UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

In the Matter of :

ALSTEAD, STRANGIS & DEMPSEY, INC. :

(8-14697) :

INITIAL DECISION

Washington, D.C. December 20, 1982 Warren E. Blair Chief Administrative Law Judge

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FILE NO. 3-6135

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

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APPEARANCES:

Peter B. Shaeffer and Anita M. Nagler, of the Chicago Regional Office of the Commission, for the Division of Enforcement.

Michael C. Mahoney and Thomas P. Malone, of Curtin & Mahoney, for Alstead, Strangis & Dempsey, Inc.

BEFORE:

Warren E. Blair, Chief Administrative Law Judge.

These public proceedings were instituted on May 20, 1982 by order of the Commission ("Order") pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 19(h) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). The Order directed a public hearing be held to determine whether Alstead, Strangis & Dempsey, Inc. ("ASD," "registrant," or "respondent"), had engaged in the misconduct charged by the Division of Enforcement ("Division") and what, if any, remedial action would be appropriate in the public interest.

In substance, the Division alleges that during the period from on or about February 5, 1980 to July 31, 1980, ASD wilfully violated the anti-fraud provisions of Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder by offering and selling shares of common stock of Flight Transporation Corporation ("FTC") and of A.T. Bliss & Company ("Bliss") at excessive and unreasonable markups without disclosure to its customers that it was doing so.

Respondent appeared through counsel, who participated throughout the hearing. As part of the post-hearing procedures successive filings of proposed findings, conclusions, and supporting briefs were specified. Timely filings thereof were made by the parties.

The findings and conclusions herein are based upon the preponderance of the evidence as determined from the record and upon observation of the witnesses.

RESPONDENT

Respondent, a Minnesota corporation having its principal place of business in Minneapolis, Minnesota, became registered as a broker-dealer under the Exchange Act in May, 1978 and is a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). During the period in question Jerry A. Alstead ("Alstead") was registrant's president and one of its directors.

RESPONDENT'S TRADING ACTIVITIES

Flight Transportation Corporation

FTC, a Minnesota corporation incorporated in 1968, was engaged as of November, 1979 in a fixed-base aviation operation at Flying Cloud Airport, Eden Prairie, Minnesota. In November, 1979, FTC made a public offer of 560,000 shares of its common stock at \$3.25 per share pursuant to a "best-efforts" underwriting agreement with ASD. The offering was completed on February 4 or 5, 1980.

Upon completion of the offering, ASD decided to become $\frac{1}{}$ a "market maker" in FTC stock and on either February 4 or 5, 1980 set the opening market-price for that stock at 3-3 1/4

^{1/} By definition under Section 3(a)(38) of the Exchange Act, the term "market maker" means "... any dealer who, with respect to a security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in an inter-dealer communications system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell such security for his own account on a regular or continuous basis."

per share based upon the public offering price used in the underwriting. It appears that ASD opened its trading on February 5, 1980 with a purchase of 500 shares of FTC from another dealer at \$3.25 per share.

During the period February 4 to March 21, 1980 when ASD and two other brokers, R.J. Steichen ("Steichen") and Amswiss International ("Amswiss"), were the three dealers $\frac{2}{2}$ publishing quotations on FTC on the NASDAQ system, trading volume in FTC was in excess of 365,000 shares with ASD's participation in transactions with its customers and other dealers accounting for over 325,000 shares, or nearly 89% of $\frac{3}{2}$ that volume. For that same period, it appears that 88% of the total FTC shares traded by ASD were bought from or sold to its customers.

As contended by the Division, the record conclusively establishes that from February 4, 1980 through March 21, 1980, respondent dominated the FTC over-the-counter market. But the Division's further contention that ASD, while dominating the market in that period, effected 156 principal sales of FTC stock to its customers at excessive percentage markups is not to that extent sustained by the record.

^{2/} An inter-dealer communication system widely used by brokerdealers to obtain market information on the over-the-counter stocks.

In the period February 4-29, 1980, trading by ASD accounted for over 85% of the nearly 126,000 trading volume and exceeded 91% of the over 239,000 FTC volume from March 1-21, 1980.

The Commission has held in numerous decisions that, generally, markups of more than 10% above the prevailing $\frac{4}{}$ market price are fraudulent, and that the rule applies even in the sale of low-priced securities. In a recent decision, the Commission reiterated:

The market price is the prevailing inter-dealer price, that is, the price at which transactions take place among dealers. And. . . in the absence of countervailing evidence, a dealer's contemporaneous cost is the best evidence of that price.... [footnotes omitted] $\frac{6}{}$

But in doing so the Commission took cognizance, as it had $\frac{7}{}$ earlier, of a distinction to be made when a market maker is the accused. Under that circumstance the Commission recalled:

We have previously recognized that, generally speaking, a market maker's contemporaneous cost is not an appropriate basis for calculating its markups since this might compel a market maker to charge retail prices that are less than its wholesale offering prices. Such a result would deter market makers from taking the risk of maintaining a market or a position in a security and, consequently, would impair market liquidity. Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of market makers, markups should be computed on the basis of actual contemporaneous sales to other broker-dealers or contemporaneous offering prices, rather than contemporaneous costs which reflect a market maker's bids. [footnotes omittd] 8/

James E. Ryan, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,617
April 5, 1982), 24 SEC Docket 1859, 1864; Crosby & Elkin,
Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17709 (April 5, 1981), 22 SEC Docket 772.

^{5/} First Pittsburgh Securities Corporation, Securities Exchange Release No. 16,897 (June 16, 1980), 20 SEC Docket 401, 406.

^{6/} Peter J. Kisch, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19005 (August 24, 1982), 25 SEC Docket 1533, 1539-40.

^{7/} General Investing Corporation, 41 SEC 952, 954-55 (1964).

^{8/} Peter J. Kisch, supra, at 1540.

The Commission then distinguished between market makers, stating:

Where the firm in question dominates the market as registrant did here, its own inside offer cannot be used as the basis for computing markups since that would give the firm "unrestricted latitude in setting its inside offer and therefore [its] retail prices." Instead, contemporaneous prices charged by the firm or other market makers in actual sales to other dealers, or the contemporaneous representative asked quotations of other market makers should be used as the basis for computing markups. [footnote omitted] 9/

The Division concedes that its computation of markups charged on a total of 308 retail purchases of FTC stock made by ASD customers in the period February 4, through March 21, 1980 would have to be different if the principles enunciated in the <u>Kisch</u> opinion regarding market makers were applicable. It is the Division's position, however, that here the circumstances are such that the <u>Kisch</u> principles are inappropriate for use in computing ASD's markups. Instead the Division insists that its approach provides reliable evidence of the extent of respondent's excessive markups.

The methodology followed by the Division in its computations, as footnoted in the schedule prepared by the Division and admitted in evidence, utilized one of three means, in descending priority, to determine a base price from which ASD's

<u>9/ Id.</u>

^{10/} Division Exhibit 36.

markup was to be calculated. In the first instance, the base price per share would be fixed at the same price as that paid by ASD to another broker-dealer in connection with a purchase on the same day and closest in time preceding the retail sale. If the same-day purchase to a broker-dealer did not exist, the Division looked to the price ASD paid for FTC stock in a purchase from another of its customers on the same day and closest in time preceding the retail sale. Where such retail purchase was found, the base price was calculated as being equal to the per share price paid by ASD "adjusted by adding one-half the difference between that purchase price and the sale price."

The third priority introduced use of the per share price paid to another customer or broker-dealer on the preceding day.

