
### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION



In the Matter of

# HARD COPY

LYNN TILTON, PATRIARCH PARTNERS, LLC, PATRIARCH PARTNERS VIII, LLC, PATRIARCH PARTNERS XIV, LLC, and PATRIARCH PARTNERS XV, LLC,

Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16462

Hon. Judge Carol Fox Foelak

Respondents.

### **<u>REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO HALT THE</u> <u>DIVISION'S SEARCH FOR A SUBSTITUTE CASE FOR TRIAL</u>**

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP Four Times Square New York, NY 10036

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Counsel for Respondents

June 17, 2015

#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

In its Opposition Brief, the Division of Enforcement argues (1) that the Court blessed the Division's post-OIP investigative efforts in the prehearing conference of May 7, 2015; (2) that the Division has no need to develop a substitute case for trial given the sufficiency of testimony developed before the OIP; and (3) that the post-OIP investor contacts are ordinary "trial preparation" permissible in the administrative context. The Division is wrong on all counts.

Respondents are already immersed in third-party subpoena practice to rebut the five investor witnesses selected by the Division before the OIP. This is in addition to our continuing efforts to digest an investigative file comprising nearly 2.4 million pages, 21 testimony transcripts and handwritten notes of dozens of interviews. Yet, four months before trial, the Division has launched a new investigation into 15 investors (so far) never subpoenaed during the five-year inquiry preceding the OIP. It is too late for that. Respondents cannot initiate and complete another round of third-party subpoenas to 15 or more new investors for an October trial, with deadlines for expert reports, and exhibit and witness lists due in August. The Division's Opposition brief never addresses this fundamental impediment to a fair trial.

Instead, the Division stands by its claim that all investors were defrauded in the same manner. If so, then why is the Division's newly assigned trial counsel casting so widely to replace the investor witnesses already subpoenaed and questioned? The answer is obvious: to make a new and different case at trial, while Respondents have neither the time nor the discovery tools essential for effective rebuttal. In U.S. District Court, discovery would not be one-sided, and Respondents would have the time and tools to meet the Division's continued evidence-gathering. But the Division chose this forum over Respondents' objection knowing full-well the

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constraints of the administrative process. The only hope for a fair trial is for this Court to order the Division to halt its search for a substitute case and to try the one built prior to the OIP.

### **ARGUMENT**

### I. THE COURT DID NOT APPROVE THE NEW INVESTIGATION.

At the outset of this case, Respondents filed a Motion for a More Definite

Statement seeking the identity of investors the Division intended to rely upon at trial. In

opposing the motion, the Division emphasized its disclosure of pre-OIP contacts with investors,

as follows:

Finally, the Division notes that it has produced to Respondents transcripts of all investigative testimony, which includes testimony from five investor representatives. In addition, although not required by Rules of Practice 230 or 231, the Division has also determined to produce to Respondents all handwritten notes of any additional interviews with investors the Division conducted during the investigation . . . Additional disclosure of specific investors the Division intends to present at trial will occur at the time the Court sets for disclosure of witness lists.

Division's Brief in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for a More Definite Statement at 7. The

Division made no mention in its brief of a plan to seek new evidence from a group of investors

never previously subpoenaed, or even contacted.

On May 7, during the initial prehearing conference, the Court inquired about

Respondents' pending motion. For the first time, the Division signaled a substantial but

unquantified plan to contact additional investors. The Division professed not to know how many

investors were at issue. (Ex. 1 ("Pre-Hr'g Conference Tr.") at 21-22.)

Respondents objected and pressed for disclosure of the names. And when the

Division resisted, Respondents emphasized the necessity for third-party subpoena practice to

address investor testimony:

MR. BLISS: .... [W]e're in the process of trying to assemble a list as best as possible of all of the investors that we could potentially talk to, and, you know, we're going to be in the process of talking to them, so I don't know how helpful it would be to provide now a list of all of the investors that we've identified.

We could attempt to do that and narrow it by the time our witness list is due, but at this point we are going to contact as many investors as we can.

MR. ZORNOW: I'm perplexed, Your Honor. I don't know what they were doing for the last five years.

You know, we've got to defend these charges now and . . . we've got to do it by finding out what these people have in their file so that when they put them up on the witness stand they have to be confronted with what they had in their file.

(Pre-Hr'g Conference Tr. at 24:25-25:16.)

The Court directed the Division to disclose additional investor contacts on a rolling basis through July 10. (*Id.* at 31.) At this point, Respondents and the Court did not know – and the Division professed not to know – the number of investors to be contacted, and how many of those investors already had been the subjects of Division interviews and requests for information prior to the OIP. It was not until weeks later when the Division finally produced its notes of its prior interviews with witnesses on May 28, 2015 and made its first rolling disclosure, by letter of May 29, 2015, that Respondents learned that the Division had contacted 19 investors, 15 of whom were never previously subpoenaed or even contacted by the Division prior to the OIP. Respondents promptly moved to halt this process on June 5.

The Division cannot credibly assert that the Court made a ruling on May 7 regarding the serious issue posed by the Division's letter of May 29 and briefed by Respondents on June 5. If the Division had revealed its intentions in opposing the Motion for a More Definite Statement, the Respondents could have been heard in their reply brief, and the Court could have ruled on May 7. But that did not happen. The issue is ripe only now that the facts are on the table.

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### **II.** THE DIVISION NEEDS A SUBSTITUTE CASE.

The Division cites two testimony excerpts – from Wendy Ruttle of Rabobank and Jaime Aldama of Barclays – to assert that investor testimony supports the allegations in the OIP. Both witnesses perfectly illustrate the deficiency in the theory and record developed by the investigating staff, which is precisely why the Division's trial counsel are now scrambling for new witnesses.

Rabobank was an investor in Zohar III. (Ex. 4 ("Ruttle Tr.") at 16.) Ms. Ruttle, a manager in the middle office, could offer no relevant testimony on Rabobank's decision to invest:

Q. Were you involved, at all, in the decision to invest in the Zohar III deal?

A. No.

(*Id.* at 16:25-17:2.) Rather, her role was to determine if the bank "could administratively do the deal in our middle office and back office." (*Id.* at 18:18-19.) The Division subpoenaed the wrong witness. Ms. Ruttle did not review the materials relevant to an investor. She reviewed only "select portions" of the indenture, did not read the collateral management agreement and could not recall reading the offering memorandum. (*Id.* at 19-20.) Yet the Division elicited from Ms. Ruttle – and cites in its Opposition Brief ("Div. Opp.") at 6 – testimony that, "as an investor," Ms. Ruttle would like to have heard directly from Patriarch regarding its asset characterization process, and her "opinion" on the meaning of the definition of a defaulted asset under the Zohar III indenture. (Ruttle Tr. at 32-34.) Such testimony from a witness with her basis of knowledge would not even support a breach of contract allegation, let alone a fraud claim. It will be surprising if the Division's trial counsel chooses to call Ms. Ruttle as a trial witness.

