SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

       Litigation Release No.  15964 / October 29, 1998

       AMICUS  CURIAE  BRIEF  ADDRESSING ISSUES UNDER THE LEAD PLAINTIFF
       PROVISIONS OF THE LITIGATION  REFORM  ACT:  LAPERRIERE  v.  VESTA
       INSURANCE  GROUP,  INC.,  Civ.  Action  No.  98-AR-1407-S,  (N.D.
       Ala.)(AND RELATED CASES).

             On  September  24, 1998, in the above cases, the Securities
       and Exchange Commission  filed an amicus curiae (or friend of the
       court) brief which addresses  issues  under  the  lead  plaintiff
       provisions  of  the  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act  of
       1995.   The  brief is available  on  the  Commission's  Web  site
       (www.sec.gov).
            The Commission  has long expressed the view that meritorious
       private  actions under  the  federal  securities  laws  serve  an
       important  role in compensating investors who have been harmed by
       securities  law   violations   and,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has
       repeatedly  recognized,  in supplementing  the  Commission's  own
       enforcement efforts.  See,  e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
       Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,  310 (1985).  This role for private
       litigation  was  reaffirmed in the  legislative  history  of  the
       Litigation Reform Act.
            The Act's lead  plaintiff  provisions  seek  to make private
       litigation more effective for the protection of investors.
       The  provisions  were  enacted  in order to ensure the  investors
       receive the most effective representation  of  their interests in
       securities class actions.  The Act presumes, subject to rebuttal,
       that the most adequate representative of the class  will  be  the
       person  with "the largest financial interest in the relief sought
       by the class."
            The  objective  of the lead plaintiff provisions was to make
       securities class actions  less "lawyer driven" by placing control
       of the litigation in the hands  of a plaintiff who would have the
       financial incentive to control the  conduct  of  counsel, and the
       sophistication to do so.  Congress particularly sought to involve
       as  lead plaintiff institutional investors who it believed  could
       effectively control the litigation.
             In  the Vesta Insurance Group cases the Commission took the
       following positions:

- The Commission urged  that  the court not appoint competing applicants
  for the lead plaintiff position as "co-lead plaintiffs."  The 
  Commission argued that the language of the Act indicates  that  only  
  a single lead plaintiff (which may consist of a group of cooperating 
  persons) should be appointed.  It  also  argued  that the purpose of 
  the lead plaintiff provisions  --  of ensuring investor control  of  
  the  litigation  --  would  be  undercut  if management of the 
  litigation were dispersed among competing persons.

- The Commission argued that, in considering the application of a 
  cooperating group jointly seeking to be appointed lead plaintiff, 
  the Court generally should limit  the proposed lead plaintiff group to 
  a small number capable of most effectively  managing the litigation 
  and exercising control over counsel.  While the court  might  appoint 
  a larger group where special circumstances, such as pre-existing 
  relations among the members, exist, in general the court should appoint
  a cooperating group of no more than five persons.

             Finally,  the Commission's brief observes that  even  if  a
       plaintiff is not  selected  as lead plaintiff, and its counsel is
       not selected as lead counsel,  the  court  can  and  should award
       compensation to law firms that do work investigating and bringing
       meritorious  securities  actions.   This  is, the brief observes,
       consistent  with  Congress'  objective  to  encourage  thoroughly
       researched and diligently drafted complaints.