Defending its methodology, the Division argues that because of factual distinctions and absence of circumstances which generated the concerns about market making deterrence in the <u>Kisch</u> case, ASD's contemporaneous cost provides better evidence of the prevailing prices than use of the <u>Kisch</u> principles. As differentiations, the Division cites ASD's domination of the floating supply of FTC stock and of the wholesale and retail market for that stock and the evidence that the "actual market having depth and liquidity" was a creation of ASD amongst its retail customers and "not among dealers or customers independent" of ASD. The Division further asserts the unreliability of quotes of other dealers in FTC stock as indicators of the price

at which stock would actually be sold.

The flaw in the Division's position is that it has not shown that an exception should be made to the general rules laid down by Kisch so as to mandate use of ASD's contemporaneous cost as the base for markups calculations. Although the factual recital in Kisch does not portray trading on all fours with that of ASD, the Commission there called attention to its earlier General Investing Corporation In the latter case, which foreshadowed the more explicit guidance of Kisch, the firm asserted that it had dominated the market for the five securities involved in 73 of the 83 transactions in question, and the record indicated "that . . . the firm . . . was primarily engaged in a retail selling operation [and] held securities in inventory mainly to retail them to customers through intensive mail and telephone solicitation efforts." factual trading pattern is sufficiently similar to that followed by ASD to indicate that the general principles laid down by Kisch should be followed and the methodology advocated by the Division rejected.

Further, even were the application of contemporaneous cost considered appropriate, the Division's calculations could

^{11/} Peter J. Kisch, supra, 1540, n. 17.

^{12/} General Investing Corporation, supra, at 955.

not be accepted. Contemporaneous cost calculations are not limited, as in the Division's first priority, to use of a same day purchase from another broker-dealer preceding closest in time the retail sale in question, and there is less reason to accept the next two methods used in the Division's calculations. The Division concedes that the use of purchases from customers to determine contemporaneous cost is without precedent but urges that here the retail purchases constitute better evidence of the prevailing market than "isolated sales of a thousand shares from one dealer to another." argument ignores the very underpinning of the Kisch approach which is to avoid a result that "would deter market makers from taking a risk of maintaining a market or a position in a security and, consequently, would impair market liquidity." $\frac{14}{}$

That the Division had problems utilizing retail purchases in its methodology is evident from the fact that in its second priority it had to adjust that price by "adding one-half of the difference between that purchase price and the sale price." The adjustment, an effort by the Division to place ASD's transactions in a so-called "guasi-agent perspective," is a strained attempt to find an acceptable way to utilize same-day

^{13/} See Linder, Bilotti & Co., Inc., 42 SEC 807, 809, n. 4

^{14/} Peter J. Kisch, supra, at 1540.

^{15/} Division Exhibit 36, n. 2.

prices paid by ASD to its retail customers, and the method carries with it the burden of clearly adding to rather than resolving the problems which would face a market maker if the Division's view were accorded recognition. Illustrative are two of the transactions, as pointed out by ASD, in which ASD sold T.F. Miller 100 shares of FTC stock at \$4.00 per share at 3:01 P.M. on February 14, 1980 and the next day at 11:12 A.M., with no other intervening trade occurring, sold NA & JR Cheney 200 shares at the same \$4.00 price. the first of those trades the Division calculated by use of its second priority that ASD's markup was 14.3% and in the next trade, which required use of the third method, the markup amounted to 33.3%. Quite obviously the methodology advocated by the Division would inject considerable confusion and uncertainty into market makers' operations and deter dealers from maintaining a market for a security, contrary to the intent of the Commission as expressed in its Kisch opinion.

Respondent cites $\frac{17}{}$ as determinative of whether ASD's markups on FTC stock were excessive and contends that when properly calculated the markups on FTC retail sales were appropriate and the prices charged were reasonably

^{16/} Id., p. 4, lines 5 and 6.

^{17/} Peter J. Kisch, supra.

related to the then current market prices for that stock. Contrary to respondent's claim of fairness, the record reflects that the Division has proved its charges with respect to some of the markups on FTC stock during the period in question.

Recasting the retail sales of FTC and recalculating $\frac{18}{}$ the markups to conform with the teachings of Kisch, it appears that in a total number of 338 retail transactions, $\frac{20}{}$ excessive and unreasonable prices were charged as follows:

Range of Percentage	Number of Transactions	Percentage of All Transactions
20.0 - 23.1	8	2.4
15.0 - 19.9	15	4.4
11.1 - 14.9	_17_	5.0
Total	40	11.8

Accordingly, it is concluded that respondent wilfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder in the sale of FTC stock to its retail customers.

<u>18</u>/ <u>Id</u>.

^{19/} Appendix A sets forth the recasting and recomputation of markups on FTC stock for the period February 5 through March 21, 1980.

^{20/} Markups of more than 10% above the prevailing market price are fraudulent. <u>Kisch</u>, <u>supra</u>, and cases there cited.

A.T. Bliss & Company

Respondent began over-the-counter trading in the common stock of A.T. Bliss & Company on June 3, 1980 with a purchase of 25,000 shares from Lucius Hill Securities and actively purchased and sold that stock through July 31, 1980. The Division contends that during that period ASD effected 255 sales to its retail customers at excessive markups ranging between 11.1% and 48.5%.

In calculating the markups and the percentages involved, the Division utilized a base price which it deemed to be ASD's contemporaneous cost of the Bliss stock sold and determined the base price in either of two ways. First, if ASD had made purchases from a broker-dealer on the same day that it effected the retail sale, the base price per share for that sale was considered identical to the price per share paid by ASD in its closest preceding purchase. If no same-day purchase was found, the Division considered the base price for the retail sale to be equal to the highest price paid by ASD in a purchase from a broker-dealer on the previous day.

Although the methodology employed by the Division is consonant with principles long established for calculating markups on retail sales by broker-dealers who are not

market makers, that approach is not acceptable here where the record establishes that ASD did undertake to make a market in Bliss stock during the time in question. The Division acknowledges on the authority of the Kisch opinion that the market maker status is significant in determining the appropriate method for computing, but defends its use of contemporaneous cost on the basis that ASD was a retail dealer, not a market maker in Bliss stock.

As support for its position the Division argues that the evidence reflects that ASD's inter-dealer activity was almost exclusively as a purchaser, that ASD never listed itself as a market maker in the "pink sheets," and that ASD entered the inter-dealer market in order to fill retail customer demand generated by its salesmen. The Division relies heavily on the Commission's decision in $\frac{24}{\text{Strathmore Securities, Inc.,}} \text{for denying ASD market}$ maker status in Bliss stock.

However, in marshalling the facts militating against according status of a market maker to ASD, the Division has ignored the fact that during the period at issue ASD

^{21/} See, e.g., First Pittsburgh Securities Corporation, supra.

^{22/} Peter J. Kisch, supra.

^{23/} Pink is the color of the paper on which the Stock Section of The National Daily Service is printed.

^{24/ 42} SEC 993 (1966).

continuously held itself out as willing to buy and sell Bliss stock. Evidence of ASD's market maker activity is reflected by the appearance of quotations by ASD on Bliss stock in the regional inter-dealer over-the-counter stock quotations published in Minneapolis on each business day from June 2 through July 31, 1980. Further, as respondent argues, another Minneapolis dealer, R.J. Steichen & Co., sought ASD quotes on Bliss almost daily after June 10 before effecting its transactions in Bliss stock. It also appears that R.J. Steichen made two purchases of Bliss stock from ASD, the first for 2,000 shares on June 10 and the second for 500 shares on June 16.

The manner and means followed by ASD in holding itself out as a market maker and in its dealings with R.J. Steichen & Co., together with the testimony of Alstead that ASD was a market maker for Bliss stock, are salient differences when comparision is made with the Strathmore case. In Strathmore, the Commission found that contrary to the firm's claim that the firm made a market, an officer of

^{25/} The Division and respondent stipulated that the regional inter-dealer stock quotation sheets published by Metro Data Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota are records ordinarily used in the business of Minneapolis based broker-dealers.

^{26/} Strathmore Securities, Inc., supra.