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Mr. Aldama of Barclays was no more supportive of the allegations contained in the OIP. Like Ms. Ruttle, he played no role in Barclays' investment decision – indeed, he was asked to review the investment only years later in 2010. (Ex. 5 ("Aldama Tr.") at 15.) Mr. Aldama was unequivocal that he and Barclays *knew* from the trustee reports how Patriarch categorized the loans within the Zohar funds. Indeed, the Division cites an example of such testimony in its brief.<sup>1</sup> The Division quotes from Mr. Aldama's opinion that the indenture language did not support Patriarch's categorization practice (Div. Opp. at 7), which, again, at best would support an allegation of breach of contract. But the Division took testimony from Barclay's Head Trader, Rohit Chaku, who succinctly offered his own contrary interpretation of the indenture (*i.e.*, directly supporting Patriarch), as follows:

Q. Do you have an understanding of how Patriarch determines the categorization to which it places the assets?

• • • •

A. I believe it's effectively within the manager's discretion....

Q. Where did you come to that understanding?

A. From the indenture definition, various categories in the indenture.

(Ex. 6 ("Chaku Tr.") at 45:20-46:14 (emphasis added).) In short, Barclays did not support the allegations contained in the OIP, either.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Div. Opp. at 7 n.1 ("It is my belief based on how some of the compan[ies] gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1.... I think she's using a lot of discretion."); see Aldama Tr. at 50-51 ("I don't think I have ever seen the number 3 or the number 2 in the trustee reports. I know there is a 4 and there is a 1 but in between always seems to be a jump."); Id. at 52 ("Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of its clients that we work, owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute information on the portfolio to all investors.")

### III. A FAIR TRIAL MUST BE BASED ON THE CASE BUILT BEFORE THE OIP.

Finally, the Division is wrong to claim it is following traditional pretrial procedure in the administrative context. The Division flatly asserts: "The investigation of this case ended prior to the issuance of the OIP." (Div. Opp at 4.) But this assertion is grounded on the theory that voluntary requests for witness accounts and documents from 15 investors do not constitute "investigation" because the Division has not issued investigative subpoenas. That cannot be the test, or the Division would be able to evade its administrative discovery obligations by contacting key sources of information only after the OIP. The Division's mantra that all investors were defrauded in the same way is designed to support a strategy. The strategy is to locate and call at trial new investor witnesses unburdened by a transcript (such as the transcripts belying any fraud on Rabobank or Barclays) and by records showing what was really known and understood by investors.

The case law does not support the Division's strategy. When Chief Judge Murray reconsidered the Division's request for a trial subpoena in *optionsXpress*, she did not retreat from her view of appropriate administrative procedure. Rather, the Chief Judge recognized the "technical difference" between trial and investigative subpoenas in a context where both the respondent and the subpoenaed party asserted no prejudice. The Chief Judge explained:

It is my understanding that the investigation as to the allegations is over when the OIP is issued, and that the Division should be ready to begin the hearing .... My belief, however, is not set out directly in the Commission's Rules of Practice, which is the reason for this dilemma.

In re optionsXpress, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 710, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-14848, at 9 (S.E.C. July 11, 2012).

Here, Respondents will surely be prejudiced, as discussed above. And it was the Division that risked asking for the OIP before it was done gathering evidence. See, e.g., In re

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Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 656, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13847 (S.E.C. July 12, 2010).

Moreover, what Respondents have asked for is that the Court exercise its broad power to "[r]egulat[e] the course of a proceeding and the conduct of the parties and their counsel." 17 C.F.R. § 201.111(d) (2015). The power exists to ensure fairness and due process. In the end, the Division's brief never addresses the fundamental point that Respondents will not have the time or tools adequately to address and rebut the 15 investors recently contacted. And the Division is still not done, assuring the Court only that it "does not anticipate contacting many additional investor witnesses beyond those disclosed to the Respondents on May 29, 2015." (Div. Opp. at 3.) The Division also does not contest that it will have, essentially, one-sided discovery from regulated institutions wishing to remain in the Commission's good graces.

If there is to be fairness in the administrative context, the Court must halt the Division's search for new investor witnesses whom Respondents cannot challenge effectively given the time and discovery devices available in this forum. By choosing this forum for a case of this nature, the Division is seeking to pound a square peg into a round hole. We ask the Court to level the playing field by confining the Division to the case it built to support the OIP.

### **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court grant

the relief requested herein.

Dated: June 17, 2015 New York, New York **Respectfully Submitted**,

Christin Statter ray and By:

