable), and any contractual restrictions relating to the support. We believe that the proposed 10-year look-back period would provide shareholders and the Commission with a historical perspective that would be long enough to provide a useful

610 See supra note 440 (discussing guiding principles that are used to determine whether to include disclosure items in a fund’s prospectus or SAI).

611 See proposed (FNAV) Item 16(g) of Form N-1A; proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(2) of Form N-1A. Requiring this disclosure to appear in the fund’s SAI, rather than the prospectus, reflects the principle that funds should limit disclosure in prospectuses generally to information that is necessary for an average or typical investor to make an investment decision. See Registration Statement Adopting Release, supra note 310, at section I.

612 Rule 2a-7 currently requires a money market fund to report to the Commission the purchase of money market fund portfolio securities by an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, pursuant to rule 17a-9. See rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B). Because the proposed definition of “financial support” includes the purchase of a security pursuant to rule 17a-9 (as well as similar actions), we believe that the scope of the persons covered by the proposed definition should reflect the scope of persons covered by rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B).

613 See proposed (FNAV) Item 16(g) of Form N-1A; proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(2) of Form N-1A.

614 See infra notes 616 and 617 and accompanying text for a discussion of actions that would be deemed to constitute “financial support.”
understanding of past events, and to analyze patterns with respect to financial support received by the fund, but not so long as to include circumstances that may no longer be a relevant reflection of the fund’s management or operations. We believe that disclosing historical information about the financial support that a fund has received from a sponsor or fund affiliate in the fund’s SAI is the clearest and least expensive means to disseminate this disclosure. We believe that other possible methods, such as requiring public disclosure of a sponsor’s financial statements (such that non-shareholders could evaluate the sponsor’s capacity to provide support) would provide less straightforward information to investors, and would be costlier for funds to implement than the proposed SAI disclosure requirement.

Because past analyses of financial support provided to money market funds have differed in their assessment of what actions constitute such support,615 we are also proposing instructions to the proposed amendments that would clarify the meaning of the term “financial support” for purposes of the required disclosure.616 These proposed instructions would specify that the term “financial support” would include, but not be limited to (i) any capital contribution, (ii) purchase of a security from the fund in reliance on rule 17a-9, (iii) purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, (iv) purchase of fund shares, (v) execution of a letter of credit or letter of indemnity, (vi) capital support agreement (whether or not the fund ultimately received support), (vii) performance guarantee, or (viii) any other similar action to increase the value of the fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the fund during times of stress.617 The Commission believes that

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615 See, e.g., study accompanying Comment Letter of Linus Wilson (Jan. 1, 2013) (available in File No. FSO-2012-0003) (discussing various definitions of “support” used in analyzing historical instances of support provided to money market funds by their sponsors or other affiliated persons).

616 See Instruction 1 to proposed (FNAV) Item 16(g) of Form N-1A; Instruction 1 to proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(2) of Form N-1A.

617 Id.
all of these actions should be included in the term “financial support” because they each
represent means by which a fund’s sponsor or affiliate could provide financial or monetary
assistance to a fund by directly increasing the value of a fund’s portfolio, or (for funds that
maintain a stable share price) by otherwise permitting a fund to maintain its current intended
stable price per share. We are also proposing instructions to the proposed amendments to clarify
that funds must disclose any financial support provided to a predecessor fund (in the case of a
merger or other reorganization) within the proposed look-back period, in order to allow investors
to understand the full extent of historical support, provided to a fund or its predecessor.
Specifically, these proposed instructions would state that if the fund has participated in a merger
with another investment company during the last ten years, the fund must additionally provide
the required disclosure with respect to the other investment company.

We request comment on the proposed amendments to Form N-1A that would require
money market funds to provide disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has
received financial support from a sponsor or other fund affiliate.

- Would the proposed disclosure regarding historical instances of financial support
  provided to money market funds assist investors in appreciating the risks of investing
  in money market funds generally, and/or in particular money market funds? Do
  investors already appreciate the extent of financial support that money market funds
  sponsors and other affiliates have historically provided, and that such support has

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618 For purposes of this instruction, the term “merger” means a merger, consolidation, or purchase or sale of
substantially all of the assets between the fund and another investment company. See Instruction 2 to
proposed (FNAV) Item 16(g) of Form N-1A; Instruction 2 to proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(2) of
Form N-1A.

619 See Instruction 2 to proposed (FNAV) Item 16(g) of Form N-1A; Instruction 2 to proposed (Fees & Gates)
Item 16(g)(2) of Form N-1A. Additionally, if a fund’s name has changed (but the corporate or trust entity
remains the same), we would expect the fund to provide the required disclosure with respect to the entity or
entities identified by the fund’s former name.
been provided on a discretionary basis?

- We request comment on the specific disclosure items contemplated by the proposed SAI disclosure requirement. Is there any additional information, with respect to the historical instances in which a money market fund has received financial support from a sponsor or other fund affiliate, that funds should be required to disclose? Would all of the items included in the proposed SAI disclosure assist shareholders’ understanding of the historical financial support provided to a fund? If not, which items should we not include, and why?

- Instead of, or in addition to, requiring funds to disclose historical information about financial support received from a sponsor or fund affiliate on the fund’s SAI, should we require fund sponsors to publicly disclose their financial statements, in order to permit non-shareholders to evaluate the sponsor’s capacity to provide support? Why or why not?

- We request comment on the proposed instruction clarifying the meaning of the term “financial support” by providing a non-exclusive list of examples of actions that would be deemed to be “financial support” for purposes of the proposed disclosure requirement. Should the proposed instruction be expanded or limited, and if so, how and why?

- We request comment on the 10-year look-back period contemplated by the proposed SAI disclosure requirement. Should the proposed disclosure requirement include a longer or shorter look-back period, and if so, why?

- We request comment on the list of persons whose financial support of a fund would necessitate disclosure under the proposed SAI disclosure requirement. Should this
list of persons be expanded or limited, and if so, why?

- We request comment on the proposed instruction requiring disclosure of any financial support provided to a predecessor fund. Are there other situations, besides those identified in this instruction, in which disclosure of financial support provided to a fund or other entity besides the fund named on the registration statement would assist shareholders in understanding attendant investment risks? Are there any situations in which the merger-related disclosure that we propose to require would not assist shareholders in understanding the risks of investing in the fund named on the registration statement (for instance, if the fund’s sponsor has changed as a result of the merger)? Would the proposed merger-related disclosure make it more difficult for a fund with a history of support to merge with another fund?

- Would it be useful for shareholders for the Commission to require prospective prospectus and/or SAI disclosure regarding the circumstances under which a money market fund’s sponsor, or an affiliated person of the fund, may offer any form of financial support to the fund, as well as any limits to this support? If so, what kind of disclosure should be required?

We believe it is important for money market funds to inform existing and prospective shareholders of any present occasion on which the fund receives financial support from a sponsor or other fund affiliate. We believe that this disclosure could influence prospective shareholders’ decision to purchase shares of the fund, and could inform shareholders’ assessment of the ongoing risks associated with an investment in the fund. We believe that it is possible that shareholders would interpret prior support as a sign of fund strength, as it demonstrates the sponsor’s willingness to backstop the fund. However, we also recognize that this disclosure
could potentially make shareholders quicker to redeem shares if they believe the provision of financial support to be a sign of weakness, or an indication that the fund may not continue in business in the future (for instance, if providing financial support to a fund were to weaken the sponsor's own financial condition, possibly affecting its ability to manage the fund).

We are proposing an amendment to rule 2a-7 that would require a fund to post prominently on its website substantially the same information that the fund is required to report to the Commission on Form N-CR regarding the provision of financial support to the fund. The fund would be required to include this website disclosure on the same business day as it files a report to the Commission in response to an event specified in Part C of Form N-CR, and the disclosure would be required to be posted for a period of not less than one year following the date on which the fund filed Form N-CR concerning the event. We believe that requiring website disclosure, along with Form N-CR disclosure, is an important step towards increased transparency because we believe that significant information about a money market fund is already made available at that fund's website. As discussed in more detail below, we believe that this time frame for reporting balances the exigency of the report with the time it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information (which is the same information a fund would be required to file on Form N-CR). We believe that the one-year minimum time frame for website disclosure is appropriate because this time frame would effectively oblige a

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620 See proposed (FINA) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v); proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v); proposed (FINA) Form N-CR Part C; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part C; see also infra section II.G (discussing the proposed Form N-CR requirements).

621 See proposed (FINA) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v); proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v). A fund would also be required to file Form N-CR no later than the first business day following the occurrence of any event specified in Part C of Form N-CR.

622 See supra note 448.

623 See infra text following note 710.
fund to post the required information in the interim period until the fund files an annual
post-effective amendment updating its registration statement, which update would incorporate
the same information.\textsuperscript{624}

We request comment on the proposed amendment to rule 2a-7 that would require money
market funds to inform current and prospective shareholders, via website, of any present
occasion on which the fund receives financial support from a sponsor or other fund affiliate.

- Should any more, any less, or any other information be required to be posted on
  the fund’s website than that disclosed on Form N-CR? Is the fund’s website the
  best place for us to require such disclosure?

- As proposed, should we require this information to be posted “prominently” on
  the fund’s website? Should we provide any other instruction as to the
  presentation of this information, in order to highlight the information and/or lead
  investors efficiently to the information, for example, should we require that the
  information be posted on the fund’s home page or be accessible in no more than
  two clicks from the fund’s home page?

- Should this information be posted on the fund’s website for a longer or shorter
  period than one year following the occurrence of any event specified in Part C of
  Form N-CR?

- How would the requirement for money market funds to disclose current instances
  of financial support affect the behavior of fund shareholders and/or the market as

\textsuperscript{624} See \textit{supra} notes 611 - 619 and accompanying text. Of course, in the likely event that the fund files a
post-effective amendment within one year following the provision of financial support to the fund,
information about the financial support would appear both in the fund’s registration statement and on the
fund’s website for the remainder of the year following the provision of support.
a whole? For instance, could this disclosure make shareholders quicker to redeem shares if they believe the provision of financial support to be a sign of portfolio weakness?\textsuperscript{625} Alternatively, would shareholders prefer funds with histories of support because of the sponsors' demonstrated willingness to backstop the funds?

\textit{b. Economic Analysis}

The qualitative benefits and costs of the proposed requirements regarding the disclosure of financial support received by a fund from its sponsor or a fund affiliate are discussed above. The Commission staff has not measured the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time because of uncertainty regarding how the proposed disclosure may affect different investors' behavior.\textsuperscript{626} Because the required registration statement and website disclosure overlap with the information that a fund must disclose on Form N-CR when the fund receives financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate, we anticipate that the costs a fund will incur to draft and finalize the disclosure that will appear in its registration statement and on its website will largely be incurred when the fund files Form N-CR, as discussed below in section III.G.3.\textsuperscript{627} In addition, we estimate that a fund would incur costs of $148\textsuperscript{628} to review and update the

\textsuperscript{625} See Federated Investors Feb. 15 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 192 (noting that enhanced disclosure requirements may have unintended consequences).

\textsuperscript{626} Likewise, the SEC staff has not presently quantified the benefits of the proposed requirements on account of uncertainty regarding the effects that the requirements may have on, for example, investors' understanding of the risks associated with money market funds, investors' ability to compare the relative risks of investing in different funds, the potential imposition of market discipline on portfolio managers, or the Commission's ability to execute its oversight role.

\textsuperscript{627} Although the proposed registration statement disclosure would include historical information about the financial support that a fund has received from its sponsor or other fund affiliate(s), and the proposed Form N-CR and website disclosure would include information about current instances of financial support, the required disclosure elements for the proposed Form N-CR disclosure, website disclosure, and registration statement disclosure are identical. Therefore, we anticipate that a fund would largely be able to use the disclosure it drafted for purposes of the Form N-CR and website disclosure requirements for purposes of the registration statement disclosure requirement.

\textsuperscript{628} The costs associated with updating the fund's registration statement are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra section IV.A.7 and IV.B.7.
historical disclosure in its registration statement (plus printing costs), and costs of $207\textsuperscript{629} each
time that it updates its website to include the required disclosure.

We believe that the proposed requirements could increase informational efficiency by
providing additional information to investors and the Commission about the frequency, nature,
and amount of financial support provided by money market fund sponsors. This in turn could
assist investors in analyzing the risks associated with particular funds, which could increase
allocative efficiency\textsuperscript{630} and could positively affect competition by permitting investors to choose
whether to invest in certain funds based on this information. However, the proposed
requirements could advantage larger funds and fund groups, if a fund sponsor’s ability to provide
financial support to a fund is perceived to be a competitive benefit. Also, if investors move their
assets among money market funds or decide to invest in investment products other than money
market funds as a result of the proposed disclosure requirements, this could adversely affect the
competitive stance of certain money market funds, or the money market fund industry generally.

The proposed disclosure requirements also could have additional effects on capital
formation, depending on if investors interpret financial support as a sign of money market fund
strength or weakness. If sponsor support (or the lack of need for sponsor support) were
understood to be a sign of fund strength, the proposed requirements could enhance capital
formation by promoting stability within the money market fund industry. On the other hand, the
proposed disclosure requirements could detract from capital formation if sponsor support were
understood to indicate fund weakness and made money market funds more susceptible to heavy
redemptions during times of stress, or if money market fund investors decide to move their

\textsuperscript{629} The costs associated with updating the fund’s website are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in
more detail in infra section IV.A.1.f and IV.B.1.f.

\textsuperscript{630} See supra note 562 and accompanying text.
money out of money market funds entirely as a result of the proposed disclosure. Accordingly, because we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate, we are unable to determine the effects of this proposal on capital formation. Finally, the required disclosure could assist the Commission in overseeing money market funds and developing regulatory policy affecting the money market fund industry, which might affect capital formation positively if the resulting more efficient or more effective regulatory framework encouraged investors to invest in money market funds.

We request comment on this economic analysis:

- Are any of the proposed disclosure requirements unduly burdensome, or would they impose any unnecessary costs?

- We request comment on the staff’s estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements.

- We request comment on our analysis of potential effects of these proposed disclosure requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. In particular, would the proposed disclosure increase informational efficiency by increasing awareness of sponsor support? If so, would the disclosure requirements for sponsor support make money market funds more or less susceptible to heavy redemptions in times of fund and market stress?

   a. Proposed Disclosure Requirements

We are proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require money market funds to disclose prominently on their websites the percentage of the fund’s total assets that are invested in daily and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows, as of the end of
the previous business day. The proposed amendments would require a fund to maintain a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction on its website showing historical information about its investments in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund's net inflows or outflows, for the previous 6 months, and would require the fund to update this historical information each business day, as of the end of the preceding business day. These amendments would complement the proposed requirement, as discussed elsewhere in this Release, for money market funds to provide on their monthly reports on Form N-MFP the percentage of total assets invested in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets broken out on a weekly basis.

We believe that daily disclosure of money market funds' daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets would promote transparency regarding how money market funds are managed, and thus may permit investors to make more efficient and informed investment decisions.

Additionally, we believe that this enhanced disclosure may impose external market discipline on portfolio managers, in that it may encourage fund managers to carefully manage their daily and weekly liquid assets, which may decrease portfolio risk and promote stability in the short-term financing markets. We also believe that it could encourage funds to ensure that the fund's liquidity level is at least as large as its shareholders' demand for liquidity. The proposed daily disclosure requirement would provide an additional level of detail to the proposed requirement.

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631 See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(ii); proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(ii). A "business day," defined in rule 2a-7 as "any day, other than Saturday, Sunday, or any customary business holiday," would end after 11:59 p.m. on that day.
632 Id.
633 See infra note 769 and accompanying text.
634 See ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25 (stating that prime money market funds should be required to make frequent public disclosure (via their websites) of their weekly liquid asset levels to "enhance transparency and encourage a highly conservative approach to portfolio management").
for money market funds to break out their daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets on a weekly basis on their monthly reports on Form N-MFP, which in turn would further enhance investors' and the Commission's ability to monitor fund risks. For example, daily website disclosure of liquid asset levels would help investors estimate, in near-real time, the likelihood that a fund may be able to satisfy redemptions by using internal cash sources (rather than by selling portfolio securities) in times of market turbulence, or, if our liquidity fees and gates proposal is adopted, whether a fund may approach or exceed a trigger for the potential imposition of a liquidity fee or gate. Requiring daily website disclosure of liquid assets across the money market fund industry also would permit investors more readily to determine whether liquidity-related stresses are idiosyncratic to particular funds, thus minimizing the prospect of redemption pressures on funds that are not similarly affected. This disclosure also could make information about fund liquidity more accessible to a broad range of investors. This daily website disclosure should also assist the Commission in its oversight role and promote certain efficiencies, in that it would permit the Commission to access detailed portfolio liquidity information as necessary to its oversight of money market funds, without the need to contact fund management or service providers to obtain it. However, the proposed disclosure could also change behavior, in that it could make shareholders quicker to redeem shares if they believe a decrease in portfolio liquidity could affect the fund's ability to satisfy redemptions. The proposed disclosure also could increase the volatility of a fund's flows, even during times when the fund is not under stress, if shareholders are sensitive to changes in the fund's liquidity

635 See ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25.
636 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114 ("There is a risk that more frequent reporting of portfolio information may make investors quicker to redeem when these indicators show signs of deterioration. In addition, more frequent reporting of portfolio information such as daily mark-to-market per share values or liquidity levels could increase the volatility of MMFs' flows, even when the funds are not under stress, if investors are highly sensitive to changes in those levels.").
levels.\textsuperscript{637} While investors will be able to access historical information about money market funds’ daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets if the proposed amendments to Form N-MFP are adopted,\textsuperscript{638} we believe that daily website disclosure of money market funds’ daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows, would permit shareholders to access more detailed information in a more convenient and detailed manner than comparing monthly Form N-MFP filings. We believe that investors would be able to compare current liquidity information with previous information from which they (or others) may discern trends. Public daily disclosure of money market funds’ daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets also could decrease funds’ susceptibility to runs, as shareholders might be less likely to redeem fund shares during the occurrence of negative market events if they could ascertain, in near real time, that the fund had enough liquidity such that remaining shareholders would not bear the costs of liquidity incurred by redeeming shareholders. Because money market funds are currently required to maintain a six-month record of portfolio holdings on the fund website,\textsuperscript{639} requiring a fund to post its daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets for the same period would permit investors to analyze the relationship between the fund’s portfolio holdings and its liquidity levels over time. Additionally, we believe that disclosure of information about net shareholder flow would provide helpful contextual information regarding the significance of the reported liquidity information, as a fund would require greater liquidity to respond to greater shareholder flow volatility, and vice versa.

We request comment on the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require money

\textsuperscript{637} See id.
\textsuperscript{638} See infra note 769 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{639} See rule 2a-7(c)(12).
market funds to disclose daily the percentages of fund assets invested in daily and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows.

- Would the proposed amendments be useful in assisting shareholders in better understanding how money market funds are managed and in assessing a fund’s risk? Would the proposed amendments promote the goals of enhancing transparency and encouraging market discipline on money market funds in a way that increases stability in the short-term financing markets? How, if at all, would the proposed amendments affect the amount of liquid assets that a money market fund’s investment adviser purchases on behalf of the fund? Would disclosing information about net shareholder flows assist investors in understanding the significance of the reported liquidity information?

- Should we require that any more, any less, or any other information regarding portfolio liquidity be posted on money market funds’ websites?

- As proposed, should we require this information to be posted “prominently” on the fund’s website? Should we provide any other instruction as to the presentation of this information, in order to highlight the information and/or lead investors efficiently to the information? For example, should we require that the information be posted on the fund’s home page or be accessible in no more than two clicks from the fund’s home page?

- Should we require information regarding the percentage of money market fund assets invested in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets to be posted less frequently than daily? Should we require funds to maintain this information on their websites for a period of more or less than 6 months?
Would the proposed amendments incentivize a money market fund, in certain circumstances, to sell assets that are not weekly liquid assets rather than weekly liquid assets? Will this harm non-redeeming shareholders?

How would the requirement for money market funds to disclose the percentages of fund assets invested in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets affect the behavior of fund shareholders and/or the market as a whole? For instance, could this disclosure make shareholders quicker to redeem shares upon a decrease in portfolio liquidity, or generally increase the volatility of a fund’s flows? Would this disclosure result in reducing the chances that better-informed shareholders may redeem ahead of retail or less informed shareholders? If the liquidity fees and gates proposal is adopted, would transparency of fund liquidity be important to permit investors in funds other than the one imposing a fee to assess the liquidity position of their fund before determining whether to redeem? Would such transparency affect investors’ redemptions in normal market conditions or just in periods when liquidity is costly? Would such transparency affect investors’ willingness to buy shares? How are these factors related to what motivates money market fund investors to redeem?

Would disclosure of money market funds’ liquidity levels, coupled with portfolio holdings reported on Form N-MFP (and more frequent portfolio holdings disclosure on funds’ websites, to the extent the Commission determines to require this⁶⁴⁰), enable other market participants to infer a fund’s potential liquidity demand and likely trading needs by the fund? Would this disadvantage a money

See infra section III.F.4.
market fund in any way?

b. Economic Analysis

The qualitative benefits and costs of the proposed requirements regarding disclosure of the percentage of a money market fund’s assets that are invested in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows, are discussed above.\textsuperscript{641} We believe that the proposed requirements could increase informational efficiency by providing additional information about money market funds’ liquidity to investors and the Commission. This in turn could assist investors in analyzing the risks associated with particular funds, which could increase allocative efficiency and could positively affect competition by permitting investors to choose whether to invest in certain funds based on this information. However, if investors were to move their assets among money market funds or decide to invest in investment products other than money market funds as a result of the proposed disclosure requirements, this could adversely affect the competitive stance of certain money market funds, or the money market fund industry generally.

The proposed requirements could also have effects on capital formation. The required disclosure could assist the Commission in overseeing money market funds and developing regulatory policy affecting the money market fund industry, which might affect capital formation positively if the resulting regulatory framework more efficiently or more effectively encouraged investors to invest in money market funds. The proposed requirements also may impose external market discipline on portfolio managers, which in turn could create market stability and enhance capital formation, if the resulting market stability encouraged more investors to invest in money

\textsuperscript{641} See supra note 626 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons that the Commission staff has not measured the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time.
market funds. However, the proposed requirements could detract from capital formation by decreasing market stability if investors became quicker to redeem during times of stress as a result of the proposed disclosure requirements. Accordingly, we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate the effects of these proposed requirements on capital formation.

Costs associated with these disclosure requirements include initial, one-time costs, as well as ongoing costs. Initial costs include the costs to design the schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing historical liquidity information in a manner that clearly communicates the required information and to make the necessary software programming changes to the fund’s website to present the depiction in a manner that can be updated each business day. We estimate that the average one-time costs for each money market fund to design and present the historical depiction of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets would be $20,150.642 Funds also would incur ongoing costs to update the depiction of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets each business day. We estimate that the average ongoing annual costs that each fund would incur to update the required disclosure would be $9,184.643 Because money market funds currently must calculate the percentage of their assets that are invested in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets each day for purposes of compliance with the portfolio liquidity provisions of rule 2a-7, funds should incur no additional costs in obtaining this data for purposes of the proposed disclosure requirements.

We request comment on this economic analysis:

642 Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to project assessment (associated with designing and presenting the historical depiction of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets), as well as project development, implementation, and testing. See supra note 245(discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs). The costs associated with these activities are all paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra section IV. See infra section IV.A.1.f.

643 See id.
• Are any of the proposed disclosure requirements unduly burdensome, or would they impose any unnecessary costs?

• We request comment on the staff’s estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements.

• We request comment on our analysis of potential effects of these proposed disclosure requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

3. Daily Website Disclosure of Current NAV per Share
   a. Proposed Disclosure Requirements

   We are proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require each money market fund to disclose daily, prominently on its website, the fund’s current NAV per share, rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.0000 share price of an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price644 (the fund’s “current NAV”) as of the end of the previous business day.645 The proposed amendments would require a fund to maintain a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction on its website showing historical information about its daily current NAV per share for the previous 6 months, and would require the fund to update this historical information each business day as of the end of the preceding business day.646

   If we were to adopt the floating NAV alternative, the proposed amendments would effectively require a money market fund to publish historical information about the sale and redemption price of its shares each business day as of the end of each preceding business day.647

The proposed amendments would require a government money market fund or retail money

644  E.g., $10.000 or $100.00 per share.
645  See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii); proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii).
646  Id.
647  See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii); 17 CFR 270.22c-1.
market fund (which generally would be permitted to transact at stable price per share), on the other hand, to publish historical information about its market-based current NAV per share, rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of funds with a $1.0000 share price or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price, each business day as of the end of each preceding business day. Likewise, if we were to adopt the liquidity fees and gates alternative, the proposed amendments would require all money market funds to publish historical information about the fund's market-based current NAV per share each business day as of the end of each preceding business day. The proposed amendments would complement the current requirement for a money market fund to disclose its shadow price monthly on Form N-MFP.

Whether we adopt either of the proposed reform alternatives, we believe that daily disclosure of money market funds' current NAV per share would increase money market funds' transparency and permit investors to better understand money market funds' risks. While Form N-MFP information about money market funds' month-end shadow prices is currently publicly available with a 60-day lag, the proposed amendments would permit shareholders to reference funds' current NAV per share in near real time to assess the effect of market events on their portfolios. Public disclosure of money market funds' daily current NAV per share also

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648 See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii). The proposed amendments under the liquidity fees and gates alternative also would require money market funds to calculate their market-based NAV at least once each business day. See infra section III.F.5.

649 See Form N-MFP, Item 18. But see proposed Form N-MFP Item A.20 and B.5 (requiring money market funds to provide net asset value per share data as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported).

650 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which investors treat money market funds as essentially risk-free).

651 We are proposing to eliminate the 60-day delay in making Form N-MFP information publicly available. See infra section III.H.4.

could decrease funds' susceptibility to runs, as shareholders might be less likely to sell fund shares during the occurrence of negative market events if they could ascertain that their investment was not affected by such events on a near real-time basis.\textsuperscript{653} Requiring daily disclosure of money market funds' current NAV per share also could prevent month-end "window dressing."\textsuperscript{654} This enhanced disclosure also could impose external market discipline on portfolio managers consistent with their investment objective, as well as the stability of short-term financing markets generally.\textsuperscript{655} However, the proposed disclosure could also change behavior, in that it could make shareholders quicker to redeem shares if they believe a decrease in the fund's current NAV signals portfolio deterioration or foreshadows other problems.\textsuperscript{656} The proposed disclosure also could increase the volatility of a fund’s flows, even during times when the fund is not under stress, if shareholders are sensitive to changes in the fund’s current NAV.\textsuperscript{657}

Although current and prospective shareholders may presently obtain historical information about money market funds' month-end shadow prices on Form N-MFP, we believe that requiring a six-month record of the fund’s daily current NAV on the fund’s website would permit shareholders to access more detailed information in a more convenient manner than comparing monthly Form N-MFP filings. We believe that investors should be able to compare

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{653} See id. But see Federated Investors Feb. 15 FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 192 (noting that enhanced disclosure requirements “may have unintended consequences that should also be weighed.”); Larry G. Locke, Ethan Mitra, and Virginia Locke, \textit{Harnessing Whales: The Role of Shadow Price Disclosure in Money Market Mutual Fund Report}, 11 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 4 (2013) (asserting that, under the current Form N-MFP shadow price disclosure regime, there is no statistical correlation between the shadow price of money market funds and their investment activity, but that the effects on shareholder behavior of increased transparency and frequency of fund information reporting are hard to predict).
\item\textsuperscript{654} See Capital Advisors Group FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 652.
\item\textsuperscript{655} See ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 25 (maintaining that prime money market funds should be required to make frequent public disclosure (via their websites) of their market-based share price to “enhance transparency and encourage a highly conservative approach to portfolio management”).
\item\textsuperscript{656} See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, \textit{supra} note 114 at 60.
\item\textsuperscript{657} See id.
\end{itemize}
recent NAV information with previous information from which they (or others analyzing the data) may discern trends. Because money market funds are presently required to maintain a six-month record of portfolio holdings on the fund website,\textsuperscript{658} requiring a fund to post its daily current NAV for the same period would permit investors to analyze any relationship between the fund’s portfolio holdings and its daily current NAV over time.

There has been a significant amount of industry support for the more frequent disclosure of money market funds’ current NAV per share. In January and February of 2013, a number of money market fund sponsors of large funds began voluntarily disclosing their funds’ daily current NAV per share, calculated using available market quotations.\textsuperscript{659} Additionally, industry groups have advocated for more frequent public disclosure of money market funds’ current NAV per share.\textsuperscript{660} We request comment on the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require money market funds to disclose the fund’s daily market-based NAV per share on the fund website:

- Would daily disclosure of money market funds’ current NAV per share be useful to assist shareholders in increasing money market funds’ transparency and better understanding money market funds’ risks? Would the proposed amendments promote the goals of enhancing transparency and encouraging fund managers to manage portfolios in a manner that increases stability in the short-term financing markets? Would the daily disclosure of market prices encourage funds to invest

\textsuperscript{658} See rule 2a-7(c)(12).

\textsuperscript{659} A number of large fund complexes have begun (or plan) to disclose daily money market fund market valuations (\textit{i.e.}, shadow prices), including BlackRock, Charles Schwab, Federated Investors, Fidelity Investments, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Reich & Tang, and State Street Global Advisors. \textit{See, e.g., Money Funds’ New Openness Unlikely to Stop Regulation}, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2013).

\textsuperscript{660} See \textit{e.g.}, ICI Jan. 24 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 25; SIFMA FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 358, at 11.
in easier-to-price securities or less volatile securities? How, if at all, would the effects of the proposed disclosure requirement differ for stable price funds (which would be required to disclose their market-based current NAV per share) and floating NAV funds (which would be required to disclose the sale and redemption price of their shares)?

- How, if at all, have shareholders responded to the monthly disclosure of funds’ current NAV per share, as required by the 2010 amendments? Would shareholders respond differently to the proposed daily disclosure than they have to historical monthly disclosure?

- Should information regarding money market funds’ current NAV per share be required to be posted to a fund’s website less frequently than the proposed amendments would require? Should funds be required to maintain this information on their websites for a period of more or less than 6 months?

- As proposed, should we require this information to be posted “prominently” on the fund’s website? Should we provide any other instruction as to the presentation of this information, in order to highlight the information and/or lead investors efficiently to the information, for example, should we require that the information be posted on the fund’s home page or be accessible in no more than two clicks from the fund’s home page?

- How would the requirement for money market funds to disclose their current NAV per share daily affect the behavior of fund shareholders and/or the market as a whole? For instance, could this disclosure make shareholders quicker to redeem shares upon a decrease in current NAV, or generally increase the volatility of a
fund’s flows?

b. Economic Analysis

The qualitative benefits and costs of the proposed requirements regarding daily disclosure of a money market fund’s current NAV per share are discussed above.\textsuperscript{661} We believe that the proposed requirements’ effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation would likely be similar to the effects of the proposed daily disclosure requirements regarding funds’ daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets, discussed above.\textsuperscript{662} We believe that the proposed requirements could increase informational efficiency by providing greater information about money market funds’ daily current per-share NAV to investors and the Commission. This in turn could assist investors in analyzing the risks associated with particular funds, which could increase allocative efficiency and could positively affect competition by permitting investors to choose whether to invest in certain funds based on this information. However, if investors move their assets among money market funds or decide to invest in investment products other than money market funds as a result of the proposed disclosure requirements, this could adversely affect the competitive stance of certain money market funds, or the money market fund industry generally.

The proposed requirements could also have effects on capital formation. On one hand, the proposed requirements may impose external market discipline on portfolio managers, which in turn could create market stability and enhance capital formation, if the resulting market stability encouraged more investors to invest in money market funds. On the other hand, the proposed requirements could detract from capital formation by decreasing market stability if investors became quicker to redeem during times of stress as a result of the proposed disclosure

\textsuperscript{661} See supra note 626 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons that the Commission staff has not measured the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time.

\textsuperscript{662} See supra section III.F.2.
requirements. Accordingly, we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate of the effects of these proposed requirements on capital formation.

Costs associated with these disclosure requirements include initial, one-time costs, as well as ongoing costs.\footnote{As discussed above, some money market funds presently publicize their current NAV per share daily on the fund’s website. The staff expects these funds to incur few, if any, additional costs to comply with these proposed disclose requirements.} Initial costs include the costs to design the schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing historical NAV information in a manner that clearly communicates the required information and to make the necessary software programming changes to the fund’s website to present the depiction in a manner that will be able to be updated each business day. We estimate that the average one-time costs for each money market fund to design and present the fund’s daily current NAV would be $20,150.\footnote{Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to project assessment (associated with designing and presenting the historical depiction of the fund’s daily current NAV per share), as well as project development, implementation, and testing. See supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff’s estimates of operational and related costs). The costs associated with these activities are all paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra sections IV.A.1.f and IV.B.1.f.} Funds also would incur ongoing costs to update the depiction of the fund’s current NAV each business day. We estimate that the average ongoing annual costs that each fund would incur to update the required disclosure would be $9,184.\footnote{Id.} Because floating NAV money market funds would be required to calculate their sale and redemption price each day, these funds should incur no additional costs in obtaining this data for purposes of the proposed disclosure requirements. Stable price money market funds (including government money market funds and retail funds if we adopt the floating NAV proposal, and all funds if we adopt the liquidity fees and gates proposal), which would be required to calculate their current NAV per share daily pursuant to proposed amendments to rule 2a-7, likewise should incur no additional costs in obtaining this data for purposes of the proposed
We request comment on this economic analysis:

- Are any of the proposed disclosure requirements unduly burdensome, or would they impose any unnecessary costs?
- We request comment on the staff’s estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements.
- We request comment on our analysis of potential effects of these proposed disclosure requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

4. Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings

a. Harmonization of Rule 2a-7 and Form N-MFP Portfolio Holdings Disclosure Requirements

Money market funds are currently required to file information about the fund’s portfolio holdings on Form N-MFP within five business days after the end of each month, and to disclose much of the portfolio holdings information that Form N-MFP requires on the fund’s website each month with 60-day delay. We are proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 in order to harmonize the specific portfolio holdings information that rule 2a-7 currently requires funds to disclose on the fund’s website with the corresponding portfolio holdings information proposed to be reported on Form N-MFP pursuant to proposed amendments to Form N-MFP. We believe that these proposed amendments would benefit money market fund investors by providing additional, and more precise, information about portfolio holdings information, which could allow investors better to evaluate the current risks of the fund’s portfolio investments.

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666 See infra section III.F.5 (discussing the proposed requirement for stable price money market funds to calculate their current NAV per share daily, as well as the operational costs associated with this proposed daily calculation requirement).

667 See rule 2a-7(c)(12)(ii); rule 30b1-7; Form N-MFP, General Instruction A.
Specifically, we are proposing amendments to the categories of portfolio investments reported on Form N-MFP, and are therefore also proposing amendments to the categories of portfolio investments currently required to be reported on a money market fund’s website.\(^{668}\) We are also proposing an amendment to Form N-MFP that would require funds to report the maturity date for each portfolio security using the maturity date used to calculate the dollar-weighted average life maturity, and therefore we are also proposing amendments to the current website disclosure requirements regarding portfolio securities’ maturity dates.\(^{669}\) In addition, we are proposing amendments to the current requirement for funds to disclose the “amortized cost value” of each portfolio security to reflect the fact that funds under each proposal would no longer be permitted to use the amortized cost method to value portfolio securities.\(^ {670}\) Currently, we do not require funds to disclose the market-based value of portfolio securities on the fund’s website, because doing so would disclose this information prior to the time the information becomes public on Form N-MFP (on account of the current 60-day delay before Form N-MFP information becomes publicly available). Because we propose to remove this 60-day delay, we are also proposing that funds make the market-based value of their portfolio securities available on the fund website at the same time that this information becomes public on Form N-MFP.\(^ {671}\)

Because the new information that a fund would be required to present on its website overlaps with the information that a fund would be required to disclose on Form N-MFP, we anticipate that the costs a fund will incur to draft and finalize the disclosure that will appear in its website will largely be incurred when the fund files Form N-MFP, as discussed below in section

\(^{668}\) See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(i)(B); proposed Form N-MFP, Item C.6.

\(^{669}\) See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(i)(B); proposed Form N-MFP, Item C.6.

\(^{670}\) See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(i)(B).

\(^{671}\) See proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a 7(h)(10)(i)(B).
III.H.6. In addition, we estimate that a fund would incur annual costs of $2,484 associated with updating its website to include the required monthly disclosure.\textsuperscript{672}

- We request comment on the website disclosure that we propose to harmonize with the disclosure proposed to be reported on Form N-MFP. Should any of the information that is proposed to be reported on Form N-MFP, and that we propose to require funds to disclose on the fund’s website, not be required to appear on the fund’s website?

- We request comment on the staff’s estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Request for Comment About Additional Website Disclosure on Portfolio Holdings}
\end{itemize}

Because certain money market funds have high portfolio turnover rates, the monthly disclosure requirement described above may not permit fund investors to fully understand a fund’s portfolio composition and its attendant risks.\textsuperscript{673} For this reason, during times of stress, uncertainty regarding portfolio composition could increase investors’ incentives to redeem in between reporting periods, as they would not be able to determine if their fund is exposed to certain stressed assets.\textsuperscript{674}

We are considering whether to require more frequent disclosure of money market funds’ portfolio holdings on a fund’s website, including the market value of individual portfolio

\textsuperscript{672} The costs associated with updating the fund’s website are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in \textit{infra} section IV.A.1.f.i.

\textsuperscript{673} See Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 38 (noting that as of month end November 2012, prime funds turned over on average 44% of portfolio assets every week).

\textsuperscript{674} See \textit{id}.
securities. Increasing the frequency of such disclosure might provide greater transparency to investors and the Commission regarding the risks of the investments held by money market funds. More frequent portfolio holdings disclosure also could assist investors, particularly during times of stress, in differentiating between money market funds based on the quality and stability of their investments, potentially limiting the incentive to run. In addition, requiring money market funds to disclose their portfolio holdings more frequently may impose external market discipline on portfolio managers consistent with their investment objective.

On the other hand, more frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings could make investors quicker to redeem when these holdings show signs of deterioration, and also could encourage money market funds to use less differentiated investment strategies. More frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings also might lead to “front running” of the portfolio, where other investors could trade ahead of money market fund purchasers, or “free riding,” where other investors mirror the investment strategies of the money market fund. In past years, some fund complexes have begun disclosing money market fund portfolio holdings weekly and daily on their websites, citing shareholder demand as the impetus for this disclosure.

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675 We also request comment on whether we should require more frequent filing of Form N-MFP, which would result in more frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings on Form N-MFP, in infra section III.H.5.
676 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 60.
677 See supra notes 654 and 655 and accompanying text. See also RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 38 (noting that increased transparency of portfolio holdings “might dampen a fund manager’s willingness to hold securities whose ratings are at odds with the underlying risk, especially at times when credit conditions are deteriorating”).
678 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 61.
679 See, e.g., Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174 (“We decided to disclose portfolio holdings daily for client-servicing purposes to facilitate due diligence inquiries from fund shareholders on portfolio composition issues on a real-time basis in a manner consistent with applicable law. Institutional investors in particular are keenly aware of risk of loss in their money market fund investments. As part of their due diligence, they regularly analyze Dreyfus fund portfolio holdings for credit, issuer, liquidity, and counterparty concerns, among others.”); Colleen Sullivan & Mike Schnitzel, Money Funds Move to Update Holdings Faster, FUND ACTION, Sept. 29, 2008, available at
We request comment on whether we should require money market funds to disclose portfolio holdings via their website more frequently than monthly.

- Would more frequent disclosure of money market funds' portfolio holdings be useful to assist shareholders in assessing a fund's risk? Would more frequent disclosure promote the goals of enhancing transparency, permitting shareholders to differentiate between money market funds, and encouraging fund managers to manage portfolios in a manner that increases stability in the short-term financing markets? How, if at all, would more frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings affect the portfolio assets that a money market fund's investment adviser purchases on behalf of the fund?

- What type of investors would be most likely to benefit from more frequent disclosure of money market funds' portfolio holdings? Would this disclosure allow more attentive investors to disadvantage less attentive investors?

- If more frequent disclosure of money market funds' portfolio holdings would be useful, how frequently should such disclosure be required? Daily? Weekly?

- During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, some funds voluntarily chose to disclose portfolio information more frequently than usual, while other funds did not change their disclosure practices. How and why did funds make these decisions, and how did investors respond? How would the benefits and costs of disclosure

http://www.fundaction.com/pdf/FA092908.pdf (noting that American Beacon Funds, Fidelity Investments, Evergreen Investments, Oppenheimer Funds, and Sentinel Investments provide money market fund portfolio holdings information more frequently than monthly, for reasons related to investor demand).

be affected by moving from a voluntary system to a mandated system? What would be the benefits of retaining a voluntary system? Would investors view voluntary disclosure as a signal regarding the level of transparency of a fund?

- Should any requirement for more frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings be limited to a certain type or types of money market fund (e.g., prime money market funds, which have historically been more prone to heavy redemptions during times of market stress than other kinds of money market funds)?

- How would more frequent disclosure of money market funds’ portfolio holdings affect the behavior of fund shareholders and/or the market as a whole? For instance, would this disclosure increase or decrease funds’ susceptibility to runs, affect money market funds’ ability to use differentiated investment strategies, or lead to “front running” or “free riding”?

- If we were to require more frequent website disclosure of money market funds’ portfolio holdings, should we also require more frequent filing of Form N-MFP (which includes certain portfolio information that we do not currently require, and do not currently propose to require, funds to disclose on their websites) with the Commission? If so, should we require Form N-MFP to be filed as frequently as we require website disclosure of portfolio holdings? What impact would this have, if any, on analysts who use Form N-MFP data?

5. Daily Calculation of Current NAV per Share under the Liquidity Fees and Gates Proposal
   
   a. Proposed Daily NAV Calculation Requirement for Stable Price Funds

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680 See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
We are proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require stable price funds (including government and retail funds under the floating NAV proposal, and all funds under the fees and gates proposal) to calculate the fund's current NAV per share based on current market factors at least once each business day. Rule 2a-7 currently requires money market funds to calculate the fund's NAV per share, using available market quotations (or an appropriate substitute that reflects current market conditions), at such intervals as the board of directors determines appropriate and reasonable in light of current market conditions. We believe that daily disclosure of money market funds' current NAV per share would increase money market funds' transparency and permit investors to better understand money market funds' risks, and thus we propose amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require this proposed disclosure. Because we are proposing to require money market funds to disclose their current NAV daily on the fund website, we correspondingly are proposing to amend rule 2a-7 to require funds to make this calculation on a daily basis, rather than at the board's discretion. Many money market funds already calculate and disclose their current NAV on a daily basis, and thus we do not expect that requiring all money market funds to perform a daily calculation should entail significant additional costs.

We request comments on the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 that would require

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681 See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii); see also text accompanying supra notes 644 and 645 for definition of "current NAV."

682 Rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii). Item 18 of Form N-MFP currently requires a fund to disclose its market-based NAV monthly.

683 See supra section III.F.3.

684 If we were to adopt the floating NAV alternative, money market funds would be required to calculate a potentially fluctuating sale and redemption price daily, and therefore, under the floating NAV alternative, we do not propose to amend rule 2a-7 in order to require daily market-based NAV calculations.

685 The costs for those funds that do not already calculate and disclose their market-based NAV on a daily basis are discussed in detail below. See infra notes 689 - 693 and accompanying text.
money market funds to calculate their current NAV daily if the we were to adopt the liquidity fees and gates alternative.

- Would the proposed daily calculation requirement affect what assets a money market fund purchases? For example, would the requirement make funds less willing to invest in assets that are more difficult to value, or in more volatile assets?
- Rule 2a-7 currently requires a money market fund’s board of directors to review the amount of deviation between the fund’s market-based NAV per share and the fund’s amortized cost per share “periodically.”

If we require a money market fund to calculate its current NAV daily, should we also require the fund’s board to review the deviation between the current NAV per share and the fund’s intended stable price per share at a specified interval? If so, what would be an appropriate interval? Weekly? Monthly? Quarterly?

b. Economic Analysis

The qualitative benefits and costs of the proposed requirement for money market funds to calculate the fund’s current NAV per share daily are discussed above. We believe that this proposed requirement may positively affect competition, in that it would require all money market funds to calculate their daily current per-share NAV. Presently, some funds but not others calculate their current NAV per share daily, and therefore the proposed requirement would help level the associated costs incurred by all money market funds and neutralize any

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686 Rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A)(2). The proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 do not include this requirement, as money market funds under each proposal generally would no longer be able to use amortized cost valuation for their portfolio holdings. See supra notes 140, 177, 182, and 328 and accompanying text.

687 See supra note 626 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons that the Commission staff has not measured the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time.
competitive advantage associated with determining not to calculate daily current per-share NAV.

We believe that the effects on efficiency and capital formation of calculating the fund’s current NAV daily cannot be separated from the effects of disclosing money market funds’ current NAV per share daily, which are discussed above.

The costs associated with this proposed requirement include the costs for funds to determine the current values of their portfolio securities each day. We estimate that 25% of active money market funds, or 147 funds, will incur new costs to comply with this requirement.\textsuperscript{688} However, the proposed requirement will result in no additional costs for those money market funds that presently determine their current NAV per share daily on a voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{689}

All money market funds are presently required to disclose their market-based NAV per share monthly on Form N-MFP, and if the proposed amendments to Form N-MFP are adopted, the frequency of this disclosure would increase to weekly.\textsuperscript{690} As discussed below, some money market funds license a software solution from a third party that is used to assist the funds to prepare and file the information that Form N-MFP requires, and some funds retain the services of a third party to provide data aggregation and validation services as part of preparing and filing of reports on Form N-MFP on behalf of the fund.\textsuperscript{691} We expect, based on conversations with industry representatives, that money market funds that do not presently calculate the current

\textsuperscript{688} Commission staff estimates that there are currently 586 active money market funds. This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month ended February 28, 2013. 586 money market funds x 25% = 147 money market funds.

\textsuperscript{689} Based on our understanding of money market fund valuation practices, we estimate that 75% of active money market funds presently determine their current NAV daily.

\textsuperscript{690} See proposed Form N-MFP Item A.21 and B.5 (requiring money market funds to provide net asset value per share data as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported).

\textsuperscript{691} See infra sections III.H.6, IV.A.3 and IV.B.3.
values of their portfolio securities each day would generally use the same software or service
providers to calculate the fund’s current NAV per share daily that they presently use to prepare
and file Form N-MFP, and for these funds, the associated base costs of using this software or
these service providers should not be considered new costs. However, the third-party software
suppliers or service providers may charge more to funds to calculate a fund’s current NAV per
share daily, which costs would be passed on to the fund. While we do not have the information
necessary to provide a point estimate (as they depend on a variety of factors, including discounts
relating to volume and economies of scale, which pricing services may provide to certain funds),
we estimate that the average additional annual costs that a fund would incur associated with
calculating its current NAV daily would range from $6,111 to $24,444.692 Assuming, as
discussed above, that 147 money market funds do not presently determine and publish their
current NAV per share daily, the average additional annual cost that these 147 funds will
collectively incur would range from $898,317 to $3,593,268.693 These costs could be less than
our estimates if funds were to receive significant discounts based on economies of scale or the
volume of securities being priced.

We request comment on this economic analysis:

692 We estimate, based on discussions with industry representatives, that obtaining the price of a portfolio
security would range from $0.25 - $1.00 per CUSIP number per quote. We estimate that each money
market fund’s portfolio consists of, on average, securities representing 97 CUSIP numbers. Therefore, the
additional daily costs to calculate a fund’s market-based NAV per share would range from $24.25 ($0.25 x
97) to $97.00 ($1.00 x 97). The additional annual costs would therefore range from $6,111 (252 business
days in a year x $24.25) to $24,444 (252 business days in a year x $97.00).

693 This estimate is based on the following calculations: low range of $6,111 x 147 funds = $898,317; high
range of $24,444 x 147 funds = $3,593,268. See supra note 692. This figure likely overestimates the costs
that stable price funds would incur if the floating NAV proposal were adopted. This is because fewer than
586 active money market funds would be stable price funds required to calculate their current NAV per
share daily, and thus the estimate of 147 funds (25% x 586 active funds) that would be required to comply
with this requirement is likely overinclusive. Under the floating NAV proposal, floating NAV funds would
calculate their shares’ purchase and sale price daily, but the costs associated with this calculation are
included in the costs discussed above at section III.A.7.
• Are any of the proposed requirements unduly burdensome, or would they impose any unnecessary costs?

• We request comment on the staff’s estimates of the operational costs associated with the proposed disclosure requirements. In particular, we request comment on our assumption that money market funds would generally use the same software or service providers to calculate the fund’s current NAV per share daily that they presently use to prepare and file Form N-MFP.

• We request comment on our analysis of potential effects of these proposed requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

6. Money Market Fund Confirmation Statements

Rule 10b-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Confirmation Rule”) addresses broker-dealers’ obligations to confirm their customers’ securities transactions. The rule provides an exception for transactions in money market funds that attempt to maintain a stable net asset value and where no sales load or redemption fee is charged.694 The rule permits a broker-dealer to provide transaction information to fund shareholders on a monthly basis in lieu of individual, immediate confirmations for all purchases and redemptions of shares of these money market funds.

The floating NAV proposal, if adopted, would negate applicable exemptions that have historically permitted money market funds to maintain a stable net asset value. Instead, money market funds, like other mutual funds, would sell and redeem shares at prices that reflect the current market values of their portfolio securities. Given the likelihood that share prices of money market funds that are not exempt from the floating NAV proposal will fluctuate, broker-

694 See Exchange Act rule 10b-10(b).
dealers may not be permitted under the Confirmation Rule to provide money market fund shareholders transaction information on a monthly basis.\textsuperscript{695}

The Confirmation Rule was designed to provide customers with the relevant information relating to their investment decisions at or before the completion of a transaction. The Confirmation Rule exception was adopted because the Commission believed that in cases where funds maintain a constant net asset value per share and no load is charged, monthly statements were adequate to ensure investor protection due to the stable pricing of the fund shares.\textsuperscript{696}

However, for transactions in a floating NAV fund, investors would not know relevant information about the costs of transacting in fund shares before, or at the time of, the transaction. Because of the floating NAV, investors may desire to obtain more immediate confirmations for all purchases and redemptions to obtain better price transparency at or before the completion of a transaction. We request comment on whether, if we adopt the floating NAV requirement, we should leave the Confirmation Rule unchanged, which would have the effect of requiring broker-dealers to provide fund investors immediate confirmations of their transactions.

- Should broker-dealers be required to provide immediate confirmations to shareholders of funds with a floating NAV, or should broker-dealers be permitted to continue to provide confirmations for these transactions on a monthly basis?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring broker-dealers to provide confirmations for transactions in floating NAV funds? Would the effects of the Confirmation Rule exception balance the need for this information?

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\textsuperscript{695} Our proposal includes exemptions from the floating NAV requirement for government and retail money market funds, which would permit these funds to continue to maintain a stable price per share. See supra sections III.A.3 and III.A.4. Accordingly, for investor transactions in such exempt funds, broker-dealers would still be able to take advantage of the exception in the Confirmation Rule and send monthly transaction reports.

\textsuperscript{696} The Commission’s adopting release extending the confirmation delivery requirement exception noted that “where shares are priced at a constant net asset value per share and no load is charged, the need for investors to receive immediate confirmations does not appear to outweigh the cost to broker-dealers of providing the confirmation.” See Exchange Act Release 34-19887 (Apr. 18, 1983); [48 FR 17585 (Apr. 25, 1983)], at section II.1.
fund shareholders with immediate confirmations of transactions in floating NAV money market funds rather than monthly confirmations?

- If a floating NAV were implemented, what are the reasons why shareholders might prefer to receive this information immediately? Are there any additional costs to broker-dealers associated with providing immediate confirmations? If so, what are the nature and magnitude of such costs? Should the Commission consider alternative exceptions to the Confirmation Rule in the context of a floating NAV, such as permitting confirmations to be provided to shareholders for some different time period (e.g., weekly statements)? What benefits and costs would be associated with any alternative approach?

- How, if at all, do the proposed amendments that require money market funds to disclose daily market-based NAV per share affect the need for immediate confirmations?

G. New Form N-CR

We are proposing a new rule that would require money market funds to file new Form N-CR with the Commission when certain events occur. The information reported on Form N-CR would include instances of portfolio security default, sponsor support of funds, and other similar significant events. We believe that this information would enable the Commission to enhance its oversight of money market funds and its ability to respond to market events. It would also provide investors with better and more timely disclosure of potentially important events. The Commission would be able to use the information provided on Form N-CR in its regulatory, disclosure review, inspection, and policymaking roles. Like Form 8-K under the
Exchange Act, Form N-CR would require disclosure, by means of a current report filed with the Commission, related to specific reportable events. A report on Form N-CR would be made public on the Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system ("EDGAR") immediately upon filing. We would require reporting on Form N-CR under both of the reform alternatives we are proposing today, but the Form would differ in certain respects depending on the alternative that we adopt.

1. **Proposed Disclosure Requirements under Both Reform Alternatives**

Under both the floating NAV alternative and the liquidity fees and gates alternative, we are proposing to require that money market funds file a current report on new Form N-CR within a specified period of time after the occurrence of certain events. Under each proposed alternative, we would require a money market fund to file a report on Form N-CR if the issuer of one or more of the fund’s portfolio securities, or the issuer of a demand feature or guarantee, experiences a default or event of insolvency (other than an immaterial default unrelated to the financial condition of the issuer), and immediately before the default or event of insolvency the portfolio security or securities (or the securities subject to the demand feature or guarantee)

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698 17 CFR 249.308.

699 Proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR General Instructions; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR General Instructions. Proposed Form N-CR would also require a fund to report the following general information: (i) the date of the report; (ii) the registrant’s central index key ("CIK") number; (iii) the EDGAR series identifier; (iv) the Securities Act file number; and (v) the name, email address, and telephone number of the person authorized to receive information and respond to questions about the filing. See proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part A; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part A. The name, email address, and telephone number of the person authorized to receive information and respond to questions about the filing would not be disclosed publicly on EDGAR.

700 See 17 CFR 270.5b-3(c)(2) (defining “event of insolvency” as (i) an admission of insolvency, the application by the person for the appointment of a trustee, receiver, rehabilitator, or similar officer for all or substantially all of its assets, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, the filing by the person of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or application for reorganization or an arrangement with creditors; (ii) the institution of similar proceedings by another person which proceedings are not contested by the person; or (iii) the institution of similar proceedings by a government agency responsible for regulating the activities of the person, whether or not contested by the person).
accounted for at least 1/2 of 1% of the fund’s total assets.\textsuperscript{701} Although rule 2a-7 currently requires money market funds to report defaults or events of insolvency to the Commission by email,\textsuperscript{702} we believe that requiring funds to report these events on Form N-CR would provide important transparency to fund shareholders, and also would provide information more uniformly and efficiently to the Commission. Form N-CR would require funds to disclose certain information about these reportable events, including the nature and financial effect of the default or event of insolvency, as well as the security or securities affected.\textsuperscript{703} The Commission believes that the factors specified in the required disclosure are all necessary to understand the nature and extent of the default, as well as the potential effect of the default on the fund’s operations and its portfolio as a whole.

We would require funds to file a report on Form N-CR within one business day after the default or event of insolvency occurs, which time frame balances, we believe, the exigency of the

\textsuperscript{701} See proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part B; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part B; see also rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A).

\textsuperscript{702} See rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A). We propose to eliminate this requirement should proposed Form N-CR be adopted, as it would duplicate with the proposed Form N-CR reporting requirements discussed in this section.

\textsuperscript{703} See proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part B; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part B. Proposed Form N-CR would require a fund to disclose the following information: (i) the security or securities affected; (ii) the date or dates on which the defaults or events of insolvency occurred; (iii) the value of the affected securities on the dates on which the defaults or events of insolvency occurred; (iv) the percentage of the fund’s total assets represented by the affected security or securities; and (v) a brief description of the actions the fund plans to take in response to such event. See id.

An instrument subject to a demand feature or guarantee would not be deemed to be in default, and an event of insolvency with respect to the security would not be deemed to have occurred, if: (i) in the case of an instrument subject to a demand feature, the demand feature has been exercised and the fund has recovered either the principal amount or the amortized cost of the instrument, plus accrued interest; (ii) the provider of the guarantee is continuing, without protest, to make payments as due on the instrument; or (iii) the provider of a guarantee with respect to an unrated, first-tier asset-backed security, as defined by rule 2a-7, is continuing, without protest, to provide credit, liquidity, or other support as necessary to permit the asset-backed security to make payments as due. See Instruction to proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part B; Instruction to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part B. This instruction is based on the current definition of the term “default” in the provisions of rule 2a-7 that require funds to report defaults or events of insolvency to the Commission. See rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iv).
report with the time it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information.\footnote{704}{See General Instruction A to proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR; general Instruction A to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR.} The Commission and shareholders have a significant interest in receiving the information filed in response to Form N-CR Part B as soon as possible, as the default or event of insolvency required to be reported could signal circumstances that may require Commission action or analysis, and that may affect an investor's decision to purchase shares of the fund or remain invested in the fund.

Additionally, we believe that current reports of occasions on which a money market fund receives financial support from a sponsor or other fund affiliate would provide important transparency to shareholders and the Commission, and also could help shareholders better understand the ongoing risks associated with an investment in the fund.\footnote{705}{See supra section III.F.1.b (discussing the potential benefits and costs of the proposed requirement for a money market fund to disclose on its website any present occasion on which the fund receives financial support from a sponsor or other fund affiliate).} Therefore, under each proposed reform alternative, we would require all money market funds to report all instances of sponsor support on proposed Form N-CR. Specifically, we propose to require money market funds to file Form N-CR if the fund's sponsor, or another affiliated person of the fund, provides any form of financial support to the fund.\footnote{706}{See proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part C; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part C.} The term "financial support" includes, but is not limited to, (i) any capital contribution, (ii) purchase of a security from the fund in reliance on rule 17a-9, (iii) purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, (iv) purchase of fund shares, (v) execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, (vi) capital support agreement (whether or not the fund ultimately received support), (vii) performance guarantee, or (viii) any other similar action to increase the value of the fund's portfolio or otherwise support the fund.
during times of stress.\textsuperscript{707} Form N-CR would require funds receiving such financial support to disclose certain information about the support, including the nature, amount, and terms of the support, as well as the relationship between the person providing the support and the fund.\textsuperscript{708} The Commission believes that factors specified in the required disclosure are necessary for investors to understand the nature and extent of the sponsor's discretionary support of the fund.\textsuperscript{709} The Commission also believes that these factors are necessary for Commission staff to analyze the economic effects of financial support that money market funds receive from sponsors or other affiliated persons.

We would require funds to file a report on Form N-CR within one business day after a fund receives such financial support,\textsuperscript{710} which time frame we believe balances the exigency of the report with the time it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information. The Commission and shareholders have a significant interest in receiving the information filed in response to Form N-CR Part C as soon as possible, as the financial support required to be reported could signal circumstances that may require Commission action or analysis, and that may affect an investor's decision to purchase shares of the fund or remain invested in the fund.

Today, when a sponsor supports a fund by purchasing a security pursuant to rule 17a-9,

\textsuperscript{707} See id.

\textsuperscript{708} See id. Proposed Form N-CR would require a fund to disclose the following information: (i) a description of the nature of the support; (ii) the person providing support; (iii) a brief description of the relationship between the person providing the support and the fund; (iv) a brief description of the reason for the support; (v) the date the support was provided; (vi) the amount of support; (vii) the security supported, if applicable; (viii) the market-based value of the security supported on the date support was initiated, if applicable; (ix) the term of support; and (x) a brief description of any contractual restrictions relating to support.

In addition, if an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, purchases a security from the fund in reliance on rule 17a-9, the money market fund would be required to provide the purchase price of the security, as well as certain other information. Instruction to proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part C; Instruction to proposed (Fees & Gate) Form N-CR Part C.

\textsuperscript{709} See supra note 607.

\textsuperscript{710} See General Instruction A to proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR; general Instruction A to proposed (Fees & Gate) Form N-CR.
we require prompt disclosure of the purchase by email to the Director of the Commission’s Division of Investment Management, but we do not otherwise receive notice of such support unless the fund needs and requests no-action or other relief.711 The proposed Form N-CR reporting requirement would permit the Commission additionally to receive notification of other kinds of financial support (which could affect a fund as significantly as a security purchase pursuant to rule 17a-9) and a description of the reason for the support, and it would also assist investors in understanding the extent to which money market funds receive financial support from their sponsors or other affiliates.712

Under either alternative proposal, we also would require funds that are permitted to transact at a stable price to file a report on proposed Form N-CR on the first business day after any day on which the fund’s current NAV per share713 (rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.0000 share price, or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price) deviates downward significantly from its intended stable price (generally, $1.00). We believe that this requirement to file a report for each day the fund’s current NAV is low would not only permit the Commission and others to better monitor indicators of stress in specific funds or fund groups and in the industry, but also help increase money market funds’ transparency and permit investors to better understand money market funds’ risks.714 We believe that a deviation of 1/4 of 1 percent is sufficiently significant that it could signal future, further

711 See rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B). We propose to eliminate this requirement should proposed Form N-CR be adopted, as it would duplicate with the proposed Form N-CR reporting requirements discussed in this section.

712 As discussed above, money market funds’ receipt of financial support from sponsors and other affiliates has not historically been disclosed to investors, which has resulted in a lack of clarity among investors about which money market funds have received such financial support. See supra text following note 49.

713 See text accompanying supra notes 644 and 645 for definition of “current NAV.”

714 See generally supra section III.F.3.b (discussing the potential benefits and costs of the proposed requirement for a money market fund to disclose its current NAV on its website).
deviations in the fund’s NAV that could require a stable price fund’s board to consider re-pricing
the fund’s shares (among other actions).\footnote{See rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(B) and (C); see also rule 30b1-6T (interim final temporary rule (no longer in effect) requiring money market funds to provide the Commission certain weekly portfolio and valuation information if their market-based net asset value per share declines below 99.75% of its stable NAV).} To this end, if we adopt the floating NAV alternative, we would require only government or retail money market funds to file a report on Form N-CR if the fund’s current NAV per share deviates downward from its intended stable price by more than ¼ of 1 percent.\footnote{Proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Part D. Proposed Form N-CR would require a fund to disclose the following information: (i) the date or dates on which such deviation exceeded ¼ of 1 percent; (ii) the extent of deviation between the fund’s current NAV per share and its intended stable price; and (iii) the principal reason for the deviation, including the name of any security whose market-based value or sale price, or whose issuer’s downgrade, default, or event of insolvency (or similar event) has contributed to the deviation.} If we adopt the liquidity fees and gates alternative, we would require all money market funds to file a report on Form N-CR if the fund’s current NAV per share deviates downward from its intended stable price by more than ¼ of 1 percent.\footnote{Proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part D. Proposed Form N-CR would require a fund to disclose the following information: (i) the date or dates on which such deviation exceeded ¼ of 1 percent; (ii) the extent of the deviation between the fund’s current net asset value per share and its intended stable price; and (iii) the principal reason for the deviation, including the name of any security whose market-based value or sale price, or whose issuer’s downgrade, default, or event of insolvency (or similar event) has contributed to the deviation.} The Commission believes that the factors specified in the required disclosure are all necessary to understanding the nature and extent of the deviation, as well as the potential effect of the deviation on the fund’s operations.

We would require funds to file a report on Form N-CR within one business day following the reportable movement of the fund’s current NAV, which time frame we believe balances the exigency of the report with the time it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information.\footnote{See General Instruction A to proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR; general Instruction A to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR.} The Commission and shareholders have a significant interest in receiving the information filed in response to Form N-CR Part D as soon as possible, as the NAV deviation...
required to be reported could signal circumstances that may require Commission action or analysis, and that may affect an investor’s decision to purchase shares of the fund or remain invested in the fund.

We request comments on the proposed general disclosure requirements of new Form N-CR:

- Are there any other events that warrant a current report filing obligation for money market funds under either or both of the proposed reform alternatives? If so, what are they? Should we add any additional disclosure requirements to proposed Form N-CR? Should any proposed requirements not be included in Form N-CR?

- With respect to the proposed requirement for stable price money market funds to report certain deviations between the fund’s current NAV and its intended stable price per share, is our proposed threshold of reporting (1/4 of 1 percent deviation) appropriate? How frequently should we expect to receive reports based on this threshold? Which threshold would help the public differentiate funds that are having difficulties maintaining their stable price from those that are not? Should we adopt a lower threshold (such as 10 or 20 basis points) or a higher threshold (such as 30 or 40 basis points)? Why or why not? How would investors interpret and respond to this reporting threshold? Would it affect their purchase and redemption activity in the reporting fund or in other funds, and if so, how and why?

- Do the proposed reporting deadlines for each part appropriately balance the Commission’s and the public’s need for information on current events affecting
money market funds with the costs of preparing and submitting a report on Form N-CR? Should we require a longer or shorter time frame in which to file a report on any of the parts of Form N-CR?

- Would the particular information that we propose requiring funds to report in response to Parts B, C, and D of Form N-CR be useful to shareholders in understanding the events triggering the filing of Form N-CR, as well as certain of the risks associated with an investment in the fund? Should we require any more, any less, or any other information to be reported?

- How frequently do commenters anticipate that funds would file Form N-CR to report a default or event of insolvency with respect to portfolio securities, the provision of financial support to the fund, or a significant deviation between the fund's current per-share NAV and its intended stable price? For how many consecutive days do commenters anticipate that funds would likely report low current NAVs? Under what conditions would these reports trigger investor redemptions? Under what conditions would these reports affect investor purchases?

- Which types of investors (or other parties) would be most likely to monitor Form N-CR filings in real time?

- Would the proposed requirement to file a report in response to Part C of Form N-CR make funds less likely to request sponsor support? Why or why not? How would this affect the sponsor's willingness to provide support?

- Would the requirement to file a report in response to Part D of Form N-CR make funds more likely to request sponsor support? Why or why not? How would this
affect the sponsor’s willingness to provide support?

- How would the requirement to file Form N-CR affect the fund’s investment decisions? Would the reporting requirement make the fund more conservative, investing in safer securities to reduce the chance of being required to file Form N-CR? Would this affect fund yield to the point that it would affect how investors choose to invest in the fund?

2. **Additional Proposed Disclosure Requirements under Liquidity Fees and Gates Alternative**

We propose to require that money market funds file a report on Form N-CR if a fund reaches the threshold triggering board consideration of a liquidity fee or redemption gate, if we adopt the proposed liquidity fees and gates alternative. This report would include a description of the fund’s response (such as whether and why a fee was not imposed, as rule 2a-7 requires by default, or whether any why a gate was imposed). The Commission believes that the factors specified in the required disclosure are necessary for investors and the Commission to understand the circumstances surrounding the fund’s weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of

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7/ Proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E and F. Specifically, we propose requiring a report to be filed on Form N-CR if a fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of total fund assets as set forth in proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2). We would require the fund to disclose the following information: (i) the date on which the fund’s weekly liquid assets fell below 15% of total fund assets; (ii) if the fund imposes a liquidity fee pursuant to proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i), the date on which the fund instituted the liquidity fee; (iii) a brief description of the facts and circumstances leading to the fund’s weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of total fund assets; and (iv) a short discussion of the board of directors’ analysis supporting its decision that imposing a liquidity fee pursuant to proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i) (or not imposing such a liquidity fee) would be in the best interest of the fund. Proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part E.

Similarly, if a money market fund whose weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of total fund assets suspends the fund’s redemptions pursuant to [rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii)], we would require the fund to disclose the following information: (i) the date on which the fund’s weekly liquid assets fell below 15% of total fund assets; (ii) the date on which the fund initially suspended redemptions; (iii) a brief description of the facts and circumstances leading to the fund’s weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of total fund assets; and (iv) a short discussion of the board of directors’ analysis supporting its decision to suspend the fund’s redemptions. Proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part F.
total fund assets, or the imposition or removal of a liquidity fee or gate. This in turn could affect
the Commission’s oversight of the fund and regulation of money market funds generally, and
could influence investors’ decisions to purchase shares of the fund or remain invested in the
fund. Disclosure of the board’s analysis regarding whether to impose a liquidity fee or gate
could provide investors and the Commission with a greater understanding of the events affecting
and potentially causing stress to the fund, and could provide insight into the manner in which the
board handles periods of fund stress.

We would also require money market funds to file a report on Form N-CR when the
board lifts the fee or resumes redemptions of fund shares.\textsuperscript{720} We would require funds to file an
initial report on Form N-CR on the first business day following any occasion on which the fund’s
weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets, the fund’s board imposes (or removes) a
liquidity fee, or the fund’s board temporarily suspends (or resumes) the fund’s redemptions,
which report would provide the date of the triggering event(s).\textsuperscript{721} Funds would need to file an
amendment to the initial report on Form N-CR by the fourth business day following any of these
triggering events, which amendment would provide additional detailed information about the
event(s) (namely, a description of the facts and circumstances leading to the triggering event, as
well as a discussion of the fund board’s analysis supporting the decision with respect to the
imposition of fees or gates).\textsuperscript{722} We believe that these reporting requirements would permit the

\textsuperscript{720} Proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part G. Specifically, we would require the fund to disclose the date
on which the fund removed the liquidity fee and/or resumed fund redemptions.

\textsuperscript{721} See General Instruction A to (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR; Instructions to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-
CR Parts E and F.

\textsuperscript{722} Id. The instructions to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part E and Part F specify which information a
fund must file in the initial report, and which information a fund must file in the amendment to the initial
report. Specifically, funds would need to include the date of the triggering event(s) on the initial report.
The amendment to the initial report would include a brief description of the facts and circumstances leading
to the fund’s weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of total fund assets, and a short discussion of the
Commission to better monitor and respond to indicators of stress, and also would help alert shareholders to events that could influence their decision to purchase shares of the fund, as well as their decision or ability to sell fund shares. We believe that the deadlines of one business day for filing an initial report and four business days for amending the initial report balance the exigency of the reports with the time it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information. The Commission and shareholders have a significant interest in knowing that a fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% of total fund assets, and that the fund has imposed or removed a liquidity fee or gate, as soon as possible. This information directly affects investors’ ability to redeem shares of a fund, and it could be a material factor in determining whether to purchase or redeem fund shares. The Commission requires this information to effectively oversee money market funds that have come under stress, and to ensure the protection of investors in these funds. The Part E and Part F initial reports, as well as Part G, do not require funds to submit substantial analysis of the underlying factors; thus, we propose to require funds to submit Part E and Part F initial reports, as well as Part G, within one business day of the event triggering the filing.

The Commission and shareholders also have a substantial interest in receiving the information that a fund would submit in amending an initial report filed in response to events specified in Part E or Part F. However, we believe that receiving an analysis of the factors leading to the imposition of fees and/or gates, as well as the board’s determination whether to impose a fee and/or gates, would be of less immediate concern to the Commission and

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board’s rationale in determining whether to impose a liquidity fee (if the fund is filing Part E) or gate (if the fund is filing Part F).

Proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part G would not require an amendment after its initial filing, because Part G simply requires a fund to disclose the date on which the fund lifted liquidity fees and/or resumed fund redemptions.
shareholders. Also, the disclosure in the amendment would require more time to compose and compile than the information required to be submitted in the initial report. Because funds would be required to submit a moderate amount of explanatory information in amending initial Part E or Part F reports, and because the personnel of a fund required to file a Part E or Part F report will likely simultaneously be occupied resolving fund liquidity pressures, we propose to permit funds to submit amendments to initial Part E or Part F reports within four business days.

We request comments on the proposed additional requirements in new Form N-CR specific to the proposed liquidity fees and gates alternative:

- Should we add any additional disclosure requirements to proposed Form N-CR specific to the proposed liquidity fees and gates alternative? Should any of the proposed requirements not be included in Form N-CR?

- Should we require reporting not just when a fund reaches the thresholds that trigger consideration of board action, but also before those triggers are reached? If so, when should we require reporting? When weekly liquid assets reach 25% of portfolio assets? Some other number? What additional information should we ask? Would a higher reporting requirement result in too-frequent reporting?

- Should we require reporting not just when a fund reaches the thresholds that trigger consideration of board action, but also at some threshold after those triggers are reached? If yes, when should we require the additional reporting? When weekly liquid assets reach 10% of portfolio assets? Some other number? Should we require similar reporting when daily liquid assets drop below a certain threshold? If so, what threshold should we require? When daily liquid assets reach 0%, or should we set a higher threshold such as 5%?
• Would the particular information that we propose requiring funds to report in response to Parts E, F, and G of Form N-CR be useful to shareholders in understanding the events triggering the filing of Form N-CR? Should we require any more, any less, or any other information to be reported?

• How frequently do commenters anticipate that funds would file reports on proposed Form N-CR in response to the proposed requirements specific to the proposed liquidity fees and gates alternative? What average length of time do commenters anticipate transpiring between a fund’s initial report in response to Part E or Part F of Form N-CR, and a fund’s report in response to Part G of Form N-CR?

• Do the proposed reporting deadlines appropriately balance the Commission’s and the public’s need for information on current events affecting money market funds with the costs of preparing and submitting a report on Form N-CR? Does the proposed requirement to file an initial report on Form N-CR for Parts E and F within one business day following a triggering event, and then to file an amended report within four business days following the event, appropriately balance the exigency of the reports with the time that it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information for each part? Should we require a longer or shorter time frame in which to file a report on Form N-CR for any of the parts?

• Are there any other events that warrant a current report filing obligation under the proposed liquidity fees and gates alternative?

• How, if at all, would the requirement to file Form N-CR affect the fund’s investment decisions, including the fund’s decision to invest in weekly liquid
assets?

- How, if at all, would the requirement to file Form N-CR affect the fund's decisions with respect to accepting investments from certain groups of shareholders? For example, would funds be less likely to accept investments from large shareholders or short-term shareholders?

- How, if at all, would the requirement to file Form N-CR affect the board's decisions surrounding the imposition of liquidity fees and gates? Would the Form N-CR filing requirement affect the board's willingness to deviate from the default liquidity fee requirements? Why or why not?

3. Economic Analysis

As discussed above, we believe that the Form N-CR reporting requirements would provide important transparency to investors and the Commission, and also could help investors better understand the risks associated with a particular money market fund, or the money market fund industry generally. The Form N-CR reporting requirements would permit investors and the Commission to receive information about certain money market fund material events consistently and relatively quickly. As discussed above, we believe that investors and the Commission have a significant interest in receiving this information because it would permit investors and the Commission to monitor indicators of stress in specific funds or fund groups, as well as the money market fund industry, and also to analyze the economic effects of certain material events. The Form N-CR reporting requirements could give investors and the Commission a greater understanding of the circumstances leading to events of stress, and also how a fund's board handles events of stress. We believe that investors could find all of this information to be material and helpful in determining whether to purchase fund shares, or remain
invested in a fund. However, we recognize that the Form N-CR reporting requirements have operational costs (discussed below), and also may result in opportunity costs, in that personnel of a fund that has experienced an event that requires Form N-CR reporting may lose a certain amount of time that could be used to respond to that event because of the need to comply with the reporting requirement. However, as discussed above, we believe that the proposed time frames for filing reports on Form N-CR balance the exigency of the report with the time it will reasonably take a fund to compile the required information.

We believe that the proposed Form N-CR reporting requirements may complement the benefits of increased transparency of publicly available money market fund information that have resulted from the requirement that money market funds report their portfolio holdings and other key information on Form N-MFP each month. The RSFI Study found that the additional disclosures that money market funds are required to make on Form N-MFP improve fund transparency (although funds file the form on a monthly basis with no interim updates, and the Commission currently makes the information public with a 60-day lag).723 The RSFI Study also noted that this “increased transparency, even if reported on a delayed basis, might dampen a fund manager’s willingness to hold securities whose ratings are at odds with the underlying risk, especially at times when credit conditions are deteriorating.”724 Additionally, the availability of public, standardized, money market fund-related data that has resulted from the Form N-MFP filing requirement has assisted both the Commission and the money market fund industry in

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723 See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 31; see also infra note 793 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission’s proposal to eliminate the 60-day delay in making Form N-MFP information publicly available).

724 See RSFI Study, supra note 21, at 38.
various studies and analyses of money market fund operations and risks. The proposed Form N-CR reporting requirement could extend these benefits of Form N-MFP by providing additional transparency about money market funds’ risks on a near real-time basis, which may, like Form N-MFP disclosure, impose market discipline on portfolio managers and provide additional data that would allow investors to make investment decisions, and the Commission and the money market fund industry to conduct risk- and operations-related analyses.

We believe that the proposed reporting requirements may positively affect regulatory efficiency because all money market funds would be required to file information about certain material events on a standardized form, thus improving the consistency of information disclosure and reporting, and assisting the Commission in overseeing individual funds, and the money market fund industry generally, more effectively. The proposed requirements also could positively affect informational efficiency. This could assist investors in understanding various risks associated with certain funds, and risks associated with the money market fund industry generally, which in turn could assist investors in choosing whether to purchase or redeem shares of certain funds. The proposed requirements could positively affect competition because funds could compete with each other based on certain information required to be disclosed on Form N-CR, as well as based on more traditional competitive factors such as price and yield. For instance, investors might see a fund that invests in securities whose issuers have never experienced a default as a more attractive investment than a similar fund that frequently files reports in response to Form N-CR Part B ("Default or Event of Insolvency of portfolio security issuer"). However, if investors move their assets among money market funds or decide to invest

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725 See, e.g., Money Market Mutual Funds, Risk, and Financial Stability in the Wake of the 2010 Reforms, 19 ICI Research Perspective No. 1 (Jan. 2013), at n.29 (noting that certain portfolio-related data points are often only available from the SEC’s Form N-MFP report).
in investment products other than money market funds as a result of the Form N-CR reporting requirements, this could negatively affect the competitive stance of certain money market funds, or the money market fund industry generally. If money market fund investors decide to move all or a substantial portion of their money out of the market, this could negatively affect capital formation. On the other hand, capital formation could be positively affected if the Form N-CR reporting requirements were to assist the Commission in overseeing and regulating the money market fund industry, and the resulting regulatory framework more efficiently or more effectively encouraged investors to invest in money market funds. Additional effects of these proposed filing requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation would vary according to the event precipitating the Form N-CR filing, and they are substantially similar to the effects of other proposed disclosure requirements, as discussed in more detail above.

The operational costs of filing Form N-CR in response to the events specified in Parts B - G of Form N-CR are discussed below. The Commission staff has not measured the quantitative benefits of these proposed requirements at this time because of uncertainty about how increased transparency may affect different investors’ understanding of the risks associated

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726 For an analysis of the potential macroeconomic effects of our proposals, see supra section III.E.1.

727 We believe that the effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation of filing Form N-CR in response to Part B or C would overlap significantly with the effects of the proposed disclosure requirements regarding the financial support provided to money market funds. See discussion in supra section III.F.1.b. We believe that the effects of filing Form N-CR in response to Part D would overlap significantly with the effects of the proposed disclosure requirements regarding a money market fund’s daily market-based NAV per share. See discussion in supra section III.F.3.b. We believe that the effects of filing Form N-CR in response to Parts E, F, and G would overlap significantly with the effects of the proposed disclosure requirements regarding current and historical instances of the imposition of liquidity fees and/or gates. See supra section III.B.8.f.

728 These costs incorporate the costs of responding to Part A (“General information”) of Form N-CR. We anticipate that the costs associated with responding to Part A will be minimal, because Part A requires a fund to submit only basic identifying information.
with money market funds and their imposition of market discipline.\textsuperscript{729} We have estimated that the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part B of Form N-CR would be higher than the costs that money market funds currently incur in complying with rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A), which requires money market funds to report defaults or events of insolvency to the Commission by e-mail.\textsuperscript{730} We estimate the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part B of Form N-CR to be \$1,708 per filing,\textsuperscript{731} and we expect, based on our estimate of the average number of notifications of events of default or insolvency that money market funds currently file each year, that the Commission would receive approximately 20 such filings per year.\textsuperscript{732} Therefore, we expect that the annual costs relating to filing a report on Form N-CR in response to an event specified on Part B would be \$34,160.\textsuperscript{733} Likewise, we have estimated that the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part C of Form N-CR in part by reference to the costs that money market funds currently incur in complying with rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B), which requires disclosure to the Commission by e-mail when a sponsor supports a money market fund by purchasing a security in reliance on rule 17a-9. However, because Part C of Form N-CR defines "financial support" more broadly than the purchase of a security from a fund in reliance on rule 17a-9, and because

\textsuperscript{729} Likewise, uncertainty regarding the proposed disclosure's effect on different investors' behavior makes it difficult for the SEC staff to measure the quantitative benefits of the proposed requirements at this time.

\textsuperscript{730} The requirements of rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A) and the requirement of Part B of Form N-CR are substantially similar, although Part B on its face specifies more information to be reported than rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A). However, Commission staff understands that funds disclosing events of default or insolvency pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A) already have historically reported substantially the same information proposed to be required by Part B.

\textsuperscript{731} The costs associated with filing Form N-CR in response to an event specified on Part B of Form N-CR are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra section IV.A.4 and IV.B.4.


\textsuperscript{733} These estimates are based on the following calculations: \$1,708 (cost per report) \times 20 filings per year = \$34,160 per year. See supra notes 731 - 732 and accompanying text.
the requirements of Part C of Form N-CR are more extensive than the requirements of rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B), we expect that the costs associated with filing a report in response to a Part C event would be higher than the current costs of compliance with rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B). We estimate the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part C of Form N-CR to be $1,708 per filing.\footnote{734} and we expect, based in part by reference to our estimate of the average number of notifications of security purchases in reliance on rule 17a-9 that money market funds currently file each year, that the Commission would receive approximately 40 such filings per year.\footnote{735} Therefore, we expect that the annual costs relating to filing a report on Form N-CR in response to an event specified on Part C would be $68,320.\footnote{736}

As discussed in more detail in section IV below, we have estimated the costs associated with filing a report on Form N-CR in response to an event specified on Part D, E, F, or G on a broad average basis. In particular, in an event of filing, the staff believes a fund's particular circumstances that gave rise to a reportable event would be the predominant factor in determining the time and costs associated with filing a report on Form N-CR. Accordingly, on average, we estimate the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part D of Form N-CR to be $1,708 per report.\footnote{737} On average, we estimate the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part E or Part F of Form N-CR to be $1,708 per filing.\footnote{738} On average, we estimate the costs of filing a report in response to an event specified on Part G of

\footnote{734} The costs associated with filing Form N-CR in response to an event specified on Part C of Form N-CR are paperwork-related costs and are discussed in more detail in infra section IV.A.4 and IV.B.4.


\footnote{736} These estimates are based on the following calculations: $1,708 (cost per report) x 40 filings per year = $68,320 per year. See supra notes 734 - 735 and accompanying text.

\footnote{737} See infra section IV.A.4 and IV.B.4:

\footnote{738} Id. This estimate includes the costs of filing an initial report, as well as amending the initial report. See instructions to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E, F.
Form N-CR to be $1,708 per filing.\textsuperscript{739} We request comment on this economic analysis:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Would any of the proposed disclosure requirements impose unnecessary costs? Why or why not?
  \item How many filings would be made each year in response to the events specified on each of Part B, Part C, Part D, Part E, Part F, and Part G of Form N-CR?
  \item Please comment on our analysis of the potential effects of these proposed disclosure requirements on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
\end{itemize}

H. Amendments to Form N-MFP Reporting Requirements

The Commission is proposing to amend Form N-MFP, the form that money market funds use to report to us their portfolio holdings and other key information each month. We use the information to monitor money market funds and support our examination and regulatory programs. Each fund must file information on Form N-MFP electronically within five business days after the end of each month. We make the information public 60 days after the end of the month.\textsuperscript{740} Money market funds began reporting this information to us in November 2010.\textsuperscript{741} We are proposing to amend Form N-MFP to reflect amendments to rule 2a-7 discussed above, as well as request certain additional information that would be useful for our oversight of money market funds, and make other improvements to the form based on our experience with filings submitted during the past two and a half years. As discussed below in section III.H.1, our proposed amendments related to rule 2a-7 changes proposed elsewhere in this Release would be

\textsuperscript{739} Id.

\textsuperscript{740} See rule 30b1-7(b).

\textsuperscript{741} On average, 616 money market funds filed Form N-MFP with us each month during 2012. Funds reported information on nearly 68,000 securities on average each month.
adopted under either regulatory alternative. Regardless of the regulatory alternative adopted, or
if neither alternative is adopted, we anticipate that we would adopt the other amendments that we
propose to make to the Form described in this section relating to new reporting requirements,
clarifying amendments, and public availability of information (sections III.H.2 – III.H.4 below)
because they would be relevant to the Commission’s efforts to oversee the stability of money
market funds and compliance with rule 2a-7.¹⁴² In connection with these amendments, we
propose to renumber the items of Form N-MFP to separate the items into four separate
sections.¹⁴³

1. Amendments Related to Rule 2a-7 Reforms

Under our floating NAV proposal or our liquidity fees and gates proposal, we would
revise Form N-MFP to reflect certain proposed amendments to rule 2a-7. Because both
alternative proposals would require that all money market funds (including government and retail
money market funds otherwise exempt) value portfolio securities using market-based factors
and/or fair value pricing (not amortized cost)¹⁴⁴, we propose to amend the items in Form N-MFP
that reference “amortized cost.” Those items instead would require that funds disclose the

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¹⁴² References to Form N-MFP will be “Proposed Form N-MFP Item.” We are not proposing to amend items
in Form N-MFP that reference credit ratings. References to credit ratings will be addressed in a separate
rulemaking. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.

¹⁴³ See proposed Form N-MFP: (i) general information (Items 1 – 8); (ii) information about each series of
the fund (Items A.1 – A.21); (iii) information about each class of the fund (Items B.1 – B.8); and
(iv) information about portfolio securities (Items C.1 – C.25). Our proposed renumbering of the items will
enable us to add or delete items in the future without having to re-number all subsequent items in the form.

¹⁴⁴ As discussed above, money market funds, like other mutual funds, would be able to use amortized cost to
value securities with maturities of 60 days or less provided the fund’s board determines that the security’s
fair value is its amortized cost and the circumstances do not suggest otherwise. See supra note 136 and
accompanying discussion. Because the board in these circumstances must conclude that the amortized
value of the securities is the fair value of the securities, there would be no need for separate disclosure of
both values. In addition, government and retail money market funds, which would be exempt from our
floating NAV proposal, would be required to value portfolio securities using market-based factors (not
amortized cost), but continue to be allowed to use penny rounding to maintain a stable price per share. See
supra sections III.A.3 and III.A.4.
Accordingly, without amortized cost, funds would not have a "shadow price" to disclose. Therefore, we also propose to eliminate the items in Form N-MFP that require disclosure of "shadow prices." A fund would still be required to disclose the net asset value per share at the series level and class level, but we propose to require that each monthly report include the net asset value per share as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported. Thus, while funds would continue to file reports on Form N-MFP once each month (as they do today), certain limited information (such as the NAV per share) would be reported on a weekly basis. In addition, we propose to require, both for each series and each class, reporting of the net asset value per share, rounded to the fourth decimal place for a fund with a $1.00 share price (or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price). If we adopted our floating NAV proposal, this would conform net asset value per share reporting to the rounding.
convention in our rule proposal.\textsuperscript{748} If we adopted our liquidity fees and gates proposal, these items would in effect require reporting of the fund's price per share without penny rounding. This information would be used by the Commission and others to identify money market funds that continue to seek to maintain a stable price per share\textsuperscript{749} and better evaluate any potential deviations in their unrounded share price. Finally, we propose to amend the category options at the series level that money market funds use to identify themselves and include government funds that would be exempt under either alternative proposal.\textsuperscript{750}

Our proposed amendment to require that each monthly report include the net asset value per share as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported would be consistent with other actions taken by the Commission and fund industry participants to increase the frequency of disclosure of funds' NAV per share (on funds' websites).\textsuperscript{751} Despite the increased frequency of disclosure within the monthly report, funds would continue to file reports on Form N-MFP once each month. By including this information in Form N-MFP, in addition to a fund's website, Commission staff and others may better monitor the risks that may be present in declining prices, for example. This information, if available on Form N-MFP, could then be aggregated and analyzed across the fund industry. If we adopt our floating NAV proposal, funds required to price their shares at the market-based NAV per share would already have this information readily available. Also, as noted above, many money market funds have begun

\textsuperscript{748} See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(1).

\textsuperscript{749} We propose to require that a fund that seeks to maintain a stable price per share state the price that the fund seeks to maintain. See proposed Form N-MFP Item A.18.

\textsuperscript{750} See proposed Form N-MFP Item A.10 (adding "Exempt Government" category). If we adopt the floating NAV alternative, we would also add a new category for "Exempt Retail" funds.

\textsuperscript{751} See supra section III.F.3 (proposing to require that money market funds disclose on fund websites the fund's current market-based NAV per share); see also infra note 793 and accompanying text (noting the current industry trend to disclose shadow prices daily on fund websites).
disclosing shadow prices daily on fund websites and therefore we believe this information is readily available to funds. Any effect resulting from our proposed amendment to require that each monthly report include NAV per share data on a weekly basis is included in our economic analysis of our proposed amendment to require that money market funds disclose NAV per share daily on fund websites. Finally, we note that the remaining proposed changes would omit or amend disclosure requirements that would no longer be relevant if we adopt the changes we are proposing to rule 2a-7. Accordingly, we do not believe that the proposed amendments would impose costs on money market funds other than those required to modify systems used to aggregate data and file reports on Form N-MFP. These costs are discussed in section III.H.6 below.

We believe that the proposed revised form will be easier for investors to understand because the simplifications allow investors to focus on a single market-based valuation for individual portfolio securities and the fund’s overall NAV per share. This approach is also consistent with today’s standard practice for mutual funds that are not money market funds. We expect that the overall effects will be to increase efficiency for not only investors but also the funds themselves. As discussed above, the floating NAV proposal and the liquidity fees and gates proposal will affect both competition and capital formation. Because we believe that investors are likely to make at least incremental changes to their trading patterns in money market funds due to the proposed changes to Form N-MFP, it is likely that the changes will affect competition and capital formation. Although it is difficult to quantify the size of these effects without better knowledge about how investors will respond, we believe that the effects from the proposed changes to Form N-MFP will be small relative to the effects of the underlying

\[752 \textit{See supra section III.F.3}\]
alternative proposals. We seek comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- Should money market funds be required to include in each monthly Form N-MFP filing the NAV per share as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported? Or should we require that money market funds report market-based NAV per share data daily on Form N-MFP? Would the costs be significantly different from reporting monthly data, as is currently required? Would the costs to funds be significantly different from reporting weekly data, as we propose above? Please describe the associated costs.

- Do commenters agree with our analysis of potential effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation?

2. New Reporting Requirements

We are also proposing (regardless of the alternative proposal adopted, if any) several new items to Form N-MFP that we believe will improve our (and investors') ability to monitor money market funds. These proposed amendments would address gaps in information that have become apparent during the time we have received Form N-MFP filings and our staff has analyzed the data. As discussed further below, each proposed amendment requires reporting of additional information that should be readily available to the fund and, in many cases, should infrequently change from report to report.

Several proposed amendments are designed to help us and investors better identify fund

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753 The proposed new reporting requirements, clarifying amendments, amendments related to public availability of information, and potential amendment to Form N-MFP's filing date, discussed in infra sections III.H.2 – 5 are separate from the proposed amendments to Form N-MFP related to the rule 2a-7 reforms discussed above (see supra section III.H.1). Thus, even if we do not adopt amendments to rule 2a-7, we may adopt the other proposed amendments to Form N-MFP.
portfolio securities. To facilitate monitoring and analysis of the risks posed by funds, it is important for Commission staff to be able to identify individual portfolio securities. Fund shareholders and potential investors that are evaluating the risks of a fund’s portfolio would similarly benefit from the clear identification of a fund’s portfolio securities. Currently, the form requests information about the CUSIP number of a security, which the staff uses as a search reference. The staff has found that some securities reported by money market funds lack a CUSIP number, and this absence has reduced the usefulness of other information reported. To address this issue going forward, we propose to require that funds report, in addition to the CUSIP, the Legal Entity Identifier (“LEI”) that corresponds to the security. The proposed amendments would also require that funds report at least one other security identifier.

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754 We also propose to require that a fund provide the name, e-mail address, and telephone number of the person authorized to receive information and respond to questions about Form N-MFP. We plan to exclude this information from Form N-MFP information that is made publicly available through EDGAR. Proposed Form N-MFP Item 8.

755 Our inability to identify specific securities, for example, limits our ability to compare ownership of the security across multiple funds and monitor issuer exposure. During the month of February 2013, funds reported 6,821 securities without CUSIPs (approximately 10% of all securities reported on the form).

756 See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.4; Proposed Form N-MFP General Instructions, E. Definitions (defining “LEI”). To ensure accurate identification of Form N-MFP filers and update the Form for pending industry-wide changes, we are also proposing that each registrant provide its LEI, if available. See proposed Form N-MFP Item 3. The Legal Entity Identifier is a unique identifier associated with a single corporate entity and is intended to provide a uniform international standard for identifying counterparties to a transaction. The Commission has begun to require disclosure of the LEI, once available. See, e.g., Form PF, Reporting Form for Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf. A global LEI standard is currently in the implementation stage. See Frequently Asked Questions: Global Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) (Feb. 2013), U.S. Treasury Dept., available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/off/data/Documents/LEI_FAQs_February2013_FINAL.pdf. Consistent with staff guidance provided in a Form PF Frequently Asked Questions (http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/pfdr/pfdrfaq.shtml), funds that have been issued a CFTC Interim Compliant Identifier (“CICI”) by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may provide this identifier in lieu of the LEI until a global LEI standard is established.

757 See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.5 (requiring that, in addition to the CUSIP and LEI, a fund provide at least one additional security identifier (e.g., ISIN, CIK or other unique identifier)). Security identifiers should be readily available to funds. See, e.g., http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/cik.htm (providing a CIK lookup that is searchable by company name). We are also proposing to require that a fund provide the CUSIP number and LEI (if available) for a security subject to a repurchase agreement. See proposed Form N-MFP Items C.8.c. and C.8.d.
We also propose amendments that are designed to help the staff (and investors) better identify certain risk characteristics that the form currently does not capture. Responses to these new items, together with other information reported, would improve the staff’s (and investors’) understanding of a fund and its potential risks. First, we propose to require funds to report whether a security is categorized as a level 1, level 2, or level 3 measurement in the fair value hierarchy under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.\textsuperscript{758} Level 1 measurements include quoted prices for identical securities in an active market (e.g., active exchange-traded equity securities; U.S. government and agency securities). Level 2 measurements include: (i) quoted prices for similar securities in active markets; (ii) quoted prices for identical or similar securities in non-active markets; and (iii) pricing models whose inputs are observable or derived principally from or corroborated by observable market data through correlation or other means for substantially the full term of the security. Securities categorized as level 3 are those whose value cannot be determined by using observable measures (such as market quotes and prices of comparable instruments) and often involve estimates based on certain assumptions.\textsuperscript{759}

We understand that most money market fund portfolio securities are categorized as level 2. Although we understand that very few of a money market fund’s portfolio securities are currently valued using unobservable inputs, information about any such securities would enable our staff to identify individual securities that may be more susceptible to wide variations in pricing.\textsuperscript{760} Commission staff could also use this information to monitor for increased valuation

\textsuperscript{758} See Accounting Standards Codification 820, “Fair Value Measurement”; Proposed Form N-MFP Item C.20.

\textsuperscript{759} See Accounting Standards Codification 820, “Fair Value Measurement”.

\textsuperscript{760} For a discussion of some of the challenges regulators may face with respect to Level 3 accounting, see, e.g., Konstantin Milbradt, \textit{Level 3 Assets: Booking Profits and Concealing Losses}, in 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 55-95 (2011).
risk in these securities, and to the extent there is a concentration in the security across the industry, identify potential outliers that warrant additional monitoring or investigation. Our proposed amendment would permit the Commission and others to analyze movements in the assets in each level, for example, movements in level 2 securities as a percentage of net assets. In addition, Commission staff would be better able to identify anomalies in reported data by aggregating all money market fund holdings industry-wide into the various level categories. We believe that most funds directly evaluate the fair value level measurements when they acquire the security and re-assess the measurements when they perform portfolio valuations.\textsuperscript{761}

Accordingly, we believe that funds should have ready access to the nature of the portfolio security valuation inputs used.

- Would our new proposed requirements help us better identify certain risk characteristics that the form currently does not capture?
- Would information about each security’s categorization as a level 1, level 2, or level 3 measurement better enable our staff to identify individual securities that may be more susceptible to wide variations in pricing?
- Is our understanding about how fund sponsors value most money market fund portfolio securities (\textit{i.e.}, using Level 2 measurements) correct?
- Do our assumptions about fund valuation procedures and access to the nature of portfolio security valuation inputs correspond to fund practices? Is this information readily available to a fund?
- Are there other ways in which a fund could identify and disclose securities that do not

\textsuperscript{761} Funds should regularly evaluate the pricing methodologies used and test the accuracy of fair value prices (if used). See Accounting Series Release No. 118, Financial Reporting Codification (CCH) section 404.03 (Dec. 23, 1970).
have readily available market quotations or observable inputs?

- Do commenters agree that this information will help the Commission and investors better identify risk characteristics?

Second, we would require that funds disclose additional information about each portfolio security, including, in addition to the total principal amount, the purchase date, the yield at purchase, the yield as of the Form N-MFP reporting date (for floating and variable rate securities, if applicable), and the purchase price. We would require that funds report this information separately for each lot purchased. In addition, we propose to require that money market funds disclose the same information for any security sold during the reporting period. Because money market funds often hold multiple maturities of a single issuer, each time a security is purchased or sold, price discovery occurs and an issuer yield curve could be updated and used for revaluing all holdings of that particular credit. Therefore, our proposed amendments would have the incidental benefit of facilitating price discovery and would enable

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762 Current Form N-MFP Item 40.

763 We understand that the yields on variable rate demand notes, for example, may vary daily, weekly, or monthly. Our proposed amendment would provide Commission staff and others with a way to monitor the market's response to changes in credit quality, as well as identify potential outliers. We believe that money market funds have this information readily available because funds require this information to calculate daily distributions of income, and thus, should not impose costs on funds (other than those discussed in infra section III.H.6).

764 See proposed N-MFP Item C.17. Because yield at purchase would be disclosed in a separate item, we propose to delete the reference to "(including coupon or yield)" from current Form N-MFP Item 27 (Proposed Form N-MFP Item C.2). The purchase price must be reported as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent. See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.17.e. We believe this represents the standard convention for pricing fixed-income securities. For example, a security issued at a 1% premium to par would report the purchase price as $101.000.

765 See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.17.

766 See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.25 (requiring that a fund disclose, for each security sold by the series during the reporting period, (i) the total principal amount; (ii) the purchase price; (iii) the sale date; (iv) the yield at sale; and (v) the sale price. Information about any securities sold by the fund during the reporting period would also provide the Commission and others with important information about how the fund may be handling heavy redemptions (e.g., selling securities at a haircut).
the Commission and others to evaluate pricing consistency across funds (and identify potential
outliers). We request comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- Do commenters agree that our proposed additional requirements would facilitate price
discovery? Would any of our proposed additional requirements not facilitate price
discovery? Are there other requirements than those proposed that would be helpful?
- Should we require a different convention for pricing fixed income securities? If so,
what?

In addition, we would require funds to report the amount of cash they hold, the fund’s
Daily Liquid Assets and Weekly Liquid Assets, and whether each security is considered a
Daily Liquid Asset or Weekly Liquid Asset. Unlike the other items of disclosure on Form N-
MFP which must be disclosed on a monthly basis, we propose to require that funds report the
Daily Liquid Assets and Weekly Liquid Assets on a weekly basis. Similarly, we propose to
require that money market funds disclose the weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend
reinvestments) and weekly gross redemptions for each share class, once each week during the
month reported. As discussed earlier, money market funds would continue to file reports on
Form N-MFP once each month, but certain information (including disclosure of Daily and

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767 See Federal Reserve Bank Presidents FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 38 (suggesting that more frequent
reporting on Form N-MFP might increase price discovery (for market-based NAV calculations)).
768 See proposed Form N-MFP Item A.14.a; Proposed Form N-MFP General Instructions, E. Definitions
(require disclosure of the amount of cash held and defining “cash” to mean demand deposits in insured
depository institutions and cash holdings in custodial accounts). We propose to amend Item 14 of Current
Form N-MFP (total value of other assets) to clarify that “other assets” excludes the value of assets
disclosed separately (e.g., cash and the value of portfolio securities). See proposed Form N-MFP Item
A.14.c. Our proposed amendment would ensure that reported amounts are not double counted.
769 See proposed Form N-MFP Item A.13.
770 Proposed Form N-MFP Items C.21 – C.22.
771 See proposed Form N-MFP Item B.6. We propose to continue to require that money market funds also
disclose the monthly gross subscriptions and monthly gross redemptions for the month reported. See
current Form N-MFP Item 23 (proposed Form N-MFP Item B.6.f).
Weekly Liquid Assets and shareholder flow) would be reported weekly within the Form.

Our proposed amendments would provide Commission staff and others with more relevant data to efficiently monitor fund risk, such as the likelihood that a fund might trip a liquidity-based trigger (e.g., a liquidity fee or gate, if that regulatory alternative is adopted) and correlated risk shifts in liquidity across the industry. Increased periodic disclosure of the daily and weekly liquid assets on Form N-MFP would provide increased transparency into how funds manage their liquidity, and it may also impose market discipline on portfolio managers. In addition, increased disclosure of weekly gross subscriptions and gross redemptions (reported weekly, in addition to monthly) would improve the ability of the Commission and others to better understand the significance of other liquidity disclosures required by our proposals (e.g., daily and weekly liquid assets). As a result, investors may make more informed investment decisions and fund managers may manage fund portfolios in a way that enhances stability in the short-term financing markets. We also propose to require that funds disclose whether, during the reporting period, any person paid for or waived all or part of the fund’s operating expenses or management fees. Information about expense waivers will help us understand potential strains on a fund’s investment adviser during periods of low interest rates. We request comment on these aspects of our proposed reforms.

- Would reporting the daily and weekly liquid asset levels and gross subscriptions and redemptions as of the close of business each Friday during the reporting period conflict with the fund’s other disclosure requirements, which are required only as of

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772 As discussed in section III.F.2, under either alternative proposal, money market funds would also be required to disclose each day on its website the fund’s Daily Liquid Assets and Weekly Liquid Assets.

773 Proposed Form N-MFP Item B.8 (requiring that funds provide the name of the person and describe the nature and amount the expense payment or fee waiver, or both (reported in dollars).
the last business day or any later calendar day in the month? Should we require that this information be provided to the Commission more or less frequently, or at a different time or day each week?

- Would reporting on expense waivers help us and investors better understand potential financial strains on a fund’s investment adviser?

- Do commenters agree that increased transparency will lead to greater market discipline on portfolio managers and lead investors to make more informed decisions?

We also propose to require that funds disclose the total percentage of shares outstanding, to the nearest tenth of one percent, held by the twenty largest shareholders of record. ⁷⁷⁴ This information would help us (and investors) identify funds with significant potential redemption risk stemming from shareholder concentration, and evaluate the likelihood that a significant market or credit event might result in a run on the fund or the imposition of a liquidity fee or gate, if we were to adopt that aspect of our proposal. ⁷⁷⁵ Investors may avoid overly concentrated funds and this preference may incentivize some funds to avoid becoming too concentrated. This may, in turn, increase investment costs for large shareholders that are compelled to spread their investments across multiple funds, especially if they choose funds from multiple fund groups.

We request comment on this proposed reporting.

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⁷⁷⁴ See, e.g., Fidelity Investments, An Analysis of the SEC Study on Money Market Mutual Funds: Considering the Scope and Impact of Possible Further Regulation (Jan. 2013) at 5, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/mms-response/mmsresponse-16.pdf (suggesting one key factor that could be used to distinguish between retail and institutional money market funds be whether the top 20 shareholders accounts for greater than or less than 15% of the fund’s assets).

⁷⁷⁵ Proposed Form N-MFP Item A.19. We are also proposing to require that a fund disclose the number of shares outstanding, to the nearest hundredth, at both the series level and class level. Proposed Form N-MFP Items A.17 and B.4. This information would permit us to verify or detect errors in information provided on Form N-MFP, such as net asset value per share.
• Would the total percentage of shares outstanding held by the fund’s twenty largest shareholders help us and investors identify funds with significant potential redemption risk stemming from shareholder concentration?

• Would the use of omnibus accounts reduce the value of information about shareholder concentration? If so, is there other data we could require that would yield more useful information?

• Could funds or shareholders “game” this reporting requirement by splitting a large investment into smaller pieces? Are there reasonable rules the Commission could adopt to address this potential “gaming?”

• Should we require that funds report the total holdings of a different number of top shareholders (e.g., five, ten, or thirty shareholders)?

• Should we require the reporting of this information only if the top shareholders of record own in the aggregate at least a certain total percentage of the fund’s outstanding shares? If so, how many shareholders should we consider, and what should that threshold be (e.g., 1%, 2%, or 5%)?

• Is there a better way to assess the risks associated with shareholder concentration? Should we require aggregation of holdings by affiliates?

In addition, we propose that funds report the maturity date for each portfolio security using the maturity date used to calculate the dollar-weighted average life maturity (“WAL”) (i.e., without reference to the exceptions in rule 2a-7(i) regarding interest rate readjustments).\textsuperscript{776} In 2010, we adopted a requirement that limits the WAL of a fund’s portfolio to 120 calendar days because we were concerned about the extent to which a manager could expose a fund to credit

\textsuperscript{776} Proposed Form N-MFP Item C.12.
spread risk associated with longer-term, adjustable-rate securities. This information will assist the Commission in monitoring and evaluating this risk, at the security level, as well as help evaluate compliance with rule 2a-7's maturity provisions. In addition, our proposed amendments would make clear that funds disclose for each security all three maturity calculations as required under rule 2a-7: dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity ("WAM"), WAL, and the final legal maturity date. Finally, the proposed amendments would require that a fund disclose additional information about certain types of securities held by the fund. We request comment on our proposed amendments.

- Do commenters agree that disclosure of each security’s WAL will assist the Commission and investors in evaluating credit spread risk? We note that Form N-MFP currently requires that funds disclose each security’s WAM and final legal maturity.

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777 See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at section II.B.2.

778 We also propose to clarify that the maturity date required to be reported in current Form –N-MFP Item 35 is the maturity date used to calculate WAM under proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(1)(ii) (see proposed Form N-MFP Item C.11) and the maturity date required to be reported in current Form –N-MFP Item 36 is the final legal maturity date, i.e., the date on which, in accordance with the terms of the security without regard to any interest rate readjustment or demand feature, the principal amount must unconditionally be paid (see proposed Form N-MFP Item C.13). The final legal maturity date, as clarified, will help us distinguish between debt securities that are issued by the same issuer.

779 We propose to amend the investment categories in proposed Form N-MFP Item C.6 to include new categories: "Non U.S. Sovereign Debt," "Non-U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt," "Other Asset-Backed Security," "Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper" (instead of "Other Commercial Paper"), and "Collateralized Commercial Paper," and amend "U.S. Government Agency Debt" and "Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits)." The new investment categories would help Commission staff identify particular exposures that otherwise are often reported in other less descriptive categories (e.g., reporting sovereign debt as "treasury debt" or reporting asset-backed securities (that are not commercial paper) as "other note" or "other instrument"). We note that a fund should only designate a security as "U.S. Treasury Repurchase Agreement" or "Government Agency Repurchase Agreement" when the underlying collateral is 100% Treasuries or Government Agency, respectively; otherwise, a fund should use the "Other Repurchase Agreement" category. We are also proposing to include a requirement that a fund disclose, where applicable, the period remaining until the principal amount of a security may be recovered through a demand feature and whether a security demand feature is conditional. Proposed Form N-MFP Items C.14.e. and C.14.f. These proposed amendments would improve the Commission’s and investors’ ability to evaluate and monitor a security’s credit and default risk.
maturity date.  

- Would our proposed amendments to the category of investment increase the accuracy of how securities are categorized currently? Should we include other investment categories?

As detailed above, our proposed new reporting requirements are intended to address gaps in the reporting regime that Commission staff has identified through two and a half years of experience with Form N-MFP and to enhance the ability of the Commission and investors to monitor funds. Although the potential benefits are difficult to quantify, they would improve the ability of the Commission and investors to identify (and analyze) a fund’s portfolio securities (e.g., by requiring disclosure of LEIs and an additional security identifier beyond CUSIPs already required). In addition, many of our proposed new reporting requirements would enhance the ability of the Commission and investors to evaluate a fund’s risk characteristics (by requiring that fund’s disclose, for example, the following data: security categorizations as level 1, level 2, or level 3 measurements; more detailed information about securities at the time of purchase; liquidity metrics; and information about shareholder concentration). We believe that the additional information required should be readily available to funds as a matter of general business practice and therefore would not impose costs on money market funds other than those required to modify systems used to aggregate data and file reports on Form N-MFP. These costs are discussed in section III.H.6 below.

Our proposed new reporting requirements may improve informational efficiency by improving the transparency of potential risks in money market funds and promoting

780 Current Form N-MFP Item 35 (the maturity date taking into account the maturity shortening provisions of rule 2a-7(d), i.e., “WAM”) and Item 36 (the final legal maturity date taking into account any maturity date extensions that may be effected at the option of the issuer).
better-informed investment decisions, which, in turn, will lead to a better allocation of capital.

Similarly, the increased transparency may promote competition as fund managers are exposed to external market discipline and better-informed investors who may be more likely to select an alternative investment if they are not comfortable with the risk-return profile of their fund. The newly disclosed information may cause some money market fund investors to exchange their assets between different money market funds, but because we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate, we are unable to estimate this with specificity. In addition, some investors may exchange assets between money market funds and alternative investments or other segments of the short-term financing markets, but we are unable to estimate how frequently this will happen with specificity and we do not know how the other underlying assets compare with those of money market funds. Therefore, we are unable to estimate the overall net effect on capital formation. Nevertheless, we believe that the net effect will be small, especially during normal market conditions.

We request general comment on our proposed new reporting requirements.

- Do commenters agree that the information we would require is readily available to funds as a matter of general business practice? If not, are there other types of readily available data that would provide us with similar information?

- Are there costs associated with our proposed new reporting requirements (other than to make systems modifications discussed below) that we have not considered? If so, please describe the nature and amounts of those costs.

- Is there additional information that we have not identified that could be useful to us or investors in monitoring money market funds? How should such information be reported?
3. **Clarifying Amendments**

We are proposing (regardless of the alternative proposal adopted, if any) several amendments to clarify current instructions and items of Form N-MFP. Revising the form to include these clarifications should improve the ability of fund managers to complete the form and improve the quality of the data they submit to us.\(^7\)\(^8\)\(^1\) We believe that many of our proposed clarifying amendments are consistent with current filing practices.\(^7\)\(^8\)\(^2\)

We understand that some fund managers compile the fund’s portfolio holdings information as of the last calendar day of the month, even if that day falls on a weekend or holiday. To provide flexibility, we propose to amend the instructions to Form N-MFP to clarify that, unless otherwise specified, a fund may report information on Form N-MFP as of the last business day or any later calendar day of the month.\(^7\)\(^8\)\(^3\) We also propose to revise the definition of “Master-Feeder Fund” to clarify that the definition of “Feeder Fund” includes unregistered funds (such as offshore funds).\(^7\)\(^8\)\(^4\) Our proposed amendments also would clarify that funds should calculate the WAM and WAL reported on Form N-MFP using the same methods they use.

