

1 GLOBAL 8 ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES
2 By Daniel H. Wolf, President
3 Acting *in pro se*



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7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
8 Before the
9 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

10 August 11, 2013

11 In the Matter of

12
13 Camelot Entertainment Group, Inc.,
14 Cavico Corp.,
15 Global 8 Environmental Technologies, Inc.,
16 TTC Telecom Corp.,
17 ICF Corporation, and
18 New NRG, Inc.,

ANSWER BY GLOBAL 8
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES
3-15387

17 File No. 500-1

Administrative Law Judge: Carol Fox Foelak
Hearing date: September 5, 2013

19 COMES NOW Respondent Global 8 Environmental Technologies ("GBLE"),
20 represented by Daniel H. Wolf, President, *in pro se* in answer to the Order of Suspension of
21 Trading and the Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings and Notice of Hearing Pursuant to
22 Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

23 I.

24 With respect to the allegations that there is a lack of current and accurate information
25 concerning GBLE, Respondent answers as follows:

26 GBLE does not contest the allegation. It is true that GBLE has not filed any periodic
27 reports since June 30, 2009.
28

1 II.

2 With respect to any defenses available to Respondent for failure to file, Respondent
3 answers as follows:

4 GBLE's intention since the fall of 2009, when Daniel Wolf became Chairman of the
5 Board, has been to come back into compliance as a good corporate citizen. The company failed
6 to file periodic reports because Rene Branconnier, *de facto* managing director of GBLE until
7 October, 2009, unlawfully seized control of company records and refused to release them, in
8 spite of an order from a Nevada Superior Court judge to do so. To this date those records remain
9 in Branconnier's possession. Without them, according to PCAOB auditors with whom GBLE has
10 consulted, the required 2009 10-K could not be completed.

11 Branconnier's boiler-room operator was a defendant in a regulatory action in British
12 Columbia, Canada, in connection with GBLE and was found "liable". Branconnier himself is
13 currently a defendant in a regulatory action being undertaken by the Alberta Securities
14 Commission ("ASC"), in which the ASC has alleged that Branconnier had engaged in an illegal
15 and unregistered securities distribution in that jurisdiction in the amount of approximately
16 \$19,500,000. He is likely be found "liable" and to have his hand slapped.

17 During the course of his management of GBLE, Branconnier appears to have raised
18 between \$40,000,000 and \$50,000,000 from investors in the United States, Canada and other
19 countries, only a portion of which actually was made over to GBLE. Of the portion made over
20 and reported in GBLE's periodic filings, approximately 85 percent was paid out to Branconnier
21 in "related party transactions" for unspecified "bookkeeping and management" duties in one-
22 page contracts lacking details, milestones, consequences, or protections for GBLE. These
23 contracts were never approved by an independent board or ratified by shareholders.

24 Branconnier was able to do this because he appointed persons he could control as
25 directors and officers. During the course of this fraud, Branconnier, acting through these agents,
26 made numerous material misrepresentations and distributed millions of dollars in unregistered
27

1 securities that did not fall under any exemption to the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and
2 1934.

3 Both the Corporate Finance and Investigative divisions of the Securities and Exchange
4 Commission were duly and repeatedly informed of these crimes. To date they have taken no
5 action. GBLE's attorney William Aul has written to and spoke with these divisions and they
6 have reacted with indifference.

7 Messrs. Wolf and Aul believe that Branconnier's success in carrying out these crimes
8 under the very nose of the SEC exposes a serious policy problem in U.S. securities law and
9 enforcement. By informing the SEC, in periodic filings approved by deceived PCAOB auditors,
10 that he was essentially robbing the investors, he exploited the SEC's lack of jurisdiction over
11 criminal fraud. And by keeping the number of investors affected in each American state small,
12 he kept his crimes below the prosecution thresholds of most state Attorneys General. In this way
13 he has escaped prosecution by any agency. The only remaining jurisdictional avenue for SEC
14 enforcement is material misrepresentation and illegal distribution, both of which the SEC has
15 demonstrated itself unwilling to pursue.

16 GBLE is aware of at least three other fraudulent schemes conducted by Branconnier, one
17 of which raised over \$100,000,000 from investors in the U.S. and Canada and another of which
18 is ongoing. Both of these have been ignored by the SEC.

19 GBLE does not know how widely Branconnier's methods are being used by other
20 malfeasants, but if they were to become popular they would represent a genuine threat to the
21 integrity and safety of small-cap markets in the United States.

22 III.

23 With respect to the Commission's decision to suspend or revoke GBLE's registration,
24 Respondent wishes to inform the Commission of the following facts.

25 The acting Board of Directors, composed of persons elected in a valid shareholders
26 meeting, is dedicated to restoring GBLE to regulatory compliance, to legal and ethical
27 management, to profitability in order to win back some if not all of the shareholder value
28

1 destroyed by Branconnier, and to clawing back some of Branconnier's illegal takings, which
2 proceeds would be used to fund further growth. Implementing a turnaround in a company devoid
3 of business, intellectual property and cash, however, not to mention one plagued by the sorts of
4 legal questions that arise as a consequence of management fraud, is no small challenge. Building
5 up a war chest for clawing back the stolen wealth is equally difficult.

6 What motivates management, however, is the directors' sense of justice denied, the
7 knowledge that there are shareholders who are living in penury as a result of Branconnier's
8 fraud, and the awareness that the SEC and its sister regulatory agencies are unlikely to do
9 anything to redress the crimes cited, ever.

10 GBLE's core rebuilding strategy has been to partner with private companies to provide
11 liquidity for their investors, and to receive a share of their revenues in return. To that end, GBLE
12 signed a revenue-sharing agreement with a wheat-based plastics company for 10 percent of its
13 EBITDA revenues in exchange for about one-third of GBLE's stock. That company is now on
14 the verge of sales and revenues, according to reports by its management. If it achieves its
15 projected revenues, GBLE will have the ability to become compliant with the SEC and to
16 achieve its other goals.


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18 IV.

19 It is in GBLE's interest to negotiate a suspension or revocation agreement that provides
20 the best prospects for achieving its goals. GBLE therefore declares itself ready and willing to
21 sign a consent agreement with the Division of Enforcement that satisfies the Commission while
22 not unduly inhibiting GBLE's pursuit of its goals of good corporate citizenship and profitability.
23 It is in the interest of the SEC and of public policy, as well as of GBLE, to endeavor to identify
24 and act on the commonality of our interests.

25 DATED this August 11, 2013

26 Respectfully Submitted:

27 GLOBAL'S ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES

28 
By Daniel H. Wolf, Esq.