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# Exhibit 4

4/9/2014

	Daga	, ,	4757201
	Page		Page 3
	States States Second nes and Exchange Commission		1 PROCEEDINGS
1	In the Matter of: )		2 MS. SUMNER: We are on the record at
1	) File No. HO-11665 PATRIARCH PARTNERS, LLC ) D-3350		3 2:18 on April 9, 2014.
1			4 Will you please raise your right hand:
	WITNESS: WENDY RUTTLE		5 Do you swear to tell the truth, the
	PAGES: 1-48		6 whole truth and nothing but the truth?
	PLACE: Securities and Exchange Commission Brookfield Place	- 1	7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
	200 Vesey Street New York, New York 10281-1022		8 Whereupon,
	DATE: April 9, 2014		9 WENDY RUTTLE,
			spectrum and a walloas herein and, having been first
	The above-entitled matter came on for	1	
	hearing at 2:18 o'dockp.m.	12	
		11:	
		14	C. Froude orale and span your full hame
		11	
		10	
		11	
		118	an monitation my name is rany summer. Im
		19	a method of the stan of the Children Division of
		20	and States
		21	and and another ge Commission in and also all
		22	
		24	
		25	the least inteeligation by the original
		125	States Securities and Exchange Commission in the
	Page 2		Page 4
1		1	matter of Patriarch Partners to determine whether
2	APPEARANCES:	2	there have been violations of certain provisions of
3		3	the recent a contained Land. The recent in adu
4 5	On behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission:	4	developed in this investigation may constitute
5	Commission:	5	
6	AMY A. SUMNER, ESQ.	6	
7	Enforcement Division	ר	i not to the opening of the feedra, yea
8	Securities and Exchange Commission	8	were provided with a copy of the Formal Order of
9	1801 California Street	9	Investigation in this matter. It will be available
0	Suite 1500	10	for your examination during the course of this
1	Denver, Colorado 80202	11	proceeding.
2		12	Ms. Ruttle, have you had an opportunity
3	On behalf of the Witness:	13	to review the Formal Order?
		14	A. Yes.
4 5	ZEICHNER ELLMAN & KRAUSE LLP 1211 Avenue of the Americas	15	Q. Prior to the opening of the record, you
6	New York, New York 10036	16 17	were also provided with a copy of the Commission's
7	BY: JANTRA VAN ROY, ESQ.		Supplemental Information Form 1862. A copy of that
8	MICHAEL SIMS, ESQ.	18	notice has been previously marked as Exhibit 33.
9		19	Ms. Ruttle, have you had an opportunity
0		20	to read Exhibit 33?
L		21	A. Yes.
1 2 3		22 23	Q. Do you have any questions concerning
3		23 24	this exhibit? A. No.
4		24 25	Q. Ms. Ruttle, are you represented by
5		2.5	- mo. numo, are you represented by

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

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1	Page 13		Page 15
1	provided aftercare for any deals that closed.	1	portfolio manager role?
2	surveillance on deals to make sure that the deals	2	
3	were operating within the guidelines specified within	3	A. Basically, I was asked to take on the
4	the documents.	4	role in the middle office because of staffing
5	Q. Did anyone report to you when you were	5	constraints in the middle office and also I had the
6	in that role?	6	skill set.
7	A. No.	7	Q. And then why dld you leave the middle
8	Q. Was there any specific type of	8	office role?
9	securitization that you focused on?	-	A. Because I wanted to do something that
10	A. When I was a portfolio manager, my	9	wasn't associated with securitization.
11	primary deals were CLOs, CLOs and other securities.	10 11	Q. As you were describing your current
12	MS. VAN ROY: Could you read that back.	12	role, I thought that's pretty different. And who is
13	(Record read.)	13	your I'm scrry if you already said no, who is
14	A. I'm sorry, CDOs.	14	your current supervisor? A. Jodi Miller.
15	Q. How long were you in the role of	15	
16		16	Q. Do you supervise anyone in your current
17	portfollo manager? A. Until 2010.	17	role? A. No.
18		18	
19	Q. What role did you move to after that?		Q. And what about when you were manager of
20	A. After that, I moved to basically manager of middle office I'm sorry, middle office manager	19	the the middle office manager, did you supervise
21		20	anyone in that role?
22	for the DCM group, which is debt capital markets. Q. Is that the role you currently have?	21 22	A. Yes.
22	A. No.	22	Q. About how many people did you supervise?
1		24	A. I had four people, and then
24	Q. So what were your responsibilities in	25	initially, and then got re-orged into managing two
25	that role?	25	people.
	Page 14		Page 16
1	A. As manager as manager in the middle	1	Q. What types of functions did those people
2	office, I basically had responsibilities over the	2	do?
3	securitization middle office, the very shrinken down	3	A. They provided administrative support for
4	CDO office, and also the loan syndications group.	4	the conduit group, the CDO group, and also the loan
5	Q. What do you mean by middle office?	5	syndications.
6	A. Basically the middle office is plays		•
		6	Q. Did you have any role with respect to
7	a coordination role between the front office and also	7	Q. Did you have any role with respect to the Zohar III transaction?
7 8	a coordination role between the front office and also the back office.	7 8	Q. Did you have any role with respect to the Zohar III transaction? A. Yes.
1	a coordination role between the front office and also the back office. Q. Who did you report to in that position?	7 8 9	<ul> <li>Q. Did you have any role with respect to the Zohar III transaction?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. What was your role?</li> </ul>
8	a coordination role between the front office and also the back office. Q. Who did you report to in that position? A. Robert Serpico.	7 8 9 10	<ul> <li>Q. Did you have any role with respect to the Zohar III transaction?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. What was your role?</li> <li>A. I was the portfolio manager for the</li> </ul>
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4 (Pages 13 to 16)