Strathmore testified that "he considered the firm was $\frac{27}{}$ primarily 'a retail house'," and also found that the record supported that testimony. Here, Alstead's testimony that ASD was a market maker, the apparent recognition of that role by other Minneapolis dealers, and ASD's operations are sufficient, absent a showing that ASD's Bliss quotations were not inserted in the regional sheets in good faith, to support the conclusion that the Division has not sustained its burden of showing that respondent should not be accorded recognition as a market maker.

The conclusion that ASD was a Bliss market maker again calls into play the <u>Kisch</u> guidelines for determining the reasonableness of ASD's markups and makes the "contemporaneous cost" methodology used by the Division unacceptable. However, recasting the 307 Bliss transactions by ASD as a market maker

^{27/} Id., at 997.

Although legislative history leading to the enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 does not make specific reference to the background of the definition of the term "market maker" under Section 3(a)(38), it undoubtedly flowed from the need to define that term for purposes of Section 15(c)(5) of the Exchange Act which broadened Commission authority to regulate market making pursuant to legislative intent to encourage a "healthy, highly competitive system of market makers..."

S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1975). The existence of statutory definition under Section 3(a)(38) places a greater burden upon the Division in seeking to negate an asserted market maker status than existed in 1966 when Strathmore Securities, Inc., supra was decided.

reflects, again contrary to respondents position that its retail prices were proper, that excessive markups of over $\frac{29}{10\%}$ were made as follows:

	Number of	Percentage of
Range of Percentage	Transactions	All Transactions
10.7 - 12.7	44	14.3%

Accordingly, it is concluded that respondent wilfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder in the sale of Bliss stock to its retail customers.

Failure to Disclose Excessive Markups

Respondent asserts that the only evidence the Division presented in support of its allegation that respondent failed to disclose to retail customer purchasers of FTC and Bliss stock that ASD's markups were excessive and unreasonable were respondent's confirmations. Respondent insists that when Alstead's testimony on that issue is taken into account, the Division has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent failed to make the requisite disclosure regarding its markups. The record does not support respondent's construction but rather establishes the contrary.

Under examination by the Division, Alstead testified that he did not provide his own customers with information

^{29/} Appendix B sets forth the recasting and recomputation of markups on Bliss stock for the period June 4 through July 31, 1980.

that disclosed the extent of ASD's markups and, further, that when he did in some instances inform customers of the firm's "actual cost," the disclosure related to ASD's "average cost of inventory." Acceptance of respondent's claim that the noted testimony should be taken in context of Alstead's not considering such markups as unreasonable or excessive would be a distortion of the clear meaning of that testimony.

Similarly, respondent's argument that Alstead's disclosure of ASD's "actual costs" provided enough information to permit a customer to determine the nature and extent of ASD's markup is rejected. The average cost of inventory, which appears to be the information that Alstead provided, is not an acceptable cost upon which to calculate markups, and use of that cost basis by a customer in attempting to calculate ASD's markup would produce a misleading result.

Scienter

Respondent argues that the requisite <u>scienter</u> to establish violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities

Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5

thereunder has not been shown. In support, respondent relies upon evidence of its efforts to ascertain prevailing market prices for FTC and Bliss stocks, and executions of trades at

^{30/} Tr. 141-42; 156-57.

^{31/} Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680.

prices respondent believed to be appropriate. It does not appear that the record lends the support that respondent's argument requires in order to prevail.

Scienter is established when it is shown that misconduct is knowing, intentional or reckless, and need not be "deliberate and cold-blooded." Here, ASD's market making activities were carried on without consideration of the impact of relevant regulations, rules, and decisions of regulatory authorities relating to the appropriate methods of calculating acceptable markups. Instead, respondent adopted an attitude that its own method of determining its costs, such as average cost of inventory and the amount of commission paid 33/
sufficed for its purposes. in acquiring its inventory, Under the circumstances, respondent is deemed to have acted recklessly within the meaning of scienter in failing to assure that its pricing practices met established criteria.

Wilfulness

In its argument that the Division has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent wilfully

^{32/} Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 970 (1978).

^{33/} In effect, respondent was attempting to pass along part of its costs of operation and gain a guaranteed net profit regardless of whether the price charged was reasonably related to current market price. Cf. DMR Securities, Inc., 18 SEC Docket 873, 875 (1979).

violated Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act, respondent cites In the Matter of William Carter as its authority, quoting the Commission as follows:

We do hold however, that a finding of will-full (sic) . . . requires a showing that respondents were aware of or knew that their sale [sic] was part of an activity that was improper or illegal. 35/

Respondent's reliance on <u>Carter</u> is entirely misplaced. The quotation referred to, without ellipsis, reads in full as follows:

We do hold, however, that a finding of willful aiding and abetting within the meaning of Rule 2(e)(1)(iii) requires a showing that respondents were aware or knew that their role was part of an activity that was improper or illegal.

[Italics in original underlined above.]

Read in full and in context, it is clear that the Commission was expressing itself regarding the requisite elements of proof for finding wilful aiding and abetting when alleged in a Rule 2(e) proceeding. Regardless of whether that holding should be broadened to cover a like allegation in a broker-dealer proceeding, there is no question of the inapplicability of <u>Carter</u> where a respondent itself, as here, is charged with directly committing a wilful violation.

Apposite cases on the question of respondent's wilfulness are <u>Tager v. S.E.C.</u>, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965), and <u>Arthur Lipper</u> & Co. v. S.E.C., 547 F.2d 171, 180 (1976), which hold that

^{34/ 22} SEC Docket 292 (1981).

Respondent's Brief in Support of Its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 51.

^{36/ 22} SEC Docket, at 316.

"wilfully" within the intent of Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act means intentionally committing the acts constituting the violation. Nothing more is required than proof that the broker-dealer acted intentionally in the sense that it was aware of what it was doing. Here, respondent knew that as part of its operation as a market maker it was purchasing FTC and Bliss stock, adding the markups that are now at issue, and selling that stock at the increased prices to its retail customers. In consequence of respondent's acting with that knowledge, the excessive markup violations were "wilful" within the meaning of Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act.

PUBLIC INTEREST

Having found that respondent wilfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, it is necessary to consider the remedial action appropriate in the public interest.

The Division recommends a suspension of ASD's registration as a broker-dealer for a period of six (6) months. In support of that recommendation the Division points to the nature and extent of the violations covered in its proposed findings and to the two censures and fines imposed against respondent by the NASD, the first in 1979 and the other in 1981. On the other hand, respondent, in

keeping with its proposed findings and arguments that no wilful violations have been proved, states that it is inappropriate to impose any sanction.

Upon careful consideration of the record and the arguments and contentions of the parties, it is concluded that in the public interest respondent's registration as a broker-dealer should be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days.

While a six-month suspension would be appropriate were the violations as extensive as argued by the Division, it appears too harsh in light of the substantially smaller number of markups found to be excessive and unreasonable. Considering that fact, together with the NASD disciplinary actions which involved regulatory violations of lesser seriousness, it is concluded that a sanction of thirty (30) days is sufficient to impress upon ASD the importance of continuing to retain competent counsel and employing experienced personnel to avoid future violations of the securitis laws and regulations. In assessing the sanction, the fact that ASD no longer employs the personnel who caused the violations to occur has also been taken into $\frac{37}{}$ consideration.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the registration of Alstead, Strangis & Dempsey, Inc., as a broker-dealer is

^{37/} All proposed findings and conclusions submitted have been considered, as have the contentions. To the extent such proposals and contentions are consistent with this initial decision, they are accepted.

suspended for a period of thirty (30) days.

This order shall become effective in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Rule 17(f) of the Rules of Practice.