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781 We are proposing technical changes to the “General Information” section of the form that will clarify the circumstances under which a money market fund must complete certain question sub-parts. See proposed Form N-MFP Items 6 and 7.

782 As discussed below, the proposed amendments are consistent with guidance our staff has provided to money market fund managers and service providers completing Form N-MFP.

783 See proposed Form N-MFP General Instruction A (Rule as to Use of Form N-MFP); proposed rule 30b1-7. Our proposed approach is also consistent with a previous interpretation provided by our staff. See Staff Responses to Questions about Rule 30b1-7 and Form N-MFP, Question 1.B.1 (revised July 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/formn-mfpqqa.htm.

784 See proposed Form N-MFP General Instruction E (defining “Master-Feeder Fund,” and defining “Feeder Fund” to include a registered or unregistered pooled investment vehicle). Form N-MFP requires that a master fund report the identity of any feeder fund. Our proposed amendment is designed to address inconsistencies in reporting of master-feeder fund data that we have observed in filings, and would help us determine the extent to which feeder funds, wherever located, hold a master fund’s shares. The change would reflect how we understand data from master-feeder funds is collected by the Investment Company Institute for its statistical reports. We are also proposing to make grammatical and conforming amendments to proposed Form N-MFP Items A.7 and A.8.
for purposes of compliance with rule 2a-7. We also propose to require that funds disclose in Part B (Class-Level Information about the Fund) the required information for each class of the series, regardless of the number of shares outstanding in the class.

We also are proposing to amend the reporting requirements for repurchase agreements by restating the item's requirements as two distinct questions. The amendment would make clear that information about the securities subject to a repurchase agreement must be disclosed regardless of how the fund treats the acquisition of the repurchase agreement for purposes of rule 2a-7's diversification requirements. Finally, we propose to amend the items in Form N-MFP

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785 See proposed Form N-MFP Items A.11 and A.12 (defining "WAM" and "WAL" and cross-referencing the maturity terms to rule 2a-7). We also propose to amend the 7-day gross yield to require that the resulting yield figure be carried to (removing the words "at least") the nearest hundredth of one per cent and clarify that master and feeder funds should report the 7-day gross yield (current Form N-MFP Item 17) at the master-fund level. Proposed Form N-MFP Item A.20. These proposed amendments are intended to achieve consistency in reporting and remove potential ambiguity for feeder funds when reporting the 7-day gross yield.

786 See text before proposed Form N-MFP Item B.1. Our staff has found that funds inconsistently report fund class information, for example, when a fund does not report a fund class registered on Form N-1A because the fund class has no shares outstanding. Our proposed amendment is intended to clarify a fund's reporting obligations and provide Commission staff (and investors) with more complete information about each fund's capital structure.

787 See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.7 (requiring that a fund disclose if it is treating the acquisition of a repurchase agreement as the acquisition of the underlying securities (i.e., collateral) for purposes of portfolio diversification under rule 2a-7). See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.8 (requiring that a fund describe the securities subject to the repurchase agreement, including: (a) name of the collateral issuer; (b) CUSIP; (c) LEI (if available); (d) maturity date; (e) coupon or yield; (f) principal amount; (g) value of the collateral; and (h) the category of investments. We also propose to require that a fund specify whether the repurchase agreement is "open" (i.e., by its terms, will be extended or "rolled" each business day unless the investor chooses to terminate it). This information should be readily available to funds and would enhance the ability of Commission staff and others to evaluate the risks (e.g., rollover risk or the duration of the lending) presented by investments in repurchase agreements. See proposed Form N-MFP Item C.8.a. Our proposal would also provide a specific list of investment categories from which funds may choose, including new categories (Equity; Corporate Bond; Exchange Traded Fund; Trust Receipt (other than for U.S. Treasuries); and Derivative). Finally, our proposal would also clarify that a fund is required to disclose the name of the collateral issuer (and not the name of the issuer of the repurchase agreement). In addition, when disclosing a security's coupon or yield (as required in proposed Form N-MFP Item C.8.f), a fund would be required to report (i) the stated coupon rate, where the security is issued with a stated coupon; (ii) the interest rate at purchase, for instance, if the security is issued at a discount (without a stated coupon); and (iii) the coupon rate as of the Form N-MFP reporting date, if the security is floating or variable rate.

788 We propose several other clarifications to other items. See proposed Form N-MFP Item 1 (amending the format of reporting date provided by funds); and proposed Form N-MFP Item A.10 (modifying, for
that require information about demand features, guarantors, or enhancement providers to make clear that funds should disclose the identity of each demand feature issuer, guarantor, or enhancement provider and the amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided.\footnote{See proposed Form N-MFP Items C.14 – C.16.} Our amendments also would clarify that a fund is not required to provide additional information about a security’s demand feature(s) or guarantee(s) unless the fund is relying on the demand feature or guarantee to determine the quality, maturity, or liquidity of the security.\footnote{Form N-MFP already requires that a fund disclose only security enhancements on which the fund is relying to determine the quality, maturity, or liquidity of the security. See current Form N-MFP Item 39. Similarly, we propose to amend current Form N-MFP Items 37 (demand features) and 38 (guarantees) to make clear that funds are required to disclose information relating to demand features and guarantees only when the fund is relying on these features to determine the quality, maturity, or liquidity of the security. See proposed Form N-MFP Items C.14 and C.15.}

As discussed above, our proposed clarifying amendments are intended to improve the quality of the data we receive on Form N-MFP by clarifying a number of reporting obligations so that all funds report information on Form N-MFP in a consistent manner. Accordingly, we do not believe that our proposed clarifying amendments would impose any new costs on funds other than those required to modify systems used to aggregate data and file reports on Form N-MFP. These costs are discussed in section III.H.6 below. Because our proposed clarifying amendments would not change funds’ current reporting obligations, we believe there would be no effect on efficiency, competition, or capital formation.

We request comment on our proposed clarifying amendments.

- Is our understanding about current fund practices correct?
- Would our proposed amendments provide greater clarity and flexibility to funds? Are they consistent with current fund practices?
Would our proposed amendments alter the manner in which data is currently reported to us on Form N-MFP, or alter the amount of data reported?

Are there other clarifying amendments that we should consider that would improve the consistency and utility of the information reported on Form N-MFP to Commission staff and others?

Should we adopt our proposed clarifying amendments even if we do not adopt either the floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposals?

4. Public Availability of Information

Currently, each money market fund must file information on Form N-MFP electronically within five business days after the end of each month and that information is made publicly available 60 days after the end of the month for which it is filed. We propose (regardless of the alternative proposal adopted, if any) to make Form N-MFP publicly available immediately upon filing. The delay, which we instituted when we adopted the form in 2010, responded to commenters’ concerns regarding potential reactions of investors to the disclosure of funds’ portfolio information and shadow NAVs. Although we did not believe that it was necessary to keep the portfolio information private for 60 days, we believed then that the shadow price data should not be made public immediately. However, we now believe that the immediate release of the shadow price data would not be harmful. This is based, in part, on our understanding that many money market funds now disclose their shadow prices every business day on their

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791 See proposed rule 30b1-7 (eliminating subsection (b), public availability).

792 See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at section II.E.2 (noting that there may be less need in the future to require a 60-day delay). Commenters also objected to the disclosure of information filed on Form N-MFP because of the competitive effects on funds or fund managers. In the adopting release, we stated our belief that the competitive risks were overstated by commenters. We noted that the risks of trading ahead of funds (“front running”) or “free riding” on a fund’s investment strategies were minimal because of the short-term nature of money market fund investments and the restricted universe of eligible portfolio securities.
websites. Therefore we propose (under both alternatives we are proposing today) to eliminate the 60-day delay in making the information on the form publicly available.\textsuperscript{793}

Eliminating the 60-day delay would provide more timely information to the public and greater transparency of money market fund information, which could promote efficiency. This disclosure could also make the monthly disclosure on Form N-MFP more relevant to investors, financial analysts, and others by improving their ability to more timely assess potential risks and make informed investment decisions. In other words, investors may be more likely to use the reported information because it is more timely and informative. In response to this potential heightened sensitivity of investors to the reported information, some funds might move toward more conservative investment strategies to reduce the chance of having to report bad outcomes. Because, as discussed above, shadow prices (which were a primary reason why we adopted the 60-day delay in making filings public) have been disclosed by a number of money market funds since February 2013 without incident, we do not believe that eliminating the 60-day delay would affect capital formation. We request comment on this aspect of our proposal.

- Do commenters believe that our five-day filing deadline continues to be appropriate?
  Should the filing delay be shorter or longer? Please provide support for any suggested change to the filing deadline.

- Do commenters agree that there have not been adverse impacts from recent publication of daily shadow NAVs by a number of large money market funds?

- Is a 60-day delay in making the information public still necessary to protect against possible "front running" or "free riding?" Have any developments occurred that

\textsuperscript{793} A number of large fund complexes have begun (or plan) to disclose daily money market fund market valuations (\textit{i.e.}, shadow prices), including BlackRock, Charles Schwab, Federated Investors, Fidelity Investments, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Reich & Tang, and State Street Global Advisors. \textit{See, e.g., Money Funds' New Openness Unlikely to Stop Regulation}, \textit{Wall St. J.} (Jan. 30, 2013).
should cause us to reconsider our 2010 decision that the information required to be disclosed would not be competitively sensitive?

- Would a shorter delay (45, 30, or 15 days) be more appropriate? If so, why?
- Do commenters agree with our estimated impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation?
- Should we adopt our proposed amendment to eliminate the 60-day delay even if we do not adopt either the floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposals?

5. *Request for Comment on Frequency of Filing*

To increase further the transparency of money market funds and the utility of information disclosed, the Commission requests comment (regardless of the alternative proposal adopted, if any) on increasing the frequency of filing Form N-MFP from monthly to weekly. Given the rapidly changing composition of money market fund portfolios and increased emphasis on portfolio liquidity (*i.e.*, shortened maturities),\(^794\) the information provided on Form N-MFP may become stale and less relevant. We believe that increasing the frequency of disclosure, as well as eliminating the 60-day delay in making information on Form N-MFP publicly available (discussed above), would further increase transparency into money market funds and make the information more relevant to investors, academic researchers, financial analysts, and economic research firms. We note that, under our floating NAV proposal, more frequent disclosure on Form N-MFP could also facilitate more accurate market-based valuations.\(^795\) While we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the additional costs that may be

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794 The RSFI Study notes that as of November 30, 2012, the typical prime fund held over 25% of its portfolio in daily liquid assets ("DLA") (with 10% DLA required under rule 2a-7) and nearly 50% of its portfolio in weekly liquid assets ("WLA") (with 30% WLA required under rule 2a-7). See RSFI Study, *supra* note 21, at 20.

795 See *supra* note 767 and accompanying text.
imposed on funds because of more frequent filings of reports on Form N-MFP, we believe that the increased costs per fund would be negligible because most funds use a licensed software solution (either directly or through a third-party service provider) and would experience significant economies of scale.\textsuperscript{796} Despite the incremental increase in costs to file the report more frequently, more timely and relevant data may increase competition and efficiency for the same reasons discussed above with respect to our proposed amendment to eliminate the 60-day delay.

We request comment on increasing the frequency of the filing of Form N-MFP.

- Do commenters agree with our analysis of the benefits and costs associated with increasing the frequency of disclosure of reports on Form N-MFP? Why or why not?
- Would increasing the frequency of reporting affect the investment strategies employed by fund managers, for example, causing managers to increase risk taking?
- Would fund managers be more likely to "front-run" or reverse engineer another fund's portfolio strategy?
- Would increasing the frequency of disclosure affect the costs or benefits associated with our proposed amendment to eliminate the 60-day delay in public availability? If so, how?
- What types of costs would funds incur to change from monthly to weekly filing of reports on Form N-MFP? Would funds have sufficient time to evaluate and validate data received from outside vendors?
- Should we increase the filing frequency even if we do not adopt either the floating

\textsuperscript{796} Staff estimates that our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP (12 filings per year) would result in, at the outside range, a first-year aggregate additional 49,810 total burden hours at a total cost of $12.9 million, and external costs of $373,680. \textit{See infra} section IV.A.3. We expect that funds would incur substantially lower costs that those described above if we were to require that reports on Form N-MFP be filed weekly, rather than monthly as currently required.
NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposals?

6. **Operational Implications**

We anticipate that fund managers would incur costs to gather the new items of information we propose to require on Form N-MFP. To reduce costs, we have decided to propose needed improvements to the form at the same time we are proposing amendments necessitated by the amendments to rule 2a-7 we are proposing. We note that our proposed clarifying amendments should not affect, or should only minimally affect, current filing obligations or the information content of the filings.

We expect that the operational costs to money market funds to report the information required in proposed Form N-MFP would be the same costs we discuss in the Paperwork Reduction Act analysis in section IV of the Release, below. As discussed in more detail in that section, our staff estimates that our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP would result in, at the outside range, a first-year aggregate additional 49,810 burden hours at a total cost of $12.9 million plus $373,680 in total external costs (which represent fees to license a software solution and fees to retain a third-party service provider). Our operational cost estimates are based on our floating NAV proposal, but would not change if we instead adopted our liquidity fees and gates alternative proposal.

We request comment on our analysis of operational implications summarized above and described in detail in sections IV.A.3 and IV.B.3 below. We also request comment on the costs and benefits described above, including whether any proposed disclosure requirements are unduly burdensome or would impose unnecessary costs.

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797 *See infra section IV.A.3.*
I. Amendments to Form PF Reporting Requirements

The Commission is proposing to amend Form PF, the form that certain investment advisers registered with the Commission use to report information regarding the private funds they manage, including “liquidity funds,” which are private funds that seek to maintain a stable NAV (or minimize fluctuations in their NAVs) and thus can resemble money market funds.\(^{798}\) We adopted Form PF, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act,\(^{799}\) to assist FSOC in its monitoring and assessment of systemic risk; to provide information for FSOC’s use in determining whether and how to deploy its regulatory tools; and to collect data for use in our own regulatory program.\(^{800}\) As discussed in more detail below, FSOC and the Commission have recognized the risks that may be posed by cash management products other than money market funds, including liquidity funds, and the potentially increased significance of such products in the event we adopt further money market fund reforms such as those we propose today.\(^{801}\) Therefore, to enhance FSOC’s ability to monitor and assess systemic risks in the short-term financing markets and to facilitate our oversight of those markets and their participants, we propose today to require large liquidity fund advisers—registered advisers with $1 billion or more in combined money market fund and

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\(^{798}\) For purposes of Form PF, a “liquidity fund” is any private fund that seeks to generate income by investing in a portfolio of short term obligations in order to maintain a stable net asset value per unit or minimize principal volatility for investors. See Glossary of Terms to Form PF.

\(^{799}\) See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3308 (Oct. 31, 2011) [76 FR 71128 (Nov. 16, 2011)] (“Form PF Adopting Release”) at section I. Form PF is a joint form between the Commission and the CFTC only with respect to sections 1 and 2 of the Form; section 3, which we propose to amend, and section 4, were adopted only by the Commission. Id.

\(^{800}\) FSOC’s regulatory tools include, for example, designating nonbank financial companies that may pose risks to U.S. financial stability for supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and issuing recommendations to primary financial regulators for more stringent regulation of financial activities that FSOC determines may create or increase systemic risk. Although Form PF is primarily intended to assist FSOC in its monitoring obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act, we also may use information collected on Form PF in our regulatory program, including examinations, investigations, and investor protection efforts relating to private fund advisers. See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at sections II and VI.A.

\(^{801}\) See infra note 816 and accompanying text.
liquidity fund assets—to file virtually the same information with respect to their liquidity funds’ portfolio holdings on Form PF as money market funds are required to file on Form N-MFP. We share the concern expressed by some commenters that, if further money market fund reforms cause investors to seek alternatives to money market funds, including private funds that seek to maintain a stable NAV but that are not registered with the Commission, this shift could reduce transparency of the potential purchasers of short-term debt instruments, and potentially increase systemic risk. We discuss in detail the potential for money market fund investors to

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We propose to incorporate in a new Question 63 in section 3 of Form PF the substance of virtually all of the questions on Part C of Form N-MFP as we propose to amend that form, except that we have modified the questions where appropriate to reflect that liquidity funds are not subject to rule 2a-7 (although some liquidity funds have a policy of complying with rule 2a-7’s risk-limiting conditions) and have not added questions that would parallel Items C.7 and C.9 of Form N-MFP. We do not propose to include a question that would parallel Item C.7 because that item relates to whether a money market fund is treating the acquisition of a repurchase agreement as the acquisition of the collateral for purposes of rule 2a-7’s diversification testing; liquidity funds, in contrast, are not subject to rule 2a-7’s diversification limitations, and the information on repurchase agreement collateral we propose to collect through new Question 63(g) on Form PF would allow us to better understand liquidity funds’ use of repurchase agreements and their collateral. Item C.9 asks whether a portfolio security is a rated first tier security, rated second tier security, or no longer an eligible security. We did not include a parallel question in Form PF because these concepts would not necessarily apply to liquidity funds, and we believe the additional questions on Form PF would provide sufficient information about a portfolio security’s credit quality and the large liquidity fund adviser’s use of credit ratings.

See, e.g., Dreyfus FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 174 (opposing a floating NAV and citing adverse redistribution of systemic risk); Dreyfus 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 350 (opposing a floating NAV and stating that, after surveying 37 of its largest institutional money market fund shareholders (representing over $60 billion in assets) regarding a floating NAV, 67% responded that their business could not continue to invest in a floating NAV product and that they would have to seek an alternative investment option); Nat. Assoc. of State Treasurers PWG Comment Letter, supra note 567 (opposing a floating NAV because, among other reasons, “a floating NAV would push investors to less regulated or non-regulated markets”); AFP Jan. 2011 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 567 (reporting results of a survey of its members reflecting that four out of five organizations would likely move at least some of their assets out of money market funds if the funds were required to use floating NAVs, with 22% reporting that they would move their money market fund investments to “fixed-value investment vehicles (e.g., offshore money market funds, enhanced cash funds and stable value vehicles)”; ICI Apr 2012 PWG Comment Letter, supra note 62 (enclosing a survey commissioned by the Investment Company Institute and conducted by Treasury Strategies, Inc. finding, among other things, that if the Commission were to require money market funds to use floating NAVs, 79% of the 203 corporate, government, and institutional investors that responded to the survey would decrease their money market fund investments or stop using the funds); Federated Investors Alternative 1 FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 161 (stating that requiring money market funds to use floating NAVs, among other things, “would cause investors to move liquidity balances elsewhere,” including to “to bank-sponsored short-term investment funds, hedge funds and offshore investment vehicles that are less transparent, less regulated, less efficient and result in the same ‘roll-over risk’ for issuers in the money markets that the Council apparently wants to ameliorate through its plan to change the structure of
reallocate their assets to alternative investments in section III.E above. The amendments that we propose to Form PF today are designed to achieve two primary goals. First, they are designed to ensure to the extent possible that any further money market fund reforms do not decrease transparency in the short-term financing markets, and to better enable FSOC to monitor and address any related systemic risks and to better enable us to develop effective regulatory policy responses to any shift in investor assets. Second, the proposed amendments to Form PF are designed to allow FSOC and us to more effectively administer our regulatory programs even if investors do not shift their assets as a result of any further money market fund reforms, as the increased transparency concerning liquidity funds, combined with information we already collect on Form N-MFP, will provide a more complete picture of the short-term financing markets in which liquidity funds and money market funds both invest.

I. **Overview of Proposed Amendments to Form PF**

Our proposal would apply to large liquidity fund advisers, which generally are SEC-registered investment advisers that advise at least one liquidity fund and manage, collectively with their related persons, at least $1 billion in combined liquidity fund and money market fund assets.\(^{104}\) Large liquidity fund advisers today are required to file information on Form PF

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\(^{104}\) An adviser is a large liquidity fund adviser if it has at least $1 billion combined liquidity fund and money market fund assets under management as of the last day of any month in the fiscal quarter immediately preceding its most recently completed fiscal quarter. See Form PF: Instruction 3 and Section 3. This $1 billion threshold includes assets managed by the adviser’s related persons, except that an adviser is not required to include the assets managed by a related person that is separately operated from the adviser. *Id.* An adviser’s related persons include persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the investment adviser. See Form PF: Glossary of Terms (defining the term “related person” by reference to Form ADV). Generally, a person is separately operated from an investment adviser if the adviser: (1) has no business dealings with the related person in connection with advisory services the adviser provides to its clients; (2) does not conduct shared operations with the related person; (3) does not
quarterly, including certain information about each liquidity fund they manage. Under our proposal, for each liquidity fund it manages, a large liquidity fund adviser would be required to provide, quarterly and with respect to each portfolio security, the following information for each month of the reporting period:

- the name of the issuer;
- the title of the issuer;
- the CUSIP number;
- the legal entity identifier or LEI, if available;
- at least one of the following other identifiers, in addition to the CUSIP and LEI, if available: ISIN, CIK, or any other unique identifier;
- the category of investment (e.g., Treasury debt, U.S. government agency debt, asset-backed commercial paper, certificate of deposit, repurchase agreement);
- if the rating assigned by a credit rating agency played a substantial role in the liquidity fund’s (or its adviser’s) evaluation of the quality, maturity or liquidity of the security, the name of each credit rating agency and the rating each credit

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805 See Form PF: Instruction 3 and Section 3.
806 See Question 63 of proposed Form PF. Advisers would be required to file this information with their quarterly liquidity fund filings with data for the quarter broken down by month. Advisers would not be required to file information on Form PF more frequently as a result of today’s proposal because large liquidity fund advisers already are required to file information each quarter on Form PF. See Form PF: Instruction 9.
807 For repurchase agreements we are also proposing to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide additional information regarding the underlying collateral and whether the repurchase agreement is “open” (i.e., whether the repurchase agreement has no specified end date and, by its terms, will be extended or “rolled” each business day (or at another specified period) unless the investor chooses to terminate it).
rating agency assigned to the security;

- the maturity date used to calculate weighted average maturity;
- the maturity date used to calculate weighted average life;
- the final legal maturity date;
- whether the instrument is subject to a demand feature, guarantee, or other enhancements, and information about any of these features and their providers;
- for each security, reported separately for each lot purchased, the total principal amount; the purchase date(s); the yield at purchase and as of the end of each month during the reporting period for floating or variable rate securities; and the purchase price as a percentage of par;
- the value of the fund’s position in the security and, if the fund uses the amortized cost method of valuation, the amortized cost value, in both cases with and without any sponsor support;
- the percentage of the liquidity fund’s assets invested in the security;
- whether the security is categorized as a level 1, 2, or 3 asset or liability on Form PF,808
  - whether the security is an illiquid security, a daily liquid asset, and/or a weekly liquid asset, as defined in rule 2a-7; and
- any explanatory notes.809

We also propose to remove current Questions 56 and 57 on Form PF. These questions

808 See Question 14 of Form PF. See also infra notes 758-761 and accompanying and following text.
809 We also propose to define the following terms in Form PF: conditional demand feature; credit rating agency; demand feature; guarantee; guarantor; and illiquid security. See proposed Form PF: Glossary of Terms.
generally require large liquidity fund advisers to provide information about their liquidity funds' portfolio holdings broken out by asset class (rather than security by security). We and FSOC would be able to derive the information currently reported in response to those questions from the new portfolio holdings information we propose to require advisers to provide. We also are proposing to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide information about any securities sold by their liquidity funds during the reporting period, including sale and purchase prices.  

Finally, we propose to require large liquidity fund advisers to identify any money market fund advised by the adviser or its related persons that pursues substantially the same investment objective and strategy and invests side by side in substantially the same positions as a liquidity fund the adviser reports on Form PF.  

2. Utility of New Information, Including Benefits, Costs, and Economic Implications

The amendments that we propose today are designed to enhance FSOC's ability to fulfill its mission, and thereby to facilitate FSOC's ability to take measures to protect the U.S. economy from significant harm from future financial crises. As we have explained, the information that advisers today must report on Form PF concerning their liquidity funds is designed to assist FSOC in assessing the risks undertaken by liquidity funds, their susceptibility to runs, and how

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810 See Question 64 of proposed Form PF. See also supra notes 766-767 and accompanying text.

811 See Question 65 of proposed Form PF. This question is based on the current definition of a “parallel fund structure” in Form PF. See Glossary of Terms to Form PF (defining a “parallel fund structure” as “[a] structure in which one or more private funds (each, a ‘parallel fund’) pursues substantially the same investment objective and strategy and invests side by side in substantially the same positions as another private fund”).

812 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at nn.455-457 and accompanying and following text (explaining that “Congress responded to the recent financial crisis, in part, by establishing FSOC as the center of a framework intended ‘to prevent a recurrence or mitigate the impact of financial crises that could cripple financial markets and damage the economy’”; the goal of this framework, we explained, “is the avoidance of significant harm to the U.S. economy from future financial crises”) (internal citations omitted).
their investments might pose systemic risks either among liquidity funds or through contagion to registered money market funds. The information that advisers must report today also is intended to aid FSOC in its determination of whether and how to deploy its regulatory tools. Finally, the information that advisers must report today is designed to assist FSOC in assessing the extent to which a liquidity fund is being managed consistent with restrictions imposed on registered money market funds that might mitigate their likelihood of posing systemic risk.

We believe, based on our staff’s consultations with staff representing the members of FSOC, that the additional information we propose to require advisers to report on Form PF will assist FSOC in carrying out these responsibilities. FSOC and the Commission have recognized the risks that may be posed by cash management products other than money market funds, including liquidity funds, and the potentially increased significance of such products in the event we adopt further money market fund reforms such as those we propose today. FSOC also stated that it and its members “intend to use their authorities, where appropriate and within their jurisdictions, to address any risks to financial stability that may arise from various products

813 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at section II.C.3.
814 Id.
815 Id.
816 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 7 (“The Council recognizes that regulated and unregulated or less-regulated cash management products (such as unregistered private liquidity funds) other than MMFs may pose risks that are similar to those posed by MMFs, and that further MMF reforms could increase demand for non-MMF cash management products. The Council seeks comment on other possible reforms that would address risks that might arise from a migration to non-MMF cash management products.”) We, too, have recognized that “[l]iquidity funds and registered money market funds often pursue similar strategies, invest in the same securities and present similar risks.” See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at section II.A.4. See also Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3145 (Jan. 26, 2011) [76 FR 8068 (Feb. 11, 2011)] (“Form PF Proposing Release”), at n.68 and accompanying text (explaining that, “[d]uring the financial crisis, several sponsors of ‘enhanced cash funds,’ a type of liquidity fund, committed capital to those funds to prevent investors from realizing losses in the funds,” and noting that “[t]he fact that sponsors of certain liquidity funds felt the need to support the stable value of those funds suggests that they may be susceptible to runs like registered money market funds”). See generally supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
within the cash management industry in a consistent manner,” as “[s]uch consistency would be

designed to reduce or eliminate any regulatory gaps that could result in risks to financial stability
if cash management products with similar risks are subject to dissimilar standards.” 817 We
expect, therefore, that requiring advisers to provide additional information on Form PF as we
propose today would enhance FSOC’s ability to assess systemic risk across the short-term
financing markets.

We propose to require only large liquidity fund advisers to report this additional
information for the same reason that we previously determined to require these advisers to
provide more comprehensive information on Form PF: so that the group of private fund advisers
filing more comprehensive information on Form PF will be relatively small in number but
represent a substantial portion of the assets of their respective industries.818 Based on information
filed on Form PF and Form ADV, as of February 28, 2013, we estimate that there were

approximately 25 large liquidity fund advisers (out of 55 total advisers that advise at least one
liquidity fund), with their aggregate liquidity fund assets under management representing

approximately 98% of liquidity fund assets managed by advisers registered with the
Commission.

This threshold also should minimize the costs of our proposed amendments because large
liquidity fund advisers already are required to make quarterly reports on Form PF and, as of

817 See FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 7. The President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets reached a similar conclusion, noting that because vehicles such as liquidity funds “can take on
more risks than MMFs, but such risks are not necessarily transparent to investors..., unregistered funds
may pose even greater systemic risks than MMFs, particularly if new restrictions on MMFs prompt
substantial growth in unregistered funds.” See PWG Report, supra note 111, at 21. The potentially
increased risks posed by liquidity funds were of further concern because these risks “are difficult to
monitor, since [unregistered cash management products like liquidity funds] provide far less market
transparency than MMFs.” Id. at 35.

818 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at n.88 and accompanying text.
February 28, 2013, virtually all either advise a money market fund or have a related person that advises a money market fund. Requiring large liquidity fund advisers to provide substantially the same information required by Form N-MFP therefore may reduce the burdens associated with our proposal, which we discuss below, because large liquidity fund advisers generally already have (or may be able to obtain access to) the systems, service providers, and/or staff necessary to capture and report the same types of information for reporting on Form N-MFP. These same systems, service providers, and/or staff may allow large liquidity fund advisers to comply with our proposed changes to Form PF more efficiently and at a reduced cost than if we were to require advisers to report information that differed materially from that which the advisers must file on Form N-MFP.

In addition to our concerns about FSOC’s ability to assess systemic risk, we also are concerned about losing transparency regarding money market fund investments that may shift into liquidity funds if we were to adopt the money market reforms we propose today and our ability effectively to formulate policy responses to such a shift in investor assets.\(^{819}\) We note in particular that a run on liquidity funds could spread to money market funds because, for example, both types of funds often invest in the same securities as noted above.\(^ {820}\) Our ability to

\(^{819}\) See, e.g., RSFI Study, supra note 21, at section 4.C (analysis of investment alternatives to money market funds, considering, among other issues, the potential for investors to shift their assets to money market fund alternatives, including liquidity funds, in response to further money market fund reforms and certain implications of a shift in investor assets).

\(^{820}\) Liquidity funds may generally have a more institutional shareholder base because the funds rely on exclusions from the Investment Company Act’s definition of “investment company” provided by section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act. See section 202(a)(29) of the Advisers Act (defining the term “private fund” to mean “an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act”). Funds relying on those exclusions sell their shares in private offerings which in many cases are restricted to investors who are “accredited investors” as defined in rule 501(a) under the Securities Act. Investors in funds relying on section 3(c)(7), in addition, generally must be “qualified purchasers” as defined in section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act. The funds’ more institutional shareholder base may increase the potential for a run to develop at a liquidity fund. As discussed in greater detail in section II.C of this Release, redemption data from the 2007-2008 financial crisis show that some institutional money market fund investors are
formulate a policy response to address this risk could be diminished if we had less transparency concerning the portfolio holdings of liquidity funds as compared to money market funds, and thus were not able as effectively to assess the degree of correlation between various funds or groups of funds that invest in the short-term financing markets, or if we were unable proactively to identify funds that own distressed securities. Indeed, Form PF, by defining large liquidity fund advisers subject to more comprehensive reporting requirements as advisers with $1 billion in combined money market fund and liquidity fund assets under management today reflects the similarities between money market funds and liquidity funds and the need for comprehensive information concerning advisers’ management of large amounts of short-term assets through either type of fund. The need for this comprehensive data would be heightened if money market fund investors shift their assets to liquidity funds in response to any further money market fund reforms.

Finally, this increased information on liquidity funds managed by large liquidity fund advisers also would be useful to us and FSOC even absent a shift in money market fund investor assets. Collecting this information about these liquidity funds would, when combined with information collected on Form N-MFP, provide us and FSOC a more complete picture of the short-term financing markets, allowing each of us to more effectively fulfill our statutory mandates. For example, the contagion risk we discuss above—of a run starting in a liquidity fund and spreading to money market funds—may warrant our or FSOC’s attention even today. But it may be impossible effectively to assess this risk today without more detailed information about the portfolio holdings of the liquidity funds managed by advisers who manage substantial

likely to redeem from distressed money market funds more quickly than other investors and to redeem a greater percentage of their holdings. This may be indicative of the way institutional investors in liquidity funds would behave, particularly liquidity funds that more closely resemble money market funds.
amounts of short-term investments and the ability to combine that data with the information we collect on Form N-MFP.

For example, if a particular security or issuer were to come under stress, our staff today would be unable to determine which liquidity funds, if any, held that security. This is because advisers currently are required only to provide information about the types of assets their liquidity funds hold, rather than the individual positions.\textsuperscript{[21]} Our staff could see the aggregate value of all of a liquidity fund’s positions in unsecured commercial paper issued by non-U.S. financial institutions, for example, but could not tell whether the fund owned commercial paper issued by any particular non-U.S. financial institution. If a particular institution were to come under stress, the aggregated information available today would not allow us or our staff to determine the extent to which liquidity funds were exposed to the financial institution; lacking this information, neither we nor our staff would be able as effectively to assess the risks across the liquidity fund industry and, by extension, the short-term financing markets.

Position level information for liquidity funds managed by large liquidity fund advisers also could allow our staff more efficiently and effectively to identify longer-term trends in the industry and at particular liquidity funds or advisers. The aggregated position information that advisers provide today may obscure the level of risk in the industry or at particular advisers or liquidity funds that, if more fully understood by our staff, could allow the staff to more efficiently and effectively target their examinations and enforcement efforts, and could better inform the staff's policy recommendations.

Indeed, our experience with the portfolio information money market funds report on

\textsuperscript{[21]} See Question 56 of Form PF (requiring advisers to provide exposures and maturity information, by asset class, for liquidity fund assets under management); Question 57 of Form PF (requiring advisers to provide the asset class and percent of the fund's NAV for each open position that represents 5% or more of the fund’s NAV).
Form N-MFP—which was limited at the time we adopted Form PF—has proved useful in our regulation of money market funds in these and other ways and has informed this proposal. During the 2011 Eurozone debt crisis, for example, we and our staff benefitted from the ability to determine which money market funds were exposed to specific financial institutions (and other positions) and from the ability to see how funds changed their holdings as the crisis unfolded. This information was useful in assessing risk across the industry and at particular money market funds. Given the similarities between money market funds and liquidity funds and the possibility for risk to spread between the groups of funds, our experience with portfolio information filed on Form N-MFP suggests that virtually the same information for liquidity funds managed by large liquidity fund advisers would provide significant benefits for us and FSOC.

For all of these reasons and as discussed above, we expect that requiring large liquidity fund advisers to report their liquidity funds’ portfolio information on Form PF as we propose would provide substantial benefits for us and FSOC, including positive effects on efficiency and capital formation. If this additional information allows FSOC more effectively to monitor systemic risk as intended, our proposed amendments to Form PF could benefit the broader U.S. economy, with positive effects on capital formation, to the extent FSOC is better able to protect the U.S. economy from significant harm from future financial crises.

In addition, as we explained in more detail when adopting Form PF, requiring advisers to report on Form PF is intended to positively affect efficiency and capital formation, in part by enhancing our ability to evaluate and develop regulatory policies and to more effectively and

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Money market funds were required to begin filing information on Form N-MFP by December 7, 2010. See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at n.340 and accompanying text. Form PF was proposed shortly thereafter on January 26, 2011, and adopted on October 31, 2011. See Form PF Proposing Release, supra note 816; Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799.
efficiently protect investors and maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets. We explained, for example, that Form PF data was designed to allow us to more efficiently and effectively target our examination programs and, with the benefit of Form PF data, to better anticipate regulatory problems and the implications of our regulatory actions, and thereby to increase investor protection. We also explained that Form PF data could have a positive effect on capital formation because, as a result of the increased transparency to regulators made possible by Form PF, private fund advisers might assess more carefully the risks associated with particular investments and, in the aggregate, allocate capital to investments with a higher value to the economy as a whole.

The Form PF amendments that we propose today are designed to increase the same benefits we identified when we adopted Form PF, although we are unable to quantify them because their extent depends on future events that we cannot predict (e.g., the nature and extent of any future financial crisis and the role that Form PF data could play in mitigating or averting it). The additional information on Form PF may better inform our understanding of the activities of liquidity funds and their advisers and the operation of the short-term financing markets, including risks that may arise in liquidity funds and harm other participants in those markets or those who rely on them—including money market funds and their shareholders and the companies and governments who seek financing in the short-term financing markets. The additional information we propose to require advisers to report on Form PF, particularly when

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823 See generally Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at section V.A (explaining that, in addition to assisting FSOC fulfill its mission, “we expect this information to enhance [our] ability to evaluate and develop regulatory policies and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our efforts to protect investors and maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets”).

824 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at section V.A.

825 See id. at text accompanying and following n.494.
combined with similar data reported on Form N-MFP, therefore may enhance our ability to evaluate and develop regulatory policies and enable us to more effectively and efficiently protect investors and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets. By further increasing transparency to regulators, the proposed amendments also could increase capital formation if private fund advisers, as a result, ultimately allocate capital to investments with a higher value to the economy as a whole, as discussed above. We note, however, that any effects on capital formation from increased transparency to regulators, positive and negative, likely would be less significant than those associated with our adoption of Form PF. This is because today’s proposal would provide an incremental increase in transparency as opposed to the larger increase in transparency created by the adoption of Form PF in the first instance.

For these same reasons we believe that requiring large liquidity fund advisers to provide portfolio-level information is justified, and that it would be most beneficial and efficient to require large liquidity fund advisers to file virtually the same information for their liquidity funds as money market funds are required to file on Form N-MFP. We considered whether we and FSOC would be able as effectively to carry out our respective missions as discussed above using the information large liquidity fund advisers currently must file on Form PF. But as we discuss above, we expect that requiring large liquidity funds advisers to provide portfolio holdings information would provide a number of benefits and would allow us and FSOC to better understand the activities of large liquidity fund advisers and their liquidity funds than would be possible with the higher level, aggregate information that advisers file today on Form PF (e.g., the ability to determine which liquidity funds own a distressed security).

For the reasons discussed above we also considered, but ultimately chose not to propose, requiring advisers to file portfolio information about their liquidity funds that differs from the
information money market funds are required to file on Form N-MFP. Generally, different portfolio holdings information could be less useful than the types of information money market funds file on Form N-MFP, given our experience with Form N-MFP data, and could be more difficult to combine with Form N-MFP data. Requiring advisers to file on Form PF virtually the same information money market funds file on Form N-MFP also could be more efficient for advisers and reduce the costs of reporting.

Finally, we considered whether to propose to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide their liquidity funds’ portfolio information more frequently than quarterly. Monthly filings, for example, would provide us and FSOC more current data and could facilitate our combining the new information with the information money market funds file on Form N-MFP (which money market funds file each month). We balanced the potential benefits of more frequent reporting against the costs it would impose and believe, at this time, that quarterly reporting may be more appropriate.826

We recognize, however, that our proposed amendments to Form PF, while limited to large liquidity fund advisers, would create costs for those advisers, and also could affect competition, efficiency, and capital formation. We expect that the operational costs to advisers to report the new information would be the same costs we discuss in the Paperwork Reduction Act analysis in section IV below. As discussed in more detail in that section, our staff estimates that our proposed amendments to Form PF would result in an annual aggregate additional 7,250 burden hours at a time cost of $1,836,500, plus $409,350 in total external costs (which represent

826 Large liquidity fund advisers already are required to make quarterly filings on Form PF. See Form PF: Instruction 9. Requiring large liquidity fund advisers to provide the new portfolio holdings information on a quarterly basis should therefore be more cost effective for the advisers.
fees to license a software solution and fees to retain a third-party service provider). Allocating this burden across the estimated 25 large liquidity fund advisers that collectively advise 43 liquidity funds results in annual per large liquidity fund adviser costs, as discussed in more detail in section IV below, of 290 burden hours, at a time cost of $73,460, and $16,374 in external costs.

These estimates are based on our staff’s estimates of the paperwork burdens associated with our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP because advisers would be required to file on Form PF virtually the same information about their large liquidity funds as money market funds would be required to file on Form N-MFP as we propose to amend it. We therefore expect that the paperwork burdens associated with Form N-MFP (as we propose to amend it) are representative of the costs that large liquidity fund advisers could incur as a result of our proposed amendments to Form PF. We note, however, that this is a conservative approach for several reasons. Large liquidity fund advisers may experience economies of scale because, as discussed above, virtually all of them advise a money market fund or have a related person that advises a money market fund. Large liquidity fund advisers therefore likely would pay a combined licensing fee or fee to retain the services of a third party that covers filings on both Forms PF and Form N-MFP. We expect that this combined fee likely would be less than the combined estimated PRA costs associated with Forms PF and Form N-MFP. Finally, increased burdens associated with providing the proposed portfolio holdings information should be considered together with the cost savings that would result from our removing current Form PF questions 56 and 57.

\(^{827}\) See infra notes 1166-1168 and accompanying text.

\(^{828}\) See infra note 1165 and accompanying text.
We also recognize that large liquidity fund advisers may have concerns about reporting information about their liquidity funds’ portfolio holdings and may regard this as commercially sensitive information. Indeed, previously we have noted in response to similar concerns that Form PF data—even if it were inadvertently or improperly disclosed—generally could not, on its own, be used to identify individual investment positions, and thus provides a limited ability for competitors to use Form PF data to replicate a trading strategy or trade against an adviser. 329 Today’s proposal, of course, would require advisers to identify individual investment positions.

Without diminishing advisers’ concerns about the sensitive nature of certain of the information reported on Form PF, we note that position-level information for liquidity funds generally may not be as sensitive as position-level data for other types of private funds. For example, although some commenters on proposed Form PF confirmed that the information on Form PF is competitively sensitive or proprietary, these commenters did not address liquidity funds in particular. Further, liquidity funds, by definition, invest in “portfolio[s] of short term obligations.” This increases the likelihood that any inadvertently or improperly disclosed Form PF data, notwithstanding the controls and systems for handling the data, would relate to securities that already had matured or that would mature shortly thereafter. And because we understand that liquidity funds, like money market funds, tend to hold many of their securities to maturity—rather than selling them in the market—any inadvertent or improper disclosure of a liquidity fund’s portfolio holdings generally should not adversely affect the value of the fund’s position. 330 The relatively limited universe of securities appropriate for purchase by a liquidity

329 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at n.343 and accompanying text.

330 In contrast, if the market learned that a private fund had a concentrated position in an equity security and determined that the fund likely would need to sell that security, market makers in the security and other market participants could lower their bid prices for the security in anticipation of the sale. Information about a liquidity fund’s (relatively) concentrated position in a security likely to be held until maturity is
fund together with the similarity of investment strategies followed by liquidity funds also suggests that information about their portfolio holdings may be less sensitive than information about the holdings of hedge funds, for example, which may pursue a variety of investment strategies and whose holdings therefore may reveal more sensitive information. Finally, because we expect that many large liquidity fund advisers also will advise money market funds, they already will be accustomed to managing their portfolios while also making continuous public disclosure of their portfolio holdings as proposed here (as compared to the non-public, quarterly reporting required on Form PF).

In addition to these considerations, and as we discussed in detail in the Form PF adopting Release, we do not intend to make public Form PF information identifiable to any particular adviser or private fund, and indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Advisers Act to preclude us from being compelled to reveal this information except in very limited circumstances. We therefore make Form PF data identifiable to any particular adviser or private fund available outside of the Commission only in very limited circumstances, primarily to FSOC as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, subject to the confidentiality provisions of the

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Liquidity funds, by definition, have similar investment objectives. See Glossary of Terms to Form PF (defining a “liquidity fund” as any private fund that “seeks to generate income by investing in a portfolio of short term obligations in order to maintain a stable net asset value per unit or minimize principal volatility for investors”).

We are not today proposing to require advisers to file position-level data about private funds other than liquidity funds managed by large liquidity fund advisers, in part, because of the more sensitive information that could be revealed by the position-level data of other types of private funds. In addition, the information we propose to require large liquidity fund advisers to file concerning their liquidity funds is designed primarily to enhance FSOC’s ability to assess systemic risk, and thus is informed, in part, by FSOC’s own particular concerns about systemic risk in the short-term financing markets. See, e.g., supra note 817 and accompanying text. FSOC has not expressed similar concerns about other types of private funds or other markets in which other types of private funds invest exclusively that would suggest FSOC would derive substantial benefits from position-level data about other types of private funds.

See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at section II.D.
Dodd-Frank Act. In recognition of the sensitivity of some of the data collected on Form PF, our staff is handling Form PF data in a manner that reflects the sensitivity of this data and is consistent with the confidentiality protections established in the Dodd-Frank Act.

In addition to any concerns advisers may have about the sensitivity of their portfolio holdings, we note that although the increased transparency to regulators provided by our proposal could positively affect capital formation as discussed above, increased transparency, as we observed when adopting Form PF, could also have a negative effect on capital formation if it increases advisers’ aversion to risk and, as a result, reduces investment in enterprises that may be risky but beneficial to the economy as a whole. To the extent that our proposal were to cause changes in investment allocations that lead to reduced economic outcomes in the aggregate, our proposal could result in a negative effect on capital available for investment. As we discuss above, however, any effects on capital formation from increased transparency to regulators—including these possible negative effects—likely would be less significant than those associated with our adoption of Form PF.

We also do not believe that our proposed amendments to Form PF would have a significant effect on competition because the information that advisers report on Form PF, including the new information we propose to require, generally will be non-public and similar

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834 We also may share Form PF data with other federal departments or agencies or with self-regulatory organizations, in addition to the CFTC and FSOC, for purposes within the scope of their jurisdiction, as contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. In each case, any such department, agency or self-regulatory organization would be exempt from being compelled under FOIA to disclose to the public any information collected through Form PF and must maintain the confidentiality of that information. Id. Prior to sharing any Form PF data, we require that any such department, agency or self-regulatory organization represent to us that it has in place controls designed to ensure the use and handling of Form PF data in a manner consistent with the protections established in the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.

835 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at text accompanying and following n.537.
types of advisers will have compatible burdens under the form as we propose to amend it.\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered 836} We also do not believe that the proposed amendments would have a significant negative effect on capital formation, again because the information collected generally will be non-public and, therefore, should not affect large liquidity fund advisers’ ability to raise capital.\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered 837}

We request comment on all aspects of our proposed amendments to Form PF, including our discussion of the benefits, costs, and effects on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.

- Would the portfolio holdings information we propose to require large liquidity fund advisers to file on Form PF, together with the other information that advisers already must file on the form, appropriately identify the ways in which their liquidity funds might generate systemic risk? Are there ways these liquidity funds could create systemic risk, particularly if we were to adopt any of the money market fund reforms we are proposing today, that would not be reflected in the additional information?

- Should we require large liquidity fund advisers to file additional or different information about their liquidity funds? If so, which information and how would that information be useful to FSOC and the Commission? Do commenters expect they would derive efficiencies from our requiring large liquidity fund advisers to file the same types of information that must be reported on Form N-MFP?

- Is our proposal to require more comprehensive liquidity fund reporting by large liquidity fund advisers appropriate? Should we, instead, create a new subcategory

\textsuperscript{836} See id. at text accompanying n.535.

\textsuperscript{837} See id. at text following n.535.
of large liquidity fund advisers who would be subject to these additional reporting requirements? If so, how should we define that subcategory? Would requiring only those large liquidity fund advisers with a more substantial amount of combined liquidity fund and money market fund assets under management—for example, $10, $25 or $50 billion—allow us to more effectively achieve our goals?

- Rather than require all large liquidity fund advisers to file portfolio holdings information with respect to each of their liquidity funds, should we define “qualifying” liquidity funds and require any adviser to such a fund, potentially including advisers that are not large liquidity fund advisers, to file this more comprehensive information? If so, why, and how should we define such a qualifying liquidity fund? Should we define a “qualifying liquidity fund” as a liquidity fund that, together with funds managed in parallel with the liquidity fund, is at least a certain size? What size would be appropriate (e.g., $100 million, $500 million, $1 billion)?

- Should we retain our proposed approach but provide an exemption for de minimis liquidity funds for which no additional reporting would be required? This would require a large liquidity fund adviser to provide portfolio holdings information about all of its liquidity funds except those that qualified for the de minimis exemption. Such an approach would prevent an adviser that is a large liquidity fund adviser primarily because of its money market funds assets under management from having to file portfolio holdings information for a relatively small liquidity fund (e.g., an adviser with $10 billion in money market fund assets under management and a single liquidity fund with only $10 million in assets
under management). Would this minimize reporting burdens on advisers to smaller or start up liquidity funds that are less likely to have a systemic impact while still providing us and FSOC information about the adviser's short-term investing activities, which in the aggregate may be relevant to an assessment of systemic risks? How would we structure such a *de minimis* exemption? Should it be based solely on the size of a liquidity fund and funds managed in parallel with the liquidity fund? Would a $1 billion threshold be appropriate because it would ensure that large liquidity fund advisers are only required to provide portfolio holdings information for relatively large liquidity funds?

- Do commenters agree that the new information we propose to require advisers to provide would be useful to FSOC and the Commission for the reasons we discuss above? Do commenters believe that the information would have the effects on capital formation, competition, and efficiency that we discuss above? Why or why not? Would there be additional effects that we have not discussed here?

- Do commenters agree with our assessment of the potential sensitivity of the information we propose to require advisers to provide? Why or why not? To the extent, advisers view the proposed information as sensitive and are concerned about the information's inadvertent or inappropriate disclosure, is there other information the advisers view as less sensitive that would achieve our goals?

- We propose to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide this new information quarterly with the information broken out monthly. Should we instead require these advisers to file the information more or less frequently? Would a monthly reporting requirement, consistent with Form N-MFP, be more
appropriate?

- As discussed above, our proposed amendments to Form PF are designed to enhance FSOC’s ability to monitor and assess systemic risks in the short-term financing markets and to facilitate our oversight of those markets and their participants, particularly in the event that further money market fund reforms cause investors to seek alternatives to money market funds, including private funds. Further money market reforms also could incentivize investors to seek out money market fund alternatives that are registered with the Commission, such as ultra-short bond mutual funds. Information about these and similar funds’ portfolio holdings also could be useful to us and FSOC, particularly when combined with (or considered together with) information money market funds and advisers would file on amended Forms N-MFP and PF. Should we therefore require registered investment companies that invest in the short-term financing markets to file the same information money market funds must file on Form N-MFP and in the same format and with the same frequency to facilitate comparisons? If so, how should we designate which funds would be subject to this new requirement?

J. Diversification

Rule 2a-7 requires a money market fund’s portfolio to be diversified, both as to the issuers of the securities it acquires and providers of guarantees and demand features related to those securities.\(^3\) Generally, money market funds must limit their investments in the securities

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\(^3\) Rule 2a-7(c)(4)(i) through (iv). The diversification requirements of rule 2a-7 differ in significant respects from the requirements for diversified management investment companies under section 5(b)(1) of the Act. A money market fund that satisfies the applicable diversification requirements of the paragraphs (c)(4) and
of any one issuer of a first tier security (other than government securities) to no more than 5% of fund assets. They must also generally limit their investments in securities subject to a demand feature or a guarantee to no more than 10% of fund assets from any one provider, except that the rule provides a so-called “twenty-five percent basket,” under which as much as 25% of the value of securities held in a fund’s portfolio may be subject to guarantees or demand features from a single institution. We adopted these requirements in order to limit the exposure of a money market fund to any one issuer, guarantor, or demand feature provider.

As further explained below, we are concerned that the diversification requirements in rule 2a-7 today may not appropriately limit money market fund risk exposures. We therefore propose, as discussed below, to: (1) require money market funds to treat certain entities that are affiliated with each other as single issuers when applying rule 2a-7’s 5% issuer diversification.

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839 Rule 2a-7(c)(4)(i)(A) and (B). A first tier security is any eligible security that has received a short-term credit rating in the highest short-term category for debt obligations or, if the security is an unrated security, that is of comparable quality, as determined by the money market fund’s board of directors. Rule 2a-7(a)(14). Government securities and securities issued by money market funds also are first tier securities. Id. A fund also may invest no more than 0.5% of fund assets in any one issuer of a second tier security. Rule 2a-7(c)(4)(i)(C). A second tier security is an eligible security that is not a first tier security. Rule 2a-7(a)(24). The rule contains a safe harbor where a taxable and national tax-exempt fund may invest up to 25% of its assets in the first tier securities of a single issuer for a period of up to three business days after acquisition (but a fund may use this exception for only one issuer at a time). Rule 2a-7(c)(4)(i)(A).

840 Rule 2a-7 currently applies a 10% diversification limit on guarantees and demand features only to 75% of a money market fund’s total assets. See rule 2a-7(c)(4)(iii)(A). The money market fund, however, may only use the twenty-five percent basket to invest in demand features or guarantees that are first tier securities issued by non-controlled persons. See rule 2a-7(c)(4)(ii)(B) and (C). All of rule 2a-7’s diversification limits are applied at the time of acquisition. For example, a fund may not invest in a particular issuer if, after acquisition, the fund’s aggregate investments in the issuer would exceed 5% of fund assets. But if the fund’s aggregate exposure after making the investment was less than 5%, the fund would not be required to later sell the securities if the fund’s assets decreased and the fund’s investment in the issuer came to represent more than 5% of the fund’s assets.

841 See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at n.220 and accompanying text; 1990 Proposing Release, supra note 310, at text accompanying n.23 ("Diversification limits investment risk to a fund by spreading the risk of loss among a number of securities.").
requirement; (2) require funds to treat the sponsors of asset-backed securities as guarantors subject to rule 2a-7's diversification requirements unless the fund’s board makes certain findings; and (3) remove the twenty-five percent basket.

1. Treatment of Certain Affiliates for Purposes of Rule 2a-7’s Five Percent Issuer Diversification Requirement

The diversification requirements in rule 2a-7 apply to money market funds’ exposures to issuers of securities (as well as providers of demand features and guarantees), as discussed above. Rule 2a-7, however, does not require a money market fund to aggregate its exposures to entities that are affiliated with each other when measuring its exposure for purposes of these requirements. As a result, a money market fund could be in compliance with rule 2a-7 while assuming a concentrated amount of risk to a single economic enterprise. For example, although a money market fund would not be permitted to invest more than 5% of its assets in the securities issued by a single bank holding company, the fund could invest well in excess of 5% of its assets in securities issued by the bank holding company together with its affiliates. Under current rule 2a-7, for example, a money market fund could invest 5% of its assets in Bank XYZ, NA, another 5% of its assets in Bank XYZ Corp., another 5% of its assets in Bank XYZ Securities, LLC, another 5% of its assets in Bank XYZ (Grand Cayman), another 5% of its assets in Bank XYZ (London), and so on.

Financial distress at an issuer can quickly spread to affiliates through a number of mechanisms. Firms within an affiliated group, for example, may issue financial guarantees, whether implicit or explicit, of each other’s securities, effectively creating contingent liabilities whose values depend on the value of other firms in the group. These guarantees can be “upstream,” whereby a subsidiary guarantees its parent’s debt; “downstream,” whereby a parent guarantees a subsidiary’s debt; or “cross stream,” whereby one subsidiary guarantees another
subsidiary’s debt. Affiliates may be separate legal entities, but their valuations and the
creditworthiness of their securities may depend on the financial well-being of other firms in the
group. As an example, a firm may issue debt securities that would be considered to be in default
if one of the firm’s affiliates is unable to meet its financial obligations.

Alternatively, the value of a firm’s securities may depend, implicitly or explicitly, on the
strength of the affiliate group’s consolidated financial statements. If an affiliate in the group
experiences financial distress and the affiliate group’s consolidated financials therefore suffer,
then the value of the securities of the other firms in the group may decline. Indeed, bank holding
companies are required to act as a source of financial strength to their bank subsidiaries,
providing a means for financial distress at a bank subsidiary to affect the parent banking holding
company. The possibility for financial distress to transmit across affiliated entities was
demonstrated during the 2007-2008 financial crisis when, for example, American International
Group Inc. came under financial stress, which affected a number of its affiliates. In some cases,
AIG’s corporate group contagion required the sponsors of money market funds that owned
AIG’s affiliates’ securities to seek no-action relief from our staff in order for the sponsors to
support their funds.

842 See section 616 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

843 See, e.g., SEC Staff No-Action Letter to USAA Mutual Funds Trust (Oct. 22, 2008) (providing no-action
assurances so that an affiliated person of the money market fund could purchase certain short-term notes
issued by AIG Funding, Inc. based in part on representations that the securities’ market values could soon
decline below the securities’ shadow prices); SEC Staff No-Action Letter to MainStay VP Cash
Management Portfolio (Oct. 22, 2008) (providing the same relief for the purchase of notes issued by AIG
Funding, Inc. based in part on representations that it would be advisable for the fund to sell the security but,
due in large part to market concerns regarding the sponsoring entity of the Security and its affiliates,” the
adviser was unable to sell the security on behalf of the fund in then-current markets); SEC Staff No-Action
Letter to Phoenix Opportunities Trust and Phoenix Edge Series Fund (Oct. 22, 2008) (providing no-action
assurances so that an affiliated person of the money market funds could purchase certain securities issued
by International Lease Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of American International Group, Inc., based in
part on representations that the securities’ market values had declined below the securities’ amortized cost
values); SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Penn Series Funds, Inc. (Oct. 22, 2008) (providing no-action
assurances so that an affiliated person of the money market fund could purchase certain securities issued by
Rule 2a-7 today thus can allow a fund to take on highly concentrated risks, risks that appear inconsistent with the purposes of the diversification requirements and that may be inconsistent with investors' expectations of the level of risk posed by a money market fund. Indeed, we have explained that "[d]iversification limits investment risk to a fund by spreading the risk of loss among a number of securities." But exposure to entities that are affiliated with each other may not effectively spread the risk of loss as contemplated by rule 2a-7's diversification requirements and, as discussed in more detail below, data analyzed by our staff show that many money market funds have invested in affiliated entities to a greater extent than would be permitted if the exposures were aggregated.

We propose, therefore, to amend rule 2a-7's diversification requirements to require that money market funds limit their exposure to affiliated groups, rather than to discrete issuers in isolation. Specifically, we propose to require money market funds to aggregate their exposures to certain entities that are affiliated with each other when applying rule 2a-7's 5% issuer diversification limit. Entities would be affiliated for this purpose if one controlled the other entity or was controlled by it or under common control with it. For this purpose only, control would be defined to mean ownership of more than 50% of an entity's voting securities. By using a more than 50% test (i.e., majority ownership), we believe the alignment of economic interests and risks of the affiliated entities is sufficient to justify aggregating their exposures for

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Sun America Sponsored Trust and International Lease Finance Corporation, both affiliates of American International Group, Inc., based in part on representations that the securities' market values had declined below the securities' amortized cost values).

844 See supra note 841.
845 See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(3)(ii)(F).
846 Id.
847 Id.
purposes of rule 2a-7’s 5% issuer diversification limit.\textsuperscript{848}

This approach is consistent with some of the circumstances under which affiliated entities must be consolidated on financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, under which a parent generally must consolidate its majority-owned subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{849} Majority-owned subsidiaries generally must be consolidated under GAAP for similar reasons—the operations of the group are sufficiently related such that they are presented under GAAP as if they “were a single economic entity”—which appear to support consolidating them for purposes of rule 2a-7’s 5% diversification requirements as well.\textsuperscript{850}

A majority ownership test also should mitigate the costs to money markets funds of complying with the proposed amendment. Our understanding is that money market funds generally would be able to determine issuer affiliations, defined with a majority ownership test, as part of their evaluation of whether a security presents minimal credit risks, or that money market funds could readily obtain this information from issuers or the broker-dealers marketing the issuance. In this regard we note that, although some companies that sell their securities to money market funds will have a relatively large number of such affiliates, we expect that only a relatively small subset of these affiliates will be companies in which a money market fund could

\textsuperscript{848} We previously have taken a similar approach in delineating affiliates. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release No. 67453 (July 18, 2012) [77 FR 48208 (Aug. 13, 2012)], at nn.797-803 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{849} See, e.g., FASB ASC, supra note 270, at paragraph 810-10-15-8 (“The usual condition for a controlling financial interest is ownership of a majority voting interest, and, therefore, as a general rule ownership by one reporting entity, directly or indirectly, of more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting shares of another entity is a condition pointing toward consolidation.”).

\textsuperscript{850} See, e.g., id. at paragraph 810-10-10-1 (“The purpose of consolidated financial statements is to present, primarily for the benefit of the owners and creditors of the parent, the results of operations and the financial position of a parent and all its subsidiaries as if the consolidated group were a single economic entity. There is a presumption that consolidated financial statements are more meaningful than separate financial statements and that they are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one of the entities in the consolidated group directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest in the other entities.”).
invest (e.g., that have a requisite credit rating and issue short-term debt in U.S. dollars). We expect that in many cases affiliates under this proposal—and especially affiliates in which money market funds are likely to invest—will have other readily observable characteristics that will help money market funds to discern their affiliations (e.g., substantially similar names). We also understand that, because exposures to entities that are affiliated with each other can be expected to be highly correlated, most money market funds today consider their exposures to entities that are affiliated with each other for risk management purposes, although they may nonetheless choose to invest in affiliated entities to a greater extent than would be permitted under this proposal.

We also are concerned that the other approaches we considered could limit money market funds' investment flexibility unnecessarily and could be more difficult to apply. For example, we considered the approach we are proposing today but with the definition of “control” set at an ownership threshold lower than 50%. We also considered requiring money market funds to aggregate exposures to a broader range of entities by requiring aggregation of “affiliated persons,” as defined in the Investment Company Act. If we were to use that definition, a

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851 This approach is reflected in other provisions of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act (defining the term “affiliated person”); section 202(a)(17) of the Advisers Act (defining the term “person associated with an investment adviser”); Form ADV: Glossary of Terms (defining the term “Related Person”); see also section 2(a)(9) of the Investment Company Act (providing that the term “control” means “the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of a company, unless such power is solely the result of an official position with such company”); section 202(a)(12) (same definition of “control”).

852 See section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act (“‘Affiliated person’ of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.”).
money market fund would have to aggregate its exposures to two issuers if, for example, one issuer owned directly or indirectly 5% of the other issuer’s voting securities.

We are concerned that either of these alternative approaches could unnecessarily limit a money market fund’s flexibility. Our goal is to require money market funds to limit their exposure to particular economic enterprises without unnecessarily limiting money market funds’ investments in other persons whose connection to the economic enterprise may be sufficiently attenuated that they may not be highly correlated with the enterprise. We are concerned that either of these alternative approaches could restrict money market funds from investing in securities whose issuers had only an attenuated connection to the economic enterprise. For example, if a parent owned only 5% of the voting stock of one of its subsidiaries, the risks posed by investing in the parent and minority-owned subsidiary likely would be less correlated than if the parent owned more than 50% of the subsidiary’s voting stock. These other approaches also could be more difficult to apply in that they would require a money market fund to conduct a more extensive analysis for each investment (e.g., to ascertain the extent to which entities control one another or are under common control, where control could be established through more attenuated relationships or ownership levels).

We also considered proposing to require a money market fund to treat as affiliates all entities that must be consolidated on a balance sheet. This would include affiliated entities as we propose, as well as certain “variable interest entities,” which generally are entities in which the parent holds a controlling financial interest that is not based on the parent’s ownership of a majority of the entity’s voting stock. An SPE issuing ABS could be a variable interest entity.

See, e.g., FASB ASC, supra note 270, at paragraph 810-10-05-8 ("The Variable Interest Entities Subsections clarify the application of the General Subsections to certain legal entities in which equity investors do not have the characteristics of a controlling financial interest or do not have sufficient equity at
consolidated on the sponsor's balance sheet, for example. In light of the large variety of entities that may be variable interest rate entities and the diverse activities in which they may engage,\textsuperscript{154} we believe, at this time, that it is more appropriate to address them (as needed) through more targeted reforms like our ABS diversification proposal. For these same reasons, and because we already are further tightening rule 2a-7's 10% limit on indirect exposures through our ABS and twenty-five percent basket diversification proposals, this proposal only addresses aggregation of exposures for purpose of rule 2a-7's 5% issuer diversification limit.

We request comment on our approach.

- Do commenters agree that the exposures to risks of issuers who would be treated as affiliates under this proposal would be highly correlated? Is our proposed approach to delineating affiliates too broad or too narrow and why? Do commenters believe that our proposed approach would limit money market funds' investment flexibility unnecessarily, and if so, to what extent? Should we, instead, use any of the alternative approaches to delineating a group of affiliates we discuss above? Are there other approaches we should consider? Should we, for example, require money market funds to aggregate exposures to parent companies and any of their "majority-owned subsidiaries," as defined in the

\textsuperscript{154} See, e.g., \textit{id.} at paragraph 810-10-05-11 ("VIEs often are created for a single specified purpose, for example, to facilitate securitization, leasing, hedging, research and development, reinsurance, or other transactions or arrangements. The activities may be predetermined by the documents that establish the VIEs or by contracts or other arrangements between the parties involved.").
Investment Company Act? A parent’s majority-owned subsidiaries under this definition would be any company “50 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are owned by [the parent], or by a company which ... is a majority-owned subsidiary of such person.”\footnote{See section 2(a)(24) of the Investment Company Act ("‘Majority-owned subsidiary of a person means a company 50 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are owned by such person, or by a company which, within the meaning of this paragraph, is a majority-owned subsidiary of such person.’.")}

- Do commenters agree that a more than 50\% (\textit{i.e.}, majority ownership) test rather than a lower threshold used to define “control” or a different threshold would make it more likely that there would be an alignment of economic interests of the affiliated entities that is sufficient to justify aggregating their exposures for purposes of rule 2a-7’s 5\% issuer diversification limit?

- Do commenters agree that money market funds generally would be able to determine these affiliations, defined with a majority ownership test, as part of their evaluation of whether a security presents minimal credit risks, or that money market funds could readily obtain this information from issuers or the broker-dealers marketing the issuance? Why or why not? We ask that money market funds responding to this request for comment describe the materials they typically review as part of their evaluation of whether a security presents minimal credit risks and how these materials would or would not allow a money market fund to determine affiliations under our proposal.

- Is our understanding that money market funds today attempt to identify and measure their exposure to entities that are affiliated with each other as part of their risk management or stress testing processes correct? If so, how do they determine
affiliations for these purposes?

- Do commenters agree with our expectation that, although some issuers that sell their securities to money market funds will have a relatively large number of affiliates, only a relatively small subset of these affiliates will be companies in which a money market fund could invest? Why or not?

- Should we require a money market fund to treat as entities that are affiliated with each other those that must be consolidated on a balance sheet, including “variable interest entities” (in addition to majority-owned subsidiaries that would be treated as affiliates under our proposal)? Why or why not? Do commenters agree that, in light of the large variety of entities that may be variable interest rate entities, it is more appropriate to address them (as needed) through more targeted reforms? Should we, instead, require money market funds to treat entities that are affiliated with each other as if they were a single entity when applying rule 2a-7’s 10% diversification limit (for providers of demand features and guarantees) as well? If so, should we use the same approach for determining when entities would be affiliated with each other as we propose for purposes of the rule’s 5% issuer diversification limit (i.e., with a majority-ownership test)? Why or why not? As discussed in more detail below, we are proposing to treat certain ABS sponsors as guarantors subject to the 10% limit, and also are proposing to remove the twenty-five percent basket. What would be the cumulative impact on money market funds’ ability to acquire securities subject to guarantees or demand features (and issuers’ ability to issue those securities) if, in addition to these other two proposals, we also were to require money market funds to aggregate their
exposures to providers of demand features and guarantees that are affiliated with each other for purposes of the 10% limit?

We expect that this proposal, and our diversification proposals collectively, would provide a number of benefits. These proposals are designed to diversify the risks to which money market funds may be exposed and thereby reduce the impact of any single issuer’s (or guarantor’s or demand feature provider’s) financial distress on a fund under either of our floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates proposals. Requiring money market funds to more broadly diversify their risks should reduce the volatility of fund returns (and hence NAVs) and limit the impact of an issuer’s distress (or guarantor’s or demand feature provider’s distress) on fund liquidity. By reducing money market funds’ volatility and making their liquidity levels more resilient, our diversification proposals are designed to mitigate the risk of heavy shareholder redemptions from money market funds in times of financial distress and promote capital formation by making money market funds a more stable source of financing for issuers of short-term credit instruments. Reducing money market funds’ volatility and making their liquidity levels more resilient also should cause money market funds to attract further investments, increasing their role as a source of capital in the short-term financing markets for issuers. We are not able to quantify these benefits (although we do provide quantitative information concerning certain impacts), primarily because we believe it is impractical, if not impossible, to identify with sufficient precision the marginal decrease in risk and increase in stability we expect these diversification proposals would provide.

More fundamentally, this proposal is designed to more effectively achieve the diversification of risk contemplated by the rule’s current 5% issuer diversification requirement. As noted above, we have explained that “[d]iversification limits investment risk to a fund by
spreading the risk of loss among a number of securities. Requiring funds to purchase “a number of securities” rather than a smaller number of concentrated investments will only “spread ... the risk of loss” if the performance of those securities is not highly correlated. That is, a fund’s investments in Issuers A, B, and C are no less risky (or only marginally so) than a single investment in Issuer A if Issuers A, B, and C are likely to experience declines in value simultaneously and to approximately the same extent. This may indeed be likely if Issuers A, B, and C are affiliated with each other. Prime money market funds’ concentrated exposures to financial institutions increase these concerns because prime money market funds’ portfolios already appear correlated to some extent. The risk posed by this sector concentration would be increased if a prime money market fund, in addition, had large correlated exposures to a particular financial services group through investments in various entities that are affiliated with each other.

We recognize, however, that this proposal could impose costs on money market funds and could affect competition, efficiency, and capital formation. To help us evaluate these effects, RSFI staff analyzed the diversification and concentration in the money market fund industry, as described in detail in RSFI’s memo “Issuances by Parents and Exposures by Parents in Money Market Funds,” which will be placed in the comment file for this Release (“RSFI Diversification Memo”). That memo shows, among other things, that some money market funds invested more than 5% of their assets in the issuances of specific corporate groups, or “parents”

856 See supra note 841. See also, e.g., Occupy the SEC FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 42 (stating that rule 2a-7’s current regulatory framework for diversification is inadequate, in part because “issuer-level diversification limits do not directly address the potential for aggregate exposure across subsidiaries of the same firm, allowing for significant aggregation effects”); Better Markets FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67 (“Limiting issuer concentration in MMF portfolios, broadening the definition of ‘issuer’ to include affiliates, and enhancing liquidity standards are plainly appropriate measures that will help stabilize MMFs.”).

857 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
(as defined in the RSFI Diversification Memo) between November 2010 and November 2012. For example, the analysis shows that the largest average fund-level exposure of at least 5% to the issuances of a single parent is 31. In other words, 31 money market funds, on average, invest at least 5% of their portfolios in the issuances of the largest parent. The analysis also shows that the largest average fund-level exposure of at least 7% to the issuances of one parent is 14 while the largest average fund-level exposure of at least 10% to the issuances of one parent is 3. We expect, therefore, that this proposal would increase the diversification of at least some money market funds. For example, a money market fund that had invested more than 5% of its assets in a parent or corporate group would, when those investments matured, have to reinvest some of the proceeds in a different parent or corporate group (or in unrelated issuers). 858

The effect of this reinvestment on competition, efficiency, or capital formation would depend in part on how money market funds choose to reinvest their assets. It seems reasonable to expect that a divestment by one money market fund (because its exposure to a particular group of affiliates is too great) might become a purchasing opportunity for another money market fund whose holdings in that affiliated group do not constrain it. If the credit qualities of the investments were similar, there should be no net effect on fund risk and yield, issuers, or the economy. It is possible, however, that some money market funds would reinvest some or all of their excess exposure in securities of higher risk, albeit within the restrictions in rule 2a-7. In these instances, funds’ portfolio risk would increase, their NAVs and fund liquidity would likely become more volatile, and yields would rise. Money market funds in this instance could become less stable than they are today, investor demand for the funds could fall (to the extent increased

858 Money market funds would not be required to sell any of their portfolio securities as a result of any of our diversification proposals because rule 2a-7’s diversification limits are measured at acquisition. See, e.g., supra note 840.
volatility in money market funds is not outweighed by any increase in fund yield), and capital formation could be reduced. Alternatively, money market funds could reinvest excess exposure in securities of lower risk. In these instances, portfolio risk would fall, fund NAVs and liquidity would likely become less volatile, and yields would fall. In this scenario, money market funds would become more stable than they are today, investor demand for the funds could rise (to the extent increased stability in money market funds is not outweighed by any decrease in fund yield), and capital formation might be enhanced. We cannot predict how money market funds would invest in response to this proposal and we thus do not have a basis for determining money market funds' likely reinvestment strategies, and we accordingly seek comment on these issues below.

It also is important to note that money market funds' current exposures in excess of what our proposal would permit may reflect the overall risk preferences of their managers. To the extent that this proposal would reduce the concentration of issuer risk, fund managers that have particular risk tolerances or preferences may shift their funds' remaining portfolio assets, within rule 2a-7's restrictions, to higher risk assets. If so, portfolio risk, although more diversified, would increase (or remain constant), and we would expect portfolio yields to rise (or to remain constant). If yields were to rise, money market funds might be able to compete more favorably with other short-term investment products (to the extent the increased yield is not outweighed by any increased volatility).

At this time, we cannot predict or quantify the precise effects this proposal would have on competition, efficiency, or capital formation. The effects would depend on how money market funds, their investors, and companies who issue securities to money market funds would adjust on a long-term basis to our proposal. The ways in which these groups could adjust, and the
associated effects, are too complex and interrelated to allow us to predict them with specificity or to quantify them at this time.

For example, if a money market fund must reallocate its investments under our proposal, whether that would affect capital formation would depend on whether there are available alternative investments the money market fund could choose and the nature of any alternatives. Assuming there are alternative investments, the effects on capital formation would depend on the amount of yield the issuers of the alternative investments would be required to pay as compared to the amount they would have paid absent our proposal. For example, this proposal could cause money market funds to seek alternative investments and this increased demand could allow their issuers to pay a lower yield than they would absent this increase in demand. This would decrease issuers’ financing costs, enhancing capital formation. But it also could decrease the yield the money market fund paid to its shareholders, potentially making money market funds less attractive and leading to reduced aggregate investments by the money market fund which, in turn, could increase financing costs for issuers of short-term debt. The availability of alternative investments and the ease with which they could be identified could affect efficiency, in that money market funds might find their investment process less efficient if they were required to expend additional effort identifying alternative investments. These same factors could affect competition if more effort is required to identify alternative investments under our proposals and larger money market funds are better positioned to expend this additional effort or to do so at a lower marginal cost than smaller money market funds. These factors also could affect capital formation in other ways, in that money market funds could choose to invest in lower quality securities under our proposal if they are not able to identify alternative investments with levels of risk equivalent to the funds’ current investments.
In addition to these effects, we recognize that this proposal could require money market funds to update the systems they use to monitor their compliance with rule 2a-7's 5% issuer diversification requirement in order to aggregate exposures to affiliates. Although we understand that most money market funds today consider their exposures to entities that are affiliated with each other for risk management purposes, any systems money market funds currently have in place for this purpose may not be suitable for monitoring compliance with a diversification requirement, as opposed to a risk management evaluation (which may entail less regular or episodic monitoring).

Because money market funds differ significantly in their current practices and systems, we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the costs associated with this proposal. But based on the activities typically involved in making systems modifications, and recognizing that money market funds' existing systems currently have varying degrees of functionality, we estimate that the one-time systems modifications costs (including modifications to related procedures and controls) for a money market fund associated with this proposal would range from approximately $600,000 to $1,200,000. We do not expect that money market funds would incur material ongoing costs to maintain and modify their systems as a result of this proposal because we expect modifications required by this proposal would be incremental changes to existing systems that already perform similar functions (track exposures for purposes of monitoring compliance with rule 2a-7's 5% issuer diversification limit). We also note that, although we have estimated the costs that a single money market fund could incur as a result of

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859 Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) planning, coding, testing, and installing system modifications; (ii) drafting, integrating, and implementing related procedures and controls; and (iii) preparing training materials and administering training sessions for staff in affected areas. See also supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff's estimates of operational and related costs).
this proposal, we expect that these costs would be shared among various money market funds in a complex. To the extent money market funds use software or other solutions purchased or licensed from third-party vendors, the funds may be able to purchase any needed upgrades at a lower cost than would be required for the funds to modify their systems internally.

As we discuss above, we expect that money market funds generally would be able to determine affiliations under our proposal, which uses a majority ownership test, as part of their evaluation of whether a security presents minimal credit risks, or that money market funds could readily obtain this information from issuers or the broker-dealers marketing the issuance. We therefore do not expect that money market funds would be required to spend additional time determining affiliations under our proposal, or if an additional time commitment would be required, we expect that it would be minimal. We estimate that the costs of this minimal additional time commitment to a money market fund, if it were to occur, would range from approximately $5,000 to $105,000 annually.\(^\text{860}\)

\(^{860}\) In arriving at this estimate, we expect that any required additional work generally would be conducted each time a money market fund determined whether to add a new issuer to the approved list of issuers in which the fund may invest. The frequency with which a money market fund would make these determinations would depend on its size and investment strategy. To be conservative, and based on Form N-MFP data concerning the number of securities held in money market funds' portfolios, we estimate that a money market fund could be required to make such a determination between 33 and 339 times each year. This is based on our staff's review of data filed on Form N-MFP as of February 28, 2013, which showed that the 10 smallest money market funds by assets had an average of 33 investments and the 10 largest money market funds by assets had an average of 339 investments. The number of a money market fund's investments should be a rough proxy for the number of times each year that a money market fund could add an issuer to its approved list, although this will overstate the frequency of these determinations (e.g., a fund may have a number of separate investments in a single issuer). We estimate that the additional time commitment imposed by this proposal, if any, would be an additional 1-2 hours of an analyst's time each time the fund determined whether to add an issuer to its approved list. The estimated range of costs, therefore, is calculated as follows: (33 evaluations x 1 hour of a junior business analyst's time at $155 per hour = $5,115) to (339 evaluations x 2 hours of a junior business analyst's time at $155 per hour = $105,090). Finally, we recognize that some money market funds do not use an approved list, but instead evaluate each investment separately. We believe that the number of a money market fund's investments also should be a rough proxy for the number of times such a money market fund would evaluate each investment. Such funds may be on the higher end of the range, however, because the extent to which a fund's average number of investments reflects the number of times such a fund purchases securities would depend on the rate of the fund's portfolio turnover. Whether any additional analysis would be required as a
We request comment on this analysis, including the analysis contained in the RSFI Diversification Memo.

- Do commenters expect that they would incur operational costs in addition to, or that differ from, the costs we estimate above? Do commenters expect they would be required to expend additional time determining affiliations, or that they would incur additional or different costs in doing so?

- Do commenters expect that money market funds would encounter any difficulties in finding alternative investments under our proposal? Why or why not? In what types of assets are money market funds likely to invest if they are required to aggregate their investments in entities that are affiliated with each other as we propose? Are money market funds likely to reinvest excess exposure in assets that are similar, more risky or less risky than their original portfolios?

- How would this proposal (and our diversification proposals collectively) affect fund yields and the stability of fund NAVs and liquidity? How would they affect competition, efficiency, or capital formation?

- Do commenters expect this proposal would change the financing costs of companies who issue their securities to money market funds? If so, why, and to what extent? If financing costs increase, to what extent would that increase be passed on to money market fund investors in the form of higher yields? Would any higher yields then result in increased investments by money market funds in the aggregate? Would any aggregate increase offset or mitigate any increase in

result of this proposal for such a fund also would depend on whether the fund invested proceeds from maturing securities in issuers for which a new credit risk analysis was required or in issuers of securities owned by the fund for which the analysis may already have been done.
issuers’ financing costs? Would the inverse occur if issuers’ financing costs decreased because of increased demand from money market funds? How would any associated increases or decreases in money market funds’ volatility affect investor demand for money market funds and, in turn, capital formation and issuers’ financing costs?

- Are there any benefits, costs, or effects on competition, efficiency, and capital formation that we have not identified or discussed?

2. **Asset-Backed Securities**

In 2007, a number of money market funds were exposed to substantial losses resulting from investments in asset-backed commercial paper issued by structured investment vehicles ("SIVs"), a type of ABS.\textsuperscript{861} As we described in some detail in the 2009 Proposing Release, SIVs suffered severe liquidity problems and significant losses in 2007 when risk-averse short-term investors (including money market funds), fearing increased exposure to liquidity risk and residential mortgage defaults, began to avoid the commercial paper the SIVs issued, causing the paper to decline in value.\textsuperscript{862} The decline in value of the SIVs’ commercial paper threatened to force a number of money market funds to re-price below their $1.00 stable share price, a result that was most likely avoided in part because many of the SIVs received support from their sponsors.\textsuperscript{863}

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\textsuperscript{861} See, e.g., 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at sections I.D and II.A.4. ABCP is commercial paper issued by special purpose entities, or SPEs, to finance the purchase of various financial assets. Payments to ABCP investors are based on the financial assets, and ABCP is therefore a type of ABS. In some cases, the sponsor of the ABCP will provide explicit liquidity or credit support to the ABCP, whereas in other cases, such as the SIVs, the sponsors provide no explicit support.

\textsuperscript{862} Id.

\textsuperscript{863} Id. See also, e.g., Dan Gallagher, Citigroup says it will absorb SIV assets: Move bail out struggling investment vehicles but could hurt capital base, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 17, 2007, available at http://articles.marketwatch.com/2007-12-13/news/30731471_1_sivs-citigroup-capital-levels. In some
Thus, in addition to being exposed to the SIVs directly, money market funds also were exposed to the risk that the SIVs' sponsors would no longer support the value of the funds' troubled SIV investments. In many cases, the sponsors were banks to which money market funds were already exposed because the funds owned securities issued by or subject to guarantees or demand features from the banks. Money market funds' reliance on and exposure to SIV sponsors regarding the SIVs' ABCP in 2007 suggests a potential weakness in the way in which rule 2a-7's diversification provisions apply to ABSs, potentially permitting money market funds to become overexposed to sponsors of SIVs and ABS sponsors more generally. We therefore propose to amend rule 2a-7's diversification provisions to limit the amount of exposure money market funds can have to ABS sponsors that provide express or implicit support for their ABSs. 864

In the 2009 Proposing Release, we expressed concern about the substantial number of money market funds that owned ABCP and other asset-backed debt securities issued by SIVs in 2007 and the stresses those SIV holdings placed on many money market funds' stable share prices. 865 We sought comment on these concerns in 2009, and asked whether we should require fund boards to consider particular factors when evaluating ABSs, to limit the types of ABSs in cases, where the SIVs' sponsors were unable or unwilling to support the SIVs, money market funds' sponsors themselves supported the money market funds by purchasing the SIV investments at their amortized cost or providing some form of credit support. See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at text accompanying n.41.

864 See also infra notes 878-880 and accompanying text (describing the treatment under this proposal of ABS sponsors who may not provide support, explicit or implicit, for their ABSs).

865 See, e.g., 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.A.4 and nn.37-39 and accompanying text. See also Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms, Testimony of David S. Scharfstein, Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (June 21, 2012) (noting that in the summer of 2007 concerns about the quality of subprime loans underpinning ABCP caused the ABCP's interest rates to rise dramatically, and that "[s]ome MMFs responded to this spike in market risk by actually increasing portfolio risk, taking on higher-yielding instruments like ABCP in an effort to boost returns and attract new investors") (emphasis in original).
which funds could invest, or to further tighten rule 2a-7’s diversification limitations. Most commenters did not address these proposals, and those that addressed some of them generally did not support them.

We are concerned that the experience with SIVs suggests a potential weakness in rule 2a-7’s diversification requirements. The rule’s diversification provisions require no diversification of exposure to ABS sponsors because special purpose entities (“SPEs”)—rather than the sponsors themselves—issue the ABS, and the support that ABS sponsors provide, implicitly or explicitly, typically does not meet the rule’s definition of a “guarantee” or “demand feature.” Nonetheless, we understand that money market funds investing in some types of ABCP (and potentially other types of ABSs that may be developed in the future for which sponsor support may be particularly relevant) rely on the ABCP sponsor for liquidity and other support and make investment decisions based, at least in part, on the presumption that the

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866 See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at sections II.A.4 and II.D.

867 See, e.g., Comment Letter of the American Securitization Forum (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (“ASF 2009 Comment Letter”) (opposing the proposal to require fundboards to consider particular factors when evaluating ABSs, noting that “a list of mandatory items may inadvertently stifle innovation and unnecessarily limit the development of new financial products which may be needed in order to help the global short-term markets recover and regain vibrancy and vigor”); Comment Letter of the Independent Directors Council (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (“IDC believes such detailed direction from the Commission [to consider specific factors when evaluating ABSs] could suggest that fundboards be involved in an inappropriate level of credit analysis, inconsistent with their oversight role… IDC recommends that the Commission not adopt amendments requiring boards to evaluate such specific factors.”).

868 Explicit support includes, for example, a liquidity facility provided by the ABS sponsor to the SPE issuing the ABS under which the sponsor is obligated to provide liquidity support to permit the SPE to make payments on the ABS if the SPE is unable to sell additional ABSs sufficient to cover the payments to investors. Implicit support refers to an ABS investor’s expectation (or a sponsor’s willingness) that the ABS sponsor will provide some form of support to permit an SPE issuing ABS to make payments on the ABS as due even if the sponsor is not formally obligated to do so, or that the sponsor will provide support in excess of what it may be formally obligated to provide.

869 A money market fund must treat as an issuer of an ABS the SPE that issued it, as well as any person whose obligations constitute 10% or more of the principal amount of the qualifying assets of the ABS (a “10% obligor”) and, if a 10% obligor is itself an SPE issuing ABS (“secondary ABS”), the fund also must treat as an issuer any 10% obligor of the secondary ABS. See rule 2a-7(c)(4)(ii)(D). In each case, the 10% obligor must be treated as the issuer of the portion of the ABS that its obligations represent. Id. See also rule 2a-7(a)(17) (definition of a guarantee); rule 2a-7(a)(9) (definition of a demand feature).
sponsor will take steps to prevent the ABCP from defaulting, including committing capital. In the case of ABCP in particular, ABCP investors likely will be repaid from sources other than or in addition to the assets owned by the SPE, including potentially sponsor support, because the assets owned by the SPE issuing the ABCP generally will have greater maturities than the ABCP (e.g., investors may be due payment on the ABCP in 30 days but the assets supporting the ABCP may mature in 90 days). We have received a number of comment letters on unrelated rulemakings from representatives of participants in the ABSs markets explaining that ABCP investors analyze the structure of the ABCP programs and the financial wherewithal of their support providers more than asset-level information about the assets owned by the SPEs issuing the ABCP.  

870 See, e.g., Frank J. Fabozzi & Vinod Kothari, INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIZATION at 170 (2008) (“[T]here is almost necessarily an asset-liability mismatch [in an ABCP program], requiring the bank to provide liquidity support to the [ABCP] conduit”); Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 15730 at 8-9 (Feb. 10, 2010) (noting that conduits issuing ABCP “typically exhibit a significant maturity mismatch,” in that they hold medium- to long-term assets but issue short term liabilities but are considered safe investments in part because “the conduit’s sponsor provides credit guarantees to the conduit, which ensures that the sponsor repays maturing asset-backed commercial paper in case the conduit is unable to repay itself”). The forms of support provided to ABCP programs vary, and not all ABCP programs are supported. See, e.g., Covitz, supra note 71, at 8-9 (describing various types of ABCP programs and the types of support typically provided). The extent to which ABCP investors value the ABCP’s support and its providers was demonstrated in the financial crisis when unsupported and less fully supported ABCP programs and those with weaker sponsors suffered disproportionate “runs.” See id. at 26-27.

871 See infra note 872.

872 See, e.g., Comment Letter of the American Securitization Forum (Aug. 2, 2010) (available in File No. S7-08-10) (“ASF August 2010 Comment Letter”) (stating that “ABCP investors understand that the payments on the financed assets may not be the source of payment on the short-term ABCP they are buying and that they must continuously monitor” “several factors, including the record of the program, the conduit sponsor’s policies and experience, the creditworthiness of the financial institution(s) which provide liquidity and credit support, the conduit’s investment guidelines, the maturity of the investor’s portfolio, the conduit’s disclosure practices and the circumstances in which the conduit may be prohibited from issuing ABCP”; opposing proposed asset-level disclosure requirements for ABCP because, among other reasons, “ABCP investors focus less on asset-level information than investors do in other categories of asset-backed securities because an ABCP conduit’s assets are not likely to be the primary source of payment of the ABCP—rather, ABCP is expected to be repaid from the proceeds of the issuance of additional ABCP or the proceeds of the credit and liquidity facilities that support the ABCP”); Comment Letter of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (June 10, 2011) (available in File No. S7-14-11) (“[C]ustomer identity [i.e., the customer whose assets are being financed] is irrelevant to the conduit investor, to whom
Because under rule 2a-7 each SPE is considered a separate issuer and because money market funds are not required to diversify against implicit ABS sponsor support (and even some forms of explicit support), a money market fund’s portfolio could consist entirely of commercial paper issued by multiple SPEs, all with a single sponsor on which the fund could seek to rely to provide liquidity and capital support, if necessary. Such a result is inconsistent with the purposes of rule 2a-7’s diversification requirements and permits funds to assume a substantial concentration of risk to a single economic enterprise, which may be inconsistent with investors’ expectations of the level of risks posed by a money market fund.\textsuperscript{873}

We propose, therefore, to amend rule 2a-7 to provide that, subject to an exception, money market funds investing in ABSs, including ABCP, rely on the ABSs sponsors’ financial strength or their ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit, or other support to the ABSs.\textsuperscript{874} Subject to the exception, the amendments would require funds to treat the sponsor of an SPE issuing ABS as a guarantor of the ABS subject to rule 2a-7’s diversification limitations applicable to guarantors and demand feature providers.\textsuperscript{875} As a result, a fund could not invest in an ABS if the reputation of the sponsor and creditworthiness of the liquidity provider are of far greater interest.”). \textit{See also} ASF 2009 Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 867 (explaining that “most ABCP programs (and unsecured corporate CP programs) are supported by liquidity facilities” and that “ABCP investors cannot solely rely upon the cash flow from the financed assets to assure timely repayment of their securities since, in most cases, ABCP maturities are not match-funded to the underlying assets”).

\textsuperscript{873} \textit{See also supra} section III.J.1.

\textsuperscript{874} Although persons other than the sponsor could support an ABS, we understand that, to the extent an ABS has explicit support, it typically is provided by the sponsor, and that investors in ABSs without explicit support may view the sponsor as providing implicit support. \textit{See, e.g.}, ASF August 2010 Comment Letter, \textit{supra} note 872 (“[T]he liquidity and credit support for the vast majority of ABCP conduits are provided by their financial institution sponsors.”).

\textsuperscript{875} \textit{See proposed} (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(16)(ii) (definition of guarantee). Under this proposal, the sponsor of an SPE for an ABS would be deemed to guarantee the entire principal amount of the ABS, with certain exceptions, unless the money market fund’s board of directors (or its delegate) determines that the fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit or other support to determine the ABS’s quality or liquidity and maintains a record of this determination. \textit{Id}. Treating the ABS sponsor as a guarantor—as opposed to an issuer—recognizes that its support is more analogous to a guarantee, as the fund’s exposure to the ABS sponsor is indirect and is not
immediately after the investment, it would have invested more than 10% of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the ABS sponsor.\textsuperscript{376}

As discussed above, we understand that money market funds investing in ABS, including some types of ABCP (and potentially other types of ABSs that may be developed in the future for which sponsor support may be particularly relevant), rely on sponsors’ financial strength or their ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit or other support to evaluate both the creditworthiness and liquidity of ABSs.

- Is our understanding correct? If not, is there a way to distinguish the situations described by the authors of the academic articles and comment letters we refer to above?

- If funds do not rely significantly on ABS sponsor support as described in these sources, why not, and what other factors do they consider? If funds do not receive any significant information about the underlying assets or obligors, which we understand they generally do not for ABCP, then on what are they relying other than the ABS sponsor’s support? How do funds evaluate any mismatch

\textsuperscript{376} See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(3)(i) (diversification rules for demand features and guarantees). Rule 2a-7 currently applies a 10% diversification limitation on demand features and guarantees to 75% of funds’ total assets. As discussed in infra section III. J.3, we propose to amend rule 2a-7 to apply the diversification limitation to all of a fund’s assets rather than only 75%. 
between the time when the SPE's assets will be paid and the shorter duration of the ABCP issued by the SPE?

- This proposal assumes that, if an ABS has support (implicit or explicit), the support generally would be provided by the ABS sponsor.\textsuperscript{877} Is this correct? Do persons other than ABS sponsor provide support for ABSs?

- Do money market funds today follow internal guidelines to limit their exposure to ABS sponsors beyond what rule 2a-7 requires?

We propose to require that, subject to an exception, all ABS sponsors be deemed to guarantee their ABSs. We have proposed to apply this requirement to all ABS sponsors because we are concerned that a proposal that applied only to sponsors of certain types of ABSs could become obsolete as new forms of ABSs are introduced. We recognize, however, that it may not be appropriate to require money market funds to treat ABS sponsors as guarantors in all cases.

Accordingly, under our proposal, an ABS sponsor would not be deemed to guarantee the ABS if the money market fund's board of directors (or its delegate) determines that the fund is not relying on the ABS sponsor's financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit, or other support to determine the ABS's quality or liquidity.\textsuperscript{878} We believe that any incremental burden to make this determination should be minimal, as the money market fund would already have analyzed the security's credit quality and liquidity when assessing whether the security posed minimal credit risks and whether the fund could purchase the security consistent with rule 2a-7's limits on investment in "illiquid securities."\textsuperscript{879} The exception would

\textsuperscript{877} See, e.g., supra note 874.

\textsuperscript{878} See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(16)(ii). This determination must be documented and retained by the money market fund. See id.; and proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(6).

\textsuperscript{879} Proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(11) (definition of "eligible security") and proposed
be analogous to current rule 2a-7’s treatment of guarantees and demand features that a fund does not rely on and which may be disregarded under the rule.\(^{880}\) We request comment on our approach and the proposed exception.

- Should we instead specify that only certain types of ABS sponsors, such as sponsors of ABCP, should be deemed to guarantee the ABS? If so, which kinds of ABS and why?
- Would the exception appropriately identify situations in which a money market fund should not be required to treat an ABS sponsor as a guarantor?
- Are there other exceptions we should consider? Should we, for example, provide that an ABS sponsor will not be deemed to guarantee the ABS if the fund’s board of directors (or its delegate) determines that the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit, or other support did not play a substantial role in the fund’s assessment of the ABS’s quality or liquidity?
- Do commenters agree that any incremental burden to determine if the fund is relying on the ABS sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit, or other support to determine the ABS’s quality or liquidity should be minimal? If not, why not in light of the analysis the money market fund would be required to conduct of the ABS’s credit quality and liquidity?
- Should we take a different approach, and require a money market fund to treat as a guarantor any provider of liquidity or credit support, whether to an ABS or any

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\(^{880}\) (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(4) (portfolio liquidity).

See rule 2a-7(c)(6).
other type of security? Would a focus on the nature of any support, as opposed to 
the type of security subject to the support, be more effective than our proposed 
approach in requiring money market funds to treat as guarantors only providers of 
liquidity or credit support on which they rely in a way that is analogous to 
reliance on a guarantor? If we were to take this approach, should we include an 
exception under which some providers of liquidity or credit support would not be 
treated as guarantors? Should we use the same exception we propose for ABS 
sponsor support?

We discuss and seek comment on the economic effects of our ABS proposal together 
with the effects of our proposal to remove the twenty-five percent basket in section III.J.3, 
below, because both of these proposals would affect funds’ investments in securities subject to 
guarantees (including ABS sponsors under our proposal) and demand features for purposes of 
rule 2a-7’s 10% diversification requirement.

3. The Twenty-Five Percent Basket

We also propose to amend rule 2a-7 to tighten the diversification requirements applicable 
to guarantors and providers of demand features. The amendments would eliminate the so-called 
“twenty-five percent basket,” under which as much as 25% of the value of securities held in a 
fund’s portfolio may be subject to guarantees or demand features from a single institution.881

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881 Rule 2a-7 currently applies a 10% diversification limit on guarantees and demand features only to 75% of a 
money market fund’s total assets. See rule 2a-7(c)(4)(ii)(A). The money market fund, however, may only 
use the twenty-five percent basket to invest in demand features or guarantees that are first tier securities 
issued by non-controlled persons. See rule 2a-7(c)(4)(ii)(B) and (C). Accordingly, in conforming 
amendments we would delete rule 2a-7(a)(10), which defines a demand feature issued by a non-controlled 
person, because the term is used only in connection with the twenty-five percent basket. We also propose 
certain amendments to clarify that a fund must comply with this 10% diversification limit immediately after 
it acquires a security directly issued by, or subject to guarantees or demand features provided by, the 
institution that issued the security or provided the demand feature or guarantee. See proposed (FNAV and 
Fees & Gates) rules 2a-7(d)(3)(j) and (iii). We believe this amendment reflects funds’ current practices and
Since 2007, a number of events have highlighted the risks to money market funds caused by their substantial exposure to providers of demand features and guarantees. For example, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, many funds, particularly tax-exempt funds, were heavily exposed to bond insurers. In 2008, as much as 30% of the municipal securities held by tax-exempt money market funds were supported by bond insurance issued by monoline insurance companies.882 This concentration led to considerable stress in the municipal markets when some of these bond insurers were downgraded during the financial crisis. For example, a lack of confidence in the bond insurers was a primary contributor to the market “freeze” that occurred in variable-rate demand notes in 2008 when money market funds and other investors reduced their purchases of these securities or sold them to the financial institutions that had provided demand features for the securities.883 The freeze in turn strained the providers of the demand feature and also increased the interest the issuers of the securities were required to pay.884 A lack of confidence in the creditworthiness of the bond insurers also caused dislocations in the market for tender option bonds, which use short-term borrowings from money market funds and others to

is consistent with rule 2a-7’s current requirements.


883 See, e.g., Joan Gralla, Variable-Rate Note Market Now Freezing-Sources, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/26/sppage012-a25273728-oibsn-idUSN2527372820080226?sp=true (“One of the main culprits causing the market for variable-rate demand notes to seize up is the troubled bond insurers that guarantee them. This is the same factor that has caused the $330 billion auction-rate note market to get hit with billions of dollars of failed auctions every day since late January.”).

884 Id. (“I had heard there was tremendous stress in the variable-rate demand notes because money market (funds) and mutual investors have been putting back a lot of their variable-rate demand notes and dealers were getting overwhelmed on their balance sheets,” said Matt Fabian, managing director of Municipal Market Advisors, in Concord, Massachusetts.”); Liz Rappaport, New Monkey, Same Backs: Another Debt Market For Governments Loses Buyers, and Rates Rise, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 2008 (“Just like many issuers of auction-rate securities whose interest costs soared after auctions for some of their debt failed, an increasing number of municipalities are being hit with sharply higher interest on their variable-rate demand notes because dealers of the debt are having trouble selling it.”).
finance longer-term municipal bonds.885

Some money market funds also were heavily exposed to a few major financial institutions that served as liquidity providers, including funds that owned variable-rate demand notes and tender option bonds as discussed above.886 For example, some tax-exempt funds were significantly exposed to Dexia SA ("Dexia"), a European bank that provided demand features and guarantees for many municipal securities held by money market funds, when Dexia came under significant strain but ultimately received substantial support from various governments.887 More recently, when Dexia again came under stress during the European debt crisis, many municipal issuers had to quickly find substitutes for demand features on which they relied to shorten their securities’ maturities.888 These events highlighted the risk a money market fund assumes when it relies heavily on a single guarantor or demand feature provider.889 Our proposal to remove the twenty-five percent basket is designed to reduce this risk by limiting the extent to which a money market fund becomes exposed to a single guarantor or demand feature provider.

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885 Tom Lauricella and Liz Rappaport, How the Crunch Has Hit Corner Of Muni Market: 'Tender Option Bonds' Lose Investor Favor; Aberrations in Yield, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008 (noting that the lack of buyers for some tender option bonds caused in part by a lack of confidence in the bond insurers caused billions of dollars of the bonds to accumulate at banks and broker-dealers; caused some hedge funds to suffer "double-digit losses"; caused the yield on the bonds to increase significantly; and "caused dislocations in the wider municipal-bond market").


887 See, e.g., Bob Ivry, Why a Foreign Bank Feasted on Fed Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 7, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_16/b422403855674.htm ("If Dexia had gone ‘bankrupt, it could have been a catastrophe for municipal finance and money funds.”’). Dexia was the “biggest recipient of funds from the Federal Reserve discount window during the financial crisis,” borrowing “as much as $37 billion.” Id. (describing the support Dexia received from various governments around the world and explaining Dexia’s significance in the municipal market and that “[d]emands to back up muni bonds sapped Dexia so much that it was ‘two days from bankruptcy.’”).


889 Although we determined to further restrict funds’ ability to acquire second tier securities in the 2010 Adopting Release, we did not at that time consider eliminating the twenty-five percent basket. See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at n.59.
Our diversification proposals, including the proposal to remove the twenty-five percent basket,\textsuperscript{890} are designed to provide a number of benefits, as discussed in more detail in section III.J.1 above. And although because we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate, and thus are unable to quantify these benefits for the reasons discussed in that section, we have considered data filed on Form N-MFP in assessing the impacts of these proposals. Specifically, our staff’s review of data filed on Form N-MFP suggests that our ABS and twenty-five percent basket diversification proposals (treating only ABCP sponsors as guarantors for purposes of this analysis)\textsuperscript{891} would have little impact on the majority of money market funds, which do not make use of the twenty-five percent basket, and would likely have a minimal impact on those funds that do. Approximately 109 funds, or 19\% of all funds submitting Form N-MFP for February 28, 2013, reported that they made use of the twenty-five percent basket for guarantees and demand features, even when we treat sponsors of ABCP as guarantors (and thus subject to a 10\% diversification limitation).\textsuperscript{892} Thus, most money market funds do not use the twenty-five percent basket. Those funds that do use the twenty-five percent basket do not make significant use of it. The 109 funds that used the twenty-five percent basket had, on average, 3.9\% of their assets invested in excess of the 10\% diversification limitation we

\textsuperscript{890} See supra note 881.

\textsuperscript{891} Our staff assumed when reviewing the Form N-MFP data that any fully or partially supported ABCP owned by a fund would result in the sponsor guaranteeing the ABCP. For this purpose, our staff considered an ABCP program to be fully supported when the program’s investors are protected against asset performance deterioration and primarily rely on the ABCP sponsor to provide credit, liquidity, or some other form of support to ensure full and timely repayment of ABCP, and considered an ABCP program to be partially supported when the ABCP sponsor, although not fully supporting the program, provided some form of credit, liquidity, or other form of support. See also infra note 893.

\textsuperscript{892} Based on our review, only prime funds (which tend to have relatively concentrated positions in ABSs) and tax-exempt funds (which tend to have relatively concentrated positions in securities subject to demand features) used the twenty-five percent basket.
propose today (i.e., in the twenty-five percent basket). And although we understand that money market funds may have made greater use of the twenty-five percent basket in the past (and might do so in the future if we do not adopt this proposal), we are concerned that funds were exposed to concentrated risks inconsistent with the purposes of rule 2a-7’s diversification requirements in the past as discussed above. Money market funds’ current relatively limited use of the basket suggests that this is an opportune time to remove it.

The principal effect of the amendments may be to restrain some managers of money market funds from making use of the twenty-five percent basket in the future, under perhaps different market conditions. Our diversification proposals would deny fund managers some flexibility in managing fund portfolios and could decrease the fund yields. To assess these proposals’ effect on yield, we examined whether the 7-day gross yields of funds that use the twenty-five percent basket were higher than the 7-day gross yields for those funds that do not.

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893 This estimate likely overstates the number of funds and the amount of money market funds’ assets that could be affected by our ABS proposals for three reasons. First, it assumes that any fully or partially supported ABCP owned by a fund would result in the sponsor guaranteeing the ABCP. Under our proposal, however, an ABCP (or other ABS) sponsor would not be deemed to guarantee the ABCP if the board (or its delegate) determines the fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide support to determine the ABCP’s quality or liquidity. We did not assume sponsors of other types of ABSs guaranteed those ABSs because we understand that other forms of ABS offered to money market funds either do not typically have sponsor support or, if they are supported, the support typically is in the form of a guarantee or demand feature, which would already be included in our calculation of exposure to providers of demand features and guarantees. Second, Form N-MFP data does not differentiate between funds that would have had exposure in excess of 10% upon the acquisition of a demand feature or guarantee (which would not be permitted under our proposed amendments) and those funds that were under that level of exposure at the time of acquisition but the fund later decreased in size, increasing the fund’s exposure above the 10% limit (which would be permitted under our proposed amendments). Third, where a fund owned securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from affiliated institutions, we treated the separate affiliated institutions as single institutions for purposes of these estimates.

894 If we were to adopt the proposed amendments, funds with investments in excess of those permitted under the revised rule would not be required to sell the excess investments to come into compliance. The proposed amendments would require a fund to calculate its exposure to issuers of demand features and guarantees as of the time the fund acquires a demand feature or guarantee or a security directly issued by the issuer of the demand feature or guarantee. See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(3)(i) and (iii).

895 We assumed that any fully or partially supported ABCP owned by a fund would result in the sponsor
We found: (i) for national tax-exempt funds, the average yield for funds using the twenty-five percent basket was the same (0.16%) as the average yield for national tax-exempt funds that did not use the twenty-five percent basket; (ii) for single state funds, the average yield for funds using the twenty-five percent basket was the same (also 0.16%) as the average yield for single state funds that did not use the twenty-five percent basket; and (iii) for prime money market funds, the average yield for funds using the twenty-five percent basket was 0.27% as compared to the average yield for prime money market funds that did not use the twenty-five percent basket of 0.25%. The prime money market fund yield differences may not, of course, be caused by the use of the twenty-five percent basket, but may instead reflect the overall risk tolerance of fund managers that take advantage of the twenty-five percent basket.

Eliminating the twenty-five percent basket also may increase the costs of monitoring the credit risk of funds’ portfolios or make that monitoring less efficient, to the extent they are more diversified under our proposal and money market fund advisers must expend additional effort to monitor the credit risks posed by a greater number of guarantors and demand feature providers. We are unable to quantify these costs, however, because we do not have the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate to predict whether funds would be required to expend more effort under our proposals (or if so, how much more). A money market fund that could not acquire a particular guarantee or demand feature under our proposal could, for example, be able to acquire a guarantee or demand feature from another institution in which the fund already was invested, at no additional monitoring costs to the fund.

Our proposed amendments would require funds that use the twenty-five percent basket,

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896 These averages are derived from Form N-MFP data as of February 28, 2013, weighted by money market funds’ assets under management.
or that would use it in the future, to either choose not to acquire certain demand features or guarantees (if the fund could not assume additional exposure to the provider of the demand feature or guarantee) or to acquire them from different institutions. Funds that choose the latter course could thereby increase demand for providers of demand features and guarantees and increase competition among their providers. If new entrants do not enter the market for demand features and guarantees in response to this increased demand, eliminating the twenty-five percent basket could result in money market funds acquiring guarantees and demand features from lower quality providers than those the funds use today. If new entrants do enter the market (or if current participants increase their participation), the effect on money market funds would depend on whether these new entrants (or current participants) are of high or low credit quality as compared to the providers money market funds would use absent our proposal.

Although we recognize that money market funds could use lower credit quality guarantors and demand feature providers under our proposals, our data show that most funds do not use the twenty-five percent basket (and funds that use it do so to a limited extent) and thus we believe that this negative effect is unlikely to occur. And under our proposals, money market funds would not be required to include more than 10 guarantors or demand feature providers in their portfolios, suggesting it is unlikely that they would be forced to resort to low credit quality guarantors or demand feature providers. Indeed, our staff’s review of Form N-MFP data shows that, as of February 28, 2013, the assets in money market funds’ twenty-five percent baskets (i.e., amounts in excess of the rule’s 10% diversification limit for guarantor and demand feature providers) were invested in securities subject to demand features and guarantees from only 13 institutions, but there were a total of 98 first tier guarantors (including ABCP sponsors) and demand feature providers held by money market funds collectively as of that date.
Issuers also could incur costs if they were required to engage different providers of demand features or guarantees under our proposal, which could negatively affect capital formation. This could occur because an issuer might otherwise have sought a guarantee or demand feature from a particular bank, but might choose not to use that bank because the money market funds to which the issuer hoped to market its securities could not assume additional exposure to the bank. If issuers were unable to receive demand features or guarantees from banks (or other institutions) to which they would have turned absent our amendments, they would have to engage different banks, which could make the offering process less efficient and result in higher costs if the different banks charged higher rates. Issuers of securities with guarantees or demand features (e.g., issuers of longer-term securities that can be sold to money market funds only with a demand feature) also could be required to broaden their investor base or seek out different providers of guarantees or demand features under our proposals, which could make their offering process less efficient or more costly.

We request comment on the impact on portfolio management of our proposed elimination of the twenty-five percent basket together with our proposal to remove the twenty-five percent basket.

- As noted above, our review of Form N-MFP data suggests that most funds do not use the twenty-five percent basket. Is this correct?
- Would our proposals increase demand for providers of demand features and guarantees?
- Would there be a significant impact on fund yield, and if so, how significant?

Our review of Form N-MFP data also suggests that our proposal would have very little impact on funds that use the twenty-five percent basket today. Is this
correct?

- To what extent might a money market fund use lower credit quality or higher cost guarantors and demand feature providers in order to meet the stricter diversification requirements that we propose? Are there enough guarantors and demand feature providers to allow money market funds to meet these diversification limitations?

- As discussed in section III.E above, concerns about the creditworthiness of guarantors and demand feature providers have reduced the amount of VRDNs outstanding since 2010, and this trend is likely to continue irrespective of changes in the money market fund industry because of potential downgrades to credit and liquidity enhancement providers and potential bank regulatory changes may increase the cost to financial institutions of providing such guarantees.\textsuperscript{897} How would these factors affect money markets funds’ ability to acquire demand features and guarantees under our proposal, and the cost and quality of those guarantees and demand features?

- How should we evaluate the tradeoff between providing funds flexibility and limiting the risks to funds posed by concentrated exposures and how might we quantify it? We request commenters asserting that we retain the twenty-five percent basket provide data to help us evaluate these competing considerations. We also request those commenters to address the extent to which their assets exceed the limits our proposals would establish, and what difficulties they would encounter in identifying alternative securities with credit qualities comparable to

\textsuperscript{897} See, e.g., supra notes 601-602 and accompanying text.
their existing investments.

- To what extent would issuers of securities with guarantees or demand features (e.g., issuers of longer-term securities that can be sold to money market funds only with a demand feature) be required to broaden their investor base or seek out different providers of guarantees or demand features under our proposal? To what extent would this increase issuers’ costs or reduce the efficiency of the offering process? Would some issuers reduce their reliance on guarantees and demand features? Would issuers incur higher underwriting fees if placing securities without guarantees or demand features requires more effort? What effect on capital formation would occur if issuers are unable to find alternative investors and/or have to sell their securities at less favorable rates? Would our proposals make offerings less efficient if issuers need to spend more time and effort identifying purchasers of their securities, and if so, to what extent?