## Wendy Ruttle

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	Page 17	T	Page 19
1	decision to invest in the Zohar III deal?	1	would try to make the language stronger or ask for
2	A. No.	2	clarification, things like that, just to make sure
3	Q. Do you know who was involved in that	3	that the language within the deal was clear.
4	decision?	4	Q. So did you review did you review the
5	A. Members of the origination team.	5	indenture to Zohar III before Rabobank invested?
6	Q. Do you know who those people were?	6	A. Yes.
7	A. Jeff Bazolan.	7	Q. What other documents did you review
0	Q. Could you spell the last name?	8	relating to Zohar III before the investment was made
9	A. B-A-Z-O-1-A-N.	9	or before the closing?
10	Q. Anyone else?	10	A. Note purchase agreement.
11	A. Eraj Asadi; E-R-A-J A-S-A-D-I, and James	11	MS. VAN ROY: Could we be clear on the
12	Han, H-A-N.	12	record as to whether the witness is talking about
13	Q. Anyone else?	13	reviewing the entire document or select portions of
14	A. Those are the primary members from our	14	the document?
15	team.	15	THE WITNESS: Select portions of the
16	Q. Okay. Can you describe the process by	16	document.
17	which at least back at this time, the 2007 time	17	Q. Other than - so you reviewed portions
18	frame, what you understood the process to be by which	18	of the indenture; is that correct?
19	Rabobank would decide to make an investment in a CLO?	19	A. Uh-hum.
20	A. Sure. I'm sorry.	20	Q. Is that a yes?
21	MS. VAN ROY: Could you read that back,	21	A. I'm sony, yes.
22	maybe?	22	Q. And then portions of the note purchase
23	A. Yes, expound a little bit on decision	23	agreement?
24	from a Rabobank perspective or	24	A. Yes.
25	Q. I am asking more about the process. Was	25	Q. Anything else?
	Page 18		Page 20
1	it decided on by a committee or that type of it's	1	A. We have internal documents, such as the
2	the process that I'm asking about, not anything -	2	liquidity documents backing the deal.
3	anything more than that at this time.	3	Q. Any other external documents?
4	A. Okay. So basically a deal I don't	4	A. Not to my recollection.
5	know, you would call it a lead, would come in and the	5	Q. Do you recall reviewing the collateral
6	eriginators would basically, you know, do the	6	management agreement?
7	collateral analysis on the deal with whatever	8	A. No. Q. What about the offering memo?
8	documents they were given. They would write up the	9	A. I might have, but I can't remember for
9	credit memo and send it through credit within the bank, and depending on the size of the deal, it would	10	certain.
10 11	go through the various credit committees.	11	Q. Okay. So when you reviewed the
11	Q. So at what point did you first become	12	indenture, what portions of the indenture did you
13	involved with the Zohar deal? Had Rabobank already	13	review?
14	invested or was it some time earlier?	14	A. I would review the conditions precedent
15	A. it was pre-closing, so I would review	15	to borrowing, the borrowing procedures, the fee, the
1	the deal to make sure that - from my perspective the	16	waterfail, the there is a reporting section,
116			basically defining the requirements of their
16 17	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether	17	Dasically domining the requirements of their
		17 18	reporting, the definitions.
17	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether	L	reporting, the definitions. Q. Anything else?
17 18	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether we could administratively do the deal in our middle	18	reporting, the definitions. Q. Anything else? A. Not to the best of my abilities. Those
17 18 19	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether we could administratively do the deal in our middle office and back office. Any kind of payment terms	18 19	reporting, the definitions. Q. Anything else? A. Not to the best of my abilities. Those are the sections I can name.
17 18 19 20	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether we could administratively do the deal in our middle office and back office. Any kind of payment terms that looked, you know, complicated, we would try to	18 19 20 21 22	reporting, the definitions. Q. Anything else? A. Not to the best of my abilities. Those are the sections I can name. Q. What about in the note purchase
17 18 19 20 21	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether we could administratively do the deal in our middle office and back office. Any kind of payment terms that looked, you know, complicated, we would try to simplify them or things of that nature. Q. What type of payment terms are you thinking of?	18 19 20 21 22 23	reporting, the definitions. Q. Anything else? A. Not to the best of my abilities. Those are the sections I can name. Q. What about in the note purchase agreement, what sections of those did you review?
17 18 19 20 21 22	deal worked. So it would be a combination of whether we could administratively do the deal in our middle office and back office. Any kind of payment terms that looked, you know, complicated, we would try to simplify them or things of that nature. Q. What type of payment terms are you	18 19 20 21 22	reporting, the definitions. Q. Anything else? A. Not to the best of my abilities. Those are the sections I can name. Q. What about in the note purchase

5 (Pages 17 to 20)

### Wendy Ruttle

	Page 29	31	
1	obligations.		Page 31
2	Q. What do you mean by that?	1	ratio or - let me change that. Let me rephrase
3	A. The bank had a revolving note cut. So	2	that.
4	we would if the OC was failing, we would no longer	3	Do you have an understanding of how the
5	be required to fund any obligations that were	4	valuation of the assets is reflected in the OC ratio?
6	requested by the issuer.	5	A. My understanding is that you take the
7	•	6	value of all your assets at the haircut and then
8	Q. Do you have an understanding of any	7	basically that is your collateral.
9	other consequences if the OC test were to fail?	8	Q. And that's the numerator in the CC
10	A. That would be the primary thing.	9	ratio; is that right?
11	Q. Based on my reading of the indenture,	10	A. Yes.
12	some other consequences of Patriarch falling the test	11	Q. Did anyone from Patriarch - let me ask
13	are that Patriarch could be removed as collateral	12	you a different question.
	manager or and/or the subordinated management fees	13	Do you expect, as an investor, that the
14	could be terminated. Does that sound familiar to you	14	indenture will govern the way that those
15	at all?	15	categorizations of an asset as defaulted is made?
16	A. Yes.	16	A. I would think there would be some
17	Q. Are those are those consequences	17	language within the indenture. The company may also
18	important to you?	18	have their investment policy, which would also define
19	A. Those would be in the sense that if you	19	treatment of what they could purchase and how they
20	stop those fees from coming through, there would be	20	treated their assets.
21	more funds in the waterfail in order to pay off the	21	Q. Okay. What do you mean, an "Investment
22	debts.	22	policy"?
23	Q. Would you be in favor of replacing	23	A. To my understanding, most deals will
24	Patriarch as collateral manager if the OC test - if	24	have an investment policy, so that investment policy
25	the fund failed the OC test?	25	will define the types of deals it can be invested in
	Page 30		Page 32
1	A. I wouldn't have a view on that. That	1	and basically how that asset is then treated.
2	wouldn't be part of my responsibility.	2	Q. I see. So is that something that you
3	Q. Do you know if Rabobank ever has	3	think would be in the deal documents, though, the
4	replaced collateral managers in situations where		
		4	investment policy?
5	tests have failed?	4	A. It should be part of the deal the
5 6			
-	tests have failed? A. I wouldn't be able to answer that.	5	A. It should be part of the deal the closing set, yes.
6	tests have failed?	5 6	A. It should be part of the deal the
6 7	tests have failed? A. I wouldn't be able to answer that. Q. You just don't know one way or the	5 6 7	<ul> <li>A. It should be part of the deal the closing set, yes.</li> <li>Q. Do you expect that a collateral manager</li> </ul>
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6789012345678901	tests have falled? A. I wouldn't be able to answer that. Q. You just don't know one way or the other? A. Yeah. Q. Within the Zohar III deal, the assets are classified as either collateral assets or defaulted assets. Are you familiar with that? A. Uh-hum. Q. Is that a yes? A. Yes. I'm sorry, yes. Q. Do you have an understanding of how the categorization of an asset affects its valuation within the portfolio? A. Yes. Q. What's your understanding of that? A. Basically, all assets are given a	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<ul> <li>A. It should be part of the deal the closing set, yes.</li> <li>Q. Do you expect that a collateral manager will follow the terms of the Indenture?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Did anyone from Patriarch ever disclose to you how Patriarch made the determination of whether or not to categorize an asset as defaulted?</li> <li>A. To my knowledge, no.</li> <li>Q. I am handing you what's previously been marked as Exhibit 3. This is a copy of the indenture, the Zohar III indenture.</li> <li>MS. SUMNER: I apologize, I don't have a separate copy, Counsel. It's a lot of paper.</li> <li>MS. VAN ROY: Okay. I have one elsewhere.</li> <li>Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 3, Ms. Ruttle?</li> </ul>
67890123456789012	tests have falled? A. I wouldn't be able to answer that. Q. You just don't know one way or the other? A. Yeah. Q. Within the Zohar III deal, the assets are classified as either collateral assets or defaulted assets. Are you familiar with that? A. Uh-hum. Q. Is that a yes? A. Yes. I'm sorry, yes. Q. Do you have an understanding of how the categorization of an asset affects its valuation within the portfollo? A. Yes. Q. What's your understanding of that? A. Basically, all assets are given a defined haircut, and if their defaulted – for all	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<ul> <li>A. It should be part of the deal the closing set, yes.</li> <li>Q. Do you expect that a collateral manager will follow the terms of the Indenture?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Did anyone from Patriarch ever disclose to you how Patriarch made the determination of whether or not to categorize an asset as defaulted?</li> <li>A. To my knowledge, no.</li> <li>Q. I am handing you what's previously been marked as Exhibit 3. This is a copy of the indenture, the Zohar III indenture.</li> <li>MS. SUMNER: I apologize, I don't have a separate copy, Counsel. It's a lot of paper.</li> <li>MS. VAN ROY: Okay. I have one elsewhere.</li> <li>Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 3, Ms. Ruttle?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> </ul>
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8 (Pages 29 to 32)