Pursuant to Rule 17(f) of the Rules of Practice, this initial decision shall become the final decision of the Commission as to each party who has not, within fifteen days after service of this initial decision upon him, filed a petition for review of this initial decision pursuant to Rule 17(b), unless the Commission, pursuant to Rule 17(c), determines on its own initiative to review this initial decision as to him. If a party timely files a petition for review, or the Commission takes action to review as to a party, the initial decision shall not become final with respect to that party.

Warren E. Blair

Chief Administrative Law Judge

COMPUTATION OF MARK UPS OF COMMON STOCK OF FLIGHT TRANSPORTATION INC. BY ASD TO ITS RETAIL CUSTOMERS IN SALES

2/06/80 1:29 ASD Schweiger 500 3.875 B		2/06/80 1:27 ASD Olson 700 3.875 B	ASD Poston 100 3.875 B	3.875 B	2/06/80 12:46 ASD Juhl 100 3.875 B	12:45 ASD Linsmayer 500 3.875 B	2/06/80 12:44 ASD Wohler, R. 100 3.875 B	2/06/80 12:43 ASD Wohler 200 3.875 B	2/06/80 9:08 ASD Miller 200 3.625 B		2/05/80 3:35 ASD Beech 400 3.75 A	2/05/80 2:37 ASD Gilbertson 500 3.75 A	2/05/80 1:20 ASD Marks 200 3.75 A	2/05/80 1:20 ASD Anderson 200 3.75 A	2/05/80 1:05 RJS ASD 2000 3:25 -	NUMBER PRICE METHOD B OF PER OF P Mo/Dy/Yr. TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PE
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MARK UP METHODS

- **⊳** First Priority - Same day highest prices charged by ASD or other market makers in sales to other dealers
- Ø ı Second Priority - Highest prices charged by ASD or other market makers in sales to other dealers on the business day preceding or succeeding sales by ASD to customers.
- C 1 Third Priority - Representative asked quotations of other market makers or in NASDAQ appearing on same day as sales by ASD to customers.
- * With exception of four sales on 3/10/80 and three sales on 3/14/80, does not include retail sales to customers if mark up according to Division's calculations was less than 10%.

ABBREVIATIONS

RJS - R.J. Steichen AMS - Amswiss DW - Dean Witter

ASD - Alstead, Strangis & Dempsey, Inc. EJ - Edward D. Jones & Co.

Piper, Jaffrey

DB - Dain Bosworth

REC - Recom Securities, Inc.

SB - Smith Barney

SHLR - Shearson, Loeb Rhodes

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Anderson Waldron Dodge Aadahl	Townsend Townsend Barette Brandt Janssen Kierstead Murphy Ludvigson Leader Kuehn Peterson Besaw Grossfield Steady	Smith Stinson Janssen Wisinski Swanson Wellner Haugen Wadley Bailey Mohwinkel REC Schill Steady Strangis	
200 50 300 100	100 150 100 200 700 100 100 150 150 150	SHARES 150 200 1100 1100 100 100 500 500 500 500	NUMBER
4.00 4.00 4.00	4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00	SHARE 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875	PRICE
田 田 田		COMPUTATION B B B B A A A A A A A	METHOD
3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75	3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00	PER SHARE 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75	BASE
.25 .25 .25	. 25 . 25 . 25 . 25 . 25 . 25 . 00NE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE	PER SHARE .125 .125 .125 .125 .125 .125 .125 .12	ACTUAL
6.7 6.7 6.7	6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE NONE	PERCENTAGE 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 NONE NONE	

NONE	NONE	4.25	A	4. 25	275	Blonigen	ASD	2:45	2/20/80
NONE	NONE	4 25	Δ	4 25	קק	TOWNS 1	۸۵۳	11.15	2/20/20
NONE	NONE	4.25	A	4.25	250	Walters	ASD	11:14	2/20/80
NONE	NONE	4.25	A	4.25	100	Nord	ASD	11:13	2/20/80
1	1		_	4.25	1000	WD	RJS	10:59	2/20/80
 	-		1	3.875	1000	æ	AMS	3:46	2/19/80
NONE	NONE	3.875	A	3.875	300	Peterson	ASD	10:57	/19,
3.2	.125	3.875	A	4.00	200	Brink	ASD	10:55	2/19/80
3.2	.125	3.875	A	4.00	150	Helgesen	ASD	10:22	2/19/80
3.2	.125	3.875	À	4.00	100	Chamberlin	ASD	10:06	2/19/80
19.2	.625	3.25	Ā	3.875	50	Behr	ASD	3:03	2/15/80
23.1	.75	3.25	A	4.00	200	Anderson	ASD	2:23	2/15/80
23.1	.75	3.25	A	4.00	100	Schwalback	ASD	2:17	/15/
23.1	.75	3.25	A	4.00	100	Ebnet	ASD	1:51	2/15/80
1	-	•	•	3.25	300	ASD	RJS	1:46	2/15/80
23.1	.75	3.25	A	4.00	100	Novack	ASD	12:32	2/15/80
19.2	•625	3.25	A	3.875	250	Hecimovic	ASD	11:38	2/15/80
19.2	•625	3.25	A	3.875	1000	Mueffelman	ASD	11:34	2/15/80
23.1	.75	3.25	A	4.00	100	Knapp	ASD	11:20	2/15/80
23.1	• 75	3.25	A	4.00	100	Goldman	ASD	11:19	2/15/80
23.1	•75	3.25	A	4.00	100	Kulijewicz	ASD	11:17	2/15/80
23.1	.75	3.25	А	4.00	200	Cheney	ASD	11:12	2/15/80
6.7	.25	3.75	В	4.00	100	Miller	ASD	3:01	2/14/80
6.7	. 25	3.75	В	4.00	200	Crowley	ASD	2:29	/14
ω w	.125	3.75	В	3.875	200	Chipley	ASD	1:51	/14
6.7	. 25	3.75	В	4.00	500	Rees	ASD	12:59	2/14/80
6.7	. 25	3.75	В	4.00	800	McGraw	ASD	12:34	
6.7	. 25	3.75	В	4.00	100	Frable	ASD	11:17	14
6.7	.25	3.75	В	4.00	300	Fleming	ASD	11:16	2/14/80
}									
ω ω	.125	3.75	Α	3.875	100	Carlson	ASD	2:59	2/13/80
1	ı	1	1	3.75	50	ГЧ	RJS	12:25	2/13/80
PERCENTAGE	PER SHARE	PER SHARE	COMPUTATION	SHARE	SHARES	BUYER	SELLER	TIME	Mo/Dy/Yr.
	ACTUAL MARK UP	BASE	METHOD OF	PRICE	NUMBER OF				

APPENDIX A

2/28/80	/28/		2/28/80		· •	`	2/28/80	1/11/00	2/27/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/26/80	2/25/80	2/25/80	2/25/80	09/77/7	00/22/2	2/22/80		2/21/80	2/21/80	2/21/80	Mo/Dy/Yr.	
2:52	2:51	2:47	12:51	11:06	10:56	10:53	9:39	10000	10.00	3:24	2:37	2:35	2:32	2:31	2:29	1:49	10:56	10:55	1:22	12:17	10:34	#C:1	1,50	1:14		2:59	2:59	12:45	TIME	
ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD		USA	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	AUD	ASD	ASD		ASD	ASD	ASD	SELLER	
Radke	Peterson	Binek	Anderson	Osum	Esterka	Schlotec	Morris	S CALL CONTRACTOR	Schroeder	Fink	Douvier	Sund	01esch	Manka	Anderson	Wagner	Johnson	Beck	DW	Hannon	Gleixner	ragne	Pentoro	Ziller		Schaefer	Braun	DW	BUYER	
400	250	150	100	1000	700	200	500		350	100	80	200	200	700	1000	100	100	250	200	200	100	130	150	1000	l	125	140	300	SHARES	NUMBER OF
4.50	4.50	4.625	4.375	4.125	4.375	4.375	4.25		4.4375	4.375	4.375	4.375	4.375	4.25	4.375	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.375	4.25	4.0/0	10/0	4.25		4.375	4.375	4.25	SHARE	PRICE
В	В	₿	В	В	В	В	В		0	В	В	B	В	В	В	В	В	В	•	A	A	0	ם ני	של		A	A		COMPUTATION	METHOD OF
4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25		4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	-	4.25	4.25	C7.ħ	200	4.25		4.25	4.25	-	PER SHARE	BASE
. 25	. 25	.375	.125	NONE	.125	.125	NONE		1875	. 125	.125	.125	.125	NONE	.125	NONE	NONE	NONE		.125	NONE	C71.	C21.	NONE		.125	.125	1	PER SHARE	ACTUAL MARK UP
5.9	5.9	8.8	2.9	NONE	2.9	2.9	NONE		4.4	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	NONE	2.9	NONE	NONE	NONE	1	2.9	NONE	2.9	2.9	NONE		2.9	2.9	1	PERCENTAGE	