- Would eliminating the twenty-five percent basket make it difficult for issuers of ABSs and securities subject to demand features or guarantees to find money market fund investors to purchase their securities? As noted above, most funds do not use the twenty-five percent basket and, in addition, many money market funds as of February 28, 2013, had invested only a small portion of their assets in ABSs and securities subject to demand features or guarantees, suggesting that issuers have a ready supply of money market fund investors eligible to purchase their securities. Indeed, Form N-MFP data as of February 28, 2013, shows that over 99% of total money market fund assets are not in funds’ twenty-five percent baskets. To the extent issuers or underwriters believe they would have any
difficultly in identifying money market investors as a result of our proposal, we request that they explain why and quantify any resulting costs. As noted above, data on Form N-MFP shows that many funds would be eligible to purchase ABSs and securities subject to demand features and guarantees under our proposals.

- In assessing the impacts of our ABS proposal and our proposal to eliminate the twenty-five percent basket we have considered, as noted above, that some funds had investments as of February 28, 2013 in excess of the limits our proposals would impose. We request comment from any funds with investments in excess of these limits on whether their investments exceeded these limits upon acquisition (which would not be permitted under our proposed amendments) or if the funds' investments were below the limits at the time of acquisition but the fund later decreased in size (which would be permitted under our proposed amendments). For example, under our proposal, a fund would not be permitted to acquire ABCP sponsored by a bank if immediately thereafter more than 10% of its assets were invested in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from that bank. But the investment would be permitted if immediately after the investment the fund was below the 10% limit, even if the fund later decreased in size and the investment later exceeded the 10% limit.

- Although our proposal would remove the twenty-five percent basket, we are not proposing to change the application of rule 2a-7’s 5% issuer limit to single state funds, which today applies only to 75% of a single state fund’s total assets.898 We historically have applied the issuer diversification limitation differently to single

898 See rule 2a-7(c)(4)(i)(B).
state funds, recognizing that "single state funds face a limited choice of very high quality issuers in which to invest" and, therefore, that there is a risk that "too stringent a diversification standard could result in a net reduction in safety for certain single state funds."\textsuperscript{899} The market for demand features and guarantees, in contrast, is national and may not be subject to the same supply constraints as is the market for issuers in which single state funds may directly invest. Should we nonetheless continue to permit single state funds to continue to use the twenty-five percent basket for the same reasons that we historically have applied rule 2a-7's issuer diversification limit differently to those funds? Why or why not? Would single state funds under our proposal have difficulties in identifying high quality issuers in which to invest even though we do not propose to change rule 2a-7's issuer diversification limit as applied to those funds? Why or why not?

We do not expect that our ABS and twenty-five percent basket diversification proposals would result in operational costs for funds. We understand that money market funds generally have systems to monitor their exposures to guarantors (among other things) and to monitor the funds' compliance with rule 2a-7's current 10% demand feature and guarantee diversification limit. We expect that money market funds could use those systems to track exposures to ABS sponsors under our proposal and could continue to track the funds' compliance with a 10% demand feature and guarantee diversification limit. To the extent a money market fund did have to modify its systems as a result of our ABS and 25% basket diversification proposals, we expect that the money market fund would make those modifications when modifying its systems in response to our proposal to require money market funds to aggregate exposure to affiliated

\textsuperscript{899} See 1996 Adopting Release, \textit{supra} note 247, at text following n.38.
issuers for purposes of rule 2a-7’s 5% diversification limit, for which we provide cost estimates above. Because the costs estimated above are those associated with activities typically involved in making systems modifications, we expect they also would cover any systems modifications associated with our ABS and 25% basket diversification proposals.

Finally, we note that Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1 also refers to the twenty-five percent basket. That rule generally permits investment companies to purchase certain securities issued by companies engaged in securities-related activities notwithstanding section 12(d)(3)’s limitations on these kinds of transactions. Among other things, rule 12d3-1 provides that the acquisition of a demand feature or guarantee as defined in rule 2a-7 will not be deemed to be an acquisition of the securities of a securities-related business provided that “immediately after the acquisition of any Demand Feature or Guarantee, the company will not, with respect to 75 percent of the total value of its assets, have invested more than ten percent of the total value of its assets in securities underlying Demand Features or Guarantees from the same institution.”

- Should we revise rule 12d3-1 to apply this diversification requirement with respect to all of an investment company’s total assets, rather than just 75% of them, for consistency with our amendments to rule 2a-7?

- Would conforming rule 12d3-1 to rule 2a-7 as we propose to amend it affect investment companies other than money market funds, which also may use rule 12d3-1? If so, how and to what extent?

4. Additional Diversification Alternatives Considered

We could require money market funds to be more diversified by reducing rule 2a-7’s

\[\text{(900) See supra note 859 and accompanying text.}\]

\[\text{(901) Rule 12d3-1(d)(7)(v). We are proposing to amend rule 12d3-1 to update cross references in the rule to rule 2a-7’s definitions of the terms “demand feature” and “guarantee.” See infra note 967.}\]
current 5% and 10% diversification limits. We are concerned that reducing these limits, particularly in light of today’s diversification proposals, could lead money market funds to invest in relatively lower quality securities. Doing so could increase the likelihood of a default or other credit event affecting a money market fund while diminishing the impact of such an event on the fund. We also recognize that lowering the diversification limits would not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a default triggering shareholder redemptions: The Reserve Primary Fund held only 1.2% of its assets in Lehman Brothers commercial paper. Any amendments would need to balance the potential benefits of greater diversification that would result from our reducing rule 2a-7’s current 5% and 10% diversification limits with the potential negative effects that could result from doing so and particularly that lower limits could lead funds to assume additional credit risk.

Nonetheless, there could be benefits in reducing these limits. For example, the 10% limit permits a money market fund to have twice as much exposure to a single provider of a demand feature or guarantee than if the fund were to invest in securities directly issued by the provider, which direct investments would be subject to the rule’s 5% limit. Rule 2a-7 permits a money market fund to take on greater indirect exposures to providers of demand features and guarantees (as opposed to direct investments in them) because, rather than looking solely to the issuer, the money market fund would have two potential sources of repayment—the issuer whose securities

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902 See, e.g., FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 114, at 55-57 (seeking comment on reducing the rule 2a-7’s 5% issuer limit (and consolidating exposures to affiliated entities) in connection with a reform option under which money market funds also would have risk-based NAV buffers).

903 See, e.g., 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.D (noting that “[e]ven a diversification limitation of one percent would not preclude a fund from breaking a buck if the security should sustain sufficient losses as did the securities issued by Lehman Brothers,” and that “such a diversification limit may force funds to invest in relatively lower quality securities.”

904 See, e.g., 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at text following n.221.
are subject to the demand features or guarantees and the providers of those features if the issuer defaults. Both the issuer and the demand feature provider or guarantor would have to default at the same time for the money market fund to suffer a loss. And if a guarantor or demand feature provider were to come under stress, the issuer may be able to obtain a replacement.\footnote{See, e.g., 1993 Proposing Release, \textit{supra} note 54, at n.83 and accompanying text (observing that, if the guarantor of one of the money market fund’s securities comes under stress, “issuers or investors generally can either put the instrument back on short notice or persuade the issuer to obtain a substitute for the downgraded institution”).}

As discussed in more detail in section III.K below, however, rule 2a-7 permits a money market fund, when determining if a security subject to a guarantee meets the rule’s credit quality standards, to rely exclusively on the credit quality of the guarantor.\footnote{Rule 2a-7(c)(3)(iii) (“A security that is subject to a Guarantee may be determined to be an Eligible Security or a First Tier Security based solely on whether the Guarantee is an Eligible Security or First Tier Security, as the case may be.”).} That the money market fund has two sources of repayment—the issuer and the guarantor—therefore may not meaningfully reduce the risks of the investment in all cases because the issuer of the guaranteed securities need not satisfy rule 2a-7’s credit quality requirements. If the issuer of the guaranteed securities is of lesser credit quality, allowing the money market fund to have up to 10% of its assets indirectly exposed to the guarantor may not be justified.

And although an issuer could attempt to obtain a substitute guarantor or demand feature provider if its current provider came under stress, there is no assurance the issuer would be successful. Certain providers of guarantees or demand features may limit themselves to providing such features for only specific types of securities, such as a state that only provides these features for certain bonds within the state. If a state came under stress, the issuers of bonds within the state may be unable to obtain substitute guarantors. That certain providers of guarantees or demand features may limit themselves to providing such features for only specific
types of securities also may create further concentration risk, under which the risks of the provider of the features may be correlated with the risks of the underlying securities.

We also considered proposing industry concentration limits. Our proposal to require money market funds to aggregate their exposures to affiliated issuers is designed to reduce the risks to which a fund would be exposed if it became overexposed to the group collectively, but securities issued by separate groups of affiliates in the same industry also could come under stress at the same time. For example, a financial crisis or other event that affected the financial sector disproportionately likely would cause securities issued by financial institutions generally to decline in value even where the financial institutions are not affiliated with each other. This is relevant to prime money market funds in particular because, as a group, they invest a large percentage of their assets in securities issued by financial institutions.

Defining various industry sectors with sufficient precision for a new industry diversification requirement could be difficult, however. In deciding not to propose industry concentration limits today, we also considered the comments we received in response to our request for comment in 2009 on whether to reduce rule 2a-7’s current diversification limits and whether to introduce new industry diversification requirements. Most commenters opposed these reforms. Commenters opposed reducing rule 2a-7’s current 5% and 10% diversification limits because, among other reasons, the reductions could increase risks to funds by requiring the

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907 Id. See also, e.g., Robert Comment FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67 (explaining that his review of a sample of 50 prime funds showed that “bank issued money market instruments of all types (notes, commercial paper, large CDs, time-deposits and repo), comprised 53% of the holdings of prime funds in mid-2008 and 58% in mid-2012 (46% and 45%, respectively, excluding repo),” with much of this issued by non-U.S. banks, and concluding that “[s]ector diversification apparently is not relevant to funds’ compliance with the diversification provisions of rule 2a-7, but it plainly should be”).

908 See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.D.
funds to invest in relatively lower quality securities.\textsuperscript{909} Commenters opposed industry diversification requirements because they would be impractical, among other reasons.\textsuperscript{910} At least one commenter argued that our concerns could be better addressed through what were then proposals to further limit certain risks in funds’ portfolios and to increase their liquidity.\textsuperscript{911}

We are proposing enhancements to money market funds’ stress testing processes, as discussed in more detail in section III.L, below. Those enhancements are designed, together with all of the other changes we propose today, to address some of the risk that may result from a money market fund concentrating its investments in particular industries, or having exposures within the rule’s 5% and 10% diversification limits. For example, we propose to require money market funds’ advisers to assume as part of their stress testing that the funds’ portfolio securities

\textsuperscript{909} See, e.g., ICI 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 281 (“Further restricting the diversification limits would only heighten this problem by forcing money market funds to use institutions they may be less comfortable with to meet new diversity requirements.”); Schwab 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 350 (stating that it “would not support any changes to the diversification requirements set forth in the current rule, as more stringent diversification requirements may force a fund to invest in lower quality securities than those in which it might have otherwise invested”); Comment Letter of Stradley Ronon (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (“Stradley Ronon 2009 Comment Letter”) (“We understand that a fund might find it necessary to ease its quality standards if it had to satisfy more stringent diversification standards. This easing could threaten share stability and increase the risk that the fund will hold a defaulted security.”). But see, e.g., Comment Letter of James J. Angel (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-11-09) (noting that “[i]f a fund never holds more than ⅚ of one percent of its assets in any paper issued by any one issuer, then even a complete loss from that one issuer would not result in that fund breaking the buck,” but stating that he is “not, however, proposing that all funds be reduced to a maximum exposure of ⅛ of 1% to any issuer: This could be problematic for smaller funds that might find it overly expensive to buy smaller quantities of commercial paper”).

\textsuperscript{910} See, e.g., Stradley Ronon 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 909 (stating that “[a] more stringent industry concentration requirement would not provide a meaningful method to mitigate risk” because “[d]ifferent fund groups define industries in a variety of ways, especially given the erosion of boundaries between industries and the lack of guidance from the Commission in this area”; also stating that “an industry concentration provision to limit exposure to the financial sector is not practical, because a significant proportion of money market investments carries exposure to the financial sector (including municipal securities, certificates of deposit, repurchase agreements, commercial paper and asset-backed commercial paper).”); INVESCO 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 195 (“We also do not believe an industry concentration limit in rule 2a-7 would be an effective risk management control given the inconsistency of industry classifications, which currently can differ between advisers.”).

\textsuperscript{911} See INVESCO 2009 Comment Letter, supra note 195 (“The Commission’s proposals to limit portfolio quality risk and increase available liquidity are stronger and more appropriate tools [than industry diversification requirements] for the Commission to employ in reducing the risk of redemption pressures to money market fund shareholders.”).
will present correlated risks. Our structural reforms are designed to better position a money market fund to bear a credit loss. Our liquidity fees and gates proposal is designed to provide the fund with tools to mitigate the harm that can result from a credit event. Our floating NAV proposal is designed to more fairly apportion such a loss, thereby reducing the incentive to redeem in anticipation of it.

We request comment on the alternative approaches we considered.

- Should we reduce rule 2a-7’s current 5% diversification limits? If so, to what extent? Would lower diversification limits increase the likelihood of a default or other credit event affecting a money market fund while diminishing the impact of such an event on the fund? We request that commenters address the tradeoffs of lower diversification limits for different types of money market funds.

- Should we reduce rule 2a-7’s current 10% diversification limits on securities with a guarantee or demand feature from any one provider? Would lowering this limit increase the likelihood of a default or other credit event affecting a money market fund or diminish the impact of such an event on the fund?

- Should we continue to distinguish between a fund’s exposure to guarantors and demand feature providers and direct issuers by providing different diversification limitations for these exposures? Does the difference in the nature of a fund’s exposure to a guarantor or demand feature provider as opposed to a direct issuer warrant disparate diversification requirements? If we were to adopt a single diversification limitation that aggregated direct investments and guarantees and demand features, should we use the rule’s current 5% threshold for direct investments? If not, should it be higher or lower? At what level and why?
Should we continue to apply different diversification limitations but use limitations other than 5% (direct investments) and 10% (securities subject to demand features and guarantees)?

- What types of providers that are not affiliated with the issuer of a security provide such guarantees or demand features? To what extent do providers of guarantees and demand features limit themselves to providing features for specific types of securities? Does this limitation pose any particular risks? If so, what are they?

- Should we impose industry diversification requirements on money market funds? If so, what level of concentration in a single industry would be appropriate? How would we define industries for this purpose?

- We request that commenters address how any risks that may result from a money market fund concentrating its investments to an extent in particular industries, or from having exposures within the rule’s 5% and 10% diversification limits, would (or would not) be mitigated by the other amendments that we propose today.

- If we were to reduce rule 2a-7’s current diversification limits, could that result in more homogeneity and increased correlation among money market fund portfolios? If so, what effect, if any, would there be on systemic risk?

K. **Issuer Transparency**

In 2008, monoline insurers that provided bond insurance to municipal issuers were downgraded, forcing some advisers to tax-exempt money market funds to quickly obtain information about issuers of VRDNs and other municipal securities they held to determine whether the securities continued to present minimal credit risks (and whether to exercise demand
Two years later, in 2010, we amended our rules to improve the transparency of information about VRDNs to advisers to money market funds and other investors by prohibiting broker-dealers from underwriting VRDNs unless the issuer had committed to provide ongoing information about itself and the securities, including financial data, through the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system. Last year, we reported our concern that issuers’ compliance with their continuing contractual disclosure obligations has been inconsistent, at times leaving money market fund and investors exposed. We recommended that Congress give us greater authority to require municipal issuers to provide the market with better information, but such authority, if forthcoming, could not be implemented for some time.

Rule 2a-7 permits a money market fund when determining if a security subject to a guarantee meets the rule’s credit quality standards to rely exclusively on the credit quality of the guarantor. As a result of this and the rule’s treatment of exposures to guarantors and demand

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912 To our knowledge, none of these funds experienced difficulty in maintaining their stable net asset value or received support from an affiliate. A monoline insurance company generally is an insurance company that only provides guarantees to issuers of securities. See supra note 882.

913 See Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 62184A (May 26, 2010) [75 FR 33100 (June 10, 2010) (“Municipal Disclosure Release”), at nn.110-111 (noting that “most holders of [variable rate demand notes] are money market funds” and that the “availability of continuing disclosure information should facilitate the fulfillment” of the funds’ “obligation to monitor the securities in their funds”). See also Comment Letter of the Investment Company Institute (Sept. 8, 2009) (available in File No. S7-15-09) ([T]he availability of continuing disclosure information regarding [variable rate demand notes] would greatly benefit investors by enhancing their ability to make and monitor their investment decisions and protect themselves from misrepresentations and questionable conduct in this segment of the municipal securities market.”).


915 See id. at section V (legislative recommendations).

916 Rule 2a-7(c)(3)(ii) (“A security that is subject to a Guarantee may be determined to be an Eligible Security or a First Tier Security based solely on whether the Guarantee is an Eligible Security or First Tier Security, as the case may be.”). See also Technical Revisions to the Rules and Forms Regulating Money Market Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 22921 (Dec. 2, 1997) [62 FR 64968 (Dec. 9, 1997)] (“1997 Adopting Release”), at section I.B.1.b. A guarantee includes an unconditional demand feature that is not
feature providers for diversification purposes (the 10% limit on providers of guarantees and demand features compared to the 5% issuer limit), a money market fund can have greater indirect exposure to a guarantor than the money market fund could assume if it were investing in the guarantor directly,\(^9\) and may have minimal information about the issuer subject to the guarantee. We request comment on whether we should require money market funds to obtain financial data on the underlying issuers whose securities are subject to guarantees.\(^8\)

- If we were to require money market funds to obtain financial data about the issuers of securities subject to guarantees, should we specify in detail the data a fund must obtain? If the security is an ABS, what kind of information should we require funds to obtain about the assets held by the SPE that issued the ABS? Should we only require a money market fund to obtain the financial data when the security is subject to a guarantee from a guarantor to which the fund has a greater than 5% exposure?

- Should we require money market funds to obtain this data only when it is available? Such an approach would prevent money market funds from forgoing investment opportunities solely because financial data is not available. Should we

\footnote{9}{As discussed above, a money market fund could invest not more than 5% of its assets in securities directly issued by a bank, but could invest up to 10% of its assets in securities issued by or subject to guarantees provided by the bank. See supra notes 838-840 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{8}{This data could be important to a money market fund if a guarantor came under stress, putting the fund and its adviser in a better position to evaluate the underlying issuer’s creditworthiness, and whether to dispose of the security by exercising any demand feature. See also rule 2a-7(e)(7)(C) (“In the event that after giving effect to a rating downgrade, more than 2.5% of the fund’s Total Assets are invested in securities issued by or subject to Demand Features from a single institution that are Second Tier Securities, the fund shall reduce its investment in securities issued by or subject to Demand Features from that institution to no more than 2.5% of its Total Assets by exercising the Demand Features at the next succeeding exercise date(s), absent a finding by the board of directors that disposal of the portfolio security would not be in the best interests of the money market fund.”).}
specify when financial data would be available for this purpose? If so, in what circumstances do commenters expect financial data would be readily available? In what ways could they make better use of that data? Should we specify, for example, that financial data would be available for this purpose if it were available on the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system? Have money market funds found data currently available on that system to be helpful? If so, in what ways do money market funds use that data?

- Should we specify how current any financial data must be? Should we specifically require money market funds to review the data when the fund acquires the security or simply to retain it for use should there be a problem with the guarantor? Would money market funds have to hire additional credit analysts to meet such a requirement? What costs would this impose?

- Would requiring money market funds to have financial data about these issuers support our continuing to provide different diversification limitations for direct and indirect exposures, as discussed above? Would the data be useful to money market funds if a guarantor came under stress? Should we adopt a more stringent diversification limit (e.g., a single 5% limit that included direct and indirect exposures) and also require money market funds to obtain financial data about the issuers whose securities are guaranteed?

L. Stress Testing

In 2010, we adopted amendments to rule 2a-7 that, for the first time, required the board of directors of each money market fund to adopt procedures providing for periodic stress testing
of the money market fund's portfolio, which we refer to as the stress testing requirements.\textsuperscript{919} We adopted this requirement based on our belief that "stress testing procedures would provide money market fund boards a better understanding of the risks to which the fund is exposed and would give managers a tool to better manage those risks."\textsuperscript{920}

Under these amendments, we required that the fund adopt procedures providing for periodic testing of the fund's ability to maintain a stable price per share based on (but not limited to) certain hypothetical events.\textsuperscript{921} These hypothetical events include a change in short-term interest rates, an increase in shareholder redemptions, a downgrade of or default on portfolio securities, and the widening or narrowing spreads between yields on an appropriate benchmark selected by the fund for overnight interest rates and commercial paper and other types of securities held by the fund.\textsuperscript{922} At the time, we declined to specify further tests that a money market fund should conduct to fully assess its ability to maintain a stable value, leaving it to the fund's board (and the fund manager) to establish additional scenarios or assumptions on which the tests should be based and to tailor the tests, as appropriate, for different market conditions and different money market funds.\textsuperscript{923}

Since 2010, we and our staff have continued to monitor the stress testing requirement and how different fund groups are approaching its implementation in the marketplace. Through our staff's examinations of money market fund stress testing procedures, we have observed disparities in the quality and comprehensiveness of stress tests, the types of hypothetical

\textsuperscript{919} See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at section II.C.4.

\textsuperscript{920} See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, at section II.C.3.

\textsuperscript{921} See rule 2a-7(e)(10)(v)(A).

\textsuperscript{922} Id.

\textsuperscript{923} See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at nn.260-261 and accompanying text.
circumstances tested, and the effectiveness of materials produced by the fund’s manager to explain the stress testing results to the board. For example, although some funds actively embrace the spirit of the requirement by testing a variety of additional hypothetical events and tailoring their stress testing to the particular market conditions and potential risks that they may face, other funds test only for the events specifically listed in the rule. Some funds test for combinations of events, as well as for correlations between events and between portfolio holdings, whereas others do not. We also have examined how funds share information about stress testing results with their boards.

Since adopting the stress testing requirement in 2010, we have had several opportunities to assess its effectiveness during periods of market stress, including the 2011 Eurozone debt crisis and the 2011 U.S. debt ceiling impasse. Our staff observed, for example, that during the 2011 Eurozone debt crisis, funds that had strong stress testing procedures were able to use the results of those tests to better manage their portfolios and minimize the risks associated with the crisis.

After considering this information and experience, we believe that certain enhancements to our stress testing requirements may be warranted. We also note that our floating NAV proposal and our liquidity fees and gates proposal may have different implications regarding the need for and nature of stress testing of a money market fund’s portfolio. Accordingly, we are proposing a variety of amendments and enhancements to our stress testing requirements. The amendments and enhancements we are proposing to the stress testing requirements would largely be identical under either reform alternative we might adopt, except that for floating NAV money market funds we would remove the standard to test against preserving a stable share price if we were to adopt the floating NAV alternative, as further discussed below.
I. Stress Testing under the Floating NAV Alternative

As discussed above, we acknowledge that requiring that money market funds transact with a floating NAV mitigates but does not eliminate the possibility of heavy shareholder redemptions. We understand that in times of broad financial market stress, shareholders in floating NAV money market funds may still have an incentive to redeem shares because of funds' limited internal liquidity or because of overall flights to quality, liquidity, or transparency. Accordingly, stress testing the liquidity of floating NAV funds could enhance a fund board's understanding of risks and fund management of those risks.

If we adopt the floating NAV alternative, we propose to amend the current stress testing requirement as it would apply to floating NAV money market funds to require that such funds test the impact of certain market conditions on fund liquidity, instead of requiring that they test the fund's ability to maintain a stable price per share. More specifically, we are proposing that each floating NAV money market fund stress test its ability to avoid having its weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of all fund assets. This requirement also would be in accord with the proposed requirement, discussed in the next section, that would require funds to stress test their ability to avoid crossing the same 15% weekly liquid asset threshold because it could trigger fees or gates. We selected this 15% weekly liquid asset test for similar reasons that we selected that threshold under our liquidity fees and gates alternative—that a money market fund falling below this liquidity threshold can indicate stress on the fund. Funds that go below the 15% weekly liquid asset threshold may face significant adverse consequences, and thus fund boards and

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924 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i).

925 See supra section III.B. We note that we have also proposed a 15% weekly liquid assets trigger for use of rule 22d-3 (permitting suspension of redemptions when liquidating of a fund) under our liquidity fees and gates and floating NAV alternatives. See supra sections III.A.5 and III.B.1 - III.B.4.
advisers should understand and be aware of what could cause a fund to cross such a threshold. We understand that when a fund tests its ability to maintain a stable price (the metric that stress tests currently require), a fund also tests its ability to avoid crossing liquidity thresholds, such as the 15% weekly liquid asset test that we are proposing today. Accordingly, because we understand that funds already test their ability to avoid crossing a 15% weekly liquid asset threshold as part of their current stress tests, we do not expect that replacing the stable NAV test for floating NAV money market funds with a liquidity test will impose significant costs on funds.

For a money market fund that would be exempt from the floating NAV requirement under our proposal (a government or retail money market fund), we propose requiring that it stress test for both its ability to avoid having its weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of its total assets and its ability to maintain a stable share price.926 This would augment the current testing that these funds conduct to test not just against stresses that could cause these funds to “break the buck” but also for liquidity stresses.

We request comment on this proposed amendment to the stress-testing requirement for money market funds under the floating NAV alternative.

- Should we continue to require funds with a floating NAV to stress test their portfolio? If not, why not?
- Is the level of weekly liquid assets an appropriate measure of risk for floating NAV funds to stress test against? Should it also (or alternatively) stress test against the level of daily liquid assets? If so, what daily liquid asset threshold should be tested: 5%, 2%, or some other number?

926 See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i).
Is the threshold of 15% weekly liquid assets the right level to test stress on the fund? Should it be higher or lower, such as 10% weekly liquid assets or 20%?

Should we require that government and retail money market funds test against both their ability to maintain a stable share price and falling below 15% weekly liquid assets? Are there other stress testing factors that would be more appropriate for these exempt funds?

Are we correct in concluding that funds already stress test their liquidity when testing their ability to maintain a stable NAV? Would there be any costs for a fund to switch to using a weekly liquid asset test instead?

Instead of amending the current stress testing requirement to test liquidity, we could require a floating NAV money market fund to stress test its ability to meet other or additional metrics or standards. For example, we could require testing a floating NAV fund’s ability to meet its investment objective, avoid significant losses, or maintain low volatility. If we were to require stress testing for a fund’s ability to meet its investment objectives, funds might be able to craft tests that are particularly suited to their particular circumstances. On the other hand, funds investment objectives may be too general for an appropriate test to be created. In addition, requiring testing against investment objectives may create significant disparities in stress tests between similar funds. Requiring testing against the ability for a fund to avoid significant losses or maintaining low volatility may have the advantage of directly testing for the circumstances with which fund investors may be most concerned, but may create difficulties in establishing the appropriate metrics applicable to all funds. We expect that a floating NAV fund might regularly experience minor fluctuations in its NAV, and establishing a meaningful stress test standard related to losses or volatility while still accommodating these potential fluctuations may not be
workable.

We request comment on whether instead of amending the current stress testing requirement for floating NAV money market funds to focus only on liquidity, we should replace it (or supplement it) with a requirement to stress test to a different or additional metric or standard.

- Are there alternative or additional metrics or standards other than liquidity that would provide sufficient guidance for a fund to run effective stress tests?
- Should we instead use a metric, such as the ability for a floating NAV fund to avoid losses greater than 25 or 50 basis points in a certain period of time? If we were to use a different metric, what should it be and how should it be set? Are there any other potential metrics or standards that we could use? The fund’s ability to minimize principal volatility or losses?

We also are proposing that money market funds include factors such as correlations among securities returns and concurrences of events in their stress tests.\textsuperscript{927} Our staff’s review of money market fund stress testing and its use during periods of market stress, as well as recent evidence on portfolio asset return correlations provided by the staff, indicates many money market funds face significant correlated risk in their portfolios. We note that some commenters have agreed that correlations among securities and concurrences of events are important factors to consider when stress testing.\textsuperscript{928} Others have highlighted the correlations among many money market fund portfolio securities, and noted the relevance of such correlations when examining

\textsuperscript{927} Proposed (FINAV) rule 2a-7(7)(i).

\textsuperscript{928} See, e.g., Comment Letter of Chris Barnard (Jan. 4, 2013) (available in File No. FSOC-2012-0003) ("I would recommend that regulators specifically emphasize [sic] the importance of considering dependencies and correlations under stress testing, particularly as typically observed and expected dependencies may not apply in the tail conditions and events that underlie many stress conditions and scenarios.").
money market fund risk.\textsuperscript{929} As noted above, we observe that although some funds test for likely concurrences of events and potential correlations among securities returns, others do not. We believe that an evaluation of such correlations and concurrences is an important part of a fund’s stress testing, and accordingly are proposing to require that they be included as part of the required stress testing procedures.\textsuperscript{930} Specifically, we propose to require that stress testing procedures provide for testing of “[c]ombinations of these and any other events the adviser deems relevant, assuming a positive correlation of risk factors....”\textsuperscript{931} Such testing should include an evaluation of the effect of hypothetical events on issuers that operate in a similar industry, are based in a similar geographic region, or have other related attributes. It should include an evaluation of the likelihood that one event may influence or lead to another event. It should also test the effect of correlations of issuer and guarantor exposures on liquidity.

As part of our effort to ensure that funds consider portfolio correlations, we also propose to revise the stress testing requirement relating to the effect of downgrades or defaults of portfolio securities to require an evaluation of the effect that such an event could have on other...

\textsuperscript{929} See, e.g., Robert Comment FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 67 (noting the correlated credit risk in money market funds); Harvard Business School FSOC Comment Letter, supra note 24 (same).

\textsuperscript{930} In our 2009 Proposing Release, we stated “Boards should, for example, consider procedures that require the fund to test for the concurrence of multiple hypothetical events, e.g., where there is a simultaneous increase in interest rates and substantial redemptions.” See 2009 Proposing Release, supra note 31, text following n.209; rule 2a-7(c)(10)(v).

\textsuperscript{931} In full, under the proposed new requirement, funds would test for: “Combinations of these and any other events the adviser deems relevant, assuming a positive correlation of risk factors (e.g., assuming that a security default likely will be followed by increased redemptions) and taking into consideration the extent to which the fund’s portfolio securities are correlated such that adverse events affecting a given security are likely to also affect one or more other securities (e.g., a consideration of whether issuers in the same or related industries or geographic regions would be affected by adverse events affecting issuers in the same industry or geographic region).” Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i)(F).
securities held by the fund. Security downgrades and defaults often occur in tandem with
downgrades and defaults of other similar securities, and evaluating the effect of a single security
event in isolation may not provide a sufficient picture of the effect of such a downgrade or
default on the other securities held by the fund.

We also are proposing to require that funds test not just for increases in redemptions in
isolation, but also reflect how the fund will likely meet the redemptions, taking into
consideration assumptions regarding the prices for which portfolio securities could be sold,
historical experience in handling redemptions, the relatively liquidity of the fund's securities, and
any other relevant factors. We designed this requirement to help assist funds in taking into
account consequences of how the fund responds to shareholder redemptions.

In addition to the enhancements described above, we also are proposing certain
clarifications of our stress testing requirements, based on our experience in money market fund
use of these requirements since 2010, that would enhance the usefulness of stress testing as a
monitoring tool for funds. First, we propose to clarify that a fund is required only to stress test
for increases (rather than changes) in the general level of short-term interest rates. Although a
decrease in short-term interest rates might cause a fund's price per share to rise above $1.00, the
fund's board can return the fund to its desired stable price by distributing the gains to
shareholders. As a result, we are proposing to amend the provision to clarify that a fund is
required only to stress test for increases in the general level of short-term interest rates.

Second, we propose to require that funds stress test for the "widening or narrowing of

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932 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i)(C).
933 For example, a default by one financial institution may lead to a re-examination of other similar companies
that may result in additional downgrades or defaults.
934 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i)(B).
935 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i)(A).
spreads among the indexes to which interest rates of portfolio securities are tied." This requirement would compel funds to stress test their entire portfolios for a broad range of risks that may affect specific asset classes of portfolio securities (e.g., a change in the shape of the yield curve or a change in the interest rates of particular asset classes). The current rule requires stress testing for "widening or narrowing of spreads between yields on an appropriate benchmark the fund has selected for overnight interest rates and commercial paper and other types of securities held by the fund." See rule 2a-7(c)(10)(v)(A). However, this stress test gives similar results to the current requirement that funds test for a change in the level of short-term interest rates. The proposed clarification would better enable funds to test for changes in spreads that may affect specific asset classes held by the fund, rather than for just short-term interest rate changes.

Finally, we are proposing to add another related hypothetical event for funds to test, namely "[o]ther movements in interest rates that may affect fund portfolio securities, such as parallel and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve." This new requirement could help funds better understand the exposure of various floating rate portfolio securities to changes in interest rates.

We do not intend the enhancements and clarifications to stress testing procedures that we are proposing today to serve as a comprehensive list of events to consider when funds engage in stress testing, but as a minimum set. Funds should carefully consider if any other events not described in the rule may affect their ability to maintain at least 15% weekly liquid assets, and

936 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i)(D).
937 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(i)(E).
We request comment on our proposed enhancements and clarifications to money market fund stress testing procedures.

- Are the proposed clarifications appropriate? Are there other clarifying changes that we should consider?
- Should we include any other required hypothetical events in the rule? If so, which other events should we include and why?
- Should we require funds to test for combinations of hypothetical events in their stress testing? Instead of leaving it to the discretion of the fund, should we specify which events should be combined (e.g., increases in shareholder redemptions and increases in short-term interest rates, or increases in shareholder redemptions and a default or downgrade of a portfolio security (or security correlated to a portfolio asset class), or both)? What additional costs would funds incur for testing a combination of hypothetical events?
- Should we make any other changes to the stress testing requirements, such as requiring a minimum frequency that funds should conduct their stress tests?

In addition to the enhancements to the specific hypothetical events that money market funds’ stress testing would have to include, we are proposing a clarification to the requirement that a fund’s adviser provide the fund’s board an assessment of the results of the stress tests. We propose to require that the adviser provide not only such an assessment, but also “such information as may reasonably be necessary for the board of directors to evaluate the stress

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938 Funds should consider concurrences of such additional events and correlations of any additional factors as well as the ones described above.
testing conducted by the adviser and the results of the testing.\footnote{939} We are proposing this requirement because we have observed that in some cases advisers have not provided sufficient context and additional information for fund boards as part of this assessment to effectively evaluate the stress test results and take appropriate action. For example, a fund’s stress testing showing the effects of various levels of redemptions may not be meaningful to the fund’s board without sufficient context such as fund shareholder concentrations levels and historical redemption activity. We designed this proposed change to assist fund boards to seek out and receive any additional information that they may need to effectively evaluate and make use of money market fund stress tests. We request comment on this proposed change.

- Are fund boards receiving sufficient context and necessary information about money market funds’ stress testing? Is there additional information that they should receive?

- How many funds would need to change their stress test information dissemination procedures to their boards?

Finally, we are requesting comment on certain aspects of money market fund stress testing as it relates to our obligation under section 165(i)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act to specify certain stress testing requirements for financial companies\footnote{940} that have total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion and are regulated by a primary federal financial regulatory agency. Under this section of the Dodd-Frank Act, among other matters, we must “establish methodologies for the conduct of stress tests…that shall provide for at least three different sets of conditions,

\footnote{939} Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7)(ii)(B).

\footnote{940} For a definition of “nonbank financial companies” for these purposes, see Definition of “Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities” and “Significant” Nonbank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [78 FR 20756 (Apr. 5, 2013)].
including baseline, adverse, and severely adverse.  

Although we expect to propose these stress testing requirements in detail in a separate rulemaking, we request general comment at this time on the methodologies we should consider proposing regarding this stress testing requirement as it may relate to money market funds with over $10 billion in total consolidated assets, and in particular on the different scenarios that we must establish for such stress testing. In connection with this request for comment, we note that we could consider the approach taken by the U.S. banking regulators for stress testing of banks, in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System annually publishes a set of hypothetical economic scenarios, including baseline, adverse, and severely adverse scenarios, that are to be used in bank stress testing, with appropriate modifications.  

- How should we define what set of events qualify as baseline, adverse, or severely adverse? Should we require funds to use or look to the scenarios published annually by the Federal Reserve?  
- Are the scenarios published by the Federal Reserve appropriate for money market funds? Should we specify more or fewer or different scenarios than the 3 scenarios specified in section 165(i)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act?  
- To what extent should we provide guidance regarding what might reasonably

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941 Under this section of the Dodd-Frank Act, we also must define the term "stress test" for purposes of that section, establish the form and content of the report to the Federal Reserve Board and the Commission regarding such stress testing, and require companies subject to this requirement to publish a summary of the results of the required stress tests. We note that under this section of the Dodd-Frank Act, we must design stress testing not just for certain money market funds, but also other types of funds and investment advisers that we regulate and that meet the $10 billion total consolidated assets test.

constitute each of these scenarios with regards to money market funds?

- How should such a stress testing requirement be specifically tailored to money market funds as opposed to banks or other types of funds? Should money market funds have to assess the impact of such a scenario given the fund’s investment profile and its historical pattern of shareholder redemptions?

2. **Stress Testing under the Liquidity Fees and Gates Alternative**

If we adopt our liquidity fees and gates alternative proposal, we are proposing that money market funds stress test against the potential for a money market fund’s level of weekly liquid assets to fall below 15% of its total assets, in addition to stress testing against the fund’s ability to maintain a stable share price.\(^{943}\) If we adopt this alternative, we would also adopt the same enhancements and clarifications to the stress testing provisions of rule 2a-7 discussed above under our floating NAV proposal.\(^{944}\)

Money market funds currently must stress test their ability to maintain a stable NAV per share, because failing to maintain such stability may result in significant adverse consequences for its investors, as discussed above.\(^{945}\) Under our liquidity fees and gates alternative, if a fund’s level of weekly liquid assets falls below 15%, we would require a fund to impose liquidity fees (unless the board determines otherwise) and a fund may impose a gate. Much like the inability to maintain a stable price, the triggering of such fees or gates may result in significant consequences for a fund and its shareholders. Accordingly, we are proposing an additional metric against which the fund would have to stress test: the fund’s level of weekly liquidity

\(^{943}\) See Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(g)(9)(i). We discuss our proposed changes to MMF stress testing requirements under the floating NAV alternative above.

\(^{944}\) Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(g)(9)(i)(A)-(F).

\(^{945}\) See rule 2a-7(c)(10)(v)(A).
assets falling below 15%. Requiring funds to stress test their ability to avoid crossing this threshold should help inform boards and fund managers of the circumstances that could cause a fund to trigger fees or gates and provide them a tool to help avoid doing so.

Generally, we expect that a fund would use similar hypothetical circumstances when testing its ability to avoid triggering fees and gates that it uses when stress testing its ability to maintain a stable price. However, some funds may identify different circumstances that are more relevant to testing one standard than another, and thus may use different versions of the hypothetical scenarios, or weigh them differently for each. For example, certain events, such as significant shareholder redemptions in a short time period, may more strongly affect the ability of a fund to avoid crossing the 15% weekly liquid asset threshold than the ability to maintain a stable price. Other events, such as a credit default in a portfolio security, may more strongly affect the ability of a fund to maintain a stable price than avoid crossing the liquidity threshold. Stress tests should thus account for a variety of circumstances that affect the ability of a fund to meet each standard.

We request comment on our proposed inclusion of a fund’s ability to maintain at least 15% weekly liquid assets as an additional stress testing metric.

- Should we include this additional metric? Why or why not? Would the proposed requirement help fund managers better manage the risks of a stable price fund with standby liquidity fees and gates? Should we include any other metrics or standards for stress testing? If so, which ones and why?

- Should a fund also (or alternatively?) stress test against the level of daily liquid assets? If so, what daily liquid asset threshold should be tested: 5%, 2%, or some other number?
• Is the threshold of 15% weekly liquid assets the right level to test stress on for a fund? Should it be higher or lower, such as 10% weekly liquid assets or 20%?

If we were to adopt the liquidity fees and gates alternative, we would also adopt the same enhancements and clarifications to the stress testing requirements described in our floating NAV alternative.\textsuperscript{946} We believe that the amendments and enhancements to the stress testing requirements that we are proposing under the floating NAV alternative would provide the same benefits as under our liquidity fees and gates alternative and would help funds with fees and gates better test their portfolios for risks. As discussed in detail above, these enhancements include (among others) requirements to test for concurrences of events and correlations among returns, the ability of a fund to meet redemptions, and other revised and additional hypothetical events.\textsuperscript{947}

We request comment on whether we should include these enhancements to a fund stress testing procedures if we were to adopt our liquidity fees and gates alternative.

• Should we revise any of the proposed enhancements to account for the circumstances of a fund with standby liquidity fees and gates? If so, how?

Should we include any additional enhancements? Should we eliminate any of the proposed enhancements?

• Should we adopt these enhancements even if we do not add the additional liquidity metric? Should we adopt these enhancements even if we do not adopt the liquidity fees and gates or floating NAV proposals at all? Why or why not?

\textsuperscript{946} See supra section III.L.1.

\textsuperscript{947} Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(g)(9)(i).
3. **Economic Analysis**

As previously discussed, we expect that the costs and benefits of the proposed stress testing amendments would be largely identical under both alternatives.\textsuperscript{948} Our baseline for the economic analysis we discuss below is the current stress testing requirements for money market funds. The costs and benefits, and effects on competition, efficiency, and capital formation are measured in increments over the current stress testing requirement baseline. The benefits of the proposed stress test requirements will depend in part on the extent to which funds already engage in stress tests that are similar to the proposed requirements. For example, the staff understands that most money market funds currently test for changes in general levels of short-term interest rates. We do not, therefore, anticipate that the proposed requirement to test for increases in general levels of short-term interest rates will confer many additional benefits on funds, although funds may experience negligible savings because the proposed amendment would be limited to increases (rather than changes) in short-term interest rates. Similarly, many funds, including those that use a service provider to conduct their stress testing, already test for effects on portfolios of spread changes among indexes to which interest rates of portfolio securities are tied and other factors as well. In this case, we anticipate the proposed changes will confer benefits only on those funds that currently do not perform these types of stress tests.\textsuperscript{949} The additional information generated from the stress test should help fund managers, advisers, and boards

\textsuperscript{948} We expect that the costs and benefits of our proposed new liquidity metric and other enhancements to fund stress testing would be similar under either our floating NAV or liquidity fees and gates alternative, except that some funds under the floating NAV alternative may realize minor savings in avoiding have to test for the ability maintain a stable share price. The only substantive difference between the proposals is that we would eliminate the requirement for floating NAV money market funds to test for the ability to maintain a stable share price under our floating NAV alternative.

\textsuperscript{949} Although as we have discussed previously, money market funds can experience the risk of general heavy redemption contagion, and accordingly improved stress testing that reduces the risks of a single fund may correspondingly have some benefits in reducing the risks of contagion across all funds.
monitor, evaluate, and manage fund risk, and thus better protect the fund and its investors from
the adverse consequences that may result in failing to maintain a stable price per share or
crossing the 15% weekly liquid assets threshold. We cannot quantify the expected benefits of
our proposed stress testing requirements because we do not have sufficient data as to the extent
to which funds already include these factors in their stress tests today.

Because funds are currently required to meet a stress testing requirement, we do not
anticipate significant additional costs to funds under either proposed requirement. We note,
however, that under our floating NAV alternative, we would replace the requirement to test for a
stable NAV for floating NAV money market funds and replace it with a liquidity test, but under
our liquidity fees and gates alternative funds would be required to test for both conditions. The
cost of the proposed requirement therefore, would depend on the difference in cost of stress
testing for liquidity rather than NAV. We ask below for comment on differences in cost. We
believe that there likely would be no difference in costs in testing to either metric.

Generally, we expect that funds would use similar hypothetical circumstances when
testing their ability to avoid going below 15% weekly liquid assets that they use when stress
testing their ability to maintain a stable price. We understand that although some funds currently
test for all the new and amended hypothetical circumstances we are proposing today, others do
not. Funds that would need to alter their stress testing procedures to include the new and
amended hypothetical circumstances we are proposing would incur some additional costs. For
example, we understand that some funds do not currently stress test for correlations among
portfolio securities returns and concurrences of events. These funds may incur greater costs in
modifying their stress testing procedures and systems to add such tests, than those who already
include those circumstances in their tests.\textsuperscript{950} Below we estimate a range of operational costs that funds may incur in implementing the amendments and enhancements to fund stress testing that we are proposing.

The staff estimates that a fund that currently already tests for all of the amendments and enhancements to the hypothetical circumstances that we are proposing today would incur no new additional costs to comply. On the other hand, the staff estimates that a fund that does not currently stress test for any of the new and amended hypothetical circumstances would incur one-time costs to implement our proposed amendments. These paper-related costs are discussed in greater detail in section IV below. As we discuss there, our staff estimates that the proposed amendments to stress testing would involve 8,464 burden hours, at an average one-time cost of $3.9 million for all money market funds and funds would not incur any additional ongoing costs.\textsuperscript{951}

At this time, we believe any new costs for stress testing would be so small as compared to the fund's overall operating expenses, that any effect on competition would be insignificant. This new requirement may increase allocative efficiency if the information it provides to the fund manager, adviser, and board of directors improves the fund manager's and adviser's ability to manage the fund's risk and the board's oversight of fund risk management. Money market fund investors also may view positively enhanced stress testing requirements, and this could increase investors' demand for money market funds and correspondingly the level of the funds' investment in the short-term financing markets. We do not have the information necessary to

\textsuperscript{950} Staff estimates that these costs would be attributable to the following activities: (i) planning, coding, testing, and installing system modifications; (ii) drafting, integrating, and implementing related procedures and controls; and (iii) preparing training materials and administering training sessions for staff in affected areas. See also supra note 245 (discussing the bases of our staff's estimates of operational and related costs).

\textsuperscript{951} See infra sections IV.A.1.e and IV.B.1.e.
provide a reasonable estimate of the effects the proposed amendments would likely have on capital formation because we do not know to what extent these proposed changes would result in increases or decreases in investments in money market funds or in money market funds' allocation of investments among different types of short-term debt securities.

We request comment on our assumptions about the costs of implementing our proposed changes to money market fund stress testing procedures and the effects of the proposed stress testing amendments on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

- Would there be any increase in costs for firms to stress test against a liquidity metric instead of a stable share price test? If so, what would they be?

- Are our estimates for the range of operational costs of adding the new and amended hypothetical circumstances to a funds stress testing procedures correct? Are they too high or too low, and if so, why? Would these costs only be one-time costs as we estimate or would there also be ongoing costs? If there are ongoing costs, what would they be?

- How many funds would need to change their stress tests for:
  - weekly liquidity levels,
  - factors such as correlations among securities returns and concurrences of events,
  - hypothetical events that might occur to issuers that operate in a similar industry, are based in a similar geographic region, or have other related attributes,
  - the effect of downgrades or defaults of portfolio securities on the performance of other securities held by the fund,
shareholder redemptions,
risks that may affect specific asset classes of portfolio securities (e.g., a change in the shape of the yield curve or a change in the interest rates of particular asset classes), as well as other movements in interest rates that may affect fund portfolio securities, such as parallel and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve?

- What impact would amending this requirement have on efficiency, competition, or capital formation?

4. Combined Approach

Finally, we note that in section III.C we request comment on whether we should combine our floating NAV and liquidity fees and gates proposals. This raises the question of what we would require regarding stress testing if we combined these alternatives, given that under the floating NAV alternative we have proposed stress testing for a loss of liquidity for floating NAV funds, whereas under the liquidity fees and gates alternative we have proposed to include a liquidity test as well as a test relating to maintaining the current stable price. If we were to pursue a combined approach, we would likely not include any stress testing requirements related to maintaining a stable price for floating NAV funds. Instead, we would only require those funds to stress test against their ability to avoid imposing liquidity fees and redemption gates under a number of hypothetical scenarios. We would also expect to adopt the enhancements and clarifications to fund stress testing procedures discussed previously.

We request comment on what we should require regarding stress testing under a combined approach.

- If we were to adopt a combined approach, would funds stress testing liquidity be
useful? Should we instead not require funds to stress test at all? If so, why not?

- Alternatively, under a combined approach should we require floating NAV funds to also stress test their ability to minimize principal volatility or losses or against some other additional metric or standard? If so, to what extent and against which metric or standard?

M. Clarifying Amendments

Since our adoption of amendments to rule 2a-7 in 2010, a number of questions have arisen regarding the application of certain of those amendments. We are taking this opportunity to propose a number of amendments to clarify the operation of these provisions. In addition, we are also proposing an additional amendment to state more clearly a limit we imposed on money market funds' investments in second tier securities in 2010. These clarifying amendments would apply under either our floating NAV alternative or the standby liquidity fees and gates alternative. We note that the Commission could choose to adopt these clarifying amendments even if it does not adopt the other reforms to money market fund regulation proposed in this Release.

I. Definitions of Daily Liquid Assets and Weekly Liquid Assets

We are proposing amendments to clarify certain characteristics of instruments that qualify as a "daily liquid asset" or "weekly liquid asset." First, we are proposing to make clear that money market funds cannot use the maturity-shortening provisions in current paragraph (d) of rule 2a-7 regarding interest rate readjustments when determining whether a security satisfies

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952 In addition, we are proposing technical, conforming amendments to rule 419(b)(2)(iv) under the Securities Act of 1933 (17 CFR 230.419(b)(2)(iv), which references certain paragraphs in rule 2a-7 the location of which would change under our proposed amendments. Specifically, we propose to replace references to "paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4)" with "paragraph (d)".

953 See rule 2a-7(d) (providing a number of exceptions to the general requirement that the maturity of a
the maturity requirements of a daily liquid asset or weekly liquid asset,\(^{954}\) which include securities that will mature within one or five business days, respectively.\(^{955}\) Using an interest rate readjustment to determine maturity as permitted under current paragraph (d) for these purposes would allow funds to include as daily or weekly liquid assets securities that the fund would not have a legal right to convert to cash in one or five business days. This would not be consistent with the purposes of the minimum daily and weekly liquidity requirements, which are designed to increase a fund’s ability to pay redeeming shareholders in times of market stress when the fund cannot rely on the market or a dealer to provide immediate liquidity.\(^{956}\)

Second, we propose to require that an agency discount note with a remaining maturity of 60 days or less qualifies as a “weekly liquid asset” only if the note is issued without an obligation to pay additional interest on the principal amount.\(^{957}\) Our proposed amendment would clarify that interest-bearing agency notes that are issued at a discount do not qualify.\(^{958}\) We understand that

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\(^{954}\) Portfolio security be deemed to be the period remaining (from the trade date) until the date on which, in accordance with the terms of the security, the principal amount must unconditionally be paid; the exceptions generally provide that a fund may shorten the maturity date of certain securities to the period remaining until the next readjustment of the interest rate or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

\(^{955}\) Proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(8); proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(31). As proposed, the amended definitions would require funds to determine a security’s maturity in the same way they must calculate for purposes of determining WAL under proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(1)(ii).

\(^{956}\) Rule 2a-7(a)(8) defines “daily liquid assets” to include (i) cash, (ii) direct obligations of the U.S. government, or (iii) securities that will mature or are subject to a demand feature that is exercisable and payable within one business day. Rule 2a-7(a)(32) defines “weekly liquid assets” to include (i) cash; (ii) direct obligations of the U.S. government; (iii) securities that will mature or are subject to a demand feature that is exercisable and payable within five business days; or (iv) Government securities (as defined in section 2(a)(16) of the Act) that are issued by a person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the U.S. government that are issued at a discount to the principal amount to be repaid at maturity and have a remaining maturity date of 60 days or less.

\(^{957}\) See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at text following n.213.

\(^{958}\) Proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(31)(ii).

We understand that an interest-bearing agency note might be issued at a discount to facilitate a rounded coupon rate (i.e., 2.75% or 3.5%) when yield demanded on the note would otherwise require a coupon rate that is not rounded.
these interest-bearing agency notes issued at a discount are extremely rare. We do not believe
that interest bearing agency notes are among the very short-term agency discount notes that
appeared to be relatively liquid during the 2008 market events and that we determined could
qualify as weekly liquid assets. 959

Finally, we propose to include in the definitions of daily and weekly liquid assets
amounts receivable that are due unconditionally within one or five business days, respectively,
on pending sales of portfolio securities. 960 These receivables, like certain other securities that
qualify as daily or weekly liquid assets, provide liquidity for the fund because they give a fund
the legal right to receive cash in one to five business days. We would expect that a fund (or its
adviser) would include these receivables in daily and weekly liquid assets only if the fund (or its
adviser) has no reason to believe that the buyer might not perform.

We understand that the instruments that most, if not all, money market funds currently
hold as daily and weekly liquid assets currently conform to the amendments we are proposing
and that these practices would be consistent with positions our staff has taken in informal
guidance to money market funds. 961 The proposed amendments are designed to clarify that
securities with maturities determined according to interest rate resets and interest bearing agency
notes issued at a discount do not qualify as daily or weekly liquid assets, as applicable. Because
both of these types of securities are less liquid than the limited types of instruments that do

959 See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at text accompanying and following nn.251-55. Our
determination was informed by average daily yields of 30 day and 60 day agency discount notes during the
fall of 2008. We believe that interest-bearing agency notes issued at a discount were not included in the
indices of the agency discount notes on which we based our analysis or if they were included, there were
too few to have affected the indices’ averages.

960 Proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(8)(iv); proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-
7(a)(31)(v).

961 See Staff Responses to Questions About Money Market Fund Reform, (revised Nov. 24, 2010)
(http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/mmreform-imqa.htm) (“Staff Responses to MMF
Questions”), Questions II.1, II.2, II.4.
qualify, any funds that alter their future portfolio investments to conform to these requirements would benefit from increased liquidity and ability to absorb larger amounts of redemptions. The proposal to include certain receivables as daily and weekly assets should benefit funds because it will appropriately increase the types of assets that can satisfy those liquidity requirements. Because we believe that most funds already comply with our proposed amendments, we have not quantified any potential benefits to funds and shareholders.

We do not believe there would be any costs associated with our proposed amendments to the definitions of daily and weekly liquid assets. We do not anticipate that there would be operational costs for any funds that currently hold securities that would no longer qualify as daily or weekly assets because those securities likely would mature before the proposed compliance date for our proposal.962 Because these amendments would clarify assets that qualify as daily and weekly liquid assets and, we believe, most money market funds are currently complying with these proposed amendments, we do not anticipate that they will have any effect on efficiency or capital formation. To the extent that some funds' practices do not already conform, however, the proposed clarifications may eliminate any competitive advantages that may have resulted from those practices. We request comment on the proposed amendments and the benefits we have described.

- Do the proposed amendments comport with current fund practices?
- Would there be any costs to funds that may not conform to these proposed amendments?
- Would the amendments have any effect on efficiency, competition, or capital formation?

962 An eligible security must have a remaining maturity of no more than 397 days. Rule 2a-7(a)(12)(i).
2. Definition of Demand Feature

We are proposing to amend the definition of demand feature in rule 2a-7 to mean a feature permitting the holder of a security to sell the security at an exercise price equal to the approximate amortized cost of the security plus accrued interest, if any, at the time of exercise, paid within 397 calendar days of exercise.\textsuperscript{963} Our proposed amendment would eliminate the requirement that a demand feature be exercisable at any time on no more than 30 calendar days' notice.\textsuperscript{964}

Eliminating the requirement that a demand feature be exercisable at any time on no more than 30 days' notice would clarify the operation of rule 2a-7 by removing a provision that has become obsolete. In 1986, the Commission expanded the notice period from seven days to 30 days for all types of demand features and emphasized that the notice requirement was at least in part designed to ensure that money market funds maintain adequate liquidity.\textsuperscript{965} Because, as discussed in section II.D.1 above, the 2010 amendments added significant new provisions to enhance the liquidity of money market funds, we believe it is unnecessary to continue to require that demand features be exercised at any time on no more than 30 days' notice.\textsuperscript{966} As proposed, the demand feature definition would focus on funds' ability to receive payment within 397 calendar days of exercise of the demand feature.

Eliminating the 30-day notice requirement may improve efficiency by simplifying the operation of rule 2a-7 regarding demand features and providing issuers with more flexibility.

\textsuperscript{963} Proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(9).

\textsuperscript{964} A demand feature is currently defined to mean (i) a feature permitting the holder of a security to sell the security at an exercise price equal to the approximate amortized cost of the security plus accrued interest, if any, at the time of exercise. A Demand Feature must be exercisable either: (a) At any time on no more than 30 calendar days' notice; or (b) At specified intervals not exceeding 397 calendar days and upon no more than 30 calendar days' notice; or (ii) A feature permitting the holder of an Asset-Backed Security unconditionally to receive principal and interest within 397 calendar days of making demand. See rule 2a-7(a)(9).
Our proposed amendment may also promote competition between issuers and facilitate capital formation by permitting funds to purchase securities with demand features from a larger pool of issuers. We do not expect that our proposed amendment would impose costs on funds.\textsuperscript{967}

We request comment on our proposed amendment to eliminate the 30-day notice requirement and specific reference to asset-backed securities.

- Do commenters agree that the 30-day notice requirement is unnecessary when considering the enhanced liquidity requirements adopted as part of our 2010 amendments? Why or why not?

- Do commenters agree with our economic analysis? Would our proposal have other economic effects, other than those we describe above? If so, please describe.

3. **Short-Term Floating Rate Securities**

We are also proposing to clarify the method for determining WAL for short-term floating

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965 See Acquisition and Valuation of Certain Portfolio Instruments by Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 14983 (Mar. 12, 1986) [51 FR 9773 (Mar. 21, 1986)] ("The Commission still believes that some limit must be placed on the extent to which funds relying on the rule will have to anticipate their cash and investment needs more than seven days in advance. However, the Commission believes that funds should be able to invest in the demand instruments that are being marketed with notice periods of up to 30 days, as long as the directors are cognizant of their responsibility to maintain an adequate level of liquidity."). Liquidity was also a concern when the Commission added the definition of demand feature for asset-backed securities and noted that it was done, in part, to make clear the date on which there was a binding obligation to pay (and not just the scheduled maturity). See 1996 Adopting Release, supra note 247, at accompanying nn.151-52.


967 We note that demand features and guarantees are referenced in rule 12d3-1(d)(7)(v) (providing that, subject to a diversification limitation, the acquisition of a demand feature or guarantee is not an acquisition of securities of a securities related business (that would otherwise be prohibited pursuant to section 12(d)(3) of the Act)) and rule 31a-1(b)(1) (requiring that a fund's detailed records of daily purchase and sale records include the name and nature of any demand feature provider or guarantor). We do not believe that our proposed amendment would provide any benefits or impose any costs with respect to these rules, other than those described above. We also propose to update the cross references to the definition of the terms "demand feature" and "guarantee" in rule 12d3-1(d)(7)(v), which defines these terms by reference to rule 2a-7 (replacing the references to "rule 2a-7(a)(8)") and rule 2a-7(a)(15) with "§ 270.2a-7(a)(9)" and "§ 270.2a-7(a)(16)" and rule 31a-1(b)(1) (replacing the references to "rule 2a-7(a)(8)") and "rule 2a-7(a)(15)" with "§ 270.2a-7(a)(9)" and "§ 270.2a-7(a)(16)". 
rate securities. WAL is similar to a fund’s WAM, except that WAL is determined without reference to interest rate readjustments. Under current rule 2a-7, a short-term variable rate security, the principal of which must unconditionally be paid in 397 calendar days or less, is “deemed to have a maturity equal to the earlier of the period remaining until the next readjustment of the interest rate or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.” A short-term floating rate security, the principal amount of which must unconditionally be paid in 397 calendar days or less, is “deemed to have a maturity of one day” because the interest rate for a floating rate security will change on any date there is a change in the specified interest rate.

Despite the difference in wording of the maturity-shortening provisions for floating rate and variable rate securities, the Commission has always intended for these provisions to work in parallel and provide the same results. The omission of an explicit reference to demand features in the maturity-shortening provision for short-term floating rate securities, however, has created uncertainty in determining the maturity of short-term floating rate securities with a demand feature for purposes of calculating a fund’s WAL. Therefore, we are proposing to amend rule 2a-7(d)(4) to provide that, for purposes of determining WAL, a short-term floating rate security shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the principal amount can

968 See rule 2a-7(d)(4).
969 See rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii).
970 See rule 2a-7(d)(2).
971 See rule 2a-7(d)(4). Rule 2a-7 distinguishes between floating rate and variable rate securities based on whether the securities’ interest rate adjusts (i) when there is a change in a specified interest rate (floating rate securities), or (ii) on set dates (variable rate securities); rule 2a-7(a)(15) (defining “floating rate security”); rule 2a-7(a)(31) (defining “variable rate security”).
972 See 1996 Adopting Release, supra note 247, at n.154 (the maturity of a floating rate security subject to a demand feature is the period remaining until principal can be recovered through demand).
973 Long-term floating rate securities that are subject to a demand feature are deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand. Rule 2a-7(d)(5).
be recovered through demand.\textsuperscript{774}

We understand that most money market funds currently determine maturity for short-term floating rate securities consistent with the proposed amendment.\textsuperscript{775} Accordingly, we believe that our proposed amendment would likely not result in costs to funds. Any funds that currently limit or avoid investments in short-term floating rate securities because they would look to the security’s stated final maturity date rather than the demand feature for purposes of determining WAL (which could significantly increase the WAL), may benefit if they increase investments in short-term floating rate securities that are higher yielding than alternative investments in the fund’s portfolio. To the extent that those funds may have experienced any competitive yield disadvantage because they limited or avoided these investments, the proposed amendments should address those effects. Because we believe that most funds interpret the maturity requirements as we propose, we do not believe our proposed changes would produce quantifiable benefits or result in a significant, if any, impact on capital formation. We request comment on our proposed amendment to clarify the method for determining WAL for short-term floating rate securities.

- Is our assumption that money market funds currently determine maturity for short-term floating rate securities consistent with our proposed amendment correct? If so, would our proposed amendment have any impact on fund efficiency? If not, how would our proposed amendment affect efficiency?
- Do commenters agree that our proposed amendment would likely not result in a cost

\textsuperscript{774} Proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(i)(4).

\textsuperscript{775} Such a determination would be consistent with informal guidance that the staff has provided. See Investment Company Institute, Request for Interpretation under rule 2a-7 (Aug. 10, 2010) (incoming letter and response) at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2010/ici081010.htm.
to funds? Is our analysis of costs and benefits, including the effects on competition and capital formation accurate?

4. Second Tier Securities

In 2010, we amended rule 2a-7 to limit money market funds to acquiring second tier securities with remaining maturities of 45 days or less.\textsuperscript{976} As we explained then, "[s]ecurities of shorter maturity will pose less credit spread risk and liquidity risk to the fund because there is a shorter period of credit exposure and a shorter period until the security will mature and pay cash."\textsuperscript{977} We also explained that second tier securities with shorter maturities are less likely to be downgraded—and the data underlying this analysis looked at final legal maturities (and not maturities reflecting interest rate readjustments).\textsuperscript{978} Finally, we referenced the fact that the market typically demanded that second tier securities be issued at shorter legal maturities than first tier securities.\textsuperscript{979} Accordingly, all of our analysis in adopting this requirement was focused primarily on second tier securities’ credit risk, credit spread risk, and liquidity, all of which are more appropriately measured by the security’s final legal maturity, rather than its maturity recognizing interest rate readjustments, which focuses on interest rate risk. Thus to state more clearly the way in which this limitation operates, we propose to amend rule 2a-7 to state specifically that the 45-day limit applicable to second tier securities must be determined without reference to the maturity-shortening provisions in rule 2a-7 for interest rate readjustments.\textsuperscript{980}

We understand that most money market funds currently determine the remaining maturity

\textsuperscript{976} See 2010 Adopting Release, supra note 92, at nn.65-69 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{977} Id. at text preceding n.67.

\textsuperscript{978} Id. at n.67 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{979} Id. at n.68 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{980} See proposed (FNAV and Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(d)(2)(ii).
for second tier securities consistent with the proposed amendment. Accordingly, we believe that our proposed amendment would likely not result in costs to funds or impact competition, efficiency, or capital formation. Any funds that currently hold securities that would no longer qualify as second tier securities would not incur costs because those securities likely would mature before the proposed compliance date for our proposal.\textsuperscript{981} We request comment on our proposal to state more explicitly the way in which the 45-day limit on second tier securities operates.

N. Proposed Compliance Date

Currently, we anticipate the following compliance dates for our proposed amendments as set forth below.\textsuperscript{982} With respect to any proposed amendments requiring certain historical disclosures, we propose that funds would be required only to disclose events that occur following the respective compliance date.\textsuperscript{983} Generally, we are proposing a compliance period of 2 years for the proposed floating NAV alternative, 1 year for the liquidity fees and gates alternative, and 9 months for the other proposed amendments that are not specifically related to the implementation of either alternative.

1. Compliance Period for Amendments Related to Floating NAV

If we were to adopt our floating NAV proposal, we expect that 2 years should provide an adequate period of time for money market funds, intermediaries, and other service providers\textsuperscript{984} to

\textsuperscript{981} See supra note 962.

\textsuperscript{982} We expect to provide more nuanced guidance on the compliance periods for each particular amended provision in the adopting release once commenters have had a chance to provide input and a particular alternative has been chosen.

\textsuperscript{983} See, e.g., proposed (FNAV) Item 16(g) of Form N-1A (Historical Disclosure of Financial Support Provided to Money Market Funds); proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(2) of Form N-1A (Historical Disclosure of Financial Support Provided to Money Market Funds); proposed (Fees & Gates) Item 16(g)(1) of Form N-1A (Historical Disclosure of Imposition of Fees and/or Gates).

\textsuperscript{984} See supra section III.A.9.
conduct the requisite operational changes to their systems to implement the floating NAV and for fund sponsors to restructure or establish new money market funds if they chose to rely on any available exemptions. It would also provide an extended length of time for money market fund shareholders to consider the reforms and make any corresponding changes to their investments and for any resulting impacts on the short-term financing markets and capital formation to be gradually absorbed.

Accordingly, if we were to adopt the floating NAV alternative, the compliance date would be 2 years after the effective date of the adoption with respect to any amendments specifically related to the floating NAV proposal, including any related amendments to disclosure. We therefore propose that the compliance date would be 2 years after the effective date of adoption of new rule 30b1-8, new Form N-CR, and the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7, rule 30b1-7, rule 482, Form N-MFP and Form N-1A under the floating NAV alternative.

2. Compliance Period for Amendments Related to Liquidity Fees and Gates

If we were to adopt the standby liquidity fees and gates alternative, we expect that 1 year should allow sufficient time for money market funds and their sponsors and service providers to conduct the requisite operational changes to their systems to implement these provisions, in particular the ability to impose standby liquidity fees and gates, and for fund sponsors to restructure or establish new money market funds if they chose to rely on any exemptions available. It would also provide a substantial amount of time for money market fund shareholders to consider the reforms and make any corresponding changes to their investments and for any resulting impacts on the short-term financing markets and capital formation to be

\[1985\] *Id.*

\[1986\] *See supra* section III.A (Floating NAV Alternative).
gradually absorbed.

Accordingly, if we were to adopt our standby liquidity fees and redemption gates alternative, the compliance date would be 1 year after the effective date of the adoption with respect to any amendments specifically related to the standby liquidity fees and gates alternative,\textsuperscript{987} including any related amendments to disclosure. We therefore propose that the compliance date would be 1 year after the effective date of the adoption of new rule 30b1-8 and new Form N-CR and the amendments to rule 2a-7, rule 30b1-7, rule 482, Form N-MFP and Form N-1A under the liquidity fees and redemption gates alternative.

3. \textit{Compliance Period for other Amendments to Money Market Fund Regulation}

With respect to any amendments not specifically related to either of the two proposed alternatives, we expect that 9 months should allow sufficient time for money market funds and their sponsors and service providers to implement any applicable disclosure requirements and conduct any applicable requisite operational changes to their systems to implement these provisions.

Accordingly, except as otherwise discussed above, we propose a general compliance date of 9 months after the effective date of adoption for all other proposed amendments to money market fund regulation not specifically related to either proposed alternative.

4. \textit{Request for Comment}

We request comment on the proposed compliance period for money market funds to comply with the proposed amendments.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Should we provide a longer or shorter compliance period with respect to any of
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{987} \textit{See supra} section III.B (Standby Liquidity Fees and Gates).
our proposed amendments? If so, why and of what length? How long would it take to implement each provision of our proposed amendments? Are there any provisions that should go into effect immediately? Others that should be provided an even longer compliance period?

- Would our proposed compliance periods and transition times provide sufficient time for fund groups to determine their preferred approach to implementing any regulatory changes and conduct any necessary operational changes?

- Would our anticipated compliance dates and transition times allow investors sufficient time to evaluate the changes and determine their preferred course of action?

- If any of the proposed amendments were to result in investors substantially reallocating capital, are there other steps we could take that we have not considered to mitigate any adverse effects on the short-term financing markets and capital formation during the transition?

O. Request for Comment and Data

The Commission requests comment on the amendments proposed in this Release. Commenters are requested to provide empirical data to support their views. The Commission also requests suggestions for additional changes to existing rules or forms, and comments on other matters that might have an effect on the proposals contained in this Release.

We specifically request comment on the feasibility of any alternatives to our proposed amendments that would minimize reporting and recordkeeping burdens on funds, the utility and necessity of the additional information we propose to require in relation to the associated costs and in view of the public benefits derived, and the effects that additional recordkeeping
requirements would have on internal compliance policies and procedures.\footnote{988}{See sections 30(c)(2)(A), 30(c)(2)(B), and 31(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act.}

Consideration of Impact on the Economy. For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or “SBREFA,”\footnote{989}{Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601).} the Commission must advise OMB whether a proposed regulation constitutes a “major” rule. Under SBREFA, a rule is considered “major” where, if adopted, it results in or is likely to result in: (1) an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers or individual industries; or (3) significant adverse effects on competition, investment or innovation.

We request comment on the potential impact of our proposals on the economy on an annual basis. Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other factual support for their views to the extent possible.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

Certain provisions of the proposed amendments contain “collections of information” within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (“PRA”).\footnote{990}{44 U.S.C. 3501-3521.} The titles for the existing collections of information are: “Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Money market funds” (Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) Control No. 3235-0268); “Rule 12d3-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons engaged in securities related businesses” (OMB Control No. 3235-0561); “Rule 18f-3 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Multiple class companies” (OMB Control No. 3235-0441); “Rule 22e-3 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Exemption for liquidation of money market funds” (OMB Control No. 3235-0658); “Rule 30b1-
7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Monthly report for money market funds” (OMB Control No. 3235-0657); “Rule 31a-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Records to be maintained by registered investment companies, certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having transactions with registered investment companies” (OMB Control No. 3235-0178); “Rule 34b-1(a) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Sales Literature Deemed to be Misleading” (OMB Control No. 3235-0346); “Rule 204(b)-1 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Reporting by investment advisers to private funds” (OMB Control No. 3235-0679); “Rule 482 under the Securities Act of 1933, Advertising by an Investment Company as Satisfying Requirements of Section 10” (OMB Control No. 3235-0565); “Form N-1A under the Securities Act of 1933 and under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Registration statement of open-end management investment companies” (OMB Control No. 3235-0307); “Form N-MFP, Monthly schedule of portfolio holdings of money market funds” (OMB Control No. 3235-0657); and “Form PF, Reporting Form for Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisers” (OMB Control No. 3235-0679). We are also submitting new collections of information for new rule 30b1-8 and new Form N-CR under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Commission is submitting these collections of information to the OMB for review in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid control number.

We are proposing two alternatives as part of our money market reform proposal, discussed separately below. Under the first alternative, we are proposing to require that certain

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991 We also are proposing additional amendments that do not affect the relevant rules' paperwork collections (e.g., we propose to amend Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1 solely to update cross references in that rule to provisions of rule 2a-7).
money market funds have a floating NAV. Under the second alternative, we propose to require money market funds whose liquidity levels fell below a specified threshold to impose a liquidity fee unless the fund’s board of directors determines such a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund, and permit the funds to suspend redemptions temporarily, i.e., to “gate” the fund. Certain of the amendments we are proposing today would apply under either alternative.

A. Alternative 1: Floating Net Asset Value

1. Rule 2a-7

Under our floating NAV proposal, money market funds (other than government and retail money market funds) would no longer be permitted to use amortized cost or penny-rounding to maintain a stable price per share; instead, money market funds would be required to compute their share price by rounding the fund’s current price per share to the fourth decimal place (in the case of a fund with a $1.0000 share price). Under this first alternative, we are proposing to amend rule 2a-7 (and consequently, amend or establish new collection of information burdens) by: (a) requiring that retail money market funds seeking to rely on the exemption from our floating NAV proposal implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to allow the conclusion that Omnibus Account Holders do not permit beneficial owners of the fund from redeeming more than the permissible daily amount; (b) requiring money market funds to be diversified with respect to the sponsors of asset-backed securities by deeming the sponsor to guarantee the asset-backed security unless the fund’s board of directors makes a special finding otherwise; (c) replacing the requirement that funds promptly notify the Commission via electronic mail of defaults and other events with disclosure on new Form N-CR; (d) eliminating the required procedure that money market funds’ boards adopt written procedures that include shadow pricing; (e) amending the stress testing requirements; and (f) amending the disclosures that money market funds are required to post on their websites. Unless otherwise noted, the
estimated burden hours discussed below are based on estimates of Commission staff with
experience in similar matters. Several of the proposed amendments would create new collection
of information requirements. The respondents to these collections of information would be
money market funds, investment advisers and other service providers to money market funds,
including financial intermediaries, as noted below. The currently approved burden for rule 2a-7
is 517,228 hours.

a. Retail Exemption from Floating NAV

Under our floating NAV proposal, retail money market funds would be exempt from
floating their price per share; instead, retail funds would be permitted to maintain a stable price
per share by computing its current price per share using the penny-rounding method. A retail
money market fund would mean a money market fund that does not permit any shareholder of
record to redeem more than $1 million each business day. 992 Our proposed amendment would
permit a shareholder of record to redeem more than $1 million on any one business day if the
shareholder of record is a broker, dealer, bank, or other person that holds securities issued by the
money market fund in nominee name ("Omnibus Account Holder") and the fund (or others in the
intermediary chain) has policies and procedures reasonably designed to allow the conclusion that
the Omnibus Account Holder does not permit any beneficial owner of the fund's shares, directly
or indirectly, to redeem more than the daily permitted amount. 993 This requirement is a collection
of information under the PRA, and is designed to address operational difficulties presented by
Omnibus Account Holders and ensure that the $1 million daily redemption limit is not
circumvented. The new collections of information would be mandatory for money market funds

992 See Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3)(i).
993 See Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(c)(3)(ii).
that rely on the exemption in proposed rule 2a-7(c)(3), and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.  

For purposes of the PRA, staff estimates that approximately 100 money market fund complexes would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption and therefore be required to adopt written policies and procedures to ensure that Omnibus Account Holders apply the daily redemption limit to beneficial owners. Staff estimates that it would take approximately 12 hours of a fund attorney’s time to prepare the procedures and one hour for a board to adopt the procedures, at a time cost of approximately $8,548 per fund complex. Therefore, staff estimates the one-time burden to prepare and adopt these procedures would be approximately 1,300 hours at $854,800 in total time costs for all fund complexes. Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 433 hours and time.

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994 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552 (Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). Exemption 8 of the Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for matters that are “contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(8)).

995 For purposes of the PRA, staff estimates that those money market funds that self-reported as “retail” funds as of February 28, 2013 (based on iMoney.net data) would likely rely on the proposed retail exemption from our floating NAV proposal.

996 This estimate is based on the following calculation: (12 hours x $379 per hour for an attorney = $4,548) + (1 hour x $4,000 per hour for a board of 8 directors = $4,000) = $8,548. All estimated wage figures discussed here and throughout section IV of this Release are based on published rates have been taken from SIFMA’s Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2012, available at http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589940603, modified by Commission staff to account for an 1800-hour work-year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee benefits, and overhead.

997 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 12 burden hours to prepare written procedures + 1 burden hour to adopt procedures = 13 burden hours per money market fund complex; 13 burden hours per fund complex x 100 fund complexes = 1,300 total burden hours for all fund complexes.

998 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 100 fund complexes x $8,548 in total costs per fund complex = $854,800.
costs of $284,933 for all funds.\textsuperscript{999} Staff estimates that there would be no external costs associated with implementing this collection of information.

\textit{b. Asset-Backed Securities}

Under the proposed amendments, funds would be required to treat the sponsor of an SPE issuing ABS as a guarantor of the ABS subject to rule 2a-7’s diversification limitations applicable to guarantors and demand feature providers, unless the fund’s board of directors (or its delegate) determines that the fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity.\textsuperscript{1000} The board of directors would be required to adopt written procedures requiring periodic evaluation of this determination.\textsuperscript{1001} Furthermore, for a period of not less than three years from the date when the evaluation was most recently made, the fund must preserve and maintain in an easily accessible place a written record of the evaluation.\textsuperscript{1002} This requirement is a collection of information under the PRA, and is designed to help ensure that the objectives of the diversification limitations are achieved. This new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1003}

Based on its review of reports on Form N-MFP, Commission staff estimates that approximately 183 money market funds hold asset-backed securities and would be required to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{999} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1,300 burden hours ÷ 3 = 433 average annual burden hours; $854,800 burden costs ÷ 3 = $284,933 average annual burden cost.
\item \textsuperscript{1000} Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(a)(16)(ii).
\item \textsuperscript{1001} Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(6).
\item \textsuperscript{1002} Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(6).
\item \textsuperscript{1003} See supra note 994.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
adopt written procedures regarding the periodic evaluation of determinations made by the fund as to ABS not subject to guarantees. Staff estimates that it would take approximately eight hours of a fund attorney’s time to prepare the procedures and one hour for a board to adopt the procedures. Therefore, staff estimates the one-time burden to prepare and adopt these procedures would be approximately nine hours per money market fund, at a time cost of approximately $7,032 per fund.\textsuperscript{1004} Therefore, staff estimates the one-time burden to prepare and adopt these procedures would be approximately 1,647 hours\textsuperscript{1005} at $1.2 million in total time costs for all money market funds.\textsuperscript{1006} Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 549 hours and time costs of $400,000 for all funds.\textsuperscript{1007} Commission staff further estimates that the 183 money market funds we estimate would adopt such written procedures would spend, on an annual basis, (i) two hours of a fund attorney’s time to prepare materials for the board’s review of new and existing determinations, (ii) one hour for the board to review those materials and make the required determinations, and (iii) one hour of a fund attorney’s time per year, on average, to prepare the written records of such determinations.\textsuperscript{1008} Therefore, staff estimates that the average annual burden to prepare materials and written records for a board’s required review of new and existing determinations would be

\textsuperscript{1004} This estimate is based on the following calculation: [8 hours x $379 per hour for an attorney = $3,032] + [1 hour x $4,000 per hour for a board of 8 directors = $4,000] = $7,032.

\textsuperscript{1005} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 8 burden hours to prepare written procedures + 1 burden hour to adopt procedures = 9 burden hours per money market fund required to adopt procedures; 9 burden hours per money market fund x 183 funds expected to adopt procedures = 1,647 total burden hours.

\textsuperscript{1006} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 183 money market funds x $7,032 in total costs per fund complex = $1.2 million.

\textsuperscript{1007} This estimate is based on the following calculations: 1,647 burden hours + 3 = 549 average annual burden hours; $1.2 million burden costs + 3 = $400,000 average annual burden cost.

\textsuperscript{1008} This estimate includes documenting, if applicable, the fund board’s determination that the fund is not relying on the fund sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity or other credit support to determine the ABS's quality or liquidity. See proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(a)(16)(ii) and proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(6).
approximately four hours per fund\textsuperscript{1009} at a time cost of approximately $5,137 per fund.\textsuperscript{1010}

Therefore, staff estimates the annual burden would be approximately 732 burden hours\textsuperscript{1011} and $940,071 in total time costs for all money market funds.\textsuperscript{1012} Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 244 hours and time costs of $313,357 for all funds.\textsuperscript{1013} There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

c. Notice to the Commission

Rule 2a-7 currently requires that money market funds promptly notify the Commission by electronic mail of any default or event of insolvency with respect to the issuer of one or more portfolio securities (or any issuer of a demand feature or guarantee) where immediately before the default the securities comprised one half of one percent or more of the fund's total assets.\textsuperscript{1014}

In addition, money market funds must also provide notice to the Commission of any purchase of its securities by an affiliated person in reliance on rule 17a-9 under the Investment Company Act.\textsuperscript{1015} Based on conversations with individuals in the mutual fund industry, staff has previously estimated that the burden associated with these requirements is (1) .5 burden hours of

\textsuperscript{1009} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 hours to adopt + 1 hour for board review + 1 hour for record preparation = 4 hours per year.

\textsuperscript{1010} This estimate is based on the following calculations: [3 hours x $379 per hour for an attorney = $1,137] + [1 hour x $4,000 per hour for a board of 8 directors = $4,000] = $5,137.

\textsuperscript{1011} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 4 burden hours per money market fund x 183 funds = 732 total burden hours.

\textsuperscript{1012} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 183 money market funds x $5,137 in total costs per fund complex = $940,071.

\textsuperscript{1013} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 732 burden hours ÷ 3 = 244 average annual burden hours; $940,071 burden costs ÷ 3 = $313,357 average annual burden cost.

\textsuperscript{1014} Rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(A) (requiring that the notice include a description of the actions the money market fund intends to take in response to the event).

\textsuperscript{1015} Rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii)(B) (requiring that the notice include identification of the security, its amortized cost, the sale price, and the reasons for the purchase).
professional legal time per response for each notification of an event of default or insolvency, and (2) 1.0 burden hours of professional legal time per response for each notification of the purchase of a money market fund’s portfolio security by certain affiliated persons in reliance on rule 17a-9. The new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1016}

We are proposing to eliminate the rule 2a-7 requirements that money market funds provide electronic notice of any event of default or insolvency of a portfolio security and any purchase by a fund of a portfolio security by an affiliate in reliance on rule 17a-9.\textsuperscript{1017} Staff estimates that elimination of these requirements would reduce the current annual burden by 0.5 hours for notices of default or insolvency and 1 hour for notices of purchases in reliance on rule 17a-9. Based on our prior estimate of 20 money market funds per year that would be required to provide the notification of an event of default or insolvency, staff estimates that the proposed amendment would reduce the current collection of information by approximately 10 hours annually, at a total time cost savings of $3,790.\textsuperscript{1018} Based on our prior estimate of 25 money market fund complexes per year that would be required to provide the notification of a purchase of a portfolio security in reliance on rule 17a-9, staff estimates that the proposed amendment would reduce the current collection of information by approximately 25 hours annually, at a total

\textsuperscript{1016} See supra note 994.

\textsuperscript{1017} These requirements are being replaced by new disclosure required on proposed Form N-CR. See Section IV.A.4 below.

\textsuperscript{1018} This estimate is based on the following calculations: 20 funds x 0.5 reduction in hours per fund = reduction of 10 hours; 10 burden hours x $379 per hour for an attorney = $3,790.
time cost savings of $9,475.\textsuperscript{1019} There would be no external cost savings associated with these proposed amendments to the collection of information burdens.

d. **Required Procedures**

Rule 2a-7 currently requires that money market funds establish written procedures designed to stabilize the fund’s NAV\textsuperscript{1020} and guidelines and procedures relating to the board’s delegation of authority.\textsuperscript{1021} Based on conversations with individuals in the mutual fund industry, staff has previously estimated that the burden associated with these requirements is a one-time 15.5 burden hours per response for each new money market fund to formulate and establish these written procedures and guidelines.\textsuperscript{1022} The new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1023}

The Commission is proposing to eliminate the requirement that money market funds establish written procedures providing for the board’s periodic review of the fund’s shadow price, the methods used for calculating the shadow price, and what action, if any, the board should initiate if the fund’s shadow price exceeds amortized cost by more than ½ of 1%.\textsuperscript{1024} Staff estimates that elimination of this requirement would eliminate the current one-time 15.5 burden hours for each new money market fund to formulate and establish these written

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\textsuperscript{1019} This estimate is based on the following calculations: 25 fund complexes x 1 reduction in hours per fund = reduction of 25 hours; 25 hours x $379 per hour for an attorney = 9,475.

\textsuperscript{1020} See rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii).

\textsuperscript{1021} See rule 2a-7(e)(1).

\textsuperscript{1022} The 15.5 hours is comprised of: 0.5 hours of the board of directors’ time; 7.2 hours of professional legal time; and 7.8 hours of support staff time.

\textsuperscript{1023} See supra note 994.

\textsuperscript{1024} See rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii).
procedures and guidelines. Based on our prior estimate of 10 new money market funds per year that would be required to formulate and establish these written procedures and guidelines, staff estimates that the proposed amendments would reduce the current collection of information by approximately 155 hours, at a total time cost savings of $60,940.\(^{1025}\) There would be no external cost savings associated with these proposed amendments to the collection of information burdens.

\(e.\) **Stress Testing**

We are proposing to amend the stress testing provision of rule 2a-7 to enhance the hypothetical events for which a fund (or its adviser) is required to stress test, including:

(i) increases (rather than changes) in the general level of short-term interest rates; (ii) downgrades or defaults of portfolio securities, and the effects these events could have on other securities held by the fund; (iii) “widening or narrowing of spreads among the indexes to which interest rates of portfolio securities are tied”; (iv) other movements in interest rates that may affect the fund’s portfolio securities, such as shifts in the yield curve; and (v) combinations of these and any other events the adviser deems relevant, assuming a positive correlation of risk factors.\(^{1026}\) Floating NAV money market funds would be required to replace their current stress test for the ability to maintain a stable price per share with a test of the fund’s ability to maintain 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets. Funds that are exempt from our floating NAV requirement would continue to test the fund’s ability to maintain a stable share price as well. A written copy of the procedures, and any modifications thereto, must be maintained and preserved.

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\(^{1025}\) This estimate is based on the following calculations: 10 funds x 15.5 reduction in hours per fund = reduction of 155 hours; 10 funds x [(0.5 hours x $4,000 per hour for board time) + (7.2 hours x $379 per hour for an attorney) + (7.8 hours x $175 for a Paralegal)] = $60,940.

\(^{1026}\) Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(g)(7).
for a period of not less than six years following the replacement of such procedures with new procedures, the first two years in an easily accessible place. ¹⁰²⁷ This requirement is a collection of information under the PRA, and is designed to address disparities in the quality and comprehensiveness of stress tests. The new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law. ¹⁰²⁸

We understand that most money market funds, in their normal course of risk management, include the elements we are proposing in their stress testing. Nevertheless, some smaller funds that perform their own stress testing (rather than use a third party service provider) may incur a one-time internal burden to reprogram an existing system to provide the required reports of stress testing results based on our proposed amendments. Staff estimates that each fund that would have to implement the proposed stress testing changes would incur an average one-time burden of 92 hours at a time cost of $42,688. ¹⁰²⁹ Based on an estimate of 92 funds that would incur this one-time burden, ¹⁰³⁰ staff estimates that the aggregate one-time burden for all money market funds to implement the proposed amendments to stress testing would be 8,464

¹⁰²⁷ Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(8).
¹⁰²⁸ See supra note 994.
¹⁰²⁹ Staff estimates that these systems modifications would include the following costs: (i) project planning and systems design (24 hours x $291 (hourly rate for a senior systems analyst) = $6,984); (ii) systems modification integration, testing, installation, and deployment (32 hours x $282 (hourly rate for a senior programmer) = $9,024); (iii) drafting, integrating, implementing procedures and controls (24 hours x $327 (blended hourly rate for assistant general counsel ($467), chief compliance officer ($441), senior EDP auditor ($273) and operations specialist ($126)) = $7,848); and (iv) preparation of training materials ((8 hours x $354 (hourly rate for an assistant compliance director)) + (4 hours (4 hour training session for board of directors) x $4,000 (hourly rate for board of 8 directors)) = $18,832). Therefore, staff estimates an average one-time burden of 92 hours (24+32+24+8+4), at a total cost per fund of $42,688 ($6,984+$9,024+$7,848+$18,832).
¹⁰³⁰ This estimate is based on staff experience and discussions with industry.
hours at a total time cost of $3.9 million. Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of 2,821 burden hours and $1.3 million total time cost for all funds. There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

f. Website Disclosure

We are proposing four amendments to the information money market funds are required to disclose on their websites. These amendments would promote transparency to investors of money market funds’ risks and risk management by:

- Harmonizing the specific portfolio holdings information that rule 2a-7 currently requires funds to disclose on the fund’s website with the corresponding portfolio holdings information proposed to be reported on Form N-MFP,

- Requiring that a fund disclose on its website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the percentage of the fund’s total assets that are invested in daily and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows, as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months (which depiction must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day);

- Requiring that a fund disclose on its website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the fund’s daily current NAV per share, as of the end of

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1031 This estimate is based on the following calculations: 92 funds x 92 hours per fund = 8,464 hours; 92 funds x $42,688 = $3.9 million.

1032 This estimate is based on the following calculations: 8,464 hours ÷ 3 = 2,821 burden hours; $3.9 million ÷ 3 = $1.3 million burden cost.

1033 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(i).

1034 Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(ii).

1035 See supra notes 644 and 645 and accompanying text for discussion of the definition of “current NAV.”
each business day during the preceding six months (which depiction must be
updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day);\footnote{1036} and

- Requiring a fund to disclose on its website substantially the same information
  that the fund is required to report to the Commission on Form N-CR regarding
  the provision of financial support to the fund.\footnote{1037}

These new collections of information would be mandatory for money market funds that
rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information
pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject
to the provisions of applicable law.\footnote{1038}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings Information}
\end{enumerate}

Because the new information that a fund would be required to disclose on its website
overlaps with the information that a fund would be required to disclose on Form N-MFP, we
anticipate that the burden for each fund to draft and finalize the disclosure that would appear on
its website would largely be incurred when the fund files Form N-MFP.\footnote{1039} Commission staff
estimates that a fund would incur an additional burden of 1 hour each time that it updates its
website to include the new disclosure. Using an estimate of 586 money market funds that would
be required to include the proposed new portfolio holdings disclosure on the fund’s website,\footnote{1040}
staff estimates that each fund would incur 12 additional hours of internal staff time per year (1

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1036}{Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii).}
\footnote{1037}{Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(v).}
\footnote{1038}{See supra note 994.}
\footnote{1039}{See section IV.A.3 below.}
\footnote{1040}{This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MIFP filed with the Commission for the
month ended February 28, 2013.}
\end{footnotes}
hour per monthly filing), at a time cost of $2,484,\textsuperscript{1041} to update the website to include the new disclosure, for a total of 7,032 aggregate hours per year,\textsuperscript{1042} at a total aggregate time cost of $1,455,624.\textsuperscript{1043} There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.


The burdens associated with the proposed requirement for a fund to disclose on its website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the percentage of the fund's total assets that are invested in daily and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund's net inflows or outflows, include one-time burdens as well as ongoing burdens. Commission staff expects that each money market fund would incur a one-time burden of 70 hours,\textsuperscript{1044} at a time cost of $20,150,\textsuperscript{1045} to design the required schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction, and to make the necessary software programming changes to the fund's website to disclose the percentage of the fund's total assets that are invested in daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets, as well as the

\textsuperscript{1041} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 12 hours x $207 per hour for a webmaster = $2,484.

\textsuperscript{1042} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 12 hours per year x 586 money market funds = 7,032 hours.

\textsuperscript{1043} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 7,032 hours x $207 per hour for a webmaster = $1,455,624.

\textsuperscript{1044} In the economic analysis sections of this Release, Commission staff estimates that the lower bound of the range of the initial, one-time hour burden to design and present the historical depiction of daily and weekly liquid assets and the fund's net inflows and outflows would include the following: 16 hours (project assessment) + 40 hours (project development, implementation, and testing) = 56 hours. Commission staff estimates that the upper bound of the range of the initial, one-time hour burden to design and present the historical depiction of daily and weekly liquid assets and the fund's net inflows and outflows would include the following: 24 hours (project assessment) + 60 hours (project development, implementation, and testing) = 84 hours.

Because we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate, we are unable to estimate the costs to modify a particular fund's systems and thus have provided ranges of estimated costs in our economic analysis. See section III.F.2.b and accompanying notes. Likewise, for purposes of our estimates for the FRA analysis, we have taken the midpoint of the range discussed above (mid-point of 56 hours and 84 hours = 70 hours).

\textsuperscript{1045} This estimate is based on the following calculations: (20 hours (mid-point of 16 hours and 24 hours for project assessment) x $290 (blended rate for a compliance manager and a compliance attorney) = $5,800) + (50 hours (mid-point of 40 hours and 60 hours for project development, implementation, and testing) x $287 (blended rate for a Senior Systems Analyst and senior programmer) = $14,350) = $20,150 per fund.
fund’s net inflows or outflows, as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months. Using an estimate of 586 money market funds,\textsuperscript{1046} staff estimates that money market funds would incur, in aggregate, a total one-time burden of 41,020 hours,\textsuperscript{1047} at a time cost of $11,807,900,\textsuperscript{1048} to comply with these website disclosure requirements. Commission staff estimates that each fund would incur an ongoing annual burden of 32 hours,\textsuperscript{1049} at a time cost of $9,184,\textsuperscript{1050} to update the depiction of daily and weekly liquid assets and the fund’s net inflows or outflows on the fund’s website each business day during that year; in aggregate, staff estimates that money market funds would incur an average ongoing annual burden of 18,752 hours,\textsuperscript{1051} at a time cost of $5,381,824,\textsuperscript{1052} to comply with this disclosure requirement. Amortizing these hourly and cost burdens over three years results in an average annual increased burden of 26,175 burden hours\textsuperscript{1053} at a time cost of $7,523,849.\textsuperscript{1054} There would be no external costs associated with this

\textsuperscript{1046} See supra note 1040.

\textsuperscript{1047} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 70 hours x 586 money market funds = 41,020 hours.

\textsuperscript{1048} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $20,150 per fund x 586 money market funds = $11,807,900.

\textsuperscript{1049} Commission staff estimates that the lower bound of the range of the ongoing annual hour burden to update the required website information would be 21 hours per year (5 minutes per day x 252 business days in a year = 1,260 minutes, or 21 hours). Commission staff estimates that the upper bound of the range of the ongoing annual hour burden to update the required website information would be 42 hours per year (10 minutes per day x 252 business days in a year = 2,520 minutes, or 42 hours).

Because we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the costs to modify a particular fund’s systems we thus have provided ranges of estimated costs in our economic analysis. See section IIIF.2.b and accompanying notes. Likewise, for purposes of our estimates for the PRA analysis, we have taken the mid-point of the range discussed above (mid-point of 21 hours and 42 hours = 32 hours).

\textsuperscript{1050} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 32 hours (mid-point of 21 hours and 42 hours) x $287 (blended rate for a senior systems analyst and senior programmer) = $9,184.

\textsuperscript{1051} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 32 hours x 586 money market funds = 18,752 hours.

\textsuperscript{1052} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $9,184 per fund x 586 money market funds = $5,381,824.

\textsuperscript{1053} This estimate is based on the following calculation: (41,020 burden hours (year 1) + 18,752 burden hours (year 2) + 18,752 burden hours (year 3)) / 3 = 26,175 hours.
collection of information.

iii. Disclosure of Daily Current NAV

The burdens associated with the proposed requirement for a fund to disclose on its website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the fund’s daily current NAV as of the end of the previous business day include one-time burdens as well as ongoing burdens. Commission staff expects that these one-time and ongoing burdens will be substantially similar to the burdens associated with the proposed requirement regarding website disclosure of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets, discussed above. This is because staff expects the core activities associated with both of these website disclosure requirements (designing the required schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction; making necessary software programming changes; and updating the website disclosure each day) would be identical for each requirement, and expects that the burdens associated with these activities will not vary substantially based on the substance of the disclosure necessitated by each requirement. As discussed below, staff believes that funds will incur no additional burden obtaining current NAV data for purposes of the proposed requirement regarding website disclosure of the fund’s daily current NAV.

Commission staff expects that each money market fund would incur a one-time burden of 70 hours,\textsuperscript{1056} at a time cost of $20,150,\textsuperscript{1057} to design the required schedule, chart, graph, or other

\textsuperscript{1054} This estimate is based on the following calculation: ($11,807,900 (year 1 monetized burden hours) + $5,381,824 (year 2 monetized burden hours) + $5,381,824 (year 3 monetized burden hours)) ÷ 3 = $7,523,849.

\textsuperscript{1055} See supra notes 644 and 645 and accompanying text for discussion of the definition of “current NAV.”

\textsuperscript{1056} Commission staff estimates that the lower bound of the range of the initial, one-time hour burden to design and present the historical depiction of the fund’s daily current NAV would include the following: 16 hours (project assessment) + 40 hours (project development, implementation, and testing) = 56 hours. Commission staff estimates that the upper bound of the range of the initial, one-time hour burden to design and present the historical depiction of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets would include the following: 24 hours (project assessment) + 60 hours (project development, implementation, and testing) = 84 hours.
depiction, and to make the necessary software programming changes to the fund’s website to disclose the fund’s daily current NAV as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months. Using an estimate of 586 money market funds, Commission staff estimates that money market funds would incur, in aggregate, a total one-time burden of 41,020 hours, at a time cost of $11,807,900, to comply with these website disclosure requirements. Commission staff estimates that each fund would incur an annual ongoing burden of 32 hours, at a time cost of $9,184, to update the depiction of the fund’s daily current NAV on the fund’s website each business day during that year; in aggregate, staff estimates that money market funds would incur an ongoing annual burden on 18,752 hours, at a time cost of $5,381,824, to comply.

Because we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the costs to modify a particular fund’s systems we thus have provided ranges of estimated cost in our economic analysis. See supra section III.F.3.b and accompanying notes. Likewise, for purposes of our estimates for the PRA analysis, we have taken the midpoint of the range discussed above (mid-point of 56 hours and 84 hours = 70 hours).

This estimate is based on the following calculations: (20 hours (mid-point of 16 hours and 24 hours for project assessment) x $290 (blended rate for a compliance manager and a compliance attorney) = $5,800) + (50 hours (mid-point of 40 hours and 60 hours for project development, implementation, and testing) x $287 (blended rate for a senior systems analyst and senior programmer) = $14,350) = $20,150 per fund. See supra note 1040.

This estimate is based on the following calculation: 70 hours x 586 money market funds = 41,020 hours.

This estimate is based on the following calculation: $20,150 per fund x 586 money market funds = $11,807,900.

Commission staff estimates that the lower bound of the range of the ongoing annual hour burden to update the required website information would be 21 hours per year (5 minutes per day x 252 business days in a year = 1,260 minutes, or 21 hours). Commission staff estimates that the upper bound of the range of the ongoing annual hour burden to update the required website information would be 42 hours per year (10 minutes per day x 252 business days in a year = 2,520 minutes, or 42 hours).

Because we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the costs to modify a particular fund’s systems we thus have provided ranges of estimated costs in our economic analysis. See supra section III.F.3.b and accompanying notes. Likewise, for purposes of our estimates for the PRA analysis, we have taken the mid-point of the range discussed above (mid-point of 21 hours and 42 hours = 32 hours).

This estimate is based on the following calculation: 32 hours (mid-point of 21 hours and 42 hours) x $287 (blended rate for a senior systems analyst and senior programmer) = $9,184.

This estimate is based on the following calculation: 32 hours x 586 money market funds = 18,752 hours.

This estimate is based on the following calculation: $9,184 x 586 money market funds = $5,381,824.
with this disclosure requirement. Amortizing these hourly and cost burdens over three years results in an average annual increased burden of 26,175 burden hours\textsuperscript{1065} at a time cost of $7,523,849.\textsuperscript{1066} There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information. Because floating NAV money market funds would be required to calculate their redemption price each day, these funds should incur no additional burdens in obtaining this data for purposes of the proposed disclosure requirements. Stable price money market funds (including government money market funds and retail funds if we adopt the floating NAV proposal, and all money market funds if we adopt the fees and gates proposal), which would be required to calculate their current NAV per share daily pursuant to proposed amendments to rule 2a-7, likewise should incur no additional burdens in obtaining this data for purposes of the proposed disclosure requirements.\textsuperscript{1067}


Commission staff estimates that the Commission would receive 40 reports per year filed in response to an event specified on Part C ("Provision of financial support to Fund") of Form N-CR.\textsuperscript{1068} Because the required website disclosure overlaps with the information that a fund must

\textsuperscript{1065} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 41,020 burden hours (year 1) + 18,752 burden hours (year 2) + 18,752 burden hours (year 3) ÷ 3 = 26,175 hours.

\textsuperscript{1066} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $11,807,900 (year 1 monetized burden hours) + $5,381,824 (year 2 monetized burden hours) + $5,381,824 (year 3 monetized burden hours) ÷ 3 = $7,523,849.

\textsuperscript{1067} See supra section III.F.5 (discussing the proposed requirement for stable price money market funds to calculate their current NAV per share daily, as well as the operational costs associated with this proposed daily calculation requirement).

\textsuperscript{1068} Commission staff estimates this figure based in part by reference to our estimate of the average number of notifications of security purchases in reliance on rule 17a-9 that money market funds currently file each year. See supra note 1019 and accompanying text. Because money market funds would be required to file a report in response to an event specified on Part C of Form N-CR if the fund receives any form of financial support from the fund’s sponsor or other affiliated person (which support includes, but is not limited to, a rule 17a-9 security purchase), staff estimates that the Commission would receive a greater number of Form
disclose on Form N-CR when the fund receives financial support from a sponsor or fund
affiliate, we anticipate that the burdens a fund would incur to draft and finalize the disclosure
that would appear on its website would largely be incurred when the fund files Form N-CR.\textsuperscript{1069}
Commission staff estimates that a fund would incur an additional burden of 1 hour, at a time cost
of $207,\textsuperscript{1070} each time it updates its website to include the new disclosure. Accordingly,
Commission staff estimates that the requirement to disclose information about financial support
received by a money market fund on the fund’s website would result in a total aggregate burden
of 40 hours per year,\textsuperscript{1071} at a total aggregate time cost of $8,280.\textsuperscript{1072} There would be no external
costs associated with this collection of information.

v. \textit{Change in Burden}

The aggregate additional annual burden associated with the proposed website disclosure
requirements discussed above is 59,422 hours\textsuperscript{1073} at a time cost of $16,511,602.\textsuperscript{1074} Amortized
over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of 19,807 burden hours.

\begin{itemize}
\item N-CR Part C reports that the number of notifications of rule 17a-9 security purchases that it currently
receives.
\item See infra section IV.A.4.
\item This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour per website update x $207 per hour for a
webmaster = $207.
\item This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour per website update x 40 website updates made
by money market funds = 40 hours.
\item This estimate is based on the following calculation: 40 hours per year x $207 per hour for a webmaster =
$8,280.
\item This estimate is based on the following calculation: 7,032 hours (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of
portfolio holdings information) + 26,175 (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of daily liquid assets and
weekly liquid assets) + 26,175 (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of daily current NAV) + 40 hours
(annual aggregate burden for disclosure of financial support provided to money market funds) = 59,422
hours.
\item This estimate is based on the following calculation: $1,455,624 (annual aggregate costs associated with
disclosure of portfolio holdings information) + $7,523,849 (annual aggregate costs associated with
disclosure of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets) + $7,523,849 (annual aggregate costs associated
with disclosure of daily current NAV) + $8,280 (annual aggregate costs associated with disclosure of
financial support provided to money market funds) = $16,511,602.
\end{itemize}
and $5,503,867 total time cost for all funds.\textsuperscript{1075} There would be no change in the external cost burden associated with this collection of information.

\textit{g. Total Burden for Rule 2a-7}

The currently approved burden for rule 2a-7 is 517,228 hours. The net aggregate additional burden hours associated with the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 would increase the burden estimate to 540,892 hours annually for all funds.\textsuperscript{1076}

\textit{2. Rule 22e-3}

Rule 22e-3 under the Investment Company Act exempts money market funds from section 22(e) of the Act to permit them to suspend redemptions and postpone payment of redemption proceeds in order to facilitate an orderly liquidation of the fund, provided that certain conditions are met.\textsuperscript{1077} Rule 22e-3 is intended to facilitate an orderly liquidation, reduce the vulnerability of shareholders to the harmful effects of a disorderly fund liquidation, and minimize the potential for market disruption.

The rule requires a money market fund to provide prior notification to the Commission of its decision to suspend redemptions and liquidate.\textsuperscript{1078} This requirement is a collection of information under the PRA, and is designed to assist Commission staff in monitoring a money market fund’s suspension of redemptions. The new collection of information would be mandatory for any fund that holds itself out as a money market fund in reliance on rule 2a-7 and

\textsuperscript{1075} This estimate is based on the following calculation: \( \frac{59,422 \text{ hours} \times 3 = 19,807 \text{ burden hours}}{3} = 5,503,867 \text{ burden cost.} \)

\textsuperscript{1076} This estimate is based on the following calculation: \( \frac{517,228 \text{ hours (currently approved burden)} + 433 \text{ hours (retail exemption)} + (549 \text{ hours} + 244 \text{ hours}) \text{ (ABS determination & recordkeeping)} - (10 \text{ hours} + 25 \text{ hours}) \text{ (notice to the Commission)} - 155 \text{ hours (required procedures)} + 2,821 \text{ hours (stress testing)} + 19,807 \text{ hours (website disclosure)}}{540,892 \text{ hours.}} \)

\textsuperscript{1077} Rule 22e-3(a).

\textsuperscript{1078} Rule 22e-3(a)(3).
any conduit funds that rely on the rule, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to this collection of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.

The current approved annual aggregate collection of information for rule 22e-3 is approximately 30 minutes to provide the required notification under the rule. To provide shareholders with protections comparable to those currently provided by the rule while also updating the rule to make it consistent with our proposed amendments to rule 2a-7, we are proposing to amend rule 22e-3 under our floating NAV proposal to allow a money market fund to invoke the exemption in rule 22e-3 if: (1) the fund, at the end of a business day, has invested less than 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets; or (2) in the case of a fund relying on the exemption for government money market funds or retail money market funds, the money market fund’s price per share has deviated from the stable price established by the board of directors or the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that such a deviation is likely to occur.

These amendments are designed to permit a money market fund to suspend redemptions under our floating NAV proposal when the fund is under significant stress, as the funds may do today under rule 22e-3. We do not expect that money market funds would invoke the exemption provided by rule 22e-3 more frequently under our floating NAV proposal than they do today because, although we propose to change the circumstances under which a money market fund may invoke the exemption provided by rule 22e-3, the rule as we propose to amend it still would

1079 The rule permits funds that invest in a money market fund pursuant to section 12(d)(1)(E) of the Act ("conduit funds") to rely on the rule, and requires the conduit fund to notify the Commission of its reliance on the rule. See rule 22e-3(b).

1080 See supra note 994.

1081 Proposed (FNAV) rule 22e-3(a)(1).
permit a money market fund to invoke the exemption only when the fund is under significant stress, and our staff estimates that a money market fund is likely to experience that level of stress and choose to suspend redemptions in reliance on rule 22e-3 with the same frequency that funds today may do so.

Therefore, we are not revising rule 22e-3’s current approved annual collection of information. The rule’s current approved annual aggregate burden is approximately 30 minutes, as discussed above, and is based on our staff’s estimates that: (1) on average, one money market fund would break the buck and liquidate every six years;\textsuperscript{1082} (2) there are an average of two conduit funds that may be invested in a money market fund that breaks the buck;\textsuperscript{1083} and (3) each money market fund and conduit fund would spend approximately one hour of an in-house attorney’s time every six years to prepare and submit the notice required by the rule.\textsuperscript{1084} There is no change in the external cost burden associated with this collection of information.

3.  \textit{Rule 30b1-7 and Form N-MFP}

Rule 30b1-7 under the Investment Company Act currently requires money market funds to file electronically a monthly report on Form N-MFP within five business days after the end of each month. The information required by the form must be data-tagged in XML format and filed through EDGAR. The rule is designed to improve transparency of information about money

\textsuperscript{1082} This estimate is based upon the Commission’s experience with the frequency with which money market funds have historically required sponsor support. Although many money market fund sponsors have supported their money market funds in times of market distress, for purposes of this estimate Commission staff conservatively estimates that one or more sponsors may not provide support.

\textsuperscript{1083} These estimates are based on a staff review of filings with the Commission. Generally, rule 22e-3 permits conduit funds to suspend redemptions in reliance on rule 22e-3 and requires that they notify the Commission if they elect to do so. \textit{See supra} note 1079.

\textsuperscript{1084} This estimate is based on the following calculations: (1 hour ÷ 6 years) = 10 minutes per year for each fund and conduit fund that is required to provide notice under the rule. 10 minutes per year x 3 (combined number of affected funds and conduit funds) = 30 minutes. The estimated costs associated with the estimated burden hours ($189) are based on the following calculations: $378/hour (hourly rate for an in-house attorney) x 30 minutes = $189.
market funds' portfolio holdings and facilitate Commission oversight of money market funds. Preparing a report on Form N-MFP is a collection of information under the PRA.\textsuperscript{1085} This new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1086} The Commission staff estimates that 586 money market funds are required to file reports on Form N-MFP on a monthly basis.\textsuperscript{1087}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Discussion of Proposed Amendments}

For the reasons discussed in detail in section III.H above, we are proposing a number of amendments to Form N-MFP which would include new and amended collections of information. These changes include:

\textit{Structural Changes to Form N-MFP}. The proposed amendments would renumber the items of Form N-MFP to separate the items into four separate sections to allow Commission staff to reference, add or delete items in the future without having to re-number all subsequent items in the form.\textsuperscript{1088} We expect that these modifications would be made regardless of what action, if any, we take regarding the proposed alternatives to money market reform.

\textit{Amendments Related to Rule 2a-7 Reforms}. The proposed amendments would make a number of conforming changes to reflect the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 under either

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For purposes of the PRA analysis, the current burden associated with the requirements of rule 30b1-7 is included in the collection of information requirements of Form N-MFP.
\item See supra note 994.
\item This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month ended February 28, 2013.
\item See Proposed Form N-MFP. The proposed four sections are: (i) general information; (ii) information about each series of the fund; (iii) information about each class of the fund; and (iv) information about portfolio securities.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
alternative proposal. Our proposed amendments would also delete or modify items related to amortized cost and shadow prices that would no longer be applicable under either proposal.

New Reporting Requirements. We are proposing a number of new reporting requirements designed to improve the Commission’s and others ability to monitor money market funds. The proposed amendments would amend Form N-MFP to require the following new items: (1) the Legal Entity Identifier ("LEI") of the registrant (if available); (2) contact information for the person authorized to receive information and respond to questions about Form N-MFP; (3) in addition to the CUSIP for each security, the LEI that corresponds to each security and at least one other security identifier; (4) the level measurement (level 1, level 2, level 3) each security valuation is based upon in the fair value hierarchy under U.S. GAAP, the amount of cash held, the total value of the fund’s “daily liquid assets” and “weekly liquid assets” reported as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported, the weekly gross subscriptions and weekly gross redemptions for each share class as of the close of business for each Friday during the month reported, and whether a security is a “daily liquid asset” or “weekly liquid asset;” (5) whether any person paid for or waived all or part of the fund’s operating expenses or management fees and the total percentage of shares outstanding held by the 20 largest shareholders of record; and (6) additional information about certain types of securities held by the fund. Finally, the proposed amendments would include new disclosure items regarding each security held by the fund series, and sold by the fund series, reported separately for each lot purchased. We expect that these modifications would be made regardless of what action, if any, we take regarding the proposed alternative to money market reform.