1			
1	Page 33		Page 35
1	time as you want looking through Exhibit 3, but it	1	you mean the portion that we've just been reading
2	might be more productive for me to point to you what	2	together?
3	I'm interested in. If you need to look at more at	3	THE WITNESS: Yes.
4	that point, feel free, but the definition section is	4	Q. And is it important to you that an
5	where I'm looking, and the specific definition is on	5	asset - that the assets in Zohar ill be valued
6	page 21 of the indenture.	6	correctly?
7	And there is - the fourth entry down is	7	A. Yes.
8	a definition for defaulted investment.	8	Q. And why is that?
9	A. Uh-hum.	9	A. I think you want to know basically an
1C	Q. It says, "Any collateral investment	10	accurate picture of the portfolio composition.
11	included in the collateral (other than a current pay	11	because it really will is a portrait of what the
12	Investment):" And then it goes on to say, "With	12	risk is to that portfolio. So if you're not valuing
13	respect to which a default as to the payment of	13	your portfolio correctly, then Rabobank, as the
14	principal and/or Interest has occurred, but only so	14	investor of that debt, doesn't have an accurate
15	long as such default has not been cured."	15	picture of the risk.
16	I'm not asking you for a legal opinion,	16	Q. What about, is it important to you as an
17	but sitting here today, as you read that, what does	17	investor that the assets be appropriately categorized
18	that mean to you?	18	as either defaulted or not defaulted?
19	A. Basically, whatever asset hasn't paid	19	A. Yes.
20	the principal interest obligation, and has not been	20	Q. And why is that?
21	able to do so.	21	A. Because it would determine what kind of
22	Q. And that means that if the asset has not	22	haircut is applied to the asset, and then if your
23	paid, it should be would be considered a defaulted	23	assets are if you're counting more assets as
24	investment under this definition?	24	defaulted and they're not, then your investment would
25	A. Yes, in my opinion.	25	seem more risky.
	Page 34		Page 36
1	Q. In your opinion?	1	Vice versa, if you would then categorize
2	A. Yes.	2	assets that were defaulted but categorized them as
3	Q. Okay. We've heard from Patriarch that		
		3	-
4	•	3 4	collateral, then you would be portraying your
4 5	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset		collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than
5	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not	4	collateral, then you would be portraying your
	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the	4 5	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is.
5 6 7	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing	4 5 6	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore less risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we
5 6	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types	4 5 6 7	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that.
5 6 7 8 9	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard	4 5 6 7 8	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's
5 6 7 8 9	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before?	4 5 6 7 8 9	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in
5 6 7 8 9 10	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No.	4 5 7 8 9 10	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before?	4 5 7 8 9 10 11	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes.	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that?	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not i guess	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not i guess if Patriarch decided to support or not support a	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their ioans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not i guess if Patriarch decided to support or not support a company, would and then I guess their decision to	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their ioans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of the interest it was due that was due to Patriarch
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 7 18	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not i guess if Patriarch decided to support or not support a company, would and then I guess their decision to do so would then determine whether it's defaulted or	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of the interest it was due that was due to Patriarch between 2008 and 2013. That's across all three Zohar deals, it's not specific to Zohar III.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 9 20	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not I guess If Patriarch decided to support or not support a company, would and then I guess their decision to do so would then determine whether it's defaulted or not defaulted, I think doesn't fit the definition as	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of the interest it was due that was due to Patriarch between 2008 and 2013. That's across all three Zohar deals, it's not specific to Zohar III. But is that information something is
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 9 20 21	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not I guess If Patriarch decided to support or not support a company, would and then I guess their decision to do so would then determine whether it's defaulted or not defaulted, I think doesn't fit the definition as stated in the document.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of the interest it was due that was due to Patriarch between 2008 and 2013. That's across all three Zohar deals, it's not specific to Zohar III.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 9 20 21 22	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not I guess If Patriarch decided to support or not support a company, would and then I guess their decision to do so would then determine whether it's defaulted or not defaulted, I think doesn't fit the definition as stated in the document. Q. And when you say "the document," you	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of the interest it was due that was due to Patriarch between 2008 and 2013. That's across all three Zohar deals, it's not specific to Zohar III. But is that information something is that surprising to you, that a company that's not
5 6 7 8	Patriarch decided whether or not to classify an asset as defaulted in Zohar III based on whether or not Patriarch intended to continue to support the portfolio company by loaning it funds, providing management resources, those types of those types of factors. Is that something you've ever heard before? A. No. Q. And is that information that, as an investor, you would have liked to have known? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. In my opinion, it would not I guess If Patriarch decided to support or not support a company, would and then I guess their decision to do so would then determine whether it's defaulted or not defaulted, I think doesn't fit the definition as stated in the document.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	collateral, then you would be portraying your portfolio as stronger and therefore lass risky than it really is. Q. Based on some of the work that we strike that. Based on some of the information that's been produced by Patriarch, it appears that in certain cases, portfolio companies that were not categorized as defaulted failed to pay large percentages of interest that were due to Patriarch under the terms of their loans. For instance, one company called "American La France," which was a fire truck manufacturer, did not pay approximately 81 percent of the interest it was due that was due to Patriarch between 2008 and 2013. That's across all three Zohar deals, it's not specific to Zohar III. But is that information something is that surprising to you, that a company that's not paying 81 percent of the interest is not listed as

