

1 HELANE L. MORRISON (State Bar No. 127752)
2 JAMES A. HOWELL (State Bar No. 92721)
3 MICHAEL S. DICKE (State Bar No. 158187)
4 SUSAN F. LAMARCA (State Bar No. 215231)

5 Attorneys for Plaintiff
6 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
7 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 1100
8 San Francisco, California 94104
9 Telephone (415) 705-2500
10 Facsimile (415) 705-2501

**ORIGINAL
FILED**

JUN 26 2002

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY _____
DEPUTY CLERK

11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIV.S- 02 - 1395 LKK JFM

11 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE) Civil Action No.
12 COMMISSION,)
13 Plaintiff,)
14 vs.)
15 GREGORY P. WALDON,)
16 Defendant.)

17
18 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") alleges:

19 **SUMMARY OF THE ACTION**

20 1. From at least January 1998 through November 2001, Gregory P. Waldon,
21 a Redding, California broker, defrauded scores of retirees by recommending that they replace
22 one variable annuity with a similar variable annuity, knowing that the customers would either
23 receive no economic benefit or lose money in the transaction. By "switching" variable annuities
24 in this manner Waldon profited at the expense of his customers. Waldon received approximately
25 \$275,000 in ill-gotten commissions from approximately 57 instances of switching, while his

1 courses of business constituting the violations alleged herein occurred within the Eastern District
2 of California.

3 7. Pursuant to Local Rule 3-120(b), commencement of this action in this
4 Court sitting in Sacramento, California is appropriate because a substantial part of the events that
5 give rise to the claims occurred in Butte County, Shasta County and Tehama County, California.

6 **THE DEFENDANT**

7 8. **Gregory P. Waldon**, age 50, resides in Redding, California. From at
8 least January 1998 until approximately February 2002, Waldon was a registered representative
9 associated successively with four different broker-dealers, each of which was registered with the
10 Commission pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)]. For the
11 majority of this period, from approximately March 1998 until approximately May 2001, Waldon
12 was a registered representative of FASCO International, Inc. ("FASCO"), a registered broker-
13 dealer and member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") then
14 headquartered in Chico, California. Waldon holds a Series 6 (Investment Company/Variable
15 Products Representative) license issued by the NASD. Waldon sometimes used the fictitious
16 business name "Legacy Senior Services" for promotions of variable annuity products.

17 **VARIABLE ANNUITIES AND SWITCHING**

18 9. During the period January 1998 to November 2001, Waldon sold the
19 variable annuity contracts of several separate annuity companies. Variable annuities are
20 securities that are long-term investments. Variable annuities may be sold to customers through
21 registered representatives associated with broker-dealers. The companies that issue variable
22 annuities are typically insurance companies, and the variable annuity contracts include
23 insurance-related features.

24 10. Variable annuities are often sold as an alternative to mutual funds. Like
25 mutual funds, customers may purchase a variable annuity with a single, up-front investment, or

1 by transferring funds from another investment. Also like mutual funds, purchasers may buy a
2 variable annuity with the goal that, over time, their investment will appreciate in value. Unlike
3 mutual funds, variable annuities provide for deferral of federal income taxes on investment gains
4 until those gains are withdrawn. In addition, variable annuities allow the customer to elect
5 annuity payments, which are periodic income payments made on an agreed schedule based upon
6 the value of the annuity that usually do not begin until more than a year after the initial
7 investment. Variable annuities also provide for a payment to a designated beneficiary upon the
8 customer's death (the "death benefit").

9 11. A variable annuity allows the customer to select how his or her funds are
10 invested. The customer applies the funds in the variable annuity to purchase "units" of a
11 "separate account" established by the annuity company. Each separate account is an entity that
12 is required to register with the Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15
13 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, et seq.]. The separate account pools customer funds and invests the pooled
14 funds in specific types of securities. Under the terms of the variable annuity contracts, customers
15 are permitted to apportion their investments among different investment "subaccounts" within
16 the separate account – essentially different investment programs similar to mutual funds – and to
17 make transfers among the subaccounts, usually without incurring any additional fees. For
18 example, a customer might choose to allocate her investment between two subaccounts, with half
19 allocated to an equity growth fund and the other half to a corporate bond fund.