Clarifying Amendments. The proposed amendments to Form N-MFP would also include amendments to the current instructions and items of Form N-MFP designed to: (1) clarify in the
general instructions to Form N-MFP that a fund may report information on Form N-MFP as of
the last business day or any later calendar day of the month; (2) clarify in the definition of
“master-feeder fund” that “Feeder Fund” includes unregistered funds; (3) cross reference WAM
and WAL as used in Form N-MFP with those terms as defined in rule 2a-7; (4) clarify that
disclosure in Part B (Class-Level Information about the Fund) is required for each class of the
series, regardless of the number of shares outstanding in the class; (5) clarify the required
disclosure related to repurchase agreements, and (6) remove the reference to disclosure of the
coupon or yield from the requirement that funds disclose the title of the issue. We expect that
these modifications would be made regardless of what action, if any, we take regarding the
proposed alternative to money market reform.

b. Current Burden

The current approved collection of information for Form N-MFP is 45,214 annual
aggregate hours and $4,424,480 in external costs.

c. Change in Burden

Staff understands that approximately 35% of the 586\(^{1089}\) (for a total of 205\(^{1090}\)) money
market funds that report information on Form N-MFP license a software solution from a third
party that is used to assist the funds to prepare and file the required information. Staff also
understands that approximately 65% of the 586\(^{1091}\) (for a total of 381) money market funds that
report information on Form N-MFP retain the services of a third party to provide data

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\(^{1089}\) This estimate is based on staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month
ended February 28, 2013.

\(^{1090}\) The staff estimated this 35% in the current burden. This estimate is based on the following calculation:
586 funds \(\times 35\% = 205\) funds.

\(^{1091}\) The staff estimated this 65% in the current burden. This estimate is based on the following calculation:
586 funds \(\times 65\% = 381\) funds.
aggregation and validation services as part of the preparation and filing of reports on Form N-MFP on behalf of the fund. Staff estimates that, in the first year, each fund (regardless of whether the fund licenses the software or uses a third-party service provider) will incur an additional average annual burden of 85 hours, at a time cost of $22,045 per fund,\textsuperscript{1092} to prepare and file the report on Form N-MFP (as proposed) and an average of approximately 60 additional burden hours (five hours per fund, per filing), at a time cost of $15,562 per fund\textsuperscript{1093} each year thereafter.

Staff also understands that software service providers (whether provided by a licensor or third-party service provider) are likely to incur additional external costs to modify their software and may pass those costs down to money market funds in the form of higher annual licensing fees. Although we do not have the information necessary to provide a point estimate of the external costs or the extent to which the software service providers will pass down any external costs to funds, we can estimate a range of costs, from 5% to 10% of current annual licensing fees. Accordingly, staff estimates that 35% of funds (205 funds) would pay $336 in additional external licensing costs each year and 65% of funds (381 funds) would pay $800 in additional

\textsuperscript{1092} This estimate is based on the following calculations: [30 hours for the initial monthly filing at a total cost of $7,800 per fund (8 hours x $243 blended average hourly rate for a financial reporting manager ($294 per hour) and fund senior accountant ($192 per hour) = $1,944 per fund) + (4 hours x $155 per hour for an intermediate accountant = $620 per fund) + (6 hours x $314 per hour for a senior database administrator = $1,884 per fund) + (4 hours x $300 for a senior portfolio manager = $1,200 per fund) + (8 hours x $269 per hour for a compliance manager = $2,152 per fund)] + [55 hours (5 hours per fund x 11 monthly filings) at a total cost of $14,245 per fund ($259 average cost per fund per burden hour x 55 hours)]. The additional average annual burden per fund for the first year is 85 hours (30 hours (initial monthly filing) + 55 hours (remaining 11 monthly filings)) and the additional average cost burden per fund for the first year is $22,045 ($7,800 (initial monthly filing) + $14,245 (remaining 11 monthly filings) = $22,045).

\textsuperscript{1093} This estimate is based on the following calculations: (16 hours x $243 blended average hourly rate for a financial reporting manager ($294 per hour) and fund senior accountant ($192 per hour) = $3,888 per fund) + (9 hours x $155 per hour for an intermediate accountant = $1,395 per fund) + (13 hours x $314 per hour for a senior database administrator = $4,082 per fund) + (9 hours x $300 for a senior portfolio manager = $2,700 per fund) + (13 hours x $269 per hour for a compliance manager = $3,497 per fund) = 60 hours (16 + 9 + 13 + 9 + 13) at a total cost of $15,562 per fund ($3,888 + $1,395 + $4,082 + $2,700 + $3,497). Therefore, the additional average cost per fund per burden hour is approximately $259 ($15,562 / 60 burden hours).
Staff therefore estimates that our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP would result in a first-year aggregate additional 49,810 burden hours at a total time cost of $12.9 million plus $373,680 in total external costs for all funds, and 35,160 burden hours at a total time cost of $9.1 million plus $373,680 in total external costs for all funds each year hereafter. Amortizing these additional hourly and cost burdens over three years results in an average annual aggregate burden of approximately 40,043 hours at a total time cost of $10.4 million plus $373,680 in external costs for all funds. Finally, staff estimates that our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP would result in a total aggregate annual collection of information burden of 85,257 hours and $4,798,160 in external costs.

4. Rule 30b-1-8 and Form N-CR

a. Discussion of New Reporting Requirements

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1094 Staff estimates that the annual licensing fee for 35% of money market funds is $3,360: a 5% to 10% increase - $168 - $336 in increased costs; staff estimates that the annual licensing fee for 65% of money market funds is $8,000: a 5% to 10% increase = $400 - $800 in increased costs.

1095 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 586 funds x 85 hours = 49,810 burden hours in year 1.

1096 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 586 funds x $22,045 annual cost per fund in the initial year = $12.9 million.

1097 This estimate is based on the following calculation: (205 funds x $336 additional external costs) + (381 funds x $800 additional external costs) = $373,680.

1098 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 586 funds x 60 hours per fund = 35,160 hours.

1099 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 586 funds x $15,562 annual cost per fund in subsequent years = $9.1 million.

1100 See supra note 1097.

1101 This estimate is based on the following calculation: (49,810 hours (year 1) + 35,160 hours (year 2) + 35,160 hours (year 3)) ÷ 3 = 40,043 hours; ($12.9 million (year 1) + $9.1 million (year 2) + $9.1 million (year 3)) ÷ 3 = $10.4 million in time costs; + ($373,680 (year 1) + $373,680 (year 2) + $373,680 (year 3)) ÷ 3 = $373,680 million in external costs.

1102 This estimate is based on the following calculation: current approved burden of 45,214 hours + 40,043 in additional burden hours as a result of our proposed amendments = 85,257 hours.

1103 This estimate is based on the following calculation: current approved burden of $4,424,480 in external costs + $373,680 in additional external costs as a result of our proposed amendments = $4,798,160.
As outlined above, proposed new rule 30b1-8 would require money market funds to file new Form N-CR with the Commission when certain events occur. Similar to Form 8-K under the Exchange Act, Form N-CR would require disclosure, by means of a current report filed with the Commission, of certain specific reportable events. Under the floating NAV alternative, the information reported on Form N-CR would include instances of portfolio security default, sponsor support of funds, and certain significant deviations in net asset value. This requirement is a collection of information under the PRA, and is designed to enhance the Commission’s oversight of money market funds and its ability to respond to market events. This new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.

b. Estimated Burden

The staff estimates that the Commission would receive, in the aggregate, an average of 20 reports per year filed in response to an event specified on Part B ("Default or Event of Insolvency of Portfolio Security Issuer"), an average of 40 reports per year filed in response

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1104 17 CFR 249.308.
1105 See proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Parts A – D; see also section III.G.1.
1106 See supra note 994.
1107 Commission staff estimates this figure based in part by reference to our current estimate of an average of 20 notifications to the Commission of an event of default or insolvency that money market funds currently file pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(7)(iii) each year. See Submission for OMB Review, Comment Request, Extension: Rule 2a-7, OMB Control No. 3235-0268, Securities and Exchange Commission [77 Fed. Reg. 236 (Dec. 7, 2012)].
1108 Commission staff estimates this figure based in part by reference to our current estimate of an average of 25 notifications to the Commission of certain security purchases that money market funds currently file in reliance on rule 17a-9 each year. See Submission for OMB Review, Comment Request, Extension: Rule 2a-7, OMB Control No. 3235-0268, Securities and Exchange Commission [77 Fed. Reg. 236 (Dec. 7, 2012)]. Because money market funds would be required to file a report in response to an event specified on Part C
to an event specified on Part C ("Provision of Financial Support to Fund"), and an average of 1 report filed every 6 years\textsuperscript{1109} in response to an event specified on Part D ("Deviation Between Current Net Asset Value Per Share and Intended Stable Price Per Share") of Form N-CR.

When filing a report on Form N-CR,\textsuperscript{1110} staff estimates that a fund would spend on average approximately 4 hours\textsuperscript{1111} of an in-house attorney's and one hour of in-house accountant's time to prepare, review and submit Form N-CR, at a total time cost of $1,708.\textsuperscript{1112} Accordingly, in the aggregate, staff estimates that compliance with new rule 30b1-8 and Form N-CR would result in a total annual burden of approximately 301 burden hours and total annual time costs of approximately $102,765.\textsuperscript{1113} Given an estimated 586 money market funds that would be required to comply with new rule 30b1-8 and Form N-CR,\textsuperscript{1114} this would result in an annual burden of approximately 0.51 burden hours and annual time costs of approximately $175 on a per-fund basis. Staff estimates that there will be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

\textsuperscript{1109} Staff currently estimates that on average, one money market fund would break the buck and liquidate every six years. See supra note 1082.

\textsuperscript{1110} For purposes of this estimate the staff expects that it would take approximately the same amount of time to prepare and file a report on Form N-CR, regardless under which Part of Form N-CR it is filed.

\textsuperscript{1111} This estimate is derived in part from our current PRA estimate for Form 8-K.

\textsuperscript{1112} This estimate is based on the following calculations: (4 hours x $379/hour for an attorney = $1,516), plus (1 hour x $192/hour for a fund senior accountant = $192), for a combined total of 5 hours and total time costs of $1,708.

\textsuperscript{1113} This estimate is based on the following calculations: (20 reports filed per year in respect of Part B) + (40 reports filed per year in respect of Part C) + (0.167 reports filed per year in respect of Part D) = 60.167 reports filed per year. 60.167 reports filed per year x 5 hours per report = approximately 301 total annual burden hours. 60.167 reports filed per year x $1,708 in costs per report = $102,765 total annual costs.

\textsuperscript{1114} This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month ended February 28, 2013. For purposes of this PRA, the staff assumes that the universe of money market funds affected by the amendments to rule 482(b)(4) would be the same as the current universe for Form N-MFP.
5.

**Rule 34b-1(a)**

Rule 34b-1 under the Act is an antifraud provision governing sales material that accompanies or follows the delivery of a statutory prospectus. Among other things, rule 34b-1 deems to be materially misleading any advertising material by a money market fund required to be filed with the Commission by section 24(b) of the Act that includes performance data, unless such advertising also includes the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures already discussed in section IV.A.6 below. Because we are amending the wording of the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures, rule 34b-1(a) is indirectly affected by our proposed amendments. However, we are proposing no changes to rule 34b-1(a) itself.

We already account for the burdens associated with the wording changes to the risk disclosures in money market fund advertising when discussing our amendments to rule 482(b)(4).\(^{1115}\) By complying with our amendments to rule 482(b)(4), money market funds would also automatically remain in compliance with respect to how our proposed changes would affect rule 34b-1(a). Therefore, any burdens associated with rule 34b-1(a) as a result of our proposed amendment to rule 482(b)(4) are already accounted for in section IV.A.6 below.

6. **Rule 482**

Rule 482 applies to advertisements or other sales materials with respect to securities of an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act that is selling or proposing to sell its securities pursuant to a registration statement that has been filed under the Investment Company Act.\(^{1116}\) In particular, rule 482(b) describes the information that is required to be included in an advertisement, including a cautionary statement under rule 482(b)(4) disclosing

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\(^{1115}\) *See supra* section IV.A.6.

\(^{1116}\) *See rule 482(a).*
the particular risks associated with investing in a money market fund. This new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.

a. Discussion of the Proposed Amendments

If implemented, the floating NAV alternative would change the investment expectations and experience of money market fund investors, rendering the current rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures in advertisements for money market funds out of date. Accordingly, we are proposing to amend the particular wording of the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures in money market funds' advertisements (including requiring that they be disclosed prominently on a fund's website).

b. Change in Burden

The current approved collection of information for rule 482 is 301,179 annual aggregate hours. Given that the proposed amendments are one-time updates to the wording of the risk disclosures already required under current rule 482(b)(4), staff estimates that, once funds have made these one-time changes, the amendments to rule 482(b)(4) would only require money market funds to incur the same costs and hour burdens on an ongoing basis as under current rule 482(b)(4).

For each money market fund, staff estimates that internal marketing staff and in-house

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1117 See rule 482(b)(4).
1118 See supra note 994.
1119 With respect to non-government money market funds and non-retail money market funds, see proposed (FNAV) rule 482(b)(4)(i). With respect to government money market funds and retail money market funds, see proposed (FNAV) rule 482(b)(4)(ii).
counsel would spend, on a one-time basis, an average of 4 hours to update and review the wording of the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures for each fund’s printed advertising and sales materials, resulting in one-time time costs of $1,162. In addition, for each money market fund, staff estimates that internal information technology staff and in-house counsel would spend, on a one-time basis, an average of 1.25 hours to post and review the wording of the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures on a fund’s website, resulting in one-time time costs of approximately $302. In the aggregate, staff estimates that each money market fund would spend a total of 5.25 hours and incur total time costs of approximately $1,464 on a one-time basis to comply with the amendments to rule 482(b)(4). Staff estimates that there would be no external costs incurred in complying with the proposed amendment.

Using an estimate of 586 money market funds that would be required to comply with the amendments to rule 482(b)(4), staff estimates that in the aggregate, these proposed

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1120 Under the floating NAV alternative, the compliance period for updating rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures would be 2 years. The staff understands that money market funds commonly update and issue new advertising materials on a relatively periodic and frequent basis. Accordingly, given the extended compliance period proposed, the staff expects that funds should be able to amend the wording of their rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures as part of one of their general updates of their advertising materials. Similarly, the staff believes that funds could update the corresponding risk disclosures on their websites when performing other periodic website maintenance. The staff therefore accounts only for the incremental change in burden that amending the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures would cause in the context of a larger update to a fund’s advertising materials or website.

1121 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 3 hours spent by a marketing manager to update the wording of the risk disclosures for each fund’s marketing materials + 1 hour spent by an attorney reviewing the amended rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures. Accordingly, the estimated costs are based on the following: $261/hour for a marketing manager x 3 hours = $783, plus $379/hour for an attorney x 1 hour = $379, for a combined total of $1,162.

1122 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour spent by a webmaster to update a fund’s website’s risk disclosures, plus 15 minutes spent by an attorney reviewing the amended risk disclosures. The estimated costs are based on the following calculations: $207/hour for a webmaster x 1 hour = $207, plus $378/hour for an attorney x 0.25 hours = approximately $95, for a combined total of approximately $302.

1123 This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month ended February 28, 2013. For purposes of this PRA, the staff assumes that the universe of money market funds affected by the amendments to rule 482(b)(4) would be the same as the current universe for Form N-MFP.
amendments would result in a total one-time burden of approximately 3,077 burden hours\textsuperscript{1124} at a total one-time time cost of approximately $857,904.\textsuperscript{1125} Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 1,026 burden hours at a total annual time cost of approximately $285,968 for all funds.

7. \textit{Form N-1A}

We are also proposing amendments to Form N-1A in connection with our alternative proposal for money market funds to move to a floating NAV. These new collections of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1126}

\textbf{a. Discussion of Proposed Amendments}

The move to a floating NAV would be designed to change fundamentally the investment expectations and experience of money market fund investors. Because of the significance of this change, we propose to require that each money market fund, other than a government or retail fund, include a new bulleted statement disclosing the particular risks associated with investing in a floating NAV money market fund in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used). We also propose to include wording designed to inform investors about the primary general risks of investing in money market funds in this

\textsuperscript{1124} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 5.25 burden hours per fund x 586 funds = approximately 3,077 total burden hours.

\textsuperscript{1125} This estimate is based on the following calculation: approximately $1,464 total costs per fund x 586 funds = approximately $857,904 total costs.

\textsuperscript{1126} \textit{See supra} note 994.
bulleted disclosure statement. With respect to money market funds that are not government or retail funds, we propose to remove current requirements that money market funds state that they seek to preserve the value of shareholder investments at $1.00 per share. This disclosure, which was adopted to inform investors in money market funds that a stable net asset value does not indicate that the fund will be able to maintain a stable NAV, will not be relevant once funds are required to “float” their net asset value. We propose to require government and retail funds, which the floating NAV proposal would exempt from the floating NAV requirement, to include a new bulleted disclosure statement in the summary section of the fund’s statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used) that does not discuss the risks of a floating NAV, but that would be designed to inform investors about the risks of investing in money market funds generally.

The proposed requirement that money market funds transition to a floating NAV would entail certain additional tax- and operations-related disclosure, which disclosure requirements would not necessitate rule and form amendments. However, we expect that, pursuant to current disclosure requirements, floating NAV money market funds would include disclosure in their prospectuses about the tax consequences to shareholders of buying, holding, exchanging, and selling the shares of the floating NAV fund. In addition, we expect that a floating NAV money market fund would update its prospectus and SAI disclosure regarding the purchase, redemption, and pricing of fund shares, to reflect any procedural changes resulting from the fund’s use of a floating NAV.

As discussed above in section III.A.8, while money market funds are currently required to include a similar disclosure statement on their advertisements and sales materials, we propose amending this disclosure statement to emphasize that money market fund sponsors are not obligated to provide financial support, and that money market funds may not be an appropriate investment option for investors who cannot tolerate losses.
For the reasons discussed above in section III.F.1.a, we are also proposing amendments to Form N-1A that would require all money market funds to provide SAI disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate. Specifically, the proposed amendments would require each money market fund to disclose any occasion during the last ten years on which an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, provided any form of financial support to the fund.

b. Change in Burden

The current approved collection of information for Form N-1A is 1,578,689 annual aggregate hours and the total annual external cost burden is $122,730,472. The respondents to this collection of information are open-end management investment companies registered with the Commission. The entities that would be affected by the proposed amendments to Form N-1A discussed above include all money market funds. However, various aspects of these amendments would only affect floating NAV money market funds, or alternatively would only affect government and retail money market funds relying on the proposed government fund exemption and retail fund exemption from the floating NAV requirement. For purposes of the PRA, staff estimates that, of the estimated 586 total money market funds,1128 165 funds would rely on the proposed government fund exemption,1129 and 100 funds would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption.1130

The burdens associated with the proposed amendments to Form N-1A include one-time

1128 This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month ended February 28, 2013.

1129 This estimate is based on the number of money market funds that self-reported as Government/Agency or Treasury funds on Form N-MFP as of February 28, 2013.

1130 See supra note 995.
burdens as well as ongoing burdens. Commission staff estimates that each floating NAV money market fund would incur a one-time burden of 5 hours,\textsuperscript{1131} at a time cost of $1,480,\textsuperscript{1132} to draft and finalize the required disclosure and amend its registration statement. In aggregate, staff estimates that floating NAV money market funds would incur a one-time burden of 1,605 hours,\textsuperscript{1133} at a time cost of $475,080,\textsuperscript{1134} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements. In addition, Commission staff estimates that each floating NAV money market fund would incur an ongoing burden of 0.5 hours, at a time cost of $148,\textsuperscript{1135} each year to review and update the SAI disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate. In aggregate, staff estimates that floating NAV money market funds would incur an annual burden of approximately 161 hours,\textsuperscript{1136} at a time cost of $47,656,\textsuperscript{1137} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

Amortizing these one-time and ongoing hour and cost burdens over three years results in

\textsuperscript{1131} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour to update registration statement to include bulleted disclosure statement + 3 hours to update registration statement to include tax- and operations-related disclosure about floating NAV + 1 hour to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by the fund = 5 hours.

\textsuperscript{1132} This estimate is based on the following calculations: (1 hour (to update registration statement to include bulleted disclosure statement) x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $296) + (3 hours (to update registration statement to include tax- and operations-related disclosure about floating NAV) x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $888) + (1 hour (to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by the fund) x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $296 = $1,480.

\textsuperscript{1133} This estimate is based on the following calculations: 5 hours x 321 funds (586 total money market funds - 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption - 100 funds that would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption) = 1,605 hours.

\textsuperscript{1134} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1,605 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $475,080.

\textsuperscript{1135} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 0.5 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $148.

\textsuperscript{1136} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 0.5 hours x 321 funds (586 total money market funds - 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption - 100 funds that would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption) = approximately 161 hours.

\textsuperscript{1137} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 161 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $47,656.
an average annual increased burden of approximately 2 hours per floating NAV fund,\textsuperscript{138} at a
time cost of $592 per fund.\textsuperscript{139} In aggregate, staff estimates that floating NAV money market
funds would incur an average annual increased burden of 642 hours,\textsuperscript{140} at a time cost of
$190,032,\textsuperscript{141} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

Commission staff estimates that each government or retail money market fund would
incure a one-time burden of 2 hours,\textsuperscript{142} at a time cost of $592,\textsuperscript{143} to draft and finalize the required
disclosure and amend its registration statement. In aggregate, staff estimates that government
and retail money market funds would incur a one-time burden of 530 hours,\textsuperscript{144} at a time cost of
$156,880,\textsuperscript{145} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements. In addition,
Commission staff estimates that each government or retail money market fund would incur an
ongoing burden of 0.5 hours, at a time cost of $148,\textsuperscript{146} each year to review and update the SAI

\textsuperscript{138} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 5 burden hours (year 1) + 0.5 burden hours (year 2) +
0.5 burden hours (year 3) ÷ 3 = 2 hours.

\textsuperscript{139} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $1,480 (year 1 monetized burden hours) + $148 (year 2
monetized burden hours) + $148 (year 3 monetized burden hours) ÷ 3 = $592.

\textsuperscript{140} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 hours x 321 funds (586 total money market funds –
165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption – 100 funds that would rely on the
proposed retail fund exemption) = 642 hours.

\textsuperscript{141} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 642 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance
attorney and a senior programmer) = $190,032.

\textsuperscript{142} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour to update registration statement to include
bulleted disclosure statement + 1 hour to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial
support received by the fund = 2 hours.

\textsuperscript{143} This estimate is based on the following calculation: (1 hour (to update registration statement to include
bulleted disclosure statement) x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) =
$296) + (1 hour (to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by
the fund) x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $296) = $592.

\textsuperscript{144} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 hours x 265 funds (165 funds that would rely on the
proposed government fund exemption + 100 funds that would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption) =
530 hours.

\textsuperscript{145} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 530 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance
attorney and a senior programmer) = $156,880.

\textsuperscript{146} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 0.5 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance
attorney and a senior programmer) = $148.
disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate. In aggregate, staff estimates that government and retail money market funds would incur an annual burden of approximately 133 hours,\textsuperscript{1147} at a time cost of $39,368,\textsuperscript{1148} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

Amortizing these one-time and ongoing hour and cost burdens over three years results in an average annual increased burden of 1 hour per government or retail fund,\textsuperscript{1149} at a time cost of $296.\textsuperscript{1150} In aggregate, staff estimates that government and retail fund money market funds would incur an average annual increased burden of 265 hours,\textsuperscript{1151} at a time cost of $78,440,\textsuperscript{1152} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

In total, the staff estimates that all money market funds (floating NAV funds, as well as government and retail funds that rely on the proposed government and retail exemptions) would incur an annual increased burden of 907 hours,\textsuperscript{1153} at a time cost of $268,472,\textsuperscript{1154} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements. Additionally, the staff estimates that there

\textsuperscript{1147} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 0.5 hours \times 265 funds (165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption + 100 funds that would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption) = approximately 133 hours.

\textsuperscript{1148} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 133 hours \times $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $39,368.

\textsuperscript{1149} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 burden hours (year 1) + 0.5 burden hours (year 2) + 0.5 burden hours (year 3) \div 3 = 1 hour.

\textsuperscript{1150} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $592 (year 1 monetized burden hours) + $148 (year 2 monetized burden hours) + $148 (year 3 monetized burden hours) \div 3 = $296.

\textsuperscript{1151} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour \times 265 funds (165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption + 100 funds that would rely on the proposed retail fund exemption) = 265 hours.

\textsuperscript{1152} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 265 hours \times $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $78,440.

\textsuperscript{1153} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 642 hours + 265 hours = 907 hours. \textit{See supra} notes 1140 and 1151.

\textsuperscript{1154} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $190,032 + $78,440 = $268,472. \textit{See supra} notes 1141 and 1152.
would be one-time aggregate external costs (in the form of printing costs) of $3,134,588

associated with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements; amortizing these external
costs over three years results in annual aggregate external costs of $1,044,863.\footnote{1355}

8. Advisers Act Rule 204(b)-1 and Form PF

Advisers Act rule 204(b)-1 requires SEC-registered private fund advisers that have at
least $150 million in private fund assets under management to report certain information
regarding the private funds they advise on Form PF. The rule implements sections 204 and 211
of the Advisers Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, which direct the Commission (and the
CFTC) to supply FSOC with information for use in monitoring systemic risk by establishing
reporting requirements for private fund advisers. Form PF divides respondents into groups based
on their size and the types of private funds they manage, with some groups of advisers required
to file more information than others or more frequently than others. Large liquidity fund
advisers—the only group of advisers that would be affected by today’s proposed amendments to
Form PF—must provide information concerning their liquidity funds on Form PF each quarter.
Form PF contains a collection of information under the PRA.\footnote{1356} This new collection of

\footnote{1355}{We expect that a fund that must include disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has
received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate would need to add 1-4 pages of new disclosure
to its registration statement. Adding this new disclosure would therefore increase the number of pages in,
and change the printing costs of, the fund’s registration statement.

Commission staff calculates the external costs associated with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure
requirements as follows: 2.5 pages (mid-point of 1 page and 4 pages) x $0.045 per page x 27,863,000
money market fund registration statements printed annually = $3,134,588 one-time aggregate external
costs. Amortizing these external costs over three years results in aggregate annual external costs of
$1,044,863. Our estimate of potential printing costs ($0.045 per page: $0.035 for ink + $0.010 for paper) is
based on data provided by Lexecon Inc. in response to Investment Company Act Release No. 27182 (Dec:
8, 2005) [70 FR 74598 (Dec. 15, 2005)]. \textit{See} Lexecon Inc. Letter (Feb. 13, 2006), \textit{available at}
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71005/dbgross9433.pdf. For purposes of this analysis, our best
estimate of the number of money market fund registration statements printed annually is based on
27,863,000 money market fund shareholder accounts in 2012. \textit{See} Investment Company Institute, \textit{2013

\footnote{1356}{For purposes of the PRA analysis, the current burden associated with the requirements of rule 204(b)-1 is
included in the collection of information requirements of Form PF.}
information would be mandatory for large liquidity fund advisers, and would be kept confidential to the extent discussed above in section III.I. Based on data filed on Form PF and Form ADV, Commission staff estimates that, as of February 28, 2013, there were 25 large liquidity fund advisers subject to this quarterly filing requirement that collectively advised 43 liquidity funds.

a. Discussion of Proposed Amendments

Under the proposed amendments to Form PF, for each liquidity fund it manages, a large liquidity fund adviser would be required to provide, quarterly and with respect to each portfolio security, the following additional information for each month of the reporting period:

- the name of the issuer;
- the title of the issue;
- the CUSIP number;
- the legal entity identifier, or LEI, if available;
- at least one of the following other identifiers, in addition to the CUSIP and LEI, if available: ISIN, CIK, or any other unique identifier;
- the category of investment (e.g., Treasury debt, U.S. government agency debt, asset-backed commercial paper, certificate of deposit, repurchase agreement1157);
- if the rating assigned by a credit rating agency played a substantial role in the liquidity fund’s (or its adviser’s) evaluation of the quality, maturity or liquidity of the security, the name of each credit rating agency and the rating each credit rating agency assigned to the security;

1157 For repurchase agreements we are also proposing to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide additional information regarding the underlying collateral and whether the repurchase agreement is “open” (i.e., whether the repurchase agreement has no specified end date and, by its terms, will be extended or “rolled” each business day (or at another specified period) unless the investor chooses to terminate it).
the maturity date used to calculate weighted average maturity;

- the maturity date used to calculate weighted average life;

- the final legal maturity date;

- whether the instrument is subject to a demand feature, guarantee, or other enhancements, and information about any of these features and their providers;

- for each security, reported separately for each lot purchased, the total principal amount; the purchase date(s); the yield at purchase and as of the end of each month during the reporting period for floating or variable rate securities; and the purchase price as a percentage of par;

- the value of the fund’s position in the security and, if the fund uses the amortized cost method of valuation, the amortized cost value, in both cases with and without any sponsor support;

- the percentage of the liquidity fund’s assets invested in the security;

- whether the security is categorized as a level 1, 2, or 3 asset or liability on Form PF;\note{1158}

- whether the security is an illiquid security, a daily liquid asset, and/or a weekly liquid asset, as defined in rule 2a-7; and

- any explanatory notes.\note{1159}

Our proposed amendments to Form PF are designed, as discussed in more detail in section III.I above, to assist FSOC in its monitoring and assessment of systemic risk; to provide

\note{1158} See Question 14 of Form PF. See also infra notes 758-761 and accompanying and following text.

\note{1159} We also propose to define the following terms in Form PF: conditional demand feature; credit rating agency; demand feature; guarantee; guarantor; and illiquid security. See proposed Form PF: Glossary of Terms.
information for FSOC’s use in determining whether and how to deploy its regulatory tools; and to collect data for use in our own regulatory program. The additional information we are proposing to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide with respect to the liquidity funds they advise is virtually the same information that money market funds must file on Form N-MFP as we propose to amend it, and should be familiar to large liquidity fund advisers because, as of February 28, 2013, virtually all of the 25 large liquidity funds advisers already manage a money market fund or have a related person that manages a money market fund. Because advisers would be required to report this information about their portfolio holdings, the proposed amendments to Form PF also would remove current Questions 56 and 57 on Form PF, which generally require large liquidity fund advisers to provide information about their liquidity funds’ portfolio holdings broken out by asset class (rather than security by security). We also proposing to require large liquidity fund advisers to provide information about any securities sold by their liquidity funds during the reporting period, including sale and purchase prices. Finally, the amendments would require large liquidity fund advisers to identify any money market fund advised by the adviser or its related persons that pursues substantially the same investment objective and strategy and invests side by side in substantially the same positions as a liquidity fund the adviser reports on Form PF.

b. Current Burden

The current approved collection of information for Form PF is 258,000 annual aggregate hours and $25,684,000 in aggregate external costs. In estimating these total approved burdens, Commission staff estimated that the amortized average annual burden of Form PF for large liquidity fund advisers in particular would be 290 hours per large liquidity fund adviser for each of the first three years, resulting in an aggregate amortized annual burden of 23,200 hours for
large liquidity fund advisers for each of the first three years. Staff estimated that the external cost burden would range from $0 to $50,000 per large private fund adviser, which resulted in aggregate estimated external costs attributable to large liquidity fund advisers of $4,000,000. The external cost estimates also included estimates for filing fees, which were $150 per annual filing and $150 per quarterly filing, resulting in annual filings costs for large liquidity fund advisers of $48,000.161

c. Change in Burden

Our staff estimates that the paperwork burdens associated with Form N-MFP (as we propose to amend it) are representative of the burdens that large liquidity fund advisers could incur as a result of our proposed amendments to Form PF because advisers would be required to file on Form PF virtually the same information money market funds would file on Form N-MFP as we propose to amend it and because, as discussed above, virtually all of the 25 large liquidity funds advisers already manage a money market fund or have a related person that manages a money market fund. Therefore, we believe that large liquidity fund advisers—when required to compile and report for their liquidity funds generally the same information virtually all of them already report for their money market funds—likely will use the same (or comparable) staff and/or external service providers to provide portfolio holdings information on Form N-MFP and Form PF.

Our staff accordingly estimates that our proposed amendments to Form PF would result in paperwork burden hours and external costs determined as follows. First, as discussed in the

160 See Form PF Adopting Release, supra note 799, at n.411 (“290 burden hours on average per year x 80 large hedge fund advisers = 23,200 hours.”).

161 This estimate is based on the following calculation: ($150 quarterly filing fee x 4 quarters) x 80 large liquidity fund advisers) = $48,000.
PRA analysis for our amendments to Form N-MFP, our staff estimates that the average annual amortized burdens per money market fund imposed by Form N-MFP as we propose to amend it are 145 hours\textsuperscript{1162} and $8,187 in external costs.\textsuperscript{1163} Our staff estimates that large liquidity fund advisers would incur these burdens for each of their liquidity funds, for the reasons discussed above, and would incur a time cost of $36,730 associated with the 145 estimated burden hours.\textsuperscript{1164} Because our staff estimates that there were 25 large liquidity fund advisers that collectively advised 43 liquidity funds as of February 28, 2013 as discussed above, this would result in increased annual burdens per large liquidity fund adviser of 290 burden hours, at a total time cost of $73,460, and $16,374 in external costs.\textsuperscript{1165} This would result in increased aggregate

\textsuperscript{1162} As discussed in the PRA analysis for Form N-MFP, our staff estimates that Form N-MFP, as we propose to amend it, would result in an aggregate collection of information burden of 85,257 hours. \textit{See supra} note 1102 and accompanying text. Based on the staff's estimated 586 money market fund respondents, this results in a per fund annual burden of approximately 145 hours.

\textsuperscript{1163} As discussed in the PRA analysis for Form N-MFP, our staff estimates that Form N-MFP, as we propose to amend it, would result in an aggregate external cost burden of $4,798,160. \textit{See supra} note 1103. Based on the staff's estimated 586 money market fund respondents, this results in a per fund annual external cost burden of approximately $8,187.

\textsuperscript{1164} Our staff estimates, as discussed above, that large liquidity fund advisers are likely to use the same (or comparable) staff and/or external service providers to provide portfolio holdings information on Form N-MFP and Form PF. Accordingly, our staff estimates that large liquidity fund advisers would use the same professionals, and in comparable proportions (conservatively based on the professionals used for the Form N-MFP initial filings), for purposes of the staff's estimate of time costs associated with our proposed amendments to Form PF. \textit{See supra} note 1092. This results in the following estimated time cost for the staff's estimated 145 per liquidity fund hour burdens: (85 hours x $243 blended average hourly rate for a financial reporting manager ($294 per hour) and fund senior accountant ($192 per hour) = $20,655 per fund) + (10 hours x $155 per hour for an intermediate accountant = $1,550 per fund) + (17 hours x $314 per hour for a senior database administrator = $5,538 per fund) + (10 hours x $300 for a senior portfolio manager = $3,000 per fund) + (23 hours x $269 per hour for a compliance manager = $6,187 per fund) = $36,730.

\textsuperscript{1165} This estimate assumes for purposes of the PRA that each large liquidity fund adviser advises two large liquidity funds (43 total liquidity funds divided by 25 large liquidity fund advisers). Each large liquidity fund adviser therefore would incur the following burdens: 145 estimated burden hours per fund x 2 large liquidity funds = 290 burden hours per large liquidity fund adviser; $36,730 estimated time cost per fund x 2 large liquidity funds = $73,460 time cost per large liquidity fund adviser; and $8,187 estimated external costs per fund x 2 large liquidity funds = $16,374 external costs per large liquidity fund adviser.
burden hours across all large liquidity fund advisers of 7,250 burden hours,\textsuperscript{1166} at a time cost of 
$1,836,500,\textsuperscript{1167}$ and $409,350$ in external costs.\textsuperscript{1168} Finally, the aggregate paperwork burden for
Form PF under our proposed amendments therefore would be 249,300 burden hours\textsuperscript{1169} and 
$23,310,350$ in external costs.\textsuperscript{1170}

B. Alternative 2: Standby Liquidity Fees and Gates

As discussed above, we are proposing an alternative to our floating NAV proposal.

Under this alternative, we propose to require that, in the event that a money market fund’s 
weekly liquid assets fell below 15\% of its total assets, the money market fund would be required 
to institute a liquidity fee and permitted to impose a redemption gate.

\textsuperscript{1166} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 290 estimated additional burden hours per large 
liquidity fund adviser x 25 large liquidity fund advisers = 7,250.

\textsuperscript{1167} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $73,460 estimated time cost per large liquidity fund 
 adviser x 25 large liquidity fund advisers = $1,836,500.

\textsuperscript{1168} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $16,374 estimated external costs per large liquidity 
 fund adviser x 25 large liquidity fund advisers = $409,350.

\textsuperscript{1169} Form PF’s current approved burden includes 23,200 aggregate burden hours associated with large liquidity 
 fund advisers, based on 80 large liquidity fund advisers and an estimated 290 burden hours per large 
 liquidity fund adviser. Our amendments to Form PF would increase the estimated 290 burden hours per 
 large liquidity fund adviser by 290 hours, as discussed above, resulting in a total of 580 burden hours per 
 large liquidity fund adviser. Multiplying 580 by the current estimated number of 25 large liquidity fund 
advisers results in 14,500 burden hours attributable to large liquidity fund advisers, a 8,700 reduction from 
the approved burden hours attributable to large liquidity fund advisers. This therefore results in 249,300 
total burden hours for all of Form PF (current approved 258,000 burden hours - 8,700 reduction = 
249,300).

\textsuperscript{1170} Form PF’s current approved burden includes $25,684,000 in external costs, which includes $4,000,000 
 attributable to large liquidity fund advisers for certain costs ($50,000 per adviser), and $48,000 (or $600 per 
adviser) for filing fees, in both cases assuming 80 large liquidity fund adviser respondents. Form PF’s 
approved burden therefore includes a total of $4,048,000 in external costs attributable to large liquidity 
 fund advisers. Reducing these estimates to reflect our staff’s current estimate of 25 large liquidity fund 
adviser respondents results in costs of $1,250,000 (25 large liquidity fund advisers x $50,000 per adviser) 
and $15,000 (25 large liquidity fund advisers x $600), respectively, for an aggregate cost of $1,265,000. 
These costs, plus the additional external costs associated with our proposed amendments to Form PF 
($409,350 as estimated above), result in total external costs attributable to large liquidity fund advisers of 
$1,674,350, a reduction of $2,373,650 from the currently approved external costs attributable to large 
liquidity fund advisers. This therefore results in total external cost for all of Form PF of $23,310,350 
(current approved external cost burden of $25,684,000 - $2,373,650 reduction = $23,310,350).
1. **Rule 2a-7**
   
a. **Board Determinations**

   Under the proposed liquidity fees and gates proposal, if a money market fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 15% of total assets, the fund’s board may be required to make and document a number of determinations, when in the best interest of the fund, regarding the imposition of liquidity fees and gates, including (i) whether to impose the liquidity fee, and if so, what the amount of the liquidity fee should be (not to exceed 2%); (ii) whether to impose a redemption gate; (iii) when to remove a liquidity fee put in place (subject to other rule requirements); and (iv) when to lift a redemption gate put in place (subject to other rule requirements).1171 This requirement is a collection of information under the PRA, and is designed to ensure that a fund that imposes a liquidity fee or gate does so only when, as determined by the fund’s board, it is in the best interest of the fund to do so. This new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.1172

   As discussed above, staff analysis of Form N-MFP data shows that, between March 2011 and October 2012, four prime money market funds had weekly liquid assets below 15% of total assets, the trigger for board determinations regarding the imposition of liquidity fees and gates. Commission staff estimates that the four money market funds we estimate would satisfy the triggering event would spend, on an annual basis, (i) four hours of a fund attorney’s time to prepare materials for the board’s determinations, (ii) two hours for the board to review those

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1171 See Proposed (Fees and Gates) rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i), (ii).
1172 See supra note 994.
materials and make the required determinations, and (iii) one hour of a fund attorney's time per year, on average, to prepare the written records of such determinations.\textsuperscript{1173} Therefore, staff estimates that the average annual burden to prepare materials and written records for a board's required determinations would be approximately seven hours per fund\textsuperscript{1174} at a time cost of approximately $9,895 per fund.\textsuperscript{1175} Therefore, staff estimates the annual burden would be approximately 28 burden hours\textsuperscript{1176} and $39,580 in total time costs for all money market funds.\textsuperscript{1177} Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 9 hours and a time cost of $13,193 for all funds.\textsuperscript{1178} There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

\textit{b. Retail Exemption}

As discussed above in section III.B.5, we are not proposing a retail money market fund exemption from our liquidity fees and gates proposal. Accordingly, there would be no collection of information burden related to the retail exemption.

\textit{c. Asset-Backed Securities.}

As outlined above, we are proposing certain amendments relating to ABS securities that would be adopted if the first alternative (requiring money market funds to float their NAV per

\textsuperscript{1173} This estimate includes preparing and evaluating materials relevant to the determinations required in imposing (and removing) either or both liquidity fees and redemption gates. \textit{See supra} note 1171.

\textsuperscript{1174} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 4 hours to adopt + 2 hours for board review + 1 hour for record preparation = 7 hours per year.

\textsuperscript{1175} This estimate is based on the following calculation: [5 hours x $379 per hour for an attorney = $1,895] + [2 hours x $4,000 per hour for a board of 8 directors = $8,000] = $9,895.

\textsuperscript{1176} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 7 burden hours per money market fund x 4 funds = 28 total burden hours.

\textsuperscript{1177} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 4 money market funds x $9,895 in total costs per fund complex = $39,580.

\textsuperscript{1178} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 28 burden hours ÷ 3 = 9 average annual burden hours; $39,580 burden costs ÷ 3 = $13,193 average annual burden cost.
share) is adopted. 1179 Under the proposal, the board of directors would be required to adopt written procedures requiring periodic evaluation of its determination that the fund is not relying on an ABS sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity. We are also proposing that these amendments would be adopted if the liquidity fees and gates alternative is adopted. Therefore, staff estimates that, under the liquidity fees and gates alternative, the onetime burden to adopt written procedures regarding the periodic evaluation of determinations made by the fund as to ABS not subject to guarantees would be approximately 1,647 hours and $1.2 million in total time costs for all money market funds. Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 549 hours and time costs of $400,000 for all funds. In addition, staff estimates the annual burden to prepare materials and written records for a board’s required review of new and existing determinations would be approximately 732 burden hours and $940,071 in total time costs for all money market funds. Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 244 hours and time costs of $313,357 for all funds. There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

d. Notice to Commission

As outlined above, we propose to eliminate the requirements that money market funds provide electronic notice of any event of default or insolvency of a portfolio security and any purchase by a fund of a portfolio security by an affiliate in reliance on rule 17a-9.1180 We are also proposing that these amendments would be adopted if the second alternative requiring liquidity fees and gates is adopted. Therefore, staff estimates that the proposed amendment to eliminate

1179 See Section IV.A.1.b above.
1180 See supra section IV.A.1.c.
electronic notice of any event of default or insolvency would reduce the current collection of
information by approximately 10 hours annually, at a total time cost savings of $3,790. Staff
further estimates that the proposed amendment to eliminate electronic notification of a purchase
of a portfolio security in reliance on rule 17a-9 would reduce the current collection of
information by approximately 25 hours annually, at a total time cost savings of $9,475. 1181 There
would be no external cost savings associated with this collection of information.

e. Stress Testing

As outlined above, we are proposing amendments to the stress testing provision of rule
2a-7 to enhance the hypothetical events for which a fund (or its adviser) is required to test. The
amendments and enhancements we are proposing to the stress testing requirements would largely
be identical under either reform alternative we might adopt, except that for floating NAV money
market funds we would remove the standard to test against preserving a stable share price if we
were to adopt the floating NAV alternative, as discussed above in more detail. Therefore, staff
estimates that the aggregate one-time burden for all money market funds to implement the
proposed amendments to stress testing would be the same as under our floating NAV alternative
(8,464 hours at a total time cost of $3.9 million). Amortized over a three-year period, this would
result in an average annual burden of 2,821 burden hours and $1.3 million total time cost for all
funds. 1182 There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

f. Website Disclosure

We are proposing four amendments to the information money market funds are required
to disclose on their websites. These amendments would promote transparency of money market

1181 Id.

1182 See supra section IV.A.1.e note 1032 and accompanying text.
funds' risks and risk management by:

- Harmonizing the specific portfolio holdings information that rule 2a-7 currently requires funds to disclose on the fund's website with the corresponding portfolio holdings information proposed to be reported on Form N-MFP;\(^{1183}\)

- Requiring that a fund disclose on its website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the percentage of the fund’s total assets that are invested in daily and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows, as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months (which depiction must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day);\(^{1184}\)

- Requiring that a fund disclose on its website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the fund’s daily current NAV per share, as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months (which depiction must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day);\(^{1185}\) and

- Requiring a fund to disclose on its website substantially the same information that the fund is required to report to the Commission on Form N-CR regarding the provision of financial support to the fund, the imposition and removal of liquidity fees, and the suspension and resumption of fund redemptions.\(^{1186}\)

This new collection of information would be mandatory for money market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these

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\(^{1183}\) Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(i).

\(^{1184}\) Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(ii).

\(^{1185}\) Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iii).

\(^{1186}\) Proposed (FNAV) rule 2a-7(h)(10)(iv).
collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1187}

\textit{i. Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings Information}

As outlined above, we are proposing amendments to the portfolio holdings information that rule 2a-7 currently requires money market funds to disclose on the fund’s website to harmonize this information with the corresponding portfolio holdings information proposed to be reported on Form N-MFP. We are proposing substantially similar amendments under both the floating NAV alternative and the liquidity fees and gates alternative. Therefore, the burdens associated with the proposed amendments would be the same as those discussed in section IV.A.1.f.i above (7,032 aggregate hours per year, at a total aggregate time cost of $1,455,624). There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.


We are proposing to require money market funds to disclose on the fund’s website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the percentage of the fund’s total assets that are invested in daily and weekly liquid assets, as well as the fund’s net inflows or outflows, and to update this depiction each business day, as discussed above. We are proposing identical requirements under both the floating NAV alternative and the liquidity fees and gates alternative. Therefore, the burdens associated with the proposed requirements would be the same as those discussed in Section IV.A.1.f.ii above (26,175 aggregate hours per year, at a total aggregate time cost of $7,523,849). There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

\textit{iii. Disclosure of Daily Current NAV}

\textsuperscript{1187} \textit{See supra} note 994.
We are proposing to require a money market fund to disclose on the fund's website a schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the fund's daily current NAV as of the end of the previous business day, and to update this depiction each business day, as discussed above. We are proposing substantially similar requirements under both the floating NAV alternative and the liquidity fees and gates alternative. Therefore, the burdens associated with the proposed requirements would be the same as those discussed in Section IV.A.1.f.iii above (26,175 aggregate hours per year, at a total aggregate time cost of $7,523,849). There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

iv. Disclosure Regarding Financial Support Received by the Fund, the Imposition and Removal of Liquidity Fees, and the Suspension and Resumption of Fund Redemptions

As outlined above, we are proposing to require money market fund to disclose on the fund's website substantially the same information that the fund is required to report to the Commission on Form N-CR regarding the provision of financial support to the fund. We are proposing identical requirements under both the floating NAV alternative and the liquidity fees and gates alternative. Therefore, the burdens associated with these proposed requirements would be the same as those discussed in Section IV.A.1.f.iv above (40 aggregate hours per year, at a total aggregate time cost of $8,280). There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

In connection with the fees and gates alternative, we are also proposing to require money market funds to disclose on the fund's website substantially the same information that the fund is required to report to the Commission on Form N-CR regarding the imposition and removal of liquidity fees, and the suspension and resumption of fund redemptions. Commission staff estimates that the Commission would receive, in aggregate, an average of 8 reports per year filed
in response to events specified on Part E ("Imposition of liquidity fee"), Part F ("Suspension of Fund redemptions"), and Part G ("Removal of liquidity fees and/or resumption of Fund redemptions") of Form N-CR.\footnote{This estimate is based on staff's analysis of Form N-MFP data that shows that, between March 2011 and October 2012, 4 prime money market funds had weekly liquid assets below 15\% at the time of filing. We assume that the Commission would receive 4 reports on Form N-CR filed in response to events specified on Part E (which requires filing when the 15\% threshold is crossed, regardless of whether the fund imposes the default liquidity fee) and Part F (which requires filing when the 15\% threshold is crossed and the fund imposes a redemption gate). Assuming that each time a fund crosses the 15\% threshold, it would impose a fee or gate, and that it would eventually remove this fee or gate, we assume that the Commission would additionally receive 4 reports on Form N-CR filed in response to events specified on Part G (which requires filing when a fund has imposed a liquidity fee and/or suspended the fund's redemptions determines to remove such fee and/or resume fund redemptions). However, this is a conservative estimate, because we expect that funds would be less likely to cross the 15\% threshold if we adopt our proposal, since we expect that the funds would increase their risk management around their level of weekly liquid assets in response to the fee and gate requirements.}{188} Because the required website disclosure overlaps with the information that a fund must disclose on Form N-CR when the fund imposes or removes liquidity fees, or suspends and resumes fund redemptions, we anticipate that the burdens a fund would incur to draft and finalize the disclosure that would appear on its website would largely be incurred when the fund files Form N-CR.\footnote{See infra section IV.B.4.}{189} Commission staff estimates that a fund would incur an additional burden of 1 hour, at a time cost of $207,\footnote{This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour per website update x $207 per hour for a webmaster = $207.}{190} each time that it updates its website to include the new disclosure. Accordingly, Commission staff estimates that the requirement to disclose information about the imposition and removal of liquidity fees, and the suspension and resumption of fund redemptions, on the fund's website would result in a total aggregate burden of 8 hours per year,\footnote{This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour per website update x 8 website updates made by money market funds = 8 hours.}{191} at a total aggregate time cost of $1,656.\footnote{This estimate is based on the following calculation: 8 hours per year x $207 per hour for a webmaster = $1,656.}{192} There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.
v. Change in Burden

The aggregate additional annual burden associated with the proposed website disclosure requirements discussed above is 59,430 hours\textsuperscript{1193} at a time cost of $16,513,258.\textsuperscript{1194} Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of 19,810 burden hours and $5,504,419 total cost for all funds.\textsuperscript{1195} There would be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

g. Total Burden for Rule 2a-7

The currently approved burden for rule 2a-7 is 517,228 hours. The net aggregate additional burden hours associated with the proposed amendments to rule 2a-7 would increase the burden estimate to 540,626 hours annually for all funds.\textsuperscript{1196}

2. Rule 22e-3

As outlined above, rule 22e-3 under the Investment Company Act exempts money market funds from section 22(e) of the Act to permit them to suspend redemptions and postpone payment of redemption proceeds in order to facilitate an orderly liquidation of the fund, provided

\textsuperscript{1193} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 7,032 hours (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of portfolio holdings information) + 26,175 (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets) + 26,175 (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of daily market-based NAV) + 40 hours (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of financial support provided to money market funds) + 8 hours (annual aggregate burden for disclosure of the imposition and removal of liquidity fees, and the suspension and resumption of fund redemptions) = 59,430 hours.

\textsuperscript{1194} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $1,455,624 (annual aggregate costs associated with disclosure of portfolio holdings information) + $7,523,849 (annual aggregate costs associated with disclosure of daily liquid assets and weekly liquid assets) + $7,523,849 (annual aggregate costs associated with disclosure of daily market-based NAV) + $8,820 (annual aggregate costs associated with disclosure of financial support provided to money market funds) + $1,656 (annual aggregate costs associated with disclosure of the imposition and removal of liquidity fees, and the suspension and resumption of fund redemptions) = $16,513,258.

\textsuperscript{1195} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 59,430 hours $\div$ 3 = 19,810 burden hours; $16,513,258 \div 3 = \$5,504,419 burden cost.

\textsuperscript{1196} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 517,228 hours (currently approved burden) + 9 hours (board determinations) + (549 hours + 244 hours) (ABS determination & recordkeeping) - (10 hours + 25 hours) (notice to the Commission) + 2,821 hours (stress testing) + 19,810 hours (website disclosure) = 540,626 hours.
that certain conditions are met. To provide shareholders with protections comparable to those currently provided by the rule while also updating the rule to make it consistent with our proposed amendments to rule 2a-7, we are proposing to amend rule 22e-3 under our fees and gates proposal to permit a money market fund to invoke the exemption in rule 22e-3 if the fund, at the end of a business day, has invested less than 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets. As under the current rule, a money market fund would continue to be able to invoke the exemption in rule 22e-3 if it had broken the buck or was about to break the buck.

The proposed amendments to rule 22e-3 under our fees and gates proposal, like the amendments we propose to rule 22e-3 under our floating NAV proposal, are designed to permit a money market fund to suspend redemptions when the fund is under significant stress, as the funds may do today under rule 22e-2. As with our proposed amendments to rule 22e-3 under our floating NAV proposal, we do not expect that money market funds would invoke the exemption provided by rule 22e-3 more frequently under our fees and gates proposal than they do today. Although we propose to change the circumstances under which a money market fund may invoke the exemption provided by rule 22e-3, the rule as we propose to amend it still would permit a money market fund to invoke the exemption only when the fund is under significant stress, and our staff estimates that a money market fund is likely to experience that level of stress and choose to suspend redemptions in reliance on rule 22e-3 with the same frequency that funds today may do so. Therefore, we are not revising rule 22e-3’s current approved annual aggregate collection of information, which would remain approximately 30 minutes. There would be no change in the external cost burden associated with this collection of information.

1197 Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(1)(ii).
1198 Proposed (Fees & Gates) rule 2a-7(a)(1)(i).
3. Rule 30b1-7 and Form N-MFP

As outlined above, we are also proposing that these amendments would be adopted if the second alternative, requiring money market funds whose liquidity levels fell below a specified threshold to consider imposing a liquidity fee and permit the funds to suspend redemptions temporarily, were adopted. Therefore, as discussed above under the floating NAV proposal, Commission staff estimates that, under our fees and gates proposal, our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP would result in all money market funds, incurring, in aggregate, 40,043 hours at a total time cost of $10.4 million plus $373,680 in external costs for all funds.\textsuperscript{1199} Staff estimates that our proposed amendments to Form N-MFP would result in a total aggregate annual collection of information burden of 85,257 hours and $4,798,160 in external costs.\textsuperscript{1200}

4. Rule 30b1-8 and Form N-CR

As discussed above, we are proposing to adopt new Form N-CR under the floating NAV alternative, which would require disclosure, by means of a current report filed with the Commission, of certain specific reportable events. Similarly, we are also proposing to adopt new Form N-CR if the liquidity fees and gates alternative is adopted. Albeit with some variations, under both alternatives the information reported on Form N-CR would include instances of portfolio security default, sponsor support of funds, and certain significant deviations in net asset value.\textsuperscript{1201} In addition, under the liquidity fees and gates alternative, we would also require that money market funds file a report on Form N-CR in response to events specified on Part E ("Imposition of Liquidity Fee"), Part F ("Suspension of Fund Redemptions") and Part G

\textsuperscript{1199} See supra note 1101 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{1200} See supra notes 1102 and 1103 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{1201} See proposed (FNAV) Form N-CR Parts A – D; proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Part A – D; see also section III.G.1.
("Removal of Liquidity Fees and/or Resumption of Fund Redemptions").

Under the liquidity fees and gates alternative, the staff estimates that on average the Commission would receive the same number of reports filed per year in response to the events specified on Parts B, C, and D as under the floating NAV alternative. In addition, the staff estimates that on average the Commission would add an additional 8 reports per year filed in response to events specified on Parts E, F, and G of Form N-CR.  

As discussed above, the staff estimates that a fund would spend on average approximately 5 hours of an in-house attorney's and an accountant's time to prepare, review and submit Form N-CR, at a total time cost of $1,708. In the aggregate, the staff estimates that compliance with new rule 30b1-8 and Form N-CR would result in a total annual burden of approximately 341 burden hours and total annual time costs of approximately $116,429.

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This estimate is based on staff's analysis of Form N-MFP data that shows that, between March 2011 and October 2012, 4 prime money market funds had weekly liquid assets below 15% at the time of filing. The staff assumes that the Commission would receive 4 reports on Form N-CR filed in response to events specified on Part E (which requires filing when the 15% threshold is crossed, regardless of whether the fund imposes the default liquidity fee) and Part F (which requires filing when the 15% threshold is crossed and the fund imposes a redemption gate). Solely for purposes of this estimate, the staff counts the filings of the initial as well as amended report under Parts E and F as one report. See instructions to proposed (Fees & Gates) Form N-CR Parts E, F. Assuming that each time a fund crosses the 15% threshold, it would impose a fee or gate, and that it would eventually remove this fee or gate, the staff assumes that the Commission would additionally receive 4 reports on Form N-CR filed in response to events specified on Part G (which requires filing when a fund that has imposed a liquidity fee and/or suspended the fund's redemptions determines to remove such fee and/or resume fund redemptions).

However, this is a conservative estimate, because the staff expects that funds would be less likely to cross the 15% threshold if the Commission adopts our proposal, since the staff expects that the funds would increase their risk management around their level of weekly liquid assets in response to the fee and gate requirements.

This estimate is derived in part from our current PRA estimate for Form 8-K. In addition, the staff expects that it would take approximately the same amount of time to prepare and file a report on Form N-CR, regardless under which Part of Form N-CR it is filed.

This estimate is based on the following calculation: (4 hours x $379/hour for an attorney = $1,516), plus (1 hour x $192/hour for a fund senior accountant = $192), for a combined total of 5 hours (4 hours for an attorney + 1 hour for a fund senior accountant) and total time costs of $1,708.

This estimate is based on the following calculations: (20 reports filed per year in respect of Part B) + (40 reports filed per year in respect of Part C) + (0.167 reports filed per year in respect of Part D (1 report every 6 years divided by 6 years)) + (8 reports filed per year in respect of Parts E, F and G) = 68.167 reports filed
Given an estimated 586 money market funds that would be required to comply with new rule 30b-1-8 and Form N-CR,\textsuperscript{1206} this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 0.58 burden hours and average annual time costs of approximately $199 on a per-fund basis. The staff estimates that there will be no external costs associated with this collection of information.

5.  \textit{Rule 34b-1(a)}

As outlined above,\textsuperscript{1207} because we are amending the wording of the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures in money market funds’ advertisements, rule 34b-1(a) is indirectly affected by our proposed amendments because it references rule 482. However, we are proposing no changes to rule 34b-1(a) itself.

We already account for the burdens associated with the wording changes to the risk disclosures in money market fund advertising when discussing our amendments to rule 482(b)(4).\textsuperscript{1208} By complying with our amendments to rule 482(b)(4), money market funds would also automatically remain in compliance with respect to how our proposed changes would affect rule 34b-1(a). Therefore, any burdens associated with rule 34b-1(a) as a result of our proposed amendment to rule 482(b)(4) are already accounted for in section IV.B.6 below.

6.  \textit{Rule 482}

As outlined above, we are proposing to amend the wording of the rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures in money market funds’ advertisements that would be adopted under the floating NAV alternative.\textsuperscript{1209} Similarly, we are also proposing to amend the wording of the rule

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See supra note 1114.
\item See supra section IV.A.5.
\item See infra section IV.B.6.
\item See supra section IV.A.6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
482(b)(4) risk disclosures in money market funds' advertisements (including prominently on a fund's website) if the liquidity fees and gates alternative is adopted. For purposes of the estimated burden of the proposed amendments under the liquidity fees and gates alternative, however, Commission staff estimates the same burden as under the floating NAV alternative as discussed in Section IV.A.6 above. Therefore, using an estimate of 586 money market funds that would be required to comply with the amendments to rule 482(b)(4), the staff estimates that in the aggregate, the proposed amendments would result in a total one-time burden of approximately 3,077 burden hours at a total one-time time cost of approximately $857,904. Amortized over a three-year period, this would result in an average annual burden of approximately 1,026 burden hours at an annual time cost of approximately $285,968 for all funds. The staff estimates that there would be no external costs incurred in complying with the proposed amendment.

7. **Form N-1A**

We are proposing amendments to Form N-1A in connection with the liquidity fees and gates alternative proposal. This new collection of information would be mandatory for money

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1210 See (Fees & Gates) rule 482(b)(4)(i); (Fees & Gates) rule 482(b)(4)(ii).

1211 In *supra* note 1120, we discuss how the proposed compliance period of 2 years under the floating NAV alternative should allow funds sufficient time to amend the wording of their rule 482(b)(4) risk disclosures as part of a more general, periodic update of their advertising materials and website. While shorter than under the floating NAV alternative, the staff expects that making these changes as part of a more general update should still be possible with a compliance period of only 1 year as proposed under the liquidity fees and gates alternative.

1212 This estimate is based on a staff review of reports on Form N-MFP filed with the Commission for the month ended February 28, 2013. For purposes of this PRA, the staff assumes that the universe of money market funds affected by the amendments to rule 482(b)(4) would be the same as the current universe for Form N-MFP.

1213 This estimate is based on the following calculation: 5.25 burden hours per fund x 586 funds = approximately 3,077 total burden hours.

1214 This estimate is based on the following calculation: approximately $1,464 total costs per fund x 586 funds = approximately $857,904 total costs.
market funds that rely on rule 2a-7, and to the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, such information would be kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\textsuperscript{1215}

\textit{a. Discussion of Proposed Amendments}

The Commission's fees and gates alternative proposal would permit funds to charge liquidity fees and impose redemption restrictions on money market fund investors. To inform investors about these potential restrictions, we propose to require that each money market fund (other than government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption for government money market funds from the fee and gate requirements) include a bulleted statement, disclosing the particular risks associated with investing in a fund that may impose liquidity fees or redemption restrictions, in the summary section of the statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus, if used). We also propose to include wording designed to inform investors about the primary general risks of investing in money market funds in this bulleted disclosure statement.\textsuperscript{1216}

The liquidity fees and gates proposal would exempt government money market funds from any fee or gate requirement, but a government money market fund would be permitted to impose fees or gates if the ability to impose fees or gates were disclosed in the fund's prospectus. Accordingly, the proposed amendments to Form N-1A would require government money market funds that have chosen to rely on this exemption to include a bulleted disclosure statement in the summary section of the fund's statutory prospectus (and, accordingly, in any summary prospectus).

\textsuperscript{1215} \textit{See supra} note 994.

\textsuperscript{1216} As discussed above in section III.B.8, while money market funds are currently required to include a similar disclosure statement on their advertisements and sales materials, we propose amending this disclosure statement to emphasize that money market fund sponsors are not obligated to provide financial support, and that money market funds may not be an appropriate investment option for investors who cannot tolerate losses.
prospectus, if used) that does not include discussion of the risks of liquidity fees and gates, but
that includes additional detail about the risks of investing in money market funds generally.

Currently, funds are required to disclose any restrictions on fund redemptions in their
registration statements. We expect that, to comply with these requirements, money market funds
(besides government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7
exemption from the fee and gate requirements) would disclose in the statutory prospectus, as
well as in the SAI, as applicable, the effects that the potential imposition of fees and/or gates
may have on a shareholder’s ability to redeem shares of the fund. We also expect that, promptly
after a money market fund imposes a redemption fee or gate, it would inform prospective
investors of any fees or gates currently in place by means of a prospectus supplement.

For the reasons discussed above in section III.B.8.c, we are also proposing amendments
to Form N-1A that would require all money market funds (except government money market
funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fee and gate
requirements) to provide SAI disclosure regarding the historical occasions in which the fund’s
weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or redemption
gates.

Finally, for the reasons discussed above in section III.F.1.a, we are proposing
amendments to Form N-1A that would require all money market funds to provide SAI disclosure
regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or
fund affiliate. Specifically, the proposed amendments would require each money market fund to
disclose any occasion during the last ten years on which an affiliated person, promoter, or
principal underwriter of the fund, or an affiliated person of such person, provided any form of
financial support to the fund.
b. Change in Burden

The current approved collection of information for Form N-1A is 1,578,689 annual aggregate hours, and the total annual external cost burden is $122,730,472. The respondents to this collection of information are open-end management investment companies registered with the Commission. The entities that would be affected by the proposed amendments to Form N-1A discussed above include all money market funds. However, various aspects of these amendments would only affect those money market funds that are not government funds that rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fee and gate requirements, while others would only affect government funds relying on the proposed exemption. For purposes of the PRA, staff estimates that, of the estimated 586 total money market funds,\(^{1217}\) 165 funds would rely on the proposed government fund exemption.\(^{1218}\)

The burdens associated with the proposed amendments to Form N-1A include one-time burdens as well as ongoing burdens. Commission staff estimates that each money market fund (except government money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fee and gate requirements) would incur a one-time burden of 5 hours,\(^{1219}\) at a time cost of $1,480,\(^{1220}\) to draft and finalize the required disclosure and amend its registration.

\(^{1217}\) See supra note 1040.

\(^{1218}\) This estimate is based on the number of money market funds that self-reported as Government/Agency or Treasury funds on Form N-MFP as of February 28, 2013.

\(^{1219}\) This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour to update registration statement to include bulleted disclosure statement + 3 hours to update registration statement to include disclosure about effects that fees/gates may have on shareholder redemptions, and disclosure about historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed fees/gates + 1 hour to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by the fund = 5 hours.

\(^{1220}\) This estimate is based on the following calculation: (1 hour (to update registration statement to include bulleted disclosure statement) x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $296) + (3 hours (to update registration statement to include disclosure about effects that fees/gates may have on shareholder redemptions, and disclosure about historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed fees/gates) x $296 (blended rate for a
statement. In aggregate, staff estimates that these funds would incur a one-time burden of 2,105 hours,\textsuperscript{1221} at a time cost of $623,080,\textsuperscript{1222} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements. In addition, Commission staff estimates that each money market fund (except government money market funds relying on the proposed government fund exemption) would incur an ongoing burden of 1 hour, at a time cost of $296,\textsuperscript{1223} each year to: 1) review and update the SAI disclosure regarding historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or redemption gates; 2) review and update the SAI disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate; and 3) inform prospective investors of any fees or gates currently in place (as appropriate) by means of a prospectus supplement. In aggregate, staff estimates that these funds would incur an annual burden of 421 hours,\textsuperscript{1224} at a time cost of $124,616,\textsuperscript{1225} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A requirements.

Amortizing these one-time and ongoing hour and cost burdens over three years results in an average annual increased burden of approximately 2 hours per fund (except government

\begin{align*}
\text{compliance attorney and a senior programmer} &= \$888 + (1 \text{ hour (to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by the fund)} \times \$296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = \$296) = \$1,480.
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{1221} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 5 hours \times 421 funds (586 total money market funds - 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption) = 2,105 hours.

\textsuperscript{1222} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2,105 hours \times \$296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = \$623,080.

\textsuperscript{1223} This estimate is based on the following calculation: (0.5 hours (to review and update the SAI disclosure regarding historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed liquidity fees or redemption gates, and to inform prospective investors of any fees or gates currently in place (as appropriate) by means of a prospectus supplement) \times \$296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = \$148) + (0.5 hours (to review and update the SAI disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate) \times \$296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = \$148) = \$296.

\textsuperscript{1224} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hours \times 421 funds (586 total money market funds - 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption) = 421 hours.

\textsuperscript{1225} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 421 hours \times \$296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = \$124,616.
money market funds that have chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fee and gate requirements),

at a time cost of approximately $691 per fund. In aggregate, staff estimates that these funds would incur an average annual increased burden of 842 hours, at a time cost of $249,232, to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

Commission staff estimates that each government money market fund that has chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption from the fee and gate requirements would incur a one-time burden of 2 hours, at a time cost of $592, to draft and finalize the required disclosure and amend its registration statement. In aggregate, staff estimates that these government funds would incur a one-time burden of 330 hours, at a time cost of $97,680, to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements. In addition, Commission staff estimates that each government fund relying on the proposed government fund exemption would incur an ongoing

\[1226\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: (5 burden hours (year 1) + 1 burden hour (year 2) + 1 burden hours (year 3)) ÷ 3 = approximately 2 hours.

\[1227\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: ($1,480 \text{ (year 1 monetized burden hours)} + $296 \text{ (year 2 monetized burden hours)} + $296 \text{ (year 3 monetized burden hours)}) ÷ 3 = approximately $691.

\[1228\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 hours x 421 funds (586 total money market funds - 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption) = 842 hours.

\[1229\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: 842 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $249,232.

\[1230\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour to update registration statement to include bulleted disclosure statement + 1 hour to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by the fund = 2 hours.

\[1231\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: (1 hour \text{ (to update registration statement to include bulleted disclosure statement)} \times $296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = $296) + (1 hour \text{ (to update registration statement to include disclosure about financial support received by the fund)} \times $296 \text{ (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer)} = $296) = $592.

\[1232\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 hours x 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption = 330 hours.

\[1233\] This estimate is based on the following calculation: 330 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $97,680.
burden of 0.5 hours, at a time cost of $148,\textsuperscript{1234} each year to review and update the SAI disclosure regarding historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate. In aggregate, staff estimates that government funds would incur an annual burden of approximately 83 hours,\textsuperscript{1235} at a time cost of $24,568,\textsuperscript{1236} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

Amortizing these one-time and ongoing hour and cost burdens over three years results in an average annual increased burden of 1 hour per government fund that has chosen to rely on the proposed rule 2a-7 exemption,\textsuperscript{1237} at a time cost of $296 per fund.\textsuperscript{1238} In aggregate, staff estimates that these government funds would incur an average annual increased burden of 165 hours,\textsuperscript{1239} at a time cost of $48,840,\textsuperscript{1240} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements.

In total, the staff estimates that all money market funds would incur an average annual increased burden of 1,007 hours,\textsuperscript{1241} at a time cost of $298,072,\textsuperscript{1242} to comply with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements. Additionally, the staff estimates that there would be one-

\textsuperscript{1234} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 0.5 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $148.

\textsuperscript{1235} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 0.5 hours x 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption = approximately 83 hours.

\textsuperscript{1236} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 83 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $24,568.

\textsuperscript{1237} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 2 burden hours (year 1) + 0.5 burden hours (year 2) + 0.5 burden hours (year 3) ÷ 3 = 1 hour.

\textsuperscript{1238} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $592 (year 1 monetized burden hours) + $148 (year 2 monetized burden hours) + $148 (year 3 monetized burden hours) ÷ 3 = $296.

\textsuperscript{1239} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 1 hour x 165 funds that would rely on the proposed government fund exemption = 165 hours.

\textsuperscript{1240} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 165 hours x $296 (blended rate for a compliance attorney and a senior programmer) = $48,840.

\textsuperscript{1241} This estimate is based on the following calculation: 842 hours + 165 hours = 1,007 hours. See supra notes 1228 and 1239.

\textsuperscript{1242} This estimate is based on the following calculation: $249,232 + $48,840 = $298,072.
time aggregate external costs (in the form of printing costs) of $6,269,175 associated with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements; amortizing these costs over three years results in annual aggregate external costs of $2,089,725.1243

8. Advisers Act Rule 204(b)-1 and Form PF

We are proposing the same amendments to Form PF under both the floating NAV and fees and gates proposals. Staff estimates that the estimated paperwork burdens associated with our amendments to Form PF as discussed above in connection with our floating NAV proposal apply equally to our fees and gates proposal. Therefore, as discussed above under our floating NAV proposal, our staff estimates that the proposed amendments to Form PF under our fees and gates proposal also would result in (1) increased annual burdens per large liquidity fund advisers of 290 burden hours, at a total time cost of $73,460, and $16,374 in external costs;1244 (2) increased aggregate annual burden hours across all large liquidity fund advisers of 7,250 burden hours, at a total time cost of $1,836,500, and $409,350 in external costs;1245 and (3) the aggregate paperwork burden for Form PF being revised to 249,300 burden hours and $23,310,350 in

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1243 We expect that a fund that must include disclosure about historical occasions in which the fund’s weekly liquid assets have fallen below 15% or the fund has imposed fees/gates, or historical instances in which the fund has received financial support from a sponsor or fund affiliate, would need to add 2-8 pages of new disclosure to its registration statement. Adding this new disclosure would therefore increase the number of pages in, and change the printing costs of, the fund’s registration statement.

Commission staff calculates the external costs associated with the proposed Form N-1A disclosure requirements as follows: 5 pages (mid-point of 2 pages and 8 pages) x $0.045 per page x 27,863,000 money market fund registration statements printed annually = $6,269,175 one-time aggregate external costs. Amortizing these external costs over three years results in aggregate annual external costs of $2,089,725. Our estimate of potential printing ($0.045 per page: $0.035 for ink + $0.010 for paper) is based on data provided by Lexcon Inc. in response to Investment Company Act Release No. 27182 (Dec. 8, 2005) [70 FR 74598 (Dec. 15, 2005)]. See Lexcon Inc. Letter (Feb. 13, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7i003/dbgross9453.pdf. For purposes of this analysis, our best estimate of the number of money market fund registration statements printed annually is based on 27,863,000 money market fund shareholder accounts in 2012. See Investment Company Institute, 2013 Investment Company Fact Book, at 178, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.

1244 See infra note 1165.

1245 See infra notes 1166-1168.
external costs.\textsuperscript{1246}

\section*{C. Request for Comments}

We request comment on whether our estimates for the change in burden hours and associated costs, as well as any external costs for the proposed amendments described above under our first alternative proposal—floating NAV—are reasonable. We also request comment on whether our estimates for the change in burden hours associated costs, as well as any external costs for the proposed amendments described above under our second alternative proposal—liquidity fees and gates—are reasonable. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits comments in order to: (i) evaluate whether the proposed collections of information are necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information will have practical utility; (ii) evaluate the accuracy of the Commission’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collections of information; (iii) determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (iv) determine whether there are ways to minimize the burden of the collections of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

The agency has submitted the proposed collection of information to OMB for approval. Persons wishing to submit comments on the collection of information requirements of the proposed amendments should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget, Attention Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and should send a copy to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC

\textsuperscript{1246} See infra notes 1169-1170.
20549-1090, with reference to File No. S7-03-13. OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collections of information between 30 and 60 days after publication of this Release; therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days after publication of this Release. Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with regard to these collections of information should be in writing, refer to File No. S7-03-13, and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-0213.

V. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT CERTIFICATION

Section 3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980\(^\text{1247}\) ("RFA") requires the Commission to undertake an initial regulatory flexibility analysis ("IRFA") of the proposed rule amendments on small entities unless the Commission certifies that the rule, if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.\(^\text{1248}\) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that new rule 30b1-8 and Form N-CR under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the proposed amendments to rules 2a-7, 12d3-1, 18f-3, 22e-3, 30b1-7, and 31a-1 and Forms N-MFP and N-1A under the Investment Company Act, Form PF under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and rules 482 and 419 under the Securities Act of 1933, would not, if adopted have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The proposal would amend rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act to:

- Require money market funds other than government and retail money market funds: (a) to "float" their net asset values; or (b) under an alternative proposal, to

\(^{1247}\) 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
\(^{1248}\) 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
impose, under certain circumstances, a liquidity fee, and permit funds to impose a redemption gate.

- Require that money market funds disclose on the fund's website daily and weekly liquidity, the funds' daily market-based NAV per share (or current NAV per share under our floating NAV proposal), and certain information that the fund is required to report to the Commission on new Form N-CR regarding the imposition and subsequent removal of liquidity fees or gates (where applicable).

- Require money market funds to treat certain affiliates as single issuers when applying rule 2a-7's 5% issuer diversification requirement.

- Require money market funds to treat the sponsors of asset-backed securities as guarantors subject to rule 2a-7's diversification requirements unless the fund's board of directors determines the fund is not relying on the sponsor's support when determining the asset-backed security's credit quality or liquidity.

- Require money market funds to apply rule 2a-7's diversification restrictions applicable to demand features and guarantees (including guarantees deemed issued by sponsors of asset-backed securities) to all of the funds' total assets, rather than 75% of the funds' total assets as provided in current rule 2a-7.

- Amend the stress testing requirements to require funds to adopt procedures providing for periodic testing (and reporting of results to fund boards) of money market funds' ability to maintain 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets (and, under the floating NAV proposal, eliminate the current requirement to test a fund's ability to maintain a stable NAV per share), based on specified amended hypothetical events.
- Make clarifying amendments to: (a) certain characteristics of instruments that qualify as daily or weekly liquid assets; (b) the definition of demand feature; (c) the method for determining weighted average life for short-term floating rate securities; and (d) the method for determining the 45-day remaining maturity when complying with rule 2a-7's limitation on the acquisition of second tier securities.

We also are proposing to amend rule 22e-3, which exempts money market funds from section 22(e) to permit them to suspend redemptions in order to facilitate an orderly liquidation of fund assets. Under both proposals, we propose to amend the rule to provide that money market funds be permitted to suspend redemptions, when, among other requirements, the fund, at the end of a business day, has less than 15% of its total assets in weekly liquid assets.

We are also proposing new rule 30b1-8 that would require money market funds to file reports with the Commission on new Form N-CR upon the occurrence of specific events, which reports would immediately be made public. New Form N-CR would require all money market funds to make prompt public disclosure of instances of portfolio security default and sponsor support. If we adopt our liquidity fees and gates proposal, money market funds would be required to disclose a decline in the fund’s weekly liquid assets below 15% of total assets, imposition and removal of liquidity fees and/or gates, and a decline in the market-based price of the fund below $0.9975. If we adopt our floating NAV proposal, money market funds would be required to disclose a decline in the market-based price of the fund below $0.9975 (for a government or retail money market fund that retains a stable price per share).

We also are proposing to amend rule 30b1-7 by (i) requiring that money market funds file Form N-MFP with the Commission, current as of the last business day or any subsequent
calendar day of the preceding month; and (ii) making information filed on Form N-MFP publicly
available immediately upon filing, rather than 60 days after the end of the month to which the
information pertains. We also are proposing to amend Form N-MFP to reflect the proposed
amendments to rule 2a-7 discussed above, request certain additional information that would be
useful for our oversight of money market funds, and make technical and clarifying changes
based on our experience with filings submitted during the past year and a half.

We are also proposing to amend Form PF to require registered investment advisers to
certain “qualifying” liquidity funds to provide certain information with respect to those funds’
portfolio holdings, similar to the information we require money market funds to disclose on
Form N-MFP.

We are also proposing to amend rule 482 under the Securities Act of 1933 to require that
money market funds amend any “advertisements” to notify investors that the fund may impose a
liquidity fee and/or gate under certain circumstances and include specific language informing
investors about the potential risks of investing in money market funds (under our proposed
liquidity fees and gates proposal). Similarly, if we adopt our alternative floating NAV proposal,
we would amend rule 482 to provide enhanced disclosure to investors about the potential for
fluctuation in the value of the fund shares and the possibility for losses.

We also are proposing under either alternative proposal to amend Form N-1A to require
that money market funds include the revised risk disclosures (discussed above in proposing to
amend rule 482) pursuant to Item 4 and also disclose historic instances of sponsor support. In
addition, if we adopt our liquidity fees and gates proposal, we propose to amend Item 3 of Form
N-1A to make clear that “redemption fees” would not include any liquidity fee imposed.

Finally, we are proposing to amend rules 12d3-1, 18f-3, 31a-1, and 419, in each case
simply to update cross references in those rules to reflect our proposed amendments to rule 2a-7.

Based on information in filings submitted to the Commission, we believe that there are no money market funds that are small entities.\textsuperscript{1249} For this reason, the Commission believes the new rule 30b1-8 and the proposed amendments to rules 2a-7, 12d3-1, 18f-3, 22e-3, 30b1-7, 31a-1, 419 and 482, and Forms N-CR, N-MFP, PF and N-1A, would not, if adopted, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

We encourage written comments regarding this certification. We solicit comment as to whether new rule 30b1-8 and the proposed amendments to rules 2a-7, 12d3-1, 18f-3, 22e-3, 30b1-7, 31a-1, 419 and 482, and Forms N-CR, N-MFP, PF and N-1A could have an effect on small entities that has not been considered. We request that commenters describe the nature of any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to support the extent of such impact.

\textbf{VI. STATUTORY AUTHORITY}

The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 419 under the rulemaking authority set forth in sections 3, 4, 5, 7, and 19 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77e, 77g, and 77s]. The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 482 pursuant to authority set forth in sections 5, 10(b), 19(a), and 28 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77e, 77j(b), 77s(a), and 77z-3] and sections 24(g) and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-24(g) and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 2a-7 under the exemptive and rulemaking authority set forth in sections 6(c), 8(b), 22(c), 35(d), and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c), 80a-8(b), 80a-22(c), 80a-35(d), and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is

\textsuperscript{1249} Under the Investment Company Act, an investment company is considered a small business or small organization if it, together with other investment companies in the same group of related investment companies, has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its most recent fiscal year. \textit{See} 17 CFR 270.0-10.
proposing amendments to rule 12d3-1 pursuant to the authority set forth in sections 6(c) and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c) and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 18f-3 pursuant to the authority set forth in sections 6(c) and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c) and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 22e-3 pursuant to the authority set forth in sections 6(c), 22(e) and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c), 80a-22(e), and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 30b1-7 and Form N-MFP pursuant to authority set forth in Sections 8(b), 30(b), 31(a), and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-8(b), 80a-29(b), 80a-30(a), and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing new rule 30b1-8 and Form N-CR pursuant to authority set forth in Sections 8(b), 30(b), 31(a), and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-8(b), 80a-29(b), 80a-30(a), and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing amendments to rule 31a-1 pursuant to authority set forth in sections 6(c) and 38(a)] of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-6(c) and 80a-37(a)]. The Commission is proposing amendments to Form N-1A pursuant to authority set forth in Sections 5, 6, 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77e, 77f, 77g, 77j and 77s(a)] and Sections 8, 24(a), 24(g), 30, and 38 of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-8, 80a-24(a), 80a-24(g), 80a-29, and 80a-37]. The Commission is proposing amendments to Form PF pursuant to authority set forth in Sections 204(b) and 211(e) of the Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-4 and 15 U.S.C. 80b-11].

List of Subjects

17 CFR Parts 230, 239, 270, 274, and 279

Investment companies, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

TEXT OF PROPOSED RULES AND FORMS

For reasons set out in the preamble, Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of Federal
Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 230—GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

1. The general authority citation for Part 230 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77b, 77b note, 77c, 77d, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77r, 77s, 77z–3, 77sss, 78c, 78d, 78j, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o, 78o–7 note, 78t, 78w, 78ll(d), 78mm, 80a–8, 80a–24, 80a–28, 80a–29, 80a–30, and 80a–37, unless otherwise noted.

* * * * *

2. Section 230.419(b)(2)(iv)(B) is revised by removing the phrase “paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4)” and adding in its place “paragraph (d)”.

3. Section 230.482(b)(3) is revised under Alternative 1 by adding after “An advertisement for a money market fund” the phrase “that is subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(c)(2) of this chapter or § 270.2a-7(c)(3) of this chapter”.

4. Section 230.482(b)(4) is revised to read as follows:

Alternative 1

§ 230.482 Advertising by an investment company as satisfying requirements of section 10.

(a) * * *

(b) * * *

(4) Money market funds.

(i) An advertisement for an investment company that holds itself out to be a money market fund, and that is not subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(c)(2) of this
chapter or § 270.2a-7(c)(3) of this chapter, must include the following statement, presented as prescribed in Item 4(b) of Form N-1A (§ 274.11A of this chapter):

You could lose money by investing in the Fund.

You should not invest in the Fund if you require your investment to maintain a stable value.

The value of shares of the Fund will increase and decrease as a result of changes in the value of the securities in which the Fund invests. The value of the securities in which the Fund invests may in turn be affected by many factors, including interest rate changes and defaults or changes in the credit quality of a security’s issuer.

An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

(ii) An advertisement for an investment company that holds itself out to be a money market fund, and that is subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(c)(2) of this chapter or § 270.2a-7(c)(3) of this chapter, must include the following statement, presented as prescribed in Item 4(b) of Form N-1A (§ 274.11A of this chapter):

You could lose money by investing in the Fund.

The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.

An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.
Note to paragraph (b)(4). If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the Fund, the statement may omit the last sentence ("The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.") for the term of the agreement. For purposes of this Note, the term “financial support” includes, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the fund during times of stress.

Alternative 2

§ 230.482 Advertising by an investment company as satisfying requirements of section 10.

(a) * * *

(b) * * *

(4) Money market funds.

(i) An advertisement for an investment company that holds itself out to be a money market fund (including any money market fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(iii) of this chapter, but that has chosen not to rely on the exemption provided by rule § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(iii) of this chapter) must include the following statement, presented as prescribed in Item 4(b) of Form N-1A (§ 274.11A of this chapter):

You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.

The Fund may impose a fee upon sale of your shares when the Fund is under considerable stress.

The Fund may temporarily suspend your ability to sell shares of the Fund when the Fund is under considerable stress.

An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

(ii) An advertisement for an investment company that holds itself out to be a money market fund, and that is subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(e)(2)(iii) of this chapter and has chosen to rely on the exemption provided by § 270.2a-7(e)(2)(iii) of this chapter, must include the following statement, presented as prescribed in Item 4(b) of Form N-1A (§ 274.11A of this chapter):

You could lose money by investing in the Fund.

The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.

An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

Note to paragraph (b)(4). If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the Fund, the statement may omit the last sentence (“The Fund’s sponsor has
no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.”) for the term of the agreement. For purposes of this Note, the term “financial support” includes, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the Fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the Fund during times of stress.

PART 270 – RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

5. The authority citation for Part 270 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq., 80a-34(d), 80a-37, and 80a-39, unless otherwise noted.

* * * * *

6. Section 270.2a-7 is revised to read as follows:

Alternative 1

§ 270.2a-7 Money market funds.

(a) Definitions.

(1) Acquisition (or acquire) means any purchase or subsequent rollover (but does not include the failure to exercise a Demand Feature).

(2) Amortized cost means the value of a security at the fund’s acquisition cost as adjusted for amortization of premium or accretion of discount rather than at the security’s value based on current market factors.
(3) *Asset-backed security* means a fixed income security (other than a government security) issued by a special purpose entity (as defined in this paragraph (a)(3)), substantially all of the assets of which consist of qualifying assets (as defined in this paragraph (a)(3)). *Special purpose entity* means a trust, corporation, partnership or other entity organized for the sole purpose of issuing securities that entitle their holders to receive payments that depend primarily on the cash flow from qualifying assets, but does not include a registered investment company. *Qualifying assets* means financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash within a finite time period, plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security holders.

(4) *Business day* means any day, other than Saturday, Sunday, or any customary business holiday.

(5) *Collateralized fully* has the same meaning as defined in § 270.5b-3(c)(1) except that § 270.5b-3(c)(1)(iv)(C) and (D) shall not apply.

(6) *Conditional demand feature* means a demand feature that is not an unconditional demand feature. A conditional demand feature is not a guarantee.

(7) *Conduit security* means a security issued by a municipal issuer (as defined in this paragraph (a)(7)) involving an arrangement or agreement entered into, directly or indirectly, with a person other than a municipal issuer, which arrangement or agreement provides for or secures repayment of the security. *Municipal issuer* means a state or territory of the United States (including the District of Columbia), or any political subdivision or public instrumentality of a state or territory of the United States. A conduit security does not include a security that is:

(i) Fully and unconditionally guaranteed by a municipal issuer;

(ii) Payable from the general revenues of the municipal issuer or other municipal
issuers (other than those revenues derived from an agreement or arrangement with a person who is not a municipal issuer that provides for or secures repayment of the security issued by the municipal issuer);

(iii) Related to a project owned and operated by a municipal issuer; or

(iv) Related to a facility leased to and under the control of an industrial or commercial enterprise that is part of a public project which, as a whole, is owned and under the control of a municipal issuer.

(8) *Daily liquid assets* means:

(i) Cash;

(ii) Direct obligations of the U.S. Government;

(iii) Securities that will mature, as determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments, or are subject to a demand feature that is exercisable and payable, within one business day; or

(iv) Amounts receivable and due unconditionally within one business day on pending sales of portfolio securities.

(9) *Demand feature* means a feature permitting the holder of a security to sell the security at an exercise price equal to the approximate amortized cost of the security plus accrued interest, if any, at the later of the time of exercise or the settlement of the transaction, paid within 397 calendar days of exercise.

(10) *Designated NRSRO* means any one of at least four nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, as that term is defined in section 3(a)(62) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(62)), that:

(i) The money market fund’s board of directors:
(A) Has designated as an NRSRO whose credit ratings with respect to any obligor or
security or particular obligors or securities will be used by the fund to determine whether a
security is an eligible security; and

(B) Determines at least once each calendar year issues credit ratings that are
sufficiently reliable for such use;

(ii) Is not an “affiliated person,” as defined in section 2(a)(3)(C) of the Act (15 U.S.C.
80a-2(a)(3)(C)), of the issuer of, or any insurer or provider of credit support for, the security; and

(iii) The fund discloses in its statement of additional information is a designated
NRSRO, including any limitations with respect to the fund’s use of such designation.

(11) Eligible security means:

(i) A rated security with a remaining maturity of 397 calendar days or less that has
received a rating from the requisite NRSROs in one of the two highest short-term rating
categories (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating relative standing); or

(ii) An unrated security that is of comparable quality to a security meeting the
requirements for a rated security in paragraph (a)(11)(i) of this section, as determined by the
money market fund’s board of directors; provided, however, that: a security that at the time of
issuance had a remaining maturity of more than 397 calendar days but that has a remaining
maturity of 397 calendar days or less and that is an unrated security is not an eligible security if
the security has received a long-term rating from any designated NRSRO that is not within the
designated NRSRO’s three highest long-term ratings categories (within which there may be sub-
categories or gradations indicating relative standing), unless the security has received a long-
term rating from the requisite NRSROs in one of the three highest rating categories.
(iii) In addition, in the case of a security that is subject to a demand feature or guarantee:

(A) The guarantee has received a rating from a designated NRSRO or the guarantee is issued by a guarantor that has received a rating from a designated NRSRO with respect to a class of debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class) that is comparable in priority and security to the guarantee, unless:

(1) The guarantee is issued by a person that, directly or indirectly, controls, is controlled by or is under common control with the issuer of the security subject to the guarantee (other than a sponsor of a special purpose entity with respect to an asset-backed security);

(2) The security subject to the guarantee is a repurchase agreement that is collateralized fully; or

(3) The guarantee is itself a government security; and

(B) The issuer of the demand feature or guarantee, or another institution, has undertaken promptly to notify the holder of the security in the event the demand feature or guarantee is substituted with another demand feature or guarantee (if such substitution is permissible under the terms of the demand feature or guarantee).

(12) *Event of insolvency* has the same meaning as defined in § 270.5b-3(c)(2).

(13) *First tier security* means any eligible security that:

(i) Is a rated security that has received a short-term rating from the requisite NRSROs in the highest short-term rating category for debt obligations (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating relative standing);

(ii) Is an unrated security that is of comparable quality to a security meeting the requirements for a rated security in paragraph (a)(13)(i) of this section, as determined by the
fund's board of directors;

(iii) Is a security issued by a registered investment company that is a money market fund; or

(iv) Is a government security.

(14) *Floating rate security* means a security the terms of which provide for the adjustment of its interest rate whenever a specified interest rate changes and that, at any time until the final maturity of the instrument or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand, can reasonably be expected to have a market value that approximates its amortized cost.

(15) *Government security* has the same meaning as defined in section 2(a)(16) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(16)).

(16) *Guarantee:*

(i) Means an unconditional obligation of a person other than the issuer of the security to undertake to pay, upon presentment by the holder of the guarantee (if required), the principal amount of the underlying security plus accrued interest when due or upon default, or, in the case of an unconditional demand feature, an obligation that entitles the holder to receive upon the later of exercise or the settlement of the transaction the approximate amortized cost of the underlying security or securities, plus accrued interest, if any. A guarantee includes a letter of credit, financial guaranty (bond) insurance, and an unconditional demand feature (other than an unconditional demand feature provided by the issuer of the security).

(ii) The sponsor of a special purpose entity with respect to an asset-backed security shall be deemed to have provided a guarantee with respect to the entire principal amount of the asset-backed security for purposes of this section, except paragraphs (a)(11)(iii) (definition of
eligible security), (d)(2)(iii) (credit substitution), (d)(3)(iv)(A) (fractional guarantees) and (e) (guarantees not relied on) of this section, unless the money market fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit or other support to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section) or liquidity (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section) of the asset-backed security, and maintains a record of this determination (pursuant to paragraphs (g)(6) and (h)(6) of this section).

(17) **Guarantee issued by a non-controlled person** means a guarantee issued by:

(i) A person that, directly or indirectly, does not control, and is not controlled by or under common control with the issuer of the security subject to the guarantee (*control* has the same meaning as defined in section 2(a)(9) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(9)); or

(ii) A sponsor of a special purpose entity with respect to an asset-backed security if the money market fund’s board of directors has made the findings described in paragraph (g)(6) of this section.

(18) **Illiquid security** means a security that cannot be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business within seven calendar days at approximately the value ascribed to it by the fund.

(19) **Penny-rounding method** of pricing means the method of computing an investment company’s price per share for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase whereby the current net asset value per share is rounded to the nearest one percent.

(20) **Rated security** means a security that meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)(20)(i) or (ii) of this section, in each case subject to paragraph (a)(20)(iii) of this section:

(i) The security has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO, or has
been issued by an issuer that has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO with respect to a class of debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class) that is comparable in priority and security with the security; or

(ii) The security is subject to a guarantee that has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO, or a guarantee issued by a guarantor that has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO with respect to a class of debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class) that is comparable in priority and security with the guarantee; but

(iii) A security is not a rated security if it is subject to an external credit support agreement (including an arrangement by which the security has become a refunded security) that was not in effect when the security was assigned its rating, unless the security has received a short-term rating reflecting the existence of the credit support agreement as provided in paragraph (a)(20)(i) of this section, or the credit support agreement with respect to the security has received a short-term rating as provided in paragraph (a)(20)(ii) of this section.

(21) **Refunded security** has the same meaning as defined in § 270.5b-3(c)(4).

(22) **Requisite NRSROs** means:

(i) Any two designated NRSROs that have issued a rating with respect to a security or class of debt obligations of an issuer; or

(ii) If only one designated NRSRO has issued a rating with respect to such security or class of debt obligations of an issuer at the time the fund acquires the security, that designated NRSRO.

(23) **Second tier security** means any eligible security that is not a first tier security.

(24) **Single state fund** means a tax exempt fund that holds itself out as seeking to maximize the amount of its distributed income that is exempt from the income taxes or other
taxes on investments of a particular state and, where applicable, subdivisions thereof.

(25) *Tax exempt fund* means any money market fund that holds itself out as distributing income exempt from regular federal income tax.

(26) *Total assets* means the total value of the money market fund's assets, as defined in section 2(a)(41) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(41)) and the rules thereunder.

(27) *Unconditional demand feature* means a demand feature that by its terms would be readily exercisable in the event of a default in payment of principal or interest on the underlying security or securities.

(28) *United States dollar-denominated* means, with reference to a security, that all principal and interest payments on such security are payable to security holders in United States dollars under all circumstances and that the interest rate of, the principal amount to be repaid, and the timing of payments related to such security do not vary or float with the value of a foreign currency, the rate of interest payable on foreign currency borrowings, or with any other interest rate or index expressed in a currency other than United States dollars.

(29) *Unrated security* means a security that is not a rated security.

(30) *Variable rate security* means a security the terms of which provide for the adjustment of its interest rate on set dates (such as the last day of a month or calendar quarter) and that, upon each adjustment until the final maturity of the instrument or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand, can reasonably be expected to have a market value that approximates its amortized cost.

(31) *Weekly liquid assets* means:

(i) Cash;

(ii) Direct obligations of the U.S. Government;
(iii) Government securities that are issued by a person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the government of the United States pursuant to authority granted by the Congress of the United States that:

(A) Are issued at a discount to the principal amount to be repaid at maturity without provision for the payment of interest; and

(B) Have a remaining maturity date of 60 days or less;

(iv) Securities that will mature, as determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments, or are subject to a demand feature that is exercisable and payable, within five business days; or

(v) Amounts receivable and due unconditionally within five business days on pending sales of portfolio securities.

(b) Holding out and use of names and titles.

(1) It shall be an untrue statement of material fact within the meaning of section 34(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-33(b)) for a registered investment company, in any registration statement, application, report, account, record, or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to the Act, including any advertisement, pamphlet, circular, form letter, or other sales literature addressed to or intended for distribution to prospective investors that is required to be filed with the Commission by section 24(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-24(b)), to hold itself out to investors as a money market fund or the equivalent of a money market fund, unless such registered investment company complies with this section.

(2) It shall constitute the use of a materially deceptive or misleading name or title within the meaning of section 35(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-34(d)) for a registered investment company to adopt the term "money market" as part of its name or title or the name or title of any
redeemable securities of which it is the issuer, or to adopt a name that suggests that it is a money
market fund or the equivalent of a money market fund, unless such registered investment
company complies with this section.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a name that suggests that a
registered investment company is a money market fund or the equivalent thereof includes one
that uses such terms as “cash,” “liquid,” “money,” “ready assets” or similar terms.

(c) Share price.

(1) Level of accuracy. Except as provided in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this
section, the money market fund must compute its price per share for purposes of distribution,
redemption and repurchase by rounding the fund’s current net asset value per share to the fourth
decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.0000 share price or an equivalent level of accuracy
for money market funds with a different share price (e.g. $10.000 or $100.00 per share).

(2) Exemption for funds investing primarily in government securities. A money
market fund may, notwithstanding section 2(a)(41) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(41)) and §§
270.2a-4 and 270.22c-1, compute the current price per share of its redeemable securities for
purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase by use of the penny-rounding method if and
so long as eighty percent or more of the money market fund’s total assets are invested in cash,
government securities, and/or repurchase agreements that are collateralized fully.

(3) Exemption for retail money market funds.

(i) General. A money market fund may, notwithstanding section 2(a)(41) of the Act
(15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(41)) and §§ 270.2a-4 and 270.22c-1, compute the current price per share of
its redeemable securities for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase by use of the
penny-rounding method if, subject to paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this section, the fund does not permit
any shareholder of record to redeem more than $1,000,000 of redeemable securities on any one business day.

(ii) **Omnibus account holders.** A money market fund may permit a shareholder of record to redeem more than $1,000,000 of redeemable securities on any one business day if the shareholder of record is a broker, dealer, bank, or other person that holds securities issued by the fund in nominee name ("omnibus account holder") and the money market fund has policies and procedures reasonably designed to allow the conclusion that the omnibus account holder does not permit any beneficial owner of the money market fund’s shares, directly or indirectly, (or the omnibus account holder itself investing for its own account) to redeem more than $1,000,000 of redeemable securities on any one business day.

(iii) **Exemptions.**

(A) A money market fund is exempt from the requirements of sections 18(f)(1) and 22(e) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-18(f)(1) and 80a-22(e)) to the extent necessary to permit the money market fund to limit redemptions in excess of $1,000,000 of redeemable securities on any one business day as provided in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section.

(B) A registered separate account funding variable insurance contracts and the sponsoring insurance company of such account are exempt from the requirements of section 27(i)(2)(A) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-27(i)(2)(A)) to the extent necessary to permit the separate account or the sponsoring insurance company of such account to apply the limitations on redemptions as provided in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section to contract owners who allocate all or a portion of their contract value to a subaccount of the separate account that is either a money market fund or that invests all of its assets in shares of a money market fund.

(d) **Risk-limiting conditions.**
(1) **Portfolio maturity.** The money market fund must maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity appropriate to its investment objectives; provided, however, that the money market fund must not:

(i) Acquire any instrument with a remaining maturity of greater than 397 calendar days;

(ii) Maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity ("WAM") that exceeds 60 calendar days; or

(iii) Maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity that exceeds 120 calendar days, determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments ("WAL").

(2) **Portfolio quality.**

(i) **General.** The money market fund must limit its portfolio investments to those United States dollar-denominated securities that the fund’s board of directors determines present minimal credit risks (which determination must be based on factors pertaining to credit quality in addition to any rating assigned to such securities by a designated NRSRO) and that are at the time of acquisition eligible securities.

(ii) **Second tier securities.** No money market fund may acquire a second tier security with a remaining maturity of greater than 45 calendar days, determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments. Immediately after the acquisition of any second tier security, a money market fund must not have invested more than three percent of its total assets in second tier securities.

(iii) **Securities subject to guarantees.** A security that is subject to a guarantee may be determined to be an eligible security or a first tier security based solely on whether the guarantee
is an eligible security or first tier security, as the case may be.

(iv) **Securities subject to conditional demand features.** A security that is subject to a conditional demand feature ("underlying security") may be determined to be an eligible security or a first tier security only if:

(A) The conditional demand feature is an eligible security or first tier security, as the case may be;

(B) At the time of the acquisition of the underlying security, the money market fund's board of directors has determined that there is minimal risk that the circumstances that would result in the conditional demand feature not being exercisable will occur; and

(1) The conditions limiting exercise either can be monitored readily by the fund or relate to the taxability, under federal, state or local law, of the interest payments on the security; or

(2) The terms of the conditional demand feature require that the fund will receive notice of the occurrence of the condition and the opportunity to exercise the demand feature in accordance with its terms; and

(C) The underlying security or any guarantee of such security (or the debt securities of the issuer of the underlying security or guarantee that are comparable in priority and security with the underlying security or guarantee) has received either a short-term rating or a long-term rating, as the case may be, from the requisite NRSROs within the NRSROs' two highest short-term or long-term rating categories (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating relative standing) or, if unrated, is determined to be of comparable quality by the money market fund's board of directors to a security that has received a rating from the requisite NRSROs within the NRSROs' two highest short-term or long-term rating categories, as the case
may be.

(3)  *Portfolio diversification.*

(i)  *Issuer diversification.* The money market fund must be diversified with respect to issuers of securities acquired by the fund as provided in paragraphs (d)(3)(i) and (d)(3)(ii) of this section, other than with respect to government securities and securities subject to a guarantee issued by a non-controlled person.

(A)  *Taxable and national funds.* Immediately after the acquisition of any security, a money market fund other than a single state fund must not have invested more than:

(1)  Five percent of its total assets in securities issued by the issuer of the security, provided, however, that such a fund may invest up to twenty-five percent of its total assets in the first tier securities of a single issuer for a period of up to three business days after the acquisition thereof; provided, further, that the fund may not invest in the securities of more than one issuer in accordance with the foregoing proviso in this paragraph at any time; and

(2)  Ten percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(B)  *Single state funds.* Immediately after the acquisition of any security, a single state fund must not have invested:

(1)  With respect to seventy-five percent of its total assets, more than five percent of its total assets in securities issued by the issuer of the security; and

(2)  With respect to all of its total assets, more than ten percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(C)  *Second tier securities.* Immediately after the acquisition of any second tier
security, a money market fund must not have invested more than one half of one percent of its
total assets in the second tier securities of any single issuer, and must not have invested more
than 2.5 percent of its total assets in second tier securities issued by or subject to demand features
or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(ii) **Issuer diversification calculations.** For purposes of making calculations under
paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section:

(A) **Repurchase agreements.** The acquisition of a repurchase agreement may be
deemed to be an acquisition of the underlying securities, provided the obligation of the seller to
repurchase the securities from the money market fund is collateralized fully and the fund’s board
of directors has evaluated the seller’s creditworthiness.

(B) **Refunded securities.** The acquisition of a refunded security shall be deemed to be
an acquisition of the escrowed government securities.

(C) **Conduit securities.** A conduit security shall be deemed to be issued by the person
(other than the municipal issuer) ultimately responsible for payments of interest and principal on
the security.

(D) **Asset-backed securities.**

(1) **General.** An asset-backed security acquired by a fund (“primary ABS”) shall be
deemed to be issued by the special purpose entity that issued the asset-backed security, provided,
however:

(i) **Holdings of primary ABS.** Any person whose obligations constitute ten percent or
more of the principal amount of the qualifying assets of the primary ABS (“ten percent obligor”)
shall be deemed to be an issuer of the portion of the primary ABS such obligations represent; and

(ii) **Holdings of secondary ABS.** If a ten percent obligor of a primary ABS is itself a
special purpose entity issuing asset-backed securities ("secondary ABS"), any ten percent obligor
of such secondary ABS also shall be deemed to be an issuer of the portion of the primary ABS
that such ten percent obligor represents.

(2) Restricted special purpose entities. A ten percent obligor with respect to a
primary or secondary ABS shall not be deemed to have issued any portion of the assets of a
primary ABS as provided in paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D)(J) of this section if that ten percent obligor
is itself a special purpose entity issuing asset-backed securities ("restricted special purpose
entity"), and the securities that it issues (other than securities issued to a company that controls,
or is controlled by or under common control with, the restricted special purpose entity and which
is not itself a special purpose entity issuing asset-backed securities) are held by only one other
special purpose entity.

(3) Demand features and guarantees. In the case of a ten percent obligor deemed to
be an issuer, the fund must satisfy the diversification requirements of paragraphs (d)(3)(iii) of
this section with respect to any demand feature or guarantee to which the ten percent obligor’s
obligations are subject.

(E) Shares of other money market funds. A money market fund that acquires shares
issued by another money market fund in an amount that would otherwise be prohibited by
paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section shall nonetheless be deemed in compliance with this section if
the board of directors of the acquiring money market fund reasonably believes that the fund in
which it has invested is in compliance with this section.

(F) Treatment of certain affiliated entities. The money market fund, when calculating
the amount of its total assets invested in securities issued by any particular issuer for purposes of
paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section, must treat as a single issuer two or more issuers of securities
owned by the money market fund if one issuer controls the other, is controlled by the other issuer, or is under common control with the other issuer, provided that “control” for this purpose means ownership of more than 50 percent of the issuer’s voting securities.

(iii) Diversification rules for demand features and guarantees. The money market fund must be diversified with respect to demand features and guarantees acquired by the fund as provided in paragraphs (d)(3)(iii) and (d)(3)(iv) of this section, other than with respect to a demand feature issued by the same institution that issued the underlying security, or with respect to a guarantee or demand feature that is itself a government security.

(A) General. Immediately after the acquisition of any demand feature or guarantee, any security subject to a demand feature or guarantee, or a security directly issued by the issuer of a demand feature or guarantee, a money market fund must not have invested more than ten percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(B) Second tier demand features or guarantees. Immediately after the acquisition of any demand feature or guarantee, any security subject to a demand feature or guarantee, a security directly issued by the issuer of a demand feature or guarantee, or a security after giving effect to the demand feature or guarantee, in all cases that is a second tier security, a money market fund must not have invested more than 2.5 percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(iv) Demand feature and guarantee diversification calculations.

(A) Fractional demand features or guarantees. In the case of a security subject to a demand feature or guarantee from an institution by which the institution guarantees a specified
portion of the value of the security, the institution shall be deemed to guarantee the specified portion thereof.

(B) Layered demand features or guarantees. In the case of a security subject to demand features or guarantees from multiple institutions that have not limited the extent of their obligations as described in paragraph (d)(3)(iv)(A) of this section, each institution shall be deemed to have provided the demand feature or guarantee with respect to the entire principal amount of the security.

(v) Diversification safe harbor. A money market fund that satisfies the applicable diversification requirements of paragraphs (d)(3') and (e) of this section shall be deemed to have satisfied the diversification requirements of section 5(b)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-5(b)(1)) and the rules adopted thereunder.

(4) Portfolio liquidity. The money market fund must hold securities that are sufficiently liquid to meet reasonably foreseeable shareholder redemptions in light of the fund’s obligations under section 22(e) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-22(e)) and any commitments the fund has made to shareholders; provided, however, that:

(i) Illiquid securities. The money market fund may not acquire any illiquid security if, immediately after the acquisition, the money market fund would have invested more than five percent of its total assets in illiquid securities.

(ii) Minimum daily liquidity requirement. The money market fund may not acquire any security other than a daily liquid asset if, immediately after the acquisition, the fund would have invested less than ten percent of its total assets in daily liquid assets. This provision does not apply to tax exempt funds.

(iii) Minimum weekly liquidity requirement. The money market fund may not acquire
any security other than a weekly liquid asset if, immediately after the acquisition, the fund would have invested less than thirty percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets.

(e) *Demand features and guarantees not relied upon.* If the fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on a demand feature or guarantee to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section), or maturity (pursuant to paragraph (i) of this section), or liquidity of a portfolio security (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section), and maintains a record of this determination (pursuant to paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(7) of this section), then the fund may disregard such demand feature or guarantee for all purposes of this section.

(f) *Downgrades, defaults and other events.*

(i) *Downgrades.*

(ii) *General.* Upon the occurrence of either of the events specified in paragraphs (f)(1)(i)(A) and (B) of this section with respect to a portfolio security, the board of directors of the money market fund shall reassess promptly whether such security continues to present minimal credit risks and shall cause the fund to take such action as the board of directors determines is in the best interests of the money market fund:

(A) A portfolio security of a money market fund ceases to be a first tier security (either because it no longer has the highest rating from the requisite NRSROs or, in the case of an unrated security, the board of directors of the money market fund determines that it is no longer of comparable quality to a first tier security); and

(B) The money market fund’s investment adviser (or any person to whom the fund’s board of directors has delegated portfolio management responsibilities) becomes aware that any unrated security or second tier security held by the money market fund has, since the security was acquired by the fund, been given a rating by a designated NRSRO below the designated
NRSRO's second highest short-term rating category.

(ii) *Securities to be disposed of.* The reassessments required by paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this section shall not be required if the fund disposes of the security (or it matures) within five business days of the specified event and, in the case of events specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i)(B) of this section, the board is subsequently notified of the adviser's actions.

(iii) *Special rule for certain securities subject to demand features.* In the event that after giving effect to a rating downgrade, more than 2.5 percent of the fund's total assets are invested in securities issued by or subject to demand features from a single institution that are second tier securities, the fund shall reduce its investment in securities issued by or subject to demand features from that institution to no more than 2.5 percent of its total assets by exercising the demand features at the next succeeding exercise date(s), absent a finding by the board of directors that disposal of the portfolio security would not be in the best interests of the money market fund.

(2) *Defaults and other events.* Upon the occurrence of any of the events specified in paragraphs (f)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section with respect to a portfolio security, the money market fund shall dispose of such security as soon as practicable consistent with achieving an orderly disposition of the security, by sale, exercise of any demand feature or otherwise, absent a finding by the board of directors that disposal of the portfolio security would not be in the best interests of the money market fund (which determination may take into account, among other factors, market conditions that could affect the orderly disposition of the portfolio security):

(i) The default with respect to a portfolio security (other than an immaterial default unrelated to the financial condition of the issuer);

(ii) A portfolio security ceases to be an eligible security;
(iii) A portfolio security has been determined to no longer present minimal credit

risks; or

(iv) An event of insolvency occurs with respect to the issuer of a portfolio security or

the provider of any demand feature or guarantee.

(3) Notice to the Commission. The money market fund must notify the Commission

of the occurrence of certain material events, as specified in Form N-CR (§ 274.222 of this

chapter).

(4) Defaults for purposes of paragraphs (f)(2) and (3) of this section. For purposes of

paragraphs (f)(2) and (3) of this section, an instrument subject to a demand feature or guarantee

shall not be deemed to be in default (and an event of insolvency with respect to the security shall

not be deemed to have occurred) if:

(i) In the case of an instrument subject to a demand feature, the demand feature has

been exercised and the fund has recovered either the principal amount or the amortized cost of

the instrument, plus accrued interest;

(ii) The provider of the guarantee is continuing, without protest, to make payments as

due on the instrument; or

(iii) The provider of a guarantee with respect to an asset-backed security pursuant to

paragraph (a)(16)(ii) of this section is continuing, without protest, to provide credit, liquidity or

other support as necessary to permit the asset-backed security to make payments as due.