9 (Pages 33 to 36)

# Exhibit 5

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Jaime Aldama

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5/1/2014

<b>—</b>				
	Page 1			Page 3
1	UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION	1		
	In the Matter of: )	2	INDEX	
	) File No. Patriarch Partners LLC ) HO-11665	3	EXHIBITS	
1	)	1	NUMBER DESCRIPTION	PAGE
	MITHERS INHE AL DAMA	5	33 Form 1662	5
	WITNESS: JAIME ALDAMA	6		-
	PAGES: 1-84	17	177 Subpoena	6
1	PLACE: 200 Vesey Street	a	178 Background questionnaire	8
[	New York, New York		1 Zohar indenture	55
	DATE: Thursday, May 1 2014	9	160 Petriarch loans	58
	DATE: Thursday, May 1, 2014	10		
	The above entitled matter came on	111	161 Interest on loans	58
	for hearing at 2:05 p.m.	12	175 Zohar quarterly financial statem	ent 60
			179 Bates # PAT 0001 - 0006	60
		13	176 Term sheet	69
		14		69
		15	180 Bates # PAT 00028 - 00036	70
		16		
		17 18		
		19		
		20 21		
		22		
		23 24		
		25		
	Page 2			Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:	1	PROCEEDINGS	_
2		2	MS. SUMNER: We're on the r	ecord at 2:05 on
3	For the SEC:	3	May 1st, 2014.	
4	AMY A. SUMNER	4	Would you please raise your rig	ghi hand?
5	United States Securities and Exchange Commission	5	(The wilness complied.)	
5	1801 California Street, Suite 1500 Denver, Colorado 80202	6	Do you swear to tell the truth,	lhe whole
6		7	truth, and nothing but the truth?	
7 8	For Mr. Chaku:	8	THE WITNESS: I do.	
-		9	EXAMINATION BY MS. SUMNER:	
9	ANDREW Z. MICHAELSON	10	Q. Please state and spell full name	
10	MICHAEL S. GRISOLIA Boles, Schiller & Flexner, LLP	11	A. Jaime Revero Aldama; J-A-I-M-E	, R-E-Y-E-R-O,
	575 Lexington Avenue, 7th Floor	12	A-L-D-A-M-A.	
11 12		13	Q. Mr. Aldama, my name is Amy Su	1
13		14	of the staff of the Enforcement Division	1 1 1
	ALLAN BORKOW	15 16	regional office of the United States Sec	
14	Diffortion of the second	16 17	Exchange Commission. I'm also an of	
15	New York New York 10019	18	Commission for the purposes of this pr This is an investigation by the Unit	- 1
16		19	Securities and Exchange Commission	(
17 18	1	20	Patriarch Partners, to determine wheth	
19		21	violations of certain provisions of the fe	1
20 21		22	securities laws. However, the facts de	1
21 22		23	investigation may constitute violations	• 1
23		24	or state, civil or criminal laws.	
24 25	1	25	Prior to the opening of the record,	you were
		·····		

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

5/1/2014

			5/1/2014
	Page 13	1	Page 15
1	Brothers in September 2008.	1	Want to work out of.
2	Q. When you started at Barclays in September of	2	Q. When you say people want to work out of these
3	2008, what was your role?	3	legacy assets, what kind of people do you mean?
4	A. I moved to a group in charge of structuring	4	A. The risk sits – it's evolved from 2008. Sit
5	credit and ABS products.	5	with banks or European institutions that found
6	Q. And when you started, what were your day-to-day	6	themselves owning the risk and our engagement with those
7	responsibilities?	1	Institutions was to help them exit the risk. It was
8	A. A Lot of the work for the first few years while	8	banks, insurance companies, European government, U.S.
9	at Barclays was to work structured products that were	9	government.
10	created between 2005 and 2008, and work with our clients	10	Q. When did you first become involved with the Zohar
11	in finding ways to better their economic position.	11	1 deal?
12	Q. What was your title when you first started at	12	A. The deal was brought to our attention at some
13	Barclays?	13	point in 2010.
14	A. My first title was Director.	14	Q. And who brought it to your attention?
15	Q. Director of what?	15	A. It would have been my boss, Jeff Smailes, at the
16	A. Credit and ABS Structuring Desk.	16	time.
17	Q. And then, about how many people did you work with	17	Q. And what were you told back in 2010 about it?
18	in that role?	18	A. My work was to work with our clients in their
19	A. Our group of 12.	19	structured products. One of our clients was Barclays,
20	Q. And did you supervise others?	20	and Barclays held a series of legacy positions on their
21	A. The 12, yes.	2:	portfolio. And our expertise and our services were used
22	Q. Who did you report to in that position?	22	to work more challenged positions and if the position
23	A. My direct supervisor was Jeff Smalles.	23	could be traded it would be traded by a trader. If
24	Q. What is his title or was his title, I guess?	24	there was something to do it's in the position it would
25	A. The Global Head of Credit and ABS Structure.	25	have been done. It's positions that are challenging and
	Page 14		Page 16
1	Q. Were you originating ABS products at this point?	1	positions that are troubled and it's when we were
2	A. The market did not want new products, so there	2	brought in. So I was part of a series of positions that
3	was no new origination of products; so we focused on the	3	we worked for the legacy group at Barclays.
4	existing products. We worked with existing products	4	Q. Why was Zohar considered challenged or I can't
5	already in the market.	5	remember the other adjective you used?
6	Q. And then, has your role changed over the time	6	A. Troubled.
7	you've been at Barclays?	7	Q. Troubled or chailenged?
8	A. The role has not changed. The market has changed	8	A. At the time that the position was brought to my
9	which has evolved the role, while in 2008. there was no	9	attention it probably wasn't as troubled as when we
10	appetite for new origination. In 2013, there is more	10	started do some of the digging and some of the work.
11	appetite. So we're moving to origination function.	11	The guys at the legacy group had tried to dispose and to
12	Between 2008 and 2011 the most part of our work product	12	work with the manager in finding ways to move forward
13	was around existing positions, existing structured	13	and to exit the risk, and they did not have any success.
14	positions. ABS, CDOs, CLOs, commercial real estate	14	Q. What had they tried to do previously, do you
15	positions, and work with our clients in helping them	15	know?
16	exit those risks and extract them from those positions.	16	A. I don't. The fact they came to us meant that
17	Q. Do you still report to Mr. Smailes?	17	they had not been able to succeed in anything that they
18	A. No, I now report to Bill Hirschberg.	18	had attempted to do.
19	Q. Do you still supervise a group of 12 or so?	19	Q. Do you know who was dealing with Zohar before it
20	A. We have reduced, shrunk the size of the group and	20	was brought to your group?
21	we're now five.	21	A. It have been a combination of Rohit Chaku and
22	Q. What sort of functions do those folks have?	22	Jake Scrivens, and Bitt Hammock.
23	A. Part of the group is in focus on new origination	23	Q. Once the deal was brought to your group or to
24	of products like CLOs and structured credit. And other part is still focus on legacy assets that people still	24 25	your attention, what did you do? A. Normally, when a deal is brought to our group,
25			