NUMBER PALCE PART PART
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES
NUMBER N
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59
NOMBER OF
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100 9:31 ASD Lincoln 100 9:56 ASD McGill 500 1:47 ASD Johnson 100 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Hobot 400 1:24 ASD Bergman 200
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500 9:56 ASD Johnson 100 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Hobot 400 11:24 ASD Bergman 200
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100 9:31 ASD Lincoln 100 9:56 ASD McGill 500 - AMS DW 400 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Rhode 200 9:29 ASD DB 200
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500 9:56 ASD Johnson 100 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Rhode 200 1:48 ASD Hobot 400
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500 9:56 ASD Johnson 100 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Rhode 200 3:38 ASD Hobot 400
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500 9:56 ASD Johnson 100 1:47 ASD Berglund 200 1:47 ASD Rhode 200
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500 9:56 ASD Johnson 100 - AMS DW 400
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500 9:56 ASD Johnson 100
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100 9:31 ASD McGill 500
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100 8:59 ASD Lincoln 100
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100 8:59 ASD Bigler 100
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES 8:59 ASD Beecher 100
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES
OF OF CHARPS

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3/12/80	3/12/80	3/12/80	3/12/80	3/12/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	3/11/80	- 1	<u>(</u> 01/	3/10/80	3/10/80	3/10/80	3/10/80	3/10/80	3/10/80	3/07/80	3/07/80	/07,	3/07/80	3/07/80	/07/	3/07/80	2,00,00	3/06/80	3/06/80	3/06/80	3/06/80	Mo/Dy/Yr.		
1:36	1:30	1:08	12:49	10:08	2:56	2:50	2:10	1:13	11:35	9:52	9:49	9:22		2:39	1:20	12:32	11:17	11:17	11:08	10:51	10:10	9:55	9:12	9:11	9:10	9:07	-		11:0	9:51	9:50	9:49	TIME		
ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	RJS	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	· [ASD	RJS	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD		ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	SELLER		
Yurczyk	Wagner	Guanella	Callstrum	Bauman	Torgerson	Burkel	ASD	Johnson	Morrissette	Hall, R.	Hall	Silver		Tidquist	ASD	Larson	Johnson	Buehler	Kjeseth	Fitzgerald	Nissen	Smith	Kanta	Jung	Kuettel	Struyk	Odegaar		- 1	Brandes, T.	Brandes, R.	Frenzel	BUYER		
2000	100	100	200	100	500	500	800	400	100	200	1000	1000		100	440	300	100	200	1000	200	150	100	100	200	550	500	100		100	100	100	100	SHARES	OF	NIMBER
5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.875	5.00	5.00	4.25	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.9375	4.75		4.75	4.25	5.00	4.875	4.875	4.75	5.00	4.50	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.50		4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50	SHARE	PER	4010E
A	A	A	A	A	A	A	ı	A	A	A	A	A		Ā	1	A	A	A	A	A	В	В	В	В	В	В	В		1 (A	A	A	COMPUTATION	OF	METEOD
4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.25	ı	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25		4.25	1	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75			4.75	4.75	4.75	PER SHARE	PRICE	BACE
•50	•50	• 50	•50	.375	.75	.75	1	.75	• 50	.50	.6875	•50		•50	1	.75	.625	•625	•50	.75	NONE	. 25	THON	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE		f	NONE	HONE	NONE	PER SHARE	MARK UP	ACM IAT
11.1	11.1	11.1	11.1	8.3	17.6	17.6	t	17.6	11.8	11.8	16.2	11.8		11.8	1	17.6	14.7	14.7	11.8	17.6	NONE	5.3	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE		1	NONE	NONE	NONE	PERCENTAGE		

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			or \$3.00 under Method C.	base price	Lated on a l	No saies nad mark ups over 10% carculated on a	nad mark up	NO Sales	3/21/80
		under Method C.	of \$	base price	ulated on a	s over 10% calcu	No sales had mark ups over 10%	No sales	3/20/80
NONE	NONE	4.75	C	4.25	200	1 1	ASD	1	3/20/80
5.8	. 25	4.50	В	4.75	100	Esser	ASD	•	3/19/80
NONE	NONE	4.50	A	4.25	100	Musser	ASD	1:57	3/18/80
5.8	.25	4.50	A	4.75	100	Verby	ASD	1:55	3/18/80
5.8	• 25	4.50	A	4.75	1000	Groger	ASD	1:21	3/18/80
5.8	.25	4.50	A	4.75	200	Saari	ASD	11:01	/18,
ı	1	-	-	4.50	100	EJ	AMS	10:24	
5.8	.25	4.50	A	4.75	400	Hemmer	ASD	10:21	3/18/80
					200	1 100	į	100	
•	1	1	1	4.375	200	USA	SWA	1.37	3/17/80
8.6	.375	4.375	Ā	4.75	200	Meyers	ASD	12:59	3/17/80
14.3	•625	4.375	В	5.00	1000	Stadheim	ASD	2:49	
11.4	•50	4.375	В	4.875	500	Omdahl	ASD	2:45	`
14.3	•625	4.375	В	5.00	100	Palmer	ASD	11:41	3/14/80
11.8	.50	4.25	A	4.75	1000	Lear	ASD	3:09	3/13/80
17.6	•75	4.25	A	5.00	400	Evans	ASD	3:05	3/13/80
		-	1	4.25	1000	ASD	RJS	10:01	3/13/80
17.6	.75	4.25	A	5.00	500	Hiar	ASD	9:27	3/13/80
							- (
11.1	•50	4.50	A	5.00	200	Klock	ASD	2:44	3/12/80
11.1	.50	4.50	A	5.00	100	Belew	ASD	2:40	3/12/80
;			t	4.50	100	ASD	AMS	2:11	3/12/80
PERCENTAGE	PER SHARE	PER SHARE	COMPUTATION	SHARE	SHARES	BUYER	SELLER	TIME	Mo/Dy/Yr.
	ACTUAL MARK UP	BASE PRICE	METHOD OF	PRICE PER	NUMBER OF				
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COMPUTATION OF MARK UPS OF COMMON STOCK OF A.T. BLISS & COMPANY IN SALES BY ASD TO ITS RETAIL CUSTOMERS*

7.1	.25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Weber	ASD	2:17	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50		3.75	100	Knoke	ASD	2:16	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	C	3.75	200	Jacobson	ASD	2:16	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	2	3.75	200	Janson	ASD	2:15	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	C	3.75	500	Welter Co.	ASD	2:14	6/04/80
NONE	NONE	3.50	С	3.50	100	Knudsen	ASD	2:14	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	С	3.75	500	Stadheim	ASD	2:13	6/04/80
7.1	. 25	3.50	С	3.75	500	Grossfield	ASD	2:12	6/04/80
7.1	•25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Schendel	ASD	2:11	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	С	3.75	100	Goodwater	ASD	2:04	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Henricks	ASD	1:55	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	C	3.75	500	Oglansky	ASD	1:54	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	С	3.75	500	Schlee	ASD	1:52	6/04/80
7.1	•25	3.50	С	3.75	500	Hlavac	ASD	1:51	6/04/80
NONE	ENON	3.50	С	3.25	200	Kaiser	ASD	10:41	6/04/80
7.1	.25	3.50	_ C	3.75	200	Senn	ASD	ı	6/04/80
NONE	NONE	3.50	С	3.25	200	Friederichs	ASD	ı	6/04/80
PERCENTAGE	PER SHARE	PER SHARE	COMPUTATION	SHARE	OF SHARES	BUYER	SELLER	TIME	Mo/Dy/Yr.
٠	ACTUAL	BASE	METHOD	PRICE	NUMBER				

Mark Up Methods

- \triangleright First Priority - Same day highest prices charged by ASD in sales to other dealers.
- W ı Second Priority - Highest prices charged by ASD in sales to other dealers on the business day preceding or succeeding sales by ASD to customers.
- a Third Priority - Highest asked quotations of ASD appearing on same day as the sales by ASD to customers.
- Does not include retail sales to customers if mark up according to Division's calculations was less than 10%.

ABBREVIATIONS

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6/04/80	04	04,	/04/	6/04/80	04,	6/04/80	/04,	6/04/80	6/04/80		6/04/80	40	/04/80	/80	/04/80	/04/80		\dashv	6/04/80	+		/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	/04/80	88	6/04/80	Mo/Dy/Yr.	
2:41	2:41	2:40	2:39	2:39	2:39	2:38	2:37	2:36	2:35	2:35	2:34	2:34	2:33	2:28	2:23	2:23	2:23	2:23	2:22	2:20	2:20	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:19	2:18	2:18	TIME	
ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	SELLER	
Gray	Eik	Larson	Stanley	Polis	Eliasson	Wandtke	Morris	Smischney	Fuch	Dahlman	Townsend	Hecimovic	Bjornson	Person	Treat	Pillard	Falkum	Carlson	Lougue	Moline	Brandt	Plunkett	Harmon	Goblish	Fitzgerald	Czola	Blum	Berghoff	Arnt	Anderson	Anderson	Vaa	Anderson	BUYER	
400	300	300	100	200	200	200	200	T00	200	100	200	2000	100	200	100	300	100	500	500	200	200	450	200	200	200	200	100	200	400	200	200	2000	500	OF SHARES	ואטוישטאו
3.75	3.40	3.40	3.75	3.75	3./5	3.75	3.75	3./5	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	PER SHARE	FIVICE
C		0								2 (0	C		C	C	C	0	C	0	C	C	C	C	C	C	С	C	C	C	C	C	C	С	OF COMPUTATION	
3.50	3.50	3,50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3 0.00	30.00	3 50	3 000	500	3 50	3.50	3 4 50	3.50	3.50	3,50	3.50	3,50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3,50	3.50	3.50	3.50	PER SHARE	
.23	NONE	NONE	.22	25.0	35.	27.0	200	35	200	25.	20.	2.25	22	25.	22.0	22.	25.	NONE	22.	27.	225	225	. 25	25	225	22.0	. 25	. 25	.25	. 25	. 25	25	. 25	PER SHARE	
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	I TACINE	FINCH	1.1	7 1	7 1	7.1	7-1	7 7	7 1	7 1	7 1	7.1	7 -	7.1	7.1	7	7.1	NONE	1.1	7.1	71	7 1	1 /• L	7.1]	7.1	J /-	\. -	\. -	7.1	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	7.1	7.1	PERCENTAGE	

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	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	200	Niethammer	ASD	10:12	6/05/80
	NONE	4.00	C	3.75	200	Smutka	ASD	10:09	6/05/80
	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	350	Babcock	ASD	9:52	6/05/80
	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	100	Carlson	ASD	9:05	6/05/80
ı	ļ								
ı	•25	3,50	С	3.75	200	Curtis	ASD	3:23	6/04/80
ļ	.25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Kraus	ASD	3:20	6/04/80
	• 25	3,50	C	3.75	1000	Cadmus	ASD	3:15	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	C	3.75	2500	Slettemoen	ASD	3:13	6/04/80
	NONE	3.50	С	3.50	500	Sec Vent.	ASD	3:12	6/04/80
	25	3.50	C	3.75	200	Jefferson	ASD	3:11	/04,
	NONE	3.50	C	3.25	500	Hennings	ASD	3:10	2
	.25	3.50	a	3.75	1000	Cadmus	ASD	3:10	04
	NONE	3.50	C	3.50	1200	Price	ASD	3:09	04
	NONE	3.50	C	3.50	500	Healy	ASD	3:07	04,
	•25	3.50	C	3.75	150	Ackele	ASD	3:03	04,
	. 25	3.50	C	3.75	400	Doherty	ASD	3:02	04
	NONE	3.50	С	3.50	1000	Schaal	ASD	3:00	6/04/80
	.25	3.50	C	3.75	100	Alfords	ASD	2:59	6/04/80
	.25	3.50	C	3.75	450	Zeigler	ASD	2:58	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	C	3.75	200	Pederson	ASD	2:58	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	С	3.75	100	Messerli	ASD	2:57	6/04/80
	. 25	3.50	C	3.75	100	Atlas	ASD	2:56	6/04/80
	•25	3.50	C	3.75	200	Ryan	ASD	2:55	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	C	3.75	200	Bailey	ASD	2:55	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	C	3.75	200	Beecher	ASD	2:54	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Bernstein	ASD	2:53	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Bohanon	ASD	2:52	6/04/80
	. 25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Stacki	ASD	2:47	6/04/80
	NONE	3.50	C	3.30	200	Schwartz	ASD	2:47	6/04/80
	•25	3.50	С	3.75	100	Syring	ASD	2:43	6/04/80
	•25	3.50	С	3.75	200	Donnelly	ASD	2:43	6/04/80
	• 25	3.50	С	3.75	100	Frable	ASD	2:42	6/04/80
	ACTUAL MARK UP PER SHARE	BASE PRICE PER SHARE	METHOD OF COMPUTATION	PRICE PER SHARE	NUMBER OF SHARES	BUYER	SELLER	TIME	Mo/Dy/Yr.

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מי לענים			
CHADEC	Q	NUMBER	
CHARF	PER	PRICE	
NOTERATION	OF	METHOD	
PER SHARE	PRICE	BASE	
PER SHARE	MARK UP	ACTUAL	
PERCENTAGE			