(g) Required procedures. The money market fund’s board of directors must adopt

written procedures including the following:

(1) General. In supervising the money market fund’s operations and delegating

special responsibilities involving portfolio management to the money market fund’s investment
adviser, the money market fund's board of directors, as a particular responsibility within the overall duty of care owed to its shareholders, must establish written procedures reasonably designed, taking into account current market conditions, to achieve the fund's investment objectives of earning short-term yields, consistent with the preservation of capital and, for a money market that relies on the exemptions provided by paragraph (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this section, to assure to the extent reasonably practicable that the money market fund's price per share, as computed for the purpose of distribution, redemption and repurchase, rounded to the nearest one percent, will not deviate from the stable price established by the board of directors.

(2) Securities for which maturity is determined by reference to demand features. In the case of a security for which maturity is determined by reference to a demand feature, written procedures shall require ongoing review of the security's continued minimal credit risks, and that review must be based on, among other things, financial data for the most recent fiscal year of the issuer of the demand feature and, in the case of a security subject to a conditional demand feature, the issuer of the security whose financial condition must be monitored under paragraph (d)(2)(iv) of this section, whether such data is publicly available or provided under the terms of the security's governing documentation.

(3) Securities subject to demand features or guarantees. In the case of a security subject to one or more demand features or guarantees that the fund's board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section), maturity (pursuant to paragraph (i) of this section) or liquidity (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section) of the security subject to the demand feature or guarantee, written procedures must require periodic evaluation of such determination.

(4) Adjustable rate securities without demand features. In the case of a variable rate
or floating rate security that is not subject to a demand feature and for which maturity is
determined pursuant to paragraph (i)(1), (i)(2) or (i)(4) of this section, written procedures shall
require periodic review of whether the interest rate formula, upon readjustment of its interest
rate, can reasonably be expected to cause the security to have a market value that approximates
its amortized cost value.

(5) Ten percent obligors of asset-backed securities. In the case of an asset-backed
security, written procedures must require the fund to periodically determine the number of ten
percent obligors (as that term is used in paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section) deemed to be the
issuers of all or a portion of the asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of
this section; provided, however, written procedures need not require periodic determinations
with respect to any asset-backed security that a fund’s board of directors has determined, at the
time of acquisition, will not have, or is unlikely to have, ten percent obligors that are deemed to
be issuers of all or a portion of that asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D)
of this section, and maintains a record of this determination.

(6) Asset-backed securities not subject to guarantees. In the case of an asset-backed
security for which the fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on the
sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit or other
support in connection with the asset-backed security to determine the quality (pursuant to
paragraph (d)(2) of this section) or liquidity (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section) of the
asset-backed security, written procedures must require periodic evaluation of such determination.

(7) Stress Testing. Written procedures must provide for:

(i) The periodic testing, at such intervals as the board of directors determines
appropriate and reasonable in light of current market conditions, of the money market fund’s
ability to have invested at least fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets and, in
the case of a money market fund relying on the exemptions provided by paragraph (c)(2) or (3)
of this section, the fund's ability to maintain the stable price per share established by the board of
directors for the purpose of distribution, redemption, and repurchase, based upon specified
hypothetical events that include, but are not limited to:

(A) Increases in the general level of short-term interest rates;

(B) An increase in shareholder redemptions, together with an assessment of how the
fund would meet the redemptions, taking into consideration assumptions regarding the relative
liquidity of the fund's portfolio securities, the prices for which portfolio securities could be sold,
the fund's historical experience meeting redemption requests, and any other relevant factors;

(C) A downgrade or default of portfolio securities, and the effects these events could
have on other securities held by the fund;

(D) The widening or narrowing of spreads among the indexes to which interest rates
of portfolio securities are tied;

(E) Other movements in interest rates that may affect the fund's portfolio securities,
such as parallel and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve; and

(F) Combinations of these and any other events the adviser deems relevant, assuming
a positive correlation of risk factors (e.g., assuming that a security default likely will be followed
by increased redemptions) and taking into consideration the extent to which the fund's portfolio
securities are correlated such that adverse events affecting a given security are likely to also
affect one or more other securities (e.g., a consideration of whether issuers in the same or related
industries or geographic regions would be affected by adverse events affecting issuers in the
same industry or geographic region).
(ii) A report on the results of such testing to be provided to the board of directors at its next regularly scheduled meeting (or sooner, if appropriate in light of the results), which report must include:

(A) The date(s) on which the testing was performed and the magnitude of each hypothetical event that would cause the money market fund to have invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets and, in the case of a money market fund relying on the exemptions provided by paragraph (c)(2) or (3) of this section, that would cause the fund’s price per share for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase to deviate from the stable price per share established by the board of directors; and

(B) An assessment by the fund’s adviser of the fund’s ability to withstand the events (and concurrent occurrences of those events) that are reasonably likely to occur within the following year, including such information as may reasonably be necessary for the board of directors to evaluate the stress testing conducted by the adviser and the results of the testing.

(h) Record keeping and reporting.

(1) Written procedures. For a period of not less than six years following the replacement of such procedures with new procedures (the first two years in an easily accessible place), a written copy of the procedures (and any modifications thereto) described in paragraphs (g) and (j) of this section must be maintained and preserved.

(2) Board considerations and actions. For a period of not less than six years (the first two years in an easily accessible place) a written record must be maintained and preserved of the board of directors’ considerations and actions taken in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities, as set forth in this section, to be included in the minutes of the board of directors’ meetings.
(3)  *Credit risk analysis.* For a period of not less than three years from the date that the credit risks of a portfolio security were most recently reviewed, a written record of the determination that a portfolio security presents minimal credit risks and the designated NRSRO ratings (if any) used to determine the status of the security as an eligible security, first tier security or second tier security shall be maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place.

(4)  *Determinations with respect to adjustable rate securities.* For a period of not less than three years from the date when the assessment was most recently made, a written record must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the determination required by paragraph (g)(4) of this section (that a variable rate or floating rate security that is not subject to a demand feature and for which maturity is determined pursuant to paragraph (i)(1), (i)(2) or (i)(4) of this section can reasonably be expected, upon readjustment of its interest rate at all times during the life of the instrument, to have a market value that approximates its amortized cost).

(5)  *Determinations with respect to asset-backed securities.* For a period of not less than three years from the date when the determination was most recently made, a written record must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the determinations required by paragraph (g)(5) of this section (the number of ten percent obligors (as that term is used in paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section) deemed to be the issuers of all or a portion of the asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section). The written record must include:

(i)  The identities of the ten percent obligors (as that term is used in paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section), the percentage of the qualifying assets constituted by the securities of each ten percent obligor and the percentage of the fund’s total assets that are invested in securities of each ten percent obligor; and
(ii) Any determination that an asset-backed security will not have, or is unlikely to have, ten percent obligors deemed to be issuers of all or a portion of that asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section.

(6) Evaluate with respect to asset-backed securities not subject to guarantees. For a period of not less than three years from the date when the evaluation was most recently made, a written record must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the evaluation required by paragraph (g)(6) of this section (regarding asset-backed securities not subject to guarantees).

(7) Evaluate with respect to securities subject to demand features or guarantees. For a period of not less than three years from the date when the evaluation was most recently made, a written record must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the evaluation required by paragraph (g)(3) of this section (regarding securities subject to one or more demand features or guarantees).

(8) Reports with respect to stress testing. For a period of not less than six years (the first two years in an easily accessible place), a written copy of the report required under paragraph (g)(7)(ii) of this section must be maintained and preserved.

(9) Inspection of records. The documents preserved pursuant to paragraph (h) of this section are subject to inspection by the Commission in accordance with section 31(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-30(b)) as if such documents were records required to be maintained pursuant to rules adopted under section 31(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-30(a)).

(10) Website disclosure of portfolio holdings and other fund information. The money market fund must post prominently on its website the following information:

(i) For a period of not less than six months, beginning no later than the fifth business
day of the month, a schedule of its investments, as of the last business day or subsequent
calendar day of the preceding month, that includes the following information:

(A) With respect to the money market fund and each class of redeemable shares
thereof:

(1) The WAM; and
(2) The WAL.

(B) With respect to each security held by the money market fund:

(1) Name of the issuer;
(2) Category of investment (indicate the category that most closely identifies the
instrument from among the following: U.S. Treasury Debt; U.S. Government Agency Debt; Non
U.S. Sovereign Debt; Non U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt; Variable Rate Demand Note; Other
Municipal Debt; Financial Company Commercial Paper; Asset-Backed Commercial Paper;
Other Asset-Backed Security; Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper; Collateralized
Commercial Paper; Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits);
Structured Investment Vehicle Note; Other Note; U.S. Treasury Repurchase Agreement;
Government Agency Repurchase Agreement; Other Repurchase Agreement; Insurance Company
Funding Agreement; Investment Company; Other Instrument);

(3) CUSIP number (if any);
(4) Principal amount;
(5) The maturity date determined by taking into account the maturity shortening
provisions in paragraph (i) of this section (i.e., the maturity date used to calculate WAM under
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section);

(6) The maturity date determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i)
of this section regarding interest rate readjustments (i.e., the maturity used to calculate WAL under paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section);

(7) Coupon or yield; and

(8) Value.

(ii) A schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction, which must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day, showing, as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months:

(A) The percentage of the money market fund’s total assets invested in daily liquid assets;

(B) The percentage of the money market fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets; and

(C) The money market fund’s net inflows or outflows.

(iii) A schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the money market fund’s net asset value per share (which each fund relying on the exemption provided by paragraph (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this section must calculate based on current market factors before applying the penny rounding method), rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of funds with a $1.0000 share price or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price (e.g., $10.0000 or $100.00 per share), as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months, which must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day.

(iv) A link to a website of the Securities and Exchange Commission where a user may obtain the most recent 12 months of publicly available information filed by the money market fund pursuant to § 270.30b1-7.

(v) For a period of not less than one year, beginning no later than the first business
day following the occurrence of any event specified in Part C of Form N-CR (§274.222 of this chapter), the same information that the money market fund is required to report to the Commission on Part C of Form N-CR concerning such event.

(i) **Maturity of portfolio securities.** For purposes of this section, the maturity of a portfolio security shall be deemed to be the period remaining (calculated from the trade date or such other date on which the fund’s interest in the security is subject to market action) until the date on which, in accordance with the terms of the security, the principal amount must unconditionally be paid, or in the case of a security called for redemption, the date on which the redemption payment must be made, except as provided in paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(8) of this section:

(1) **Adjustable rate government securities.** A government security that is a variable rate security where the variable rate of interest is readjusted no less frequently than every 397 calendar days shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the next readjustment of the interest rate. A government security that is a floating rate security shall be deemed to have a remaining maturity of one day.

(2) **Short-term variable rate securities.** A variable rate security, the principal amount of which, in accordance with the terms of the security, must unconditionally be paid in 397 calendar days or less shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the earlier of the period remaining until the next readjustment of the interest rate or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(3) **Long-term variable rate securities.** A variable rate security, the principal amount of which is scheduled to be paid in more than 397 calendar days, that is subject to a demand feature, shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the longer of the period remaining until the
next readjustment of the interest rate or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(4)  *Short-term floating rate securities.* A floating rate security, the principal amount of which, in accordance with the terms of the security, must unconditionally be paid in 397 calendar days or less shall be deemed to have a maturity of one day, except for purposes of determining WAL under paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section, in which case it shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(5)  *Long-term floating rate securities.* A floating rate security, the principal amount of which is scheduled to be paid in more than 397 calendar days, that is subject to a demand feature, shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(6)  *Repurchase agreements.* A repurchase agreement shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the date on which the repurchase of the underlying securities is scheduled to occur, or, where the agreement is subject to demand, the notice period applicable to a demand for the repurchase of the securities.

(7)  *Portfolio lending agreements.* A portfolio lending agreement shall be treated as having a maturity equal to the period remaining until the date on which the loaned securities are scheduled to be returned, or where the agreement is subject to demand, the notice period applicable to a demand for the return of the loaned securities.

(8)  *Money market fund securities.* An investment in a money market fund shall be treated as having a maturity equal to the period of time within which the acquired money market fund is required to make payment upon redemption, unless the acquired money market fund has
agreed in writing to provide redemption proceeds to the investing money market fund within a shorter time period, in which case the maturity of such investment shall be deemed to be the shorter period.

(i) **Delegation.** The money market fund’s board of directors may delegate to the fund’s investment adviser or officers the responsibility to make any determination required to be made by the board of directors under this section other than the determinations required by paragraphs (a)(10)(i) (designation of NRSROs), (f)(2) (defaults and other events), (g)(1) (general required procedures), and (g)(7) (stress testing procedures) of this section.

(1) **Written guidelines.** The board of directors must establish and periodically review written guidelines (including guidelines for determining whether securities present minimal credit risks as required in paragraph (d)(2) of this section) and procedures under which the delegate makes such determinations.

(2) **Oversight.** The board of directors must take any measures reasonably necessary (through periodic reviews of fund investments and the delegate’s procedures in connection with investment decisions and prompt review of the adviser’s actions in the event of the default of a security or event of insolvency with respect to the issuer of the security or any guarantee or demand feature to which it is subject that requires notification of the Commission under paragraph (f)(3) of this section by reference to Form N-CR (§274.222 of this chapter)) to assure that the guidelines and procedures are being followed.

**Alternative 2**

§ 270.2a-7 Money market funds.

(a) **Definitions.**

(1) **Acquisition** (or **Acquire**) means any purchase or subsequent rollover (but does not
include the failure to exercise a demand feature).

(2) Amortized cost means the value of a security at the fund’s acquisition cost as adjusted for amortization of premium or accretion of discount rather than at the security’s value based on current market factors.

(3) Asset-backed security means a fixed income security (other than a government security) issued by a special purpose entity (as defined in this paragraph (a)(3)), substantially all of the assets of which consist of qualifying assets (as defined in this paragraph (a)(3)). Special purpose entity means a trust, corporation, partnership or other entity organized for the sole purpose of issuing securities that entitle their holders to receive payments that depend primarily on the cash flow from qualifying assets, but does not include a registered investment company. Qualifying assets means financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash within a finite time period, plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security holders.

(4) Business day means any day, other than Saturday, Sunday, or any customary business holiday.

(5) Collateralized fully has the same meaning as defined in § 270.5b-3(c)(1) except that § 270.5b-3(c)(1)(iv)C) and (D) shall not apply.

(6) Conditional demand feature means a demand feature that is not an unconditional demand feature. A conditional demand feature is not a guarantee.

(7) Conduit security means a security issued by a municipal issuer (as defined in this paragraph (a)(7)) involving an arrangement or agreement entered into, directly or indirectly, with a person other than a municipal issuer, which arrangement or agreement provides for or secures repayment of the security. Municipal issuer means a state or territory of the United States
(including the District of Columbia), or any political subdivision or public instrumentality of a state or territory of the United States. A conduit security does not include a security that is:

(i) Fully and unconditionally guaranteed by a municipal issuer;

(ii) Payable from the general revenues of the municipal issuer or other municipal issuers (other than those revenues derived from an agreement or arrangement with a person who is not a municipal issuer that provides for or secures repayment of the security issued by the municipal issuer);

(iii) Related to a project owned and operated by a municipal issuer; or

(iv) Related to a facility leased to and under the control of an industrial or commercial enterprise that is part of a public project which, as a whole, is owned and under the control of a municipal issuer.

(8) *Daily liquid assets* means:

(i) Cash;

(ii) Direct obligations of the U.S. Government;

(iii) Securities that will mature, as determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments, or are subject to a demand feature that is exercisable and payable, within one business day; or

(iv) Amounts receivable and due unconditionally within one business day on pending sales of portfolio securities.

(9) *Demand feature* means a feature permitting the holder of a security to sell the security at an exercise price equal to the approximate amortized cost of the security plus accrued interest, if any, at the later of the time of exercise or the settlement of the transaction, paid within 397 calendar days of exercise.
(10) **Designated NRSRO** means any one of at least four nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, as that term is defined in section 3(a)(62) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(62)), that:

(i) The money market fund's board of directors:

(A) Has designated as an NRSRO whose credit ratings with respect to any obligor or security or particular obligors or securities will be used by the fund to determine whether a security is an eligible security; and

(B) Determines at least once each calendar year issues credit ratings that are sufficiently reliable for such use;

(ii) Is not an "affiliated person," as defined in section 2(a)(3)(C) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(3)(C)), of the issuer of, or any insurer or provider of credit support for, the security; and

(iii) The fund discloses in its statement of additional information is a designated NRSRO, including any limitations with respect to the fund's use of such designation.

(11) **Eligible security** means:

(i) A rated security with a remaining maturity of 397 calendar days or less that has received a rating from the requisite NRSROs in one of the two highest short-term rating categories (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating relative standing); or

(ii) An unrated security that is of comparable quality to a security meeting the requirements for a rated security in paragraph (a)(11)(i) of this section, as determined by the money market fund's board of directors; provided, however, that: a security that at the time of issuance had a remaining maturity of more than 397 calendar days but that has a remaining maturity of 397 calendar days or less and that is an unrated security is not an eligible security if
the security has received a long-term rating from any designated NRSRO that is not within the designated NRSRO's three highest long-term ratings categories (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating relative standing), unless the security has received a long-term rating from the requisite NRSROs in one of the three highest rating categories.

(iii) In addition, in the case of a security that is subject to a demand feature or guarantee:

(A) The guarantee has received a rating from a designated NRSRO or the guarantee is issued by a guarantor that has received a rating from a designated NRSRO with respect to a class of debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class) that is comparable in priority and security to the guarantee, unless:

(I) The guarantee is issued by a person that, directly or indirectly, controls, is controlled by or is under common control with the issuer of the security subject to the guarantee (other than a sponsor of a special purpose entity with respect to an asset-backed security);

(2) The security subject to the guarantee is a repurchase agreement that is collateralized fully; or

(3) The guarantee is itself a government security; and

(B) The issuer of the demand feature or guarantee, or another institution, has undertaken promptly to notify the holder of the security in the event the demand feature or guarantee is substituted with another demand feature or guarantee (if such substitution is permissible under the terms of the demand feature or guarantee).

(12) Event of insolvency has the same meaning as defined in § 270.5b-3(c)(2).

(13) First tier security means any eligible security that:

(i) Is a rated security that has received a short-term rating from the requisite
NRSROs in the highest short-term rating category for debt obligations (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating relative standing);

(ii) Is an unrated security that is of comparable quality to a security meeting the requirements for a rated security in paragraph (a)(13)(i) of this section, as determined by the fund's board of directors;

(iii) Is a security issued by a registered investment company that is a money market fund; or

(iv) Is a government security.

(14) *Floating rate security* means a security the terms of which provide for the adjustment of its interest rate whenever a specified interest rate changes and that, at any time until the final maturity of the instrument or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand, can reasonably be expected to have a market value that approximates its amortized cost.

(15) *Government security* has the same meaning as defined in section 2(a)(16) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(16)).

(16) *Guarantee:*

(i) Means an unconditional obligation of a person other than the issuer of the security to undertake to pay, upon presentment by the holder of the guarantee (if required), the principal amount of the underlying security plus accrued interest when due or upon default, or, in the case of an unconditional demand feature, an obligation that entitles the holder to receive upon the later of exercise or the settlement of the transaction the approximate amortized cost of the underlying security or securities, plus accrued interest, if any. A guarantee includes a letter of credit, financial guaranty (bond) insurance, and an unconditional demand feature (other than an
unconditional demand feature provided by the issuer of the security).

(ii) The sponsor of a special purpose entity with respect to an asset-backed security shall be deemed to have provided a guarantee with respect to the entire principal amount of the asset-backed security for purposes of this section, except paragraphs (a)(11)(iii) (definition of eligible security), (d)(2)(iii) (credit substitution), (d)(3)(iv)(A) (fractional guarantees) and (e) (guarantees not relied on) of this section, unless the money market fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit or other support to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section) or liquidity (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section) of the asset-backed security, and maintains a record of this determination (pursuant to paragraphs (g)(6) and (h)(6) of this section).

(17) *Guarantee issued by a non-controlled person* means a guarantee issued by:

(i) A person that, directly or indirectly, does not control, and is not controlled by or under common control with the issuer of the security subject to the guarantee (*control* has the same meaning as defined in section 2(a)(9) of the Act) (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(9)); or

(ii) A sponsor of a special purpose entity with respect to an asset-backed security if the money market fund’s board of directors has made the findings described in paragraph (g)(6) of this section.

(18) *Illiquid security* means a security that cannot be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business within seven calendar days at approximately the value ascribed to it by the fund.

(19) *Penny-rounding method* of pricing means the method of computing an investment company’s price per share for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase whereby the
current net asset value per share is rounded to the nearest one percent.

(20) **Rated security** means a security that meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)(20)(i) or (ii) of this section, in each case subject to paragraph (a)(20)(iii) of this section:

(i) The security has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO, or has been issued by an issuer that has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO with respect to a class of debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class) that is comparable in priority and security with the security; or

(ii) The security is subject to a guarantee that has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO, or a guarantee issued by a guarantor that has received a short-term rating from a designated NRSRO with respect to a class of debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class) that is comparable in priority and security with the guarantee; but

(iii) A security is not a rated security if it is subject to an external credit support agreement (including an arrangement by which the security has become a refunded security) that was not in effect when the security was assigned its rating, unless the security has received a short-term rating reflecting the existence of the credit support agreement as provided in paragraph (a)(20)(i) of this section, or the credit support agreement with respect to the security has received a short-term rating as provided in paragraph (a)(20)(ii) of this section.

(21) **Refunded security** has the same meaning as defined in § 270.5b-3(c)(4).

(22) **Requisite NRSROs** means:

(i) Any two designated NRSROs that have issued a rating with respect to a security or class of debt obligations of an issuer; or

(ii) If only one designated NRSRO has issued a rating with respect to such security or class of debt obligations of an issuer at the time the fund acquires the security, that designated
NRSRO.

(23)  *Second tier security* means any eligible security that is not a first tier security.

(24)  *Single state fund* means a tax exempt fund that holds itself out as seeking to maximize the amount of its distributed income that is exempt from the income taxes or other taxes on investments of a particular state and, where applicable, subdivisions thereof.

(25)  *Tax exempt fund* means any money market fund that holds itself out as distributing income exempt from regular federal income tax.

(26)  *Total assets* means the total value of the money market fund’s assets, as defined in section 2(a)(41) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(41)) and the rules thereunder.

(27)  *Unconditional demand feature* means a demand feature that by its terms would be readily exercisable in the event of a default in payment of principal or interest on the underlying security or securities.

(28)  *United States dollar-denominated* means, with reference to a security, that all principal and interest payments on such security are payable to security holders in United States dollars under all circumstances and that the interest rate of, the principal amount to be repaid, and the timing of payments related to such security do not vary or float with the value of a foreign currency, the rate of interest payable on foreign currency borrowings, or with any other interest rate or index expressed in a currency other than United States dollars.

(29)  *Unrated security* means a security that is not a rated security.

(30)  *Variable rate security* means a security the terms of which provide for the adjustment of its interest rate on set dates (such as the last day of a month or calendar quarter) and that, upon each adjustment until the final maturity of the instrument or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand, can reasonably be expected to have
a market value that approximates its amortized cost.

(31) *Weekly liquid assets* means:

(i) Cash;

(ii) Direct obligations of the U.S. Government;

(iii) Government securities that are issued by a person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the government of the United States pursuant to authority granted by the Congress of the United States that:

(A) Are issued at a discount to the principal amount to be repaid at maturity without provision for the payment of interest; and

(B) Have a remaining maturity date of 60 days or less;

(iv) Securities that will mature, as determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments, or are subject to a demand feature that is exercisable and payable, within five business days; or

(v) Amounts receivable and due unconditionally within five business days on pending sales of portfolio securities.

(b) Holding out and use of names and titles.

(1) It shall be an untrue statement of material fact within the meaning of section 34(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-33(b)) for a registered investment company, in any registration statement, application, report, account, record, or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to the Act, including any advertisement, pamphlet, circular, form letter, or other sales literature addressed to or intended for distribution to prospective investors that is required to be filed with the Commission by section 24(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-24(b)), to hold itself out to investors as a money market fund or the equivalent of a money market fund, unless such registered
investment company complies with this section.

(2) It shall constitute the use of a materially deceptive or misleading name or title within the meaning of section 35(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-34(d)) for a registered investment company to adopt the term “money market” as part of its name or title or the name or title of any redeemable securities of which it is the issuer, or to adopt a name that suggests that it is a money market fund or the equivalent of a money market fund, unless such registered investment company complies with this section.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a name that suggests that a registered investment company is a money market fund or the equivalent thereof includes one that uses such terms as “cash,” “liquid,” “money,” “ready assets” or similar terms.

(c) **Share price calculations.** The current price per share, for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase, of any redeemable security issued by any registered investment company (“money market fund” or “fund”), notwithstanding the requirements of section 2(a)(41) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(41)) and of §§ 270.2a-4 and 270.22c-1, may be computed by use of the penny-rounding method; provided, however, that:

(1) **Board findings.** The board of directors of the money market fund must determine, in good faith, that it is in the best interests of the money market fund to maintain a stable price per share by virtue of the penny-rounding method.

(2) **Liquidity fees and temporary suspensions of redemptions.** Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(iii) of this section, and notwithstanding sections 22(e) and 27(i) of the Act (15 USC 80a-22(e) and 80a-27(i)) and § 270.22c-1:

(i) **Liquidity fees.** If, at the end of a business day, the money market fund has invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets, the fund must institute
a liquidity fee, effective as of the beginning of the next business day, as described in paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, unless the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that imposing the fee is not in the best interest of the fund.

(A) **Amount of liquidity fee.** The liquidity fee shall be two percent of the value of shares redeemed unless the money market fund’s board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that a lower fee level is in the best interest of the fund. If a liquidity fee remains in effect for more than one business day, the board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons of the fund, may vary the level of the liquidity fee (provided that the liquidity fee may not exceed two percent of the value of shares redeemed) if it determines that the new fee level is in the best interest of the fund, with the new fee level taking effect as of the beginning of the next business day.

(B) **Duration and application of liquidity fee.** Once imposed, a liquidity fee, which must be applied to all shares redeemed, shall remain in effect until the money market fund’s board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that imposing the liquidity fee is not in the best interest of the fund, provided that if, at the end of a business day, the money market fund has invested thirty percent or more of its total assets in weekly liquid assets, the fund must cease charging the liquidity fee, effective as of the beginning of the next business day.

(ii) **Temporary suspension of redemptions.** If, at the end of a business day, the money market fund has invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets, the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons of
the fund, may determine to suspend the right of redemption temporarily, effective at the beginning of the next business day, if the board determines that doing so is in the best interest of the fund. The temporary suspension of redemptions may remain in effect until the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines to restore the right of redemption, provided that the fund must restore the right of redemption within thirty calendar days of suspending redemptions (or the next business day following such day) or on such earlier business day if, at the end of the preceding business day, the money market fund has invested thirty percent or more of its total assets in weekly liquid assets. The money market fund may not suspend the right of redemption pursuant to this paragraph for more than thirty days in any ninety-day period.

(iii)  *Exemption for government money market funds.* A money market fund is not required to comply with paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section if and so long as eighty percent or more of the money market fund’s total assets are invested in cash, government securities, and/or repurchase agreements that are collateralized fully, but such a fund may choose not to rely on the exemption provided by this paragraph, and may impose liquidity fees and suspend redemptions temporarily, provided that the fund must then comply with paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section and any other requirements that apply to liquidity fees and temporary suspensions of redemptions (*e.g.*, Item 4(b)(1)(ii) of Form N-1A (§ 274.11A of this chapter)).

(iv)  *Variable contracts.* A variable insurance contract sold by a registered separate account funding variable insurance contracts or the sponsoring insurance company of such separate account may apply a liquidity fee or temporary suspension of redemptions pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section to contract owners who allocate all or a portion of their contract
value to a subaccount of the separate account that is either a money market fund or that invests all of its assets in shares of a money market fund.

(d)  

Risk-limiting conditions.

(1)  

Portfolio maturity. The money market fund must maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity appropriate to its objective of maintaining a stable price per share; provided, however, that the money market fund must not:

(i)  
Acquire any instrument with a remaining maturity of greater than 397 calendar days;

(ii)  
Maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity ("WAM") that exceeds 60 calendar days; or

(iii)  
Maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity that exceeds 120 calendar days, determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments ("WAL").

(2)  

Portfolio quality.

(i)  
General. The money market fund must limit its portfolio investments to those United States dollar-denominated securities that the fund’s board of directors determines present minimal credit risks (which determination must be based on factors pertaining to credit quality in addition to any rating assigned to such securities by a designated NRSRO) and that are at the time of acquisition eligible securities.

(ii)  
Second tier securities. No money market fund may acquire a second tier security with a remaining maturity of greater than 45 calendar days, determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments. Immediately after the acquisition of any second tier security, a money market fund must not have invested
more than three percent of its total assets in second tier securities.

(iii) Securities subject to guarantees. A security that is subject to a guarantee may be determined to be an eligible security or a first tier security based solely on whether the guarantee is an eligible security or first tier security, as the case may be.

(iv) Securities subject to conditional demand features. A security that is subject to a conditional demand feature ("underlying security") may be determined to be an eligible security or a first tier security only if:

(A) The conditional demand feature is an eligible security or first tier security, as the case may be;

(B) At the time of the acquisition of the underlying security, the money market fund’s board of directors has determined that there is minimal risk that the circumstances that would result in the conditional demand feature not being exercisable will occur; and

(I) The conditions limiting exercise either can be monitored readily by the fund or relate to the taxability, under federal, state or local law, of the interest payments on the security; or

(2) The terms of the conditional demand feature require that the fund will receive notice of the occurrence of the condition and the opportunity to exercise the demand feature in accordance with its terms; and

(C) The underlying security or any guarantee of such security (or the debt securities of the issuer of the underlying security or guarantee that are comparable in priority and security with the underlying security or guarantee) has received either a short-term rating or a long-term rating, as the case may be, from the requisite NRSROs within the NRSROs’ two highest short-term or long-term rating categories (within which there may be sub-categories or gradations
indicating relative standing) or, if unrated, is determined to be of comparable quality by the

money market fund’s board of directors to a security that has received a rating from the requisite
NRSROs within the NRSROs’ two highest short-term or long-term rating categories, as the case
may be.

(3) **Portfolio diversification.**

(i) **Issuer diversification.** The money market fund must be diversified with respect to
issuers of securities acquired by the fund as provided in paragraphs (d)(3)(i) and (d)(3)(ii) of this
section, other than with respect to government securities and securities subject to a guarantee
issued by a non-controlled person.

(A) **Taxable and national funds.** Immediately after the acquisition of any security, a
money market fund other than a single state fund must not have invested more than:

(1) Five percent of its total assets in securities issued by the issuer of the security,

provided, however, that such a fund may invest up to twenty-five percent of its total assets in the
first tier securities of a single issuer for a period of up to three business days after the acquisition
thereof; provided, further, that the fund may not invest in the securities of more than one issuer
in accordance with the foregoing proviso in this paragraph at any time; and

(2) Ten percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features
or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(B) **Single state funds.** Immediately after the acquisition of any security, a single state
fund must not have invested:

(1) With respect to seventy-five percent of its total assets, more than five percent of
its total assets in securities issued by the issuer of the security; and

(2) With respect to all of its total assets, more than ten percent of its total assets in
securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued
the demand feature or guarantee.

(C) Second tier securities. Immediately after the acquisition of any second tier
security, a money market fund must not have invested more than one half of one percent of its
total assets in the second tier securities of any single issuer, and must not have invested more
than 2.5 percent of its total assets in second tier securities issued by or subject to demand features
or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(ii) Issuer diversification calculations. For purposes of making calculations under
paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section:

(A) Repurchase agreements. The acquisition of a repurchase agreement may be
deemed to be an acquisition of the underlying securities, provided the obligation of the seller to
repurchase the securities from the money market fund is collateralized fully and the fund’s board
of directors has evaluated the seller’s creditworthiness.

(B) Refunded securities. The acquisition of a refunded security shall be deemed to be
an acquisition of the escrowed government securities.

(C) Conduit securities. A conduit security shall be deemed to be issued by the person
(other than the municipal issuer) ultimately responsible for payments of interest and principal on
the security.

(D) Asset-backed securities.

(l) General. An asset-backed security acquired by a fund (“primary ABS”) shall be
deemed to be issued by the special purpose entity that issued the asset-backed security, provided,
however:

(i) Holdings of primary ABS. Any person whose obligations constitute ten percent or
section (ii) Holdings of secondary ABS. If a ten percent obligor of a primary ABS is itself a special purpose entity issuing asset-backed securities ("secondary ABS"), any ten percent obligor of such secondary ABS also shall be deemed to be an issuer of the portion of the primary ABS that such ten percent obligor represents.

(2) Restricted special purpose entities. A ten percent obligor with respect to a primary or secondary ABS shall not be deemed to have issued any portion of the assets of a primary ABS as provided in paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D)(i) of this section if that ten percent obligor is itself a special purpose entity issuing asset-backed securities ("restricted special purpose entity"), and the securities that it issues (other than securities issued to a company that controls, or is controlled by or under common control with, the restricted special purpose entity and which is not itself a special purpose entity issuing asset-backed securities) are held by only one other special purpose entity.

(3) Demand features and guarantees. In the case of a ten percent obligor deemed to be an issuer, the fund must satisfy the diversification requirements of paragraphs (d)(3)(iii) of this section with respect to any demand feature or guarantee to which the ten percent obligor’s obligations are subject.

(E) Shares of other money market funds. A money market fund that acquires shares issued by another money market fund in an amount that would otherwise be prohibited by paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section shall nonetheless be deemed in compliance with this section if the board of directors of the acquiring money market fund reasonably believes that the fund in which it has invested is in compliance with this section.
(F) Treatment of certain affiliated entities. The money market fund, when calculating the amount of its total assets invested in securities issued by any particular issuer for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section, must treat as a single issuer two or more issuers of securities owned by the money market fund if one issuer controls the other, is controlled by the other issuer, or is under common control with the other issuer, provided that “control” for this purpose means ownership of more than 50 percent of the issuer’s voting securities.

(iii) Diversification rules for demand features and guarantees. The money market fund must be diversified with respect to demand features and guarantees acquired by the fund as provided in paragraphs (d)(3)(iii) and (d)(3)(iv) of this section, other than with respect to a demand feature issued by the same institution that issued the underlying security, or with respect to a guarantee or demand feature that is itself a government security.

(A) General. Immediately after the acquisition of any demand feature or guarantee, any security subject to a demand feature or guarantee, or a security directly issued by the issuer of a demand feature or guarantee, a money market fund must not have invested more than ten percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.

(B) Second tier demand features or guarantees. Immediately after the acquisition of any demand feature or guarantee, any security subject to a demand feature or guarantee, a security directly issued by the issuer of a demand feature or guarantee, or a security after giving effect to the demand feature or guarantee, in all cases that is a second tier security, a money market fund must not have invested more than 2.5 percent of its total assets in securities issued by or subject to demand features or guarantees from the institution that issued the demand feature or guarantee.
(iv) Demand feature and guarantee diversification calculations.

(A) Fractional demand features or guarantees. In the case of a security subject to a demand feature or guarantee from an institution by which the institution guarantees a specified portion of the value of the security, the institution shall be deemed to guarantee the specified portion thereof.

(B) Layered demand features or guarantees. In the case of a security subject to demand features or guarantees from multiple institutions that have not limited the extent of their obligations as described in paragraph (d)(3)(iv)(A) of this section, each institution shall be deemed to have provided the demand feature or guarantee with respect to the entire principal amount of the security.

(v) Diversification safe harbor. A money market fund that satisfies the applicable diversification requirements of paragraphs (d)(3) and (e) of this section shall be deemed to have satisfied the diversification requirements of section 5(b)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-5(b)(1)) and the rules adopted thereunder.

(4) Portfolio liquidity. The money market fund must hold securities that are sufficiently liquid to meet reasonably foreseeable shareholder redemptions in light of the fund's obligations under section 22(e) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-22(e)) and any commitments the fund has made to shareholders; provided, however, that:

(i) Illiquid securities. The money market fund may not acquire any illiquid security if, immediately after the acquisition, the money market fund would have invested more than five percent of its total assets in illiquid securities.

(ii) Minimum daily liquidity requirement. The money market fund may not acquire any security other than a daily liquid asset if, immediately after the acquisition, the fund would
have invested less than ten percent of its total assets in daily liquid assets. This provision does not apply to tax exempt funds.

(iii) **Minimum weekly liquidity requirement.** The money market fund may not acquire any security other than a weekly liquid asset if, immediately after the acquisition, the fund would have invested less than thirty percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets.

(e) **Demand features and guarantees not relied upon.** If the fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on a demand feature or guarantee to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section), or maturity (pursuant to paragraph (i) of this section), or liquidity of a portfolio security (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section), and maintains a record of this determination (pursuant to paragraphs (g)(3) and (h)(7) of this section), then the fund may disregard such demand feature or guarantee for all purposes of this section.

(f) **Downgrades, defaults and other events.**

(1) **Downgrades.**

(i) **General.** Upon the occurrence of either of the events specified in paragraphs (f)(1)(i)(A) and (B) of this section with respect to a portfolio security, the board of directors of the money market fund shall reassess promptly whether such security continues to present minimal credit risks and shall cause the fund to take such action as the board of directors determines is in the best interests of the money market fund:

(A) A portfolio security of a money market fund ceases to be a first tier security (either because it no longer has the highest rating from the requisite NRSROs or, in the case of an unrated security, the board of directors of the money market fund determines that it is no longer of comparable quality to a first tier security); and

(B) The money market fund’s investment adviser (or any person to whom the fund’s
board of directors has delegated portfolio management responsibilities) becomes aware that any
unrated security or second tier security held by the money market fund has, since the security
was acquired by the fund, been given a rating by a designated NRSRO below the designated
NRSRO's second highest short-term rating category.

(ii) **Securities to be disposed of.** The reassessments required by paragraph (f)(1)(i) of
this section shall not be required if the fund disposes of the security (or it matures) within five
business days of the specified event and, in the case of events specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i)(B)
of this section, the board is subsequently notified of the adviser's actions.

(iii) **Special rule for certain securities subject to demand features.** In the event that
after giving effect to a rating downgrade, more than 2.5 percent of the fund's total assets are
invested in securities issued by or subject to demand features from a single institution that are
second tier securities, the fund shall reduce its investment in securities issued by or subject to
demand features from that institution to no more than 2.5 percent of its total assets by exercising
the demand features at the next succeeding exercise date(s), absent a finding by the board of
directors that disposal of the portfolio security would not be in the best interests of the money
market fund.

(2) **Defaults and other events.** Upon the occurrence of any of the events specified in
paragraphs (f)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section with respect to a portfolio security, the money
market fund shall dispose of such security as soon as practicable consistent with achieving an
orderly disposition of the security, by sale, exercise of any demand feature or otherwise, absent a
finding by the board of directors that disposal of the portfolio security would not be in the best
interests of the money market fund (which determination may take into account, among other
factors, market conditions that could affect the orderly disposition of the portfolio security):
(i) The default with respect to a portfolio security (other than an immaterial default unrelated to the financial condition of the issuer);

(ii) A portfolio security ceases to be an eligible security;

(iii) A portfolio security has been determined to no longer present minimal credit risks; or

(iv) An event of insolvency occurs with respect to the issuer of a portfolio security or the provider of any demand feature or guarantee.

(3) Notice to the Commission. The money market fund must notify the Commission of the occurrence of certain material events, as specified in Form N-CR (§ 274.222 of this chapter).

(4) Defaults for purposes of Paragraphs (f)(2) and (3) of this section. For purposes of paragraphs (f)(2) and (3) of this section, an instrument subject to a demand feature or guarantee shall not be deemed to be in default (and an event of insolvency with respect to the security shall not be deemed to have occurred) if:

(i) In the case of an instrument subject to a demand feature, the demand feature has been exercised and the fund has recovered either the principal amount or the amortized cost of the instrument, plus accrued interest;

(ii) The provider of the guarantee is continuing, without protest, to make payments as due on the instrument; or

(iii) The provider of a guarantee with respect to an asset-backed security pursuant to paragraph (a)(16)(ii) of this section is continuing, without protest, to provide credit, liquidity or other support as necessary to permit the asset-backed security to make payments as due.

(g) Required procedures. The money market fund’s board of directors must adopt
written procedures including the following:

(1) **General.** In supervising the money market fund’s operations and delegating special responsibilities involving portfolio management to the money market fund’s investment adviser, the money market fund’s board of directors, as a particular responsibility within the overall duty of care owed to its shareholders, must establish written procedures reasonably designed, taking into account current market conditions and the money market fund’s investment objectives, to assure to the extent reasonably practicable that the money market fund’s price per share, as computed for the purpose of distribution, redemption and repurchase, rounded to the nearest one percent, will not deviate from the stable price established by the board of directors.

(2) **Securities for which maturity is determined by reference to demand features.** In the case of a security for which maturity is determined by reference to a demand feature, written procedures shall require ongoing review of the security’s continued minimal credit risks, and that review must be based on, among other things, financial data for the most recent fiscal year of the issuer of the demand feature and, in the case of a security subject to a conditional demand feature, the issuer of the security whose financial condition must be monitored under paragraph (d)(2)(iv) of this section, whether such data is publicly available or provided under the terms of the security’s governing documentation.

(3) **Securities subject to demand features or guarantees.** In the case of a security subject to one or more demand features or guarantees that the fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section), maturity (pursuant to paragraph (i) of this section) or liquidity (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section) of the security subject to the demand feature or guarantee, written procedures must require periodic evaluation of such determination.
(4) **Adjustable rate securities without demand features.** In the case of a variable rate or floating rate security that is not subject to a demand feature and for which maturity is determined pursuant to paragraph (i)(1), (i)(2) or (i)(4) of this section, written procedures shall require periodic review of whether the interest rate formula, upon readjustment of its interest rate, can reasonably be expected to cause the security to have a market value that approximates its amortized cost value.

(5) **Ten percent obligors of asset-backed securities.** In the case of an asset-backed security, written procedures must require the fund to periodically determine the number of ten percent obligors (as that term is used in paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section) deemed to be the issuers of all or a portion of the asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section; provided, however, written procedures need not require periodic determinations with respect to any asset-backed security that a fund’s board of directors has determined, at the time of acquisition, will not have, or is unlikely to have, ten percent obligors that are deemed to be issuers of all or a portion of that asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section, and maintains a record of this determination.

(6) **Asset-backed securities not subject to guarantees.** In the case of an asset backed-security for which the fund’s board of directors has determined that the fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength or its ability or willingness to provide liquidity, credit or other support in connection with the asset-backed security to determine the quality (pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) of this section) or liquidity (pursuant to paragraph (d)(4) of this section) of the asset-backed security, written procedures must require periodic evaluation of such determination.

(7) **Stress testing.** Written procedures must provide for:

(i) The periodic testing, at such intervals as the board of directors determines
appropriate and reasonable in light of current market conditions, of the money market fund’s
ability to maintain the stable price per share established by the board of directors for the purpose
of distribution, redemption, and repurchase, and to have invested at least fifteen percent of its
assets in weekly liquid assets, based upon specified hypothetical events that include, but are not
limited to:

(A) Increases in the general level of short-term interest rates;

(B) An increase in shareholder redemptions, together with an assessment of how the
fund would meet the redemptions, taking into consideration assumptions regarding the relative
liquidity of the fund’s portfolio securities, the prices for which portfolio securities could be sold,
the fund’s historical experience meeting redemption requests, and any other relevant factors;

(C) A downgrade or default of portfolio securities, and the effects these events could
have on other securities held by the fund;

(D) The widening or narrowing of spreads among the indexes to which interest rates
of portfolio securities are tied;

(E) Other movements in interest rates that may affect the fund’s portfolio securities,
such as parallel and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve; and

(F) Combinations of these and any other events the adviser deems relevant, assuming
a positive correlation of risk factors (e.g., assuming that a security default likely will be followed
by increased redemptions) and taking into consideration the extent to which the fund’s portfolio
securities are correlated such that adverse events affecting a given security are likely to also
affect one or more other securities (e.g., a consideration of whether issuers in the same or related
industries or geographic regions would be affected by adverse events affecting issuers in the
same industry or geographic region).
(ii) A report on the results of such testing to be provided to the board of directors at its next regularly scheduled meeting (or sooner, if appropriate in light of the results), which report must include:

(A) The date(s) on which the testing was performed and the magnitude of each hypothetical event that would cause the fund’s price per share for purposes of distribution, redemption and repurchase to deviate from the stable price per share established by the board of directors, or cause the fund to have invested less than fifteen percent of its assets in weekly liquid assets; and

(B) An assessment by the fund’s adviser of the fund’s ability to withstand the events (and concurrent occurrences of those events) that are reasonably likely to occur within the following year, including such information as may reasonably be necessary for the board of directors to evaluate the stress testing conducted by the adviser and the results of the testing.

(h) Record keeping and reporting.

(1) Written procedures. For a period of not less than six years following the replacement of such procedures with new procedures (the first two years in an easily accessible place), a written copy of the procedures (and any modifications thereto) described in paragraphs (g) and (j) of this section must be maintained and preserved.

(2) Board considerations and actions. For a period of not less than six years (the first two years in an easily accessible place) a written record must be maintained and preserved of the board of directors’ considerations and actions taken in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities, as set forth in this section, to be included in the minutes of the board of directors’ meetings.

(3) Credit risk analysis. For a period of not less than three years from the date that
the credit risks of a portfolio security were most recently reviewed, a written record of the
determination that a portfolio security presents minimal credit risks and the designated NRSRO
ratings (if any) used to determine the status of the security as an eligible security, first tier
security or second tier security shall be maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place.

(4)  *Determinations with respect to adjustable rate securities.* For a period of not less
than three years from the date when the assessment was most recently made, a written record
must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the determination required by
paragraph (g)(4) of this section (that a variable rate or floating rate security that is not subject to
a demand feature and for which maturity is determined pursuant to paragraph (i)(1), (i)(2) or
(i)(4) of this section can reasonably be expected, upon readjustment of its interest rate at all times
during the life of the instrument, to have a market value that approximates its amortized cost).

(5)  *Determinations with respect to asset-backed securities.* For a period of not less
than three years from the date when the determination was most recently made, a written record
must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the determinations required
by paragraph (g)(5) of this section (the number of ten percent obligors (as that term is used in
paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section) deemed to be the issuers of all or a portion of the asset-
backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section). The written record must
include:

(i) The identities of the ten percent obligors (as that term is used in paragraph
(d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section), the percentage of the qualifying assets constituted by the securities
of each ten percent obligor and the percentage of the fund’s total assets that are invested in
securities of each ten percent obligor; and

(ii) Any determination that an asset-backed security will not have, or is unlikely to
have, ten percent obligors deemed to be issuers of all or a portion of that asset-backed security for purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(D) of this section.

(6) **Evaluations with respect to asset-backed securities not subject to guarantees.** For a period of not less than three years from the date when the evaluation was most recently made, a written record must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the evaluation required by paragraph (g)(6) of this section (regarding asset-backed securities not subject to guarantees).

(7) **Evaluations with respect to securities subject to demand features or guarantees.** For a period of not less than three years from the date when the evaluation was most recently made, a written record must be preserved and maintained, in an easily accessible place, of the evaluation required by paragraph (g)(3) of this section (regarding securities subject to one or more demand features or guarantees).

(8) **Reports with respect to stress testing.** For a period of not less than six years (the first two years in an easily accessible place), a written copy of the report required under paragraph (g)(7)(ii) of this section must be maintained and preserved.

(9) **Inspection of records.** The documents preserved pursuant to paragraph (h) of this section are subject to inspection by the Commission in accordance with section 31(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-30(b)) as if such documents were records required to be maintained pursuant to rules adopted under section 31(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-30(a)).

(10) **Website disclosure of portfolio holdings and other fund information.** The money market fund must post prominently on its website the following information:

(i) For a period of not less than six months, beginning no later than the fifth business day of the month, a schedule of its investments, as of the last business day or subsequent
calendar day of the preceding month, that includes the following information:

(A) With respect to the money market fund and each class of redeemable shares thereof:

(1) The WAM; and
(2) The WAL.

(B) With respect to each security held by the money market fund:

(1) Name of the issuer;
(2) Category of investment (indicate the category that most closely identifies the instrument from among the following: U.S. Treasury Debt; U.S. Government Agency Debt; Non U.S. Sovereign Debt; Non U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt; Variable Rate Demand Note; Other Municipal Debt; Financial Company Commercial Paper; Asset-Backed Commercial Paper; Other Asset-Backed Security; Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper; Collateralized Commercial Paper; Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits); Structured Investment Vehicle Note; Other Note; U.S. Treasury Repurchase Agreement; Government Agency Repurchase Agreement; Other Repurchase Agreement; Insurance Company Funding Agreement; Investment Company; Other Instrument);
(3) CUSIP number (if any);
(4) Principal amount;
(5) The maturity date determined by taking into account the maturity shortening provisions in paragraph (i) of this section (i.e., the maturity date used to calculate WAM under paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section);
(6) The maturity date determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of this section regarding interest rate readjustments (i.e., the maturity used to calculate WAL
under paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section;

(7) Coupon or yield; and

(8) Value.

(ii) A schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction, which must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day, showing, as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months:

(A) The percentage of the money market fund's total assets invested in daily liquid assets;

(B) The percentage of the money market fund's total assets invested in weekly liquid assets; and

(C) The money market fund's net inflows or outflows.

(iii) A schedule, chart, graph, or other depiction showing the money market fund's net asset value per share (which the fund must calculate based on current market factors before applying the penny-rounding method), rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of funds with a $1.0000 share price or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price (e.g., $10.000 or $100.00 per share), as of the end of each business day during the preceding six months, which must be updated each business day as of the end of the preceding business day.

(iv) A link to a website of the Securities and Exchange Commission where a user may obtain the most recent 12 months of publicly available information filed by the money market fund pursuant to § 270.30b1-7.

(v) For a period of not less than one year, beginning no later than the first business day following the occurrence of any event specified in Parts C, E, F, or G of Form N-CR (§
274.222 of this chapter), the same information that the money market fund is required to report
to the Commission on Part C, Part E (Items E.1 and E.2), Part F (Items F.1 and F.2), or Part G of
Form N-CR concerning such event.

(11) **Processing of transactions.** The money market fund (or its transfer agent) must
have the capacity to redeem and sell securities issued by the fund at a price based on the current
net asset value per share pursuant to § 270.22c-1. Such capacity must include the ability to
re redeem and sell securities at prices that do not correspond to a stable price per share.

(i) **Maturity of portfolio securities.** For purposes of this section, the maturity of a
portfolio security shall be deemed to be the period remaining (calculated from the trade date or
such other date on which the fund’s interest in the security is subject to market action) until the
date on which, in accordance with the terms of the security, the principal amount must
unconditionally be paid, or in the case of a security called for redemption, the date on which the
redemption payment must be made, except as provided in paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(8) of this
section:

(1) **Adjustable rate government securities.** A government security that is a variable
rate security where the variable rate of interest is readjusted no less frequently than every 397
calendar days shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the next
readjustment of the interest rate. A government security that is a floating rate security shall be
deemed to have a remaining maturity of one day.

(2) **Short-term variable rate securities.** A variable rate security, the principal amount
of which, in accordance with the terms of the security, must unconditionally be paid in 397
calendar days or less shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the earlier of the period
remaining until the next readjustment of the interest rate or the period remaining until the
principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(3)  Long-term variable rate securities. A variable rate security, the principal amount of which is scheduled to be paid in more than 397 calendar days, that is subject to a demand feature, shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the longer of the period remaining until the next readjustment of the interest rate or the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(4)  Short-term floating rate securities. A floating rate security, the principal amount of which, in accordance with the terms of the security, must unconditionally be paid in 397 calendar days or less shall be deemed to have a maturity of one day, except for purposes of determining WAL under paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section, in which case it shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(5)  Long-term floating rate securities. A floating rate security, the principal amount of which is scheduled to be paid in more than 397 calendar days, that is subject to a demand feature, shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the principal amount can be recovered through demand.

(6)  Repurchase agreements. A repurchase agreement shall be deemed to have a maturity equal to the period remaining until the date on which the repurchase of the underlying securities is scheduled to occur, or, where the agreement is subject to demand, the notice period applicable to a demand for the repurchase of the securities.

(7)  Portfolio lending agreements. A portfolio lending agreement shall be treated as having a maturity equal to the period remaining until the date on which the loaned securities are scheduled to be returned, or where the agreement is subject to demand, the notice period
applicable to a demand for the return of the loaned securities.

(8) **Money market fund securities.** An investment in a money market fund shall be
treated as having a maturity equal to the period of time within which the acquired money market
fund is required to make payment upon redemption, unless the acquired money market fund has
agreed in writing to provide redemption proceeds to the investing money market fund within a
shorter time period, in which case the maturity of such investment shall be deemed to be the
shorter period.

(j) **Delegation.** The money market fund’s board of directors may delegate to the
fund’s investment adviser or officers the responsibility to make any determination required to be
made by the board of directors under this section other than the determinations required by
paragraphs (a)(10)(i) (designation of NRSROs), (c)(1) (board findings), (c)(2)(i) and (ii)
(determinations related to liquidity fees and temporary suspensions), (f)(2) (defaults and other
events), (g)(1) (general required procedures), and (g)(7) (stress testing procedures) of this
section.

(1) **Written Guidelines.** The board of directors must establish and periodically review
written guidelines (including guidelines for determining whether securities present minimal
credit risks as required in paragraph (d)(2) of this section) and procedures under which the
delegate makes such determinations.

(2) **Oversight.** The board of directors must take any measures reasonably necessary
(through periodic reviews of fund investments and the delegate’s procedures in connection with
investment decisions and prompt review of the adviser’s actions in the event of the default of a
security or event of insolvency with respect to the issuer of the security or any guarantee or
demand feature to which it is subject that requires notification of the Commission under
paragraph (f)(3) of this section by reference to Form N-CR (§ 274.222 of this chapter)) to assure that the guidelines and procedures are being followed.

7. Section 270.12d3-1(d)(7)(v) is revised by removing “§ 270.2a-7(a)(8) and § 270.2a-7(a)(15)” and adding in its place “§ 270.2a-7(a)(9) and § 270.2a-7(a)(16)”.

8. Section 270.18f-3(c)(2)(i) is revised by removing the phrase “that determines net asset value using the amortized cost method permitted by § 270.2a-7” and adding in its place “that operates in compliance with § 270.2a-7”.

9. Section § 270.22e-3 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(1) and adding paragraph (d).

The revisions and additions read as follows.

**Alternative 1**

§ 270.22e-3  Exemption for liquidation of money market funds.

(a) * * *

(1) The fund, at the end of a business day, has invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets or, in the case of a fund relying on the exemptions provided by § 270.2a-7(c)(2) or (3), the fund’s price per share as computed for the purpose of distribution, redemption and repurchase, rounded to the nearest one percent, has deviated from the stable price established by the board of directors or the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that such a deviation is likely to occur;

* * *

(d) Definitions. Each of the terms business day, total assets, and weekly liquid assets has the same meaning as defined in § 270.2a-7.
Alternative 2

§ 270.22e-3  Exemption for liquidation of money market funds.

(a)  *    *    *

(1)  The fund, at the end of a business day, has invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets, or the fund’s price per share as computed for the purpose of distribution, redemption and repurchase, rounded to the nearest one percent, has deviated from the stable price established by the board of directors or the fund’s board of directors, including a majority of directors who are not interested persons of the fund, determines that such a deviation is likely to occur;

*    *    *

(d)  Definitions. Each of the terms business day, total assets, and weekly liquid assets has the same meaning as defined in § 270.2a-7.

10.  Section 270.30b1-7 is revised to read as follows:

§ 270.30b1-7  Monthly report for money market funds.

Every registered open-end management investment company, or series thereof, that is regulated as a money market fund under § 270.2a-7 must file with the Commission a monthly report of portfolio holdings on Form N-MFP (§ 274.201 of this chapter), current as of the last business day or any subsequent calendar day of the preceding month, no later than the fifth business day of each month.

11.  Section 270.30b1-8 is added to read as follows:


Every registered open-end management investment company, or series thereof, that is regulated as a money market fund under § 270.2a-7, that experiences any of the events specified
on Form N-CR (17 CFR 274.222 of this chapter), must file with the Commission a current report on Form N-CR within the period specified in that form.

12. Section 270.31a-1(b)(1) is revised by removing "§ 270.2a-7(a)(8) or § 270.2a-7(a)(15)" and adding in its place "§ 270.2a-7(a)(9) or § 270.2a-7(a)(16)".

PART 239 — FORMS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

13. The authority citation for Part 239 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 77sss, 78c, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78o-7 note, 78u-5, 78w(a), 78ll, 78mm, 80a-2(a), 80a-3, 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-10, 80a-13, 80a-24, 80a-26, 80a-29, 80a-30, and 80a-37, unless otherwise noted.

* * * * *

PART 274—FORMS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

14. The authority citation for Part 274 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s, 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 80a-8, 80a-24, 80a-26, and 80a-29, unless otherwise noted.

* * * * *

15. Form N-1A (referenced in §§ 239.15A and 274.11A) is amended by:

a. Revising paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of Item 4; and

b. Adding a paragraph (g) to Item 16; or

c. Revising paragraph 2(b) of the instructions to Item 3;

d. Revising paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of Item 4; and

e. Adding a paragraph (g) to Item 16.

The additions and revisions read as follows:
Note: The text of Form N-1A does not, and this amendment will not, appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.

Alternative 1

Form N-1A

* * * * *

Item 4. Risk/Return Summary: Investments, Risks, and Performance

* * * *

(b) * * *

(l) * * *

(ii) (A) If the Fund is a Money Market Fund that is not subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(c)(2) or § 270.2a-7(c)(3), include the following bulleted statement:

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- You should not invest in the Fund if you require your investment to maintain a stable value.
- The value of shares of the Fund will increase and decrease as a result of changes in the value of the securities in which the Fund invests. The value of the securities in which the Fund invests may in turn be affected by many factors, including interest rate changes and defaults or changes in the credit quality of a security's issuer.
- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.
• The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

(B) If the Fund is a Money Market Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of § 270.2a-7(c)(2) or § 270.2a-7(c)(3), include the following bulleted statement:

• You could lose money by investing in the Fund.

• The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.

• An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

• The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

*Instruction.* If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the Fund, and the term of the agreement will extend for at least one year following the effective date of the Fund’s registration statement, the bulleted statement specified in Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(A) or Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(B) may omit the last bulleted sentence (“The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.”). For purposes of this Instruction, the term “financial support” includes, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par,
purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support
agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or
any other similar action to increase the value of the fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the
fund during times of stress.

*   *   *   *   *

Item 16. Description of the Fund and Its Investments and Risks

*   *   *   *   *

(g) Financial Support Provided to Money Market Funds. If the Fund is a Money
Market Fund, disclose any occasion during the last 10 years on which an affiliated person,
promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, provided
any form of financial support to the Fund, including a description of the nature of support, person
providing support, brief description of the relationship between the person providing support and
the Fund, brief description of the reason for support, date support provided, amount of support,
security supported (if applicable), value of security supported on date support was initiated (if
applicable), term of support, and a brief description of any contractual restrictions relating to
support.

Instructions.

1. The term “financial support” includes, for example, any capital contribution,
purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or
devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of
indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or
performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the Fund’s portfolio
or otherwise support the Fund during times of stress.
2. If during the last 10 years, the Fund has participated in one or more mergers with another investment company (a "merging investment company"), provide the information required by Item 16(g) with respect to any merging investment company as well as with respect to the Fund; for purposes of this instruction, the term "merger" means a merger, consolidation, or purchase or sale of substantially all of the assets between the Fund and a merging investment company.

Alternative 2

Form N-1A

*/ * * * * *

Item 3. Risk/Return Summary: Fee Table

*/ * * * *

Instructions

*/ *

2. Shareholder Fees.

*/ *

(b) "Redemption Fee" includes a fee charged for any redemption of the Fund's shares, but does not include a deferred sales charge (load) imposed upon redemption, and, if the Fund is a Money Market Fund, does not include a liquidity fee imposed upon the sale of Fund shares in accordance with rule 2a-7(c)(2).

*/ *

Item 4. Risk/Return Summary: Investments, Risks, and Performance

*/ *

(b) */ *
(I) *

* *

* *

(ii) (A) If the Fund is a Money Market Fund (including any Money Market Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii), but that has chosen not to rely on the rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) exemption provisions), include the following bulleted statement:

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.
- The Fund may impose a fee upon sale of your shares when the Fund is under considerable stress.
- The Fund may temporarily suspend your ability to sell shares of the Fund when the Fund is under considerable stress.
- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.
- The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

(B) If the Fund is a Money Market Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) and that has chosen to rely on the rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) exemption provisions, include the following bulleted statement:

- You could lose money by investing in the Fund.
- The Fund seeks to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00
per share, but cannot guarantee such stability.

- An investment in the Fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.

- The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.

*Instruction.* If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, has entered into an agreement to provide financial support to the Fund, and the term of the agreement will extend for at least one year following the effective date of the Fund’s registration statement, the bulleted statement specified in Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(A) or Item 4(b)(1)(ii)(B) may omit the last bulleted sentence (“The Fund’s sponsor has no legal obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund at any time.”). For purposes of this Instruction, the term “financial support” includes, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the Fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the Fund during times of stress.

* * * * * * *

*Item 16. Description of the Fund and Its Investments and Risks*
(g) *Money Market Fund Material Events.* If the Fund is a Money Market Fund (except any Money Market Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) and has chosen to rely on the rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) exemption provisions) disclose, if applicable, the following events:

1. During the last 10 years, any occasion on which the Fund has invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets (as provided in rule 2a-7(c)(2)), and with respect to each such occasion, whether the Fund’s board of directors determined to impose a liquidity fee pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i) and/or temporarily suspend the Fund’s redemptions pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii).

*Instructions.* With respect to each such occasion, disclose: the dates and length of time for which the Fund invested less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets; a brief description of the facts and circumstances leading to the Fund’s investing less than fifteen percent of its total assets in weekly liquid assets; the dates and length of time for which the Fund’s board of directors determined to impose a liquidity fee pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i) and/or temporarily suspend the Fund’s redemptions pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii); and a short discussion of the board’s analysis supporting its decision to impose a liquidity fee (or not to impose a liquidity fee) and/or temporarily suspend the Fund’s redemptions.

2. During the last 10 years, any occasion on which an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, provided any form of financial support to the Fund, including a description of the nature of support, person providing support, brief description of the relationship between the person providing support and the Fund, brief description of the reason for support, date support provided, amount of support, security supported (if applicable), value (calculated using available market quotations or an appropriate
substitute that reflects current market conditions) of security supported on date support was initiated (if applicable), term of support, and a brief description of any contractual restrictions relating to support.

Instructions.

1. The term "financial support" includes, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the Fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the Fund during times of stress.

2. If during the last 10 years, the Fund has participated in one or more mergers with another investment company (a “merging investment company”), provide the information required by Item 16(g)(2) with respect to any merging investment company as well as with respect to the Fund; for purposes of this instruction, the term “merger” means a merger, consolidation, or purchase or sale of substantially all of the assets between the Fund and a merging investment company.

16. Form N-MFP (referenced in § 274.201) is revised to read as follows:

Note: The text of Form N-MFP does not, and this amendment will not, appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.

FORM N-MFP

MONTHLY SCHEDULE OF PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS

OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS

Form N-MFP is to be used by registered open-end management investment companies, or
series thereof, that are regulated as money market funds pursuant to rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Act") (17 CFR 270.2a-7) ("money market funds"), to file reports with the Commission pursuant to rule 30b1-7 under the Act (17 CFR 270.30b1-7). The Commission may use the information provided on Form N-MFP in its regulatory, disclosure review, inspection, and policymaking roles.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. Rule as to Use of Form N-MFP

Form N-MFP is the public reporting form that is to be used for monthly reports of money market funds required by section 30(b) of the Act and rule 30b1-7 under the Act (17 CFR 270.30b1-7). A money market fund must report information about the fund and its portfolio holdings as of the last business day or any subsequent calendar day of the preceding month. The Form N-MFP must be filed with the Commission no later than the fifth business day of each month, but may be filed any time beginning on the first business day of the month. Each money market fund, or series of a money market fund, is required to file a separate form. If the money market fund does not have any classes, the fund must provide the information required by Part B for the series.

A money market fund may file an amendment to a previously filed Form N-MFP at any time, including an amendment to correct a mistake or error in a previously filed form. A fund that files an amendment to a previously filed form must provide information in response to all items of Form N-MFP, regardless of why the amendment is filed.

B. Application of General Rules and Regulations

The General Rules and Regulations under the Act contain certain general requirements that are applicable to reporting on any form under the Act. These general requirements should
be carefully read and observed in the preparation and filing of reports on this form, except that any provision in the form or in these instructions shall be controlling.

C. Filing of Form N-MFP

A money market fund must file Form N-MFP in accordance with rule 232.13 of Regulation S-T. Form N-MFP must be filed electronically using the Commission’s EDGAR system.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act Information

A registrant is not required to respond to the collection of information contained in Form N-MFP unless the Form displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") control number. Please direct comments concerning the accuracy of the information collection burden estimate and any suggestions for reducing the burden to the Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090. The OMB has reviewed this collection of information under the clearance requirements of 44 U.S.C. 3507.

E. Definitions

References to sections and rules in this Form N-MFP are to the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a] (the "Investment Company Act"), unless otherwise indicated. Terms used in this Form N-MFP have the same meaning as in the Investment Company Act or related rules, unless otherwise indicated.

As used in this Form N-MFP, the terms set out below have the following meanings:

"Cash" means demand deposits in depository institutions and cash holdings in custodial accounts.

"Class" means a class of shares issued by a Multiple Class Fund that represents interests in the same portfolio of securities under rule 18f-3 [17 CFR 270.18f-3] or under an order
exempting the Multiple Class Fund from sections 18(f), 18(g), and 18(i) [15 U.S.C. 80a-18(f), 18(g), and 18(i)].

“Fund” means the Registrant or a separate Series of the Registrant. When an item of Form N-MFP specifically applies to a Registrant or a Series, those terms will be used.

“LEI” means, with respect to any company, the “legal entity identifier” assigned by or on behalf of an internationally recognized standards setting body and required for reporting purposes by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research or a financial regulator. In the case of a financial institution, if a “legal entity identifier” has not been assigned, then LEI means the RSSD ID assigned by the National Information Center of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, if any.

“Master-Feeder Fund” means a two-tiered arrangement in which one or more Funds (or registered or unregistered pooled investment vehicles) (each a “Feeder Fund”), holds shares of a single Fund (the “Master Fund”) in accordance with section 12(d)(1)(E) [15 U.S.C. 80a-12(d)(1)(E)].

“Money Market Fund” means a Fund that holds itself out as a money market fund and meets the requirements of rule 2a-7 [17 CFR 270.2a-7].


“Series” means shares offered by a Registrant that represent undivided interests in a portfolio of investments and that are preferred over all other series of shares for assets specifically allocated to that series in accordance with rule 18f-2(a) [17 CFR 270.18f-2(a)].

“Value” has the meaning defined in section 2(a)(41) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(41)).
General Information

Item 1. Report for [mm/dd/yyyy].

Item 2. CIK Number of Registrant.

Item 3. LEI of Registrant (if available) (See General Instructions E.)

Item 4. EDGAR Series Identifier.

Item 5. Total number of share classes in the series.

Item 6. Do you anticipate that this will be the fund’s final filing on Form N-MFP?
   [Y/N] If Yes, answer Items 6.a – 6.c.
   a. Is the fund liquidating? [Y/N]
   b. Is the fund merging with, or being acquired by, another fund? [Y/N]
   c. If applicable, identify the successor fund by CIK, Securities Act file number, and EDGAR series identifier.

Item 7. Has the fund acquired or merged with another fund since the last filing?
   [Y/N] If Yes, answer Item 7.a.
   a. Identify the acquired or merged fund by CIK, Securities Act file number, and EDGAR series identifier.

Item 8. Provide the name, e-mail address, and telephone number of the person authorized to receive information and respond to questions about this
Form N-MFP.

Part A: Series-Level Information about the Fund

Item A.1 Securities Act File Number.

Item A.2 Investment Adviser.

a. SEC file number of investment adviser.

Item A.3 Sub-Adviser. If a fund has one or more sub-advisers, disclose the name of each sub-adviser.

a. SEC file number of each sub-adviser.

Item A.4 Independent Public Accountant.

a. City and state of independent public accountant.

Item A.5 Administrator. If a fund has one or more administrators, disclose the name of each administrator.

Item A.6 Transfer Agent.

a. CIK Number.

b. SEC file number of transfer agent.

Item A.7 Master-Feeder Funds. Is this a Feeder Fund? [Y/N] If Yes, answer Items A.7.a - 7.c.

a. Identify the Master Fund by CIK or, if the fund does not have a CIK, by name.

b. Securities Act file number of the Master Fund.
c. EDGAR series identifier of the Master Fund.

Item A.8 Master-Feeder Funds. Is this a Master Fund? [Y/N] If Yes, answer Items A.8.a – 8.c.

a. Identify all Feeder Funds by CIK or, if the fund does not have a CIK, by name.

b. Securities Act file number of each Feeder Fund.

c. EDGAR series identifier of each Feeder Fund.

Item A.9 Is this series primarily used to fund insurance company separate accounts? [Y/N]

Item A.10 Category. Indicate the category that most closely identifies the money market fund from among the following: Treasury, Government/Agency, Exempt Government, Prime, Single State, or Other Tax Exempt.

Item A.11 Dollar-weighted average portfolio maturity ("WAM" as defined in rule 2a-7(d)(1)(ii)).

Item A.12 Dollar-weighted average life maturity ("WAL" as defined in rule 2a-7(d)(1)(iii)). Calculate WAL without reference to the exceptions in rule 2a-7(d) regarding interest rate readjustments.

Item A.13 Liquidity. Provide the following, to the nearest cent, as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported (if the reporting date falls on a holiday or other day on which the fund does not calculate the daily or weekly liquidity, provide the value as of the close of business on the date in that week last calculated):
a. Total Value of Daily Liquid Assets:
   i. Friday, week 1:
   ii. Friday, week 2:
   iii. Friday, week 3:
   iv. Friday, week 4:
   v. Friday, week 5 (if applicable):

b. Total Value of Weekly Liquid Assets (including Daily Liquid Assets):
   i. Friday, week 1:
   ii. Friday, week 2:
   iii. Friday, week 3:
   iv. Friday, week 4:
   v. Friday, week 5 (if applicable):

Item A.14 Provide the following, to the nearest cent:
   a. Cash. (See General Instructions E.)
   b. Total Value of portfolio securities. (See General Instructions E.)
   c. Total Value of other assets (excluding amounts provided in A.14.a–b.)

Item A.15 Total value of liabilities, to the nearest cent.

Item A.16 Net assets of the series, to the nearest cent.

Item A.17 Number of shares outstanding, to the nearest hundredth.

Item A.18 If the fund seeks to maintain a stable price per share, state the price the funds seeks to maintain.
Item A.19 Total percentage of shares outstanding, to the nearest tenth of one percent, held by the twenty largest shareholders of record.

Item A.20 7-day gross yield. Based on the 7 days ended on the last day of the prior month, calculate the fund’s yield by determining the net change, exclusive of capital changes and income other than investment income, in the value of a hypothetical pre-existing account having a balance of one share at the beginning of the period and dividing the difference by the value of the account at the beginning of the base period to obtain the base period return, and then multiplying the base period return by (365/7) with the resulting yield figure carried to the nearest hundredth of one percent. The 7-day gross yield should not reflect a deduction of shareholders fees and fund operating expenses. For master funds and feeder funds, report the 7-day gross yield at the master-fund level.

Item A.21 Net asset value per share. Provide the net asset value per share, rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.00 share price (or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price), as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported (if the reporting date falls on a holiday or other day on which the fund does not calculate the net asset value per share, provide the value as of the close of business on the date in that week last calculated):

a. Friday, week 1:

b. Friday, week 2:

c. Friday, week 3:
d. Friday, week 4:

e. Friday, week 5 (if applicable):

Part B: Class-Level Information about the Fund

For each Class of the Series (regardless of the number of shares outstanding in the Class), disclose the following:

Item B.1    EDGAR Class identifier.

Item B.2    Minimum initial investment.

Item B.3    Net assets of the Class, to the nearest cent.

Item B.4    Number of shares outstanding, to the nearest hundredth.

Item B.5    Net asset value per share. Provide the net asset value per share, rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.00 share price (or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price), as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported (if the reporting date falls on a holiday or other day on which the fund does not calculate the net asset value per share, provide the value as of the close of business on the date in that week last calculated):

a. Friday, week 1:

b. Friday, week 2:

c. Friday, week 3:

d. Friday, week 4:

Friday, week 5 (if applicable):
Item B.6  Net shareholder flow. Provide the aggregate weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments) and gross redemptions, rounded to the nearest cent, as of the close of business on each Friday during the month reported (if the reporting date falls on a holiday or other day on which the fund does not calculate the gross subscriptions or gross redemptions, provide the value as of the close of business on the date in that week last calculated):

a. Friday, week 1:
   i. Weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments):
   ii. Weekly gross redemptions:

b. Friday, week 2:
   i. Weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments):
   ii. Weekly gross redemptions:

c. Friday, week 3:
   i. Weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments):
   ii. Weekly gross redemptions:

d. Friday, week 4:
   i. Weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments):
   ii. Weekly gross redemptions:
e. Friday, week 5 (if applicable):
   i. Weekly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments):
   ii. Weekly gross redemptions:

f. Total for the month reported:
   i. Monthly gross subscriptions (including dividend reinvestments):
   ii. Monthly gross redemptions:

Item B.7 7-day net yield, as calculated under Item 26(a)(1) of Form N-1A (§ 274.11A of this chapter).

Item B.8 During the reporting period, did any Person pay for, or waive all or part of the fund’s operating expenses or management fees? [Y/N] If Yes, answer Item B.8.a.

   a. Provide the name of the Person and describe the nature and amount of the expense payment or fee waiver, or both (reported in dollars).

Part C: Schedule of Portfolio Securities and Other Information on Securities Sold

For each security held by the money market fund, disclose the following:

Item C.1 The name of the issuer.

Item C.2 The title of the issue.

Item C.3 The CUSIP.

Item C.4 The LEI (if available). (See General Instruction E.)
Item C.5 Other identifier. In addition to CUSIP and LEI, provide at least one of the following other identifiers, if available:

a. The ISIN;

b. The CIK; or

c. Other unique identifier.

Item C.6 The category of investment. Indicate the category that most closely identifies the instrument from among the following: U.S. Treasury Debt; U.S. Government Agency Debt; Non U.S. Sovereign Debt; Non U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt; Variable Rate Demand Note; Other Municipal Debt; Financial Company Commercial Paper; Asset-Backed Commercial Paper; Other Asset-Backed Security; Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper; Collateralized Commercial Paper; Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits); Structured Investment Vehicle Note; Other Note; U.S. Treasury Repurchase Agreement; Government Agency Repurchase Agreement; Other Repurchase Agreement; Insurance Company Funding Agreement; Investment Company; Other Instrument. If Other Instrument, include a brief description.

Item C.7 If the security is a repurchase agreement, is the fund treating the acquisition of the repurchase agreement as the acquisition of the underlying securities (i.e., collateral) for purposes of portfolio diversification under rule 2a-7? [Y/N]

Item C.8 For all repurchase agreements, specify whether the repurchase agreement is “open” (i.e., the repurchase agreement has no specified end date and, by
its terms, will be extended or “rolled” each business day (or at another specified period) unless the investor chooses to terminate it), and describe the securities subject to the repurchase agreement (i.e., collateral).

a. Is the repurchase agreement “open”? [Y/N]

b. The name of the collateral issuer.

c. CUSIP.

d. LEI (if available).

e. Maturity date.

f. Coupon or yield.

g. The principal amount, to the nearest cent.

h. Value of collateral, to the nearest cent.

i. The category of investments that most closely represents the collateral, selected from among the following:

U.S. Treasury Debt; U.S. Government Agency Debt; Non U.S. Sovereign Debt; Non U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt; Variable Rate Demand Note; Other Municipal Debt; Financial Company Commercial Paper; Asset-Backed Commercial Paper; Other Asset-Backed Security; Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper; Collateralized Commercial Paper; Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits); Structured Investment Vehicle Note; Equity; Corporate Bond; Exchange Traded Fund; Trust Receipt (other than for U.S. Treasuries); Derivative; Other Instrument. If Other Instrument, include a brief description.
If multiple securities of an issuer are subject to the repurchase agreement, the securities may be aggregated, in which case disclose: (a) the total principal amount and value and (b) the range of maturity dates and interest rates.

Item C.9 Rating. Indicate whether the security is a rated First Tier Security, rated Second Tier Security, an Unrated Security, or no longer an Eligible Security.

Item C.10 Name of each Designated NRSRO.

a. For each Designated NRSRO, disclose the credit rating given by the Designated NRSRO. If the instrument and its issuer are not rated by the Designated NRSRO, indicate “NR.”

Item C.11 The maturity date determined by taking into account the maturity shortening provisions of rule 2a-7(i) (i.e., the maturity date used to calculate WAM under rule 2a-7(d)(1)(ii)).

Item C.12 The maturity date determined without reference to the exceptions in rule 2a-7(i) regarding interest rate readjustments (i.e., the maturity date used to calculate WAL under rule 2a-7(d)(1)(iii)).

Item C.13 The maturity date determined without reference to the maturity shortening provisions of rule 2a-7(i) (i.e., the final legal maturity date on which, in accordance with the terms of the security without regard to any interest rate readjustment or demand feature, the principal amount must unconditionally be paid).
Item C.14 Does the security have a Demand Feature on which the fund is relying to determine the quality, maturity or liquidity of the security? [Y/N] If Yes, answer Items C.14.a – 14.f. Where applicable, provide the information required in Items C.14b – 14.f in the order that each Demand Feature issuer was reported in Item C.14.a.

a. The identity of the Demand Feature issuer(s).

b. Designated NRSRO(s) for the Demand Feature(s) or provider(s) of the Demand Feature(s).

c. For each Designated NRSRO, disclose the credit rating given by the Designated NRSRO. If there is no rating given by the Designated NRSRO, indicate “NR.”

d. The amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided by each Demand Feature issuer.

e. The period remaining until the principal amount of the security may be recovered through the Demand Feature.

f. Is the demand feature conditional? [Y/N]

Item C.15 Does the security have a Guarantee (other than an unconditional letter of credit disclosed in item C.14 above) on which the fund is relying to determine the quality, maturity or liquidity of the security? [Y/N] If Yes, answer Items C.15.a – 15.d. Where applicable, provide the information required in Item C.15.b – 15.d in the order that each Guarantor was reported in Item C.15.a.

a. The identity of the Guarantor(s).
b. Designated NRSRO(s) for the Guarantee(s) or Guarantor(s).

c. For each Designated NRSRO, disclose the credit rating given by the
   Designated NRSRO. If there is no rating given by the Designated
   NRSRO, indicate “NR.”

d. The amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided by each
   Guarantor.

Item C.16 Does the security have any enhancements, other than those identified in
   Items C.14 and C.15 above, on which the fund is relying to determine the
   quality, maturity or liquidity of the security? [Y/N] If Yes, answer
   Items C.16.a – 16.e. Where applicable, provide the information required
   in Items C.16.b – 16.e in the order that each enhancement provider was
   reported in Item C.16.a.

a. The identity of the enhancement provider(s).

b. The type of enhancement(s).

c. Designated NRSRO(s) for the enhancement(s) or enhancement
   provider(s).

d. For each Designated NRSRO, disclose the credit rating given by the
   Designated NRSRO. If there is no rating given by the Designated
   NRSRO, indicate “NR.”

e. The amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided by each
   enhancement provider.

Item C.17 The following information for each security held by the series (report
   items C.17.a – 17.e separately for each lot purchased):
a. The total principal amount, to the nearest cent.
b. The purchase date(s).
c. The yield at purchase.
d. The yield as of the Form N-MFP reporting date (for floating or variable rate securities, if applicable).
e. The purchase price (as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent).

Item C.18 The total Value of the fund’s position in the security, to the nearest cent:
(See General Instruction E.)
a. Including the value of any sponsor support:
b. Excluding the value of any sponsor support:

Item C.19 The percentage of the money market fund’s net assets invested in the security, to the nearest hundredth of a percent.

Item C.20 The security’s level measurement (level 1, level 2, level 3) in the fair value hierarchy under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (ASC 820, Fair Value Measurement)?

Item C.21 Is the security a Daily Liquid Asset? [Y/N]

Item C.22 Is the security a Weekly Liquid Asset? [Y/N]

Item C.23 Is the security an Illiquid Security? [Y/N]

Item C.24 Explanatory notes. Disclose any other information that may be material to other disclosures related to the portfolio security. If none, leave blank.
For any security sold during the reporting period, disclose the following:

Item C.25  The following information for each security sold by the series (report items C.25.a – 25.e separately for each lot sold):

a. The total principal amount, to the nearest cent.

b. The purchase price (as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent).

c. The sale date(s).

d. The yield at sale.

e. The sale price (as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent).

SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

__________________________
Registrant)

Date __________________________

__________________________
(Signature)*

*Print name and title of the signing officer under his/her signature.

17. Section 274.222 and Form N-CR are added to read as follows:

Alternative 1
§ 274.222 Form N-CR, Current report of money market fund material

This form shall be used by registered investment companies that are regulated as money market funds under § 270.2a-7 of this chapter to file current reports pursuant to § 270.30b1-8 of this chapter within the time periods specified in the form.

Note: The text of Form N-CR will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.

FORM N-CR
CURRENT REPORT
MONEY MARKET FUND MATERIAL EVENTS

Form N-CR is to be used by registered open-end management investment companies, or series thereof, that are regulated as money market funds pursuant to rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act") (17 CFR 270.2a-7) ("money market funds"), to file current reports with the Commission pursuant to rule 30b1-8 under the Investment Company Act (17 CFR 270.30b1-8). The Commission may use the information provided on Form N-CR in its regulatory, disclosure review, inspection, and policymaking roles.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. Rule as to Use of Form N-CR

Form N-CR is the public reporting form that is to be used for current reports of money market funds required by section 30(b) of the Act and rule 30b1-8 under the Act. A money market fund must file a report on Form N-CR upon the occurrence of any one or more of the events specified in Parts B - D of this form. Unless otherwise specified, a report is to be filed within one business day after occurrence of the event, and will be made public immediately upon filing. If the event occurs on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday on which the Commission is not
open for business, then the report is to be filed on the first business day thereafter.

B. Application of General Rules and Regulations

The General Rules and Regulations under the Act contain certain general requirements that are applicable to reporting on any form under the Act. These general requirements should be carefully read and observed in the preparation and filing of reports on this form, except that any provision in the form or in these instructions shall be controlling.

C. Information to Be Included in Report Filed on Form N-CR

Upon the occurrence of any one or more of the events specified in Parts B - D of Form N-CR, a money market fund must file a report on Form N-CR that includes information in response to each of the items in Part A of the form, as well as each of the items in the applicable Parts B - D of the form.

D. Filing of Form N-CR

A money market fund must file Form N-CR in accordance with rule 232.13 of Regulation S-T. Form N-CR must be filed electronically using the Commission’s EDGAR system.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act Information

A registrant is not required to respond to the collection of information contained in Form N-CR unless the form displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") control number. Please direct comments concerning the accuracy of the information collection burden estimate and any suggestions for reducing the burden to the Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090. The OMB has reviewed this collection of information under the clearance requirements of 44 U.S.C. 3507.

F. Definitions

References to sections and rules in this Form N-CR are to the Investment Company Act
(15 U.S.C 80a), unless otherwise indicated. Terms used in this Form N-CR have the same
meaning as in the Investment Company Act or rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act,
unless otherwise indicated. In addition, as used in this Form N-CR, the term “Fund” means the
registrant or a separate series of the registrant.

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20549

FORM N-CR
CURRENT REPORT
MONEY MARKET FUND MATERIAL EVENTS

Part A: General information

Item A.1 Report for [mm/dd/yyyy].

Item A.2 CIK Number of registrant.

Item A.3 EDGAR Series Identifier.

Item A.4 Securities Act File Number.

Item A.5 Provide the name, e-mail address, and telephone number of the person
authorized to receive information and respond to questions about this Form N-
CR.

Part B: Default or Event of Insolvency of portfolio security issuer

If the issuer of one or more of the Fund’s portfolio securities, or the issuer of a Demand Feature
or Guarantee to which one of the Fund’s portfolio securities is subject, and on which the Fund is
relying to determine the quality, maturity, or liquidity of a portfolio security, experiences a
default or Event of Insolvency (other than an immaterial default unrelated to the financial
condition of the issuer), and the portfolio security or securities (or the securities subject to the
Demand Feature or Guarantee) accounted for at least ½ of 1 percent of the Fund’s Total Assets immediately before the default or Event of Insolvency, disclose the following information:

Item B.1 Security or securities affected.

Item B.2 Date(s) on which the default(s) or Event(s) of Insolvency occurred.

Item B.3 Value of affected security or securities on the date(s) on which the default(s) or Event(s) of Insolvency occurred.

Item B.4 Percentage of the Fund’s Total Assets represented by the affected security or securities.

Item B.5 Brief description of actions Fund plans to take in response to the default(s) or Event(s) of Insolvency.

Instruction. For purposes of Part B, an instrument subject to a Demand Feature or Guarantee will not be deemed to be in default (and an Event of Insolvency with respect to the security will not be deemed to have occurred) if: (i) in the case of an instrument subject to a Demand Feature, the Demand Feature has been exercised and the Fund has recovered either the principal amount or the amortized cost of the instrument, plus accrued interest; (ii) the provider of the Guarantee is continuing, without protest, to make payments as due on the instrument; or (iii) the provider of a Guarantee with respect to an Asset-Backed Security pursuant to rule 2a-7(a)(16)(ii) is continuing, without protest, to provide credit, liquidity or other support as necessary to permit the Asset-Backed Security to make payments as due.

Part C: Provision of financial support to Fund

If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, provides any form of financial support to the Fund (including, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of
any defaulted or devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the Fund's portfolio or otherwise support the Fund during times of stress), disclose the following information:

Item C.1 Description of nature of support.
Item C.2 Person providing support.
Item C.3 Brief description of relationship between the person providing support and the Fund.
Item C.4 Brief description of reason for support.
Item C.5 Date support provided.
Item C.6 Amount of support.
Item C.7 Security supported (if applicable).
Item C.8 Value of security supported on date support was initiated (if applicable).
Item C.9 Term of support.
Item C.10 Brief description of any contractual restrictions relating to support.

Instruction. If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, purchases a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, the Fund must provide the purchase price of the security in responding to Item C.6.

Part D: Deviation between current net asset value per share and intended stable price per share

If a Fund is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2) or rule 2a-7(c)(3), and its current net asset value per share (rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.00 share price, or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price)
deviates downward from its intended stable price per share by more than \( \frac{1}{4} \) of 1 percent, disclose:

Item D.1 Date(s) on which such deviation exceeded \( \frac{1}{4} \) of 1 percent.

Item D.2 Extent of deviation between the Fund’s current net asset value per share and its intended stable price per share.

Item D.3 Principal reason for the deviation, including the name of any security whose value calculated using available market quotations (or an appropriate substitute that reflects current market conditions) or sale price, or whose issuer’s downgrade, default, or event of insolvency (or similar event), has contributed to the deviation.

SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

________________________________________
(Registrant)

Date ____________________________________

________________________________________
(Signature)*

*Print name and title of the signing officer under his/her signature.

Alternative 2

§ 274.222 Form N-CR, Current report of money market fund material events

This form shall be used by registered investment companies that are regulated as money market funds under § 270.2a-7 of this chapter to file current reports pursuant to § 270.30b1-8 of this chapter within the time periods specified in the form.
FORM N-CR

CURRENT REPORT
MONEY MARKET FUND MATERIAL EVENTS

Form N-CR is to be used by registered open-end management investment companies, or series thereof, that are regulated as money market funds pursuant to rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) (17 CFR 270.2a-7) (“money market funds”), to file current reports with the Commission pursuant to rule 30b1-8 under the Investment Company Act (17 CFR 270.30b1-8). The Commission may use the information provided on Form N-CR in its regulatory, disclosure review, inspection, and policymaking roles.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. Rule as to Use of Form N-CR

Form N-CR is the public reporting form that is to be used for current reports of money market funds required by section 30(b) of the Act and rule 30b1-8 under the Act. A money market fund must file a report on Form N-CR upon the occurrence of any one or more of the events specified in Parts B - G of this form. Unless otherwise specified, a report is to be filed within one business day after occurrence of the event, and will be made public immediately upon filing. If the event occurs on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday on which the Commission is not open for business, then the report is to be filed on the first business day thereafter.

B. Application of General Rules and Regulations

The General Rules and Regulations under the Act contain certain general requirements that are applicable to reporting on any form under the Act. These general requirements should be carefully read and observed in the preparation and filing of reports on this form, except that any provision in the form or in these instructions shall be controlling.
C. Information to Be Included in Report Filed on Form N-CR

Upon the occurrence of any one or more of the events specified in Parts B - G of Form N-CR, a money market fund must file a report on Form N-CR that includes information in response to each of the items in Part A of the form, as well as each of the items in the applicable Parts B - G of the form.

D. Filing of Form N-CR

A money market fund must file Form N-CR in accordance with rule 232.13 of Regulation S-T. Form N-CR must be filed electronically using the Commission’s EDGAR system.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act Information

A registrant is not required to respond to the collection of information contained in Form N-CR unless the form displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") control number. Please direct comments concerning the accuracy of the information collection burden estimate and any suggestions for reducing the burden to the Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090. The OMB has reviewed this collection of information under the clearance requirements of 44 U.S.C. 3507.

F. Definitions

References to sections and rules in this Form N-CR are to the Investment Company Act (15 U.S.C 80a), unless otherwise indicated. Terms used in this Form N-CR have the same meaning as in the Investment Company Act or rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act, unless otherwise indicated. In addition, as used in this Form N-CR, the term "Fund" means the registrant or a separate series of the registrant.
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20549

FORM N-CR
CURRENT REPORT
MONEY MARKET FUND MATERIAL EVENTS

Part A: General information

Item A.1 Report for [mm/dd/yyyy].

Item A.2 CIK Number of registrant.

Item A.3 EDGAR Series Identifier.

Item A.4 Securities Act File Number.

Item A.5 Provide the name, e-mail address, and telephone number of the person authorized to receive information and respond to questions about this Form N-CR.

Part B: Default or Event of Insolvency of portfolio security issuer

If the issuer of one or more of the Fund’s portfolio securities, or the issuer of a Demand Feature or Guarantee to which one of the Fund’s portfolio securities is subject, and on which the Fund is relying to determine the quality, maturity, or liquidity of a portfolio security, experiences a default or Event of Insolvency (other than an immaterial default unrelated to the financial condition of the issuer), and the portfolio security or securities (or the securities subject to the Demand Feature or Guarantee) accounted for at least ½ of 1 percent of the Fund’s Total Assets immediately before the default or Event of Insolvency, disclose the following information:

Item B.1 Security or securities affected.

Item B.2 Date(s) on which the default(s) or Event(s) of Insolvency occurred.
Item B.3 Value of affected security or securities on the date(s) on which the default(s) or Event(s) of Insolvency occurred.

Item B.4 Percentage of the Fund’s Total Assets represented by the affected security or securities.

Item B.5 Brief description of actions Fund plans to take in response to the default(s) or Event(s) of Insolvency.

Instruction. For purposes of Part B, an instrument subject to a Demand Feature or Guarantee will not be deemed to be in default (and an Event of Insolvency with respect to the security will not be deemed to have occurred) if: (i) in the case of an instrument subject to a Demand Feature, the Demand Feature has been exercised and the Fund has recovered either the principal amount or the amortized cost of the instrument, plus accrued interest; (ii) the provider of the Guarantee is continuing, without protest, to make payments as due on the instrument; or (iii) the provider of a Guarantee with respect to an Asset-Backed Security pursuant to rule 2a-7(a)(16)(ii) is continuing, without protest, to provide credit, liquidity or other support as necessary to permit the Asset-Backed Security to make payments as due.

Part C: Provision of financial support to Fund

If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, provides any form of financial support to the Fund (including, for example, any capital contribution, purchase of a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, purchase of any defaulted or devalued security at par, purchase of Fund shares, execution of letter of credit or letter of indemnity, capital support agreement (whether or not the Fund ultimately received support), or performance guarantee, or any other similar action to increase the value of the Fund’s portfolio or otherwise support the Fund during times of stress), disclose the following
information:

Item C.1 Description of nature of support.
Item C.2 Person providing support.
Item C.3 Brief description of relationship between the person providing support and the Fund.
Item C.4 Brief description of reason for support.
Item C.5 Date support provided.
Item C.6 Amount of support.
Item C.7 Security supported (if applicable).
Item C.8 Value of security supported on date support was initiated (if applicable).
Item C.9 Term of support.
Item C.10 Brief description of any contractual restrictions relating to support.

Instruction. If an affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of the Fund, or an affiliated person of such a person, purchases a security from the Fund in reliance on § 270.17a-9, the Fund must provide the purchase price of the security in responding to Item C.6.

Part D: Deviation between current net asset value per share and intended stable price per share

If a Fund’s current net asset value per share (rounded to the fourth decimal place in the case of a fund with a $1.00 share price, or an equivalent level of accuracy for funds with a different share price) deviates downward from its intended stable price per share by more than \( \frac{1}{4} \) of 1 percent, disclose:

Item D.1 Date(s) on which such deviation exceeded \( \frac{1}{4} \) of 1 percent.
Item D.2 Extent of deviation between the Fund’s current net asset value per share and its
intended stable price per share.

Item D.3 Principal reason for the deviation, including the name of any security whose value calculated using available market quotations (or an appropriate substitute that reflects current market conditions) or sale price, or whose issuer’s downgrade, default, or event of insolvency (or similar event), has contributed to the deviation.

**Part E: Imposition of liquidity fee**

If, at the end of a business day, a Fund (except any Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) and that has chosen to rely on the rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) exemption provisions) has invested less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets (as provided in rule 2a-7(c)(2)), disclose the following information:

Item E.1 Initial date on which the Fund invested less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets.

Item E.2 If the Fund imposes a liquidity fee pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i), date on which the Fund instituted the liquidity fee.

Item E.3 Brief description of the facts and circumstances leading to the Fund’s investing less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets.

Item E.4 Short discussion of the board of directors’ analysis supporting its decision that imposing a liquidity fee pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(i) (or not imposing such a liquidity fee) would be in the best interest of the Fund.

**Instruction.** A Fund must file a report on Form N-CR responding to Items E.1 and E.2 on the first business day after the initial date on which the Fund has invested less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets. A Fund must amend its initial report on Form N-CR to respond to Items E.3 and E.4 by the fourth business day after the initial date on which the Fund
has invested less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets.

Part F: Suspension of Fund redemptions

If a Fund (except any Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) and that has chosen to rely on the rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) exemption provisions) that has invested less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets (as provided in rule 2a-7(c)(2)) suspends the Fund's redemptions pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2)(ii), disclose the following information:

Item F.1 Initial date on which the Fund invested less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets.

Item F.2 Date on which the Fund initially suspended redemptions.

Item F.3 Brief description of the facts and circumstances leading to the Fund’s investing less than fifteen percent of its Total Assets in weekly liquid assets.

Item F.4 Short discussion of the board of directors’ analysis supporting its decision to suspend the Fund’s redemptions.

*Instruction.* A Fund must file a report on Form N-CR responding to Items F.1 and F.2 on the first business day after the initial date on which the Fund suspends redemptions. A Fund must amend its initial report on Form N-CR to respond to Items F.3 and F.4 by the fourth business day after the initial date on which the Fund suspends redemptions.

Part G: Removal of liquidity fees and/or resumption of Fund redemptions

If a Fund (except any Fund that is subject to the exemption provisions of rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) and that has chosen to rely on the rule 2a-7(c)(2)(iii) exemption provisions) that has imposed a liquidity fee and/or suspended the Fund’s redemptions pursuant to rule 2a-7(c)(2) determines to remove such fee and/or resume fund redemptions, disclose the following, as applicable:
Item G.1  Date on which the Fund removed the liquidity fee and/or resumed Fund redemptions.

SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

________________________________________
(Registrant)

Date _________________________________

________________________________________
(Signature)*

*Print name and title of the signing officer under his/her signature.

PART 279—FORMS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940

18. The authority citation for Part 279 continues to read as follows:


19. Form PF (referenced in § 279.9) is amended by:

a. In General Instruction 15, removing the reference to Question 57 from the last bulleted sentence;

b. Revising section 3 to read as follows;

c. Redesignating Questions 65-79 in section 4 to 66-80;

d. In newly designated question 67(b) in section 4, revising the reference to “Question 66(a)” to read “Question 67(a)”;
e. In newly designated question 76(b) in section 4, revising the reference to "Question 75(a)" to read "Question 76(a)";

f. In newly designated question 77(b) in section 4, revising the reference to "Question 76(a)" to read "Question 77(a)"; and

g. In the Glossary of Terms, adding and revising certain terms.

The additions and revisions read as follows:

Note: The text of Form PF does not, and this amendment will not, appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.

Form PF

* * * * * *

Section 3

Section 3: Information about liquidity funds that you advise.

You must complete a separate Section 3 for each liquidity fund that you advise. However, with respect to master-feeder arrangements and parallel fund structures, you may report collectively or separately about the component funds as provided in the General Instructions.

Item A. Reporting fund identifying and operational information

51. (a) Name of the reporting fund ............................................................

(b) Private fund identification number of the reporting fund......................

52. Does the reporting fund use the amortized cost method of valuation in computing its net asset value?

☐ Yes        ☐ No

53. Does the reporting fund use the penny rounding method of pricing in computing its net asset value?

☐ Yes        ☐ No

54. (a) Does the reporting fund have a policy of complying with the risk limiting conditions of rule 2a-7?

☐ Yes        ☐ No

(b) If you responded “no” to Question 54(a) above, does the reporting fund have a policy of complying with the following provisions of rule 2a-7:
(i) the diversification conditions? □ Yes □ No
(ii) the credit quality conditions? □ Yes □ No
(iii) the liquidity conditions? □ Yes □ No
(iv) the maturity conditions? □ Yes □ No

Item B. Reporting fund assets

55. Provide the following information for each month of the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Month</th>
<th>2nd Month</th>
<th>3rd Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Net asset value of reporting fund as reported to current and prospective investors.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Net asset value per share of reporting fund as reported to current and prospective investors (to the nearest hundredth of a cent).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Net asset value per share of reporting fund (to the nearest hundredth of a cent; exclude the value of any capital support agreement or similar arrangement).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) WAM of reporting fund (in days).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) WAL of reporting fund (in days).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) 7-day gross yield of reporting fund (to the nearest hundredth of one percent).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Dollar amount of the reporting fund's assets that are daily liquid assets.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Dollar amount of the reporting fund's assets that are weekly liquid assets.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Dollar amount of the reporting fund's assets that have a maturity greater than 397 days.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item C. Financing information

56. (a) Is the amount of total borrowing reported in response to Question 12 equal to or greater than 5% of the reporting fund's net asset value?
    □ Yes □ No

(b) If you responded “yes” to Question 56(a) above, divide the dollar amount of total borrowing reported in response to Question 12 among the periods specified below depending on the type of borrowing, the type of creditor and the latest date on which the reporting fund may repay the principal amount of the borrowing without defaulting or incurring penalties or additional fees.

    (If a creditor (or syndicate or administrative/collateral agent) is permitted to vary unilaterally the economic terms of the financing or to revalue posted collateral in its...
own discretion and demand additional collateral, then the borrowing should be
deemed to have a maturity of 1 day or less for purposes of this question. For
amortizing loans, each amortization payment should be treated separately and
grouped with other borrowings based on its payment date.)
(The total amount of borrowings reported below should equal approximately the total
amount of borrowing reported in response to Question 12.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 day or less</th>
<th>2 days to 7 days</th>
<th>8 days to 30 days</th>
<th>31 days to 397 days</th>
<th>Greater than 397 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Unsecured borrowing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) U.S. financial institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Non-U.S. financial institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Other U.S. creditors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Other non-U.S. creditors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Secured borrowing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) U.S. financial institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Non-U.S. financial institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Other U.S. creditors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Other non-U.S. creditors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. (a) Does the reporting fund have in place one or more committed liquidity facilities?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

(b) If you responded “yes” to Question 57(a), provide the aggregate dollar
amount of commitments under the liquidity facilities..........................

Item D. Investor information

58. Specify the number of outstanding shares or units of the reporting fund’s stock
or similar securities..............................................................................

59. Provide the following information regarding investor concentration.
(For purposes of this question, if you know that two or more beneficial owners
of the reporting fund are affiliated with each other, you should treat them as a
single beneficial owner.)

(a) Specify the percentage of the reporting fund’s equity that is beneficially
owned by the beneficial owner having the largest equity interest in the
reporting fund...........................................................................................

(b) How many investors beneficially own 5% or more of the reporting fund’s
equity?

60. Provide a good faith estimate, as of the data reporting date, of the percentage of the reporting fund’s outstanding equity that was purchased using securities lending collateral .................................................................

61. Provide the following information regarding the restrictions on withdrawals and redemptions by investors in the reporting fund. 
(For Questions 61 and 62, please note that the standards for imposing suspensions and restrictions on withdrawals/redemptions may vary among funds. Make a good faith determination of the provisions that would likely be triggered during conditions that you view as significant market stress.)

As of the data reporting date, what percentage of the reporting fund’s net asset value, if any:

(a) May be subjected to a suspension of investor withdrawals/redemptions by an adviser or fund governing body (this question relates to an adviser’s or governing body’s right to suspend and not just whether a suspension is currently effective) .................................................................

(b) May be subjected to material restrictions on investor withdrawals/redemptions (e.g., “gates”) by an adviser or fund governing body (this question relates to an adviser’s or governing body’s right to impose a restriction and not just whether a restriction has been imposed) ..............

(c) Is subject to a suspension of investor withdrawals/redemptions (this question relates to whether a suspension is currently effective and not just an adviser’s or governing body’s right to suspend) ........................................

(d) Is subject to a material restriction on investor withdrawals/redemptions (e.g., a “gate”) (this question relates to whether a restriction has been imposed and not just an adviser’s or governing body’s right to impose a restriction) .................................................................

62. Investor liquidity (as a % of net asset value): 
(Divide the reporting fund’s net asset value among the periods specified below depending on the shortest period within which investors are entitled, under the fund documents, to withdraw invested funds or receive redemption payments, as applicable. Assume that you would impose gates where applicable but that you would not completely suspend withdrawals/redemptions and that there are no redemption fees. Please base on the notice period before the valuation date rather than the date proceeds would be paid to investors. The total should add up to 100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>% of NAV locked for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 day or less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 days – 7 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 days – 30 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 days – 90 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 days – 180 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181 days – 365 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Item E. Portfolio Information

63. For each security held by the reporting fund, provide the following information for each month of the reporting period.

(a) Name of the issuer

(b) Title of the issue

(c) CUSIP

(d) LEI, if available

(e) In addition to CUSIP and LEI, provide at least one of the following other identifiers, if available:
   - ISIN
   - CIK
   - Other unique identifier

(f) The category of investment that most closely identifies the instrument:
   (Select from among the following categories of investment: U.S. Treasury Debt; U.S. Government Agency Debt; Non U.S. Sovereign Debt; Non U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt; Variable Rate Demand Note; Other Municipal Debt; Financial Company Commercial Paper; Asset Backed Commercial Paper; Other Asset Backed Security; Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper; Collateralized Commercial Paper; Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits); Structured Investment Vehicle Note; Other Note; U.S. Treasury Repurchase Agreement; Government Agency Repurchase Agreement; Other Repurchase Agreement; Insurance Company Funding Agreement; Investment Company; Other Instrument. If Other Instrument, include a brief description.)

(g) For repos, specify whether the repo is "open" (i.e., the repo has no specified end date and, by its terms, will be extended or "rolled" each business day (or at another specified period) unless the investor chooses to terminate it), and provide the following information about the securities subject to the repo (i.e., the collateral):
   (If multiple securities of an issuer are subject to the repo, the securities may be aggregated, in which case provide: (i) the total principal amount and value and (ii) the range of maturity dates and interest rates.)

   Whether the repo is "open"

   Name of the collateral issuer

   CUSIP

   LEI, if available

   Maturity date
Coupon or yield .................................................................

The principal amount, to the nearest cent..........................

Value of the collateral, to the nearest cent........................

The category of investment that most closely represents the collateral .................................................................

(Select from among the following categories of investment: U.S. Treasury Debt; U.S. Government Agency Debt; Non U.S. Sovereign Debt; Non U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt; Variable Rate Demand Note; Other Municipal Debt; Financial Company Commercial Paper; Asset Backed Commercial Paper; Other Asset Backed Security; Non-Financial Company Commercial Paper; Collateralized Commercial Paper; Certificate of Deposit (including Time Deposits and Euro Time Deposits); Structured Investment Vehicle Note; Equity; Corporate Bond; Exchange Traded Fund; Trust Receipt (other than for U.S. Treasuries); Derivative; Other Instrument. If Other Instrument, include a brief description.)

(h) If the rating assigned by a credit rating agency played a substantial role in the reporting fund's (or its adviser's) evaluation of the quality, maturity or liquidity of the security, provide the name of each credit rating agency and the rating each assigned to the security.

(i) The maturity date used to calculate WAM ......................................

(j) The maturity date used to calculate WAL ......................................

(k) The final legal maturity date (i.e., the date on which, in accordance with the terms of the security without regard to any interest rate readjustment or demand feature, the principal amount must unconditionally be paid) ...

(l) If the security has a demand feature on which the reporting fund (or its adviser) is relying when evaluating the quality, maturity, or liquidity of the security, provide the following information:

(If the security does not have such a demand feature, enter “NA.”)

Identity of the demand feature issuer(s) ..............................

If the rating assigned by a credit rating agency played a substantial role in the reporting fund's (or its adviser's) evaluation of the quality, maturity or liquidity of the demand feature, its issuer, or the security to which it relates, provide the name of each credit rating agency and the rating assigned by each credit rating agency ............

The period remaining until the principal amount of the security may be recovered through the demand feature..........................................

The amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided by each demand feature issuer ....................................................

Whether the demand feature is a conditional demand feature ........

(m) If the security has a guarantee (other than an unconditional letter of credit reported in response to Question 63(l) above) on which the reporting fund (or its adviser) is relying when evaluating the quality, maturity, or
liquidity of the security, provide the following information:

*(If the security does not have such a guarantee, enter NA.*)

Identity of the guarantor(s) .................................................................

If the rating assigned by a credit rating agency played a substantial role in the reporting fund's (or its adviser's) evaluation of the quality, maturity or liquidity of the guarantee, the guarantor, or the security to which the guarantee relates, provide the name of each credit rating agency and the rating assigned by each credit rating agency.................................................................

The amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided by each guarantor ........................................................................................................

(n) If the security has any enhancements, other than those identified in response to Questions 63(l) and (m) above, on which the reporting fund (or its adviser) is relying when evaluating the quality, maturity, or liquidity of the security, provide the following information:

*(If the security does not have such an enhancement, enter "NA.")

Identity of the enhancement provider(s) ..................................................

The type of enhancement(s) .................................................................

If the rating assigned by a credit rating agency played a substantial role in the reporting fund's (or its adviser's) evaluation of the quality, maturity or liquidity of the enhancement, its provider, or the security to which it relates, provide the name of each credit rating agency and the rating assigned by the credit rating agency ..

The amount (i.e., percentage) of fractional support provided by each enhancement provider..............................................................................................

(o) The following information for each security held by the reporting fund, reported separately for each lot purchased:

The total principal amount, to the nearest cent.................................

The purchase date(s) .................................................................

The yield at purchase ......................................................................

The yield as of the end of each month during the reporting period (for floating or variable rate securities, if applicable) ..................

The purchase price (as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent) .....................................................

(p) The total value of the reporting fund's position in the security, and separately, if the reporting fund uses the amortized cost method of valuation, the amortized cost value, in both cases to the nearest cent:

Including the value of any sponsor support ........................................

Excluding the value of any sponsor support ..................................

(q) The percentage of the reporting fund's net assets invested in the security, to the nearest hundredth of a percent...........................................
(r) Is the security categorized as a level 1, 2, or 3 asset or liability in Question 14?

(s) Is the security a daily liquid asset?

(t) Is the security a weekly liquid asset?

(u) Is the security an illiquid security?

(v) Explanatory notes. Disclose any other information that may be material to other disclosures related to the portfolio security.
   *(If none, leave blank.)*

**Item F. Securities Sold During the Reporting Period**

64. For each security sold by the reporting fund during the reporting period, provide the following information, provided separately for each lot sold:

(a) The total principal amount, to the nearest cent..................................................

(b) The purchase price (as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent) .................................................................

(c) The sale date(s) ........................................................................................................

(d) The yield at sale........................................................................................................

(e) The sale price (as a percentage of par, rounded to the nearest one thousandth of one percent)........................................................................

**Item G. Parallel Money Market Funds**

65. If the reporting fund pursues substantially the same investment objective and strategy and invests side by side in substantially the same positions as a money market fund advised by you or any of your related persons, provide the money market fund’s EDGAR series identifier .................................................................

*(If neither you nor any of your related persons advise such a money market fund, enter “NA.”)*

* * * * *

**GLOSSARY OF TERMS**

* * *

Conditional demand feature Has the meaning provided in rule 2a-7.
Credit rating agency  Any nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, as that term is defined in section 3(a)(62) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

* * *

Demand feature    Has the meaning provided in rule 2a-7.

* * *

Guarantee      For purposes of Question 63, has the meaning provided in paragraph (a)(16)(i) of rule 2a-7.

Guarantor      For purposes of Question 63, the provider of any guarantee.

* * *

Illiquid security    Has the meaning provided in rule 2a-7.

* * *

Maturity    The maturity of the relevant asset, determined without reference to the maturity shortening provisions contained in paragraph (i) of rule 2a-7 regarding interest rate readjustments.

* * *

Risk limiting conditions    The conditions specified in paragraph (d) of rule 2a-7.

* * *
**WAL**  Weighted average portfolio maturity of a *liquidity fund* calculated taking into account the maturity shortening provisions contained in paragraph (i) of *rule 2a-7*, but determined without reference to the exceptions in paragraph (i) of *rule 2a-7* regarding interest rate readjustments.

**WAM**  Weighted average portfolio maturity of a *liquidity fund* calculated taking into account the maturity shortening provisions contained in paragraph (i) of *rule 2a-7*

By the Commission.


Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

Dated: June 5, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69704 / June 6, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15352

In the Matter of

Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
R&G Financial Corp.,
Verbena Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Vistula Communications Services, Inc.,
Z-II, Inc., and,
Zonic Corp.,

Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(j) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Respondents Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., R&G Financial Corp., Verbena Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Vistula Communications Services, Inc., Z-II, Inc., and Zonic Corp.

II.