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

#### Jaime Aldama

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5/1/2014

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	Page 49		Page 51
1	again is the standard in every structured transaction	1	seen the number 3 or the number 2. In fact, I don't
2	and for investors to have that and rely on that	2	think I've ever seen the number 3 or number 2 in the
3	Information.	3	trustee reports. I know there is 4 and there is 1 but
4	Q. Do you have an understanding of when an asset is	4	In between seems to be always a jump.
5	considered a category 4?	5	Q. I think that's right.
6	A. My understanding is from what the indenture says	6	What does that say to you?
17	what a category 4 should be. My understanding is that	7	A. She didn't know that the companies were going to
8	Lynne can decide what is a category 4 and she has some	8	file the day before and she only found out that day or
9	discretion to what to call 4 whatever she wants.	9	she is not performing her duties as stated in the
10	Q. Why do you think she has full discretion?	10	collateral management agreement.
11	A. I don't think - my understanding, my belief that	11	MS. SUMNER: Let's go off the record at
12	it is Lynne and Patriarch that assign the internal	12	3:27. Let's take a short break.
13	ratings to the facility's reference on the portfolio.	13	(Recess taken.)
14	And there is no mechanic to dispute the categorization.	14	MS. SUMNER: We are back on the record at
15	So a defaulted security that has been publicly labelled	15	3:45.
16	defaulted she can call that 4 if she wants to. It would	16	BY MS. SUMNER:
17	be hard for her to justify herself but there is no - as	17	Q. During the break, Mr. Aldama, did you have any
18	the manager of the portfolio she has a lot of discretion	10	substantive conversations with the SEC staff about this
19	to use and call whatever she wants. She shouldn't,	19	Investigation?
20	but	20	A. No.
21	Q. Do you believe that under the terms of the	21	Q. Have you reviewed the Indenture for Zohar 1?
22	indenture she has the right to label something 4 at her	22	A. I have at some point reviewed and read some
23	own discretion?	23	sections on Indenture, yes.
24	A. I don't think so. I just feel that that's what	24	Q. What parts have you reviewed?
25	she has been doing for the past few years.	25	A. Basically related to the rights that we would
1	Page 50		Page 52
1	Q. You don't think she has the right to do that	1	have under the indenture upon an event of default of the
2	necessarily but you think she	2	deal and then around the portfolio management. The
3	(Talking over each other.)	3	section that talks about characterization of assets, the
4	A. Let me clarify. The indenture clearly defines	4	section that talks about the rights that Lynne has to
5	what a fig a 3 a 3 and a 1. These are also		
6	what a 4 is, a 3, a 2 and a 1. These are clear	5	extend maturities and so on and so forth.
	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a	6	Q. And you testified earlier that you received the
7	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It	6 7	Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look
8	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone	6 7 8	Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?
8 9	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to	6 7 8 9	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays</li> </ul>
8 9 10	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think	6 7 8 9 10	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee</li> </ul>
8 9 10 11	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think she's using the internal categories that she's meant to	6 7 9 10 11	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute</li> </ul>
8 9 10 11 12	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think she's using the internal categories that she's meant to use. I think she's using a lot of discretion. I don't	6 7 9 10 11 12	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute information on the portfolio to all investors. As</li> </ul>
8 9 10 11 12 13	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think she's using the internal categories that she's meant to use. I think she's using a lot of discretion. I don't she has the discretion she's just	6 7 9 10 11 12 13	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute information on the portfolio to all investors. As opposed to bilateral discussion with the manager, asset</li> </ul>
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think she's using the internal categories that she's meant to use. I think she's using a lot of discretion. I don't she has the discretion she's just Q. What companies are you specifically thinking of? A. There are companies like the one that comes to	6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports? A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute information on the portfolio to all investors. As opposed to bilateral discussion with the manager, asset managers use the trustee reports as a distribution platform to all investors of the security around the
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think she's using the internal categories that she's meant to use. I think she's using a lot of discretion. I don't she has the discretion she's just Q. What companies are you specifically thinking of? A. There are companies like the one that comes to mind is American LaFrance and that was labeled as a category 4 shortly before we had to read in the paper that she has shut down the entire company and news reports seem to imply that a company was doing very bad	6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 :6 17 18 19	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute information on the portfolio to all investors. As opposed to bilateral discussion with the manager, asset managers use the trustee reports as a distribution platform to all investors of the security around the performance of the portfolio, the current levels on the coverage ratios and how the deal is performing.</li> <li>Q. Have you had any discussions with anyone at Natixis about restructuring the Zohar 1 deal?</li> </ul>
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	definitions of what a 4 is and a clear definition what a 1 is. I don't think she is using that to classify. It is my belief based on how some of the company's gone from a 4 to 1 from trustee report from November to December there is a jump from 4 to 1. I don't think she's using the internal categories that she's meant to use. I think she's using a lot of discretion. I don't she has the discretion she's just Q. What companies are you specifically thinking of? A. There are companies like the one that comes to mind is American LaFrance and that was labeled as a category 4 shortly before we had to read in the paper that she has shut down the entire company and news reports seem to imply that a company was doing very bad much earlier and that went from a 4 to a 1. And I don't believe that one day the company is a 4 and in good standing and the following day you have to	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 :6 17 18 19 20 21 22	<ul> <li>Q. And you testified earlier that you received the trustee reports. Why is that something that you look at? Why do you look at the trustee reports?</li> <li>A. Any structured vehicle that we own, that Barclays or any of the clients that we work owns, the trustee report is the means that the manager has to distribute information on the portfolio to all investors. As opposed to bilateral discussion with the manager, asset managers use the trustee reports as a distribution platform to all investors of the security around the performance of the portfolio, the current levels on the coverage ratios and how the deal is performing.</li> <li>Q. Have you had any discussions with anyone at Natikis about restructuring the Zohar 1 deal?</li> <li>A. We have had over time different discussions at different points in time.</li> <li>Q. Who have you dealt with at Natikis?</li> </ul>