20 12. Switching variable annuities – that is, selling one variable annuity and
21 reinvesting the proceeds in another variable annuity offered by a different annuity company –
22 subjects customers to additional costs. The annuity companies assess a penalty – called a
23 "surrender charge" – if during the first several years of ownership (the "surrender period") the
24 customer surrenders the annuity for cash, withdraws funds in excess of the contract limits, or
25 switches the annuity for another company's annuity. These surrender charges are highest during

1 the initial two years of the surrender period and typically decrease during the rest of the
2 surrender period. The surrender charge is eliminated altogether by the end of the surrender
3 period, typically 5 to 8 years after purchase. When a customer switches his variable annuity for
4 another variable annuity during the surrender period, the original variable annuity issuer deducts
5 the surrender charge from the funds in the annuity and transfers the balance of the customer's
6 funds to the new annuity company. The customer then starts a new surrender period under the
7 new variable annuity, thereby often extending the time during which the customer will be subject
8 to surrender charges.

9 WALDON'S DUTIES TO CUSTOMERS

10 13. As a registered representative of four broker-dealers at various times, each
11 of which was a member of the NASD, Waldon was required to adhere to rules established by the
12 NASD concerning fair practices in the sales of securities. Waldon was required, in
13 recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, to have reasonable
14 grounds for believing that the recommendation was suitable for such customer upon the basis of
15 the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer about his other security holdings, financial situation
16 and needs. Further, prior to completing such transactions for his customers, Waldon was
17 required to make reasonable efforts to obtain information reasonably necessary to make a
18 recommendation. Waldon was also required to determine, based on the information provided by
19 the customer and Waldon's own knowledge of the product features, that replacing an existing
20 contract with a new contract was suitable for the customer.

21 WALDON'S VIOLATIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS

22 A. **Waldon Recommended Unsuitable Switches Of Variable Annuities**

23 14. Between January 1998 and November 2001, Waldon sold variable
24 annuities to at least 43 customers in at least 57 transactions, identified in Appendix A, by
25 persuading the customers to switch from variable annuities which they already owned, usually

1 for a short period, to another variable annuity offered by a different annuity company. Each of
2 the 57 variable annuity switches was unsuitable for the customer because the customer either
3 received no overall benefit or suffered a loss of benefits from the transaction. At the same time,
4 Waldon received large commissions for each switch.

5 15. Waldon's customers were primarily individuals of moderate means and
6 limited investment experience, living in Northern California and Oregon. All but four of the
7 customers were at least 70 years old at the time of the switch, and, with one exception, all were
8 retired. (The Commission identifies these customers only by their initials to protect their
9 privacy.)

10 16. Waldon promoted variable annuities in a variety of settings, including at
11 seminars purportedly regarding estate planning, and when selling insurance-related products.
12 Through these contacts, Waldon attempted to build relationships of trust, which he exploited in
13 selling variable annuities.

14 17. During the relevant period, Waldon solicited his customers to switch to
15 variable annuities offered by five different annuity companies. Waldon made the solicitations
16 primarily through in-person presentations at his office or the customer's home. If Waldon
17 obtained the customer's oral consent for the transaction, he then completed the transaction
18 documents, obtained the customer's signature, and submitted the documents to the annuity
19 company. The customer generally also received a written prospectus from the issuer of the
20 variable annuity, either at the time of Waldon's presentation or after the customer's application
21 was submitted.

22 18. In each of the 57 variable annuity switches identified in Appendix A, the
23 customer incurred increased costs or risks from the transaction, without offsetting benefits, as
24 follows:
25

1 a. In all but three switches, the customer incurred an immediate
2 surrender charge. In most instances, the surrender charges were greater than 5
3 percent of the customer's initial investment, or as much as \$17,000. As a result
4 of each switch transaction, the customer began a new surrender period,
5 effectively increasing in most cases the amount of time the customer was
6 exposed to surrender charges.

7 b. In all of the switches, the customer selected subaccount options in
8 the new variable annuity that were very similar to those the customer had
9 selected, or which were available, under the old variable annuity contract. To the
10 extent the customers switched variable annuities in order to achieve a different
11 investment mix in their subaccounts, those customers could have done so by
12 reallocating their investments in their original variable annuity among different
13 subaccount options without incurring any additional charges.

14 c. In at least two-thirds of the transactions, the switches occurred
15 within two years after Waldon sold the customers their original variable annuity.
16 During this initial two-year period, the cost to the customer was the highest.