After an investigation, the Division of Enforcement alleges that:

A. RESPONDENTS

1. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. (CIK No. 906595) is a dissolved Delaware corporation located in Atlantic City, New Jersey with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Greate Bay Hotel & Casino is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004, which reported a net loss of over $5.6 million for the prior six months. On January 5, 1998, Greate Bay
Hotel & Casino filed a Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, and the case was terminated on March 3, 2005.

2. R&G Financial Corp. (CIK No. 1016933) is a Puerto Rico corporation located in San Juan, Puerto Rico with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). R&G Financial is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2004. On May 14, 2010, R&G Financial filed a Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico, and the case was still pending as of February 20, 2013.

3. Verbena Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (CIK No. 1355016) is a dissolved Delaware corporation located in Langhorne, Pennsylvania with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Verbena Pharmaceuticals is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, which reported a net loss of over $41,000 for the prior nine months.

4. Vistula Communications Services, Inc. (CIK No. 1288518) is a void Delaware corporation located in New York, New York with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Vistula Communications Services is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2007, which reported a net loss of over $6.4 million for the prior six months. As of February 20, 2013, the company's stock (symbol "VSTL") was traded on the over-the-counter markets.

5. Z-II, Inc. (CIK No. 1423818) is a void Delaware corporation located in New York, New York with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Z-II is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2008, which reported a net loss of over $28,000 for the prior six months.

6. Zonic Corp. (CIK No. 320515) is an Ohio corporation located in Milford, Ohio with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Zonic is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2000. On June 22, 2001, Zonic filed a Chapter 7 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and the case was terminated on September 3, 2003.

B. DELINQUENT PERIODIC FILINGS

7. As discussed in more detail above, all of the Respondents are delinquent in their periodic filings with the Commission, have repeatedly failed to meet their obligations to file timely periodic reports, and failed to heed delinquency letters sent to them by the Division of Corporation Finance requesting compliance with their periodic filing obligations or, through their failure to maintain a valid address on file with the Commission as required by Commission rules, did not receive such letters.
8. Exchange Act Section 13(a) and the rules promulgated thereunder require issuers of securities registered pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12 to file with the Commission current and accurate information in periodic reports, even if the registration is voluntary under Section 12(g). Specifically, Rule 13a-1 requires issuers to file annual reports, and Rule 13a-13 requires domestic issuers to file quarterly reports.

9. As a result of the foregoing, Respondents failed to comply with Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and/or 13a-13 thereunder.

III.

In view of the allegations made by the Division of Enforcement, the Commission deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be instituted to determine:

A. Whether the allegations contained in Section II hereof are true and, in connection therewith, to afford the Respondents an opportunity to establish any defenses to such allegations; and,

B. Whether it is necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of each class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act of the Respondents identified in Section II hereof, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents.

IV.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a public hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the questions set forth in Section III hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be fixed, and before an Administrative Law Judge to be designated by further order as provided by Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.110].

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file an Answer to the allegations contained in this Order within ten (10) days after service of this Order, as provided by Rule 220(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b)].

If Respondents fail to file the directed Answers, or fail to appear at a hearing after being duly notified, the Respondents, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents, may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be determined against them upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f), and 310 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f), and 201.310].
This Order shall be served forthwith upon Respondents personally or by certified, registered, or Express Mail, or by other means permitted by the Commission Rules of Practice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 120 days from the date of service of this Order, pursuant to Rule 360(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)].

In the absence of an appropriate waiver, no officer or employee of the Commission engaged in the performance of investigative orprosecuting functions in this or any factually related proceeding will be permitted to participate or advise in the decision of this matter, except as witness or counsel in proceedings held pursuant to notice. Since this proceeding is not “rule making” within the meaning of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not deemed subject to the provisions of Section 553 delaying the effective date of any final Commission action.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
On October 4, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") instituted public administrative proceedings pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Paul Randall Fraley ("Fraley" or "Respondent").

II.

Respondent, pursuant to Rule 240(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.240(a), has now submitted an Offer of Settlement ("Offer") in connection with these public administrative proceedings, which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission's jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings, and the findings contained in Section III.2 below, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Order") as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:
1. Fraley, age 52, is a resident of San Diego, California. Fraley solicited investors for Nova Gen Corporation ("Nova Gen") from January 2006 through October 2009.

2. On September 2, 2011, a judgment of permanent injunction and other relief was entered against Fraley, permanently enjoining him from future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, in the civil action entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Nova Gen Corp., et al., Civil Action No. CV-09-2711-MMA-WVG, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

3. The Commission’s complaint alleged that, from January 2006 through October 2009, Fraley raised more than $2.3 million for Nova Gen through an unregistered offering of Nova Gen stock. The complaint further alleged that Fraley solicited prospective investors with written offering documents including Nova Gen’s business plans and an executive summary. The complaint further alleged that, in the written offering documents, Fraley misrepresented Nova Gen’s assets and revenues, the risk of an investment in Nova Gen, and the company’s operational status, and that the business plans that Fraley disseminated also contained baseless projections of Nova Gen’s future revenue. The complaint further alleges that Fraley made numerous oral misrepresentations to investors, telling one investor that Nova Gen’s stock was about to become publicly traded and that the stock paid a guaranteed 11% dividend. As alleged in the complaint, contrary to the representations that Fraley made to investors, Nova Gen never had any assets, operations, or revenues other than raising money from investors, and all of the funds raised from investors were dissipated, primarily through expenses including research, rent, consultant fees, employee salaries, and broker commissions. The complaint alleged that Fraley knew or was reckless in not knowing that the representations made to Nova Gen’s investors were false, and that Fraley was acting as an unregistered broker while selling Nova Gen’s securities to investors.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Fraley’s Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act that Respondent Fraley be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization; and

barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.
Any reapplication for association by the Respondent will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69726 / June 11, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15353

ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 19(h)(1) AND 21C OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING FINDINGS AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

In the Matter of
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated and C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated, Respondents.

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Sections 19(h)(1) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated ("CBOE" or the "Exchange") and C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated ("C2") (collectively, "Respondents").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted Offers of Settlement (the "Offers") that the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 19(h)(1) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order"), as set forth below.
III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offers, the Commission finds\(^1\) that:

**SUMMARY**

Self-regulation is a unique and fundamental component of federal securities regulation in the United States. The principal markets where securities are bought and sold — the nation’s securities exchanges — are also the principal regulators of the activities of broker-dealers using those markets. With the benefits of operating an exchange come certain regulatory responsibilities. In order to exist as a registered national securities exchange or securities association, an exchange or association must fulfill certain well-established regulatory obligations as a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”). An SRO must comply with, and enforce its members’ compliance with, the federal securities laws and rules, as well as its own rules. In this regard, an SRO must conduct surveillance of trading on its exchanges and examine the securities-related operations of its members. An SRO must also file proposed rules and rule changes governing its operations with the Commission. Among other requirements, an SRO’s rules must provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among exchange or association members or other persons using the SRO’s facilities and must not be designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers or dealers.

In spite of these well-established obligations, an inherent conflict exists within every SRO between the regulation of its members and its business interests, as well as the potential for unfair discrimination among members. The Commission has recognized that unchecked conflicts in the dual role of regulating and serving members can result in under zealous enforcement of rules against members and less robust rulemaking.

\[\text{Even where an SRO structure may appear sound, successful self-regulation relies on sufficiently vigorous rule enforcement against members on the part of the SRO. If regulatory staff is disinclined to regulate members, self-regulation will fail. Thus, to be effective, an SRO must be structured in such a way that regulatory staff is unencumbered by inappropriate business pressure.}\]


This matter concerns the failure of a self-regulatory organization to police and control this conflict and prevent the advancement of its business interests, and the interests of its member firms, ahead of its regulatory obligations.

The Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE” or the “Exchange”) failed to fulfill its fundamental responsibilities as an SRO and exchange. CBOE’s failures were not mere oversights or technical violations, but a systemic breakdown in several of its regulatory and

\(^{1}\) The findings herein are made pursuant to the Respondents’ Offers and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
compliance responsibilities as an exchange. Not only did it fail to enforce the Commission’s rules by not adequately investigating a member firm’s compliance with Regulation SHO of the Exchange Act (“Reg. SHO”), CBOE’s conduct also interfered with the Commission’s Division of Enforcement (“Enforcement Division”) staff’s Reg. SHO investigation of the same member firm. This conduct was egregious. CBOE assisted that member firm by taking the unprecedented step of providing information for, and edits to, the member firm’s Wells submission\(^2\) to the Commission — even more troubling, the information and edits provided by CBOE resulted in the member firm providing the Commission with inaccurate and misleading information. When questioned by Enforcement Division staff about the underlying matter, CBOE failed to disclose that it had assisted the member firm with its Wells submission. CBOE also failed to enforce Reg. SHO because it employed a Reg. SHO surveillance program that failed to detect a single violation, despite numerous red flags that its members engaged in violative conduct.

CBOE’s failures cut across all aspects of its regulatory, business and exchange operations. In addition to failing to adequately enforce the Commission’s rules, CBOE failed to adequately enforce its own rules, including its firm quote and priority rules, as well as rules governing registration of persons associated with proprietary trading member firms. In addition, by making unauthorized “customer accommodations,” rebates, and other credits to certain member firms\(^3\) and not others without an applicable rule in place that was consistent with the applicable statutory standards, CBOE failed to provide for the equitable allocation of fees and other charges and engaged in unfair discrimination between member firms. Furthermore, CBOE and C2 failed to file proposed rule changes or filed proposed rule changes long after, and in some instances years after, certain trading functions had been in effect. Lastly, CBOE failed to promptly furnish complete and accurate business records on a timely basis at Commission staff’s request.

As a result of its conduct, CBOE violated Sections 17(a), 19(b)(1), and 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 17a-1 thereunder, and C2 violated Section 19(b)(1).

In response to the Commission’s investigation, CBOE voluntarily entered into a comprehensive program of remediation to address the issues that had weakened its ability to operate as an SRO and undertook several initiatives to improve the Exchange’s performance and operations, including changes to its regulatory, compliance, and corporate governance structure.

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\(^2\) A Wells submission is a memorandum or video in which a witness in a Commission investigation makes factual, legal or policy arguments in response to a Wells notice from the Commission’s Enforcement Division staff in an effort to persuade the Commission not to charge them with federal securities violations. The Wells notice informs the person or entity (1) that the Division of Enforcement is considering recommending or intends to recommend that the Commission file an action or proceeding against them; (2) the potential violations at issue in the recommendation; and (3) that the person or entity may submit arguments or evidence (the “Wells submission”) to Enforcement and the Commission regarding the recommendation and evidence.

\(^3\) Member firms of CBOE and CBOE Stock Exchange (“CBSX”), a stock trading facility owned by CBOE and a consortium of financial entities, are now referred to as trading permit holders.
RESPONDENTS

1. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated ("CBOE") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. CBOE is registered with the Commission as a national securities exchange pursuant to Section 6 of the Exchange Act. CBOE provides regulatory services to several other exchanges pursuant to Regulatory Services Agreements. CBOE is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CBOE Holdings, Inc., a publicly-traded company. The Commission previously brought two actions against CBOE for failure to enforce its rules.4

2. C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated ("C2") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. C2 is registered with the Commission as a national securities exchange pursuant to Section 6 of the Exchange Act. C2 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CBOE Holdings, Inc.

FACTS

3. CBOE engaged in conduct that violated laws and rules regulating SROs. Specifically, the Exchange, in several instances: (i) failed to adequately enforce the federal securities laws and regulations and its own rules, (ii) engaged in conduct that interfered with a Commission investigation and failed to timely provide information requested by Commission staff, and (iii) engaged in certain conduct without effective rules in place. Further, C2 also violated the laws and rules regulating SROs by failing to file proposed rule changes until after it had implemented certain trading functions.


Failure to Adequately Enforce the Federal Securities Laws, the Commission's Rules and CBOE Rules

4. Section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to comply with the provisions of the Exchange Act, the rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules, as well as to enforce compliance by its members with such provision, rules and regulations. CBOE failed to adequately enforce compliance with Reg. SHO and then engaged in unprecedented conduct that interfered with Commission staff's Reg. SHO investigation. In addition, CBOE failed to enforce its own rules in at least three areas: (i) firm quote and priority rules; (ii) registration; and (iii) access to CBSX.

CBOE Failed to Adequately Enforce Regulation SHO of the Exchange Act

5. Rules 204 and 204T of Reg. SHO deal with the requirement to close-out failures to deliver. Rule 204T became effective on September 18, 2008 and Rule 204 became effective on July
31, 2009. Rules 204 and 204T require clearing firms to deliver equity securities to a registered clearing agency when delivery is due; that is, by settlement date, which is generally three days after the trade date ("T+3"). For short sales, if the clearing firm does not deliver securities by T+3 and it has a failure-to-deliver position at the clearing agency, it must purchase or borrow securities of like kind and quantity to close out the failure-to-deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular trading hours on the settlement day following the settlement date ("T+4").

6. In 2008, CBOE moved its surveillance and monitoring of Reg. SHO compliance from the Department of Regulated Entities to the Department of Market Regulation ("DMR"). The transfer of responsibilities to DMR adversely affected CBOE’s Reg. SHO enforcement program. Since that transfer, CBOE’s DMR has not taken action against any firm for violations of Reg. SHO as a result of the Reg. SHO surveillance or complaints from third parties. CBOE failed to adequately enforce Reg. SHO because its staff lacked a fundamental understanding of the rule, it provided no training to regulatory staff, and it failed to follow existing policies and procedures.

CBOE’s Surveillance Program Failed to Adequately Detect, Investigate and Discipline Reg. SHO Violations

7. CBOE’s DMR developed policies and procedures for its surveillance program to identify and investigate instances in which market participants used options or options strategies to circumvent Reg. SHO Rules 204 and 204T by giving the appearance of having purchased shares to close-out an open failure-to-deliver position while in fact not doing so.

8. These policies and procedures required CBOE to generate an exception report on a quarterly basis and to surveil for trades that fell within certain predetermined parameters (known as “exceptions”) for “suspicious scenarios.” The procedures then required the investigator assigned to the surveillance to contact the member firms responsible for the exceptions and request certain information. After reviewing the information requested, the investigator was to determine whether the firms were utilizing options to circumvent Reg. SHO’s close-out requirements.

9. If, after reviewing all the information supplied by the firms, the investigator determined that there was no circumvention, the investigator would recommend that the inquiry be closed. The procedures required the investigator’s supervisor, prior to formally closing the inquiry, to review and approve the investigator’s recommendation and case file to ensure accuracy and validate the staff’s analysis.

10. These policies and procedures were not followed by CBOE’s DMR. For example, in January 2010, CBOE’s Reg. SHO surveillance generated 75 exceptions in several securities for one member firm in the third and fourth quarters of 2009. As a result, CBOE sent a letter to the

Rule 204T, the “temporary” Reg. SHO rule, was made permanent, with some modifications, through the adoption of Rule 204.

DMR was one of several departments within CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division. During the same period, the former head of DMR reported to CBOE’s Chief Regulatory Officer ("CRO"). The CRO reported to the former head of the Member and Regulatory Services Division, who reported to CBOE’s former President and Chief Operating Officer.
member firm requesting additional information concerning those transactions. The member, which
was a self-clearing firm, provided documents to CBOE which demonstrated that, for each of the
securities involved, the firm had a failure to deliver position for a number of consecutive settlement
days, indicating that it was potentially not in compliance with Reg. SHO. However, CBOE staff
failed to adequately review, much less understand the import of, this information to determine
whether the member firm was in fact attempting to circumvent its close-out obligations. Indeed,
this was the first time that staff assigned to the surveillance had seen such information.

11. Instead, CBOE took no action against the member firm as a result of these
surveillance exceptions and closed the inquiry merely because the firm had represented to the
Exchange that it did not receive any buy-ins for the securities involved. CBOE did nothing to
investigate the firm’s representation.\(^7\)

12. Accordingly, in December 2010, CBOE sent two “filed without action” letters to the
member firm stating that CBOE had completed its inquiry into whether the member firm had
violated Reg. SHO Rules 204 and 204T and “determined that no violations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission or Exchange rules were apparent with respect to the materials reviewed in
conjunction with this inquiry.” CBOE sent these letters despite the fact that the materials it
purportedly reviewed showed that the member firm had ongoing failures to deliver.

13. Inquiries related to all other firms that had exceptions generated by the Reg. SHO
surveillance were handled in a similar manner by CBOE.

14. Moreover, CBOE failed to properly train its investigative staff on short sales and
Reg. SHO. For instance, CBOE staff responsible for the Exchange’s Reg. SHO surveillance
never received any formal training on Reg. SHO, were instructed to read the rules themselves, did
not have a basic understanding of what a failure to deliver was, and were unaware of the
relationship between failures to deliver and a clearing firm’s net short position at the Depository
Trust and Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”).\(^8\) In fact, the investigator primarily responsible for
monitoring the Reg. SHO surveillance from the third quarter 2009 to the second quarter 2010 had
never even read the rule in its entirety, but only briefly perused it.

15. As a result, CBOE’s DMR has not taken action against any firm for violations of
Reg. SHO as a result of the Reg. SHO surveillance, or complaints from third parties, since the Reg.
SHO surveillance went into effect in the third quarter 2009.

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\(^7\) CBOE’s DMR took the representations of another member firm at face value as well. In that instance, the
member firm, a clearing broker, had represented to CBOE in an interview that it had policies and procedures in
place to prevent Reg. SHO violations. Based solely on those representations, CBOE updated its Reg. SHO
surveillance manual to state that exceptions generated by the market maker clients of this particular member firm
would be “disregard[ed].”

\(^8\) Virtually all equities securities trades in the United States are cleared and settled through the National
Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Depository Trust Company (DTC), clearing agency subsidiaries of
the DTCC.
CBOE Failed to Adequately Investigate Reg. SHO Violations of A Member Firm

16. In February 2009, CBOE’s DMR received a complaint concerning possible short sale violations involving a customer account at the same member firm discussed above and began investigating whether the trading activity violated Rule 204T of Reg. SHO. However, CBOE staff conducting the investigation lacked the most basic understanding of Rule 204T.

17. In particular, CBOE staff assigned to the case did not know what a failure to deliver was, did not know how to determine if a fail existed, and were confused as to whether Reg. SHO applied to a retail customer.

18. As part of its investigation, CBOE staff sought guidance from Commission staff. In doing so, however, CBOE erroneously focused on whether the member firm’s customer, as opposed to the member firm itself, was in violation of Reg. SHO and erroneously represented to the Division of Trading and Markets (“Trading and Markets”) that there were no failures to deliver associated with the trading at issue. Based on CBOE’s representations, Trading and Markets advised CBOE on a call that if there were no failures to deliver, then there was no Reg. SHO violation, and that there was no violation on the part of the customer because customers cannot violate Reg. SHO. Trading and Markets also suggested to CBOE on the call that it consider whether the customer’s trading activity was fraudulent.

19. CBOE did not undertake more than a cursory analysis of the trading to determine if it was fraudulent and never considered the applicability of Rule 10b-21 of the Exchange Act, the anti-fraud short-selling rule that was promulgated together with Rule 204T. CBOE staff provided a written memorandum to the Commission’s Enforcement Division purporting to analyze the trading and ultimately decided to refer the matter to the Enforcement Division as a formal advisory; however, no referral was made.

20. Because CBOE focused almost exclusively on the customer’s activity and wrongly concluded that there were no failures to deliver associated with the trading, it never investigated whether the member firm itself was properly fulfilling its close-out obligations under Reg. SHO. As a result, CBOE formally closed the investigation in September 2009 and only issued the member firm a letter of caution based on a technical deviation from the firm’s buy-in procedures.

21. In the course of closing its Reg. SHO investigation, CBOE staff finalized an internal investigative report dated September 23, 2009, purporting to document the reasons CBOE closed the case. However, the information contained in the report was inaccurate in that it erroneously attributed guidance to Trading and Markets that was never given. The report also failed to disclose that Trading and Markets informed CBOE that there was no Reg. SHO violation on the part of the member firm’s customer because customers cannot violate Reg. SHO and that Trading and Markets provided no guidance as to whether the member firm itself violated Reg. SHO.
CBOE Interfered, and Failed to Cooperate, with the Commission Staff's Reg. SHO Investigation

22. Not only did CBOE fail to adequately detect violations and investigate and discipline one of its members, CBOE also took misguided and unprecedented steps to assist that same member which was under investigation by the Commission's Enforcement Division staff and failed to provide information to Commission staff when requested.

23. Commission staff began investigating one of CBOE's member firms and some of its customers for potential Reg. SHO and fraud violations in December 2009. Commission staff informed the former head of CBOE's DMR of its investigation on February 1, 2010 and requested, among other data, exception data from CBOE's Reg. SHO surveillance for the third and fourth quarter of 2009.

24. CBOE's Chief Regulatory Officer ("CRO") responded in a February 3, 2010 letter that contained factual inaccuracies as to guidance received from Trading and Markets regarding CBOE's earlier Reg. SHO investigation involving the same member firm. Among other things, the letter failed to disclose that Trading and Markets gave no definitive guidance to CBOE as to whether the member firm violated Reg. SHO, based on the information that CBOE provided. Moreover, the letter incorrectly stated that CBOE had "initially been inclined to take formal disciplinary action against [the member firm]" and failed to explain why the trading activity was not referred to the Commission.

25. The letter was drafted by the CRO's supervisor, who was the former head of CBOE's Member and Regulatory Services Division, and was reviewed by the former head of CBOE's DMR who failed to correct the letter's inaccuracies prior to it being sent to Commission staff. Moreover, CBOE did not provide the surveillance exception data for the third and fourth quarters 2009 as requested by Commission staff.

26. A month later, the same member firm requested CBOE's assistance in advocating before Commission staff concerning its investigation. In particular, the member firm asked the head of CBOE's Department of Member Firm Regulation ("DMFR") to get the Commission to "back off" its investigation. This request was discussed internally by senior business executives at CBOE, including its former President and Chief Operating Officer. In fact, the former President and Chief Operating Officer asked DMFR's head to facilitate a conference call with the member firm.

27. As a result, on March 9, 2010, DMFR's head told the member firm that CBOE would discuss the issue internally to determine if there was anything CBOE could do to assist the member firm. Later that day, DMFR's head and a CBOE colleague held a conference call with senior officers at the member firm. The member firm explained that it was the subject of a Commission investigation involving Reg. SHO and asked CBOE to intercede on its behalf and tell the Commission that the trading activity at issue was acceptable. The head of DMFR responded that, in his view, CBOE should not intercede and that the Commission was CBOE's regulator and could conduct an oversight inspection of CBOE. Nonetheless, he told the member firm that it would discuss the issue internally and get back to the member firm.
28. Ultimately, CBOE declined the member firm’s request and informed the member firm that it would not advocate on its behalf with respect to the Commission’s investigation. Upon learning of this decision, CBOE’s former President and Chief Operating Officer emailed the head of DMFR: “Thanks. Showing that we tried helps. We can’t solve everyone’s problems. I appreciate it.”

29. During this time, CBOE still had not provided the exception data from its Reg. SHO surveillance as requested by Commission staff.

30. In September 2010, the former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division proposed that CBOE hold a senior-level meeting with the member firm over concerns that had developed about the relationship between the member firm and CBOE, including the firm’s lack of cooperation in CBOE examinations and other related issues. The former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division prepared a written summary of those concerns that was emailed to CBOE’s former President and Chief Operating Officer on October 26, 2010. CBOE’s former President and Chief Operating Officer agreed to set up a meeting with the CEO of the member firm, who was, at the time, also a member of CBOE’s Board of Directors and sat on CBOE’s Audit Committee, to discuss CBOE’s concerns.⁹

31. Two weeks later, in November 2010, CBOE’s former President and Chief Operating Officer and the former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division met with the member firm’s CEO. During the meeting, the Commission’s investigation of the member firm was discussed. According to the member firm’s CEO, he was informed that it was CBOE’s position that the trading activity under investigation was appropriate under Reg. SHO — which contrasted with the information that CBOE provided to Commission staff both before and after November 2010. The member firm’s CEO was also informed that CBOE reached out to Trading and Markets and was told that Trading and Markets agreed with CBOE’s view of the trading, information which was not accurate.

32. Shortly thereafter, on December 3, 2010, the member firm’s in-house counsel called the former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division and requested information that would assist the member firm in responding to the Commission investigation. Specifically, the member firm’s in-house counsel explained that the member firm and four of its officers had received Wells notices from Commission staff and that she had become aware that CBOE had communicated with Trading and Markets about the trading. She then requested that the member firm be allowed to look at CBOE’s investigative file or be provided a copy of it.

33. On December 6, 2010, the former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division told the member firm’s in-house counsel that CBOE would not provide a copy of the file, but would provide a summary of events and to the extent that the member firm wanted to include that information in its Wells submission, CBOE would review the submission and respond. He then provided a summary of the events to the member firm’s in-house counsel, including inaccurate information about communications CBOE had with Trading and Markets. The former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division provided this summary despite

⁹ The member firm’s CEO has not been a member of either CBOE’s Board or Audit Committee since October 2011.
knowing that CBOE investigations, and information obtained from other regulators during those investigations, were to be kept confidential.

34. On December 9, 2010, the member firm emailed the former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division an excerpt from a draft Wells response it intended to submit in connection with the Commission’s Reg. SHO investigation. The member firm asked CBOE to provide “review, modification and insight” into the Wells submission excerpt. The excerpt contained details of CBOE’s investigation and CBOE’s purported communications with Trading and Markets, and was being used by the member firm for exculpatory purposes. That Wells submission excerpt, however, contained numerous factual inaccuracies, most notably the erroneous description of guidance received from Trading and Markets.

35. The former head of CBOE’s Member and Regulatory Services Division edited the excerpt “to clarify the record” and forwarded it for review to senior members of the Regulatory Services Division, including the head of DMFR and the former head of DMR, who participated on CBOE’s calls with Trading and Markets. The excerpt, as edited by CBOE, incorrectly stated that Trading and Markets informed CBOE that Trading and Markets did not believe that the member firm violated Reg. SHO. The former head of the Member and Regulatory Services Division then emailed the “redline” edits to the member firm, despite the CRO’s recommendation that CBOE not get involved with the member’s Wells submission.

36. CBOE’s edits failed to correct the excerpt’s factual inaccuracies and included the erroneous attribution of guidance to Trading and Markets.

37. After receiving CBOE’s edits of the Wells submission, the member firm’s in-house counsel thanked CBOE for following up so quickly and said that CBOE “truly has gone above and beyond.”

38. The member firm provided its Wells submission to Commission staff on December 12, 2010. It contained language which was substantially similar to the edits that CBOE had provided.

39. At the time of the Wells submission, CBOE still had not provided the exception data from its Reg. SHO surveillance as requested by Commission staff and did not inform Commission staff of the two December 2010 “file without action” letters, discussed in paragraph 12 above, that CBOE had just issued to the member firm. The two letters were discussed for exculpatory purposes and included as exhibits in the member firm’s Wells and supplemental Wells submissions to the Commission.

40. After receiving the Wells submission, Commission staff held a conference call in January 2011 with the former heads of the Member and Regulatory Services Division and DMR and the CRO, all of whom were aware that CBOE had provided input to the member firm’s Wells submission, as well as CBOE’s in-house enforcement counsel. Commission staff asked about various aspects of CBOE’s relationship with the member firm and CBOE’s Reg. SHO investigation of that member firm, the basis and timing of the two December 2010 “file without action” letters, CBOE’s continuing failure to provide staff with the Reg. SHO exception reports, and the statements
in CBOE’s February 3, 2010 letter to staff. On the call, CBOE admitted that some of the statements in the February 3, 2010 letter regarding CBOE’s communications with Trading and Markets were factually incorrect. At no time during the call did anyone from CBOE disclose the fact that CBOE had reviewed and edited a portion of the member firm’s Wells submission.

41. On January 28, 2011, CBOE produced documents in response to a document request by the Commission’s Enforcement Division staff. Included in those documents were CBOE’s edits to the member firm’s Wells submission and related emails. The discovery of those documents was the first time that Commission staff became aware that CBOE had reviewed and edited the Wells submission.

CBOE Failed to Adequately Enforce Its Firm Quote and Priority Rules

42. Since 2003, CBOE has operated a Hybrid Trading System which combines electronic trading and open outcry trading. Unlike options traded electronically (via automatic execution, electronic auction, or automatic routing to another market), options traded in open outcry (where traders on the trading floor call out their orders or use hand signals to negotiate orders) require manual handling by floor traders or Exchange employees on the Exchange floor. For such trades, CBOE uses automated surveillance programs to assess whether floor traders and Exchange employees comply with CBOE’s firm quote and priority rules.

43. However, CBOE’s automated surveillance programs for manually handled trades were ineffective because (i) the programs were too narrowly focused in that they did not cover a majority of potential rule violations or they excluded numerous order types and order handling scenarios from evaluation, (ii) the programs failed to incorporate necessary information, (iii) CBOE’s investigative staff did not have a comprehensive understanding of the logic underlying the automated surveillance programs, and (iv) the procedures manual and requirements did not document that CBOE maintained for the automated surveillance programs in the course of conducting its self-regulatory activity were accurate and incomplete as they did not include a comprehensive, reliable, or easily accessible description of the underlying surveillance logic.

44. As a result of these deficiencies, a review of CBOE’s firm quote investigation files dating back to April 2002 showed that of the 63 firm quote investigation files reviewed, only six were generated from the automated surveillances. The remaining files were complaint driven. In addition, none of the 63 firm quote investigations resulted in any disciplinary actions.

45. In addition, CBOE was unable to promptly furnish Commission staff with complete and accurate records concerning its surveillance logic for its firm quote and priority rule violation automated surveillance programs for manually handled orders and trades.

CBOE Failed to Adequately Enforce Its Registration Rules

46. In 2010, the Commission approved CBOE rule changes governing the registration and qualification of persons associated with proprietary trading firms that were CBOE members. The rules required such associated persons to pass a qualification examination, but authorized
CBOE to waive that requirement in exceptional circumstances and for good cause shown. CBOE failed to rigorously enforce this rule.

47. On June 3, 2009, Trading and Markets sent a letter to the exchanges, including CBOE, asking them to ensure that their rules required all associated persons of members to be registered through the Form U4, qualified by passing an appropriate examination, and subject to training and continuing education requirements. Trading and Markets requested that the exchanges file rules to address any gaps in their registration requirements by July 3, 2009.

48. Following lengthy discussions with Commission staff over concerns regarding CBOE’s handling of these registration requirements and the submission of several draft rule filings, CBOE filed its proposed rule change on September 10, 2010. The Commission approved the rule change on November 12, 2010. As amended, CBOE’s rules required all associated persons of its members engaged in a securities business on CBOE or on its stock trading facility, CBSX, as well as those who supervise those persons, to register with the Exchange, qualify by passing an appropriate examination, and comply with continuing education requirements. CBOE’s rules permitted CBOE to waive the examination requirement “in exceptional cases and where good cause is shown” by the applicant. In the course of its business, CBOE maintained registration records concerning persons associated with proprietary trading firms, including records relating to waivers that were requested and granted.

49. The Commission order approving the rule change required: (1) CBOE members to register associated persons by January 11, 2011; (2) CBOE to develop and file the new examination by May 12, 2011; and (3) the associated persons to pass the examination by August 12, 2011. However, CBOE requested extensions to the registration and examination deadlines for associated persons on several occasions.

50. During the summer of 2009, Trading and Markets asked CBOE the number of associated persons that would be implicated by the new requirements. CBOE was unable to answer this question. Trading and Markets later asked CBOE for the number of waivers it had granted. CBOE was also unable to promptly furnish a consistent, accurate, and reliable answer to this question from its records. Indeed, CBOE provided several inconsistent and contradictory responses.

51. Based on the information it was able to provide, CBOE granted a substantial number of waiver requests it had received as of January 31, 2012. For example, for the proprietary trader examination, CBOE granted 2,215 of the 2,801 valid waiver requests. For the proprietary trader compliance officer examination, CBOE granted 118 of the 168 valid waiver requests. For the proprietary trader principal examination, CBOE granted 352 of the 503 valid waiver requests. When granting waiver requests both before and after January 31, 2012, CBOE failed to adequately consider whether the circumstances under which the waivers were granted met the standard in its rule permitting CBOE to grant waivers only in exceptional circumstances where good cause was demonstrated by the applicants.10

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10 These numbers include 496 proprietary trader, 291 proprietary trader principal, and 44 proprietary trader compliance officer waiver requests that CBOE later determined were unnecessary.
52. CBOE’s internal procedures were insufficient to ensure that waiver determinations would be made consistent with CBOE Rule 3.6A which permits CBOE to grant waivers only in exceptional cases, where good cause was shown. Moreover, CBOE’s records of the reasons for granting or denying waivers were not detailed enough to provide a reliable audit trail of the rationale for CBOE’s waiver determinations.

CBOE Failed to Adequately Monitor and Surveil CBSX

53. CBOE failed to adequately monitor and surveil CBSX because CBOE failed to maintain a reliable or accurate audit trail of orders submitted by CBSX members on that exchange facility. Specifically, the audit trail did not capture the identity of those members who CBSX allowed access to its exchange facility when this connectivity was provided through non-member entities such as service bureaus, but instead aggregated those trades. As a result, CBOE could not reliably and accurately determine which CBSX members were providing access for orders.

54. Because of CBOE’s inability to determine who was responsible for granting access to CBSX, CBOE failed to adequately monitor that exchange facility for enforcement, and surveil for potential violations, of the Commission’s and the Exchange’s rules. For example, CBOE regulatory staff noted that certain surveillance parameters were based on the aggregate data approach used by CBSX for its order audit trail and not on a member-by-member level.

Business Interference with a Regulatory Matter

55. CBOE’s Regulatory Services Division is responsible for enforcing the federal securities laws and regulations and CBOE rules. Until recently, CBOE had no formal policies separating its Regulatory Services Division from its business side, which was responsible for CBOE’s income generation. In fact, until recently, CBOE’s Chief Regulatory Officer reported up to a senior business executive. As a result, the line between business and regulation became blurred.

56. An example of that potential for blurred boundaries occurred in late 2009, when, as part of its routine portfolio margining examination of the same member firm which was subject to the Reg. SHO investigation above, CBOE’s DMFR began asking questions about a particular portfolio margin account which had a significant amount of trading activity.

57. The member firm informed CBOE that the account was not a proprietary trading account, but an account of an affiliate that de-registered as a broker-dealer, but continued its trading activities as a portfolio margin customer of the firm.

58. DMFR continued to investigate the trading activities of the affiliate and later informed the member firm in June 2010 that it believed the affiliate was functioning as a dealer and thus needed to be registered. Subsequently, in July 2010, the affiliate filed an application for registration with the Commission and was granted conditional approval. For its Commission registration to become effective, the affiliate was required to be a member of FINRA or an exchange.
59. As of early October 2010, the affiliate had yet to become a member of FINRA or an exchange. As a result of the affiliate’s delay, the DMFR planned to issue the member firm a CBOE Wells notice for operating a non-registered dealer.

60. When informed of this development by the former head of Member and Regulatory Services, who oversaw the DMFR, CBOE’s former President and Chief Operating Officer asked that the Wells notice not be issued until after an upcoming meeting with the member firm’s CEO, who, at the time, sat on CBOE’s Board and its Audit Committee. The purpose of that meeting, as described above, was to review the firm’s conduct and regulatory compliance.

61. Shortly after the meeting, the affiliate of the member firm completed its registration as a dealer. CBOE issued no Wells notice either to the member firm or to the affiliate concerning the registration issue.

Failure to File Rules

62. Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to file proposed rules or rule changes (collectively “proposed rule changes”) with the Commission and for the Commission to publish notice of the proposed rule changes and to give interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments. Section 19(b)(1) further provides that “[n]o proposed rule change shall take effect unless approved by the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.”

Financial Accommodations to Only Certain Members

63. In 2008, the Commission’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) conducted a special inspection of CBOE’s billing and collection practices. The inspection staff learned that CBOE lacked written policies and procedures that were sufficiently defined to deter intentional or inadvertent discriminatory billing and collection practices and suggested that its fee functions would benefit from greater management oversight.

64. In response, CBOE developed and implemented written policies and procedures concerning its billing and collection process which it provided to OCIE on November 10, 2008. According to CBOE, its procedures were designed to (1) better ensure that all fees were uniformly assessed and collected in accordance with Exchange rules; (2) reduce unnecessary discretion regarding disputes, adjustments, credits, past due balances and sanctions; and (3) provide better regulatory oversight of these functions to facilitate compliance and deter disparate or discriminatory treatment.

65. Despite these new procedures, CBOE made several financial accommodations to certain members, and not to others, that were not authorized by existing rules.11 These

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11 Pursuant to Sections 6(b)(4) and (5) of the Exchange Act, national securities exchange rules must “provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members and issuers and other
accommodations were not offered to all member firms. The accommodations were made for business reasons and were authorized by senior CBOE business executives who lacked an understanding of CBOE's legal obligations as a self-regulatory organization.

66. After Commission staff expressed concern regarding CBOE's accommodation to the same member firm which was subject to the Reg. SHO investigation above, CBOE discovered and self-reported additional instances of financial accommodations to certain members, as described below. As part of that internal review, CBOE hired outside counsel to investigate such practices and discontinued these practices where not authorized by rule.

Payments to a Member Firm for the Firm's Own Preference Errors

67. In 2008, CBOE introduced a new routing system which allowed member firms to direct (or "preference") their orders to preferred market makers by identifying their preference on each order. Under the old routing system, firms could preference their orders, but did not have to identify their preferences on each order because the orders would default to a table which would look up the firms' preferences and add them to the orders. CBOE issued a circular introducing the new routing system that stated that orders under the new routing system bypassed the old routing system and that the routing parameters for the old system no longer applied.

68. In 2009, a member firm asked CBOE about lower-than-expected payments for order flow. CBOE determined that the firm had not been identifying preferred market makers on its orders under the new routing system. Because the firm did not indicate its preferences on its orders, control of any marketing fee/pool dollars was given to the designated primary market maker and not to the firm. As a result, approximately $2.8 million in marketing fee/pool dollars was paid to the designated market maker during the July 2008 through March 2009 time period, instead of the member firm.

69. The member firm claimed it was unaware of the new procedures. Although CBOE took the position that the firm was on notice, CBOE nonetheless agreed to "reimburse" the firm up to $1.2 million (over seven monthly payments) in return for the firm increasing its order flow for each of those months. CBOE ultimately made five payments to the member firm totaling $857,000. These payments were not made pursuant to any rule. CBOE did not offer similar accommodations to other firms. Senior business executives at CBOE were responsible for the agreement.

70. One of the senior executives who approved the payments at one point asked a CBOE analyst whether the Exchange could apply some of the collected funds to the member firm as if the firm had gone through the preferencing table, similar to what was done in another matter. The analyst responded that although she could figure out how to manually override the data, she "would feel very uncomfortable doing so." She explained that the other matter was done "because of a discovered error. In this case, even if it was not clearly stated, it wouldn't be technically fixing an error. In addition, I could not do this override for all firms, and if we did it persons using its facilities" and that are "not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers."
for the member firm [which requested the accommodation] [I] suspect that the SEC, if they ever audit my process, would say that we were playing favorites.”

CBOE and CBSX Use of Error Accounts

71. CBOE maintained error accounts at two brokerage firms through which the Exchange conducted trades to compensate member firms for errors as well as to make “accommodation payments.” CBSX also maintained an error account at one of the brokerage firms.

72. To fix an error or to make an accommodation payment through the error accounts, CBOE’s execution services department would write trade tickets into one of the error accounts. The counterparty would do the same. CBOE had no rules in place permitting these actions.

73. Between September 2006 and October 2011, approximately 2,800 transactions were processed through CBOE error accounts for a net loss to CBOE of approximately $496,000. For the period May 2007 through September 2011, approximately 1,100 transactions were processed through the CBSX error account for a net gain to CBSX of approximately $131,000.

74. While it is unclear what percentage of the transactions in the error accounts were bona fide errors and what percentage were accommodation payments (i.e., non-bona fide errors), there were no rules in place which permitted the use of the error accounts and the error accounts were used to compensate certain member firms for non-bona fide errors.

75. Senior management at CBOE knew about the error accounts and how they operated. The process for resolving the errors was well documented and subject to internal controls.

76. Beginning in mid-2009, information relating to trades in the error accounts was sent to CBOE’s DMR, which questioned whether certain of the trades were appropriate. However, no action was taken.

Direct Accommodation Payments and Credits

77. CBOE also made direct accommodation payments or gave credits to member firms. The accommodation payments generally arose when certain members complained about mistakes they made in designating their orders, resulting in higher fees. The accommodations were usually a percentage of the difference between the fees charged and the lower fees had the correct designations been made. Accommodations between $2,000 and $25,000 were approved by the Vice-President of Market Operations. Accommodations greater than $25,000 were approved by the Chief Financial Officer.

78. Many of the accommodation payments were documented by CBOE’s Finance Department in “Non-Standard Transaction” memos. The memos disclosed that CBOE had made at least $1.6 million in accommodation payments. Examples of these accommodation payments include the following:
a. A $240,000 payment to a member firm because it had placed orders with CBOE and then, without canceling them, proceeded to fill the orders at other exchanges;

b. A $100,000 rebate as a “one time show of good faith” to a member firm because of an issue with the member firm’s back-office systems which forced it to send orders as a non-member, resulting in higher transaction fees; and

c. A $43,496 payment to the same member firm that was subject to the Reg. SHO investigation above that had sent orders, on behalf of one of its affiliates, to CBOE’s Automated Improvement Mechanism, a price improvement auction offered by the Exchange. The payment reimbursed the member firm for the difference between the higher transaction fees it paid as a broker-dealer and the transaction fees paid for member firm proprietary orders.

79. CBOE had no rules in place governing these accommodation payments and, as a result, the payments were not offered to all member firms.

Spread Order Accommodation Payments

80. In 2001, a member firm wanted to use CBOE’s software that allowed spread orders to be sent electronically for paired execution, but would only do so if it was guaranteed the National Best Bid and Offer (“NBBO”) for both legs of the trade. Although there was no rule that required the NBBO for each leg of a spread trade, the member firm was able to secure NBBO agreements with several designated primary market makers.

81. In 2006, the member firm closed down its presence on CBOE floor. By this time, many of the designated primary market makers had also changed. At the firm’s request, CBOE assumed the agreements and continued to guarantee NBBO on both legs of spread trades.

82. Once CBOE began assisting the firm, CBOE would ensure the NBBO by executing a trade at the NBBO with the member firm in CBOE’s error account whenever there was a non-NBBO fill. CBOE would essentially buy the option from the member firm at the old (non-NBBO) price and resell it to the member firm at the new (NBBO) price.

83. The original non-NBBO transaction was reported on the consolidated tape. The error account trade, however, was not reflected on the tape. CBOE had no rules in place permitting the activity.

Implementing Trading Functions and Features Without Appropriate Rules

84. On several other occasions, CBOE and C2 changed or implemented new exchange functionality without first obtaining approval, or effectiveness, of a proposed rule change. For example:
a. CBOE activated percentage distance price check parameters on July 28, 2006 and C2 activated similar parameters on July 25, 2011. However, the exchanges did not submit proposed rule change filings that would authorize the new functionality until August 26, 2011.

b. C2 operated a quote risk monitor mechanism 12 without a rule since it began operations as a national securities exchange in October 2010. C2 did not file a proposed rule change that would authorize the quote risk monitor mechanism until November 7, 2011.

c. On February 16, 2009 and July 25, 2011, CBOE and C2, respectively activated auction features which automatically auctioned marketable complex orders that were a specified number of ticks away from the current market. However, the Exchanges did not file proposed rule changes that would authorize this feature until December 6, 2011.

85. In addition, on a number of occasions, CBSX, allowed persons not authorized by rule to submit and execute orders on its exchange, including orders (i) conducted by a terminated member, (ii) where no authorized member could be identified, (iii) conducted by CBOE members who were not authorized to trade on CBSX, and (iv) by an unauthorized sponsored user.

86. CBSX employees also traded directly on the CBSX to resolve positions in the error accounts. This trading was done with no rule in place and little oversight. 13

Failure to Maintain Books and Records

87. Section 17(a)(1) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to make and keep for prescribed periods, and to furnish the Commission with a copy of, such records as the Commission, by rule, prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. Rule 17a-1(a) requires exchanges to keep and preserve at least one copy of all documents, including all correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, notices, accounts, and other such records as shall be made or received by it in the course of its business as such and in the conduct of its self-regulatory activity. Rule 17a-1(c) requires exchanges to promptly furnish these records to the Commission upon request. The requirement that exchanges keep and furnish records to the Commission includes the requirement that any accompanying explanation of those records be complete and accurate. 14

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12 A quote risk monitor mechanism allows market makers to establish parameters in the system to cancel their electronic quotes in all series of an option class until the market maker refreshes those electronic quotes.

13 After Commission staff began its investigation of CBOE, CBOE and, where applicable, CBSX, discontinued these practices, self-reported them, and hired outside counsel to further investigate these activities.

88. As discussed above, on several occasions CBOE failed to promptly provide documents and records requested by Commission staff that the Exchange made or received in the course of its business or provided such documents and records that were inaccurate, inconsistent, or unreliable.

VIOLATIONS

Section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act

89. Section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to comply with the provisions of the Exchange Act, the rules and regulations, thereunder, and its own rules, and to enforce compliance by its members with such provisions, absent some "reasonable justification or excuse" for failing to do so. An exchange's obligation to enforce compliance under Section 19(g)(1) "necessarily includes an obligation to monitor and maintain surveillance over its members." 15 An exchange violates Section 19(g)(1) when it fails "to be vigilant in surveilling for, evaluating, and effectively addressing issues that could involve violations" of Commission rules and its own rules. 16

90. CBOE violated Exchange Act Section 19(g)(1) when it failed to enforce Reg. SHO Rule 204/204T by not adequately investigating Reg. SHO violations; by not adequately detecting, investigating and disciplining Reg. SHO violations through its surveillance program; and by interfering with Commission staff's investigation of Reg. SHO. In addition, CBOE failed to enforce its firm quote and priority rules by not adequately detecting, investigating and disciplining rule violations. CBOE also failed to enforce its registration rules when it granted a substantial number of waivers without adequately considering whether the circumstances under which the waivers were granted met the standard in its rule that permitted it to grant waivers only in exceptional circumstances and where good cause was shown, from qualifying examinations for persons associated with proprietary trading firms that were CBOE members. Lastly, CBOE was unable to adequately surveil CBSX because CBOE did not maintain a reliable and accurate audit trail of orders submitted by CBSX members to that exchange.

Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act

91. Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to file any proposed rule change with the Commission and for the Commission to publish notice of the proposed rule change and to give interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the proposed rule change. Section 19(b)(1) further provides that "[n]o


proposed rule change shall take effect unless approved by the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.”

92. CBOE violated Exchange Act Section 19(b)(1) by not filing proposed rule changes governing the use of error accounts and the several accommodation payments and credits provided to certain member firms. Further, CBOE and C2 violated Exchange Act Section 19(b)(1) when they failed to file proposed rule changes until after, and in some cases years after, they had implemented certain trading functions.

Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-1, Thereunder

93. Section 17(a)(1) of the Exchange Act requires every exchange to make and keep for prescribed periods, and to furnish the Commission with a copy of, such records as the Commission prescribes, by rule, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. Rule 17a-1 requires exchanges to:

keep and preserve at least one copy of all documents, including all correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, notices, accounts, and other such records as shall be made or received by it in the course of its business as such and in the conduct of its self-regulatory activity.

Rule 17a-1(c) requires an exchange promptly to furnish the Commission with a copy of any such document that a representative of the Commission requests. “The requirement that an exchange keep and furnish records to the Commission includes the requirement that any accompanying explanation of those records be complete and accurate and that those materials be furnished on a timely basis.” In the Matter of American Stock Exchange LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55507, 2007 WL 858743, at *10 (Mar. 22, 2007). Furthermore, the “preparation, maintenance, and furnishing of complete and accurate records are essential to the proper functioning of an exchange as a self-regulatory organization.” Id.

94. CBOE violated Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-1 thereunder when it: (1) failed to promptly furnish the Commission’s Enforcement Division staff with Reg. SHO surveillance records and provided Enforcement Division staff with information that was not accurate concerning its communications with Trading and Markets during its Reg. SHO investigation; (2) failed to promptly furnish Commission staff with complete and accurate records concerning its surveillance logic for its firm quote and priority rule automated surveillance programs for manually handled orders and trades; (3) failed to promptly furnish Commission staff with complete and accurate records relating to examination waivers for persons associated with proprietary trading member firms; and (4) provided an explanation of the records related to examination waivers for persons associated with proprietary trading member firms that was not complete and accurate.
95. After Commission staff brought these matters to the attention of the Regulatory Oversight and Compliance Committee ("ROCC") of CBOE’s Board of Directors, CBOE and C2 engaged in remedial efforts. In determining to accept the Offer and to establish the penalty amount ordered, the Commission considered CBOE’s and C2’s cooperation and the remedial efforts promptly undertaken by them, including the following:

a. Implementing a mandatory annual training program for all staff responsible for surveillance, investigation, examination and discipline. The training program, provided over the course of a year, covers the rules for which the staff member is responsible and obligations regarding recordkeeping and confidentiality of information. CBOE has appointed a Training Coordinator in the Regulatory Services Division and hired supporting staff to facilitate and implement the training program. CBOE has also established a baseline training program for each regulatory staff member which will be monitored and recorded for supervisor review;

b. Providing mandatory formal training to its entire staff and management concerning regulatory independence, on the rules and obligations applicable to SROs, compliance with the federal securities laws and regulations and CBOE/C2 rules, conflicts of interest, recordkeeping, and confidentiality of information;

c. Assigning subject matter experts in the following areas: Reg. SHO, Net Capital, Customer Protection, Sections 9, 10, 11 and 11A of the Exchange Act, and Rule 15c3-5;

d. Updating and formalizing CBOE’s written policies regarding regulatory independence and confidentiality of regulatory information;

e. Implementing a formal written policy prohibiting: (1) the use of any exchange error account pending formal rule authority and filing a rule change concerning CBOE, C2, and CBSX’s use of error accounts; (2) payments to any trading permit holder in connection with trading on CBOE, C2, or CBSX that is not made pursuant to an exchange rule; and (3) any action that has the effect of changing the amount or kind of fee paid by trading permit or privilege holders under the applicable fee schedules for CBOE, C2, or CBSX;

f. Amending CBOE’s and C2’s rule filing policy to require that CBOE and C2 staff shall consult with their Legal Divisions prior to offering services and products to trading permit holders and other market participants to determine whether a rule change is necessary and to comply with the requirements of the Exchange Act, including that their rules are not designed to permit unfair discrimination among its trading permit holders and other market participants;
g. Expanding the charter of the ROCC to incorporate compliance with CBOE’s obligations as an SRO, and the charter of the Audit Committee to include oversight of the compliance function and an expansion of its enterprise risk management oversight;

h. Hiring a Chief Compliance Officer ("CCO") whose responsibilities include establishing written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that CBOE fulfills its compliance obligations;

i. Hiring two Deputy Chief Regulatory Officers and reorganizing the structure of the Regulatory Services Division to enhance the independence of CBOE’s regulatory staff and to provide that regulatory staff continue to have sole discretion as to what matters to investigate and prosecute, and is generally insulated from the commercial interests of CBOE/C2 and their members;

j. Increasing CBOE’s regulatory budget by 52.8% over 2011 for 2012 and an additional 46.6% over 2012 for 2013 and increased the headcount of the Regulatory Services Division from 99 approved positions in October 2011 to 169 approved positions by April 2013; and

k. Engaging a third-party consultant in October 2011 to review CBOE’s Reg. SHO surveillances, practices and procedures, and training to determine if any changes were necessary to strengthen CBOE’s Reg. SHO enforcement program and procedures.

**INITIATIVES**

96. CBOE’s remedial efforts also include the following initiatives:

a. Engaging outside counsel to conduct an independent, “bottom-up” review of the Regulatory Services Division focused on regulatory independence. CBOE is in the process of implementing all of outside counsel’s recommendations;

b. Requesting a third-party consultant to conduct a “gap” analysis to determine whether there are any CBOE or Commission rules that the Exchange’s surveillance and examination programs do not adequately cover. Nineteen areas were identified by the consultant that required improvement. CBOE is in the process of implementing all of the consultant’s recommendations.

c. Engaging a third-party consultant to conduct a comprehensive review of all of its eighty-five (85) non-Reg. SHO regulatory surveillances. The consultant has completed its review and CBOE is in the process of implementing all of the consultant’s recommendations;
d. Engaging a third-party consultant to assess whether identified CBOE action plans reasonably address the consultant’s recommendations and to monitor CBOE’s progress in completing those action plans; and

e. Retaining a third-party consultant to conduct a review of CBOE’s enterprise risk management framework and recommend areas of improvement. The consultant has completed its review and CBOE is in the process of implementing enhanced risk management procedures and programs.

97. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission has considered the remedial efforts and voluntary initiatives undertaken by CBOE and determined that under these circumstances it is not in the public interest to impose limitations upon the activities, functions, or operations of CBOE pursuant to Section 19(h)(1) of the Exchange Act.

UNDERTAKINGS

Respondents have undertaken to do the following:  

A. CBOE and C2 shall provide for the autonomy and independence of the regulatory function of CBOE such that the regulatory staff, and any successor thereto, has sole discretion as to what matters to examine, investigate and prosecute, and all decisions regarding resolution of any examination, investigation or prosecution shall be made without regard to the actual or perceived business interests of CBOE, C2, CBSX or any of their trading permit or privilege holders.

B. CBOE and C2 shall take all necessary steps to ensure that CBOE’s/C2’s regulatory functions shall be independent from the commercial interests of CBOE/C2 and CBOE’s/C2’s trading permit holders, including the following:

1. Develop and implement a written regulatory independence policy.

2. Develop and implement a written policy on the confidentiality of regulatory information.

3. Provide annual training on self-regulatory organizations rules and obligations, compliance with the federal securities laws and regulations and CBOE/C2 rules, conflicts of interest, recordkeeping, and confidentiality of information to all CBOE/C2 officers and employees.

4. CBOE shall not permit its Chief Executive Officer to have any direct supervisory responsibility over the CRO, including decisions regarding what matters to examine, investigate and prosecute or other regulatory policy matters. Subject to this limitation and provided that the principle and mandate

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17 As part of its remediation efforts, CBOE has begun or completed Undertakings A, B, C, D, E, F, G, L, N, P, Q, R, T, and U.
of Undertakings A and B are observed, the CEO may perform all duties and functions customary to that position, including those steps necessary to prepare the certifications called for under this Order.

5. To the extent that the CEO has any indirect supervisory responsibility for the role or function of the CRO, including but not limited to, implementation of the budget for the regulatory function or regulatory personnel matters, the ROCC shall take all steps reasonably necessary to ensure that the CEO does not compromise the regulatory autonomy and independence of the CRO or the regulatory function.

C. CBOE shall conduct a “bottom-up” review to assess the impact that CBOE’s commercial interests and the interests of its trading permit holders have on CBOE’s regulatory functions no later than 90 days after the issuance of this Order and create a written summary of findings and recommendations.

1. CBOE, under the oversight of the ROCC, shall develop and implement a written plan of corrective actions to address any findings and recommendations, including a date by which each corrective action shall be implemented.

2. CBOE will provide the written summary of findings and recommendations and its plan of action to the Directors of OCIE and Trading and Markets no later than 180 days from the issuance of this Order.

D. CBOE and C2 shall implement a mandatory annual training program for all staff responsible for surveillance, investigation, examination, and discipline. The training shall include information on the rules for which the staff member is responsible, recordkeeping, and confidentiality of information.

E. CBOE shall, no later than 180 days from the issuance of this Order, conduct a gap analysis to determine (i) if there are any CBOE rules or federal laws or regulations for which CBOE does not have an adequate regulatory program, including, if applicable, a reasonable surveillance system; (ii) if CBOE’s existing regulatory program is reasonably capable of detecting violations; (iii) if CBOE’s written regulatory policies and procedures are effective; and (iv) if CBOE is following its written policies and procedures.

1. CBOE shall create a written summary of findings and recommendations.

2. CBOE, under the oversight of the ROCC, shall develop and implement a plan of corrective action to address any findings and recommendations, including a date by which each corrective action shall be implemented.
3. CBOE will provide the written summary of findings and recommendations and its plan of action to the Directors of OCIE and Trading and Markets no later than 210 days from the issuance of this Order.

F. CBOE shall, no later than 90 days from the issuance of this Order, review CBOE's Reg. SHO surveillances, practices and procedures, and training to determine if any changes are necessary to strengthen the ability of CBOE to enforce Reg. SHO compliance and create a written summary of findings and recommendations.

1. CBOE, under the oversight of the ROCC, shall develop and implement a plan of corrective action to address any findings and recommendations, including a date by which each corrective action shall be implemented.

2. CBOE will provide the written summary of findings and recommendations and its plan of action to the Directors of OCIE and Trading and Markets no later than 120 days from the issuance of this Order.

G. CBOE shall, no later than 120 days from the issuance of this Order, review CBOE's regulatory program, practices and procedures, and training related to firm quote and priority surveillances to determine if any changes are necessary to strengthen the ability of CBOE to enforce these rules and create a written summary of findings and recommendations.

1. CBOE, under the oversight of the ROCC, shall develop and implement a plan of corrective action to address any findings and recommendations, including a date by which each corrective action shall be implemented.

2. CBOE will provide the written summary of findings and recommendations and its plan of action to the Directors of OCIE and Trading and Markets no later than 150 days from the issuance of this Order.

H. No later than 60 days after the end of the calendar year for each of the next five years, CBOE shall provide the Director of OCIE with a list of all surveillances with the number of formal investigations opened and the number of disciplinary actions that resulted from these surveillances.

I. CBOE and C2 shall, no later than 360 days from the issuance of this Order, conduct an analysis of their business operations, based on reasonable inquiry, to determine if CBOE or C2 needs to file any additional rules with the Commission or modify any existing rules and create a written summary of findings and recommendations.

1. If CBOE or C2 identifies any rule that needs to be filed with the Commission or identifies the need to modify an existing rule, CBOE or C2 shall immediately notify the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE and provide a plan for ensuring that CBOE or C2 is in prompt compliance with its obligations under the federal securities laws and regulations.
2. Every 120 days from the issuance of this Order until completion of the analysis, CBOE and C2, under the oversight of the Audit Committee, shall provide the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE with a status report showing the actions taken to date to comply with this Undertaking and the actions to be taken during the next 120 day period.

3. Upon completion of the analysis, CBOE and C2, under the oversight of the Audit Committee, shall develop and implement a plan of corrective action to address any findings and recommendations, including a date by which each corrective action shall be implemented.

4. CBOE and C2 will provide the written summary of findings and recommendations and their plan of action to the Directors of OCIE and Trading and Markets no later than 390 days from the issuance of this Order.

J. CBOE shall, no later than 150 days from the issuance of this Order, formulate and implement procedures and training designed to ensure that, where CBOE’s activities require rule authority, rules are put in place prior to such activity commencing.

K. If, within 120 days of receipt of any of the written summaries of findings and recommendations and plans of action to be completed pursuant to Undertakings C, E, F, G, and I above, the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE determine, based on good cause shown, and notify CBOE or C2 in writing, that the analyses or reviews to be performed pursuant to those Undertakings are inadequate, CBOE or C2 shall retain at its expense an independent consultant, not unacceptable to Commission staff, or request that the previously retained consultant expand the scope of its review (collectively, the “Consultants”) to conduct the required analysis or review. The analysis or review by the independent Consultant(s) will be completed no later than 180 days after CBOE or C2 has been notified by the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE that the initial analysis or review was inadequate.

1. CBOE or C2, as appropriate, shall provide the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE with a written report of the independent consultant’s findings no later than 210 days after CBOE or C2 was notified by the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE that the initial analysis or review was inadequate.

2. CBOE or C2, as appropriate, shall develop and implement a plan of corrective action to address any findings, including a date by which each corrective action shall be implemented and provide the plan to the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE no later than 240 days from the date that CBOE or C2 was notified by the Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE that the initial analysis or review was inadequate.
3. CBOE or C2, as appropriate, shall require any independent Consultant retained to satisfy this Undertaking to enter into a written agreement that provides that for the period of engagement and for a period of two (2) years from completion of the engagement, the independent Consultant shall not enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with CBOE, C2, or any of its present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their capacity. The written agreement will also provide that the independent Consultant will require that any firm with which he/she is affiliated or of which he/she is a member, and any person engaged to assist the independent Consultant in performance of his/her duties under the attached Order shall not, without prior written consent of the Commission staff, enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with CBOE, C2, or any of its present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their capacity as such for the period of the engagement and for a period of two years after the engagement.

L. CBOE shall implement a mandatory annual training program for all officers and employees involved in business development, accounting, and proposed rule change filings covering customer accommodations and the rules related to monies paid by or to trading permit holders.

M. CBOE, under the oversight of the ROCC, shall take all reasonably necessary steps to ensure that going forward (a) all Trading Permit Holders, and their associated persons, comply with CBOE Rule 3.6A and all applicable Exchange rules regarding registration, qualification, and continuing education; and (b) examination waivers granted are, in accordance with CBOE Rule 3.6A, given only in exceptional circumstances where good cause is shown.

1. CBOE shall provide to the Director of Trading and Markets, on a quarterly basis, for a period of two years, a detailed report containing an explanation and justification for each waiver that was granted or denied during that quarter pursuant to CBOE Rule 3.6A. As part of the quarterly report, CBOE shall certify in writing that such waivers comply with CBOE Rule 3.6A.

2. No later than 180 days from the issuance of this Order, CBOE shall adopt policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonably designed to ensure compliance with CBOE Rule 3.6A.

N. CBOE shall, no later than 45 days from the issuance of this Order, implement written policies and procedures designed to prevent unauthorized access to CBSX.

O. No later than 120 days after the issuance of this Order, CBOE shall enhance its regulation of CBSX-only trading permit holders by developing and implementing a regulatory plan to enforce all applicable federal securities laws and regulations and CBSX rules, including but not limited to the anti-fraud rules, regardless of trading
venue. CBOE shall provide a written report of the action it has taken to the Directors of OCIE and Trading and Markets no later than 150 days from the issuance of this Order.

P. CBOE shall implement an audit trail sufficient to enable CBOE to reconstruct CBSX's market promptly, to effectively surveil CBSX, and to facilitate the effective enforcement of the federal securities laws and regulations and CBSX rules.

Q. CBOE shall conduct an enterprise risk management review to enhance internal risk management and compliance processes.

R. CBOE shall employ a CCO whose responsibilities include implementing written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that CBOE fulfills its compliance obligations.

S. CBOE and C2 shall expend sufficient funds to discharge the Undertakings referenced herein, including, but not limited to, the hiring of sufficient qualified personnel and providing adequate funds for the retention of outside counsel and/or professionals.

T. CBOE shall provide for the independence of the internal audit department to ensure that it is capable of assessing the effectiveness of controls to review and detect risks within CBOE.

U. CBOE shall require its internal audit department to develop a 3-year risk-based audit plan for the Regulatory Division. CBOE shall ensure the internal audit department has sufficient resources to implement the 3-year audit plan.

V. CBOE shall require its CEO to certify, in writing, that CBOE has complied with Undertakings A, B, C, I, J, L, M, N, Q, R, S, T, and U set forth above. The certification shall identify the Undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and Respondents agree to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material as to each Undertaking other than Undertaking I shall be submitted to Deborah A. Tarasevich, Assistant Director, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel, of the Commission's Enforcement Division, no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of each of the Undertakings, and in any event no later than 240 days from the issuance of this Order. A separate certification with respect to Undertaking I shall be submitted in accordance with the preceding requirement no later than 60 days from the date of the completion of that Undertaking, and in any event no later than 420 days from the issuance of this Order.

W. CBOE shall require its CRO to certify, in writing, that CBOE has complied with Undertakings A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, O, P, and S set forth above. The certification shall identify the Undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance.
Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and Respondents agree to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be submitted to Deborah A. Tarasevich, Assistant Director, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel, of the Commission’s Enforcement Division, no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of each of the Undertakings, and in any event no later than 240 days from the issuance of this Order.

X. Beginning one (1) year after the date of the last certification described in Undertaking V above (other than the certification with respect to Undertaking I), and each year thereafter for four (4) years (for a total of five (5) annual certifications), CBOE shall require its CEO to certify to the Director of OCIE and to the Director of Trading and Markets that:

1. CBOE’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure the independence of CBOE’s regulatory functions from the commercial interests of CBOE and its trading permit holders and that CBOE is in compliance with those written policies and procedures;

2. CBOE’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure CBOE is filing all new rules and modification to rules in compliance with the Exchange Act; and that CBOE is in compliance with those written policies and procedures;

3. CBOE’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure that payments and/or credits are made to trading permit holders only when allowable under a rule and in a nondiscriminatory manner; and that CBOE is in compliance with those written policies and procedures;

4. CBOE’s trading permit holder registration process policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure that (i) trading permit holders and their associated persons who are engaged in the securities business register with the Exchange; (ii) waivers are granted only pursuant to and in accordance with CBOE Rule 3.6A; and (iii) CBOE is in compliance with those written policies and procedures; and

5. CBOE’s internal controls are reasonably designed to detect and control risks within CBOE, including but not limited to, risks associated with the independence of the Regulatory function, and the filing of all appropriate rules.

Y. Beginning one (1) year after the date of the certification described in Undertaking W above, and each year thereafter for four (4) years (for a total of five (5) annual certifications), CBOE shall require its CRO to certify to the Director of OCIE and to the Director of Trading and Markets that:
1. CBOE’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure the independence of CBOE’s regulatory functions from the commercial interests of CBOE and its trading permit holders and that CBOE is in compliance with those written policies and procedures; and

2. CBOE’s surveillance, examination, investigation and disciplinary programs policies and procedures, including but not limited to surveillance parameters and examination and surveillance procedures, are reasonably designed to ensure compliance with and to detect and deter violations of all federal securities laws and Exchange rules; and that CBOE is in compliance with those written policies and procedures.

Z. C2 shall require its CEO to certify, in writing, that C2 has complied with Undertakings A, B, I, and S set forth above. The certification shall identify the Undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and Respondents agree to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material as to each Undertaking other than Undertaking I shall be submitted to Deborah A. Tarasevich, Assistant Director, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel, of the Commission’s Enforcement Division, no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of each of the Undertakings, and in any event no later than 240 days from the issuance of this Order. A separate certification with respect to Undertaking I shall be submitted in accordance with the preceding requirement no later than 60 days from the date of the completion of that Undertaking, and in any event no later than 420 days from the issuance of this Order.

AA. C2 shall require its CRO to certify, in writing, that C2 has complied with Undertakings A, B, D and S set forth above. The certification shall identify the Undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and Respondents agree to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be submitted to Deborah A. Tarasevich, Assistant Director, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel, of the Commission’s Enforcement Division, no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of each of the Undertakings, and in any event no later than 240 days from the issuance of this Order.

BB. Beginning one (1) year after the date of the last certification described in Undertaking Z above (other than the certification with respect to Undertaking I), and each year thereafter for four (4) years (for a total of five (5) annual certifications), C2 shall require its CEO to certify to the Director of OCIE and to the Director of Trading and Markets that:

1. C2’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure the independence of C2’s regulatory functions from the commercial
interests of C2 and its trading permit holders and that C2 is in compliance with those written policies and procedures; and

2. C2’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure C2 is filing all new rules and modification to rules in compliance with the Exchange Act; and that C2 is in compliance with those written policies and procedures.

CC. Beginning one (1) year after the date of the certification described in Undertaking AA above, and each year thereafter for four (4) years (for a total of five (5) annual certifications), C2 shall require its CRO to certify to the Director of OCIE and to the Director of Trading and Markets that C2’s policies, procedures, and internal controls are reasonably designed to ensure the independence of C2’s regulatory functions from the commercial interests of C2 and its trading permit holders and that C2 is in compliance with those written policies and procedures.

DD. The Directors of Trading and Markets and OCIE, or their designees, may, based on good cause shown by CBOE or C2, jointly grant in writing: (1) extensions of time for compliance with any of the foregoing undertakings; and (2) modifications to any of the foregoing undertakings in connection with a filing made by CBOE or C2 under the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder that is approved by the Commission, including by delegated authority. Nothing herein would preclude CBOE or C2 from applying to the Commission for other modifications to the foregoing undertakings.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents’ Offers.

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 19(h)(1) and 21C of the Exchange Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent CBOE cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(1), 19(b)(1), and 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-1, thereunder.

B. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent C2 cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act.

C. Pursuant to Section 19(h)(1) of the Exchange Act, Respondents CBOE and C2 are censured.

D. Pursuant to Section 21B(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, Respondent CBOE shall, within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $6,000,000 ($6 million) to the United States Treasury. If timely payment is not made, additional
interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717. Such payment must be made in one of the following ways: (1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request; (2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the Commission’s website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or (3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying CBOE as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Daniel M. Hawke, Chief, Market Abuse Unit, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Mellon Independence Center, 701 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1532.

E. Respondents shall comply with the Undertakings enumerated above.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 15(b) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING
REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Robert A. Gist ("Gist" or "Respondent").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings and the findings contained in Section III.2 below, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.
III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds:

1. Gist, age 62, resides in Atlanta, Georgia. From March 2001 through December 31, 2011, he was a registered representative associated with a Georgia broker-dealer registered with the Commission. He is not currently associated with a registered broker-dealer.

2. On May 31, 2013, an order was entered by consent against Gist, permanently enjoining him from future violations of Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, in the civil action entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Robert A. Gist, et al., Civil Action Number 1:13-cv-01833-AT, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

3. The Commission’s complaint alleged that from approximately 2003 to the present, in connection with the sale of securities, Gist misused and misappropriated investor funds, falsely stated to investors that their funds were invested, sent out false account statements indicating that investors funds were fully invested and earning returns, and otherwise engaged in a variety of conduct which operated as a fraud and deceit on investors. The complaint also alleged that for a portion of the time of the alleged misconduct, Gist was a registered representative of a Commission-registered broker-dealer, and that for a later portion of the time of the alleged misconduct, Gist acted as an unregistered broker-dealer.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Gist’s Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act that Respondent Gist be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization; and barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.

Any reapplication for association by the Respondent will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served
as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
In the Matter of

The Great Train Store Co.,
Greate Bay Casino Corp.,
Gridline Communications Holdings, Inc.
   (f/k/a North Shore Capital IV, Inc.),
Gulf Exploration Consultants, Inc.,
Gulfside Industries Ltd. (n/k/a Consolidated
Gulfside Resources, Ltd.),
GulfTex Energy Corp.,
Lynn Two, Inc., and
III to I Maritime Partners Cayman I, LP,

Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(j) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Respondents The Great Train Store Co., Greate Bay Casino Corp., Gridline Communications Holdings, Inc. (f/k/a North Shore Capital IV, Inc.), Gulf Exploration Consultants, Inc., Gulfside Industries Ltd. (n/k/a Consolidated Gulfside Resources, Ltd.), Gulftex Energy Corp., Lynn Two, Inc., and III to I Maritime Partners Cayman I, LP.
II.

After an investigation, the Division of Enforcement alleges that:

A. RESPONDENTS

1. The Great Train Store Co. (CIK No. 924380) is a void Delaware corporation located in Dallas, Texas with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). The Great Train Store is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended October 2, 1999, which reported a net loss of over $2.9 million for the prior thirty-nine weeks. On February 28, 2000, The Great Train Store filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and the case was terminated on September June 9, 2004.

2. Greate Bay Casino Corp. (CIK No. 30117) is a dissolved Delaware corporation located in Dallas, Texas with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Greate Bay Casino is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2001, which reported a net loss of $267,000 for the prior year. On December 28, 2001, Greate Bay Casino filed a Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and the case was terminated on January 22, 2004.

3. Gridline Communications Holdings, Inc. (f/k/a North Shore Capital IV, Inc.) (CIK No. 1102005) is a void Delaware corporation located in Frisco, Texas with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Gridline Communications Holdings is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2005, which reported a net loss of over $990,000 for the prior nine months.

4. Gulf Exploration Consultants, Inc. (CIK No. 824088) is a forfeited Delaware corporation located in Jacksonville, Florida with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Gulf Exploration is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 1997, which reported a net loss of over $4,200 for the prior three months.

5. Gulfside Industries Ltd. (n/k/a Consolidated Gulfside Resources, Ltd.) (CIK No. 865847) is a British Columbia corporation located in Somerset, Texas with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Gulfside Industries is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 1995, which reported a net loss of over $148,000 for the prior nine months.

6. GulfTex Energy Corp. (CIK No. 1122154) is a Texas corporation located in Woodstock, Georgia with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant
to Exchange Act Section 12(g). GulfRx Energy is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-QSB for the period ended October 31, 2001, which reported a net loss of over $3,500 for the prior three months.

7. Lynn Two, Inc. (CIK No. 1407676) is a revoked Nevada corporation located in Sumter, South Carolina with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Lynn Two is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended July 30, 2009, which reported a net loss of over $1,300 for the prior six months.

8. III to I Maritime Partners Cayman I, LP (CIK No. 1385436) is a Cayman Islands company located in Dallas, Texas with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). III to I Maritime Partners Cayman I is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2010, which reported a net loss of over $50 million for the prior year.

B. DELINQUENT PERIODIC FILINGS

9. As discussed in more detail above, all of the Respondents are delinquent in their periodic filings with the Commission, have repeatedly failed to meet their obligations to file timely periodic reports, and failed to heed delinquency letters sent to them by the Division of Corporation Finance requesting compliance with their periodic filing obligations or, through their failure to maintain a valid address on file with the Commission as required by Commission rules, did not receive such letters.

10. Exchange Act Section 13(a) and the rules promulgated thereunder require issuers of securities registered pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12 to file with the Commission current and accurate information in periodic reports, even if the registration is voluntary under Section 12(g). Specifically, Rule 13a-1 requires issuers to file annual reports, and Rule 13a-13 requires domestic issuers to file quarterly reports.

11. As a result of the foregoing, Respondents failed to comply with Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and/or 13a-13 thereunder.

III.

In view of the allegations made by the Division of Enforcement, the Commission deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be instituted to determine:

A. Whether the allegations contained in Section II hereof are true and, in connection therewith, to afford the Respondents an opportunity to establish any defenses to such allegations; and,
B. Whether it is necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of each class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act of the Respondents identified in Section II hereof, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents.

IV.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a public hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the questions set forth in Section III hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be fixed, and before an Administrative Law Judge to be designated by further order as provided by Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.110].

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file an Answer to the allegations contained in this Order within ten (10) days after service of this Order, as provided by Rule 220(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b)].

If Respondents fail to file the directed Answers, or fail to appear at a hearing after being duly notified, the Respondents, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents, may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be determined against them upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f), and 310 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f), and 201.310].

This Order shall be served forthwith upon Respondents personally or by certified, registered, or Express Mail, or by other means permitted by the Commission Rules of Practice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 120 days from the date of service of this Order, pursuant to Rule 360(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)].

In the absence of an appropriate waiver, no officer or employee of the Commission engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related proceeding will be permitted to participate or advise in the decision of this matter, except as witness or counsel in proceedings held pursuant to notice. Since this proceeding is not “rule making” within the meaning of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not deemed subject to the provisions of Section 553 delaying the effective date of any final Commission action.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
ORDER DETERMINING WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD CLAIM

Four individuals Claimant #1 , Claimant #2 , Claimant #3 and Claimant #4 — each filed timely whistleblower award claims pursuant to section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, in connection with Notice of Covered Action 2012-27. The Claims Review Staff ("CRS") issued a Preliminary Determination recommending that the respective claims of Claimant #1, Claimant #2 and Claimant #3 each be allowed in the amount of five percent (5%) of the monetary sanctions collected, and that Claimant #4’s claim be denied. Only Claimant #4 now has filed a response contesting the Preliminary Determination. For the reasons set forth below, Claimant #1, Claimant #2 and Claimant #3 claims each are approved in the amount of 5%, and Claimant #4’s claim is denied.

I. SEC Enforcement Action and Notice of Covered Action

On October 26, 2011, the Commission filed an enforcement action in SEC v. Andrey C. Hicks and Locust Offshore Management, LLC, 1:11-cv-11888-RGS (D. Mass. 2011) (the "Locust Matter"). The Commission alleged in its complaint that the defendants, Andrey C. Hicks ("Hicks") and Locust Offshore Management, LLC ("Locust"), committed fraud in connection with the offer and sale of shares in the Locust Offshore Fund, Ltd. (the "Fund"), a pooled investment fund purportedly incorporated in the British Virgin Islands ("BVI"), which turned out to be wholly fictitious. On March 20, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered final judgments in favor of the Commission after default was entered against the defendants. Among other relief, the court held both defendants jointly and severally liable for disgorgement and prejudgment interest in the amount of $2,512,058.39. In addition,
the court imposed a civil penalty on Locust Offshore Management, LLC in the amount of $2,512,058.39, and a civil penalty on Andrey C. Hicks in the amount of $2,512,058.39.

On April 3, 2012, the Office of the Whistleblower posted Notice of Covered Action 2012-27 for the Locust Matter. As noted above, all four claimants filed timely whistleblower award claims.

II. Claimant #1, Claimant #2 and Claimant #3 Respective Claims are Approved.

On December 19, 2012, the CRS issued a Preliminary Determination recommending that Claimant #1, Claimant #2 and Claimant #3 each receive a whistleblower award because each of them voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the Locust Matter pursuant to Section 21F(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1), and Rule 21F-3(a) thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a). Further, the CRS recommended that each such award be set in the amount of 5% of monetary sanctions collected in the Locust Matter, after considering the factors set forth in Rule 21F-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6, as they applied to each claimant.

Neither Claimant #1, Claimant #2 nor Claimant #3 filed a response contesting the Preliminary Determination. Upon due consideration under Rule 21F-10(f) and (h), 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(f) and (h), their claims each are approved in the amount of 5%.

III. Claimant #4 Claim is Denied.

A. Background

In December 2011, Claimant #4 submitted a tip to the SEC about "securities fraud committed by many brokers/dealers/traders involved with naked shorting" of the securities of which, #4 allegedly, had occurred as early as 2003 through 2005. Claimant #4 tip also noted that #4 had forwarded this same information to the Commission and that #4 had earlier sent written information about this fraud to staff in the Commission's Division of Enforcement and to Chairman Mary Schapiro on again on The Division of Enforcement determined that no further action would be taken on this tip because Claimant #4 information was vague or insubstantial.

In March and April 2012, Claimant #4 submitted two new tips regarding The Division of Enforcement determined that no further action would be taken on these two tips.

None of Claimant #4 tips contained information on the Locust Matter, nor did they even mention the Locust Matter defendants. Further, the Commission's complaint in the Locust
Notice of Covered Action 2012-27
Page 3

Matter alleged that the defendants made misrepresentations when soliciting individuals to invest in a purported hedge fund controlled by defendants, and did not make any allegations concerning naked short selling, which was the subject of Claimant #4's tips.

On December 19, 2012, the CRS made a Preliminary Determination recommending that claim should be denied. The Preliminary Determination explained that the information provided by Claimant #4 prior to July 21, 2010 was not "original information" because it was not submitted after July 21, 2010, the date that Section 21F was added to the Exchange Act by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Preliminary Determination further concluded that the information provided after July 21, 2010 did not lead to the successful enforcement of the Locust Matter because it neither caused the Commission to open its investigation nor significantly contributed to the success of the enforcement action.

B. Claimant #4 Response to the Preliminary Determination

On February 19, 2013, Claimant #4 submitted a response contesting the Preliminary Determination pursuant to Rule 21F-10(e)(2). Rule 21F-10(e)(2) provides that a claimant seeking to contest a Preliminary Determination must submit a written response within 60 days that "sets forth the grounds for your objection to either the denial of an award or the proposed amount of an award." 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(e)(2).

Claimant #4's response argues that #4 provided original information to the Commission alerting it to fraudulent activity allegedly conducted by Redacted and that this tip led the Commission to file suit against Redacted. Claimant #4 does not provide any information to show that #4 assisted or contributed to either the Commission's investigation or its successful enforcement action in the Locust Matter. Rather, #4 states that #4 is using Redacted as an "example of illegal naked shorting" and that this makes #4 "the original informant to the Commission about security violations found in 2012-27, Exchange Act Section 10(b), and Rule 10(b)-5 hereunder" (internal quotation in original).

C. Analysis

To be considered for an award under Section 21F, a whistleblower must voluntarily provide the Commission with "original information" that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action or related action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). Under Rule 21F-4(b)(1)(iv), information will be considered "original information" only if it was provided to the Commission for the first time after July 21, 2010. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(1)(iv). Further, as relevant here, original information "leads to" a successful enforcement action if either: (i) the

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original information caused the staff to open an investigation, and the Commission brought a
successful action based in whole or in part on conduct that was the subject of the original
information; or (ii) the conduct was already under investigation, and the original information
significantly contributed to the success of the action. Rule 21F-4(c)(1)-(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-
4(c)(1)-(2).

The information Claimant #4 provided prior to July 21, 2010, including the information re-
submitted after July 21, 2010, is not "original information" and therefore does not provide a basis
for a whistleblower award. With regard to the information Claimant #4 submitted after July 21,
2010, Claimant #4 fails to articulate any connection or nexus between this information and either
the opening of the investigation or the success of the enforcement action in the Locust Matter.
Further, we find no evidence whatsoever after our review of the record that Claimant #4
information was used in either the investigation or litigation of the Locust Matter; indeed, the
record indicates that Claimant #4 information was not used in any Commission investigation or
enforcement action. Accordingly, the information Claimant #4 provided after July 21, 2010 did not
lead to a successful Commission enforcement action and therefore does not provide the basis for
a whistleblower award. For these reasons, #4 claim is denied.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Claimant #1, Claimant #2, and Claimant #3 each shall receive an
award of 5% of the monetary sanctions collected in the above-referenced covered action,
including any monetary sanctions collected after the date of this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that Claimant #4 whistleblower award claim be, and hereby is, denied.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
I.

On December 10, 2012, the Commission instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings pursuant to Sections 9(b) and 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act") against J. Kenneth Alderman, CPA ("Alderman"); Jack R. Blair ("Blair"); Albert C. Johnson, CPA ("Johnson"); James Stillman R. McFadden ("McFadden"); Allen B. Morgan Jr. ("Morgan"); W. Randall Pittman, CPA ("Pittman"); Mary S. Stone, CPA ("Stone"); and Archie W. Willis III ("Willis"). (collectively "Respondents" or "the Directors"). Respondents have submitted Offers of Settlement which the Commission has determined to accept.

II.

Solely for the purpose of settling these proceedings, and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission's jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order.
Making Findings and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondents' Offer, the Commission finds\(^1\) that:

**SUMMARY**

1. This matter concerns the eight directors (collectively "the Directors") who all served on the boards of five registered investment companies ("The Funds"). Between at least January 2007 and August 2007 (the "Relevant Period"), significant portions of the Funds' portfolios contained below-investment grade debt securities for which market quotations were not readily available. Some of these securities were backed by subprime mortgages. Under the Investment Company Act, those securities were required to be valued at fair value as determined in good faith by the Directors. In discussing fund directors' statutory fair valuation obligations, the Commission has stated that directors must "determine the method of arriving at the fair value of each such security. To the extent considered necessary, the board may appoint persons to assist them in the determination of such value, and to make the actual calculations pursuant to the board's direction. The board must also, consistent with this responsibility, continuously review the appropriateness of the method used in valuing each issue of security in the company's portfolio."\(^2\) The Directors did not specify a fair valuation methodology pursuant to which the securities were to be fair valued. Nor did they continuously review how each issue of security in the Funds' portfolios were being valued. The Directors delegated their responsibility to determine fair value to the Valuation Committee of the investment adviser to the Funds, but did not provide any meaningful substantive guidance on how those determinations should be made. In addition, they did not learn how fair values were actually being determined. They received only limited information on the factors considered in making fair value determinations and almost no information explaining why fair values were assigned to specific portfolio securities. These failures were particularly significant given that fair valued securities made up the majority—and in most cases upwards of 60%—of the Funds' net asset values ("NAVs") during the Relevant Period.

**RESPONDENTS**

2. J. Kenneth Alderman, 60 years of age and a resident of Birmingham, Alabama, was an interested director of the Funds beginning in 2003 and during the entire Relevant Period. He is a Certified Public Accountant ("CPA"), licensed in Florida and Alabama, and is a Chartered Financial Analyst.

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\(^1\) The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents' Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.

3. Jack R. Blair, 70 years of age and a resident of Germantown, Tennessee, was an independent director and a member of the Audit Committee of the Funds beginning in 2005 and during the entire Relevant Period. Blair has never held any professional licenses.

4. Albert C. Johnson, 68 years of age and a resident of Hoover, Alabama, was an independent director and a member of the Audit Committee of the Funds beginning in 2005 and during the entire Relevant Period. He was also designated as an Audit Committee Financial Expert. Johnson is a CPA currently licensed in Alabama and Texas.

5. James Stillman R. McFadden, 55 years of age and a resident of Germantown, Tennessee, was an independent director and a member of the Audit Committee of the Funds beginning in 2002 and during the entire Relevant Period. He was also designated as an Audit Committee Financial Expert. He has never held any professional licenses.

6. Allen B. Morgan Jr., 70 years of age and a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, was an interested director of the Funds beginning in 2002 and during the entire Relevant Period, and was Chairman and CEO of Morgan Keegan until he retired in December 2003.

7. W. Randall Pittman, 59 years of age and a resident of Birmingham, Alabama, was an independent director and a member of the Audit Committee of the Funds beginning in 2003 and during the entire Relevant Period. He was also designated as an Audit Committee Financial Expert. Pittman is a CPA licensed in Alabama.

8. Mary S. Stone, 62 years of age and a resident of Birmingham, Alabama, was an independent director and a member of the Audit Committee of the Funds beginning in 2003 and Chairman of the Audit Committee during the entire Relevant Period. She was also designated as an Audit Committee Financial Expert. Stone is a CPA licensed in Florida.

9. Archie W. Willis III, 54 years of age and a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, was an independent director and a member of the Audit Committee of the Funds beginning in 2002 and during the entire Relevant Period. Willis has never held any professional licenses.

OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES

10. Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("Morgan Asset") is an investment adviser registered with the Commission, and Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan") is a broker-dealer and an investment adviser registered with the Commission. Morgan Asset was headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama while Morgan Keegan was headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. During the Relevant Period, Morgan Asset served as the investment adviser for the Funds and Morgan Keegan provided accounting services to the Funds through its Fund Accounting group ("Fund Accounting").
OVERVIEW OF THE FUNDS

11. The Funds consisted of five registered investment companies: (i) RMK High Income Fund, Inc.; (ii) RMK Multi-Sector High Income Fund, Inc.; (iii) RMK Strategic Income Fund, Inc.; (iv) RMK Advantage Income Fund, Inc.; and (v) Morgan Keegan Select Fund, Inc. ("Select Fund"). The Select Fund was an open-end company with a fiscal year end of June 30 that contained three open-end series—the Select High Income portfolio, the Select Intermediate Bond portfolio, and the Select Short Term Bond portfolio. The other funds were closed-end funds with a fiscal year end of March 31. The closed-end funds calculated and published daily NAVs, although these were not the basis of transactions in their shares.

12. During the Relevant Period, each Fund had a board of directors that consisted of two interested directors and six independent directors. Respondents Alderman and Morgan were the interested directors. Blair, Johnson, McFadden, Pittman, Stone and Willis were the independent directors. All of the independent directors sat on each Fund’s Audit Committee.

13. As of March 31, 2007, the Funds held securities with a combined net asset value of approximately $3.85 billion. The Funds owned many of the same securities and invested the majority of their total assets in complex securities known as structured products that included collateralized debt obligations, collateralized mortgage obligations, collateralized loan obligations, home-equity loan-backed securities, various types of asset-backed securities, and certificate-backed obligations.

14. The Funds’ assets were heavily invested in below-investment grade debt securities, which carried inherent risks such as more frequent and pronounced changes in the perceived creditworthiness of issuers, greater price volatility, reduced liquidity, and the presence of fewer dealers in the market for such securities. Another, particularly relevant characteristic of the Funds’ holdings was their significant concentrations in mortgage-backed securities.

15. A significant number of the structured products held by the Funds were subordinated tranches of various securitizations, for which market quotations were not readily available during the Relevant Period. As a result, a large percentage of the Funds’ portfolios had to be fair valued as determined in good faith by the Funds’ directors in accordance with the requirements of Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment Company Act. As of March 31, 2007, more than 60% of the NAV of each of the four closed-end funds was required to be fair valued. As of June 30, 2007, more than 50% of the NAV of each of the two largest open-end series was required to be fair valued.

RESPONDENTS DELEGATE THEIR VALUATION RESPONSIBILITIES WITH MINIMAL GUIDANCE

16. In the Funds’ Policy and Procedure Manual (the “Manual”), the Directors delegated to Morgan Asset “the responsibility for carrying out certain functions relating to the valuation of portfolio securities... in connection with calculating the NAV per share of the
Funds.” The Manual also stated that “portfolio securities for which market quotations are readily available are valued at current market value [while] . . . . all other portfolio securities will be valued at ‘fair value’ as determined in good faith by [Morgan Asset] in accordance with the Funds’ Valuation Procedures.”

17. The Funds’ Valuation Procedures within the Manual stated more specifically that “[w]hen price quotations for certain securities are not readily available from the sources noted above [i.e., sources of market prices] or if the available quotations are not believed to be reflective of market value, those securities shall be valued at ‘fair value’ as determined in good faith by [Morgan Asset’s] Valuation Committee.” [Emphasis added] The Valuation Procedures then listed various general and specific factors, which the Valuation Committee was supposed to consider when making fair value determinations. The “General Factors” listed were (i) the fundamental analytical data relating to the investment; (ii) the nature and duration of restrictions on disposition of the securities; and (iii) an evaluation of the forces which influence the market in which these securities are purchased and sold.” The “Specific Factors” listed were: (i) type of security; (ii) financial statements of the issuer; (iii) cost at date of purchase (generally used for initial valuation); (iv) size of the Fund’s holding; for restricted securities, (v) any discount from market value of restricted securities of the same class at the time of purchase; (vi) the existence of a shelf registration for restricted securities; (vii) information as to any transactions or offers with respect to the security; (viii) special reports prepared by analysts; (ix) the existence of merger proposals, tender offers or similar events affecting the security; and (x) the price and extent of public trading in similar securities of the issuer or comparable companies.”

18. Other than listing these factors, which were copied nearly verbatim from ASR 118, the Valuation Procedures provided no meaningful methodology or other specific direction on how to make fair value determinations for specific portfolio assets or classes of assets. For example, there was no guidance in the Valuation Procedures on how the listed factors should be interpreted, on whether some of the factors should be weighed more heavily or less heavily than others, or on what specific information qualified as “fundamental analytical data relating to the investments”. Additionally, the Valuation Procedures did not specify what valuation methodology should be employed for each type of security or, in the absence of a specified methodology, how to evaluate whether a particular methodology was appropriate or inappropriate. Also, the Valuation Procedures did not include any mechanism for identifying and reviewing fair-valued securities whose prices remained unchanged for weeks, months and even entire quarters.

19. The Directors did not provide any other guidance—either written or oral—on how to determine fair value beyond what was stated in the Valuation Procedures.

20. The “Written Reports of Fair Value Determinations” subsection of the Valuation Procedures contained the only procedures regarding information required to be provided to the Directors. It stated that “[u]pon making a determination as to the fair value of a security, the Valuation Committee shall maintain a written report documenting the manner in which the fair
value of a security was determined and the accuracy of the valuation made based on the next reliable public price quotation for that security,” and further required that the Valuation Committee create and provide to the Directors for review “quarterly reports listing all securities held by the Fund that were fair valued during the quarter under review, along with explanatory notes for the fair values assigned to the securities.” The procedures did not require the Directors to ratify any fair value determinations made by Morgan Asset, and they did not ratify any such determinations.

THE FUNDS’ ACTUAL FAIR VALUATION PROCEDURES

21. The Valuation Committee, which consisted of Fund officers and Fund Accounting employees, and which did not include any Directors, was responsible according to the Funds’ procedures for overseeing the fair valuation process. In practice, the task of assigning fair values on a daily basis was performed by Fund Accounting, a unit which consisted of Morgan Keegan employees.

22. In determining fair value, Fund Accounting did not use any reasonable analytical method to arrive at fair value. For example, neither Fund Accounting nor the Valuation Committee used a pricing model or made any meaningful effort to analyze future cash flows, or the present values thereof, that a particular bond in the portfolio would likely generate.

23. Under the actual fair valuation process, Fund Accounting typically set a security’s initial fair value as its purchase price (its cost) and, thereafter, left that fair value unchanged unless a sale or a price confirmation indicated a more than 5% variance from the previously assigned fair value. In addition, the Portfolio Manager repeatedly contacted Fund Accounting, by email or other means, and provided price adjustments for particular securities. Without any explanation of his basis for such prices, Fund Accounting routinely accepted the prices provided by the Portfolio Manager. Neither the Directors nor Morgan Keegan or Morgan Asset ever provided guidelines by which Fund Accounting or the Valuation Committee should evaluate the reasonableness of such adjustments.

24. Shortly after each month end, Fund Accounting selected and sought price confirmations for a random sample of the Funds’ securities that were required to be fair valued, except for March and June when, in connection with annual audits, confirmations were sought by the Funds’ independent auditors for 100% of the fair valued securities. The price confirmations were essentially opinions on price from broker-dealers, rather than bids or firm quotes. The price confirmations generally contained disclaimers explicitly making clear that the dealer providing the price confirmation was not offering to buy the security at the stated price. In addition, the price confirmations generally related to month-end prices, but were obtained several weeks after the respective month-ends. Accordingly, they could not have sufficed as the primary valuation method, given the open-end Fund series’ obligation to daily price the securities and the closed-end Funds daily publication of their NAVs.
25. The Valuation Procedures contained a section entitled “Price Override Procedures,” which provided that the Adviser could “override prices provided by a pricing service or broker-dealer only when it had a reasonable basis to believe that the price . . . does not accurately reflect the fair value of the portfolio security.” The section further provided that “the basis for overriding the price shall be documented and provided to the Valuation Committee for its review.” Because the Valuation Committee and Fund Accounting interpreted this provision as applying only to broker-dealer quotes (i.e., actual offers to buy or sell), the Valuation Committee was not advised, and could not advise the Directors, as to the basis upon which Fund Accounting chose to ignore the price confirmations.

26. In the event a price confirmation indicated a more than 5% variance from the previously assigned fair value, Fund Accounting effectively allowed the Portfolio Manager to determine the fair value. The Portfolio Manager arbitrarily set values without a reasonable basis and did so in a way that postponed the degree of decline in the NAVs of the Funds which should have occurred during the Relevant Period.

27. Fund Accounting also engaged in smoothing prices (using preplanned daily reductions in value provided by the Portfolio Manager to gradually reduce, over days or weeks, a bond to its current proper valuation).

28. As a result of the foregoing practices, during the Relevant Period, the NAVs of the Funds were inaccurate at least from March 31, 2007 through August 9, 2007. Consequently, the prices at which the open-end series sold, redeemed, and repurchased their shares were also inaccurate.

29. During the Relevant Period, the Directors did not determine what methodology was actually used by Fund Accounting and the Valuation Committee to fair value particular securities or types of securities. The information and reports provided to Directors at their board meetings did not provide sufficient information for the Directors to understand what methodology was being used by Fund Accounting to fair value particular securities. For example, at each quarterly board meeting the Directors received a list of the Funds’ portfolio securities that were required to be fair valued and the fair values assigned to each security at quarter end. However, the information provided did not identify the type of security, the basis for a particular assigned fair value, or whether that price had changed from prior quarters.

30. The Directors received at each quarterly board meeting three other documents relating to fair value determinations. The three documents were: (i) a “Report from the Joint Valuation Committee [of the Funds];” (ii) a “Fair Valuation Form” for each of the Funds; and (iii) “Security Sales” reports for each of the Funds.

31. The Report from the Joint Valuation Committee provided in connection with the quarterly board meetings in November 2006, January 2007 and May 2007, said: “The Valuation Committee met three times during the [preceding] calendar quarter[. . . The values of internally-priced securities were randomly confirmed with third parties and no material
exceptions were noted. The Valuation Committee feels that all securities are being fairly priced and there are no material misstatements.” The report did not, however, state how fair values were determined, and gave no details on how fair valued securities, which it referred to as “internally-priced securities,” were “randomly confirmed with third parties.”

32. Although price confirmations played a significant role in the Funds’ fair valuation process, the Directors never established any guidelines regarding the use of price confirmations, such as how frequently they should be requested for any particular type of security, or the selection of broker-dealers used to provide such price confirmations. Nor did the Directors require any review to identify those securities for which no price confirmation had been obtained for a particular length of time.

33. The “Fair Valuation Form” was received quarterly by the Directors for each of the Funds. That form contained, next to the words “Basis/Source/Method For Determining Price Used,” the recurring phrase: “[i]nternal matrix based on actual dealer prices and/or Treasury spread relationships provided by dealers.” There was no explanation of the “internal matrix” and no indication of what was meant by the terms “actual dealer prices” or “Treasury spread relationships provided by dealers.” Contrary to the statements in the Fair Valuation Form, the internal matrix was only used to price a small percentage (for example, approximately 12% of the securities held by the four closed-end Funds) that were required to be fair valued as of March 31, 2007. The Directors were unaware as to how the matrix operated.

34. Meaningful “explanatory notes for the fair values assigned to the securities” were not presented, quarterly or otherwise, to the Directors, despite the fact that the Valuation Procedures required that the Directors receive them on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, the Directors never followed up to request that such explanatory notes or any other specific information regarding the basis for the values assigned be provided to them. Although the Portfolio Manager’s price adjustments were purportedly based on information obtained by the Portfolio Manager from other traders and although the Board-approved Valuation Procedures required the Valuation Committee to present the Board with explanatory notes for all fair-valued securities, the Valuation Committee never identified to the Directors the bonds for which values were assigned based upon the price adjustments. Nor did the Directors require Fund Accounting or the Valuation Committee to identify those instances where the portfolio manager’s price adjustment varied materially from a confirmation.

35. The “Security Sales” report for the Funds listed information about the securities sold in each Fund in the preceding quarter, including: (1) par value sold; (2) sales price; (3) the previous day’s assigned price; (4) whether it was priced externally or internally, i.e., fair valued; (5) the resulting variance; and (6) the impact on the Fund.

36. The Security Sales report included no information about securities that had not been sold—a significant limitation given the fact that securities that were required to be fair valued constituted a majority of Fund assets and most of those securities were not sold during the first six months of calendar 2007. For example, although approximately 290 securities were fair
valued for substantially all of the period between November 2006 and July 31, 2007, only 24 of those securities were sold during that period.

37. The absence of information about potentially stale prices further limited the Directors’ ability to (a) review carefully the findings of the Valuation Committee and, (b) satisfy themselves that all relevant factors had been considered. Indeed, the prices of many securities remained relatively unchanged for prolonged periods during the Relevant Period. This information would have been particularly valuable given the increasingly turbulent market conditions during the Relevant Period and the Funds’ admonition in their filings that the prices for many of the securities in the portfolio could be volatile.

38. Outside counsel advised the Directors in connection with the adoption of the written Valuation Procedures. Further, during the Relevant Period, independent auditors audited the financial statements for the closed-end funds for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2007 and the open-end fund’s financial statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007. During each of these audits, the auditor provided unqualified opinions and advised the Directors that the Valuation Procedures were appropriate and reasonable.

39. These audits did not provide the Directors with sufficient information about the valuation methodologies actually employed by Fund Accounting and the Valuation Committee to satisfy the Directors’ obligations. The auditors were not retained to opine on the Funds’ internal controls and in fact, advised the Directors that the auditors’ “consideration will not be sufficient to enable us to provide assurances on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.” As a result, the auditors did not advise the Directors in any meaningful detail as to what pricing methodologies were actually being employed.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD

40. Funds are required to adopt and implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the securities laws, including policies and procedures concerning a fund’s determination of the fair value of portfolio securities. It is a responsibility of a fund’s board to ensure that the fund fulfills these obligations, particularly with respect to policies and procedures concerning the determination of fair value. The Directors’ explicit statutory responsibilities with regard to the determining of the fair value of securities for which

3 Rule 38a-1 under the Investment Company Act requires each investment company to “adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities Laws by the fund, including policies and procedures that provide for the oversight of compliance by each investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and transfer agent of the fund....” In the adopting release for this rule, the Commission specifically said that the rule “requires funds to adopt policies and procedures that ... provide a methodology or methodologies by which the fund determines the current fair value of the portfolio security....” Investment Company Act Release No. 26229 (Dec. 17, 2003).
market quotations were not readily available are set forth in the definition of "value" in Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment Company Act, which states in pertinent part:

"Value", with respect to assets of registered investment companies . . . means . . . (i) with respect to securities for which market quotations are readily available, the market value of such securities; and (ii) with respect to other securities and assets, fair value as determined in good faith by the board of directors. [Emphasis added]}

In 1970, the Commission issued guidance on various questions relating to the accounting by registered investment companies for investment securities, including the valuation of such securities. The Commission emphasized that it is the responsibility of a fund’s board of directors to determine fair values and cautioned that, while a board may enlist the assistance of individuals who are not board members, it remains the board’s duty to establish the fair value methodology to be used and to continuously review both the appropriateness of the methods used in valuing each issue of security and the valuation findings resulting from such methods. Specifically, the Commission stated:

[I]t is incumbent upon the Board of Directors to satisfy themselves that all appropriate factors relevant to the value of securities for which market quotations are not readily available have been considered and to determine the method of arriving at the fair value of each such security. To the extent considered necessary, the board may appoint persons to assist them in the determination of such value, and to make the actual calculations pursuant to the board’s direction. The board must also, consistent with this responsibility, continuously review the appropriateness of the method used in valuing each issue of security in the company’s portfolio. The directors must recognize their responsibilities in this matter and whenever technical assistance is requested from individuals who are not directors, the findings of such individuals must be carefully reviewed by the directors in order to satisfy themselves that the resulting valuations are fair.

The Commission repeated essentially the same guidance in a 1984 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act relating to Seaboard Associates

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5 ASR 118.

("Seaboard"). Finding fault with a registered fund’s board of directors that had not properly fairly valued oil and gas royalty interests, the Commission wrote:

While the Commission recognizes the difficulties inherent in the valuation of [such] interests, directors have an affirmative responsibility to keep informed of developments which materially affect those assets not having a readily ascertainable market value. . . . Consistent with this responsibility, the directors of a registered investment company must continuously review the appropriateness of the method used in valuing the asset not having a readily ascertainable market value.

In ASR 118 and Seaboard, the Commission clearly stated that the ultimate responsibility for determining fair value lies with a fund’s directors, and that this responsibility cannot be delegated away. And while directors may assign to a separate valuation committee the task of calculating fair values pursuant to board-approved valuation methodologies, “each director retains responsibility to be involved in the valuation process and may not passively rely on securities valuations provided by such a committee.”

41. In connection with determining fair values, the Directors did not calculate the valuations themselves, and neither established clear and specific valuation methodologies nor followed up their general guidance to review and approve the actual methodologies used and the resulting valuations. Instead, they approved policies generally describing the factors to be considered but failed to determine what was actually being done to implement those policies. As a result, Fund Accounting implemented deficient procedures, effectively allowing the Portfolio Manager to determine valuations without a reasonable basis. In this regard, the Directors failed to exercise their responsibilities with regard to the adoption and implementation by the Funds of procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the federal securities laws.

These failures were particularly significant given that fair-valued securities made up a substantial percentage of the portfolios of each of the Funds—specifically between 64% and 68% of the value of all securities in the closed-end Funds and between 28% and 64% of the value of all securities in the portfolios of the open-end series as of March 31, 2007.

VIOLATIONS

42. As a result of the conduct described above, Respondents caused the Funds’ violations of Rule 38a-1 under the Investment Company Act. That rule requires that registered

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investment companies adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to prevent violation of the federal securities laws by the fund, including policies and procedures
that provide for the oversight of compliance by the fund’s investment adviser.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to
impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents’ Offer. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 9(f) of the
Investment Company Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

Respondents Alderman, Morgan, Blair, Johnson, McFadden, Pittman, Stone and Willis
shall cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of, Rule
38a-1 promulgated under the Investment Company Act.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Revlon, Inc. ("Respondent").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission's jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Making Findings, and Imposing Civil Penalties and a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission finds that:

Summary

1. This matter involves Revlon's violations of Exchange Act Section 13(e) and Rule 13e-3 thereunder, which provide critical investor protections to shareholders involved in "going-private" transactions. In particular, Revlon violated Exchange Act Section 13(e) and Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(iii) thereunder, which prohibits an issuer (in connection with a Rule 13e-3 transaction) from directly or indirectly engaging in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. The Commission promulgated rules such as Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(iii) because, among other things, it recognized that going private transactions presented opportunities for overreaching and abuse by issuers and their affiliates, and the terms of going-private transactions may be designed to accommodate the interests of affiliated parties because the negotiations ordinarily are not conducted at arm's-length. ¹

2. Here, Revlon engaged in various acts described as "ring-fencing," which were acts undertaken by Revlon to avoid receiving an opinion from a third-party financial adviser who ultimately found that the terms of Revlon's proposed "going-private" transaction did not provide for adequate consideration (as that term is used in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")) to participants in Revlon's 401(k) plan. Revlon's "ring-fencing" acts operated as a fraud or deceit upon Revlon's minority shareholders - as they rendered various disclosures in Revlon's publicly-filed offering documents materially misleading to Revlon's minority shareholders.

3. In 2009, Revlon owed a significant debt to its controlling shareholder. To address this significant debt, Revlon and its controlling shareholder ultimately proposed a going-private, voluntary exchange offer transaction. In this transaction, Revlon's minority shareholders could decide whether to exchange their Revlon common stock shares for newly-issued preferred stock with certain financial characteristics. The exchanged common stock shares would ultimately be provided to Revlon's controlling shareholder, thereby reducing Revlon's debt.

4. Revlon had many minority shareholders. A subset of those minority shareholders included Revlon current and former employees, as well as Revlon retirees and beneficiaries, who held Revlon shares in Revlon's 401(k) plan ("401(k) members"). Revlon's 401(k) plan was

administered by a Massachusetts trust company (the "trustee"), which determined that it could only allow 401(k) members to tender their shares in the exchange offer if a third-party financial adviser found that the exchange offer provided for "adequate consideration." Thus, a third-party financial adviser had to determine whether tendering 401(k) members would receive an asset whose value at least equaled the fair market value of the exchanged common stock shares ("the adequate consideration opinion" or "the adequate consideration determination").

5. Whether the trustee could allow 401(k) members to tender their shares rested solely on the result of the adequate consideration opinion. If the third-party financial adviser determined that the exchange offer provided for adequate consideration, then the trustee would allow 401(k) members to tender their shares. The trustee informed Revlon that this opinion would wholly determine whether it could allow 401(k) members to tender their shares.

6. Revlon did not want to disclose the adequate consideration determination to shareholders considering the exchange offer. To avoid a potential disclosure obligation, Revlon engaged in several acts to avoid receiving the adequate consideration determination. For example, Revlon proposed and entered into an amendment to the trust agreement it had with the trustee to ensure that the trustee would not share the adequate consideration determination with it; ensured that it was not a party to any engagement letter concerning the adequate consideration determination; and directed the trustee to inform Revlon of its decision whether to allow 401(k) members to tender their shares without any reference to the adequate consideration determination. A Revlon employee described these acts as "ring-fencing."

7. Ultimately, the third-party financial adviser found that the exchange offer did not provide adequate consideration to tendering 401(k) members. Thus, the 401(k) members who wished to tender their shares in the exchange offer could not do so. Neither Revlon's minority shareholders nor its Independent Board members knew the adviser determined that the consideration to be received by 401(k) members – which was the same consideration to be received by Revlon's non-401(k) minority shareholders – was not "adequate consideration" under ERISA. Moreover, neither Revlon minority shareholders nor its Independent Board members knew that Revlon had engaged in several acts to "ring-fence" that determination.

8. Revlon's Independent Board members were charged with the critical responsibility of determining the fairness of the exchange offer for all of Revlon's minority shareholders (including those who decided to tender their shares and those who decided to not tender their shares) and for evaluating and, ultimately approving, the exchange offer for consideration by minority shareholders.

9. Revlon made a number of disclosures to minority shareholders concerning the Board's fairness determination and ultimate approval of the exchange offer -- and the process the Board
engaged in to reach its determinations. Revlon’s disclosures concerning the Board’s process were materially misleading because Revlon had concealed from both its Board and minority shareholders that it had engaged in “ring-fencing.” In addition, Revlon’s “ring-fencing” deprived minority shareholders of the opportunity to receive revised, qualified, or supplemental disclosures, including any that might have informed them of the adviser’s ultimate determination that the voluntary exchange offer did not provide adequate consideration for 401(k) members under ERISA.

**Respondent**


**Background**

11. In early 2009, Revlon was largely owned by MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. (“M&F” or “controlling shareholder”), which owned approximately 58% of Revlon’s Class A common stock and 100% of Revlon’s Class B common stock, together representing approximately 75% of the combined voting power of all of Revlon’s outstanding equity securities. Throughout 2009, Revlon’s board of directors consisted of three M&F executives (one of whom was also a member of Revlon management), another member of Revlon management, and at least seven independent directors.

12. As Revlon reported in its first quarter 2009 Form 10-Q, Revlon was a highly-leveraged company with approximately $1.3 billion in long-term debt and long-term debt instruments that had various maturity dates.

13. One of these long-term debt instruments was a senior subordinated term loan that the controlling shareholder had provided to Revlon to pay off the principal amount on other senior subordinated notes. By April 2009, Revlon owed the controlling shareholder $107 million on this loan which had a maturity date of the earlier of August 1, 2010 or the date Revlon issued equity with gross proceeds of at least $107 million (the “$107M term loan”).

14. Revlon faced significant consequences if it was unable to repay the controlling shareholder on the $107M term loan. In particular, while the $107M term loan was subordinate to Revlon’s more senior long-term debt, failure to repay the loan would trigger a default event under certain other Revlon long-term debt instruments.

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2 While the $107M term loan had a maturity date of August 1, 2010, if Revlon had not repaid it by September 30, 2009, Revlon would have had to classify it as a current maturity.
15. In April 2009, to address the $107M term loan’s pending maturity, M&F proposed a mandatory merger transaction – a transaction that would have taken Revlon private. Under the merger proposal, each Revlon common stock shareholder would give up their common stock shares, on a one-for-one basis, for a newly issued preferred share with certain financial characteristics. For example, the newly issued preferred share would provide for certain dividend payments on a quarterly basis for a number of years.

16. The controlling shareholder would ultimately receive the surrendered common stock shares; reduce the debt on the $107M term loan by up to $75 million; and for the remaining debt, extend the maturity date with an increased interest rate. On April 20, 2009, Revlon publicly disclosed the merger proposal.

17. To evaluate the merger proposal, Revlon's Independent Board members formed a Special Committee which, among other things, retained a financial adviser to opine on whether the merger proposal was financially fair to Revlon and its minority shareholders.

18. The financial adviser subsequently advised the Special Committee that, if asked, it would find the merger proposal was not financially fair to Revlon and its minority shareholders. Accordingly, by early June 2009, the merger proposal was no longer under consideration.