06/	3	8	8	6/06/80	6/06/80	6/06/80	6/06/80	6/06/80	6/06/80	9		જ્રી	6/06/80	6/06/80	6/06/80	6/06/80		6/05/80	6/05/80	6/05/80	05	6/05/80	6/05/80	6/05/80	6/05/80	6/05/80	6/05/80	3		3	6/05/80	6/05/80	6/05/80	Mo/Dy/Yr.	
3:57	3:57	3:56	3:55	3:53	3:53	12:37	11:10	11:09	11:09	11:02	11:01	10:57	9:36	9:34	9:32	1		3:50	3:20	3:16	3:02	2:33	2:10	1:19	1:09	12:20	11:49	10:54	10:52	10:43	10:30	10:28	10:25	TIME	
ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD		ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	SELLER	
Swomi	Busyn	Smiley	Linsmayer	Silberman	Rhode	Derosier	Rosenberger	Fryer	Boun	Dixon	Hynes	Amundson	Chandler	Suderman	Bremer	Ветт		Bartholow	Howard	Strangis	Sec. Vent	Thompson	Stuhr	Dubiel	Kranz	Vodonik	McQuay	Coh1	Lear	Eriksen	Nelson	Boyd	Ducos	BUYER	
500	300	500	500	1000	200	350	100	300	300	200	200	100	300	500	500	500	500	100	100	1000	100	300	300	150	200	1000	100	100	200	200	200	. 300	400	OF SHARES	NUMBER
3.75	3.75	3./5	3./5	3.75	3./5	3.50	3./5	3./5	3./5	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.625	20.70	7	3.75	3./5	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.75	3./5	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.50	PER	PRICE
С	С										C	C	C) C		2	C		2 (C	C			C	C	C	С	С	C	C	C	С	OF	METHOD
4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	*•00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	***	4.00	200	4 00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	PRICE PER SHARE	BASE
NONE	NONE	MONE	MONE	INCINE	INONE	NONE	NONE	INCINE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	TACKE TO THE	NONE	NO.E	HONE	INONE	INONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	MARK UP PER SHARE	ACTUAL
NONE	INCINE	NO.	NONE	NOW	NONE	NONE	MONE	ENCE.	NONE	NONE	NO.NE.	NONE	INONE	TONE	MONE	FINCE	NONE	INONE		NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	PERCENTAGE	

APPENDIX B

METHOD BASE ACTUAL OF PRICE MARK UP OF PRICE MARK UP OF PRICE PRICE MARK UP B 3.4375 .3125 .4375 B 3.4375 .4375 .3125 B 3.4375 .3125 .3125 B 3.4375		.40/0	3.43/5	8	3.875	100	Altstatt	ASD	3:08	6/09/80
Marie Mari	130	1750	3.43/3	B	3.75	350	Eager	ASD	3:07	6/09/80
TIME SELLER SHYER SHARES SHAR	9	2125	3.43/3		3.875	100	Berg	ASD	3:07	옔
Time Seller Sel	10 7	1375	3,4375	5 00	3.75	500	Pink	ASD	3:06	6/09/80
TINE SELLER SUYER SHARES SHAR	٥١	10105	3.43/3	, &	3.75	100	Ernst	ASD	3:06	6/09/80
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PASE ACTUAL	٥١	20105	2 42/2		3.75	200	Bruellman	ASD	3:06	9
TIME SEILERR SUYER SHARES OF PRUCE PRUCE ARK UP PRUCE COF PRUCE CO	9	3015	3 /375	שׁל	3./5	100	Prins	ASD	3:05	9
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA	ا ا	3777	3 /375	שׁ	3.8/5	TOO	Guanella	ASD	3:05	<u>}</u>
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE OF PER OF PER SHARE SHARE OF PER SHARE SHARE OF PER SHARE	12.7	4375	3 /375	J U	3./5	100 100	Craig	ASD	3:05	/ 09/
TITME SEILER BUYER SHARES SHARE OF PER OF PER OF PER SHARE SHARE SHARE SHARE OF PER SHARE PE	9.	3125	3 /375	J 0	3.75	100 T00	Larson	ASD	3:04	6/09/80
Number PRICE NETHOD PASE ACTUAL	9.]	37.75	2 /275	ש	3.8/5	100 T00	Hall	ASD	3:04	6/09/80
TIME SEILER SUYER SHARE SHAR	12.7	4375	2 /375	ש	3.75	100 T00	Greger	ASD	3:04	6/09/80
TIINE SEILLER SUYER SHARES SHARE S	9	3775	3 /375	5 0	3./5	200	Titus	ASD	3:03	6/09/80
TIME SEILER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA	9.]	3125	3 /375	שומ	3.75	200	Bergland	ASD	3:03	
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA	9.1	2127	3 /375	J (4	3.8/5	100	Beck	ASD	3:03	/09/
TIME SELLER BUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER	12.7	7775	3 /375		3.75	100	Pederson	ASD	3:02	9
TIME SEILER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA		3015	3 4375	שונ	3./5	200	Forsythe	ASD	3:01	9
MIMBER PRICE METHOD BASE ACTUAL OF PER OF PER OF PER OF PRICE MARK UP PR	9.1	2175	3.43/5	W	3.75	2000	Vaa	ASD	3:00	9
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA	0 1	1010	3.43/3	t	3.875	100	Paper	ASD	2:59	6/09/80
TIME SEILER BUYER SHARES SHARE OF PER SHARE DE	1.07	.3125	3.43/5	В	3.75	100	Cunnion	ASD	2:59	6/09/80
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHARES SHARE	9.1	.3125	3.43/5	В	3.75	200	Johnson	ASD	2:58	6/09/80
NIME PRICE METHOD BASE ACTUAL OF PER OF PER OF PER OF PRICE MARK UP PRIC	12./	.43/5	3,43/5	В	3.875	100	Gleixner	ASD	2:58	6/09/80
TIME SEILER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA	1.0.1	.3125	3.43/5	В	3.75	200	Luby	ASD	2:57	ૢૢૢૢૢૢૺ
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE SHA	12./	.43/5	3.4375	В	3.875	100	Ì	ASD	2:57	
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE ACTUAL	19.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	300	Ī	ASD	2:56	
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER OF PER OF PRICE MARK UP PER STARE	9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	200		ASD	2.55	
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE SHARE	9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	300		ASD	2.54	6/09/80
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER SHARE	9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	200	Ryan	ASD	2.54	08/09/80
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER SHARE	9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	200	Lvden	ASD	2.53	6/05/05
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER PER SHARE PER SHARE	12.7	.4375	3.4375	В	3.875	150	Leader	ASD	2:53	
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER COMPUTATION PER SHARE P	19.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	200	Kellett	ASD	2:52	
TIME SELLER SUYER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER SHARE	12./	.43/5	3.4375	В	3.875	100	Sund	ASD	2:51	9
TIME SELLER SHARES SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER SHARE 2:48 ASD Carlson 300 3.75 B 3.4375 .3125	12./	.43/5	3.4375	В	3.875	100	Olesh	ASD	2:51	9
NUMBER PRICE METHOD BASE ACTUAL OF PER OF PRICE MARK UP OF SHARE COMPUTATION PER SHARE PER SHARE	9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	300	Carlson	ASD	2:48	9
PRICE METHOD BASE ACTUAL PER OF PRICE MARK UP	PERCENTA	PEK SHAKE	PER SHARE	COMPUTATION	SHARE	SHARES	BUYER	SELLER	TIME	Mo/Dy/Yr.
PRICE METHOD BASE		MARK UP	PRICE	OF.	PER	OF				
		ACTUAL	BASE	METHOD	PRICE	NUMBER				

APPENDIX B

6/11/80	6/11/80	6/11/80	6/11/80	/11,	$/11_{c}$	6/11/80	/11,	/11/	6/11/80	6/11/80	6/11/80	6/11/80		/01/		6/10/80	6/10/80	6/10/80	6/10/80		6/10/80	6/10/80	6/10/80		/10	6/10/80	/10		6/10/80		6/10/80	6/10/80	6/10/80	6/10/80	Mo/Dy/Yr.
11:44	11:34	11:31	11:28	11:27	11:22	11:22	11:17	11:12	11:00	10:57	10:56	9:15		3:27	3:11	2:31	2:30	2:24	2:23	2:06	2:00	1:50	1:38	1:33	1:32	1:32	1:31	1:28	11:58	11:52	11:52	11:50	11:43	11:13	TIME
ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	1	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	SELLER
Kniefel	Groger	Sodergren	Karels	Johnson	Silver	Cumings	Stemmer	Zeigler	Sorenson	McCumber	Beggin	Chelgren		Torgerson	Parsons	Gaffney	Halverson	Maxwell	Hanson	Nyberg	Sec. Vent	Hart	Cuneo	Tullis	Garber	Fisher	Schaal	Farley	Falkum	Callstrum	Anderson	Krumwiede	Kopas	RJS	BUYER
200	400	100	200	500	300	300	200	150	1000	1500	100	2000		300	200	1000	200	500	500	1000	400	100	200	250	200	200	1000	500	400	200	200	100	100	2000	NUMBER OF SHARES
3,75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.875	3.75	3.75	3.875	3.75		3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.875	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.5625	3.75	3.75	3.875	3.875	3.4375	PRICE PER SHARE
В	В	В	В	В	В	B	В	В	В	В	В	В	ļ	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	ı	METHOD OF COMPUTATION
3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375		3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	3.4375	1	BASE PRICE PER SHARE
.3125	.3125	•3125	.3125	.3125	.3125	•3125	.3125	.4375	.3125	•3125	.4375	.3125		•3125	.3125	.3125	.3125	.3125	.3125	•3125	.3125	.4375	.3125	•3125	.3125	•312 5	•3125	•3125	.125	•3125	•3125	.4375	.4375	ı	ACTUAL MARK UP PER SHARE
9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	12.7	9.1	9.1	12.7	9.1		9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	12.7	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1	3.6	9.1	9.1	12.7	12.7	•	PERCENTAGE

12.5	.4375	3,50	В	3.9375	100	Anderson, H.	ASD	3:15	/13
12.5	.4375	3.50	В	3.9375	700	Rosenberg	ASD	2:50	6/13/80
12.5	.4375	3.50	В	3.9375	100	Swanson	ASD	2:10	6/13/80
12.5	.4375	3.50	В	3.9375	200	Duoos	ASD	12:50	6/13/80
10.7	.375	3.50	В	3.875	300	Kellaher	ASD	11:29	6/13/80
12.5	.4375	3.50	В	3.9375	1000	Vodonik	ASD	11:26	6/13/80
12.5	.4375	3.50	В	3.9375	300	Boyd	ASD	11:25	6/13/80
10.7	.375	3.50	В	3.875	300	Besaw	ASD	11:23	6/13/80
10.7	.375	3.50	В	3.875	200	Fink	ASD	11:15	6/13/80
		.							
NONE	NONE	4.00	C	3.75	200	Bergquist	ASD	3:05	6/12/80
NONE	HONE	4.00	С	3.875	500	Strobel	ASD	3:00	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	2	3.50	4000	Turner	CLSA	2:07	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	200	Stabnow	dSA	10:24	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	C	3.75	200	Rhein	ASD	10:22	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	200	Bremer	ASD	10:21	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	800	Kranz	ASD	10:16	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	200	Millar	ASD	10:15	/12/
NONE	NONE	4.00	C	3.75	200	Higgins	ASD	10:14	6 12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	400	Stahn	ASD	10:12	/12,
NONE	HONE	4.00	C	3.75	800	Hecimovich	ASD	10:01	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	300	Zillgitt	ASD	9:33	6/12/80
NONE	NONE	4.00	С	3.75	300	Palmquist	ASD	9:33	6/12/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	500	Stafford	ASD	3:58	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	300	Busyn	ASD	3:29	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3,75	250	Pederson	ASD	2:47	71
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	100	Sullivan	ASD	2:38	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	200	01son	ASD	2:37	6/11/80
1.8	.0625	3.4375	В	3.50	500	Matson	ASD	2:13	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	600	Margolis	ASD	2:11	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	B	3.75	400	Carlson	ASD	1:50	6/11/80
12.7	.4375	3.4375	В	3.875	100	Ekberg	ASD	1:39	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	300	Murphy	ASD	12:51	6/11/80
9.1	.3125	3.4375	В	3.75	100	Melby	ASD	11:56	6/11/80
PERCENTAGE	PER SHARE	PEK SHAKE	COMPUTATION	SHAKE	SHARES	はこれに大	SELLEX	TIME	MO/DY/Yr.
	MARK UP	PRICE	OF	PER	OF) i i i	-	:
	ACTUAL	BASE	METHOD	PRICE	NUMBER				

APPENDIX B

6/18/80) 	18	/18	6/18/80	6/18/80		/18,	6/18/80		6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	6/17/80	.	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	6/16/80	Mo/Dy/Yr.	
2:50	2:13	1:54	1:50	11:11	10:37	10:21	9:07	9:00	100	2.56	2:41	2:41	2:41	2:41	2:39	2:18	2:17	2:03	11:54	11:53	11:28		2:30	2:25	2:23	2:08	1:37	11:21	9:49	9:44	9:36	9:33	TIME	
ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	1 1000	ASI	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD		ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	ASD	SELLER	-
Rosenberg	Stabnow	Swann	Babcock	Blazei	Peterson	Schweger	Bergman	Bard	R) Cash	Rohr	Spletter	Southdale, Inc	Schenefeld	Goett1	Stadheim	Wellner	Jernberg	Johnson	Vold	Grayson	Hughes		Ahlm	Chard	Pederson	RJS	Saltzman	Folstad	Foley	Dusich	Connor	Eliasson	BUYER	-
700	1100	300	500	200	2000	1000	100	300		100	800	200	300	400	500	500	200	200	500	500	200		800	250	100	500	500	500	100	200	500	250	SHARES	NUMBER OF
3.9375	3.875	3.875	3.75	3.875	3.875	3.875	3.875	3.875		3 875	3.875	3.875	3.875	3.875	3.75	3.75	3.875	3.875	3.875	3.875	3.875		3.75	3.9375	3.9375	3.50	3.9375	3.9375	3.9375	3.9375	3.9375	3.875	SHARE	PRICE PER
00	0	C	C	С	Ċ	С	C	C	t	꼬	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В		A	A	A	Α	Α	A	A	Α	A	A	COMPUTATION	METHOD OF
4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4 0	2 50	3,50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50		3.50	3.50	3.50	1	3.50	3,50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	PER SHARE	BASE PRICE
NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE		375	.375	.375	.375	.375	.25	.25	.375	.375	.375	.375	.375		. 25	.4375	.4375	1	.4375	.4375	.4375	.4375	.4375	.375	PER SHARE	ACTUAL MARK UP
NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	100	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.7	7.1	7.1	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.7		7.1	12.5	12.5		12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	10.7	PERCENTAGE	

7/18/80 th		7/17/80	7/17/80		7/16/80		6/20/80 th		6/19/80	6/19/80	6/19/80		6/18/80		M / 7x / V -	
rough 7/31		11:41	11:27	11:15	10ugh 7/15	rough 7/15,	2:55	12:19	11:11	11:11	3:12	Į.	TIME			
/80 ALL CALCU		ASD	ASD		ASD		/80 ALL CALC		ASD	ASD	ASD		ASD		CFILED	
18/80 through 7/31/80 ALL CALCULATIONS UNDER 10% Using the offering price		Doop	Mattella		Peterson		ULATIONS UNDER 10% Using th	Potter	Busyn	Fryer		Anderson, D.	DOLLER	l grwsp		
0% Using th		200	600		250			600	300	300		100	CIFE	OF OF	NUMBER	
ne offering		3.875	3.75		3.875		the offerin		3.875	3.75	3.75		3.9375	O. E. M.	PER	PRICE
1.7		C	C		С		6/20/80 through 7/15/80 ALL CALCULATIONS UNDER 10% Using the offering price of \$4.00 under Method C as the base price.		С	С	С		С	COURTINITION	OF GOWDINAMINATION	METHOD
of \$4.00 under Method C as the base price.		4.00	4.00		4.00				4.00	4.00	4.00		4.00	F DIV COPPACE	PRICE	BASE
as the base		NONE	NONE		NONE		C as the base		NONE	NONE	NONE		NONE	F CIV OLDANGS	MARK UP	ACTUAL
price.	ü	NONE	NONE		NONE	.	price.		NONE	NONE	NONE		NONE	FUNCTIATION	DEDC FAMILY CE	