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

# Exhibit 6

Rohit Chaku

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5/1/2014

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	UNITED STATES	1	
	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION	2	INDEX
	In the Matter of: )	3	EXHIBITS
	) File No.	4	NUMBER DESCRIPTION PAGE
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	WITNESS: ROBIT CHAKU	6	173 Subpoena 6
		7	174 Background questionnaire 8
	PAGES: 1-72	8	175 Zohar quarterly financial statement 26
	PLACE: 200 Vesey Street,	9	1 Zohar indenture 48
	New York, New York	10	160 Patriarch Ioan schedule 53
	DATE: Thursday, May 1, 2014	11	161 Patriarch loan payments 53
	bring: marday, may 1, 2014	12	162 Karen Wule-mall 58
	The above entitled matter came on	13	32 Patriarch/Barclays e-mail 64
	for hearing at 9:47 a.m.	14	176 Bates # PAT 00019 - restructuring proposal 66
		15	
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		21	
		22 23	
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		25	
	Page 2		Page
1	APPEARANCES:	1	PROCEEDINGS
2 3	For the OFO:	2	MS. SUMNER: We are on the record at 9:47 on
3	For the SEC:	3	May 1st, 2014.
4	AMY A. SUMNER	4	Would you raise your right hand?
5	United States Securities and Exchange Commission 1801 California Street, Suite 1500	5	(The witness complied.)
5	Denver, Colorado 80202	6	Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole
6		7	truth and nothing but the truth?
7 8	For Mr. Chaku:	8	THE WITNESS: I do.
9	for Mr. Criard.	9	EXAMINATION BY MS. SUMNER:
	ANDREW Z. MICHAELSON	10	Q. Please state and spell your full name for the
10	MICHAEL S. GRISOLIA Boles, Schiller & Flexner, LLP	11	
11	575 Lexington Avenue, 7th Floor	12	A. Rohit Chaku; R-O-H-I-T. C-H-A-K-U.
	New York, New York 10022	13	Q. Mr. Chaku, my name is Amy Sumner. I'm a member
12 13		14	of the staff with the Enforcement Division of the Denver
14	ALLAN BORKOW	15	regional office of the United States Securities and
	Barclays Capital Inc.	16	Exchange Commission. I'm also an officer of the
15	745 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10019	17	Commission for purposes of this proceeding. This is an investigation by the United States
16		18	Securities and Exchange Commission in the matter of
17		19	Patriarch Partners to determine whether there have been
18 19		20	
20		21	violations of certain provisions of the federal securities laws. However, the facts developed in this
21		22	securities laws. However, the facts developed in this investigation may constitute violations of other federal
22 23		23	- · · ·
24		24 25	or state, civil or criminal laws. Prior to the opening of the record you were
25		22	Liter to all obsimily of the loopid log more

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

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1	Page 45	Τ	Page 47
1	four or three to a one or two, as a substitute for par	1	A. Yes.
2	value you will effectively use the lesser of market	2	Q. Why is that?
3	value and cost with the intent being generally that	3	A. Because the indenture is there to govern
4	market value is the overriding factor there.	4	basically how the structure and deal operates and really
5	Q. Is the valuation of the assets something that is	5	provide protections for all investors, senior investors
6	important to you as an investor?	6	specifically who have spent time bargaining for certain
7	A. Yes.	7	rights and protection within forwarded within the
8	Q. Why is that?	8	operating documents of the indenture; and so it is very
9	A. It will help us estimate ultimate recovery on	9	Important that the manager especially adhere to those
10	that asset, which impacts the ultimate recovery on our	10	operating documents properly.
111	ownership.	11	Q. Do you think that the categorization is
12	Q. Is valuation of the assets important to you	12	subjective or do you believe that it's objective?
13	independent of the OC ratio?	13	A. I believe it is objective.
14	A. Yes.	14	Q. And why do you think that?
15	Q. Why is that?	15	
16	A. For the same reason, that it will ultimately	16	A. There's certain objective points where very
17	provide guidance in terms of the overail recovery to the	17	clearly if discussions are being had of a restructuring. whether it's within inside or outside of a bankruptcy
18		18	
19	portfolio company, that lean which directly impacts the	19	proceeding or other official proceeding, it cannot be a
20	ultimate recovery on our investment. Q. Do you have an understanding of how Patriarch	20	category 4. There is definitive guidelines for insolvency proceedings and court processes that
20	determines the categorization to which it places the	21	
22	assets?	[	establish which categories it can also be in.
4		22	Q. Other than insolvency, are there other
23	A. Only to the extent the guidance provided within	23	circumstances that you recall?
24	the indenture.	24	A. I believe if the manager has an idea that the
25	Q. Do you have understanding of what the indenture	25	loans are going to be structured they will become more
	Page 46		Page 48
1	says on this topic?	1	credit risky; and if conversations are being had around
2	A. I believe that it's effectively within the	2	
1			restructuring the loans they objectively cannot be
3	manager's discretion. The idea is that the category 4	3	within category 4.
1	•	3 4	within category 4. Q. I'm handing your a document that's previously
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12 (Pages 45 to 48)

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served on the following on this 17th day of June 2015, in the manner indicated below:

Securities and Exchange Commission Office of the Secretary Attn: Secretary of the Commission Brent J. Fields 100 F Street, N.E. Mail Stop 1090 Washington, D.C. 20549 Fax: (202) 772-9324 (By Facsimile and original and three copies by FedEx)

Hon. Judge Carol Fox Foelak 100 F Street, N.E. Mail Stop 2557 Washington, D.C. 20549 (By FedEx)

Dugan Bliss, Esq. Division of Enforcement Securities and Exchange Commission Denver Regional Office 1961 Stout Street, Ste. 1700 Denver, CO 80294 (By Email pursuant to the parties' agreement)

Matthew T. Warren