19. Revlon, however, still faced the impending maturity of the $107M term loan. In June 2009, the controlling shareholder asked Revlon’s Independent Board members to consider a voluntary exchange offer to address the $107M term loan.

20. Revlon’s Independent Board members were charged with the critical responsibility of determining the fairness of the exchange offer for all of Revlon’s minority shareholders (including those who decided to tender their shares and those who decided to not tender their shares) and for evaluating and, ultimately approving, the exchange offer for consideration by minority shareholders.

21. The terms of the voluntary exchange offer were, in many respects, similar to that of the merger proposal. Revlon would offer its minority shareholders the option to exchange, on a one-for-one basis, their common stock shares for a newly-issued preferred share with certain financial characteristics. More specifically, Revlon minority shareholders would receive an annual dividend of 12.75% (paid quarterly), and at the end of four years, Revlon would pay tendering shareholders $5.21 per share for their preferred stock. Tendering shareholders would not, however, participate in any equity appreciation of Revlon’s publicly-traded common stock, except in the event of a change in control. Unlike the merger proposal, however, the exchange offer was not a mandatory transaction.
22. M&F would ultimately receive new Revlon shares equal in number to the exchanged common stock shares; reduce the debt on the $107M term loan by up to $105 million; and for the remaining debt, extend the maturity date with an increased interest rate.

Trustee Informs Revlon that Adequate Consideration Determination is Required

23. Revlon had many minority shareholders. A subset of those minority shareholders included those who invested in Revlon common stock through Revlon's 401(k) plan ("401(k) members"). At the time of the exchange offer, there were more than 20 million shares of Revlon stock eligible to participate in the exchange offer, with 131,714 shares held by 401(k) members. These 401(k) members generally included Revlon current and former employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries. To administer its 401(k) plan, Revlon used a Massachusetts trust company (the "trustee").

24. Revlon had a trust agreement with the trustee that governed the trustee's responsibilities and obligations as administrator of the 401(k) plan. In addition, the trustee was required to act in accordance with existing applicable law, namely ERISA. In general, Revlon or the 401(k) members were responsible for reimbursing the trustee for fees and expenses incurred in connection with the 401(k) plan.

25. Under the applicable ERISA law, the trustee could allow 401(k) members to tender their shares in the exchange offer only if the transaction provided for "adequate consideration" (emphasis added).

26. The trustee determined that, because the consideration offered in the transaction was neither cash nor a publicly-traded security, it needed to retain a third-party financial adviser to opine whether the transaction provided "adequate consideration" to 401(k) members. In other words, a third-party financial adviser had to determine whether 401(k) members were receiving an asset whose value at least equaled the fair market value of the exchanged common stock shares.

27. Whether the trustee could allow 401(k) members to tender their shares rested solely on the result of the adequate consideration determination. Put simply, if a third-party financial adviser found the exchange offer provided for adequate consideration to 401(k) members, then the trustee would honor a 401(k) member's decision to tender.

28. The trustee subsequently informed Revlon that it needed an adequate consideration opinion from a third-party financial adviser. Moreover, the trustee informed Revlon that this
opinion would wholly determine whether the trustee could allow 401(k) members to tender their shares.

29. Revlon proposed to the trustee alternatives to obtaining an adequate consideration opinion from a third-party financial adviser. For example, Revlon proposed that the trustee simply conclude that the exchange offer provided for inadequate consideration without obtaining an opinion, or obtain a legal opinion instead of an opinion from a third-party financial adviser.

30. Revlon proposed these alternatives to avoid a potential legal obligation to disclose the adequate consideration determination. In particular, in going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 and filed on Schedule 13E-3, Item 1015 of Regulation M-A requires an issuer like Revlon to state whether it has received any report, opinion (other than an opinion of counsel), or appraisal from an outside party that is materially related to the Rule 13e-3 transaction. This disclosure requirement states that such reports, opinions, or appraisals include any that relate to the consideration offered to shareholders in the transaction.

31. The trustee rejected Revlon’s proposals and retained a New York-based valuation firm to provide an adequate consideration determination. Revlon not only knew that a third-party financial adviser had been retained for this purpose, but it reimbursed the trustee for the cost of the adequate consideration determination.

**Revlon “Ring-Fences” the Adequate Consideration Determination**

32. In an effort to avoid any potential disclosure obligations, Revlon subsequently engaged in several acts designed to keep Revlon out of the flow of information concerning the adequate consideration determination. A Revlon employee described Revlon’s efforts to avoid receiving the adequate consideration determination as “ring-fencing.”

33. Revlon’s “ring-fencing” of the adequate consideration determination included the following: First, Revlon proposed and entered into an amendment to the existing trust agreement between it and the trustee. In particular, the trust agreement was amended to mandate that “any reports, documents or other work product (and the contents thereof) prepared by or for the [t]rustee or any such outside advisors shall be the proprietary information of the [t]rustee and shall not be disclosed to [Revlon], its affiliates, any employee of [Revlon] or its affiliates, or any participant in the [401(k) plan] under any circumstances, except as required by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

34. To ensure that it had comprehensively “ring-fenced” the adequate consideration determination, Revlon proposed and adopted additional amendments to the trust agreement. For example, Revlon proposed amendments stating that the trustee had sole authority to determine whether to allow 401(k) members to tender their shares. The trustee informed Revlon that the
existing trust agreement already contained a similar provision, and therefore was unnecessary. Notwithstanding this, Revlon insisted on the amendment and it was ultimately adopted.

35. Second, Revlon directed the trustee to exclusively obtain the adequate consideration determination without any Revlon involvement and without Revlon being a party to the engagement letter with the third-party financial adviser. Nevertheless, Revlon reimbursed the trustee for the entire cost of the engagement. If Revlon had not directed the trustee in this manner, Revlon would have been a party to the engagement letter with the trustee and the third-party financial adviser.

36. Third, Revlon instructed the trustee on precisely what it wanted to be told regarding whether the trustee would allow 401(k) members to tender their shares. In particular, Revlon instructed the trustee that it should not communicate any information to Revlon concerning the adequate consideration determination. Rather, Revlon instructed the trustee that it simply wanted to be told whether the trustee would be honoring the 401(k) members’ instructions to tender – with no additional information. In essence, Revlon wrote a script of what it wanted to be told.

37. As described earlier, Revlon already knew that the trustee’s determination on whether to allow 401(k) members to tender rested solely on the result of the adequate consideration opinion. Thus, as a practical matter, Revlon knew the third-party financial adviser had found the exchange offer did not provide for adequate consideration under ERISA if the trustee informed Revlon it would not be honoring the 401(k) members’ instructions to tender.

38. In late July 2009, the trustee drafted a letter to be sent to the 401(k) members concerning the exchange offer. In that letter, the trustee expressly explained that it would only honor the 401(k) members’ instructions to tender if a third-party financial adviser determined adequate consideration, and that such an adviser had been retained.

39. In particular, the trustee wrote:

“The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (‘ERISA’), and the trust agreement between Revlon and [the trustee] prohibit the sale of Common Shares to Revlon for less than ‘adequate consideration.’ An independent financial advisor has been engaged to determine whether the consideration the Plan will receive under the Offer constitutes ‘adequate consideration’ within the meaning of ERISA. If the financial advisor determines that the Plan would not receive adequate consideration in return for the Common Shares tendered through the Exchange Offer, notwithstanding your direction to tender Common Shares in the Exchange Offer, the Common Shares attributable to your account will not be tendered.”
40. Revlon reviewed this draft letter and proposed significant revisions to remove provisions which would have disclosed that (i) a third-party financial adviser had been retained, and (ii) the result of the adequate consideration opinion would wholly determine whether the 401(k) members would be able to tender their shares.

41. Revlon revised the letter to read in relevant part:

“As required by applicable law, [the trustee], as the Plan trustee, will disregard your instructions to tender Class A Common Stock if it determines that following them would result in a non-exempt prohibited transaction under the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (including the rules, regulations and interpretations thereunder).”

42. The trustee accepted Revlon’s proposed revisions and Revlon’s version of the letter was ultimately sent to the 401(k) members and was also an exhibit in Revlon’s exchange offer public filings with the Commission.

_The Third-Party Financial Adviser for the 401(k) Plan Finds Inadequate Consideration_

43. On August 10, 2009, Revlon launched the exchange offer and issued an offering document to shareholders disclosing, among other things, the previously described terms of the transaction. Revlon supplemented the exchange offer filings with amended filings on August 27, 2009 and September 3, 2009.

44. On September 24, 2009, Revlon filed its third – and final – amended exchange offer filing. In this filing, Revlon disclosed that it had increased the proposed dividend payments to tendering shareholders, and also had increased the price-per-share at which it would redeem the tendering shareholders’ preferred shares after a certain number of years.

45. The third-party financial adviser evaluated the third amended exchange offer terms – and despite the financial improvements to minority shareholders – found the transaction did not provide 401(k) members with adequate consideration. The third-party financial adviser informed the trustee of this finding. The trustee then informed Revlon it could not allow 401(k) members to tender their shares – and did so in the manner scripted by Revlon, and as described in paragraph 36.

46. On October 8, 2009, the voluntary exchange offer closed and consummated, with approximately 9.3 million shares of Revlon Class A common shares tendering (or approximately 46% of the shares of Revlon Class A common stock not beneficially owned by M&F).
47. Neither Revlon’s minority shareholders – nor any of its Independent Board members – knew about the adequate consideration determination, or that Revlon had engaged in a course of conduct to “ring-fence” that determination.

48. Thus, certain 401(k) members – including a Revlon executive – were unable to tender their shares in the exchange offer because of the result of the adequate consideration determination. In essence, the adequate consideration determination provided protection to the 401(k) members, while the remaining tendering minority shareholders had no information concerning the adequate consideration determination or Revlon’s “ring-fencing” of that determination.

*Revlon’s Materially Misleading Disclosures*

49. Revlon’s third amended exchange offer filing included a section, prominently displayed in bold, entitled “Position of Revlon as to the Fairness of the Exchange Offer.” As a general matter, Revlon disclosed in this section the view of its Independent Board members concerning the fairness of the transaction.

50. Specifically, Revlon disclosed that its Independent Directors determined the transaction was fair to Revlon, and fair to those shareholders who decided to tender their shares and those who decided to not tender their shares.³

51. Revlon further set forth the process in which the Board engaged to reach the fairness determination it made on behalf of Revlon and, in particular, described the positive and negative factors on which the Board relied in making its fairness determination.

52. Revlon disclosed: “The Board of Directors approved the Exchange Offer and related transactions based upon the totality of the information presented to and considered by its members.” Second, in a related disclosure, Revlon, in disclosing the positive factors it considered for the exchange offer, noted that “the exchange offer . . . [was] unanimously

³ Revlon also disclosed that the Independent Directors made no recommendation as to whether shareholders should participate in the exchange offer. Revlon further disclosed it believed that its Independent Board was not legally required to obtain a fairness opinion for the exchange offer, and believed it could not obtain a fairness opinion for the exchange offer given that the financial adviser who evaluated the fairness of the merger proposal, whose analysis concerning the merger proposal was included in the exchange offer filings, would not conclude it was financially fair to minority shareholders. The merger proposal, however, preceded the exchange offer by approximately six months and involved transaction terms that were similar, but not identical, to the terms of the exchange offer. Moreover, notwithstanding these disclosures, and as described in greater detail in this Order, Revlon’s “ring-fencing” acts rendered various disclosures concerning the Board’s fairness determination to be materially misleading.
approved by the Independent Directors . . . who were granted full authority to evaluate and negotiate the Exchange Offer and related transactions.”

53. As represented by Revlon to its minority shareholders, the Board’s process in evaluating and approving the exchange offer was full, fair, and complete. The Board’s process, however, was not full, fair, and complete. In particular, the Board’s process was compromised because Revlon concealed – both from minority shareholders and its Independent Board members – that it had engaged in a course of conduct to “ring-fence” the adequate consideration determination.

54. Accordingly, Revlon’s disclosures about the Board’s evaluation of the exchange offer were materially misleading to minority shareholders. Moreover, Revlon’s “ring-fencing” deprived the Board, and in turn, minority shareholders of the opportunity to receive revised, qualified, or supplemental disclosures, including any that might have informed them of the third-party financial adviser’s determination that the transaction consideration to be received by 401(k) members in connection with the transaction was inadequate.

55. Third, Revlon materially misled minority shareholders when it stated that unaffiliated shareholders – which included Revlon’s 401(k) members – could decide whether to voluntarily tender their shares. Revlon cited the voluntary nature of the exchange as a positive factor on which the Board relied in approving the exchange offer.

56. In fact, all minority shareholders – as well as its Independent Board members – were unaware that Revlon’s 401(k) members would not be able to tender their shares if an adviser found that the consideration offered for their shares was inadequate. Moreover, Revlon’s non-401(k) minority shareholders were not on equal footing with Revlon’s 401(k) members because Revlon’s 401(k) members received protection as a result of the adviser’s finding that 401(k) members were not provided adequate consideration.

**Violations**

57. Under Section 21C of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease-and-desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of the Exchange Act and upon any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would contribute to such violation.

58. Section 13(e) of the Exchange Act governs going-private transactions and Exchange Act Rule 13e-3 thereunder prohibits issuers and their affiliates from engaging in fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative acts in connection with a going-private transaction. An Exchange Act Rule 13e-3 transaction, as defined in Rule 13e-3(a)(3), includes any transaction, or series of transactions, involving one or more specified transactions which has either a reasonable likelihood or a purpose of producing, either directly or indirectly, the effect of causing any class of equity securities which is subject to Section 12(g) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act to become eligible for deregistration or otherwise eligible to terminate reporting obligations under the Exchange Act, or causing the delisting of a class of equity securities from a national exchange or inter-dealer quotation system.

59. The Commission adopted Exchange Act Rule 13e-3 to provide critical investor protections for shareholders in going-private transactions. In the Commission’s adopting release, the Commission noted that, in the going-private context, the need for investor protection is particularly evident given the presence of opportunities for shareholder harm, overreaching by issuers or its affiliates, and potential coercive effects on minority shareholders in such transactions. See e.g., Interpretative Release Relating to Going Private Transactions Under Rule 13e-3, Exch. Act Rel. 34-17719, 1981 SEC LEXIS 1647 (April 13, 1981).

60. Moreover, the Commission noted, “the terms of the transaction, including the consideration received and other effects upon unaffiliated security holders, may be designed to accommodate the interest of the affiliated parties rather than determined as a result of arm’s-length negotiations. Further, the timing of the transaction[ ] is within the control of the issuer or its affiliate, who may choose a period of depressed market prices to propose the transaction, resulting in a loss to the unaffiliated security holders.” Id.

61. Among other rules, the Commission adopted Exchange Act Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(iii), which provides that it shall be a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice, in connection with a Rule 13e-3 transaction, for an issuer (or an affiliate of such issuer) to, directly or indirectly, engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

62. Revlon violated Exchange Act Section 13(e) and Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(iii) thereunder as, through its “ring-fencing” acts, Revlon knew or should have known that it was engaging in an act, practice or course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Revlon’s minority shareholders. As noted earlier, Revlon’s “ring-fencing” acts included amending the trust agreement it had with the trustee to ensure that the trustee would not share the adequate consideration determination with it; ensuring that it was not a party to any engagement letter concerning the adequate consideration determination; and directing the trustee to inform Revlon of its decision whether to allow 401(k) members to tender their shares without any reference to the adequate consideration determination. Moreover, Revlon’s “ring-fencing” acts rendered various disclosures in Revlon’s public filings with the Commission to be materially misleading.
IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions agreed to in the Respondent’s Offer.

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

A. Respondent Revlon cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and future violations of Section 13(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(iii) promulgated thereunder.

B. Respondent Revlon shall, within 30 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $850,000 to the United States Treasury.\(^5\) If timely payment is not made, interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

1. Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;\(^6\)
2. Respondent may make direct payment from a bank via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
3. Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

   Enterprise Services Center
   Accounts Receivable Branch
   HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
   6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
   Oklahoma City, OK 73169

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\(^5\) In setting the penalty amount, the Commission took into account the substantial monetary payments that Revlon has agreed to make to settle all of its class action lawsuits for conduct related to the exchange offer.

\(^6\) On December 31, 2012, the minimum threshold for transmission of payment electronically was increased to $1,000,000. For amounts below the threshold, respondents must make payments pursuant to option (2) or (3) above.
Payments made by check or money order must be accompanied by a letter identifying Revlon, Inc. as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and money order or check shall be sent to Antonia Chion, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, N.E., Mail Stop 5720-B, Washington, DC 20549.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Kevin M. O’Neill
Deputy Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15357

In the Matter of

EMANUEL GOFFER,
Respondent.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 15(b) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING
REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the
public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to
Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Emanuel Goffer
("Goffer" or "Respondent").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent consents to the Commission's
jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings and to the entry of this Order
Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing
Remedial Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.
III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:

1. Goffer, age 33, resides in New York, New York. During the relevant time period, Goffer was a registered representative and a proprietary trader at Spectrum Trading, LLC, a registered broker-dealer.

2. On June 7, 2013, a judgment was entered by consent against Goffer, permanently enjoining him from future violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, in the civil action entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Arthur J. Cutillo, et al., Civil Action Number 09-CV-9208, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

3. The Commission’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that, while working as a trader at Spectrum Trading in 2007, Goffer was tipped material, nonpublic information concerning the acquisition of Alliance Data Systems Corp. and 3Com Corp., which had been misappropriated in violation of a duty. The complaint further alleged that Goffer traded in these securities based on that material, nonpublic information and that he knew, or should have known, that the information was obtained in breach of a fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence owed to the source of the information.

4. On June 13, 2011, Goffer was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and two counts of securities fraud in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 2 and 371, and Title 15 United States Code, Sections 78j(b) and 78ff, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, in United States v. Emanuel Goffer, 10-CR-56. On October 7, 2011, a judgment in the criminal case was entered against Goffer. He was sentenced to a prison term of 36 months followed by three years of supervised release and ordered to forfeit $761,623.

5. In connection with that conviction, the jury found Goffer guilty on the counts of his criminal indictment that alleged, inter alia, that Goffer participated in a scheme to defraud by executing securities trades on the basis of material nonpublic information, including information regarding certain public companies’ merger and acquisition activities, including, but not limited to, information about the potential acquisition of 3Com Corp., that had been misappropriated in violation of fiduciary and other duties of trust and confidence.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent Goffer’s Offer.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED pursuant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, Respondent Goffer be, and hereby is, barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, and barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.

Any reapplication for association by the Respondent will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against the Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Release No. 34-69767; File No. SR-OCC-2013-802)

June 14, 2013

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; Notice of No Objection to Advance Notice Filing to Change the Expiration Date For Most Option Contracts to the Third Friday of the Expiration Month Instead of the Saturday Following the Third Friday

I. Introduction

On April 17, 2013, The Options Clearing Corporation ("OCC")\(^1\) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") advance notice SR-OCC-2013-802 pursuant to Section 806(e) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act")\(^2\), entitled the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 ("Title VIII" or "Clearing Supervision Act")\(^3\). The advance notice was published in the Federal Register on May 23, 2013\(^4\). The Commission received one comment letter to the Advance Notice.

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\(^3\) OCC also filed the proposals contained in this advance notice as a proposed rule change, under Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 19b-4 thereunder, seeking Commission approval to permit OCC to change its rules to reflect the proposed changes in this advance notice. 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1); 17 CFR 240.19b-4; See Exchange Act Release No. 69480 (April 30, 2013) (SR-OCC-2013-04).

Notice, in which the commenter expressed support for the change. This publication serves as a notice of no objection to the advance notice.

II. Description of Proposed Rule Change

Proposal

OCC filed this advance notice to change the expiration date for most option contracts ("Standard Expiration Contracts") to the third Friday of the specified expiration month ("Expiration Date"). Standard Expiration Contracts currently expire at the "expiration time" (11:59 pm Eastern Time) on the Saturday following the third Friday of the specified expiration month ("Expiration Date").

The proposed change applies only to series of option contracts opened for trading after the effective date of this proposed rule change and having Expiration Dates later than February 1, 2015. Option contracts having non-standard expiration dates ("Non-standard Expiration Contracts") are unaffected by this proposed rule change.

In order to provide a smooth transition to the Friday expiration, OCC intends to, beginning June 21, 2013, move the expiration exercise procedures to Friday for all Standard Expiration Contracts even though the contracts would continue to expire on Saturday. After

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6 See the definition of “expiration time” in Article I of OCC’s By-Laws.

7 Examples of options with Non-standard Expiration Contracts include flex options and quarterly, monthly, and weekly options where the expiration exercise processing for such options presently occurs on a weekday.

8 For contracts having a Saturday expiration date, exercise requests received after Friday expiration processing is complete but before the Saturday contract expiration time will continue
February 1, 2015, virtually all Standard Expiration Contracts will expire on Friday. According to OCC, the only Standard Expiration Contracts that will expire on a Saturday after February 1, 2015 are certain options that were listed prior to the effectiveness of this rule change, and a limited number of options that may be listed prior to necessary systems changes of the options exchanges, which are expected to be completed in August 2013. After the transition period and the expiration of all existing Saturday-expiring options, expiration processing should be a single operational process and should run on Friday night for all Standard Expiration Contracts.

In connection with moving from Saturday to Friday night processing and expiration, OCC reviewed other aspects of its business to confirm that there would be no unintended consequences, and concluded that there would be none. For example, OCC believes the proposed changes do not affect OCC’s liquidity forecasting procedures, nor do they impact OCC’s liquidity needs, since OCC’s liquidity forecasts and liquidity needs are driven by settlement obligations, which occur on the same day (T+3) irrespective of the move to Friday night processing and expiration dates. According to OCC, industry groups, clearing members, to be processed so long as they are submitted in accordance with OCC’s procedures governing such requests.

According to OCC, certain option contracts have already been listed on exchanges with expiration dates as distant as December 2016. Such options have Saturday expiration dates and OCC cannot change the terms of existing option contracts. In addition, clearing members have expressed a clear preference not to have open interest in any particular month with different expiration dates. Therefore, OCC will designate certain expiration dates as “grandfathered,” and any option contract that is listed, or may be listed in the future, that expires on a grandfathered date will have a Saturday expiration date even if such expiration date is after February 1, 2015. After OCC designates an expiration date as grandfathered, the exchanges have agreed not to permit the listing of, and OCC will not accept for clearance, any newly listed standard expiration option contract with a Friday expiration in the applicable month.

The exchanges have agreed that once these systems changes are made they will not open for trading any new series of option contracts with Saturday expiration dates falling after February 1, 2015.
and options exchanges have been active participants in planning for the transition to the Friday expiration. OCC has obtained assurances from all options industry participants that they will be ready to move to Friday night expiration processing by June 2013.

*Rule Changes*

In order to implement the change to Friday expiration processing and eventual transition to Friday expiration for all Standard Expiration Contracts, OCC is amending the definition of “expiration date” in Article I and certain other articles of the By-Laws. As amended, the applicability of the definition is no longer limited to stock options, and the definition of “expiration date” in certain articles of the By-Laws therefore is deleted in reliance on the Article I definition. OCC is also amending Rule 805, and all rules supplementing or replacing Rule 805, to allow for Friday expiration processing during the transition to Friday expiration. OCC is also amending section 18 of Article VI of the By-Laws to align procedures for delays in producing Expiration Exercise Reports and submission of exercise instructions with the amended expiration exercise procedures in Rule 805. OCC is amending Rule 801 to modify the prohibition against exercising an American-style option contract on the business day prior to its expiration date, because this prohibition is necessary only for options expiring on a Saturday, and to remove clearing members’ ability to revoke or modify exercise notices in order to accommodate the compressed Friday expiration processing expiration schedule.

Finally, OCC is amending Rules 801 and 805 to allow certain determinations to be made by high-level officers of OCC, rather than the Board of Directors, in order to provide OCC with greater operational flexibility in processing exercise requests received after Friday expiration processing is complete but before the Saturday contract expiration time, and to replace various references to the expiration date of options with reference to the procedures of Rule 805.
Under the proposed change, OCC is preserving the ability of the options exchanges to designate (or, in the case of flexibly structured options, permit clearing members to designate) non-standard expiration dates for options, or classes or series of options, so long as the designated expiration date is not a date OCC has specified as ineligible to be an expiration date.

III. Analysis of Advance Notice

Although Title VIII does not specify a standard of review for an Advance Notice, the Commission believes that the stated purpose of Title VIII is instructive.\textsuperscript{11} The stated purpose of Title VIII is to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial stability by, among other things, promoting uniform risk management standards for systemically-important financial market utilities ("FMU") and providing an enhanced role for the Federal Reserve Board in the supervision of risk management standards for systemically-important FMUs.\textsuperscript{12}

Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act\textsuperscript{13} authorizes the Commission to prescribe risk management standards for the payment, clearing, and settlement activities of designated clearing entities and financial institutions engaged in designated activities for which it is the supervisory agency or the appropriate financial regulator. Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act\textsuperscript{14} states that the objectives and principles for the risk management standards prescribed under Section 805(a) shall be to:

\begin{itemize}
\item promote robust risk management;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{11} 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).

\textsuperscript{12} Id.

\textsuperscript{13} 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).

\textsuperscript{14} 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
• promote safety and soundness;
• reduce systemic risks; and
• support the stability of the broader financial system.

The Commission adopted risk management standards under Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act on October 22, 2012 ("Clearing Agency Standards").\textsuperscript{15} The Clearing Agency Standards became effective on January 2, 2013 and require clearing agencies that perform central counterparty services to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to meet certain minimum requirements for their operations and risk management practices on an ongoing basis.\textsuperscript{16} As such, the Commission believes it is appropriate to review Advance Notices against these risk management standards that the Commission promulgated under Section 805(a) and the objectives and principles of these risk management standards as described in Section 805(b).

OCC’s proposal to move the expiration date of Standard Expiration Contracts to the third Friday of the month, as described above, is designed to help mitigate operational risk that Saturday expiration imposes on OCC and its members. Consistent with Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act,\textsuperscript{17} the Commission believes the proposed changes should promote safety and soundness of OCC’s operations and reduce systemic risks by allowing OCC to


\textsuperscript{16} The Clearing Agency Standards are substantially similar to the risk management standards established by the Federal Reserve Board governing the operations of designated FMUs that are not clearing entities and financial institutions engaged in designated activities for which the Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the Supervisory Agency. See Financial Market Utilities, 77 FR 45907 (Aug. 2, 2012).

\textsuperscript{17} See 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
streamline the expiration process among Standard Expiration Contracts and Non-Standard Expiration Contracts and quarterly options and weekly options. It should also allow OCC to align the expiration process for Standard Expiration Contracts with expiration processing schedules for European markets and should allow clearing members to run a single operational process for all US equity/index options regardless of where such options are exercised.

Furthermore, Rule 17Ad-22(d)(4), adopted as part of the Clearing Agency Standards, requires clearing agencies to “establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify sources of operational risk and minimize them through the development of appropriate systems, controls, and procedures . . .”\(^{18}\) The Commission believes the proposed rule changes minimize operational risk through the development of a system to move the expiration date of Standard Expiration Contracts to the third Friday of the month so that exercise processing across Standard Expiration Contracts, Non-standard Expiration Contracts, quarterly options, and weekly options occur on the same day in a single operational process.

\(^{18}\) 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d)(4).
IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE NOTICED, pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(I) of the Clearing Supervision Act,¹⁹ that, the Commission DOES NOT OBJECT to the advance notice (File No. SR-OCC-2013-802) and that OCC be and hereby is AUTHORIZED to implement proposed rule change (File No. AN-OCC-2013-802) as of the date of this notice or the date of an “Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Change the Expiration Date for Most Option Contracts to the Third Friday of the Expiration Month Instead of the Saturday Following the Third Friday” (File No. SR-OCC-2013-04), whichever is later.

By the Commission.

Kevin M. O’Neill
Deputy Secretary

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69765 / June 14, 2013

ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT
Release No. 3464 / June 14, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15358

ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 4C AND 21C OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND RULE 102(e) OF THE COMMISSION’S RULES OF PRACTICE, MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate that public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted against Rosenberg Rich Baker Berman & Company ("RRBB") and Brian Zucker ("Zucker") pursuant to Sections 4C and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.2

1 Section 4C provides, in relevant part, that the Commission may censure any person, or deny, temporarily or permanently, to any person the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission in any way, if that person is found to be lacking in character or integrity, or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.

2 Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, that: "The Commission may . . . deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it . . . to any person who is found . . . to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct."
II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have each submitted an Offer of Settlement (the “Offers”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Public Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 4C and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:

A. SUMMARY

This matter concerns violations of the auditor independence rules by RRBB and Zucker. RRBB partner Brian Zucker performed Financial and Operations Principal (“FINOP”) services for a broker-dealer client, (the “Broker-Dealer”), while his firm was serving as the Broker-Dealer’s auditor. Zucker also arranged for RRBB to pay a contractor who was serving as the Broker-Dealer’s FINOP (the “Designated FINOP”) and directed an RRBB staff accountant to provide FINOP services to the Broker-Dealer. As a consequence of this conduct, Zucker and RRBB engaged in improper professional conduct, violated the auditor independence rules, and caused the Broker-Dealer’s failure to file an annual report audited by an independent accountant.

B. RESPONDENTS

1. Respondent RRBB, a professional corporation, is an accounting and auditing firm that also provides tax and management consulting services. RRBB has 10 partners and 50 professional staff located in two New Jersey based offices. In October 2011, RRBB merged with

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3 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents’ Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.

4 FINOPs are responsible for broker-dealer compliance with applicable net capital rules and have final approval and responsibility for the accuracy of financial reports submitted to any securities industry regulatory body. Moreover, FINOPs are charged with the supervision and/or performance of broker-dealer responsibilities under all financial responsibility rules promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act and are responsible for the overall supervision of and responsibility for the individuals who are involved in the administration of and maintenance of the broker-dealer’s back office operations. See FINRA Rule 1022(b).
Zucker & Associates LLP and CFO Partners. Following the merger, RRBB provided FINOP services through a group it called CFO Financial Partners LLC.

2. Respondent Zucker, a CPA licensed in New York and New Jersey, is an equity partner at RRBB. Prior to October 2011, Zucker owned an entity called Zucker & Associates LLP, which provided FINOP and CFO services to broker-dealers. In October 2011, Zucker & Associates LLP merged with RRBB. At RRBB, Zucker provides FINOP and CFO services for broker-dealers and hedge funds and oversees individuals at RRBB who provide such services. He does not perform financial statement audits at RRBB. Zucker holds Series 7, 24, 53, 79, and 99 licenses. Zucker 51 years old, resides in Wall Township, New Jersey.

C. FACTS

Zucker’s Relationship with the Broker-Dealer and His Firm’s Merger with RRBB

3. In late 2008, Zucker began working as the Broker-Dealer’s FINOP. At that time, Zucker owned Zucker & Associates LLP, a firm that provided outsourced FINOP and CFO services to broker-dealers. In 2010 the Designated FINOP became the Broker-Dealer’s FINOP. Whereas the Broker-Dealer had paid Zucker $1,250 per month when he was the firm’s FINOP, Zucker & Associates began billing the Broker-Dealer $2,500 per month, which it split evenly between Zucker and the Designated FINOP.

4. In October 2011, Zucker & Associates merged with RRBB, and Zucker became one of RRBB’s equity partners. Among Zucker’s responsibilities at RRBB was to lead a newly-created group at the firm called CFO Financial Partners LLC that provided FINOP and CFO services to broker-dealers and hedge funds.

5. During the merger, one of RRBB’s co-managing partners told Zucker that RRBB could not be FINOP and auditor to the same client at the same time. Zucker and the co-managing partner discussed the fact that Zucker & Associates and RRBB had two overlapping clients for whom Zucker served as FINOP and for which RRBB served as auditor. They agreed that RRBB would terminate their auditor relationship with the clients so that Zucker could remain FINOP for those clients.

6. The co-managing partner participated in a second conversation with Zucker and the head of RRBB’s audit department in or around October or November 2011 in which they told Zucker that RRBB could not audit entities for whom two independent contractors who were joining RRBB from Zucker & Associates were acting as FINOPs.

7. In connection with this discussion, the co-managing partner and the head of RRBB’s audit department provided Zucker with relevant guidance on the independence rules.

RRBB Becomes the Broker-Dealer’s Auditor
8. In November 2011, the Broker-Dealer hired RRBB as its independent auditor for its fiscal year 2011 audit.

9. Though he did not ultimately sign the audit opinion, Zucker was listed on the Broker-Dealer's engagement letter as the audit engagement partner. Zucker was also the relationship and billing partner on the Broker-Dealer engagement. RRBB also billed approximately two hours of Zucker's time to the Broker-Dealer audit.

10. Between February and April 2012, members of the audit engagement team kept Zucker updated on the progress of the audit. Zucker sent e-mails encouraging the audit engagement team and the Broker-Dealer's CFO to keep the audit moving forward amid delays and difficulty pulling source documents together.

The Designated FINOP's Role After RRBB Becomes the Broker-Dealer's Auditor

11. During the audit engagement period, the Designated FINOP consulted with and obtained advice from Zucker about his FINOP work at the Broker-Dealer just as he had before Zucker & Associates merged with RRBB and before RRBB took over the Broker-Dealer audit engagement.

12. In November 2011, Zucker also arranged for RRBB to handle billing for the Designated FINOP, telling the Designated FINOP to invoice RRBB for his FINOP work at the Broker-Dealer. RRBB collected the FINOP payments from the Broker-Dealer and then paid the Designated FINOP for his work just as Zucker & Associates had previously done.

13. Also in November 2011, following discussions between Zucker, RRBB's co-managing partner and the head of RRBB's audit department, RRBB decided to stop administering the Designated FINOP's billings because of the perception it created that Zucker, and thereby RRBB, was not independent. However the billing arrangement continued until March 2012 when Zucker directed the Designated FINOP to start invoicing the Broker-Dealer directly.

Zucker Performs and Directs an RRBB Staff Accountant to Perform FINOP Work for the Broker-Dealer

14. From January to March 2012, the Designated FINOP was on vacation or otherwise unavailable on at least two occasions when the Broker-Dealer needed to file reports with FINRA or when there were net capital deficiency issues.

15. When that happened, Zucker personally performed FINOP services for the Broker-Dealer. In January 2012, Zucker filed a Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single ("FOCUS") report for the Broker-Dealer. In February 2012, Zucker advised the Broker-Dealer's CFO on what was allowable for net capital purposes. In March 2012, Zucker calculated the Broker-Dealer's net capital and filed a notification with FINRA that the Broker-Dealer had a net capital deficiency. That same day, Zucker e-mailed individuals at FINRA regarding the
Broker-Dealer’s net capital deficiency, stating that he was “the firm’s ‘acting FINOP’ in [the Designated FINOP’s] absence.”

16. At the end of March 2012, Zucker directed an RRBB staff accountant to perform FINOP work for the Broker-Dealer. During the audit and professional engagement period, the RRBB staff accountant prepared net capital calculations, filed FOCUS reports, and filed at least one net capital deficiency notice for the Broker-Dealer. In late March 2012, in response to a request from the Broker-Dealer’s CFO to Zucker and the RRBB staff accountant to conduct a net capital calculation for FINRA, the RRBB staff accountant confirmed that he did the calculation, then engaged in an e-mail exchange with FINRA regarding that calculation. In April 2012, the RRBB staff accountant filed an amended FOCUS report for the Broker-Dealer.

The Broker-Dealer Files its Annual Audited Report for Fiscal Year 2011

17. On April 20, 2012, the Broker-Dealer filed its Annual Audited Report for fiscal year 2011. Included in the report was RRBB’s unqualified audit report, dated April 20, 2012, which represented that RRBB “conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America.”

18. Shortly after this filing, the Broker-Dealer terminated the Designated FINOP, and on May 2, 2012, the RRBB staff accountant, officially became the Broker-Dealer’s FINOP.

19. In May 2012, FINRA informed the Broker-Dealer that it did not consider the firm’s annual fiscal year 2011 audit filed by the Broker-Dealer as having been filed because the audit was not conducted by an independent public accountant.

20. In response to FINRA raising the independence issue, RRBB resigned as the Broker-Dealer’s auditor, and the Broker-Dealer hired another audit firm to conduct a new audit for fiscal year 2011. The new audit opinion was filed in June 2012, along with a new FOCUS report. After the new auditor performed its work there were no substantive changes to the audit report or the FOCUS report as prepared by RRBB.

Violations

21. Rule 17a-5(d)(1) under the Exchange Act requires that, “[e]very broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 15 of the Act shall file annually, on a calendar or fiscal year basis, a report which shall be audited by an independent public accountant.” Rule 17a-5(f)(3) further states that, for such audits, “[a]n accountant shall be independent in accordance with the provisions of Rule 2-01(b) and (c) of Regulation S-X.” Rule 17a-5(g) requires that “[t]he audit shall be made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards” and Rule 17a-5(i) requires that “[t]he accountant’s report shall . . . [s]tate whether the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.” Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (“GAAS”) requires auditors to maintain strict independence from their audit clients; an auditor “must be free from any obligation to or interest in the client, its management or its owners.” See Statement on Auditing Standard No. 1, Section 220.03. Accordingly, if an auditor’s report states
that its audit was in accordance with GAAS when the auditor was not independent, then it has violated Rule 17a-5(i).

22. Regulation S-X Rule 2-01(c)(4) provides that accountants are not independent if, at any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accountant provides prohibited non-audit services to an audit client. Regulation S-X Rule 2-01(c)(4)(i) provides that prohibited non-audit services include bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client, and defines such services as:

Any service, unless it is reasonable to conclude that the results of these services will not be subject to audit procedures during an audit of the audit client's financial statements, including:

(A) Maintaining or preparing the audit client's accounting records;

(B) Preparing the audit client's financial statements that are filed with the Commission or that form the basis of financial statements filed with the Commission; or

(C) Preparing or originating source data underlying the audit client's financial statements.

23. Regulation S-X Rule 2-01(c)(4)(vi) defines an additional area of prohibited non-audit services as "[a]cting, temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer, or employee of an audit client, or performing any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function for the audit client." FINOPs perform management functions at broker-dealers and are specifically charged with providing supervisory and monitoring functions. FINOPs are responsible for the broker-dealer's compliance with applicable net capital rules and have final approval and responsibility for the accuracy of financial reports submitted to any securities industry regulatory body. Moreover, FINOPs are charged with the supervision and/or performance of a broker-dealer's responsibilities under all financial responsibility rules promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act and are responsible for the overall supervision of and responsibility for the individuals who are involved in the administration of and maintenance of a broker-dealer's back office operations.

24. Under Section 21C of the Exchange Act, a person is a "cause" of another's primary violation if the person knew or should have known that his act or omission would contribute to the primary violation. Negligence is sufficient to establish "causing" liability under Section 21C when a person is alleged to have caused a primary violation that does not require scienter. In re KPMG Peat Marwick, Exch. Act. Rel. No. 43862 (Jan. 19, 2001), aff'd, KPMG v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

25. Zucker and RRBB provided FINOP related services to the Broker-Dealer, including Zucker's personal provision of FINOP services, Zucker's oversight of the RRBB staff accountant's FINOP work, and through Zucker and RRBB's payment to and consultation with the Designated
FINOP. Regulation S-X Rules 2-01(c)(4)(i) and 2-01(c)(4)(vi) prohibited these services given that RRBB was engaged as the Broker-Dealer’s independent auditor.

26. RRBB’s fiscal year 2011 audit report for the Broker-Dealer falsely stated that its audit of the Broker-Dealer’s financial statements was conducted in accordance with GAAS. RRBB therefore violated Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(i).

27. Zucker caused RRBB’s violation of Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(i). Zucker contributed to this violation through his own performance of FINOP duties as well as through his directing of the RRBB staff accountant to perform FINOP work and his consultations with the Designated FINOP while RRBB was handling the Designated FINOP’s billing during the audit engagement period. Based on his communications with RRBB partners about the independence rules, his review of AICPA independence guidance, and his understanding that RRBB dropped audit clients so that he could continue to provide those clients FINOP services, Zucker knew or should have known that he was contributing to RRBB’s violation of Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(i).


29. Zucker and RRBB caused the Broker-Dealer’s violation of Exchange Act 17(a) and Rule 17a-5. Zucker personally performed FINOP services for the Broker-Dealer, arranged for RRBB to pay the Designated FINOP for serving as the Broker-Dealer’s FINOP and directed the RRBB staff accountant to provide FINOP services to the Broker-Dealer. Zucker and RRBB knew or should have known that they were contributing to the Broker-Dealer’s violation of Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-5.

30. RRBB also caused the Broker-Dealer’s violation of Exchange Act 17(a) and Rule 17a-5 by falsely stating in its fiscal year 2011 audit report for the Broker-Dealer that its audit was conducted in accordance with GAAS.

31. Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rule of Practice allows the Commission to censure a person, or deny such person, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission if it finds that such person has engaged in “improper professional conduct.” Exchange Act § 4C(a)(2); Rule 102(e)(1)(ii). Rule 102(e) defines improper professional conduct, in part, as: “a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that results in a violation of applicable professional standards in circumstances in which the registered public accounting firm or associated person knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny is warranted.” Exchange Act § 4C(b)(2); Rule 102(e)(1)(iv)(B).

57,164, at 57,168 (Oct. 26, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 201). The Commission has defined the "highly unreasonable" standard as

an intermediate standard, higher than ordinary negligence but lower than the traditional definition of recklessness used in cases brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. The highly unreasonable standard is an objective standard. The conduct at issue is measured by the degree of the departure from professional standards and not the intent of the accountant.

Id. at 57,167; see also PeopleSoft Initial Decision Release No. 249, at 60 (April 16, 2004).

33. Because of the conduct set forth above, Zucker engaged in highly unreasonable conduct that resulted in a violation of applicable professional standards when he knew or should have known that heightened scrutiny was required.

34. As a consequence of Zucker's conduct, and by affirming, in violation of Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(i), that its fiscal year 2011 audit for the Broker-Dealer was conducted in accordance with GAAS when RRBB was not in fact independent during the audit engagement period, RRBB also engaged in highly unreasonable conduct that resulted in a violation of applicable professional standards when it knew or should have known that heightened scrutiny was required.

35. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that RRBB engaged in improper professional conduct pursuant to Exchange Act Section 4C and Rule 102(e)(1)(i) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.

36. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that RRBB committed a violation of Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(i) and caused the Broker-Dealer's violation of Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-5 promulgated thereunder.

37. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Zucker engaged in improper professional conduct pursuant to Exchange Act Section 4C and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.

38. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Zucker caused RRBB's violation of Exchange Act Rule 17a-5(i) and caused the Broker-Dealer's violation of Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-5 promulgated thereunder.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents RRBB and Zucker's Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that:
A. RRBB is hereby censured.

B. RRBB shall cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-5 promulgated thereunder.

C. RRBB shall, within seven days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of $12,000 and a civil monetary penalty in the amount of $25,000 to the United States Treasury. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600 and 31 U.S.C. 3717. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;  
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or 
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

Enterprise Services Center  
Accounts Receivable Branch  
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341  
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard  
Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying RRBB as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Stephen L. Cohen, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE, Washington, DC 20549.

D. Zucker shall cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-5 promulgated thereunder.

E. Zucker is denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant.

F. After one-year from the date of this order, Zucker may request that the Commission consider his reinstatement by submitting an application (attention: Office of the Chief Accountant) to resume appearing or practicing before the Commission as:

1. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with the Commission. Such

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5 The minimum threshold for transmission of payment electronically is $50,000.00 as of April 1, 2012. This threshold will be increased to $1,000,000 by December 31, 2012. For amounts below the threshold, respondents must make payments pursuant to option (2) or (3) above.
an application must satisfy the Commission that Respondent’s work in his/her practice before the Commission will be reviewed either by the independent audit committee of the public company for which he/she works or in some other acceptable manner, as long as he/she practices before the Commission in this capacity; and/or

2. an independent accountant. Such an application must satisfy the Commission that:

   (a) Zucker, or the public accounting firm with which he is associated, is registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("Board") in accordance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and such registration continues to be effective;

   (b) Zucker, or the registered public accounting firm with which he is associated, has been inspected by the Board and that inspection did not identify any criticisms of or potential defects in the respondent’s or the firm’s quality control system that would indicate that the respondent will not receive appropriate supervision;

   (c) Zucker has resolved all disciplinary issues with the Board; and has complied with all terms and conditions of any sanctions imposed by the Board (other than reinstatement by the Commission); and

   (d) Zucker acknowledges his responsibility, as long as he appears or practices before the Commission as an independent accountant, to comply with all requirements of the Commission and the Board, including, but not limited to, all requirements relating to registration, inspections, concurring partner reviews and quality control standards.

G. The Commission will consider an application by Zucker to resume appearing or practicing before the Commission provided that his state CPA license is current and he has resolved all other disciplinary issues with the applicable state boards of accountancy. However, if state licensure is dependent on reinstatement by the Commission, the Commission will consider an application on its other merits. The Commission’s review may include consideration of, in addition to the matters referenced above, any other matters relating to Zucker’s character, integrity, professional conduct, or qualifications to appear or practice before the Commission.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69766 / June 14, 2013

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-14810

In the Matter of the Application of

JOHN JOSEPH PLUNKETT
476 16th Street
Brooklyn, NY 11215

For Review of Disciplinary Action Taken by

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.

OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

REGISTERED SECURITIES ASSOCIATION—REVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Conduct Inconsistent with Just and Equitable Principles of Trade

Failure to Provide Requested Information

President, chief compliance officer, general securities principal, and general securities representative directed removal of member firm's books and records and erasure of its electronic files before he left the firm following a business dispute. He also failed to respond to FINRA's requests for information made pursuant to Rule 8210. Held, registered securities association's findings of violations are sustained; the bar it imposed for the first cause of action is sustained; the bar it imposed for the second cause of action is set aside, and this proceeding is remanded so that sanctions for that cause of action may be reassessed.

APPEARANCES:

John Joseph Plunkett, pro se.

Alan Lawhead, Gary Dernelle, and Jante C. Turner, for the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.

Appeal filed: March 21, 2012
Last brief received: June 20, 2012
John Joseph Plunkett, a former president, chief compliance officer, general securities principal, and general securities representative of Lempert Brothers International USA, Inc., seeks review of a disciplinary action taken against him by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. FINRA found that Plunkett violated NASD Conduct Rule 2110 when he resigned from Lempert in anticipation of being fired and, before leaving, directed others to remove almost all of Lempert's books and records, erase its electronic files, and remove its backup tapes. FINRA also found that Plunkett violated FINRA Rules 8210 and 2010 by failing to respond to its staff's requests for information. FINRA barred Plunkett for each violation. We base our findings on an independent review of the record. We sustain FINRA's findings of both violations. We further sustain its imposition of a bar for the first cause of action. However, we set aside its imposition of the bar for the second cause of action and remand the case for further consideration in accordance with the analysis in this opinion.


3 NASD Conduct Rule 2110 states that "[a] member, in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." NASD Rule 2110 applies with equal force to FINRA members and their associated persons. See NASD Rule 0115(a). On December 15, 2008, NASD Rule 2110 was superseded by FINRA Rule 2010, though its contents remained the same. Similarly, NASD Rule 0115(a) was replaced by FINRA Rule 0140(a). FINRA Announces SEC Approval and Effective Date for New Consolidated FINRA Rules, FINRA Notice to Members 08-57, 2008 FINRA LEXIS 50, at *30, 32 (Oct. 2008). When discussing the first cause of action, this decision relies on NASD Rule 2110, which was the rule that was in place at the time of Plunkett's misconduct.

4 Effective December 15, 2008, NASD Rule 8210 was superseded by FINRA Rule 8210 as part of the rulebook consolidation process. See FINRA Announces SEC Approval and Effective Date for New Consolidated FINRA Rules, 2008 FINRA LEXIS 50, at *1, 16. Because the conduct for the second cause of action occurred after this consolidation took place, FINRA Rules 8210 and 2010 apply.
II.

A. In the midst of a business dispute, Plunkett resigned from Lempert and directed the removal of books and records and the erasure of electronic files.

The facts are largely undisputed. In February 1993, Plunkett entered the securities industry as a registered representative with an NASD member firm. After associating with a few other firms, Plunkett joined Lempert in August 2003 and helped establish the firm. He was a registered general securities principal and representative, and he served as the firm's president and chief compliance officer.

Lempert, a registered broker-dealer, was wholly owned and funded by Lempert Brothers Holding Establishment ("LBHE"), a holding company based in Liechtenstein. LBHE was owned by two Ukrainian brothers, Eduard and Roman Orlov, who lived in Austria. Because they were overseas, the Orlovs authorized their nephew, George Milter, to act as their surrogate in the United States. In addition to Lempert, the Orlovs also owned and operated several other brokerage firms in Europe.

Lempert was never profitable, and by March 2005 the Orlovs stopped paying its expenses—including its employees' salaries. After unsuccessfully seeking back pay, Plunkett and several others at the firm told the Orlovs and Milter that they intended to leave Lempert if its financial situation did not improve. But Plunkett did not disclose that he and two other principals, Mitch Borchering and Brian Coventry, had already decided to establish their own broker-dealer (later known as Emerald Investments, Inc.). Their plan was to remain at Lempert for as long as they could, building a customer base that they intended to take with them when they left.

On or about March 9, 2006, Plunkett received an e-mail from an individual in Europe who said she was part of a team of lawyers representing certain European investors in a lawsuit against a purported European branch of a United States-based broker-dealer. The e-mail attached a memorandum addressed to Lempert and the other broker-dealer that described in further detail allegations that the Orlovs and the other broker-dealer were involved in defrauding the European investors and binding Lempert to the assumption of the broker-dealer's obligations. On March 23, Plunkett faxed and e-mailed a letter to the Orlovs expressing his concern about the

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5 On March 31, 2006, FINRA staff faxed a letter to Plunkett requesting information pursuant to Rule 8210 about a customer complaint it received on March 22, 2006. The customer complaint was sent by a European investor who made similar allegations about fraudulent activity involving the same purported European branch of a United States-based broker-dealer and Lempert. Plunkett responded to FINRA's request in a letter dated April 13, 2006. Plunkett also consulted Lempert's attorney, who wrote a response to the European investor on March 31, 2006. Among other things, the letter disavowed Lempert's involvement in the alleged fraud.
allegations, including his belief that documents referred to in the memorandum as involving Lempert were false and/or forged.\(^6\)

As the allegations came to light, Plunkett also learned that the Orlovs intended to fire him. Around March 16, an attorney representing the Orlovs and Milter prepared a draft resolution for Lempert's board of directors to approve, which he e-mailed to Milter. That resolution called for Plunkett's immediate dismissal as Lempert's president. Plunkett learned of this because he reviewed all of Lempert's correspondence in his capacity as president and chief compliance officer.\(^7\)

On or about March 27, Plunkett held a meeting outside of the firm's offices with Coventry, Raymond Thomas (another principal at the firm), and all but three members of Lempert's staff.\(^8\) During that meeting, Plunkett disclosed his plan to leave Lempert and invited each to join him at Emerald Investments. Everyone in attendance agreed. On Friday, March 31, Plunkett wrote fourteen checks from Lempert's bank account totaling approximately $28,000. Some of the checks were for back pay to Plunkett and others who agreed to join him at Emerald. Other checks were made payable to the firm's vendors for amounts in arrears.

The following Monday, April 3, Plunkett and his confederates left their offices at the close of business, waited for the non-resigning personnel to leave, and then returned. That evening, at Plunkett's direction, they took all of the firm's books and records, except those that were in the offices of Milter, Borcherding, and Shah. Among other things, they took Lempert's accounting documents, checkbook and register, bank and brokerage statements, compliance manuals, confidential customer files containing account information and Social Security numbers, employee records, documents of incorporation, order tickets, and documents concerning pending investment deals. After copying all of the firm's electronic records (including its FOCUS reports), they erased the originals and removed the firm's back-up computer tapes. Everything they took was temporarily stored in an attorney's office. The items

\(^6\) The record does not contain a response from the Orlovs, and Plunkett asserts that they made none. FINRA made no findings as to the accuracy of the allegations against the Orlovs and Milter. Dept of Enf. v. John Joseph Plunkett, Complaint No. 20060052598-01, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 22, at *13 n.7 (OHO Jan. 4, 2011). Nor do we, as such findings are unnecessary for the issues at hand.

\(^7\) Around this time, Plunkett also had a disagreement with that attorney about the production of documents in connection with a routine compliance examination conducted by the SEC. On March 30, the attorney sent another e-mail to the Orlovs and Milter that explained the circumstances of the disagreement. After summarizing what transpired, the attorney added, "[t]his of course may all be academic as we will soon be relieving [Plunkett] of his position." Plunkett saw this e-mail as well.

\(^8\) Those three were Milter, Borcherding, and Andy Shah. Milter, as the Orlovs' surrogate, was excluded. So, too, was Shah, a registered representative who had ties to Milter. Borcherding, who was unwilling to sever ties with the firm, was also not invited. According to Plunkett's Wells submission, "Mitch was not asked to attend due to his insistence upon wanting to remain on the fund he had created with Lempert even after we left. . . . Mitch stated that he would not leave his fund no matter what! For that reason we decided to leave Mitch behind." Plunkett's Response to Wells Notice at ¶ 10 (June 29, 2009).
were later moved to the office space Emerald Investments had subleased in the same building as Lempert two weeks earlier.

According to Plunkett, he suspected that the Orlovs were going to forge more firm documents in order to transfer the accounts of the fraud victims to Lempert accounts and then reimburse the defrauded investors by filing a false claim with the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.9 Plunkett claimed that he intended to thwart the Orlovs' plans by removing the firm's books and records and computer files without the Orlovs' knowledge, thereby preventing the Orlovs from forging any firm documents.

Before leaving that night, each of the departing employees submitted a letter of resignation addressed to Plunkett as Lempert's president and chief compliance officer. After accepting those resignations, Plunkett faxed his own letter of resignation to the Orlovs in Vienna.10 Within 24 hours, Plunkett and the others contacted all of their former firm's customers by letter or telephone. Because FINRA had not yet approved Emerald's membership application, Plunkett and the others briefly joined Success Trade Securities, Inc. Almost all of Lempert's customers agreed to transfer their accounts to Success and, later, to Emerald. When the remaining Lempert employees arrived for work on April 4, they discovered the ransacked offices and called the police. They also stopped payment on the 14 checks Plunkett had written on March 31.

On April 4, Plunkett called FINRA and an SEC examiner who had been on site auditing the firm to explain the resignations and the removal of Lempert's records.11 On April 11, he met with FINRA representatives for a follow-up conversation. Plunkett never offered to turn over Lempert's books and records to FINRA; nor did FINRA ask him to do so. When FINRA staff learned that Lempert no longer had access to its books and records, however, the staff told Lempert that, until the firm could confirm its compliance with net capital requirements, the firm could only liquidate transactions.

SIPC was created by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) (15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-III) to protect customers of broker-dealers and maintain confidence in the United States securities markets. These goals are accomplished in two principal ways. First, when a broker is in or approaching financial difficulty, SIPC has the authority to petition the courts for protection of the broker's customers in a "protective proceeding." Such protection can include the court-ordered appointment of a trustee to liquidate the firm and satisfy customer claims from the proceeds of the liquidation (15 USC § 78ff). Second, SIPC is endowed with funds raised by assessments on its members, who are all the brokers registered under Exchange Act section 15(b). From these funds, SIPC can advance monies to the trustee to settle claims.

Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. BDO Saidman, LLP, 245 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2001).

In anticipation of their departure, a Lempert employee filed with FINRA earlier that day Uniform Termination Notices for Securities Industry Registration—commonly known as Forms U-4—on behalf of Plunkett and those who left with him.

The record contains limited information about the nature of this examination.
On April 12, Lempert's attorney demanded that Plunkett immediately return the removed records. But Plunkett refused to do so unless Lempert first agreed to compensate him and the others for back pay and to make other payments. Lempert's attorney tried without success between April and June to negotiate the return of the documents.

Plunkett's actions had a devastating effect on Lempert. During the next four months, the firm struggled to repair the damage and rebuild its business. Initially, it hired a consultant, and then a new principal, to reconstruct its records. After working with its clearing firm for two weeks, Lempert was able to get trading records. When Borcherding eventually spoke to the firm's former customers, he learned that some were confused about where their accounts were and were unaware they had been moved from Lempert.

B. FINRA initiated an investigation and requested information.

Shortly after meeting with Plunkett on April 11, 2006, FINRA initiated an investigation. Between May and October 2006, its staff sent Plunkett several requests for information pursuant to Rule 8210, to which he responded. Though Plunkett's responses to those requests were not perfect, FINRA never took issue with them.13

On May 8, 2009, FINRA sent Plunkett a Wells notice informing him that its staff had made a preliminary determination to recommend that a formal disciplinary proceeding against him be filed and giving him the opportunity to explain why the association should not subject him to legal action.14 On June 29, 2009, Plunkett provided an explanation of the circumstances surrounding his departure from Lempert. He claimed that Lempert and the Orlovs intended to perpetrate a fraud on the investing public, and that he had taken the documents and computer tapes defensively. He also asserted there were documents and individuals that could substantiate his claims.

FINRA was unable to fully test his claims because Plunkett did not provide supporting documentation for all of his assertions or identify relevant fact witnesses. On July 15, 2009, it sent Plunkett a follow-up Rule 8210 request requiring him to answer twenty sets of

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12 This is the same attorney referenced earlier who prepared the draft resolution calling for Plunkett's dismissal.

13 As the hearing panel noted:

   Respondent responded to several requests for information from FINRA, although typically not promptly in 2006. FINRA requested information from Respondent pursuant to Rule 8210 on March 31, May 23, July 20, August 18, and October 20, 2006. Respondent submitted responses to all of these requests, answering all questions, except one about his financial situation.

   Plunkett, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 22, at *37 (citations omitted). The March 31, 2006 request focused on the investor allegation concerning fraud by the Orlovs; later requests focused on the removal and erasure of Lempert's records.

14 See FINRA Notice to Members 09-17, 2009 FINRA LEXIS 45, at *5-6 (Mar. 2009) (describing the Wells process).
interrogatories concerning his earlier representations and to produce supporting documentation no later than July 27. In the event any of the requested documents were no longer available, FINRA instructed Plunkett to explain the reasons why.

On July 27, Plunkett asked for more time to conduct his search, and FINRA set a new deadline of August 10. Plunkett did not meet that deadline. Instead, on August 11, without having produced any information, Plunkett asked for another extension, claiming he was ill and would provide the information "as soon as possible."15 Having received no response by August 20, FINRA sent Plunkett a second Rule 8210 request that directed him to respond by September 3, which Plunkett again failed to do.

C. Plunkett and Lempert filed arbitration claims against each other.

Meanwhile, in June 2006, Plunkett and others who had resigned from Lempert filed arbitration claims seeking back pay from the firm and its owners. Lempert counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, that the claimants stole Lempert's property, breached their fiduciary duties, engaged in unfair competition, and tortiously interfered with existing and prospective customer relations. During the proceedings that followed, Plunkett produced some—though not all—of the files he had taken, but only after the firm twice moved to compel their production. On May 16, 2007, the arbitration panel denied the claimants any relief, and instead ordered them to pay Lempert approximately $550,000 in fees and compensatory and punitive damages.16

D. FINRA filed a disciplinary proceeding; the hearing panel found Plunkett liable; and the NAC increased sanctions.

On December 1, 2009, FINRA filed a complaint in this matter. On April 29, 2010—nine months after FINRA officially asked for documents and information related to his Wells submission and more than four months after it filed suit—Plunkett sent FINRA a written narrative in response. He did not attach any of the requested documents. Instead, he offered a number of excuses as to why he could not find them, including the general disarray of his office, the departure of his secretary, and Emerald's eviction from its space for nonpayment of rent.

During a two-day hearing that began on September 27, 2010, Plunkett admitted that the Orlovs did not authorize him to remove the firm's books and records or erase its electronic files. Instead, he claimed (as he did in his Wells submission) that his actions were justified. He acted, he said, to protect himself, the employees he supervised, the firm's customers, investors, and SIPC from fraud by Lempert's owners. When asked why he did not turn over to the SEC or

15 E-mail from Plunkett to FINRA, Aug. 11, 2009, at 1.

16 Plunkett never paid that award and, in January 2010, FINRA filed a disciplinary action against him, which eventually resulted in his suspension until such time as he paid what was owed. As of the date of this opinion, Plunkett has not satisfied that obligation.
FINRA the records he removed, Plunkett said it was because he "didn't think of it" and because he did not want to be associated with the Orlows' purported criminal activity.

On January 4, 2011, the hearing panel issued a decision that found that Plunkett violated NASD Rule 2110 by removing the firm's books and records and erasing its electronic files, fined him $20,000, and suspended him in all capacities for two years. It also found that Plunkett violated FINRA Rules 8210 and 2010 by failing to respond to FINRA's requests for information, fined him $5,000, and suspended him for six months, to be served consecutively with the two-year suspension. One of the stated reasons the hearing panel did not bar Plunkett from the industry for failing to respond was because Plunkett had previously responded to several other requests that touched upon the same subject matter.17

Although neither party appealed, a Review Subcommittee of FINRA's National Adjudicatory Council called this matter for discretionary review to examine the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel.18 Once the case was before it, the NAC had the ability to "affirm, modify, reverse, increase, or reduce any sanction, or impose any other fitting sanction."19 Plunkett did not participate in that review.

In a decision issued on February 21, 2012, the NAC found that the record "suggest[ed] that the Hearing Panel grossly misjudged the gravity of Plunkett's misconduct and the effect of that misconduct on Lempert's customers, the firm, and FINRA."20 The NAC determined that Plunkett's misconduct "impeded [Lempert's] ability to comply with basic requirements necessary for customer protection" and "hindered the firm's ability to comply with a host of financial and operational rules."21 It also found that "[t]he fact that Plunkett assumed control of customers' records without their consent, risked their assets to transfer their accounts to Emerald Investments, and held their records hostage for his personal gain is intolerable and presents a significant aggravating factor."22 The NAC further found that Plunkett's conduct was "intentional and self-serving," and that his relevant disciplinary history, which the hearing panel did not consider, was an aggravating factor.23 Based on its view of the seriousness of his misconduct toward Lempert, the NAC barred him for the removal and erasure of the Lempert's books and records.

17 Plunkett, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 22, at *37.
18 See FINRA Rule 9312(a).
19 FINRA Rule 9348.
20 Dep't of Enf. v. John Joseph Plunkett, Complaint No. 2006005259801, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 1, at *17 (NAC Feb. 21, 2012).
21 Id. at *20–21.
22 Id. at *21.
23 Id. at *17, 22.
The NAC also found that Plunkett did not respond to FINRA's Rule 8210 requests for information before FINRA filed a complaint, which it treated as a complete failure to respond pursuant to its Sanction Guidelines. It found that "the information and documents that FINRA requested not only were important to determine whether FINRA should proceed with formal disciplinary action against Plunkett, but also to assist FINRA's investigation of the Orlovs." The NAC found no evidence of mitigation and also barred Plunkett for this second violation.

This appeal followed.

III.

A. The removal and erasure of Lempert's books and records and electronic files violated NASD Conduct Rule 2110.

NASD Conduct Rule 2110 states that "[a] member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." Pursuant to General Provision 0115(a), that rule applies with equal force to associated persons. The "special focus" of the association's rules is "the professionalization of the securities industry," Rule 2110 "is not limited to rules of legal conduct but [instead] states a broad ethical principle," giving FINRA the authority to impose sanctions for violations of "moral standards" even if there is no "unlawful" conduct. Scierter is not an element of a Rule 2110 violation, nor is it necessary to ascertain a respondent's motive to find that a violation was committed.

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26 As part of the rule consolidation process following the merger of NASD and the member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the NYSE, see supra note 2, NASD Rule 2110 was renumbered, and is now FINRA Rule 2010.

27 See supra note 3.

28 Id.


Plunkett does not dispute that the removal and erasure of Lempert's records arose in the conduct of his business. It is well established that FINRA's disciplinary authority under the rule "is broad enough to encompass business-related conduct that is inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, even if that activity does not involve a security." We conclude that Rule 2110 applies here because Plunkett's "business" included his relationship with his employer, as well as his commercial relationships with Lempert's customers. We recently so held in a similar case that involved the improper downloading and removal of a member firm's files.

We also find that Plunkett's actions, which put Lempert's customers at risk and crippled its business, were inconsistent with high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. Rule 2110 encompasses "a wide variety of conduct that may operate as an injustice to investors or other participants in the marketplace." Plunkett's misconduct here violated those principles.

In analyzing whether a securities professional's conduct is consistent with just and equitable principles of trade, we frequently have focused on whether the conduct implicates a generally recognized duty owed to customers or the firm. Here, Plunkett had a duty to maintain the confidentiality of customer information. A case involving a breach of confidence "implicates quintessential ethical considerations not necessarily implicated in a breach of

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35 DiFrancesco, 2012 SEC LEXIS 54, at *17 (holding that a respondent's actions in downloading and removing confidential, nonpublic information relating to approximately 36,000 of his firm's customers involved both his business relationship with the firm and his commercial relationship with his customers; as such, it was "business-related.").

36 Id. at *18 (quoting Thomas W. Heath III, Exchange Act Release No. 59223, 2009 SEC LEXIS 14, at *15 (Jan. 9, 2009), aff'd, 586 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2351 (2010)).

37 Id. at *19 (finding that applicant's disclosure of customers' material, nonpublic information breached his duty of confidentiality and violated NASD Rule 2110) (citing Heath, 2009 SEC LEXIS 14, at *17 (finding that applicant's disclosure of client's material, nonpublic information breached his duty of confidentiality and violated NYSE Rule 476)); Manoff, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2684, at *10 (finding that applicant's unauthorized use of customer's credit card constituted breach of his fiduciary duties and violated NASD Rule 2110); Louis Feldman, Exchange Act Release No. 34933, 52 SEC 19, 1994 SEC LEXIS 3428, at *22 (Nov. 3, 1994) (finding that applicant's transfer of customer accounts to new firm without prior consent of customers or firm violated NASD Art. III, § 1 (retilted NASD Rule 2110) because "under fundamental principles of agency law such prior consent is required").

38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) (setting forth an agent's duty "not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third party"); see also DiFrancesco, 2012 SEC LEXIS 54, at *22 (finding that a registered representative's duty to maintain confidentiality of customer information "is grounded in agency law principles"); Heath, 2009 SEC LEXIS 14, at *10 ("The duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information is grounded in fundamental fiduciary principles . . .."); Jonathan Feins, Exchange Act Release No. 41943, 54 SEC 366, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2039, at *13 (Sep. 29, 1999) (holding that, "[a]s agent, [applicant] was obligated to act solely for his customer's benefit, and in his customer's best interests, in completing the transaction").
Plunkett breached his duty to his customers when he moved confidential customer files, which included nonpublic information such as their Social Security numbers, from Lempert to Success Trade (and, later, to Emerald Investments) without first receiving the customers' consent. Although many of the customers ultimately agreed to move their accounts to Emerald Investments, they did so only after Plunkett had already removed their account records from Lempert's office.

Plunkett also owed a duty of loyalty to Lempert. He violated that duty when, while employed by that firm, he took steps to transfer its customer base to a competing firm that he began forming while at Lempert and severely undermined Lempert's ability to contact and attempt to reclaim its customers by removing Lempert's books and records and erasing its electronic files. His conduct also gave Emerald Investments unlimited access to models of procedural and operational documents such as compliance manuals, employee files, and FOCUS reports, as well as access to Lempert's proprietary information about investment deals.

As we previously observed:

The [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999] required the Commission and other federal agencies to adopt rules implementing notice requirements and restrictions on a financial institution's ability to disclose nonpublic personal information about consumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. Under the GLBA, a financial institution must provide its customers with notice of its privacy policies and practices, and must not disclose nonpublic personal information about a consumer to a nonaffiliated third party unless the institution provides certain information to the consumer and the consumer does not opt out of the disclosure.

Plunkett resigned from Lempert on the same day he removed its books and records. It is not clear, however, which event occurred first. Plunkett testified that he may have removed the books and records and then faxed his resignation to the Orlovs but that he did not "remember what the order was." Tr. of Hearing (Sept. 27, 2010), at 139. But the order does not matter as the events of that day were part of a single course of action. And even if Plunkett had resigned first, he was still obligated by his duties to the customers and the firm. See Comments (b) and (c) to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 ("Termination of an agency relationship does not end an agent's duties") (continued...)
Plunkett's actions to remove Lempert's files also exhibited a blatant disregard for, and interference with, his former employer's ability to comply with statutory and rule requirements related to capital, margin, operations, books-and-records, and reporting obligations. His conduct impeded Lempert's ability to comply with basic requirements necessary for customer protection and put their assets at risk. His misconduct was further compounded by the fact that he failed to produce some of the documents he took—which interfered with FINRA's and the SEC's ability to carry out their regulatory responsibilities with respect to him and others. The fact that Lempert was eventually able to reproduce many of those documents through other sources does not mitigate the seriousness of Plunkett's misconduct.

Plunkett nevertheless asserts that his actions were justified because he needed to take those files to protect himself and others from potential fraud. There is, however, ample support in the record for FINRA's conclusion that he acted out of self-interest, which we also find.

Plunkett also argues—without citing any authority—that he "was under no obligation what so ever [sic] to exhibit commercial honor toward the firm" because, he claims, Lempert violated Rule 2110 which, in turn, "cancelled [Plunkett's] contract" with Lempert. To the contrary, he was required to ensure that his own conduct was consistent with high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade regardless of whether others engaged in misbehavior. Moreover, his argument shows a disturbing indifference to the fact that, by

(...continued)

regarding property of the principal. A former agent who continues to possess property of a principal has a duty to return it and to comply with the management and record-keeping rules stated in § 8.12."; "An agent's duties concerning confidential information do not end when the agency relationship terminates."). In any event, the record demonstrates that Plunkett took many steps detrimental to the customers and the firm while he was a firm employee that ultimately led to the removal of the books and records.

44 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a); Exchange Act Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3; Exchange Act Rules 15c3-1 and 15c3-3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1, 15c3-3; Eric J. Brown, Exchange Act Release No. 66469, 2012 SEC LEXIS 1127, at *32 (Feb. 27, 2012) ("The books and records provisions require that broker-dealers registered with the Commission maintain and keep current, for prescribed periods, certain books and records. That requirement includes the requirement that the records be accurate, which applies regardless of whether the information itself is mandated."). (citations omitted); Paul Joseph Benz, Exchange Act Release No. 51046, 58 SEC 34, 2005 LEXIS 116, at *7 (Jan. 14, 2005) (stating that the purpose of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, the net capital rule, "is to ensure that a broker-dealer has sufficient liquidity to protect the assets of its customers and to be able to cover its indebtedness to other broker-dealers"); Fred A. Borries Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 31461, 51 SEC 51, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3038, at *2–3 (Nov. 16, 1992) (stating that Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3, the customer protection rule, "requires a broker-dealer to establish a 'special reserve bank account for the exclusive benefit of customers to whom it owes money' and that the "account protects customer funds and the cash realized through the use of customers' securities from the hazards of the brokerage business").

45 See Plunkett, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 1, at *22–24.

46 Plunkett's Opening Br. at 2.


(continued...)
rendering Lempert incapable of complying with basic financial and operational rules that are designed for customer protection, he put Lempert's customers at risk.\footnote{See, e.g., Benz, 2005 SEC LEXIS 116, at *7 (stating that the purpose of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, the net capital rule, "is to ensure that a broker-dealer has sufficient liquidity to protect the assets of its customers and to be able to cover its indebtedness to other broker-dealers"); Borries, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3038, at *2-3 (stating that Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3, the customer protection rule, "requires a broker-dealer to establish a 'special reserve bank account for the exclusive benefit of customers to whom it owes money' and that the 'account protects customer funds and the cash realized through the use of customers' securities from the hazards of the brokerage business").}

Plunkett additionally argues that no one at Emerald used the records and other business materials that were taken from Lempert because "[t]he reps used their personal book of business" to contact customers and Emerald had, for example, its own compliance manual that was prepared by a consultant.\footnote{Plunkett's Opening Br. at 7.} Whether anyone at Emerald used the information in the manner he describes is beside the point, because as detailed above, Plunkett violated his duty to Lempert in part by disabling Lempert from discharging its duty to its customers and in part by providing Lempert's competitor with access to Lempert's records, whether Emerald used those records or not. Additionally, the information belonged to the customers and Lempert, and neither consented to its removal.\footnote{Cf. Feldman, 1994 SEC LEXIS 3428, at *4–7 (rejecting applicant's argument that he effectively owned accounts he sought to transfer from one firm to another and concluding that the accounts were firm assets).} We therefore reject Plunkett's arguments and find that he violated the professional standards of ethics covered by NASD Conduct Rule 2110.

**B. Plunkett's failure to provide requested information violated FINRA Rules 8210 and 2010.**

Rule 8210(a)(1) states, in relevant part, that FINRA has the right to "require a member, person associated with a member, or person subject to the Association's jurisdiction to provide information orally, in writing, or electronically . . . with respect to any matter involved in the investigation . . . ."\footnote{FINRA Rule 8210(a)(1).} Rule 8210 "provides a means, in the absence of subpoena power, for [FINRA] to obtain from its members information necessary to conduct investigations."\footnote{Berger, 2008 SEC LEXIS 3141, at *13.} This rule is at the "heart of the self-regulatory system for the securities industry"\footnote{Id. at *13.} and is an "essential cornerstone of [FINRA's] ability to police the securities markets and should be rigorously
enforced. "Failures to comply are serious violations because they subvert [FINRA’s] ability to carry out its regulatory responsibilities," threatening investors and the markets.  

During the investigation that preceded the Wells notice, Plunkett meaningfully responded to the staff’s Rule 8210 requests, though his responses often were not timely. After filing his Wells submission, however, Plunkett stopped responding to Rule 8210 requests. As noted, in July and August 2009, FINRA sent two letters to Plunkett pursuant to Rule 8210 asking for specific information about documents and the identities of individuals to whom he had referred generally in his Wells submission. FINRA was entitled to test the accuracy of the assertions Plunkett made. Moreover, the documents and information FINRA asked for were not only important for it to determine whether it should proceed with a formal disciplinary action against Plunkett, but also could have assisted its investigation of others in the industry.

Plunkett did not respond until more than four months after FINRA sued him. When he did finally respond, he produced no documents, offering a variety of excuses as to why they were missing. By waiting as long as he did to respond, Plunkett frustrated not only FINRA’s ability to more completely investigate him, but also impeded its ability to investigate the activities of others.

Plunkett does not dispute any of these facts. We therefore find that Plunkett violated Rules 8210 and 2010 by failing to respond to some of FINRA’s requests for information.


Vigorous enforcement of Rule 8210 helps ensure the continued strength of the self-regulatory system—and thereby enhances the integrity of the securities markets and protects investors—by preventing members and their associated persons who demonstrate their unfitness by failing to respond in any manner to Rule 8210 requests from remaining in the securities industry. Members and their associated persons who fail to respond in any manner to Rule 8210 requests present "too great a risk" to the markets and investors to be permitted to remain in the securities industry.

Berger, 2008 SEC LEXIS 3141, at *15.

56 See supra note 13.
57 Though Rule 8210 is typically used by FINRA to obtain testimony and documents, by its explicit language it may also be used to obtain “information,” which may not exist in a recorded format at the time the request is made. See, e.g., Dept of Enf. v. Paul Joseph Benz, Complaint No. C01020014, 2004 NASD Discip. LEXIS 7, at *8, 18–19 (NAC May 11, 2004) (wherein the staff asked respondent, pursuant to Rule 8210, to provide a net capital computation). Here, FINRA asked Plunkett to respond to twenty sets of interrogatories, and to produce supporting documentation.

Plunkett also attacks this proceeding on a number of alternative grounds, none of which has merit. First, Plunkett asserts that he was "persecuted and prosecuted by FINRA to keep [him] silent about their cover up of their failure to act on the evidence of the [Orlovs' purported] Ponzi scheme."\(^59\) Plunkett states that "FINRA instituted a campaign of company and personal harassment directed against [his] new broker dealer, [him]self, and [his] registered representatives" because he "received nonstop requests for information from FINRA" and "FINRA staff questioned [him as to] why [he] had so many African American registered reps in the firm."\(^60\)

To establish a claim for selective prosecution, Plunkett must demonstrate that "he was unfairly singled out and that his prosecution was motivated by improper considerations such as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of a constitutionally protected right."\(^61\) He has not done so. Instead, the record demonstrates that FINRA's investigation was amply warranted and began in response to Plunkett's accusations of possible illegal activity by the Orlovs and his own admissions concerning the removal and erasure of Lempert's books and records. Far from failing to act, FINRA sent Plunkett multiple requests for information designed to evaluate the merit of Plunkett's claims. In contrast, Plunkett presented no evidence during the proceedings below, called no witnesses, and declined to cross-examine the staff member who gave testimony in FINRA's case-in-chief about its motives in prosecuting or seeking information from him. Though Plunkett alleges that FINRA instituted this action for improper reasons, there is no evidence in the record to support his claim.

Next, Plunkett broadly argues that "[t]he [NAC] as well as the Hearing Panel were prejudiced toward [him]" and rendered their decisions "without a thorough examination of the circumstances, evidence, and facts."\(^62\) We reviewed the record and do not find any evidence of

\(^{59}\) Plunkett's Application for Review at 2.

\(^{60}\) Id. at 1.


\(^{62}\) Plunkett's Application for Review at 1. The errors Plunkett claims were committed by the hearing panel are not before us. Robert M. Ryerson, Exchange Act Release No. 57839, 2008 SEC LEXIS 1153, *8-9 (May 20, 2008) ("[i]t is the decision of the NAC, not the decision of the Hearing Panel, that is the final action of NASD which is subject to Commission review."). (Citation omitted). Plunkett also "protest[s] in the strongest manner possible the Arbitration Panel" decision. That, too, is not before us as he did not file any formal challenge to that decision and, in any event, it does not fall within any of the four bases for jurisdiction under Exchange Act § 19(d). Cf. Wedbush Morgan Sec., Inc. Order Dismissing Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 57138, 2008 SEC LEXIS 57, at *9 (Jan. 14, 2008) (finding that Commission lacked jurisdiction to review applicant's request for the Commission to, among other things, find that no interest or costs were due from applicant regarding an NASD arbitration proceeding, because the imposition of interest and costs did not, pursuant to Exchange Act § 19(d), (i) impose a final disciplinary sanction on (continued...)}
prejudice or unfair treatment of Plunkett during the FINRA proceedings. In addition, our de novo review of the evidence cures whatever bias or errors of fact, if any, that may have existed.

Finally, Plunkett asserts that he is "at a disadvantage" in his appeal because FINRA "would not provide [him] with the same material which they had provided to the Commission." In its response, FINRA states that, as required, it provided Plunkett with a copy of the index to the certified record under Commission Rule of Practice 420(e). Plunkett attached several documents to his opening brief that are already in the record. It is unclear what further materials Plunkett seeks, and he has not demonstrated any way in which he was disadvantaged.

V.

Pursuant to Exchange Act § 19(e)(2), we will sustain FINRA's sanctions unless we find, having due regard for the public interest and the protection of investors, that they are "excessive or oppressive" or "impose[] any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate" to further the purposes of the Act. Plunkett does not claim, and the record does not show, that FINRA's sanctions imposed an unnecessary or inappropriate burden on competition. He does, however, assert that the bars were excessive and oppressive. We examine each violation separately.

A. The bar for the removal and erasure of Lempert's books and records and electronic files was not excessive or oppressive.

Although the Commission is not bound by FINRA's Sanction Guidelines, we use them as a benchmark in conducting our review under Exchange Act § 19(e)(2). The Guidelines state

(continued...)

an NASD member; (ii) deny membership or participation to an applicant; (iii) prohibit or limit any person with respect to access to services offered by NASD or an NASD member; or (iv) bar any person from becoming associated with an NASD member.


65 Plunkett's Opening Br. at 1.

66 17 C.F.R. § 201.420(e).


68 E.g., CMG Inst'l Trading, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 59325, 2009 SEC LEXIS 215, at *31 n.38 (Jan. 30, 2009) (citing Perpetual Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56613, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2353, at *42 n.56 (Oct. 4, 2007) (stating that the SRO's predecessor, NASD, promulgated them to achieve greater consistency, uniformity, and fairness in its sanctions)). We have also acknowledged that "the Sanction Guidelines do not provide fixed sanctions for particular violations' and 'are not intended to be absolute.'" Houston, 2011 SEC LEXIS 4491, at *26; see also

(continued...)
that, where there is no specific guideline for a violation, it is appropriate to consider those for analogous misconduct,\(^69\) and if there is no analogous guideline, the General Principles and Principal Considerations may provide direction.\(^70\) FINRA adjudicators also may consider relevant precedent.\(^71\)

Because the Guidelines contain no specific recommendation regarding removal and erasure of a firm's information, FINRA reasonably assessed the remedy for that misconduct by considering the General Principles and Principal Considerations applicable to all violations. Specifically, FINRA concluded that Plunkett's misconduct imposed substantial risk on Lempert's customers and impeded the firm's ability to comply with basic requirements necessary for customer protection.\(^72\) FINRA also found that Plunkett's misconduct was intentional and resulted in the potential for monetary or other gain.\(^73\)

We agree with FINRA that "[t]he fact that Plunkett assumed control of customers' records without their consent, risked their assets to transfer their accounts to Emerald Investments, and held their records hostage for his personal gain is intolerable and presents a significant aggravating factor."\(^74\) As we have stated,

"The ability to credibly assure a client that [confidential nonpublic information] will be used solely to advance the client's own interests is central to any securities professional's ability to provide informed advice to clients. Disclosure [and use] of such information jeopardizes the foundation of trust and confidence crucial to any professional advising relationship."\(^75\)

\(^69\) FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 3 ("Adjudicators may determine that egregious misconduct requires the imposition of sanctions above or otherwise outside of a recommended range. For instance, in an egregious case, Adjudicators may consider barring an individual respondent and/or expelling a respondent member firm, regardless of whether the individual guidelines applicable to the case recommend a bar and/or expulsion or other less severe sanctions.").

\(^70\) FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 1.

\(^71\) Id.

\(^72\) Cf. Kirlin Sec., Inc., 2009 SEC LEXIS 4168, at *84-86 (Dec. 10, 2009) (noting that FINRA considered Commission precedent regarding gravity of the violation and general considerations in determining sanction, as set forth in the Guidelines, where there was no specific guideline for the violation at issue).

\(^73\) See FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 6 (Principal Consideration No. 11).

\(^74\) See id. at 7 (Principal Consideration Nos. 13 and 17).

As FINRA found, Plunkett's misconduct "not only rendered the firm inoperable for four months, but also hindered the firm's ability to comply with a host of financial and operational rules," including, for example, the inability to ensure that it met net capital requirements or provide customers with its usual services. Moreover, Lempert had to expend significant resources to resume its business and never regained some of its own records. Plunkett asserts that his conduct served the goals of "investor protection and market integrity." But we conclude that such detrimental conduct undermined those goals.

The record also supports FINRA's finding that Plunkett's conduct was intentional and self-serving. Notwithstanding Plunkett's testimony that his actions were motivated by his interest in protecting Lempert's customers, we find that the evidence supports FINRA's conclusion that his true motivation was his own financial interest. Plunkett had not been paid and knew the Orlovs intended to fire him. In anticipation of leaving, he formed Emerald Investments and took steps to ensure that his new firm had working capital, office space, a contract with a clearing firm, a pending application for FINRA membership, and administrative and sales personnel. Concerned about following through with his promise to his financial backers to bring an established customer base to Emerald, Plunkett took Lempert's customer records and eventually transferred most of their accounts. The fact that he went to the trouble of erasing Lempert's electronic files and removed its back-up tapes underscores the point that his intent was to have exclusive access to those customers.

Plunkett states that "[t]he NAC statement of my [disciplinary] history again shows bias and is prejudiced" because it is not "relevant to this case." We disagree. "Relevant" disciplinary history includes "past misconduct similar to that at issue" or past misconduct that "evidences disregard for regulatory requirements, investor protection, or commercial integrity." "We have long recognized that prior disciplinary history ... provides evidence of whether an applicant's misconduct is isolated, the sincerity of the applicant's assurance that he will not commit future violations and/or the egregiousness of the applicant's misconduct." FINRA routinely considers

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76 Plunkett, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 1, at *21.
77 Plunkett's Opening Br. at 3.
78 See FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 6 (Principal Consideration No. 11) (considering whether the misconduct resulted directly or indirectly in injury to the firm).
79 See FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 7 (Principal Consideration Nos. 13 and 17) (considering whether misconduct was the result of an intentional act or resulted in the potential for monetary or other gain).
80 Plunkett's Opening Brief at 7.
an applicant's disciplinary history in determining the appropriate sanction. Such consideration is consistent with the Guidelines, which state that "[a]judicators should always consider a respondent's disciplinary history in determining sanctions."\(^{83}\)

Plunkett is currently under suspension for failing to pay the arbitration award that was rendered in connection with the conduct at issue here. Also, in May 2000, Plunkett settled another disciplinary action for acting as a general securities principal without the proper qualifications and registrations, agreeing to a fifteen-day suspension in all capacities and a $7,500 fine.\(^{84}\) FINRA properly considered these matters in assessing sanctions because they evidence a disregard for regulatory requirements and are further evidence that he poses a risk to the investing public absent a bar.\(^{85}\)

Plunkett states that he and the other individuals who left Lempert acted "in the manner that [they] did in order to protect the clients, [their] good name, and avoid possibly massive claims against SIPC."\(^{86}\) He asserts that "[h]is intention was not to irreparably harm and forever shut down Lempert."\(^{87}\) Plunkett contends that the firm was not harmed because all of its information was available through other sources, and the customers who transferred "did no business."\(^{88}\) Plunkett believes that "[n]o customers were placed in jeopardy, nor injured in any way."\(^{89}\) Plunkett argues that he "did not want to seek the back pay owed" and that the attorney for Lempert "duped" him into delaying return of the books and records under the pretext that the firm "would accept the documents and in the spirit of cooperation re-issue the checks which had

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\(^{84}\) While disciplinary actions that go back more than a decade may be too stale for consideration, they may be taken into account when, combined with more recent violations, they evidence a pattern of disregard for regulatory compliance matters. See, e.g., Robert J. Prager, Exchange Act Release No. 51974, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1558, at *59 n.73 (July 6, 2005) ("We reject Alexander's argument that certain of his past disciplinary actions are too stale to be considered for purposes of determining sanctions. His past disciplinary history is important because, as NASD found, it establishes 'a disturbing pattern of disregard for regulatory compliance matters'). We find that the types of violations Plunkett accumulated evidence such a pattern.

\(^{85}\) Joseph Ricupero, Exchange Act Release No. 62891, 2010 SEC LEXIS 2988, at *24 (Sep. 10, 2010) (considering applicant's disciplinary history and finding that it was further evidence that he posed a risk to the investing public should he re-enter the industry), petition for rev. denied, 436 Fed. App'x 31 (2d Cir. 2011). Even if a respondent has no relevant disciplinary history, the misconduct at issue may be serious enough on its own to warrant severe sanctions. FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 2. Plunkett's misconduct here falls into that category and warrants a bar even without regard to his disciplinary history.

\(^{86}\) Plunkett's Application for Review at 2.

\(^{87}\) Plunkett's Reply Br. at 2.

\(^{88}\) Plunkett's Opening Br. at 8.

\(^{89}\) Plunkett's Reply Br. at 3.
been stopped. According to Plunkett, "[t]hese facts outweigh and should over-shadow the technical violations."

The record does not support Plunkett's assertions, and we conclude he fails to appreciate his obligations as a securities professional. As FINRA stated, Plunkett "had far less drastic alternatives at his disposal to address the situation, including notifying FINRA or the Commission." "Instead, he initiated an intentional and risky course of conduct, which by design benefitted him and his newly-formed broker-dealer, at the expense of Lempert Brothers and its customers." Indeed, Plunkett still had not returned the books and records to the firm after FINRA and SEC staff were made aware of the situation, and he returned only a portion of them after Lempert twice moved to compel their return during the arbitration proceeding.

Plunkett objects to a bar, stating that he has been out of work, he cannot find employment, and his family is suffering. But any negative consequences for Plunkett resulting from the violation he committed, or from the disciplinary proceeding that followed, are not mitigating. This matter involves very serious misconduct. We find that a bar will have the remedial effect of protecting the investing public from harm by removing him from the industry and impressing upon Plunkett and others the importance of maintaining the privacy of customers' confidential nonpublic information and refraining from self-interested actions at an employer's expense. The securities industry "presents continual opportunities for dishonesty and abuse." The hardship Plunkett asserts he has and will continue to suffer is outweighed by the necessity of ensuring that public investors are protected from him. We conclude that the bar FINRA imposed serves a remedial purpose.

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90 Id. at 2; Plunkett's Opening Br. at 8.
91 Plunkett's Reply Br. at 3.
92 Plunkett, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 1, at *23.
93 Id.
94 "Although general deterrence is not, by itself, sufficient justification for a bar, it may be considered as part of the overall remedial inquiry." McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2005); PAZ Sec., Inc., 494 F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing McCarthy, 406 F.3d at 189).
B. FINRA erred in its assessment of sanctions for Plunkett's failure to provide requested information.

In assessing the sanction for the Rule 8210 violation, FINRA properly looked to the Guidelines that were in effect in February 2011. Those Guidelines state that in the absence of mitigating circumstances, a bar should be the standard sanction when an individual fails to respond in any manner.\(^\text{97}\) We have recognized the remedial justification for such a sanction:

The imposition of a bar as the standard sanction for a complete failure to respond to [FINRA] information requests "reflects the judgment that, in the absence of mitigating factors, a complete failure to cooperate with [FINRA] requests for information or testimony is so fundamentally incompatible with [FINRA's] self-regulatory function that the risk to the markets and investors posed by such misconduct is properly remedied by a bar."\(^\text{98}\)

Where "a respondent does not respond until after FINRA files a complaint," the Guidelines further recommend that "[a]djudicators should apply the presumption that the failure constitutes a complete failure to respond."\(^\text{99}\)

FINRA found that "Plunkett did not respond to the information requests until April 2010, four months after Enforcement had filed the complaint in this matter," and applied the presumption that this constituted a complete failure to respond.\(^\text{100}\) It then examined the record for evidence of mitigation, concluded that no such evidence existed, and found that "the record supports assessing Plunkett with the standard sanction [i.e., a bar] for failing to respond in any manner to a request for information and documents."\(^\text{101}\)

We disagree with FINRA's analysis. Plunkett correctly asserts that he complied with several earlier Rule 8210 requests made during the course of the same investigation, which addressed a wide range of potential violations involving numerous entities and individuals, including Plunkett. In response to those earlier requests, Plunkett provided information about Lempert's accounts, staff, management structure, organizational structure, and contractual arrangements with a third party, and communications regarding the possible improprieties involving the Orlovs and the firm. Some of this related to the inquiries FINRA posed in the Rule

\(^{97}\) *FINRA Sanction Guidelines*, at 33. "Where mitigation exists," Adjudicators may "consider suspending the individual in any or all capacities for up to two years." *Id.*


\(^{99}\) *FINRA Sanction Guidelines*, at 33 n.1.

\(^{100}\) *Plunkett*, 2012 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 1, at *24-25.

\(^{101}\) *Id.* at *27-28.
8210 requests it sent after receiving Plunkett's Wells submission. FINRA failed to take any of this into account when assessing sanctions.

We faced a similar situation in Kent M. Houston,\textsuperscript{102} where NASD's determination that a bar was warranted appeared to have been based on its finding that Houston failed to appear at an on-the-record interview and was therefore presumptively unfit to remain in the securities industry. But Houston had responded to previous Rule 8210 requests that were part of the same investigation by NASD regarding possible improprieties in Houston's conduct.\textsuperscript{103} Because we determined that Houston responded in some manner to NASD's requests in connection with that investigation, we concluded that NASD should have analyzed factors other than the presumptive unfitness indicated by a failure to respond in any manner.\textsuperscript{104}

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that Plunkett's conduct is closer to the partial failure to respond in Houston and Sahai. Accordingly, we remand so that FINRA may, in the first instance, analyze Plunkett's violation of Rule 8210 under its Guideline for a partial response.\textsuperscript{105}


\textsuperscript{103} Id. at *27.

\textsuperscript{104} Id. at *25. See also Sahai, 2007 SEC LEXIS 13, at * 14 (on review after remand, rejecting NASD's finding that Sahai failed to respond "in any manner" to Rule 8210 requests where, although Sahai failed to respond to two letter requests, he had responded to five other requests for information to some extent, and reducing a permanent bar to a two-year suspension).

\textsuperscript{105} See FINRA Sanction Guidelines, at 33 (listing as categories of conduct "Failure to Respond or Respond Truthfully," "Providing a Partial but Incomplete Response," and "Failure to Respond in a Timely Manner").
We do not intend to suggest any view as to the outcome of that analysis, but FINRA should be mindful of the need to explain why any sanction it imposes will serve a remedial purpose in light of the particular facts of this case.\(^{106}\)

An appropriate order will issue.\(^{107}\)

By the Commission (Chair WHITE and Commissioners AGUILAR, PAREDES and GALLAGHER); Commissioner WALTER not participating.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

\[\text{By: Jill M. Peterson} \]
Assistant Secretary

\(^{106}\) See PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (remanding after finding that the Commission imposed "the most drastic remed[y] at [the Commission's] disposal [i.e., a bar for a complete failure to respond]" and that, in such circumstances, the Commission "has a greater burden to show with particularity the facts and policies that support those sanctions and why less severe action would not serve to protect investors") (quoting Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1137 (Oct. 4, 1979); see also id. at 1065-66 (finding that "as the circumstances in a case suggesting that a sanction is excessive and inappropriately punitive become more evident, the Commission must provide a more detailed explanation linking the sanction imposed to those circumstances if it wishes to uphold the sanction")) (citing Edward John McCarthy, 406 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding after finding that the Commission did not provide a meaningful explanation for upholding a two-year suspension of a floor trader who violated trading and recordkeeping provisions and that "the record contains mitigating facts and circumstances from which a compelling argument can be made that suspending McCarthy now will not serve remedial interests and will work an excessive and punitive result—namely, the destruction of the brokerage practice McCarthy has built during several years of rule-abiding trading").

\(^{107}\) We have considered all of the parties' contentions. We have rejected or sustained them to the extent that they are inconsistent or in accord with the views expressed in this opinion.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69766 / June 14, 2013

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-14810

In the Matter of the Application of

JOHN JOSEPH PLUNKETT
476 16th Street
Brooklyn, NY 11215

For Review of Disciplinary Action Taken by

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.

ORDER SUSTAINING DISCIPLINARY ACTION IN PART

On the basis of the Commission's opinion issued this day, it is

ORDERED that the findings of violations made by FINRA against John Joseph Plunkett be, and they hereby are, sustained; and it is further

ORDERED that the bar imposed by FINRA on John Joseph Plunkett for violating NASD Conduct Rule 2110 is sustained; and it is further

ORDERED that the bar imposed by FINRA on John Joseph Plunkett for violating FINRA Rules 8210 and 2010 be, and it hereby is, set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that this proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to FINRA for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion; and it is further

ORDERED that FINRA's imposition of costs on John Joseph Plunkett be, and it hereby is, sustained.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
United States of America
Before the
Securities and Exchange Commission
June 18, 2013

In the Matter of: iTrackr Systems, Inc.
File No. 500-1

Order of Suspension of Trading

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that there is a lack of current and accurate information concerning the securities of iTrackr Systems, Inc. ("iTrackr") because it has not filed a periodic report since it filed its Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2012, filed on November 6, 2012.

The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the securities of iTrackr. Therefore, it is ordered, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the securities of iTrackr is suspended for the period from 9:30 a.m. EDT, June 18, 2013 through 11:59 p.m. EDT, on July 1, 2013.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69780 / June 18, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15360

In the Matter of
iTrackr Systems, Inc.
Respondent.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(j) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it necessary and appropriate and for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").

II.

After an investigation, the Division of Enforcement alleges that:

RESPONDENT

1. iTrackr Systems, Inc. ("Respondent") is a Florida corporation headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent has a class of equity securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. Respondent's common stock (ticker "IRYS") is quoted on the OTC Link operated by OTC Markets Group, Inc.
2. Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and the rules promulgated thereunder require issuers with classes of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act to file with the Commission current and accurate information in periodic reports. Specifically, Rule 13a-1 requires issuers to file annual reports and Rule 13a-13 requires issuers to file quarterly reports.


4. As discussed above, Respondent is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission. The following periodic filings are delinquent.

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5. As a result of the conduct described above, Respondent has failed to comply with Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder.

III.

In view of the allegations made by the Division of Enforcement, the Commission deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors to institute public administrative proceedings to determine:

A. Whether the allegations set forth in Section II are true and, in connection therewith, to afford Respondent an opportunity to establish any defenses to such allegations; and,

B. Whether it is necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of each class of securities of Respondent registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act.

IV.

IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the questions set forth in Section III hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be fixed, and before an Administrative Law Judge to be designated by further order as provided by Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.110].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall file an Answer to the allegations contained in this Order within ten (10) days after service of this Order, as provided by Rule 220 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.220].
If Respondent fails to file the directed Answer, or fails to appear at a hearing after being duly notified, Respondent may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be determined against it upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f) and 310 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f) and 201.310].

This Order shall be served forthwith upon Respondent personally or by certified mail.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 120 days from the date of service of this Order, pursuant to Rule 360(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)].

In the absence of an appropriate waiver, no officer or employee of the Commission engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related proceedings will be permitted to participate or advise in the decision of this matter, except as witness or counsel in proceedings held pursuant to notice. Since this proceeding is not “rule making” within the meaning of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not deemed subject to the provisions of Section 553 delaying the effective date of any final Commission action.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69781 / June 18, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15359

In the Matter of

Greater Lenora Resources Corp. (n/k/a
Mistango River Resources, Inc.),
Greenstone Resources, Ltd.,
GST Telecommunications, Inc.,
GT Group Telecom, Inc.,
Gulf International Minerals Ltd.,
Powernova Technologies Corp.,
20/20 Wireless, Inc., and
360Networks, Inc.,

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(j) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Respondents Greater Lenora Resources Corp. (n/k/a Mistango River Resources, Inc.), Greenstone Resources, Ltd., GST Telecommunications, Inc., GT Group Telecom, Inc., Gulf International Minerals Ltd., Powernova Technologies Corp., 20/20 Wireless, Inc., and 360Networks, Inc.

II.

After an investigation, the Division of Enforcement alleges that:

A. RESPONDENTS

1. Greater Lenora Resources Corp. (n/k/a Mistango River Resources, Inc.) (CIK No. 928454) is an Ontario corporation located in Toronto, Ontario, Canada with a class
of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Greater Lenora Resources is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 20-F for the period ended December 31, 1994, which reported a net loss of over $191,000 (Canadian) for the prior year.

2. Greenstone Resources, Ltd. (CIK No. 832519) is a Canadian corporation located in Toronto, Ontario, Canada with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Greenstone Resources is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 20-F for the period ended December 31, 1998, which reported a net loss of over $129,000,000 for the prior year.

3. GST Telecommunications, Inc. (CIK No. 911522) is a federally chartered Canadian corporation located in Vancouver, Washington with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). GST is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2000, which reported a net loss of over $386 million for the prior nine months. On May 17, 2000, GST Telecommunications filed a Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and the case was terminated on March 5, 2012.

4. GT Group Telecom Inc. (CIK No. 1058283) is a Canadian corporation located in Toronto, Ontario, Canada with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). GT Group Telecom is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 20-F for the period ended September 30, 2001, which reported a net loss of over $393 million (Canadian) for the prior year. As of June 11, 2013, the company’s stock (symbol “GTTLQ”) was traded on the over-the-counter markets.

5. Gulf International Minerals Ltd. (CIK No. 877654) is a British Columbia corporation located in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Gulf International Minerals is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 20-F for the period ended December 31, 1996, which reported a net loss of over $1.4 million (Canadian) for the prior year.

6. Powernova Technologies Corp. (CIK No. 1281216) is a British Columbia corporation located in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Powernova Technologies is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 20-F for the period ended May 31, 2010, which reported a net loss of over $60,000 (Canadian) for the prior year. As of June 11, 2013, the company’s stock (symbol “PNTFF”) was traded on the over-the-counter markets.

7. 20/20 Wireless, Inc. (CIK No. 1081053) is a void Delaware corporation located in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). 20/20 Wireless is delinquent in
its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it
filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2001, which reported a net loss of
over $14,000 for the prior three months.

8. 360Networks, Inc. (CIK No. 10845877) is a Nova Scotia corporation located in
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada with a class of securities registered with the
Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). 360Networks is delinquent in its
periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a
Form 20-F for the period ended December 31, 2000, which reported a net loss of $355
million for the prior year. On June 28, 2011, 360Networks filed a Chapter 11 petition in
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, and the case was
terminated on January 12, 2012. As of June 11, 2013, the company’s stock (symbol
“TSXFF”) was traded on the over-the-counter markets.

B. DELINQUENT PERIODIC FILINGS

9. As discussed in more detail above, all of the Respondents are delinquent in
their periodic filings with the Commission, have repeatedly failed to meet their
obligations to file timely periodic reports, and failed to heed delinquency letters sent to
them by the Division of Corporation Finance requesting compliance with their periodic
filing obligations or, through their failure to maintain a valid address on file with the
Commission as required by Commission rules, did not receive such letters.

10. Exchange Act Section 13(a) and the rules promulgated thereunder require
issuers of securities registered pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12 to file with the
Commission current and accurate information in periodic reports, even if the registration
is voluntary under Section 12(g). Specifically, Rule 13a-1 requires issuers to file annual
reports, and Rule 13a-13 requires domestic issuers to file quarterly reports.

11. As a result of the foregoing, Respondents failed to comply with Exchange
Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and/or 13a-13 thereunder.

III.

In view of the allegations made by the Division of Enforcement, the Commission
deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public
administrative proceedings be instituted to determine:

A. Whether the allegations contained in Section II hereof are true and, in
connection therewith, to afford the Respondents an opportunity to establish any defenses
to such allegations; and,

B. Whether it is necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors to
suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of each
class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act of the
Respondents identified in Section II hereof, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules
12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents.
IV.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a public hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the questions set forth in Section III hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be fixed, and before an Administrative Law Judge to be designated by further order as provided by Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.110].

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file an Answer to the allegations contained in this Order within ten (10) days after service of this Order, as provided by Rule 220(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b)].

If Respondents fail to file the directed Answers, or fail to appear at a hearing after being duly notified, the Respondents, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents, may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be determined against them upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f), and 310 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f), and 201.310].

This Order shall be served forthwith upon Respondents personally or by certified, registered, or Express Mail, or by other means permitted by the Commission Rules of Practice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 120 days from the date of service of this Order, pursuant to Rule 360(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)].

In the absence of an appropriate waiver, no officer or employee of the Commission engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related proceeding will be permitted to participate or advise in the decision of this matter, except as witness or counsel in proceedings held pursuant to notice. Since this proceeding is not “rule making” within the meaning of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not deemed subject to the provisions of Section 553 delaying the effective date of any final Commission action.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
Release No. 30561 / June 18, 2013

In the Matter of

ASA Gold and Precious Metals Limited
c/o Deborah Djeu
400 S. El Camino Real, Suite 710
San Mateo, California 94402

(812-13877)

ORDER UNDER SECTION 7(d) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940

ASA Gold and Precious Metals Limited ("ASA") filed an application on March 9, 2011, and amendments to the application on March 21, 2012, and February 6, 2013, pursuant to section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Act") requesting an order permitting ASA to make changes to its custodial arrangements without prior Commission approval, hold assets and conduct certain securities transactions in specified foreign countries, as well as permit ASA and certain other persons to designate CT Corporation System in the U.S. to accept service of process.

On May 22, 2013, a notice of the filing of the application was issued (Investment Company Act Release No. 30539). The notice gave interested persons an opportunity to request a hearing and stated that an order disposing of the application would be issued unless a hearing was ordered. No request for a hearing has been filed, and the Commission has not ordered a hearing.

The matter has been considered and it is found, on the basis of the information stated in the application, as amended, that it is both legally and practically feasible effectively to enforce the provisions of the Act against ASA and that the issuance of the requested order is otherwise consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.
Accordingly, in the matter of ASA Gold and Precious Metals Limited (File No. 812-13877),

IT IS ORDERED, that the requested order under section 7(d) of the Act is granted, effective immediately, subject to the conditions contained in the application, as amended.

By the Commission,

Kevin M. O’Neill

Kevin M. O’Neill
Deputy Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Ch. II


Regulatory Flexibility Agenda

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Notice of semiannual regulatory agenda.

SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission approved the publication of an agenda of its rulemaking actions pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The agenda, which is not a part of or attached to this document, was submitted by the Commission to the Regulatory Information Service Center for inclusion in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is scheduled for publication in its entirety on www.reginfo.gov in July 2013. The version of the Unified Agenda to be published in the Federal Register will include only those rules for which the agency has indicated that preparation of an analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act is required. Information in the Commission's agenda was accurate on June 10, 2013, the date on which the Commission's staff completed compilation of the data. To the extent possible, rulemaking actions by the Commission after that date will be reflected in the agenda. The Commission invites questions and public comment on the agenda and on the individual agenda entries.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before [30 days after publication in the Federal Register].

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic comments:

- Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/other.shtml); or
• Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number S7-04-13 on the subject line; or

• Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

Paper comments:

• Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-04-13. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help us process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s Internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/other.shtml). Comments are also available for website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.

All comments received will be posted without change; we do not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Anne Sullivan, Office of the General Counsel, 202-551-5019.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA"), (Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (September 19, 1980), requires each federal agency in April and October of each year to publish in the Federal Register an agenda identifying rules that the agency expects to consider in the next twelve months that are likely to have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities (5 U.S.C. 602(a)). The RFA specifically provides that publication of the agenda does not preclude an agency from considering or acting on any matter not included in the agenda, and that an agency is not required to consider or act on any matter that is included in the agenda (5 U.S.C. 602(d)). Actions that do not have an estimated date are placed in the long term category; the Commission may nevertheless act on items in that category within the next twelve months. The agenda includes new entries, entries carried over from previous publications, and rulemaking actions that have been completed (or withdrawn) since publication of the last agenda. The Commission invites public comment on the agenda and on the individual agenda entries.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

Dated: June 19, 2013
Electronic Comments
- Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/other.shtml); or
- Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number S7-04-13 on the subject line; or
- Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

Paper Comments
- Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File No. S7-04-13. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help us process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/other.shtml). Comments are also available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted without change; we do not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Anne Sullivan, Office of the General Counsel, 202-551-5019.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The RFA requires each Federal agency, twice each year, to publish in the Federal Register an agenda identifying rules that the agency expects to consider in the next 12 months that are likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (5 U.S.C. 602(a)). The RFA specifically provides that publication of the agenda does not preclude an agency from considering or acting on any matter not included in the agenda and that an agency is not required to consider or act on any matter that is included in the agenda (5 U.S.C. 602(d)). Actions that do not have an estimated date are placed in the long-term category; the Commission may nevertheless act on items in that category within the next 12 months. The agenda includes new entries, entries carried over from prior publications, and rulemaking actions that have been completed (or withdrawn) since publication of the last agenda.

The following abbreviations for the acts administered by the Commission are used in the agenda:
“Securities Act”—Securities Act of 1933
“Investment Company Act”—Investment Company Act of 1940
“Investment Advisers Act”—Investment Advisers Act of 1940
“Dodd-Frank Act”—Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

The Commission invites public comment on the agenda and on the individual agenda entries.

Dated: June 19, 2013.
By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
### DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE—FINAL RULE STAGE

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<td>Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” From Rule 506 Offerings</td>
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### DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE—COMPLETED ACTIONS

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### DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT—FINAL RULE STAGE

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<td>Purchase of Certain Debt Securities by Business and Industrial Development Companies Relying on an Investment Company Act Exemption</td>
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### DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT—COMPLETED ACTIONS

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<td>423</td>
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### DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS—PROPOSED RULE STAGE

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### DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS—FINAL RULE STAGE

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<td>425</td>
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<td>3235-AL14</td>
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<td>427</td>
<td>Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations</td>
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### DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS—COMPLETED ACTIONS

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<td>3235-AL11</td>
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### SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

#### 3 CDD

**Final Rule Stage**

**412. Transitional Registration as a Municipal Advisor**

**Authority: Pub. L. 111–203, sec 1**

**Abstract:** The Commission adopted an interim final temporary rule to establish a means for municipal advisors to satisfy temporarily the requirement that they register with the Commission by October 1, 2010, consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act. The rule has been amended and is effective through September 30, 2013.

**Timetable:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>10/08/10</td>
<td>76 FR 55465</td>
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<td>Interim Final Rule Extended</td>
<td>12/27/11</td>
<td>76 FR 80733</td>
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<td>Interim Final Rule Effective Through</td>
<td>12/31/11</td>
<td>77 FR 58185</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interim Final Rule Extended</td>
<td>09/26/12</td>
<td>77 FR 62185</td>
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</table>
413. Registration of Municipal Advisers


Abstract: The Commission proposed new Rules 15Ba1-1 through 15Ba1-7 and new Forms MA, MA-I, MA-W, and MA-AR under the Exchange Act. The proposed rules and forms are designed to give effect to provisions of title IX of the Dodd Frank Act that, among other things, shall establish a permanent registration regime with the Commission for municipal advisors and impose certain recordkeeping requirements on such advisors.

Timetable:

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<td>06/01/11</td>
<td>76 FR 824</td>
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<td>Final Action</td>
<td>07/01/13</td>
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Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Required: Yes.
Agency Contact: Jennifer Dodd, Office of Municipal Securities, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202-551-5653, Email: doddy@sec.gov.
RIN: 3235–AK86

414. Rules Governing the Offer and Sale of Securities Through Crowdfunding Under Section 4(e) of the Securities Act of 1933


Abstract: The Division is considering recommending that the Commission adopt rules to implement Title II of the JOBS Act by prescribing rules governing the offer and sale of securities through crowdfunding under new section 4(e) of the Securities Act.

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Required: Yes.
Agency Contact: Andrew Schoeffer, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202-551-3860.
RIN: 3235–AL41

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)
Division of Corporation Finance

415. Implementation of Titles V and VI of the Jobs Act

Legal Authority: Pub. L. 112–106

Abstract: The Division is considering recommending that the Commission propose rules or amendments to rules to implement Titles V (Private Company Flexibility and Growth) and VI (Capital Expansion) of the Jobs Act.

Timetable:

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Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Required: Yes.
Agency Contact: Steven G. Harne, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202-551-3430.
RIN: 3235–AL40

416. Treatment of Certain Communications Involving Security-Based Swaps That May Be Purchased Only by Eligible Contract Participants

Legal Authority: Not Yet Determined

Abstract: The Division is considering recommending that the Commission propose a rule under the Securities Act to address the treatment of certain communications involving security-based swaps that may be purchased only by eligible contract participants.

Timetable:

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Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Required: Yes.
Agency Contact: Ted Yu, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202-551-3500.
Charles Kwon, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

Division of Corporation Finance

Completed Actions

419. Short-Term Borrowings


Abstract: The Commission is withdrawing this item from the Unified Agenda because it does not expect to consider this item within the next 12 months, but the Commission may consider the item at a future date.

Timetable:

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Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

Required: Yes.

Agency Contact: Amy Stagg, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-3860.