17 d. Each of the variable annuities sold in the switches were annuities
18 that charged surrender charges. Waldon was aware that the issuers whose
19 annuities he sold also offered variable annuities that did not impose surrender
20 charges. However, he did not recommend those annuities because the
21 commissions paid by the issuers on those products were much lower than the
22 commissions that the issuers paid on the variable annuities that imposed
23 surrender charges.

24 19. Prior to recommending that his customers switch, Waldon either
25 disregarded information he possessed about the customers suggesting that the switches were

1 unsuitable, or he failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain other information necessary for a
2 switch recommendation. For example, Waldon did not calculate or quantify the costs or the
3 purported benefits of switching. Waldon either knew or was reckless in not knowing that the
4 switches were unsuitable for the customers.

5 20. Waldon benefited substantially from the transactions. Waldon received
6 commissions, ranging in most cases from 6 to 7 percent of the value of the new annuity. In each
7 switch, the issuer of the new variable annuity paid commissions to the broker-dealer with whom
8 Waldon was affiliated. The broker-dealer, in turn, paid to Waldon approximately 90 percent of
9 the commissions it received. Because Waldon most frequently recommended switching to
10 customers whose variable annuities were greater than \$50,000, the commissions he received
11 were usually over \$5,000 on each sale, and ranged as high as approximately \$22,000. By
12 recommending unsuitable switches to his customers, Waldon placed his own interests ahead of
13 his customers.

14 **B. Waldon Made Material Misrepresentations in Connection with Variable**
15 **Annuity Sales**

16 21. From January 1998 to November 2001, Waldon made material
17 misrepresentations of fact to some or all of the 43 customers identified in Appendix A, claiming
18 that: (1) the switch was necessary or desirable to obtain better returns on the invested funds,
19 (2) the customer would obtain a greater death benefit from the switch, and (3) the customer
20 would receive a fixed interest rate over a preliminary period on the funds invested in the new
21 annuity, which would overcome any costs of switching.

22 Misrepresentations Concerning Improved Investment Returns.

23 22. Between March 2000 and August 2001, many public company stocks
24 declined in value. This decline in stock values was widely reported in the news media. For
25 many of Waldon's customers, the precipitating event leading to a switch of variable annuities

1 was the customer's concern over declines in the value of their variable annuity during this period
2 as reported either in the news media or in periodic statements of the value of their annuities.

3 23. During this period, Waldon misrepresented to almost all of the customers,
4 as identified in Appendix A, that switching was valuable, or necessary, to achieve a better return
5 on their annuities. In particular, Waldon misrepresented to these customers that switching was
6 either the best, or only, means to address the rapid losses in investment value customers
7 experienced during stock market declines in the spring of 2000 through the summer of 2001.
8 Waldon also misrepresented the purported benefits of switching.

9 24. Waldon falsely represented to these customers that switching variable
10 annuities was a reasonable means to stem losses in their investments due to a stock market
11 decline. In fact, the switches either did not offer a means to stem losses due to market declines,
12 or were not necessary for the customers to achieve this objective.

13 25. Contrary to Waldon's representations, the switches were unnecessary and
14 costly. Waldon knew, but failed to disclose to these customers, that they could transfer their
15 funds to other subaccounts, or fixed-rate options, offered under their original variable annuity to
16 obtain the type of investment plan they wanted. Waldon knew, or was reckless in not knowing,
17 that if these customers transferred their funds to different subaccounts within the same variable
18 annuity, they would not have incurred surrender charges or begun new, often extended, surrender
19 periods in the new variable annuity.

20 Misrepresentations Concerning Death Benefits.

21 26. During the period March 2000 to August 2001, Waldon misrepresented to
22 several customers, identified in Appendix A, that by switching to another variable annuity, they
23 would obtain an increase in the minimum amount of the death benefit the variable annuity
24 company would pay their beneficiaries if they died before annuity payments began (the
25

1 “minimum death benefit”). Waldon also told these customers that the increase would be greater
2 than any costs they might incur in the transaction.

3 27. Contrary to Waldon’s representations, these customers did not obtain an
4 increase in the minimum death benefit greater than their costs in switching, and most suffered a
5 reduction in the value of their minimum death benefit by switching. Waldon knew or was
6 reckless in not knowing that by switching variable annuities, these customers would suffer a
7 reduction in the minimum death benefit.

8 28. For example, Waldon solicited W&KC, a husband and wife, to purchase a
9 variable annuity from Pacific Life in June 1999 with an initial investment of approximately
10 \$99,600. Under the terms of the Pacific Life contract, if either customer died before annuity
11 payments began, the designated beneficiary would receive \$99,600 (less any withdrawals) plus
12 any investment gain. If the investment decreased in value, the beneficiary still would receive
13 \$99,600 (less any withdrawals) as the “minimum death benefit.” In June 2000, Waldon solicited
14 W&KC to switch their variable annuity to one issued by Jackson National Life. At that time, the
15 value of the investment had declined to approximately \$98,900. Pacific Life assessed a
16 surrender charge when W&KC switched their variable annuity, further reducing the amount of
17 the investment in the new variable annuity to approximately \$92,000. Thus, under the Jackson
18 National Life variable annuity contract, the “minimum death benefit” available to W&KC was
19 \$92,000. Contrary to Waldon’s representations to W&KC, they suffered a decrease of at least
20 \$7,000 in the amount of the minimum death benefit by switching.

21 Waldon Misrepresented The Value Of Dollar Cost Averaging.

22 29. During the period November 1999 to August 2001, Waldon misled
23 several customers, identified in Appendix A, by telling them that they were “guaranteed” a fixed
24 interest rate for an initial period of time after switching variable annuities, without adequately
25 disclosing to them that other factors affected the return on their investment. In making this

1 representation, Waldon referred to a contract feature in some variable annuity contracts called
2 “dollar cost averaging.”

3 30. In the variable annuity contracts Waldon promoted, the dollar cost
4 averaging programs allowed the customer to elect to put the initial payment in an account that
5 earned a fixed rate for an introductory period. Over the time period selected (either 6 or 12
6 months), a ratable portion (either 1/6th, or 1/12th) of the investment was transferred monthly into
7 the customer’s selected subaccounts.

8 31. Waldon falsely informed these customers that dollar cost averaging would
9 eliminate the risk that their accounts would further decline in value. Waldon misled customers
10 by telling them that dollar cost averaging would provide the customers an attractive,
11 “guaranteed” interest rate during the selected period. Waldon did not adequately disclose that
12 the guaranteed rate applied only to the declining portion of the investment in the fixed-rate
13 account and that the total investment return depended on the performance of the investment
14 program they selected. He knew, but did not tell these customers, that there was a risk that they
15 could lose money on the investment. He also misrepresented that the guaranteed interest rate
16 would make up for any costs incurred in switching to the new variable annuity.

17 32. Contrary to Waldon’s representations, these customers continued to
18 experience reductions in the overall value of their variable annuities. In particular, during the
19 initial period when the dollar cost averaging program was in effect, some customers suffered
20 large losses due to declines in the stock market that, when netted against the amount received
21 from the portion of their investment in the fixed-rate account, still resulted in a negative overall
22 return. Waldon knew or was reckless in not knowing that, by switching to variable annuities
23 with dollar cost averaging programs, these customers could incur investment losses, costs and
24 charges that would result in a further reduction of the value of their investments.

1 33. In or about June 2001, the NASD issued to its member firms a warning
2 that they should avoid over-emphasizing the annual effective yield from such dollar cost
3 averaging programs. Notwithstanding this warning, Waldon continued to misrepresent the
4 investment returns under such programs to customers, including RC.

5 **C. Waldon Failed To Disclose Material Information Concerning Switches Of**
6 **Variable Annuities**

7 34. From January 1998 until November 2001, Waldon failed to disclose to the
8 customers identified in Appendix A information material to their decision to switch variable
9 annuities.

10 Unsuitability Of Switching.

11 35. Waldon failed to disclose to all of the customers that switching variable
12 annuities was unsuitable given their circumstances and also increased their risks.

13 Costs And Surrender Charges Incurred In Switching.

14 36. Waldon knew, but failed to disclose to all of the customers, that in
15 switching variable annuities the customers would incur costs, including surrender charges, that
16 were greater than the purported benefits from the switch.

17 37. Waldon also knew, but failed to disclose to these customers, the actual
18 costs of switching, including the specific amount of surrender charges, and the difference in fees
19 charged by the issuers.

20 Declines In Penalty-Free Funds Available Immediately After Switching.

21 38. Waldon knew that certain of his customers, including EG, WH, and AY,
22 had a specific need or expectation that they would use funds from their variable annuities for
23 health care or other living expenses. Waldon failed to disclose to these customers that by
24 switching variable annuities, the amount of money they could withdraw without penalty would
25 immediately decrease after switching to the new variable annuity.

1 39. For example, AY purchased a variable annuity in July 1999, with an
2 initial investment value of approximately \$76,400. In May 2000, less than one year later, she
3 switched her variable annuity at Waldon's recommendation. Waldon was aware at the time of
4 the switch that AY intended to use the variable annuity as a source of income by making regular
5 withdrawals for living expenses. At that time, the value of the original annuity had increased by
6 approximately 20 percent to \$93,900. If AY had not switched annuities at that point, she could
7 have withdrawn the investment gains of approximately \$17,500 without incurring surrender
8 charges. By switching, AY incurred a surrender charge of approximately \$4,800, more than one-
9 quarter of her investment gain. After switching, the maximum annual withdrawal that AY could
10 make without incurring a surrender charge was 10 percent of the initial investment value
11 (\$89,100), or approximately \$8,900. Thus, as an immediate consequence of the switch, the funds
12 available to AY without penalty decreased from approximately \$17,500 to \$8,900.

13 40. By failing to disclose to these customers that switching their variable
14 annuities restricted their access to penalty-free funds, Waldon omitted material information
15 necessary for the customers to evaluate whether the recommended switch was appropriate.

16 Opportunities And Risks Of Investing Within Individual Retirement Accounts.

17 41. In at least ten transactions, identified in Appendix A, Waldon's customers
18 purchased their variable annuities with funds held in individual retirement accounts ("IRAs").
19 Although federal taxes on investment earnings in variable annuities are deferred until the
20 earnings are withdrawn, federal taxes on earnings in IRAs are already deferred until withdrawal.

21 42. Variable annuities such as those sold in this case assess a variety of fees,
22 including fees for the insurance-related features, administration of the contracts, and
23 management of the subaccounts by portfolio managers. Consequently, such variable annuities
24 often must be held longer than investments in mutual funds with similar investment approaches
25 before these additional fees can be recouped through savings related to tax deferral or insurance

1 benefits. Waldon knew, but failed to disclose to these customers, that they could have invested
2 in other securities, including mutual funds, that did not have the fees and costs associated with
3 variable annuities while continuing to defer taxation.

4 43. Also, persons over 70½ years old are required, under federal tax law, to
5 withdraw a percentage of the value of their IRAs annually. Waldon knew, but failed to disclose
6 to these ten customers, that the declining principal balance of their variable annuities would
7 make it even more difficult for those customers to overcome the higher variable annuity fees.

8 44. By failing to disclose the unsuitability for certain customers of purchasing
9 a variable annuity in a switch transaction, including customers whose funds were in IRAs,
10 Waldon omitted material information necessary for the customers to evaluate whether the
11 recommended switch was appropriate.

12 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

13 *Violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act by Waldon.*

14 45. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1
15 through 44 above.

16 46. By engaging in the conduct described in Paragraphs 1 through 44 above,
17 Waldon directly or indirectly, in the offer or sale of securities, by use of the means or
18 instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails:

- 19 (a) with scienter, employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud;
20 (b) obtained money or property by means of untrue statements of
21 material fact or by omitting to state a material fact necessary in
22 order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
23 under which they were made, not misleading; and
24 (c) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of business which
25 operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers.

1 II.

2 Order defendant Waldon to disgorge all wrongfully obtained benefits, including
3 prejudgment interest.

4 III.

5 Order defendant Waldon to pay civil penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities
6 Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d) [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)].

7 IV.


8 Retain jurisdiction of this action in accordance with the principles of equity and the
9 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to implement and carry out the terms of all orders and
10 decrees that may be entered, or to entertain any suitable application or motion for additional
11 relief within the jurisdiction of this Court.

12 V.

13 Grant such other and further relief as this Court may determine to be just and necessary.
14

15 DATED: June 26, 2002

Respectfully submitted,

16
17 

18 Susan F. LaMarca
19 Attorney for Plaintiff
20 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
21
22
23
24
25

APPENDIX A

Customer No.	Contract Owners (Initials)	Switch Date	Switched VA Issuer	Former VA Issuer/Date	IRA Account	Misrepresented Death Benefit	Misrepresented Dollar Cost Averaging	Misrepresented Market Declines	Omitted Surr. Charge Applied
1	J&SA	9/25/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 5/99		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	WB	12/21/00	New York Life	ING 4/98		Yes		Yes	
3	JB	3/20/01	New York Life	Pacific Life 6/00				Yes	
4	W&KC	6/19/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 6/99	Yes		Yes	Yes	
5	RC	6/19/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 11/98				Yes	
5	RC	8/7/01	New York Life	Jackson Nat'l Life 6/00			Yes	Yes	
6	LEC	2/28/00	Pacific Life	ING 3/98				Yes	
7	MC	3/30/98	ING	Allianz 9/93					
7	MC	1/21/00	Pacific Life	ING 3/98				Yes	
8	C&JD	5/2/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 1/99		Yes		Yes	
8	C&JD	3/9/01	New York Life	Jackson Nat'l Life 5/00				Yes	
9	LD	6/5/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 6/99	Yes	Yes		Yes	
9	LD	6/2/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 7/99		Yes		Yes	
10	E&HD	3/2/01	Pacific Life	ING 3/98				Yes	
11	BE	6/5/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 6/99	Yes	Yes		Yes	
12	AF	9/22/00	Pacific Life	ING 4/98		Yes		Yes	
13	JF	3/16/01	New York Life	Lincoln Life				Yes	
14	EG	5/2/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	ING 4/98				Yes	
14	EG	7/18/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	ING 3/98				Yes	
14	EG	3/21/01	New York Life	Jackson Nat'l Life (death ben)					
15	R&MG	4/17/00	Pacific Life Value	ING 7/98				Yes	
16	D&MG	4/10/00	Pacific Life Value	Allianz 7/99	Yes			Yes	
17	M&RG	6/25/01	Pacific Life	Prudential	Yes			Yes	
18	RG	3/7/00	Pacific Life	ING 6/98				Yes	Yes
19	WH	5/9/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 8/98		Yes		Yes	
20	RH	7/27/01	New York Life	Pacific Life (death ben)					
21	MI	8/6/01	New York Life	Pacific Life 6/99				Yes	
22	LJ	6/26/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 6/99				Yes	Yes
22	LJ	6/13/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 9/99				Yes	Yes
22	LJ	8/17/01	New York Life	Jackson Nat'l Life 6/00 (2)				Yes	

APPENDIX A

Customer No.	Contract Owners (Initials)	Switch Date	Switched VA Issuer	Former VA Issuer/Date	IRA Account	Misrepresented Death Benefit	Misrepresented Dollar Cost Averaging	Misrepresented Market Declines	Omitted Surr. Charge Applied
23	RJ	2/26/01	CNA	ING 2/98, 5/98 (2)				Yes	
24	P&FK	1/9/01	New York Life	Hartford		Yes	Yes	Yes	
25	E&DK	8/6/01	New York Life	Pacific Life 4/00				Yes	
25	E&DK	8/2/01	New York Life	Pacific Life 5/00				Yes	
26	J&EL	9/25/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 12/98				Yes	
27	BM	12/11/00	New York Life	ING 4/98		Yes		Yes	
28	C&MN	1/30/01	New York Life	Pacific Life 1/00	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
28	C&MN	1/29/01	New York Life	Pacific Life 3/00		Yes	Yes	Yes	
29	IP	2/26/01	CNA	ING, Pacific Life (2)				Yes	Yes
30	GP	8/28/00	Pacific Life	ING 8/98		Yes		Yes	Yes
31	A&PP	3/9/01	New York Life	ING 7/98				Yes	
32	SR	2/5/01	CNA Plus	Aetna 3/98				Yes	
33	DR	4/24/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	ING 4/98	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
33	DR	3/30/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	ING 3/98		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
34	PS	11/16/99	Pacific Life	ING 5/98			Yes	Yes	
35	WS	11/00/01	Pacific Life	ING 3/98	Yes			Yes	
36	JS	2/10/98	ING	Prudential					
37	R&MS	5/9/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 12/98	Yes		Yes	Yes	
37	R&MS	5/9/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 12/98	Yes		Yes	Yes	
38	MT	1/12/00	Pacific Life	ING				Yes	
39	J&AU	5/28/99	Pacific Life	Hartford				Yes	Yes
39	J&AU	6/13/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 5/99			Yes	Yes	Yes
40	CW	2/22/01	Pacific Life	ING 1/98		Yes		Yes	
41	VWV	11/15/99	Pacific Life	Hartford					
42	EW	1/31/00	Pacific Life	ING 4/98				Yes	
42	EW	4/9/01	New York Life	Pacific Life, Glenbrook (2)			Yes	Yes	
43	AY	5/26/00	Jackson Nat'l Life	Pacific Life 7/99				Yes	