RIN: 3235-AL17

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

Division of Investment Management

Final Rule Stage

421. Purchase of Certain Debt Securities by Business and Industrial Development Companies Relying on an Investment Company Act Exemption


Abstract: The Commission proposed (i) to amend two rules (Rules 2a–7 and 8b–3) and four forms (Forms N–1A, N–2, N–3, and N–MIP) under the Investment Company Act that reference credit ratings and (ii) a new rule under the Act that would set forth a credit quality standard in place of a credit rating removed by the Dodd Frank Act from section 6(a)(5)(A)(iv)(1) of that Act. These proposals would give effect to section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act.

Timetable:

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<td>76 FR 77117</td>
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<td>12/24/12</td>
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Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

Required: Yes.

Agency Contact: Anu Dubey, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-6792.

RIN: 3235–AL02

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

Division of Investment Management

Completed Actions

422. Temporary Rule for Principal Trades With Certain Advisory Clients


Abstract: The Commission adopted an amendment to Rule 206(4–3)(T) under the Investment Advisers Act which provides investment advisers who are also registered broker-dealers an alternative means of compliance with the principal trading restrictions in section 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act. The amendment extends the sunset date of the rule for two years to December 31, 2014.

Timetable:

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<td>77 FR 13450</td>
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<td>05/20/13</td>
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Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

Required: Yes.

Agency Contact: Amy Stagg, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-3860.

RIN: 3235-AL17

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

Division of Investment Management

Final Rule Stage

423. Identity Theft Red Flags Rules


Abstract: The SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission jointly adopted rules and guidelines to implement certain provisions of the Dodd Frank Act. These provisions amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act and direct the Commissions to adopt programs to address identity theft.

Timetable:

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<tr>
<td>NPRM</td>
<td>03/06/12</td>
<td>77 FR 3450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPRM Comment Period End</td>
<td>05/07/12</td>
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<td>04/19/13</td>
<td>77 FR 23638</td>
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SEcurities and exchange commission (SEC)

Division of trading and Markets

Final rule Stage

425. Broker-Dealer Reports

Legal Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78q

Abstract: The Commission proposed amendments to Rule 17a-5 dealing with, among other things, broker-dealer custody of assets.

Timetable:

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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPRM</td>
<td>06/27/01</td>
<td>76 FR 37572</td>
</tr>
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<td>NPRM Comment</td>
<td>08/26/11</td>
<td>76 FR 37572</td>
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<td>Period End.</td>
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<td>Final Action</td>
<td>07/00/13</td>
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</table>

Regulatory flexibility analysis Required: yes.

Agency Contact: Kimberly Chehardy, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, 10 F Street N.E., Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-5791, Email: chehardy@sec.gov.

RIN: 3235-AK56


Legal Authority: Pub. L. 111–203, sec 939A

Abstract: Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act requires the Commission to remove any references to credit ratings from its regulations and to substitute such standards of creditworthiness as the Commission determines to be appropriate. The Commission proposed to amend certain rules and one form under the Exchange Act applicable to broker-dealer financial responsibility, distributions of securities, and confirmations of transactions. The Commission also requested comment on potential standards of creditworthiness for purposes of Exchange Act sections 3(a)(41) and 3(a)(53), which define the terms “mortgage related security” and “small business related security,” respectively, as the Commission considers how to implement section 939(e) of the Dodd Frank Act.

Timetable:

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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPRM</td>
<td>06/08/11</td>
<td>76 FR 33420</td>
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Regulatory flexibility analysis Required: yes.

Agency Contact: Rachel Yura, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street N.E., Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-5792, Email: yurara@sec.gov.

RIN: 3235-AL15

Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street N.E., Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-5640, Email: obriencc@sec.gov.

RIN: 3235-AL14

427. Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations


Abstract: The Commission proposed rules and rule amendments to implement certain provisions of the Dodd Frank Act concerning nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, providers of third-party due diligence services for asset-backed securities, and issuers and underwriters of asset-backed securities.

Timetable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>FR Cite</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPRM</td>
<td>05/06/11</td>
<td>76 FR 26550</td>
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Regulatory flexibility analysis Required: yes.

Agency Contact: Carrie O'Brien, Division of Trading and Markets,

SECurities and Exchange commission (SEC)

Division of trading and Markets

Completed Actions

428. Lost Securityholders and Unresponsive Payees

Legal Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78q(g); Pub. L. 111–203, sec 939A

Abstract: The Commission adopted amendments to Rule 17a–17 to implement the mandates of section 929W of the Dodd Frank Act. That section requires (1) adding brokers and dealers to entities that must conduct database searches for lost security holders; and (2) requiring that “paying agents,” which consist of persons that accept payments from the issuer of a security for distribution to a security holder, send written notification to a security holder who has been sent a check that has not been negotiated and that they do so no later than 7 months after the check was sent.

Timetable:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPRM</td>
<td>03/25/11</td>
<td>76 FR 16707</td>
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<td>05/09/11</td>
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<td>Final Action</td>
<td>01/23/13</td>
<td>78 FR 4678</td>
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<td>Final Action Effective</td>
<td>03/25/13</td>
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**Regulatory Flexibility Analysis**

**Required:** Yes.

**Agency Contact:** Thomas C. Etter Jr., Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549, Phone: 202 551-5713. Email: etter@sec.gov.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69808 / June 20, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15361

In the Matter of
Dennis Ashley Bukantis,
Respondent.

ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION
15(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, MAKING FINDINGS, AND
IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in
the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant
to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement ("Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose
of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to
which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to
the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings and the findings
contained in Section III.3 below, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order
Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:

I. Bukantis was and is a resident of Denver, Colorado. Beginning around
September 2009 and continuing to around September 2011, Bukantis began selling, through the
United States Mail and the instruments of interstate commerce, securities called “royalty units”
issued by an entity named 3 Eagles Research & Development, LLC ("3 Eagles") in exchange for a
percentage commission for his sales. At the time of these securities sales, Bukantis was not
registered as a broker or dealer with the Commission and was not associated with a registered
broker or dealer.
2. In July 2012, the Commission filed a lawsuit entitled *Securities and Exchange Commission v. 3 Eagles Research & Development, LLC, et al.*, Case No. 3:12-cv-01289-ST, against several defendants, including Bukantis. With respect to Bukantis, the lawsuit alleges that he violated Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act by selling securities in interstate commerce as a broker or dealer without being registered with the Commission and without being associated with a registered broker or dealer.

3. On June 6, 2013, the Commission filed with the Court the Consent of Dennis Ashley Bukantis to the Entry of a Final Judgment whereby Bukantis agreed, without admitting or denying the Complaint's allegations to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting his further violations of Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. On June 7, 2013, the Court entered a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Other Relief Against Defendant Dennis Ashley Bukantis whereby the Court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Bukantis from violating Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act by selling securities in interstate commerce as a broker or dealer without being registered as a broker or dealer with the Commission and without being associated with a registered broker or dealer.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondent’s Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED pursuant to Section 15(b)(6)(A) of the Exchange Act that Respondent be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization; and

barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.

Any reapplication for association by Respondent will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against Respondent, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served
as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

[Signature]

By: Kevin M. O' Neill
Deputy Secretary
ORDER INSTITUTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO RULE 102(e) OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES OF PRACTICE, MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted against Michael J. Stewart ("Stewart" or "Respondent") pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3)(i) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.¹

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer") which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings, and the findings contained in Section III.2 below, which are admitted, Respondent

¹ Rule 102(e)(3)(i) provides, in relevant part, that:

The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and without preliminary hearing, may, by order, . . . suspend from appearing or practicing before it any attorney . . . who has been by name . . . permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction, by reason of his or her misconduct in an action brought by the Commission, from violating or aiding and abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or of the rules and regulations thereunder.
consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission finds that:

1. Stewart, age 65, of San Clemente, California, is a principal of Apartments America, LLC ("Apartments America"). Stewart is and has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of California. Stewart does not hold any securities licenses and has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity.

2. On March 27, 2013, a judgment was entered against Stewart, permanently enjoining Stewart from future violations of Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and permanently enjoining Stewart or any entity he owns or controls from offering unregistered securities, in the civil action entitled Securities and Exchange Commission v. Apartments America, LLC, et al., Civil Action Number SACV 12-754 DOC (ANx), in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

3. The Commission's complaint alleged, among other things, that Stewart engaged in a scheme to defraud potential investors by offering Apartments America's unregistered securities, and making material misrepresentations and omissions regarding Apartments America and its principals to potential investors.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanction agreed to in Respondent's Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that Stewart is suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an attorney.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: [Signature]

Assistant Secretary
On August 31, 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") issued an Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 203(f) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and Notice of Hearing against Jason A. D’Amato ("Respondent" or "D’Amato").

In connection with these proceedings, D’Amato has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the "Offer"), which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of settling these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission or in which the Commission is a party, D’Amato consents to the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings and to the entry of this Order Making Findings and Imposing a Civil Penalty, Remedial Sanctions, and a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 203(f) and (k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Order"), as set forth below.
III.

On the basis of this Order and D’Amato’s Offer, the Commission finds that:

Respondent

1. D’Amato is 39 years old and lives in Katy, Texas. From May 2003 through February 2009, D’Amato served in various roles for Stanford Group Company (“SGC”) and Stanford Capital Management, L.L.C. (“SCM”), including: (i) President of SCM (Sep. 2008 – Feb. 2009); (ii) Senior Investment Officer of SCM (Dec. 2007 – Sep. 2008); (iii) Director of the Investment Advisory Group at SCM (Sep. 2006 – Dec. 2007) and at SGC (Nov. 2005 – Sep. 2006); and (iv) Assistant Analyst in SGC’s Investment Advisory Group (May 2003 – Nov. 2005). From November 2005 through at least September 2008, D’Amato managed a proprietary mutual fund wrap program called Stanford Allocation Strategies (“SAS”) for SCM and SGC. During this time, D’Amato made all investment decisions for each of the program’s strategies (income, balanced income, balanced, balanced growth, and growth). From the time he left SGC and SCM in February 2009 until the Fall of 2012, D’Amato worked as: (i) the Chief Investment Officer of a Houston, Texas-based investment adviser registered with the State of Texas; (ii) a registered representative of a Houston, Texas-based broker-dealer registered with the Commission; and (iii) an affiliated person of a Houston, Texas-based investment adviser registered with the Commission.

Other Relevant Entities

2. SCM, a Delaware limited liability company, was an investment adviser registered with the Commission from September 2006 through September 2009. On February 17, 2009, U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor appointed a receiver to take control of and manage SCM. As of its last pre-receivership filing with the Commission, SCM had nearly $1.7 billion in assets under management. SCM executed a sub-advisory agreement with SGC, pursuant to which it provided investment advice for the investment products offered and sold by SGC, including SAS.

3. SGC, a Texas corporation headquartered in Houston, Texas, has been dually-registered with the Commission as a broker-dealer and investment adviser since October 1995. As of November 20, 2012, SGC was still registered with the Commission, as the Receiver continues to wind down its business. SGC’s principal business consisted primarily of sales of Stanford International Bank-issued securities (self-styled as certificates of deposit) and the SAS mutual fund wrap program managed by SCM. SAS clients contracted directly with SGC.

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1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent D’Amato’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
4. In 2000, SGC began offering a mutual fund allocation program known as Mutual Fund Partners ("MFP") through its Investment Advisory Group ("IAG"). The MFP program offered several different strategies depending on an investor’s risk threshold and investment objectives. Throughout the program’s history, there were as many as ten and as few as five different strategies, including income, balanced income, balanced, balanced growth, and growth.

5. In May 2003, SGC hired D’Amato to be an assistant analyst in IAG to, among other things, track and calculate the performance of each MFP strategy and create personalized proposals (“Pitchbooks”) for SGC financial advisers (“FAs”) to use in one-on-one presentations to prospective clients. The substance and length of the Pitchbooks evolved over time, but nearly every version contained charts showing the performance of each strategy dating back to 2000. The charts were variously labeled “Hypothetical Performance,” “Hypothetical Historical Performance,” or “Model Performance.” Regardless of the label, the actual data in the Pitchbooks remained consistent.

6. In or around September 2004, D’Amato calculated the performance returns for each MFP strategy by backtesting existing allocations in each strategy against historical market data for the previous five years (i.e., if a client held a particular allocation of mutual funds from 2000 through September 2004, this is how it would have performed). IAG presented these returns in charts in the Pitchbooks and compared them to the S&P 500 returns for the same time period. As shown below for the period of 2000 to 2005, the backtested models consistently outperformed the S&P 500 by an overwhelming percentage:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAS Growth</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
<td>16.15%</td>
<td>32.84%</td>
<td>-3.33%</td>
<td>4.32%</td>
<td>18.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>4.91%</td>
<td>10.88%</td>
<td>28.68%</td>
<td>-22.10%</td>
<td>-11.88%</td>
<td>-9.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. In November 2005, D’Amato became the Director of the IAG and the portfolio manager for the MFP program. In March 2006, IAG changed the name of the program from MFP to SAS. In September 2006, IAG separated from SGC and formed SCM. D’Amato continued to manage the SAS program, making the investment decisions for each of the SAS portfolios.

8. In or around October 2006, several SGC FAs expressed “serious concerns” to SCM’s senior management about the performance returns presented in SAS Pitchbooks. The FAs complained that none of their clients had achieved the returns that SCM touted. As a result, SCM hired a performance reporting consultant to identify the disconnect between the returns presented in the Pitchbooks and the returns achieved in actual SAS accounts. For at least 2005 and 2006, the consultant concluded that: (i) actual returns earned by SAS clients were, in most cases, hundreds of basis points lower than the returns published in the Pitchbooks; and (ii) D’Amato and his team of analysts did not keep sufficient records to show contemporaneous changes in each of the SAS.
strategies prior to 2005, so the consultant could not verify the advertised performance numbers before 2005.

9. Despite the consultant’s findings, some SCM senior managers and SGC FAs wanted to continue using previously published performance data for 2000 through 2004 so they could market the SAS program with a seven-year track record. While performance data for 2000 through 2004 could not be verified, SCM management chose to continue using those figures in the Pitchbooks. At a meeting in March 2007, SGC’s Executive Director and several SGC FAs learned from SCM senior management that SAS Pitchbooks would include unverified performance data for 2000 through 2004 directly alongside audited, composite performance data for 2005 and later years. By the end of May 2007, SGC began distributing Pitchbooks, prepared by SCM, to prospective SAS clients that contained these divergent sets of performance data and that included the following end-of-Pitchbook disclosure:

The SAS Composite for the Income, Balanced Income, Balanced, Balanced Growth, Growth, and Equity/Alternative strategies have been audited and verified by [consultant’s entity] from first quarter 2005. Previous performance figures have not been audited and SCM does not represent that this information is accurate, current, or complete and it should not be relied upon as such.

10. Notwithstanding the disclosure, the revised Pitchbooks were deficient in several significant respects. First, neither SGC nor SCM could locate records or documentation to support the advertised performance data for 2000 through 2004. Neither entity disclosed this fact in the Pitchbooks. Second, the label used to describe the data changed from “hypothetical performance” to “historical performance.” This label was inaccurate and misleading because the term “historical performance” suggested that the entire set of data represented actual performance achieved by SAS clients. In fact, the 2000 to 2004 performance data was calculated by backtesting allocations against historical market data, while the 2005 to 2008 returns represented audited, composite data that accurately reflected returns earned by actual SAS clients. Last, the unaudited, unverified data from 2000 to 2004 was blended with audited, composite data from 2005 to 2008 to create 5-year, 7-year, and since-inception annualized returns. This misleading performance data was published directly alongside actual year-to-date, 1-year, and 3-year performance information, without any explanation that the data listed in the 5-year, 7-year, and since inception periods: (i) represented a blend of hypothetical performance data and audited, composite data, and (ii) was inflated because the 2000 to 2004 data materially skewed the overall performance. For example, in a 2008 Pitchbook, SCM presented SAS results in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annualized Returns</th>
<th>YTD</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>3 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>7 years</th>
<th>Since inception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAS Growth</td>
<td>-7.44%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>9.36%</td>
<td>15.31%</td>
<td>11.03%</td>
<td>12.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>-9.44%</td>
<td>-5.08%</td>
<td>5.85%</td>
<td>11.32%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
11. D’Amato knew that:

i. the 2000 to 2004 performance data for the SAS program was calculated differently than the 2005 to 2008 data;

ii. labeling the blended data as “historical performance” was misleading; and

iii. SAS performance history was material to an FA’s clients.

12. D’Amato frequently participated in presentations of the SAS program to clients, prospective clients, and FAs being recruited to join SGC. After May 2007, D’Amato used Pitchbooks – and recruit packets for the FA recruits – that contained “Historical Performance” figures for the SAS program that merged and blended audited, composite returns for 2005 and subsequent years with hypothetical, backtested returns for 2000 to 2004. The Pitchbooks also contained an incomplete and misleading disclosure about the performance figures.

13. As a representative of registered investment advisers (SGC and SCM) that recommended advisory products like SAS to clients for a fee, D’Amato owed a duty to exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with clients, a duty to disclose all material facts, a duty to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading clients, and a duty to disclose all conflicts of interest.

14. D’Amato did not disclose to clients, prospective clients, SGC FAs, and FA recruits that the performance data presented in the Pitchbooks was: (i) a combination of hypothetical, backtested data and audited, composite numbers; and (ii) not accurately labeled as “historical performance.” Further, D’Amato omitted to disclose that SCM could not locate records to support the published SAS performance numbers for 2000 through 2004.

D’Amato Misrepresented His Credentials

15. At least as early as February 2005, D’Amato began misrepresenting himself to coworkers, clients, prospective clients, SGC FAs, and FA recruits as a Chartered Financial Analyst (“CFA”).² D’Amato was not, and has never been, a CFA charterholder. Nonetheless, D’Amato purposefully used the CFA designation in his e-mail signature block on thousands of e-mails and on his business cards. To perpetuate this lie, D’Amato fabricated an e-mail that he purportedly received from the CFA Institute that congratulated him on passing the Level III CFA exam and on achieving charterholder status. In fact, D’Amato failed the CFA Level I exam the first and only time he took it.

16. D’Amato then passed along this fabricated e-mail to SGC’s human resources department, who in turn passed it along to SGC’s compliance department. SGC and SCM – the entities that employed D’Amato before and after September 2006, respectively – failed to verify

² The CFA charter is conferred upon a candidate by the CFA Institute after the candidate passes three exams: Level I, Level II, and Level III. A CFA candidate cannot take the Level III exam without first passing the Levels I and II exams.
D’Amato’s credentials. Instead, based solely on D’Amato’s misrepresentations and his fabricated e-mail, SGC and SCM actively promoted and marketed D’Amato as a CFA to prospective and existing clients, SGC FAs, and FA recruits, as follows:

i. listing D’Amato as a CFA charterholder in his bio on their websites;

ii. furnishing copies of D’Amato’s bio to SGC FAs to provide to prospective and existing clients to introduce them to D’Amato and to tout his qualifications;

iii. routinely including a copy of D’Amato’s bio in formal responses to Requests for Proposal (“RFPs”) from larger investors such as institutions, endowments, and foundations;

iv. representing D’Amato as a CFA charterholder on Schedule H of various iterations of SCM’s Form ADV Part IIIs from December 28, 2007 to August 28, 2008; and

v. introducing and presenting D’Amato as a CFA charterholder in the various presentations and pitches to clients, prospective clients, and FA recruits in which he was involved.

17. In a span of five years, D’Amato ascended from the role of assistant analyst to President of SCM. In announcing D’Amato’s promotion to SCM President, SGC’s President credited D’Amato with: (i) increasing assets under management (“AUM”) in SAS from less than $10 million in 2004 to $1.2 billion by the end of 2008, and (ii) generating $25 million in SAS management fees in 2007 and 2008 alone.

18. D’Amato’s compensation structure was tied in part to the AUM in the advisory programs that he managed, including SAS, and the amount of management fees that SGC and SCM derived therefrom.

Violations

19. As a result of the conduct described above, D’Amato willfully violated, and willfully aided and abetted and caused SGC’s violation of, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, which prohibit fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.

20. As a result of the conduct described above, D’Amato willfully aided and abetted and caused SGC’s violations of Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, which prohibit fraudulent conduct by an investment adviser.

21. As a result of the conduct described above, D’Amato willfully aided and abetted and caused SCM’s violations of Section 207 of the Advisers Act, which requires that filings by
advisers be accurate when filed with the Commission and prohibits any untrue statement of a material fact in any registration application or report.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate, in the public interest, and for the protection of investors to impose the sanctions agreed to in D'Amato's Offer.

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Exchange Act, Sections 203(f) and 203(k) of the Advisers Act, and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:

A. D'Amato cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of the Advisers Act.

B. D'Amato be, and hereby is:

barred from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal adviser, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization;

prohibited from serving or acting as an employee, officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment company or affiliated person of such investment adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter; and

barred from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.

With the right to apply for reentry after five (5) years to the appropriate self-regulatory organization, or if there is none, to the Commission.

C. Any reapplication for association by D'Amato will be subject to the applicable laws and regulations governing the reentry process, and reentry may be conditioned upon a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of any or all of the following: (a) any disgorgement ordered against D'Amato, whether or not the Commission has fully or partially waived payment of such disgorgement; (b) any arbitration award related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; (c) any self-regulatory organization arbitration award to a customer, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order; and (d) any restitution order by a self-regulatory organization, whether or not related to the conduct that served as the basis for the Commission order.
D. D’Amato shall, within 14 days of the entry of this Order, pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $50,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3717. Payment must be made in one of the following ways:

i. D’Amato may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;³

ii. D’Amato may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofrm.htm; or

iii. D’Amato may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to:

   Enterprise Services Center  
   Accounts Receivable Branch  
   HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341  
   6500 South MacArthur Boulevard  
   Oklahoma City, OK 73169

Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying Jason A. D’Amato as the Respondent in these proceedings, and File No. 3-15004 as the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to David Peavler, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 801 Cherry Street, Suite 1900, Fort Worth, TX 76102.

E. Pursuant to Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended, a Fair Fund is created for the civil penalty referenced in paragraph D above. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid as a civil money penalty pursuant to this Order shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, D’Amato agrees that in any Related Investor Action, he shall not argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he benefit by, offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages by the amount of any part of D’Amato’s payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, D’Amato agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this proceeding. For purposes of this paragraph, a

³ The minimum threshold for transmission of payment electronically is $50,000.00 as of April 1, 2012. This threshold will be increased to $100,000.00 by December 31, 2012. For amounts below this threshold, D’Amato must make payments pursuant to option (ii) or (iii) above.
"Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against D'Amato by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Order instituted by the Commission in this proceeding.

F. All funds paid by D'Amato pursuant to this Order shall be transferred to the Receiver appointed in SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Ltd., et al., Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-0298 (Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division) to be distributed for the benefit of investor victims according to a distribution plan to be approved by the court in that litigation.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Lynn M. Powalski
Deputy Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 69839 / June 24, 2013

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-15363

In the Matter of
Green Solutions China, Inc.,
Yarraman Winery, Inc. (n/k/a Global Beverages, Inc.), and
Yinlips Technology, Inc.,

Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(j) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") against Respondents Green Solutions China, Inc., Yarraman Winery, Inc. (n/k/a Global Beverages, Inc.), and Yinlips Technology, Inc.

II.

After an investigation, the Division of Enforcement alleges that:

A. RESPONDENTS

1. Green Solutions China, Inc. (CIK No. 1445186) is a Delaware corporation located in Hong Kong with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Green Solutions China is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011, which reported a net loss of over $1.7 million for the prior nine months.

2. Yarraman Winery, Inc. (n/k/a Global Beverages, Inc.) (CIK No. 1096655) is a revoked Nevada corporation located in New South Wales, Australia with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g).
Yarraman Winery is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, which reported a net loss of over $2.1 million for the prior nine months. As of June 19, 2013, the company’s stock (symbol “GBVI”) was traded on the over-the-counter markets.

3. Yinlips Technology, Inc. (CIK No. 1403793) is a void Delaware corporation located in Guangdong, China with a class of securities registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g). Yinlips Technology is delinquent in its periodic filings with the Commission, having not filed any periodic reports since it filed a Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009.

**B. DELINQUENT PERIODIC FILINGS**

4. As discussed in more detail above, all of the Respondents are delinquent in their periodic filings with the Commission, have repeatedly failed to meet their obligations to file timely periodic reports, and failed to heed delinquency letters sent to them by the Division of Corporation Finance requesting compliance with their periodic filing obligations or, through their failure to maintain a valid address on file with the Commission as required by Commission rules, did not receive such letters.

5. Exchange Act Section 13(a) and the rules promulgated thereunder require issuers of securities registered pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12 to file with the Commission current and accurate information in periodic reports, even if the registration is voluntary under Section 12(g). Specifically, Rule 13a-1 requires issuers to file annual reports, and Rule 13a-13 requires domestic issuers to file quarterly reports.

6. As a result of the foregoing, Respondents failed to comply with Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and/or 13a-13 thereunder.

**III.**

In view of the allegations made by the Division of Enforcement, the Commission deems it necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors that public administrative proceedings be instituted to determine:

A. Whether the allegations contained in Section II hereof are true and, in connection therewith, to afford the Respondents an opportunity to establish any defenses to such allegations; and,

B. Whether it is necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of each class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act of the Respondents identified in Section II hereof, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents.
IV.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a public hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the questions set forth in Section III hereof shall be convened at a time and place to be fixed, and before an Administrative Law Judge to be designated by further order as provided by Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.110].

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file an Answer to the allegations contained in this Order within ten (10) days after service of this Order, as provided by Rule 220(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b)].

If Respondents fail to file the directed Answers, or fail to appear at a hearing after being duly notified, the Respondents, and any successor under Exchange Act Rules 12b-2 or 12g-3, and any new corporate names of any Respondents, may be deemed in default and the proceedings may be determined against them upon consideration of this Order, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true as provided by Rules 155(a), 220(f), 221(f), and 310 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155(a), 201.220(f), 201.221(f), and 201.310].

This Order shall be served forthwith upon Respondents personally or by certified, registered, or Express Mail, or by other means permitted by the Commission Rules of Practice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 120 days from the date of service of this Order, pursuant to Rule 360(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice [17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)].

In the absence of an appropriate waiver, no officer or employee of the Commission engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related proceeding will be permitted to participate or advise in the decision of this matter, except as witness or counsel in proceedings held pursuant to notice. Since this proceeding is not “rule making” within the meaning of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not deemed subject to the provisions of Section 553 delaying the effective date of any final Commission action.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

[Signature]
By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Release No. 34-69838; File No. 600-23)

June 24, 2013

Order Granting the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation’s Amended Application for Permanent Registration as a Clearing Agency

I. Introduction

On April 5, 2013, the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) an amended application on Form CA-1寻求 permanent registration as a clearing agency under Sections 17A and 19(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”)[2] and Rule 17Ab2-1 thereunder.[3] Notice of the amended application was published in the Federal Register on April 17, 2013.[4] The Commission received no comments on the notice. This Order grants FICC permanent registration as a clearing agency.

II. Background

On December 13, 1986, the Mortgage-Backed Securities Clearing Corporation (“MBSCC”) filed with the Commission a Form CA-1寻求 registration as a clearing agency.

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[1] See Letter from Donaldine Temple, Senior Associate Counsel and Corporate Secretary, FICC, to Joseph P. Kamnik, Assistant Director, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission (April 4, 2013). The amendment filed by FICC updates all of the information required by Form CA-1, and incorporates by reference all information submitted in connection with FICC’s prior application and amendments thereto, to the extent not otherwise superseded by proposed rule changes filed pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Act or by FICC’s amended Form CA-1.


The Commission granted MBSCC a temporary registration on February 2, 1987\(^6\) and extended this temporary registration on several occasions thereafter.\(^7\) On October 16, 1987, the Government Securities Clearing Corporation ("GSCC") filed with the Commission a Form CA-1\(^8\) seeking registration as a clearing agency. The Commission granted GSCC a temporary registration on May 24, 1988\(^9\) and extended this temporary registration on several occasions.

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thereafter. On January 1, 2003, GSCC acquired MBSCC and named the resulting entity FICC, which has operated under a temporary registration since that time.

The temporary registrations granted to MBSCC and GSCC exempted them from certain requirements imposed by Section 17A of the Act. Specifically, both MBSCC and GSCC were exempted from compliance with the Act’s fair representation requirement, and GSCC was further exempted from the Act’s participation requirements. The Commission has since determined that MBSCC and GSCC met the statutory requirements from which they were exempted.

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12 Pursuant to Rule 17Ab2-1(c)(1), the Commission may grant registration to a clearing agency while exempting it from one or more of the requirements of paragraphs (A) through (I) of section 17A(b)(3) of the Act. See 17 CFR 240.17Ab2-1(c)(1).


exempted and consequently lifted the exemptions. As a result, FICC is currently subject to all requirements of the Act applicable to registered clearing agencies, including the requirement to submit rule change proposals to the Commission for approval and to make its records available for periodic, special, or other examinations by Commission staff.

The Commission extended FICC’s temporary registration on several occasions, most recently on June 20, 2011. At that time, the Commission explained that it would consider whether to grant FICC permanent registration after the Commission acted upon FICC’s proposal to introduce central counterparty and guaranteed settlement services to FICC’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Division ("FICC/MBSD"). The Commission approved FICC’s request to provide

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17 See 15 U.S.C. 78q(b); see also Section 807 of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (mandating that supervisory agencies examine financial market utilities at least once each year) and n.26, infra (noting that FICC has been designated a financial market utility).


central counterparty services at FICC/MBSD on March 9, 2012.\textsuperscript{20} FICC’s temporary registration expires on June 30, 2013.\textsuperscript{21}

III. Overview of FICC

FICC, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation ("DTCC"), is the sole clearing agency in the United States acting as a central counterparty and provider of significant clearance and settlement services for cash-settled U.S. Treasury and agency securities and the non-private label mortgage-backed securities markets.\textsuperscript{22} FICC is comprised of two divisions, the Government Securities Division ("FICC/GSD") and FICC/MBSD (collectively, the "Divisions"), each of which has its own membership and rules.\textsuperscript{23} The rules are similar in most aspects and differ primarily where the clearance and settlement of specific products requires distinctions.\textsuperscript{24} In 2011, the FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD cleared transactions valued at $1.1 quadrillion on a gross basis and $64.8 trillion on a gross basis,


\textsuperscript{23} FICC/GSD currently has 113 members, 104 of which are full-service members. FICC/MBSD currently has 143 members.

\textsuperscript{24} See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 66550 (March, 9, 2012), 77 FR 15155-01, 15162 (March 14, 2012) (SR-FICC-2008-01) (noting that FICC/MBSD’s rules were "revised to harmonize them with similar provisions in the current [FICC/]GSD rules, and in some cases updated to reflect the MBSD market").
respectively. On July 18, 2012, the Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") designated FICC systemically important under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act").

As the sole central counterparty in the United States for cash-settled U.S. government and agency securities, FICC/GSD provides clearing, netting, settlement, risk management, and a guarantee of trade completion for the following securities: (i) U.S. Treasury bills, notes, bonds, Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS), and Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal Securities (STRIPS), and (ii) Federal agency notes, bonds and zero-coupon securities that are book-entry, Fedwire eligible, and non-mortgage backed. FICC/GSD accepts buy-sell transactions, repurchase and reverse repurchase agreement transactions, and Treasury auction purchases in several types of U.S. Government securities.

As the sole central counterparty in the United States for the non-private label mortgage-backed securities market, FICC/MBSD provides clearing, netting, settlement, risk management, pool notification, and a guarantee of trade completion for pass-through mortgage-backed securities issued by the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), and the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae").

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IV. Discussion

A. Statutory Requirements

Section 17A of the Act directs the Commission—having due regard for the public interest, the protection of investors, the safeguarding of securities and funds, and the maintenance of fair competition—to use its authority to facilitate the establishment of a national system for the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions.27 The registration and continued oversight of clearing agencies represent key elements in promoting these statutory objectives. Accordingly, Section 17A of the Act requires a clearing agency, as defined in Section 3(a)(23) of the Act, to register with the Commission.28 Before granting registration to a clearing agency, Section 17A(b)(3) of the Act requires that the Commission make a number of determinations with respect to the clearing agency’s organization, capacity, and rules.29 Section 17A(b)(3)(A) of the Act requires a clearing agency, among other things, to be “so organized and [have] the capacity to be able to facilitate the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and derivative agreements, contracts, and transactions for which it is responsible, to safeguard securities and funds in its custody or control or for which it is responsible, [and] to comply with the provisions of [the Act] and the rules and


28 The term “clearing agency” is defined, in pertinent part, as “any person who acts as an intermediary in making payments or deliveries or both in connection with transactions in securities or who provides facilities for comparison of data respecting the terms of settlement of securities transactions, to reduce the number of settlements of securities transactions, or for the allocation of securities settlement responsibilities.” 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(23)(A).

regulations thereunder.” An approval of clearing agency registration does not mean that no further modifications of the applicant’s rules, systems, procedures, or practices are needed.

In 1980, the Commission published a statement of the views and positions that the Division of Trading and Markets (“Standards Release”) would apply in evaluating

30 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(A). The Commission has recently adopted standards for registered clearing agencies that establish minimum requirements regarding how registered clearing agencies must maintain effective risk management procedures and controls, as well as meet the statutory requirements under the Act on an ongoing basis. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68080 (October 22, 2012), 77 FR 66220 (November 2, 2012) (File No. S7-08-11) (“Clearing Agency Standards”). As the Commission noted in the Clearing Agency Standards Release, the standards were modeled on standards developed by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (“CPSS”) in the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (2001) (“RSSS”) and Recommendations for Central Counterparties (2004) (“RCCP”) (collectively, “CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations”). See id. at 66222-23. Independent assessors from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) evaluated FICC/GSD against the standards outlined in the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations and determined that FICC/GSD observed or broadly observed the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations. Since that time, FICC/MBSD updated its rules generally to mirror the rules of FICC/GSD. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 66550 (March 9, 2012), 77 FR 15155-01, 15162 (March 14, 2012) (SR-FICC-2008-01) (noting that FICC/MBSD’s rules were “revised to harmonize them with similar provisions in the current GSD rules, and in some cases updated to reflect the [FICC/MBSD] market”). Furthermore, FICC has performed a self-assessment of the clearing agency’s rules, policies, and procedures against the Clearing Agency Standards. While the Commission believes that FICC’s practices are largely consistent with the Clearing Agency Standards, it will evaluate FICC’s continued compliance with the Act, the Clearing Agency Standards, and other applicable rules under the Act on an ongoing basis.

31 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20221 (September 23, 1983), 48 FR 45167-02, 45171 (October 3, 1983) (File No. 600-1 et al.) (order approving full registration of nine clearing agencies). In approving these registrations, the Commission noted that it “does not intend this [order approving applications for registration] to suggest that no further modifications of the subject clearing agencies’ rules, systems, procedures, and practices are needed now or in the future. Indeed, the findings made in this Order are intended to supplement the Commission’s . . . continuing authority under the Act to regulate evolving clearing systems. The Commission will continue to use its oversight, inspection, and enforcement authority as necessary and appropriate to further the purposes of the Act, and, as necessary, will use its rulemaking authority . . . to ensure continued development of the National System [for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions].” Id.
applications for clearing agency registration. The Standards Release provides information concerning the Division’s interpretation of the requirements for clearing agency registration set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (l) of Section 17A(b)(3),\textsuperscript{34} illustrates specific objectives that a clearing agency’s rules, procedures, and systems should achieve to be granted registration, and discusses the Division’s views on the national system for clearance and settlement.\textsuperscript{35}

B. Membership Standards

1. Statutory Requirements

Section 17A(b)(3)(B) of the Act enumerates the following categories of persons that a clearing agency’s rules must make eligible for membership: registered brokers or dealers, registered clearing agencies, registered investment companies, banks, and insurance companies. While the Act requires that these entities must be eligible for membership, clearing agencies are permitted to establish additional admission criteria.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{32} In 1980, the Division of Trading and Markets was named the Division of Market Regulation.


\textsuperscript{34} 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(A) through (l).

\textsuperscript{35} The Commission notes that the standards reflected in the Standards Release were developed in the context registering ten clearing agencies engaged primarily in clearing domestic corporate debt and equity securities and, to a lesser extent, municipal securities. The Commission recognizes that some of these standards may not be appropriate for clearing agencies that provide services for other investment products, such as mortgage-backed securities. Accordingly, the Commission intends to apply the standards flexibly and on a case-by-case basis.

\textsuperscript{36} 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(B). The Act uses the term “participant,” rather than “member,” but as FICC’s rules refer to its users as members rather than participants, this Order will use the term “member” for the sake of clarity. See also 15 U.S.C. 78c(3)(a)(24) (“The term ‘participant’ when used with respect to a clearing agency means any person who uses a clearing agency to clear or settle securities transactions or to transfer, pledge, lend, or hypothecate securities.”).
Section 17A(b)(4)(B) of the Act contemplates that a registered clearing agency will have financial responsibility, operational capability, experience, and competency standards that are used to accept, deny, or condition participation of any member or any category of members enumerated in Section 17A(b)(3)(B), but it also provides that these criteria may not be used to unfairly discriminate among applicants.\textsuperscript{37} The rules of the clearing agency must not be designed to permit unfair discrimination in the admission of members or among members in the use of the clearing agency, nor impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.\textsuperscript{38}

2. FICC Compliance with Membership Requirements

FICC/GSD has established each of the membership categories required by Section 17A, and also offers membership to certain other types of entities.\textsuperscript{39} FICC/GSD divides its members into four types depending upon the level of services offered: (i) comparison-only members; (ii) netting members; (iii) sponsored members and their sponsors; and (iv) funds-only settling bank members. FICC/MBSD has also established each of the membership categories required by Section 17A, and also offers membership to certain other types of entities.\textsuperscript{40} FICC/MBSD offers two principal categories of membership: one for clearing members, and one for cash-settling bank members.\textsuperscript{41}

FICC has established requirements for applicants’ financial resources, operational capacity, creditworthiness, and business experience. The financial requirements vary depending

\textsuperscript{37} 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(4)(B) and (b)(3)(F).
\textsuperscript{38} 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F) and (l).
\textsuperscript{39} See GSD Rulebook, Rule 2(b).
\textsuperscript{40} See MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2A.
\textsuperscript{41} See MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2(b).
upon the nature of the applicant’s business, the types of clearing services the applicant uses, and the accounting principles the applicant follows in preparing its audited financial statements. FICC’s financial standards require, among other things, that applicants have sufficient resources to make any required clearing fund contributions, to pay cash settlement amounts, to meet any applicable regulatory capital requirements, and to satisfy all obligations to FICC. FICC ensures members’ creditworthiness by retaining the authority to deny membership to entities that, among other things, are subject to statutory disqualification under Section 3(a)(39) of the Act, have violated the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws, or have been convicted of a criminal offense. FICC’s operational criteria require applicants to have adequate personnel, physical facilities, books and records, accounting systems, and internal procedures to process transactions promptly and accurately, to communicate with FICC, and to conform to any conditions imposed by FICC. FICC’s business experience criteria require certain applicants to have a profitable business history of at least six months, or personnel with sufficient operational background and experience to ensure the firm’s ability to conduct business.

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42 For example, a FICC/GSD member that is a broker-dealer member registered under Section 15 of the Act whose financial statements are prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP must have at least $25 million in net worth and at least $10 million in excess net capital. See GSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 4(b)(ii)(A)(1) and (2). Similarly, a FICC/MBSD member that is a broker-dealer registered under Section 15 of the Act whose financial statements are prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP must have at least $25 million in net worth and at least $10 million in excess net capital. See MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 2(e)(ii)(A)(1) and (2).

43 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Sections 3 and 4; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 2.


45 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Sections 3 and 4(a); MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 2.

46 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 3; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 2.

47 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 4(c); MBSD Rulebook, Rule 2A, Section 2(f).
FICC routinely monitors its members to ensure they adhere to FICC's membership requirements on an ongoing basis. In this regard, FICC requires members to provide it with interim and annual financial statements and, periodically, certain regulatory reports (e.g., the FOCUS reports broker-dealers must file with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).\textsuperscript{48} FICC can require members to undergo periodic operational testing, and members must promptly notify FICC if they cease to satisfy any of FICC's membership requirements.\textsuperscript{49} FICC also assigns its bank and broker-dealer members a rating based on their financial stability, and this rating can affect both the level of financial scrutiny these members receive and the members' clearing fund requirement.\textsuperscript{50}

FICC has the authority to take action with respect to members that fail to maintain FICC's membership standards. A member that no longer satisfies FICC's membership requirements is subject to enhanced monitoring, increased clearing fund requirements, limitations on its access to FICC's services, and possible loss of membership privileges.\textsuperscript{51}

3. Commission Findings on FICC's Compliance With Membership Standards

At the time of GSCC's initial temporary registration, the Commission granted GSCC exemptions from compliance with the participation standards of Section 17A(b)(3)(B) and 17A(b)(4)(B) because the Commission determined that GSCC rules did not provide for all the statutory categories of membership required under the Act or the financial standards for

\textsuperscript{48} See GSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Section 2; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Section 2.

\textsuperscript{49} See GSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Sections 6 and 7; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Sections 5 and 6.

\textsuperscript{50} See GSD Rulebook, Rule 3; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 3.

\textsuperscript{51} See GSD Rulebook Rule 3; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 3.
membership as contemplated by the Act.\textsuperscript{52} Since the Commission’s original order granting temporary registration, the Commission has approved a number of rule filings that amended GS\textsuperscript{CB}’s membership categories and membership requirements.\textsuperscript{53} The Division thoroughly reviewed FICC’s membership eligibility criteria and membership requirements when GS\textsuperscript{CB} and MBSC\textsuperscript{CB} merged and determined that FICC’s participation standards were consistent with the requirements under the Act.\textsuperscript{54} FICC/MBSD updated its membership standards in 2012 to generally mirror the FICC/GSD standards.\textsuperscript{55}

FICC’s current rules provide for membership for those entities enumerated in the statute and provide for robust financial and operational competency standards. By clearly denoting ongoing compliance obligations and setting forth the consequences for failing to meet those obligations, FICC’s rules are designed to sufficiently protect the clearing agency from risk associated with not meeting those competency standards. In addition, FICC’s rules are not designed to permit unfair discrimination in the admission of members or among members in the use of the clearing agency, nor do they impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Therefore, the Commission reaffirms its


2002 and 2012 findings and finds that FICC’s membership standards are in compliance with the Act.

C. Fair Representation

1. Statutory Requirements

Section 17A(b)(3)(C) of the Act requires that the rules of a clearing agency assure fair representation of the clearing agency’s members in the selection of the clearing agency’s directors and in the administration of the clearing agency’s affairs. The Standards Release interprets this section to require that a clearing agency’s rules: (i) provide members with a meaningful opportunity to be represented in the selection of the clearing agency’s directors and the administration of its affairs; and (ii) provide members with sufficient information concerning the clearing agency’s affairs to ensure meaningful participation. In particular, clearing agencies should furnish members with audited annual financial statements, an annual report on internal accounting controls prepared by an independent public accountant, and notice of any proposed rule changes.

2. FICC’s Compliance with the Fair Representation Requirement

With respect to the selection of directors and the administration of the affairs of FICC, individuals elected to the DTCC Board of Directors are also elected to and constitute the Board of Directors of FICC (collectively, “Board”). The Board consists of between fifteen and twenty-five directors, as determined by the Board periodically. A majority of the Board must be

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58 Id.
59 Currently, the Board is composed of nineteen directors. Twelve directors represent clearing agency members, three directors are independent representatives of non-
composed of member representatives. DTCC currently maintains eight Board Committees, with at least one director serving on each Committee. Collectively, these eight committees advise DTCC’s Board on matters including, but not limited to, clearing agency operations, membership, credit, and risk. Finally, members that make full use of FICC’s services are required to purchase DTCC common shares in proportion to their relative use of FICC’s services. Holders of DTCC common shares elect all but two of the Directors of DTCC. FICC’s rules require FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD to provide members with copies of audited annual financial statements and an annual report on internal accounting controls.

members, two directors represent DTCC management, and two directors are designated by DTCC’s preferred shareholders. For more information, see http://www.dtcc.com/about/governance/board.php.


The eight Board Committees are: Governance, Executive, Audit, Business and Products, Operations and Technology, Compensation and Human Resources, Risk, and Finance and Capital.

DTCC common stock is reallocated at least once every three years based on members’ usage of services of the DTCC clearing agencies. See DTCC Common Stock Reallocation, DTCC Important Notice, May 11, 2012, available at http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/legal/imp_notices/2012/ficc/gov/GOV050.12.pdf; see also The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Third Amended and Restated Shareholders Agreement, art. 2, Section 2.01(a). Members of one DTCC entity that use the services of other DTCC entities are entitled to purchase additional shares based on their use of those services.

The other two directors are appointed by DTCC’s preferred shareholders, NYSE-Euronext and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), each of which hold 10,000 DTCC preferred shares.

See GSD Rulebook, Rule 35; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 26. Although FICC/GSD’s rule does not include a provision requiring it to provide members with an annual internal accounting controls report, both FICC/MBSD and FICC/GSD make the report available to members on DTCC’s website within the requisite 60-day period after FICC receives the report. See Letter from Nikki Poulos, Managing Director and General Counsel, DTCC, to Joseph Kamnik, Assistant Director, Division of Trading and Markets,
rules also require FICC to provide prompt notice of any proposals to change, revise, add or repeal any rule, along with the text or a brief description of the proposed rule and its purpose and effect.\textsuperscript{65} Members also have the right to submit to FICC comments on the proposal, and FICC will file such comments with the Commission and retain them with FICC’s records.

3. Commission Findings Regarding FICC’s Compliance with the Fair Representation Requirements

In approving the merger of GSCC and MBSCC in 2002, the Commission determined that FICC satisfied the fair representation requirements of Section 17A of the Act by (i) continuing to give the members the right to purchase shares of DTCC common stock on a basis that reflects their usage of FICC’s services;\textsuperscript{66} (ii) continuing to allow members of FICC to take part in the selection of individuals to the Board; and (iii) using the committee structure to ensure that FICC members will have a voice in the operations and affairs of the divisions.\textsuperscript{67} Accordingly, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion that FICC’s rules provide members with a meaningful opportunity to select Board directors and to participate in the administration of the affairs of the clearing agency. The Commission also finds that FICC provides members with the information necessary to make informed decisions regarding these matters.

\textsuperscript{65} See MBSD Rulebook, Rule 27; GSD Rulebook, Rule 36.

\textsuperscript{66} Since 2005, members of DTC, NSCC, and FICC that make full use of the services of one or more of these clearing agencies have been required to purchase DTCC common shares based on their use of those clearing agencies in which they are members. For more information, see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52922 (December 7, 2005), 70 FR 74070 (December 14, 2005) (SR-DTC-2005-16, SR-FICC-2005-19, and SR-NSCC-2005-14).

D. Capacity to Enforce Rules and to Discipline Members in Accordance with Fair Procedures

1. Statutory Requirements

Section 17A(b)(3)(A) of the Act provides that a clearing agency must be organized and have the capacity to enforce compliance by its members with the rules of the clearing agency.\textsuperscript{68} Section 17A(b)(3)(G) requires that the rules of a clearing agency provide that its members shall be appropriately disciplined for violations of any provision of those rules by expulsion, suspension, a limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, or any other fitting sanction.\textsuperscript{69} Section 17A(b)(3)(H) requires that the rules of the clearing agency provide a fair procedure with respect to the disciplining of members, the denial of a request for membership, and the prohibition or limitation by the clearing agency of any person with respect to the services offered by the clearing agency.\textsuperscript{70}

2. FICC’s Capacity to Enforce Rules and to Discipline Members in Accordance with Fair Procedures

FICC rules require members to notify FICC if they fail to maintain the relevant standards and qualifications for admission to membership, including minimum capital standards, operations testing and related reporting requirements.\textsuperscript{71} If a member (i) fails to maintain such relevant standards and qualifications, including but not limited to minimum capital standards, operations testing, or reporting requirements imposed pursuant to FICC rules, (ii) violates any rule of or agreement with FICC; (iii) fails to satisfy in a timely manner any obligations to FICC; or (iv) experiences a reportable event (e.g., changes in control of a member or events having a

\textsuperscript{71} See GSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Section 7; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Section 6.
substantial effect on a member’s business or financial condition), FICC may undertake appropriate action to determine the member’s continued eligibility for membership.

Furthermore, at any time FICC deems it necessary or advisable in order to protect FICC, its members, creditors, or investors, to safeguard securities and funds in FICC’s custody or control, or to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, FICC may undertake appropriate action to determine the member’s eligibility for membership.  

FICC rules also set forth the clearing agency’s right to discipline members for violations of any rules or member agreements, and for any error, delay, or other conduct that either constitutes an abuse or misuse of FICC’s procedures or is detrimental to the clearing agency. In addition, FICC rules describe certain member actions that may cause FICC to restrict a member’s access to services, including but not limited to failing to make certain payments, deliveries, or deposits pursuant to FICC rules, and provide the process by which FICC may wind down a member’s activities in the clearing agency. FICC may discipline a member by, as appropriate, terminating membership, ceasing to act on behalf of the member, limiting a member’s access to FICC’s services, fining or censuring a member, or imposing any other fitting sanctions. FICC must notify members of the type of disciplinary sanction being imposed, the reasons for the sanction, the effective date of the sanction, and the right to a hearing.

The rules of FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD specify the due process protections to which members are entitled. These rules permit members accused of violations to request a hearing and

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72 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Section 7; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 3, Section 6.
73 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 48; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 38.
74 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 21; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 14.
75 See GSD Rulebook, Rules 22 and 22A; MBSD Rulebook, Rules 16 and 17.
76 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 48; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 38.
77 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 48; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 38.
require FICC to establish a panel to conduct such hearings. The hearing panel is required to advise the requesting member of its decision and the grounds upon which its decision is based. Disciplinary sanctions may be imposed only in accordance with FICC rules. While decisions of the panel are generally final, the Board retains the discretion to modify any sanction or reverse any decision of the panel that is adverse to a member.

3. Commission Findings Regarding FICC’s Capacity to Enforce Rules and to Discipline Members in Accordance with Fair Procedures

In approving GSCC’s and MBSCC’s initial request for registration, the Commission reviewed the clearing agencies’ ability to enforce their rules and reviewed the processes by which the clearing agencies imposed fines, expulsions, suspensions, limitation of or restrictions on activities, functions and operations, or other sanctions. In so doing, the Commission was satisfied that GSCC and MBSCC rules met statutory requirements to have the capacity to enforce their rules and fairly discipline their members.

The Commission continues to find that FICC has procedures for enforcing rules and disciplining members that are consistent with the requirements of the Act. Specifically, the Commission finds that FICC’s rules provide it with appropriate authority to discipline members for rules violations and to impose each of the sanctions enumerated in the Act. Moreover, the Commission finds that FICC has established procedures to ensure members accused of rules violations receive notice of the alleged violations, and are afforded an opportunity to contest the allegations, including by requesting a hearing at which the accused member may be represented.

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78 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 37; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 28.
79 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 37; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 28.
by counsel. In the Commission’s view, these procedural safeguards are consistent with the protections envisioned by the Act. The Commission therefore concludes that FICC’s capacity to enforce its rules and discipline its members comports with Section 17A(b)(3)(A), (G) and (H).

E. Safeguarding Securities and Funds

1. Statutory Requirements

Sections 17A(b)(3)(A) and (F) of the Act require that a clearing agency be organized and that its rules be designed both to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions for which it is responsible and to safeguard securities and funds in its custody or control, or for which it is responsible. The clearing agency is permitted to use clearing fund resources in limited amounts on a temporary basis to meet unexpected and unusual requirements for funds.

The Standards Release also enumerated certain requirements that should be met to comply with the Act, including that a clearing agency should: (i) be organized in a manner that effectively establishes operational and audit controls while fostering director independence; (ii) have an audit committee of its board of directors composed of non-management directors that would select, or participate in the selection of, the clearing agency’s independent public accountant and that would review the nature and scope of the work to be performed by the independent public accountant and the results thereof with the independent public accountant; (iii) have an adequately and competently staffed internal audit department that reviews, monitors, and evaluates the clearing agency’s system of internal accounting control; (iv) furnish annually to members audited financial statements and furnish quarterly to members on request unaudited

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81 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(A) and (F).
financial statements; (v) furnish annually to members an opinion report prepared by its independent public accountant based on a study and evaluation of the clearing agency's system of internal accounting control for the period since the last such report; and (vi) have detailed plans to assure (1) the physical safeguarding of securities and funds, (2) the integrity of the automatic data processing system and (3) the recovery, under a variety of contingencies, from loss or destruction of securities, funds, or data.\textsuperscript{83} The Commission provides a more detailed discussion of these requirements and FICC's compliance with each directly below.

2. FICC's Safeguarding Securities and Funds
   
   a. Clearing Fund
      
      i. General

FICC maintains separate clearing funds for FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD.\textsuperscript{84} These clearing funds serve not only to provide readily accessible liquidity to facilitate timely settlement, but also to reduce costs that may be incurred in the event a member becomes insolvent or fails to fulfill its contractual obligations to FICC. FICC calculates certain portions


\textsuperscript{84} Although FICC has implemented a similar clearing fund methodology for both Divisions, some variations exist to account for the different products each Division clears. For example, to address its clearing of repurchase agreements, via a general collateral fund ("GCF"), FICC/GSD's clearing fund calculation includes a GCF Premium Charge and a GCF Repo Event Premium. Moreover, FICC/GSD's clearing fund methodology includes adjustments to account for its cross-margining agreements with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and New York Portfolio Clearing, LLC. FICC/MBSD's clearing fund formula differs in that it includes a margin requirement differential and a deterministic risk component that are absent from FICC/GSD's formula. Unlike FICC/GSD, FICC/MBSD collects clearing fund deposits once per day, and thus the margin requirement differential addresses the risk that a member may not satisfy the next day's margin requirements. The deterministic risk component captures the mark-to-market gains or losses of a member's portfolio, as well as any net cash items and adjustments.
of each member’s required clearing fund deposit twice daily\textsuperscript{85} based upon the member’s unsettled and pending transactions. In calculating members’ clearing fund obligations, FICC employs a risk-based margining methodology that measures each Division’s credit exposure to its members. Members are required to deposit cash and eligible securities into the appropriate clearing fund to cover these exposures.\textsuperscript{86}

FICC calculates clearing fund requirements for cash-settled transactions at both FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD assuming a three-day liquidation period in normal market conditions. The clearing fund requirement is calculated to provide FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD with adequate clearing fund resources to withstand a default of the largest member 99 percent of the time in normal market conditions. FICC uses routine back and stress testing to monitor the sufficiency of clearing fund levels vis-à-vis the risk represented by the 99th percentile of expected possible losses from member portfolios and to monitor tail risk exposure that falls beyond the 99th percentile. FICC’s stress tests include events from the last 10 years, as well as special stress events outside that period and hypothetical scenarios. FICC back-tests its clearing fund model on a monthly basis and has outside experts validate the model periodically.

FICC’s methodology for calculating members’ clearing fund requirements includes two principal components: (i) a Value at Risk ("VaR") charge, which is calculated using a historical simulation with full revaluation; and (ii) a risk-related charge, known as a "coverage charge."\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{85} Only certain components of the clearing fund, such as the Value at Risk component, are calculated twice each day. Others, such as the coverage component, are calculated only once daily.

\textsuperscript{86} Members’ required clearing fund deposits must be made and maintained in cash, U.S. Treasury securities, securities issued by certain federal agencies, and mortgage-backed securities issued by federal agencies or entities sponsored by the federal government. FICC requires that at least 10% of a member’s required deposit be maintained in cash, up to a required maximum of $5 million.

\textsuperscript{87} See GSD Rulebook, Rule 4; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 4.
The VaR component of the clearing fund addresses the risk presented by a member's unsettled positions. The coverage component seeks to address the VaR model's potential deficiencies through daily back-testing, and further serves to ensure that members' collateral deposits are sufficient to satisfy their obligations 99 percent of the time in normal market conditions. FICC also has the authority under its rules to levy a "special charge" on individual members to account for market conditions, changes to a member's financial and operational capabilities, and other forms of risk, including credit, reputational and legal risk.  

ii. Investment of Clearing Fund Deposits

All securities and cash associated with FICC's settlement processes and clearing fund are held in FICC's accounts at its two clearing banks, the Bank of New York Mellon and JPMorgan Chase Bank. FICC generally invests its cash in securities issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or agencies and instrumentalities of the United States or in repurchase agreements related to securities issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or agencies and instrumentalities of the United States. FICC's investment policy also permits investments in certificates of deposit or deposits in FDIC-insured banks, but limited to the level of FDIC insurance protection, and with a time to maturity of not greater than one year. FICC's investment policy also permits it to earn money market rates in interest bearing accounts with creditworthy banks and other financial institutions deemed acceptable by FICC consistent with its investment policy.

The risk of loss of invested funds is minimized in a number of ways. Investments are placed with well-capitalized financial institutions acting as principal rather than as agent, and maturity is limited to the next business day. FICC vets its counterparties for creditworthiness.

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88 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 4; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 4.
FICC ensures that its reverse repo investments are fully secured by requiring collateral to have a market value greater than or equal to 102% of the cash invested. A written confirmation of each security underlying the repo is also required to be provided by the custodian bank. In addition to these risk-minimizing measures, counterparty credit limits are established for each investment type.

iii. Loss Allocation

The rules of FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD set out a loss allocation procedure, which is invoked if a defaulting member’s clearing fund deposit is insufficient to cover losses incurred in the liquidation of the member’s positions. If a member becomes insolvent, FICC would first use that member’s clearing fund to cover a loss incurred on the liquidation of the member’s positions, along with any funds available from applicable collateral sharing arrangements between FICC and other clearing corporations. If those resources are insufficient to cover the liquidation of all of the defaulting member’s positions, FICC’s loss allocation procedure would be used. Any such loss allocation would first be made against the retained earnings of FICC.

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89 FICC has entered into a multilateral netting contract and limited cross-guaranty agreement with the Depository Trust Company (DTC), National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), and the Options Clearing Corporation, under which these clearing agencies have agreed to make payment to each other for any remaining unsatisfied obligations of a common defaulting member to the extent they have excess resources of the defaulting member. FICC/GSD has also established cross-margining arrangements with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) and New York Portfolio Clearing, LLC (“NYPC”) pursuant to which a FICC/GSD member that is also a clearing member of CME or NYPC may elect to have its clearing fund requirement in respect of eligible positions at FICC/GSD and its margin requirements in respect of eligible positions in its proprietary account at CME and NYPC calculated by taking into consideration the net risk of such eligible positions at both clearing organizations. Copies of FICC/GSD’s cross-guaranty and cross-margining agreements are appended as Exhibit G to FICC’s Amended Application for Registration, and are available on the Commission’s website at the following address: http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ficc.shtml.
attributable to the Division of which the defaulter was a member, in the amount of up to 25% of
the retained earnings or such higher amount as may be approved by the Board.

iv. Use of Clearing Fund Deposits

The rules of FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD place limits on their ability to use clearing
fund deposits and assets. Specifically, the Divisions may use the clearing fund only to satisfy
FICC’s losses or liabilities arising from the failure of a member to satisfy an obligation to FICC,
the failure of a member that is party to one of FICC’s cross-guaranty or cross-margin agreements
to satisfy an obligation to a counterparty that is also party those agreements, or from unexpected
or unusual requirements for funds incident to FICC’s clearance and settlement business,
provided these requirements represent a small percentage of the clearing fund. FICC may also
use the clearing fund as a source of collateral both to meet temporary financing needs in
connection with its own settlement obligations and those of its members, and to meet unusual or
unexpected funding needs, provided that these needs also represent a small percentage of the
clearing fund.

b. Operational Capacity

DTCC maintains perpetually active in-region and out-of-region data centers, each of
which has sufficient capacity to process the entire production workload so that any data center
can function as the sole site if one or more data centers experience an outage. Capacity plans are
reviewed annually by DTCC’s Infrastructure Department and the Board, and FICC performs a
stress test annually to determine daily capacity. DTCC’s Operations and Technology Committee
oversees the operational and technology capabilities that support FICC’s businesses, as well as
management’s operation and development of technology infrastructure capabilities, technology

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90 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 4, Section 5; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 4, Section 5.
91 See GSD Rulebook, Rule 4, Section 5; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 4, Section 5.
resources, processes, and controls necessary to fulfill service delivery requirements. The Operations and Technology Committee also monitors key operational and technology metrics associated with the delivery of services, reviews financial performance related to technology and operations, and receives reports on various operational and technological programs. The Operations and Technology Committee meets at least four times per year and reports to the Board regularly. The Committee is required to perform an annual self-assessment of its performance and provide the results to the DTCC Board for review.

c. Audit Committee and Internal Audit Department

DTCC’s Audit Committee and internal audit department oversee audit matters for all DTCC entities, including FICC. The Audit Committee’s primary responsibilities include supervising the preparation of financial reports, establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls, arranging and supervising internal and external audits, and overseeing the management of legal, compliance, and regulatory risk. The Audit Committee is composed of not less than four members, none of whom are employed by DTCC, and at least one of whom is not affiliated with a member of DTCC. The Audit Committee meets at least four times per year and reports to the Board regularly on its activities, including an annual self-assessment of its performance.

DTCC’s internal audit department reports directly to DTCC’s Audit Committee and provides

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94 See DTCC Operations and Technology Committee Charter of June 2012. This Charter appears as Exhibit A to FICC’s Amended Form CA-1, filed on April 5, 2013, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/ficc-clearing-agency-app-exhibit-a-thru-d.pdf.
95 See DTCC Operations and Technology Committee Charter of June 2012. This Charter appears as Exhibit A to FICC’s Amended Form CA-1, filed on April 5, 2013, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/ficc-clearing-agency-app-exhibit-a-thru-d.pdf.
independent validation of FICC’s risk and control environment, evaluates and remediates risk, and reviews the adequacy of FICC’s internal controls, procedures, and records. DTCC commissions an independent review of its internal audit department at least once every five years and uses an internal quality assurance program to test its processes on a sample basis every year. FICC also engages independent accountants to perform an annual study and evaluation of the internal controls relating to its operations.

d. Financial Report and Internal Accounting Control Report

FICC provides to members annual audited financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to members within sixty days after the close of the fiscal year. FICC also provides to members unaudited financial statements within thirty days following the close of FICC’s fiscal quarter for each of the first three quarters of each calendar year and for FICC’s fourth quarter of each calendar year, within sixty days following the close of FICC’s fiscal year. The financial statements include, among other things, the total

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96 See DTCC Audit Committee Charter of June 2012. The charter provides that the head of DTCC’s internal audit department, the General Auditor, has the opportunity at least four times each year to meet with the Audit Committee in an executive session. The charter appears as Exhibit A to FICC’s Amended Form CA-1, filed on April 5, 2013, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/ficc-clearing-agency-app-exhibit-a-thru-d.pdf.


99 GSD Rulebook, Rule 35; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 26. See also Letter from Nikki M. Poulos, Managing Director and General Counsel, FICC, to Joseph Kamnik, Assistant Director, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 30, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/dtcc-supplemental-letter-
balances of the clearing funds of FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD, the balances of both clearing
funds' cash and securities components, the types and amounts of investments made with the cash
balance, the amount charged to the clearing fund during the year in excess of a member's
contribution, if any, and any other charge to clearing fund during the year not directly related to a
specific member's contribution.

FICC retains an independent public accountant to evaluate FICC's system of internal
accounting control with respect to the safeguarding of members' assets, the clearance and
settlement of securities transactions, and the reliability of FICC's records. The evaluation is
conducted in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and is made available to all members within a reasonable time upon receipt from
FICC's independent accountant.\textsuperscript{100}

e. Securities, Funds, and Data Controls

DTCC has multiple data center locations, including in-region and out-of-region sites. In-
region sites use synchronous data replication between them, maintaining multiple exact copies of
all production data in separate locations. Production processing is spread across the in-region
data centers. The out-of-region site contains additional asynchronously replicated copies of in-
region production data.

All data centers have emergency monitoring and backup systems, backup generators, and
redundant telecommunications from multiple carriers. All sites have sufficient capacity to

\textsuperscript{100} See MBSD Rulebook, Rule 26. See also Letter from Nikki M. Poulos, Managing
Director and General Counsel, FICC, to Joseph Kamnik, Assistant Director, Division of
multiple sites, DTCC decentralized its information technology and key business operations staff among in-region and out-of-region sites.

DTCC’s SMART (Securely Managed and Reliable Technology) Network provides connectivity between DTCC and its customers and trading platforms. All critical clearance and settlement transactions use SMART. Each element of SMART is engineered with multiple independent levels of redundancy, and is capable of handling DTCC’s entire clearance and settlement workload independently.

3. Commission Findings Regarding FICC’s Compliance with the Safeguarding Securities and Funds Requirements

As discussed above, FICC maintains a clearing fund based on a formula applicable to all users with a requirement that the lesser of $5,000,000 or 10 percent of the total required amount, with a minimum of $100,000, must be made and maintained in cash. The clearing fund is used solely to protect members and the clearing agency from member defaults and from clearing agency losses that do not result from day-to-day expenses, and cash contributions to the clearing fund may generally be invested only in securities issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or agencies and instrumentalities of the United States, or in repurchase agreements related to securities issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or agencies and instrumentalities of the United States.

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102 See GSD Rulebook Rule 4, Section 2(b); MBSD Rulebook Rule 4, Section 2(d).

103 See GSD Rulebook Rule 4, Section 5; MBSD Rulebook Rule 4, Section 5.
DTCC has dedicated capacity planning staff and ensures that FICC has sufficient capacity to meet operational needs and adequate controls over the review of capacity plans and operational and technological capabilities of FICC. DTCC maintains an Audit Committee composed of non-management directors and an internal audit department that reports periodically to it. FICC provides financial reports and internal control reports to members on a timely basis, and DTCC has adequate controls around the prevention of a loss of securities, funds, or data and proper recovery mechanism in the event of a loss of securities, funds, or data. The Commission finds that FICC is adequately organized and that its rules are designed both to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions for which it is responsible and to safeguard securities and funds in its custody or control or for which it is responsible, as required by the Act.

F. Obligations to Members: Standard of Care

1. Statutory Requirements

Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions.\textsuperscript{104}

The Division has interpreted section 17A(b)(3)(F) to require a clearing agency to maintain a uniform standard of care in its obligations to members, and specifically that a clearing agency is responsible for delivering securities in its custody to, or as directed by, the members for whom such securities are held.\textsuperscript{105}


2. FICC’s Standard of Care.

FICC’s standard of care states in pertinent part, that “[FICC] will not be liable for any action taken, or any delay or failure to take any action, hereunder or otherwise to fulfill [FICC’s] obligation to its members, other than for losses caused directly by [FICC’s] gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of Federal securities laws for which there is a private right of action,” and that FICC will not be held liable for third party actions or omissions unless FICC was grossly negligent, engaged in willful misconduct, or in violation of Federal securities laws for which there is a private right of action against the third party.\(^{106}\)

3. Commission Findings on FICC’s Standard of Care

The Commission has previously approved a standard of care for FICC’s predecessors, MBSCC and GSCC, that limits their liability to direct losses caused by their gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of Federal securities laws for which there is a private right of action.\(^{107}\) The Commission determined that such a standard was warranted given that neither MBSCC nor GSCC has custody of their members’ funds or securities.\(^{108}\) As both FICC/GSD and FICC/MBSD continue to perform only non-custodial functions, the Commission reaffirms its prior determination that their standards of care are consistent with the Act.

G. Dues, Fees and Charges

Sections 17A(b)(3)(D) and (E) of the Act require a clearing agency’s rules to provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members, and

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\(^{106}\) See GSD Rulebook, Rule 39; MBSD Rulebook, Rule 30.


prohibit the rules of a clearing agency from imposing any schedule of prices, or fixing rates or other fees, for services rendered by its members.

The fees charged by FICC are generally usage-based and apply equally to all members using the relevant service. FICC does not impose any schedule of prices or fix rates or other fees for services rendered by its customers. Accordingly, the Commission is satisfied that the method by which FICC provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members and its prohibitions regarding the fixing of prices of its members meet the Act’s requirements.

H. Examination Findings: Other Considerations

FICC is currently subject to examination\(^{109}\) by Commission staff, and may be required by Commission staff to make records available for examination by Commission staff,\(^{110}\) including, but not limited to, in connection with FICC’s activities pertaining to risk management, membership, and the safeguarding of securities and funds.\(^{111}\) FICC also is subject to the requirement to file all proposed rule changes with the Commission for review,\(^{112}\) including proposed changes that could materially affect the nature or level of risks presented by FICC.\(^{113}\)

Based upon such supervisory contacts, the Commission is not aware of any reason to believe the

\(^{109}\) 15 U.S.C. 78q(b); see also Section 807 of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (mandating that supervisory agencies examine financial market utilities at least once each year) and n.26, supra (noting that FICC has been designated a financial market utility).


\(^{111}\) See supra n.30 for some of the standards by which Commission staff measures FICC’s activities.


\(^{113}\) Section 806(e)(1) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
approval of FICC's application for permanent registration as a clearing agency would not be consistent with the public interest.

V. Conclusion

The Commission concludes that FICC’s rules, policies and procedures, as set forth in its application for permanent registration as a clearing agency, meet the requirements for such registration, including those standards set forth under Section 17A of the Act.

It is therefore ORDERED that the application for permanent registration as a clearing agency filed by FICC (File No. 600-23) pursuant to Sections 17A(b) and 19(a)(1) of the Act be, and hereby is, APPROVED.

By the Commission.

Kevin M. O’Neill

Kevin M. O’Neill
Deputy Secretary
I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted against Bruce W. Tomlinson ("Respondent" or "Tomlinson") pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3)(i) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.¹

¹ Rule 102(e)(3)(i) provides, in relevant part, that:

The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and without preliminary hearing, may, by order, . . . suspend from appearing or practicing before it any . . . accountant . . . who has been by name . . . permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction, by reason of his or her misconduct in an action brought by the Commission, from violating or aiding and abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or of the rules and regulations thereunder.
II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over him and the subject matter of these proceedings, and the findings contained in Section III.3 below, which are admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (“Order”), as set forth below.

III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds that:

1. Tomlinson, age 53 and a resident of Los Altos, California, was the vice president, principal accounting officer, and controller of InterMune, Inc. (“InterMune”), from 2008 to June 2012. He has been licensed as a certified public accountant in the State of California since 1988. His license is currently inactive.

2. InterMune, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Brisbane, California, is a pharmaceutical development company. At all relevant times, InterMune’s common stock was registered with the Commission under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and traded on The NASDAQ Stock Market. During the relevant period, options in the common stock of InterMune traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the Boston Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the New York Stock Exchange’s Arca System.

3. On June 6, 2013, the Commission filed a complaint against Tomlinson in SEC v. Bruce W. Tomlinson (Case No. 3:13-cv-02549-JCS) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On June 20, 2013, the court entered a consent final judgment against Tomlinson permanently enjoining him from future violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, ordering him to pay a civil penalty of $616,000, and barring him for a period of five years from serving as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12 or that is required to file reports pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(d).

4. The complaint alleges that Tomlinson engaged in insider trading by tipping a friend and former business associate, Michael Sarkesian (“Sarkesian”), to material nonpublic information in advance of a December 17, 2010 announcement that the European Medicines Agency’s (“EMA”) Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (“CHMP”) had recommended that a European Union (“EU”) commission approve InterMune’s Marketing Authorization Application (“MAA”) for marketing its drug, Esbriet, in the EU. The complaint alleges that by mid-November 2010, in the course of his employment, Tomlinson had become privy
to material non-public information about the increasing probability that the CHMP would render a positive opinion and faster than had been publicly anticipated by InterMune. Tomlinson allegedly tipped Sarkesian that, amongst other things, the European regulatory review process appeared "to be moving faster and better" than anticipated and that this impacted on "Company wide strategic decisions." According to the complaint, on December 7 and 8, 2010, in advance of the December 17, 2010 announcement, Sarkesian directed the purchase of 400 out-of-the-money InterMune call options which resulted in imputed profits of $616,000.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to impose the sanction agreed to in Respondent Tomlinson's Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that:

A. Tomlinson is suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant.

B. After five years from the date of this order, Respondent may request that the Commission consider his reinstatement by submitting an application (attention: Office of the Chief Accountant) to resume appearing or practicing before the Commission as:

1. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or review, of any public company's financial statements that are filed with the Commission. Such an application must satisfy the Commission that Respondent's work in his practice before the Commission will be reviewed either by the independent audit committee of the public company for which he works or in some other acceptable manner, as long as he practices before the Commission in this capacity; and/or

2. an independent accountant. Such an application must satisfy the Commission that:

   (a) Respondent, or the public accounting firm with which he is associated, is registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("Board") in accordance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and such registration continues to be effective;

   (b) Respondent, or the registered public accounting firm with which he is associated, has been inspected by the Board and that inspection did not identify any criticisms of or potential defects in the respondent’s or the firm’s quality control system that would indicate that the respondent will not receive appropriate supervision;

   (c) Respondent has resolved all disciplinary issues with the Board, and has complied with all terms and conditions of any sanctions imposed by the Board (other than reinstatement by the Commission); and
(d) Respondent acknowledges his responsibility, as long as Respondent appears or practices before the Commission as an independent accountant, to comply with all requirements of the Commission and the Board, including, but not limited to, all requirements relating to registration, inspections, concurring partner reviews and quality control standards.

C. The Commission will consider an application by Respondent to resume appearing or practicing before the Commission provided that his state CPA license is current and he has resolved all other disciplinary issues with the applicable state boards of accountancy. However, if state licensure is dependent on reinstatement by the Commission, the Commission will consider an application on its other merits. The Commission's review may include consideration of, in addition to the matters referenced above, any other matters relating to Respondent's character, integrity, professional conduct, or qualifications to appear or practice before the Commission.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

(Release No. 34-69872)

June 27, 2013

Order Pursuant to Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting Exemption from the Clearing Agency Registration Requirement under Section 17A(b) of the Exchange Act for ICE Clear Europe Limited in Connection With its Proposal to Clear Contracts Traded on the LIFFE Administration and Management Market

I. Introduction

Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")\(^1\) sets forth the framework for the regulation of the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and directs the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") to facilitate the establishment of a national system for the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions. Pursuant to Section 17A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act,\(^2\) absent an exemption, a clearing agency that makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to perform the functions of a clearing agency with respect to any security (other than an exempted security) is required to register with the Commission. The Commission has required a foreign clearing agency to register or obtain an exemption from clearing agency registration if the foreign clearing agency provides clearance and settlement services for U.S. securities directly to U.S. persons.\(^3\) The Commission, by rule or order, upon its own motion or upon application, may


conditionally or unconditionally exempt any clearing agency or security or any class of clearing agencies or securities from any provisions of Section 17A or the rules or regulations thereunder, if the Commission finds that such exemption is consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the purposes of Section 17A, including the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds.\(^4\)

ICE Clear Europe Limited ("ICE Clear Europe") is an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary of IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. ("ICE"). Incorporated in England and Wales in 2007 as a private limited company, ICE Clear Europe is subject to supervision by the Bank of England as a Recognised Clearing House ("RCH") in the United Kingdom. Pursuant to Section 763(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act,\(^5\) on July 16, 2011, ICE Clear Europe became registered with the Commission as a clearing agency solely for the purpose of clearing security-based swaps ("SBS").\(^6\)

In connection with the proposed merger of ICE with NYSE Euronext, ICE Clear Europe filed with the Commission a proposed rule change under Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act\(^7\) and

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\(^6\) Section 763(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 17A of the Exchange Act by adding new Section 17A(l) to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(l), which provides that (i) a depository institution registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") that cleared swaps as a multilateral clearing organization prior to the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and (ii) a derivatives clearing organization registered with the CFTC that cleared swaps pursuant to an exemption from registration as a clearing agency prior to the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act will be deemed registered with the Commission as a clearing agency solely for the purpose of clearing SBS.

Rule 19b-4\(^8\) thereunder to clear futures and options contracts traded on the Liffe Administration and Management Market ("Liffe A&M"), including contracts traded over-the-counter and processed through Liffe A&M's BClear\(^9\) service.\(^10\) The contracts traded on Liffe A&M proposed to be cleared by ICE Clear Europe ("Liffe Contracts") include instruments that constitute securities for the purposes of U.S. securities laws ("Liffe Securities Products"), including U.S. securities, which for purposes of the Proposal, include futures or options on underlying U.S. equities and equity indices.


\(^9\) BClear is a service operated by Liffe A&M, which enables Liffe A&M clearing members to report certain bilaterally agreed off-exchange trades to Liffe A&M. After ICE Clear Europe launches its clearing business for Liffe A&M, trades would be eligible for clearing by ICE Clear Europe upon being reported.

\(^10\) On May 13, 2013, ICE Clear Europe filed a proposed rule change with the Commission. On May 22, 2013, ICE Clear Europe submitted Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change to, among other things, clarify the scope of products proposed to be cleared, add new Rule 207(f) prohibiting broker-dealer/futures commission merchant Clearing Members and other Clearing Members organized in the U.S. from clearing Liffe Contracts that are futures or options on underlying U.S. securities, add additional clarification surrounding the operation of the combined F&O Guaranty Fund and the margining of Liffe Contracts, and supplement the statutory basis for the proposed rule change. See Exchange Act Release No. 69628 (May 23, 2013), 78 FR 32287 (May 29, 2013) (SR-ICEEU-2013-09) ("Original Filing"). On June 4, 2013, ICE Clear Europe submitted Amendment No. 2 to the proposed rule change to set forth more fully the statutory basis for the proposed rule changes and to make certain additional rule changes relevant to changes in margin requirements. See Exchange Act Release No. 69703 (Jun. 5, 2013), 78 FR 35335 (Jun. 12, 2013) (SR-ICEEU-2013-09) ("Amendment No. 2"). On June 20, 2013, ICE Clear Europe filed Amendment No. 3 to the proposed rule change, which modified proposed Rule 207(f) to further define the persons that are subject to the restriction from clearing U.S. securities to include any clearing member having a U.S. residence, based upon the location of its executive office or principal place of business, including, without limitation, (i) a U.S. bank (as defined by Section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act) and (ii) a foreign branch of a U.S. bank or U.S. registered broker-dealer. The initial rule filing and all subsequent amendments filed are collectively referred to hereinafter as the "Proposal."
In this context, ICE Clear Europe has filed with the Commission an application on Form CA-1 for exemption from clearing agency registration under Section 17A(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17Ab2-1 thereunder in connection with ICE Clear Europe’s proposed clearing activity involving LIFFE Securities Products. Based on the rules and procedures contained in the Proposal, the representations made and information submitted by ICE Clear Europe in the Proposal, its Form CA-1 application, including the ICE Clear Europe Letter, and additional supplemental materials (collectively, the “Exemptive Application”), and for the reasons discussed in this Order, the Commission is exempting ICE Clear Europe from the registration requirement under Section 17A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act solely with respect to ICE Clear Europe’s provision of clearance and settlement services for LIFFE Securities Products, subject to certain conditions.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Standards

Section 17A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act prohibits any clearing agency from directly or indirectly making use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to perform the functions of a clearing agency with respect to any security (other than an exempted security), unless it is registered with the Commission. Section 17A(b)(1) further provides that the Commission, by rule or order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any clearing agency or security or any class of clearing agencies or securities from any provisions of Section 17A of the Exchange Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, if the Commission finds that

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11 ICE Clear Europe’s Form CA-1 incorporates a letter from Paul Swann, President, ICE Clear Europe, to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, SEC, dated June 11, 2013, requesting exemptive relief from clearing agency registration in connection with the clearing of LIFFE Securities Products (“ICE Clear Europe Letter”).

such exemption is consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the purposes of Section 17A, including the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds.\(^{13}\)

The Commission has required a foreign clearing agency to register, or obtain an exemption from clearing agency registration, when the foreign clearing agency provides clearance and settlement services for U.S. securities directly to U.S. persons.\(^{14}\)

B. \textit{ICE Clear Europe's Request for Exemption}

ICE Clear Europe is a foreign clearing agency registered in the U.S. solely for the purpose of clearing SBS. The Commission has not previously addressed the registration requirements applicable to a foreign clearing agency registered solely for the purpose of clearing SBS that proposes to clear non-SBS securities products. However, the Commission believes that the proposed clearing of the Liffe Securities Products would exceed the scope of activities permitted by ICE Clear Europe's registration as a SBS clearing agency under Section 17A(l) of


the Exchange Act, and therefore ICE Clear Europe may not clear the LIFFE Securities Products pursuant to its existing Commission registration. In addition, because the LIFFE Securities Products include certain products that are considered U.S. securities, and ICE Clear Europe clearing members include financial institutions that are organized or resident in the United States, the Commission has determined that ICE Clear Europe must register or seek an exemption from registration as a clearing agency under Section 17A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act prior to providing clearing services for the LIFFE Securities Products.

In light of the Commission’s precedents pertaining to registration requirements for foreign clearing agencies, ICE Clear Europe is proposing to amend its rule book to prohibit U.S. clearing members (“U.S. participants”) from clearing U.S. securities. Specifically, new ICE Clear Europe Rule 207(f) would prohibit U.S. participants\textsuperscript{15} from clearing U.S. securities. In addition, ICE Clear Europe has developed policies and procedures to enforce proposed Rule 207(f), including market access controls that prevent U.S. participants from creating or holding cleared positions in U.S. securities and, consequently, from engaging in any clearing-related

\textsuperscript{15} The term “U.S. participant” was previously defined for the limited purposes of a clearing agency exemptive order as a person having a U.S. residence, based upon the location of its executive office or principal place of business, including, without limitation, (i) a U.S. bank (as defined by Section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act), (ii) a foreign branch of a U.S. bank or U.S. registered broker-dealer, and (iii) any broker-dealer registered as such with the Commission even if such broker-dealer does not have a U.S. residence. See Exchange Act Release No. 39643 (Feb. 11, 1998), 63 FR 8232 (Feb. 18, 1998) (order exempting Euroclear Bank’s predecessor, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, as operator of the Euroclear system, from clearing agency registration), n. 62. Consistent with this definition of U.S. participant, ICE Clear Europe’s Proposal contains rule changes that would prohibit a person (i) that is a FCM/BD, (ii) organized in the United States of America, or (iii) having a U.S. residence, based on the location of its executive office or principal place of business, including, without limitation, a U.S. bank (as defined by Section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act) or a foreign branch of a U.S. bank or U.S. registered broker-dealer, from participating in clearing U.S. securities.
activity (including give-ups or take-ups in respect of those products).\textsuperscript{16} In addition, when a new U.S. participant is approved for clearing, LIFFE A&M and ICE Clear Europe will be jointly responsible to ensure that these access limitations are properly in place.\textsuperscript{17} ICE Clear Europe represents that it will report any incidents not in compliance with such proposed Rule 207(f).\textsuperscript{18}

In connection with its clearing of the LIFFE Contracts, ICE Clear Europe has represented that it is not seeking an exemption from substantive regulation that it is currently subject to as a registered clearing agency.\textsuperscript{19} ICE Clear Europe states that it will clear LIFFE Contracts in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 17A of the Exchange Act and Rule 17Ad-22 thereunder, including the requirements as to financial resources, operational and managerial resources, participant requirements, settlement procedures, safeguarding of funds and default procedures, among others.\textsuperscript{20} ICE Clear Europe further represents that it will manage its clearing activities involving the LIFFE Contracts, including LIFFE Securities Products, to the standards applicable to registered clearing agencies.\textsuperscript{21} ICE Clear Europe has noted that, since ICE Clear Europe is a registered clearing agency for SBS, ICE Clear Europe’s clearing of LIFFE Contracts, including LIFFE Securities Products, will be subject to the requirements under the Exchange Act applicable to a registered clearing agency, including the rule approval requirements under Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act, regardless of whether ICE Clear Europe is exempt from the

\textsuperscript{16} See Amendment No. 2 at 35337.
\textsuperscript{17} Id.
\textsuperscript{18} See Exemptive Application.
\textsuperscript{19} Id.
\textsuperscript{20} Id. See also Original Filing, supra n. 10.
\textsuperscript{21} See Exemptive Application.
registration requirement of Section 17A(b)(1). ICE Clear Europe also acknowledges the Commission’s current supervision and examination authority over ICE Clear Europe’s business generally, including the authority to conduct regular on-site examination.\(^{23}\)

In its exemptive request, ICE Clear Europe has expressed concerns that a delay in its ability to clear the LIFFE Contracts beginning July 1, 2013, would cause disruption to the market for these products.\(^{24}\) In addition, ICE Clear Europe noted that by September 2013, all European clearing agencies will need to apply for authorization under the European Markets and Infrastructure Directive (EMIR).\(^{25}\) ICE Clear Europe states that the current LIFFE A&M clearing arrangements are not built out for EMIR compliance, and therefore LIFFE A&M, ICE Clear Europe, LCH.Clearnet Limited, and market participants are relying on this transition taking place to be compliant with EU law.\(^{26}\)

C. Effect of Exemption

Based on ICE Clear Europe’s representations to clear LIFFE Contracts in a manner consistent with the standards applicable to clearing agencies registered under Section 17A, and the Commission’s existing authority over ICE Clear Europe as a registered clearing agency under Section 17A(l), granting an exemption from the clearing agency registration requirement under Section 17A(b) to ICE Clear Europe for the clearing of LIFFE Securities Products would operate as an exemption from the registration process and not from the Commission’s statutory authority to substantively oversee and regulate such activities.

\(^{22}\) Id.
\(^{23}\) Id.
\(^{24}\) Id.
\(^{25}\) Id.
\(^{26}\) Id.
Furthermore, ICE Clear Europe’s proposed limitations to prevent U.S. participants from clearing U.S. securities, including proposed Rule 207(f) and related policies, procedures, and market access controls, are consistent with clearing arrangements involving foreign clearing agencies for which the Commission has granted exemptive relief from registration requirements under Section 17A(b).27

An exemption granted to ICE Clear Europe from the clearing agency registration requirement under Section 17A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act provides legal certainty for ICE Clear Europe as to its activities associated with the clearing of LIFFE Securities Products, avoids disruption in the European markets, and facilitates compliance with EMIR, consistent with promoting the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and derivative agreements, contracts, and transactions. In addition, the Commission’s continued supervision over ICE Clear Europe as a registered clearing agency, notwithstanding the exemption from the registration requirement, permits the Commission to oversee that ICE Clear Europe provides clearance and settlement services with respect to LIFFE Contracts, including LIFFE Securities Products, in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 17A of the Exchange Act. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the amended rules and procedures contained in the Proposal, and the representations made by ICE Clear Europe in its Exemptive Application, the Commission finds that an exemption from registration with respect to the clearing activity for the LIFFE Securities Products under Section 17A(b)(1) is consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the purposes of Section 17A, including the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds.

27 See supra n. 14.
III. Scope and Modification of Order

This exemption granted by this order is solely with respect to the registration requirement in Section 17A(b)(1) applicable to the clearance and settlement services to be provided by ICE Clear Europe for LIFFE Securities Products as described in ICE Clear Europe's Proposal, and does not in any way affect the Commission's existing supervisory authority over ICE Clear Europe as a registered clearing agency. ICE Clear Europe as a registered clearing agency continues to be subject to the applicable provisions of the Exchange Act, including Sections 17A, 28 17(a), 29 17(b), 30 and 19(b), 31 and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to clearance and settlement activities and registered clearing agencies.

The Commission may modify by order the terms, scope, or condition of this exemptive order if the Commission determines that such modification is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. Furthermore, the Commission may limit, suspend, or revoke this exemption if the Commission finds that ICE Clear Europe has violated or is unable to comply with the conditions of this Order or applicable provisions in the Exchange Act with respect to a registered clearing agency, if such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.

IV. Conclusion

The Commission finds that ICE Clear Europe’s application for exemption from the registration requirement under Section 17A(b)(1) is consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the purposes of Section 17A.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Section 17A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, that the application for exemption from registration under Section 17A(b)(1) filed by ICE Clear Europe Limited be, and hereby is, approved within the scope described in this order subject to the following conditions:

(1) ICE Clear Europe shall have rules, policies, and procedures reasonably designed to prohibit the clearing of U.S. securities by U.S. participants, including market access controls preventing U.S. participants from creating or holding cleared positions in U.S. securities and, consequently, from engaging in any clearing-related activity for such products.

(2) ICE Clear Europe shall immediately notify the Commission of incidents of non-compliance with its rules, policies, or procedures prohibiting U.S. participants from clearing U.S. securities, whether intentional or otherwise, including any failure of any operational controls proposed by ICE Clear Europe to prevent U.S. participants from creating or holding cleared positions in U.S. securities.

(3) ICE Clear Europe shall clear LIFFE Contracts, including LIFFE Securities Products, in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 17A of the Exchange Act and Rule 17Ad-22 thereunder.
ICE Clear Europe, as a registered clearing agency, shall continue to be subject to the applicable provisions of the Exchange Act, including Sections 17A,\textsuperscript{32} 17(a),\textsuperscript{33} 17(b),\textsuperscript{34} and 19(b),\textsuperscript{35} and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to clearance and settlement activities and registered clearing agencies.

By the Commission.

Kevin M. O'Neill
Deputy Secretary

\begin{align*}
\textsuperscript{32} & \quad \text{15 U.S.C. 78q-1.} \\
\textsuperscript{33} & \quad \text{15 U.S.C. 78q(a).} \\
\textsuperscript{34} & \quad \text{15 U.S.C. 78q(b).} \\
\textsuperscript{35} & \quad \text{15 U.S.C. 78s(b).}
\end{align*}
United States of America
Before the
Securities and Exchange Commission

Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 69879 / June 27, 2013

Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. 3467 / June 27, 2013

Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-13151

In the Matter of
Jerry L. Burdick, CPA

Order Granting Application for
Reinstatement to Appear and Practice
Before the Commission as an Accountant
Responsible for the Preparation or
Review of Financial Statements Required
To Be Filed with the Commission

On August 29, 2008, Jerry L. Burdick, CPA ("Burdick") suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant as a result of settled public administrative proceedings instituted by the Commission against Burdick pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3)(i) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.¹ This order is issued in response to Burdick’s application for reinstatement to appear and practice before the Commission as an accountant responsible for the preparation or review of financial statements required to be filed with the Commission.

The Commission found that Burdick had been permanently enjoined by a United States District Court from future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rules 13a-14, 13b-2-1, and 13b-2-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), and aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13 thereunder. In its complaint, the Commission alleged that SeraCare Life Sciences Inc. ("SeraCare"), through the misconduct of Burdick, misstated its financial statements by inflating income before taxes for the second and third quarters of fiscal year 2005 by 20% and 17%, respectively. The complaint alleged that Burdick improperly released general inventory reserves that he created following a major acquisition by SeraCare, which caused SeraCare’s net income before taxes to be inflated in the second and third quarters of 2005. The complaint further alleged that Burdick caused misrepresentations to be made to SeraCare’s auditors by creating a backdated letter that was given to the auditors as support for recognizing revenue on an almost $1 million sale before the close of the fiscal year.

¹ See Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2870 dated August 29, 2008. Burdick was permitted, pursuant to the order, to apply for reinstatement after one year upon making certain showings.
complaint further alleged that Burdick also caused misrepresentations to be made to SeraCare’s auditors by providing an increased inventory valuation without any documented or verifiable support.

In his capacity as a preparer or reviewer, or as a person responsible for the preparation or review, of financial statements of a public company to be filed with the Commission, Burdick attests that he will undertake to have his work reviewed by the independent audit committee of any company for which he works, or in some other manner acceptable to the Commission, while practicing before the Commission in this capacity. Burdick is not, at this time, seeking to appear or practice before the Commission as an independent accountant. If he should wish to resume appearing and practicing before the Commission as an independent accountant, he will be required to submit an application to the Commission showing that he has complied and will comply with the terms of the original suspension order in this regard. Therefore, Burdick’s suspension from practice before the Commission as an independent accountant continues in effect until the Commission determines that a sufficient showing has been made in this regard in accordance with the terms of the original suspension order.

Burdick is currently subject to probation under the California Board of Accountancy. Failure to abide by the terms of his probation could result in the revocation of Burdick’s CPA license. Burdick has attested that he will notify the Commission if he is found to have violated the terms of the probation. He also has attested that he understands that the suspension of his CPA license could result in the revocation of the reinstatement of his privilege to appear or practice before the Commission as an accountant.

Rule 102(e)(5) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice governs applications for reinstatement, and provides that the Commission may reinstate the privilege to appear and practice before the Commission “for good cause shown.” This “good cause” determination is necessarily highly fact specific.

On the basis of information supplied, representations made, and undertakings agreed to by Burdick, it appears that he has complied with the terms of the August 29, 2008 order suspending him from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant, that no information has come to the attention of the Commission relating to his character, integrity, professional conduct, or qualifications to practice before the Commission that would be a basis for adverse action against him pursuant to Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, and that Burdick, by undertaking to have his work reviewed by the independent audit committee of any company for which he works, or in some other manner acceptable to the Commission, in his practice before the Commission as a preparer or reviewer of financial statements required to be filed with the Commission, has shown good cause for reinstatement. Therefore, it is accordingly,

\[2 \text{ Rule 102(e)(5)(i) provides:}\]

“An application for reinstatement of a person permanently suspended or disqualified under paragraph (e)(1) or (e)(3) of this rule may be made at any time, and the applicant may, in the Commission’s discretion, be afforded a hearing; however, the suspension or disqualification shall continue unless and until the applicant has been reinstated by the Commission for good cause shown.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(5)(i).
ORDERED pursuant to Rule 102(c)(5)(i) of the Commission's Rules of Practice that Jerry L. Burdick, CPA is hereby reinstated to appear and practice before the Commission as an accountant responsible for the preparation or review of financial statements required to be filed with the Commission.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary

By: Jill M. Peterson
Assistant Secretary
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Release No. 34-69894; File No. SR-NSCC-2013-805)

June 28, 2013

Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Securities Clearing Corporation; Notice of No Objection to Advance Notice Filing to Require that All Locked-in Trade Data Submitted to It for Trade Recording be Submitted in Real-time

I. Introduction

On April 30, 2013, National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") advance notice SR-NSCC-2013-805 ("Advance Notice") pursuant to Section 806(e) of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"),\(^1\) entitled the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 ("Clearing Supervision Act" or "Title VIII") and Rule 19b-4(n) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). On May 14, 2013, NSCC filed with the Commission Amendment No. 1 to the Advance Notice.\(^2\) The Advance Notice was published in the Federal Register on June 11, 2013.\(^3\) The Commission received one comment letter to the proposed rule change.\(^4\) This publication serves as notice of no objection to the


\(^2\) In Amendment No. 1, NSCC corrected a typographical error in the text of its Rules & Procedures ("Rules") related to the Advance Notice.

\(^3\) Release No. 34-69699 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 35076 (June 11, 2013). NSCC also filed a proposed rule change pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act on April 30, 2013 seeking Commission approval to permit NSCC to change its rules to reflect the proposed change described herein. The Commission, through delegated authority, published notice of the proposed rule change on May 14, 2013. Release No. 34-69571 (May 14, 2013), 78 FR 29408 (May 20, 2013).

II. Analysis

NSCC filed the Advance Notice to require that all locked-in trade data submitted to NSCC for trade recording be submitted in real-time,\(^5\) and to prohibit pre-netting\(^6\) and other practices that prevent real-time trade submission, as discussed below.

Proposal Overview

According to NSCC, the majority of all transactions processed at NSCC are submitted on a locked-in basis by self-regulatory organizations ("SRO") (including national and regional exchanges and marketplaces), and Qualified Special Representatives ("QSR").\(^7\) Currently,

and believes that, "any cost associated with submitting higher volumes of data from limiting pre-netting is small compared to the risks and costs of inaccurate data which might result from submission of other than accurate trade data." The Commission considers all public comments received on the proposed rule change as comments to the Advance Notice.

The term "real-time," when used with respect to trade submission, will be defined in Procedure XIII (Definitions) of NSCC's Rules as the submission of such data on a trade-by-trade basis promptly after trade execution, in any format and by any communication method acceptable to NSCC.

According to NSCC, any pre-netting practices include: (i) "summarization" (i.e., a technique in which the clearing broker nets all trades in a single CUSIP by the same correspondent broker into fewer submitted trades); (ii) "compression" (i.e., a technique to combine submissions of data for multiple trades to the point where the identity of the party actually responsible for the trades is masked); (iii) netting; and (iv) any other practice that combines two or more trades prior to their submission to NSCC (collectively, "Pre-netting").

QSRs are NSCC members ("Members") that either (i) operate an automated execution system where they are always the contra side of every trade, (ii) are the parent or affiliate of an entity operating such an automated system, where they are the contra side of every trade, or (iii) clear for a broker-dealer that operates such a system and the subscribers to the system acknowledge the clearing Member’s role in the clearance and settlement of these trades.
NSCC data reveals that almost all exchanges\(^8\) and some QSRs submit trades executed on their respective markets in real-time, representing approximately 91% of the locked-in trades submitted to NSCC today. The rule change will require that all locked-in trades submitted for trade recording by SROs and QSRs be submitted to NSCC in real-time.\(^9\)

NSCC will also prohibit Pre-netting practices that preclude real-time trade submission. NSCC states that typically, Pre-netting is done on a bilateral basis between a QSR and its customer, both NSCC Members. According to NSCC, Pre-netting practices disrupt NSCC’s ability to accurately monitor market and credit risks as they evolve during the trading day. Therefore, NSCC will prohibit Pre-netting activity on the part of entities submitting original trade data on a locked-in basis.\(^10\) The rules of NSCC’s affiliate Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”) currently prohibit such activity, and this rule change will align NSCC’s trade submission rules with those of FICC.\(^11\)

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8 One executing market with very low trade volume does not yet submit trades in real-time.

9 Files submitted to NSCC by The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) relating to option exercises and assignments (Procedure III, Section D – Settlement of Option Exercises and Assignments) will not be required to be submitted in real-time. OCC’s process of assigning option assignments is and will continue to be an end-of-day process.

10 Trades executed in the normal course of business between a Member that clears for other broker-dealers, and its correspondent, or between correspondents of the Member, which correspondent(s) is not itself a Member and settles such obligations through such clearing Member (i.e., “internalized trades”) are not required to be submitted to NSCC and shall not be considered to violate the Pre-netting prohibition.

11 See, e.g., GSD Rule 11 (Netting System), Section 3 (“All trade data required to be submitted to the Corporation under this Section must be submitted on a trade-by-trade basis with the original terms of the trades unaltered. A Member or any of its Affiliates may not engage in the Pre-Netting of Trades prior to their submission to the Corporation in contravention of this section. In addition, a Member or any of its Affiliates may not engage in any practice designed to contravene the prohibition against the Pre-Netting of Trades.”), http://dtcc.com/legal/rules_proc/FICC-Government_Security_Division_Rulebook.pdf. See also Order Granting Approval of a
Further, NSCC does not expect the rule changes to impact trade volumes significantly. According to NSCC, the majority of trades are currently being submitted to NSCC in real-time on a trade-by-trade basis, and NSCC is operationally capable of managing trade volumes that are multiple times larger than the historical peak volumes.

In the wake of recent industry disruptions, industry participants have been focused on developing controls to address the risks that arise from technology issues. A comment letter submitted to the Commission in advance of its Technology and Trading Roundtable, held in October 2012, and signed by a number of industry participants including SROs, broker-dealers, and buy-side firms, supported this rule change as a crucial component of the industry controls that could increase market transparency and ultimately mitigate risks associated with high-frequency trading and related technology.\(^\text{12}\)

**Implementation Timeframe**

NSCC will advise Members of the implementation date of the rule change through issuance of an NSCC Important Notice. The rule change will not be implemented earlier than seven (7) months from the date of Commission approval.

### III. Discussion

Although Title VIII does not specify a standard of review for an Advance Notice, the stated purpose of Title VIII is instructive.\(^\text{13}\) The stated purpose of Title VIII is to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial stability by, among other things, Proposed Rule Change Relating to Trade Submission Requirements and Pre-Netting, Release No. 34-51908 (June 22, 2005), 70 FR 37450 (June 29, 2005).


\(^{13}\) 12 U.S.C. 5461(b).
promoting uniform risk management standards for systemically-important financial market utilities ("FMU") and providing an enhanced role for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Federal Reserve") in the supervision of risk management standards for systemically-important FMUs.\textsuperscript{14}

Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act\textsuperscript{15} authorizes the Commission to prescribe risk management standards for the payment, clearing, and settlement activities of designated clearing entities and financial institutions engaged in designated activities for which it is the supervisory agency or the appropriate financial regulator. Section 805(b) of the Clearing Supervision Act\textsuperscript{16} states that the objectives and principles for the risk management standards prescribed under Section 805(a) shall be to:

- promote robust risk management;
- promote safety and soundness;
- reduce systemic risks; and
- support the stability of the broader financial system.

The Commission adopted risk management standards under Section 805(a)(2) of the Clearing Supervision Act on October 22, 2012 ("Clearing Agency Standards").\textsuperscript{17} The Clearing Agency Standards became effective on January 2, 2013 and require clearing agencies that perform central counterparty ("CCP") services to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to meet certain minimum

\textsuperscript{14} Id.
\textsuperscript{15} 12 U.S.C. 5464(a)(2).
\textsuperscript{16} 12 U.S.C. 5464(b).
requirements for their operations and risk management practices on an ongoing basis.\textsuperscript{18} As such, it is appropriate for the Commission to review Advance Notices against these risk management standards that the Commission promulgated under Section 805(a) and the objectives and principles of these risk management standards as described in Section 805(b).

Consistent with Section 805(a), the Commission believes NSCC’s proposal promotes robust risk management, as well as the safety and soundness of NSCC’s operations, while reducing systemic risks and supporting the stability of the broader financial system. As discussed above, the rule change will allow NSCC to mitigate the operational risk that results from locked-in trade data not being submitted to NSCC in real-time.

Commission Rule 17Ad-22(d)(4) regarding identification and mitigation of operational risk,\textsuperscript{19} adopted as part of the Clearing Agency Standards,\textsuperscript{20} requires clearing agencies to establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to: “[i]dentify sources of operational risk and minimize them through the development of appropriate systems, controls, and procedures . . ..”\textsuperscript{21} The Commission believes that the receipt of locked-in trade data on a real-time basis will permit NSCC’s risk management processes to monitor trades closer to trade execution on an intra-day basis and identify and manage any issues.

\textsuperscript{18} The Clearing Agency Standards are substantially similar to the risk management standards established by the Board of Governors governing the operations of designated FMUs that are not clearing entities and financial institutions engaged in designated activities for which the Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the Supervisory Agency. See Financial Market Utilities, 77 FR 45907 (Aug. 2, 2012).

\textsuperscript{19} 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d)(4).


\textsuperscript{21} 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d)(4).
relating to excessive risk exposure earlier on a closer to real-time basis, thereby potentially minimizing a source of operational risk.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE NOTICED, pursuant to Section 806(e)(1)(I) of the Clearing Supervision Act, that the Commission DOES NOT OBJECT to the proposed rule change described in the Advance Notice (File No. SR-NSCC-2013-805) and that NSCC be and hereby is AUTHORIZED to implement the proposed rule change as of the date of this notice or the date of the "Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Require that All Locked-in Trade Data Submitted to It for Trade Recording be Submitted in Real-time," whichever is later.

By the Commission. 

Kevin M. O'Neill
Deputy Secretary

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On September 27, 2011, the Commission instituted administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against LPB Capital d/b/a Family Office Group, LLC, formerly registered with the Commission as an investment adviser, under Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The Commission also instituted administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Gary J. Pappas, the firm's founder and former majority owner, chief executive officer, and chief compliance officer, under Advisers Act Sections 203(f) and 203(k) and Rule 102(e)(1)(iii) of the Commission's Rules of Practice. The Order Instituting Proceedings alleges, among other things, that Family Office Group and Pappas overstated the firm's assets under management and violated antifraud provisions.

1 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e), 80b-3(k).
2 Id., §§ 80b-3(f), 80b-3(k); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(iii).
Following the institution of proceedings, the Commission authorized the staff to accept a settlement offer pursuant to which the respondents agreed to: (i) a cease-and-desist order; (ii) the revocation of Family Office Group's registration with the Commission; (iii) a full collateral bar against Pappas from association with any investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, with the right to reapply after five years; and (iv) a denial of Pappas's privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant with the right to reapply after five years. Based on Pappas's sworn financial declaration and supporting documentation and Family Office Group's status as a defunct entity with no assets, the settlement did not impose disgorgement or civil penalties.

Subsequently, Commission staff learned that Pappas had died in July 2012. Before his death, Pappas and Family Office Group had submitted a Form ADV-W to withdraw and terminate the firm's investment adviser registration with the Commission. The respondents also had submitted withdrawals terminating Family Office Group's investment adviser registration in two states.

On May 21, 2013, the Division of Enforcement filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings instituted against the respondents, stating that "[i]n light of Pappas's demise and his estate having no assets to pay disgorgement or penalties, there is no further relief that can be obtained against him or his estate." The Division also stated that "Family Office [Group] is a defunct entity that is non-operational, is not in good standing, has no assets, and has already withdrawn and terminated its Commission and state registrations." Family Office Group has not responded to the Division's motion.

It is appropriate to grant the Division's motion in light of Pappas's death and Family Office Group's status.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the proceedings against LPB Capital d/b/a Family Office Group, LLC and Gary J. Pappas be dismissed.

By the Commission.

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
ORDER DENYING PETITION TO LIFT TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND DIRECTING HEARING ON THE PETITION

I.

Brian D. Fox has petitioned us to lift an order issued pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3) of our Rules of Practice temporarily suspending him from appearing or practicing before the Commission. Fox failed to file his Petition with the Secretary as our Rules of Practice require and the Office of the Secretary only received it after the time period specified by our Rules to challenge the Order had expired. As discussed below, we have determined to waive the requirements of Rules 102(e)(3)(ii) and 151(b), and to treat the Petition as timely filed as of May 31, 2013. We also deny the Petition to lift the suspension and direct that the matter be scheduled for a hearing before an administrative law judge.

II.

On November 2, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma entered judgment against Fox, permanently enjoining him from future violations, direct or indirect, of certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and specified rules thereunder. The Judgment, which Fox has appealed, further prohibited him from acting as an

1 SEC v. Fox, No. 4:11-CV-0211-CVE-PJC, ECF No. 53 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2012) (among other things, entering injunction with respect to violations of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B), and 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 13b2-1, and 13b2-2 thereunder).

2 See Fox v. SEC, No. 13-5013 (10th Cir. appeal filed Jan. 31, 2013).
officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act or is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. As its basis, the Judgment states that Fox had previously consented to permanent injunctive relief and an officer-and-director bar and that the Court had found his consent valid and enforceable.

On January 29, 2013, we entered an Order Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings and Imposing Temporary Suspension Pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3) of the Commission's Rules of Practice. In the Order, we found that Fox had misled the investing public by fraudulently inflating the revenue and assets and fraudulently omitting major liabilities of Powder River Petroleum International, Inc. in its Commission filings, and by making other false and misleading public disclosures. We also found that a court of competent jurisdiction had permanently enjoined Fox from violating the Federal securities laws within the meaning of Rule 102(e)(3)(i)(A) and, in view of this finding, deemed it appropriate and in the public interest that Fox be temporarily suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission. The Order further provided that Fox could file a petition with the Commission to lift the temporary suspension within thirty days after service of the Order, and that, if he failed to do so, the suspension would become permanent.

Fox subsequently prepared a petition seeking the removal of the temporary suspension or, in the alternative, seeking a hearing with respect to it. On or before February 28, 2013, the Commission's Fort Worth Regional Office received a service copy of the Petition. An attachment to the Petition states that, in addition to the copy sent to the Fort Worth Regional Office, Fox also planned to deliver a copy to our Headquarters at its general address, with no indication it was otherwise directed to the Secretary as required under our rules. The Office of Secretary did not receive that copy. Instead, the Office first received actual notice and a copy of Fox's Petition from Fort Worth on May 31, 2012, following a routine inquiry from staff in Fort Worth.

III.

Rule 102(e)(3)(ii) of our Rules of Practice provides that any person challenging a temporary suspension from appearing and practicing before the Commission must do so within thirty days after service of the order by "petition[ing] the Commission to lift the temporary suspension." Under Rule 151(b) of the Rules of Practice, "[f]iling of papers with the Commission shall be made by filing them with the Secretary." In turn, Rule 151(d) requires that "[p]apers filed with the Commission" by mail "shall be accompanied by a certificate stating,"


4 See Petition Opposing Temporary Order Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings and Imposing Temporary Suspension Pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3) of Commission's Rules of Practice (the "Petition").

5 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(3)(ii); see also Rule of Practice 102(e)(3)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(3)(iii) (referencing requirement of "the filing of a petition" under Rule 102(e)(3)(ii)).

6 17 C.F.R. § 201.151(b).
among other things, "the mailing address . . . to which service was made . . . " 7 In an attachment to his Petition, Fox indicated that he planned to deliver the Petition to the Commission at the Headquarters general address without reference to the Secretary. As noted above, the first notice and copy of the Petition that the Office of the Secretary received was the one forwarded by the Fort Worth Regional Office on May 31, 2013. Because Fox did not file his Petition with the Office of Secretary within thirty days of service of the Order he challenges — indeed, has never properly directed his Petition to the Secretary — we could treat his Petition as never properly filed in a timely manner under our Rules of Practice.

Nonetheless, under the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to waive compliance with Rules 102(e)(3)(ii) and 151(b) to the extent necessary to allow consideration of the Petition. Under Rule 100(e), we may "by order direct, in a particular proceeding, that an alternative procedure shall apply or that compliance with an otherwise applicable rule is unnecessary" based upon our determination "that to do so would serve the interests of justice and not result in prejudice to the parties to the proceeding." 8 Under the circumstances, including the fact that Fox is acting pro se and appears to have made an effort, albeit flawed, to file a copy of the Petition, we find that it would serve the interests of justice and would not prejudice Fox or the Division of Enforcement to waive compliance with Rules 102(e)(3)(ii) and 151(b) to the extent necessary to treat Fox's Petition as timely filed on May 31, 2013, when the Office of the Secretary received it.

We thus address Fox's request that we remove his temporary suspension. Rule 102(e)(3)(i)(a) permits the Commission to suspend any accountant or other professional or expert who has been "[p]ermanently enjoined . . . from violating or aiding and abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or of the rules and regulations thereunder." 9 At this stage, it appears that the findings made in the injunctive proceeding and the injunction issued against Fox "justify the continuance of his suspension until it can be determined what, if any, action may be appropriate to protect the Commission's processes." 10 As provided in Rule 102(e)(3)(iii), 11 therefore, we will set the matter down for public hearing. We express no opinion as to the merits of Fox's arguments. 12

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Fox's Petition be treated as, and is, timely filed as of May 31, 2013; it is further

ORDERED that this proceeding be set down for public hearing before an administrative law judge in accordance with Rule of Practice 110. As specified in Rule of Practice

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7 17 C.F.R. § 201.151(d).
8 17 C.F.R. § 201.100(c).
9 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(3)(i)(a).
11 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(3)(iii).
12 On June 14, 2013, the Division of Enforcement filed a response to Fox's Petition. Such a response is not contemplated by the operative Rule of Practice, 102(e)(3), and, in any event, we did not consider it in reaching this decision.
102(e)(3)(iii), the hearing in this matter shall be expedited in accordance with Rule of Practice 500; it is further

ORDERED that the administrative law judge shall issue an initial decision no later than 210 days from the date of service of this order; and it is further

ORDERED that the temporary suspension of Brian D. Fox, entered on January 29, 2013, remain in effect pending a hearing and decision in this matter.

By the Commission

[Signature]
Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary