February 10, 2017

Alan L. Dye
Hogan Lovells US LLP
alan.dye@hoganlovells.com

Re: NextEra Energy, Inc.
Incoming letter dated December 19, 2016

Dear Mr. Dye:

This is in response to your letters dated December 19, 2016, January 10, 2017 and January 20, 2017 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to NextEra by Myra K. Young. We also have received letters on the proponent’s behalf dated December 23, 2016, January 15, 2017 and January 22, 2017. Copies of all of the correspondence on which this response is based will be made available on our website at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8.shtml. For your reference, a brief discussion of the Division’s informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals is also available at the same website address.

Sincerely,

Matt S. McNair
Senior Special Counsel

Enclosure

cc: John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
Response of the Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance

Re: NextEra Energy, Inc.  
Incoming letter dated December 19, 2016

The proposal requests that the board amend the company’s proxy access bylaw in the manner specified in the proposal.

There appears to be some basis for your view that NextEra may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(10). Based on the information you have presented, it appears that NextEra’s policies, practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal and that NextEra has, therefore, substantially implemented the proposal. Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if NextEra omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10).

Sincerely,

Evan S. Jacobson  
Special Counsel
DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE
INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division’s staff considers the information furnished to it by the company in support of its intention to exclude the proposal from the company’s proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent’s representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission’s staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes and rules administered by the Commission, including arguments as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would violate the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff’s informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversarial procedure.

It is important to note that the staff’s no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company’s position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly, a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the company’s management omit the proposal from the company’s proxy materials.
Re: NextEra Energy, Inc. (NEE)
Shareholder Proposal submitted by Myra K. Young
SEC Rule 14a-8

To Whom It May Concern:

This is in response to the January 20, 2017 letter, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by NextEra Energy, Inc. (“NEE” or the “Company”), which seeks assurance that Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”) will not recommend an enforcement action if the Company excludes my wife’s shareholder proposal (the “Proposal”) from its proxy statement for the 2017 annual meeting. That letter updated the Company’s initial request dated December 19, 2016.

Because the Company has failed to demonstrate substantial implementation of the 2016 proposal, the Proposal may not be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

NEE’s Most Recent Objections

Public Fund Exclusivity

While it appears the Company has dropped its prior objections based on prior no-action letters, NEE continues to mischaracterize the proposal as ensuring that “public pension funds may form a nominating group without having to gain the support of any other stockholder.”

That is nonsense. As we have stated repeatedly, the “most likely funds to use proxy access are pension funds. We have never said or written that proxy access will be exclusively used by public pension funds.” As we noted in our last letter, “other institutional investors, especially SRI funds, and individual investors are likely to join in, especially if group nominating limitations are increased or eliminated.”

Large mainstream indexed mutual funds have never filed a shareholder proposal and are unlikely to invoke proxy access. They mostly compete in the market based on low
costs. Anything they spend on a proxy access campaign would give passive competitors an advantage, since any benefit derived from such a campaign would accrue to all shareholders but expenses would only be incurred by activists. Additionally, such funds have a potential conflict of interest, since they compete with each other for contracted retirement services. Many corporate managers would prefer not to hire activist funds that are more likely to vote against their individual interests.

NEE’s proxy access bylaws provide the illusion of proxy access, just like foods labeled with unregulated terms like “natural” provide the illusion of being healthy. The amendment would make proxy access a real possibility, not just an illusion.

**Implementation Would Not Enhance Usability**

Again, the Company boldly asserts, the impact of the proposal would be “marginal at best, and establishes that the Company’s existing aggregation limit compares favorably with the proposal by the Proponent.” Although the Proponent has shown how 31 public pension funds might have an ownership position totaling 2.98% of the Company’s outstanding common stock, “an aggregation limit of 40 or 50 would not enable public pension funds to meet the 3%/3 year minimum ownership requirement.”

However, as indicated above, we do not seek limit participants to public pension funds. We simply assert public funds appear most likely to form the core of investors invoking proxy access. Looking at other shareholders of NEE, Amalgamated Bank, founded and principle owned by labor unions, has a FactSet activist score of 4, having been involved in 13 activist campaign. They own 0.01% of NEE and seem likely to join in proxy access.

Reaching below 0.01% holders, it should be feasible to get to 3% with additional activists primarily involved in the SRI segment of the market, such as Neuberger Berman, Baldwin Brothers, Northstar Investment Management, Clean Yield Asset Management. So, that is one possible path to implementation with 35 shareholders. Of course, a threshold of 50 shareholders would be easier to meet and would facilitate participation by even smaller long-term shareholders who may have smaller holdings but may be willing to put in the work of assembling and representing a group.

What the Company terms "marginal" can obviously be the difference between bylaws that can be implemented and those that cannot. The margins of space shuttle missions are also very small.

In advancing their fallacious arguments, the Company has not met the burden of proof required by Rule 14a-8(g).
Based on the facts, as stated above, NEE has not met the burden of demonstrating objectively that the Company has substantially implemented the Proposal. The SEC must therefore conclude it is unable concur that NEE may exclude the Proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

Sincerely,

James McRitchie  
Shareholder Advocate

Myra K. Young  
NEE Shareholder

Attachment

cc: Scott Seeley, Corporate Secretary <Scott.Seeley@nexteraenergy.com>  
John Chevedden
January 20, 2017

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
shareholderproposals@sec.gov

Re: NextEra Energy, Inc.—Shareholder Proposal of Myra K. Young

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are writing in response to the Proponent’s letter dated January 15, 2017, relating to her proposal to amend the Company’s proxy access bylaw. For ease of reference, capitalized terms used in this letter have the same meaning ascribed to them in our letter to the staff dated December 19, 2016.

The Proponent argues, in effect, that the essential objective of an aggregation limit is to assure that public pension funds may form a nominating group without having to gain the support of any other stockholder. This objective is essential to the usability of proxy access, the Proponent argues, because only public pension funds have demonstrated a willingness to utilize proxy access, as demonstrated by their willingness to submit shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8.

The Proponent’s argument is flawed in two significant respects. First, the Company’s proxy access bylaw is not designed to favor any class of investor over any other class of investor. The Company’s proxy access bylaw allows any stockholder, regardless of the class with which it identifies, to form a nominating group with any other stockholder(s). The essential objective of the bylaw, including the aggregation limit, is to assure reasonable access to the nominating process by any stockholder or group of stockholders who meet the requirements of the bylaw and who share a desire to nominate one or more identified candidates. Whether any particular class of stockholder finds it more or less difficult to form an exclusively intra-class group is irrelevant to the essential objective of proxy access or an aggregation limit.
Second, even if the essential objective of an aggregation limit were to assure that public pension funds may nominate candidates without the support of any other stockholder(s), the Proponent’s own data demonstrate that the Proposal would not achieve that objective. According to the Proponent, the Company’s stockholders include 31 public pension funds and members of the Council of Institutional Investors, who own a total of 2.98% of the Company’s outstanding common stock. Assuming the Proponent’s data is correct, and assuming further that all 31 investors of these investors have owned their shares for at least three years, an aggregation limit of 40 or 50 would not enable public pension funds to meet the 3%/3 year minimum ownership requirement. Moreover, again according to the Proponent’s data, the 20 pension funds with the largest holdings of the Company’s common stock own a total of 2.81% of the shares outstanding. Accordingly, increasing the aggregation limit to 40 or 50 would add only 0.17% of the outstanding stock to the potential intra-class group, assuming that all 11 additional pension funds were willing to join a nominating group. This impact is marginal at best, and establishes that the Company’s existing aggregation limit compares favorably with that proposed by the Proponent.

We continue to believe that the Proposal may be excluded from the 2017 Proxy Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(10). If you have any questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact me at (202) 637-5737 or Alan.Dye@hoganlovells.com.

Sincerely,

Alan L. Dye

cc: John Chevedden
    Scott Seeley, NextEra Energy, Inc.
To Whom It May Concern:

This is in response to the January 10, 2017 letter, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by NextEra Energy, Inc. (“NEE” or the “Company”), which seeks assurance that Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”) will not recommend an enforcement action if the Company excludes my wife’s shareholder proposal (the “Proposal”) from its proxy statement for the 2017 annual meeting. That letter updated the Company’s initial request dated December 19, 2016.

Because the Company has failed to demonstrate substantial implementation of the 2016 proposal, the Proposal may not be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

NEE’s Most Recent Objections

NEE’s most recent objections appear fall into the following two categories:

1. Rule 14a-8(i)(10) does not require that a company substantially implement a change requested by a shareholder proposal in order to obtain a no-action letter under (i)(10).

2. Implementation of the proposal would not enhance the usability of proxy access.

I address each objection in turn.

Substantial Implementation Not Required

The Company cites, for example, Borders Group (Mar. 11, 2008), claiming “the company had a bylaw that allowed holders of 25% of the outstanding stock to call a special meeting, subject to certain procedural requirements, and the shareholder
proposal requested that the company amend its bylaws to impose ‘no restriction… compared to the standard allowed by applicable law.’ The staff deemed the proposal to have been substantially implemented even though the company took no action to amend its bylaw.”

The Company misstates the facts. In 2007 bylaws of the Borders Group made no provision to allow shareholders to call a special meeting. Mr. Steiner made a request they do so. His shareholder proposal was presented and voted on at the May 2007 annual meeting. Since Borders took no apparent action, Mr. Steiner again submitted a proposal on January 18, 2008.

That same day, on January 18, 2008, Borders amended its bylaws. Since Borders had substantially implemented Mr. Steiner’s proposal, SEC staff provided a no-action letter to Borders based on that action. Contrary to the statement made by NEE, the company did take action to address the concerns expressed by Mr. Steiner is his proxy proposals.

In another case cited by NEE, shareholders proposed that Wal-Mart (Mar, 25, 2015) “include in the metrics used to determine senior executives’ incentive compensation at least one metric related to Walmart’s employee engagement.” Wal-Mart argued substantial implementation because the company “already includes a diversity and inclusion metric related to employee engagement, as defined in the Proposal, and the Committee has adopted this metric for use in its compensation determinations.” SEC Staff granted the no-action. The proponent’s low bar of “one metric” made it easy to document substantial implementation had already occurred.

The current case involving NEE is different. While Wal-Mart claimed they met the proponent’s request of including a metric of the type suggested by the proponent, NEE makes no claim it has taken any action to address the substance of the Proposal at hand, which requests that bylaws be amended to increase from 20 to 40 or 50 the number of shareholders who may aggregate share holdings to meet minimum ownership requirements to use the Company’s proxy access bylaw.

**Implementation Would Not Enhance Usability**

The Company boldly asserts, “there is no reason to believe that implementation of the Proposal would enhance, in any significant way, the ability of public pension funds or any other shareholders to utilize proxy access.” NEE goes on to argue that past involvement in proxy contests over board representation is a better predictor than filing proxy proposals. Therefore, hedge funds are the investors most likely to invoke proxy access.

However, the author of the Company’s rebuttal is taking readers for fools. NEE’s proxy access bylaws, like most, require the following from investors seeking to invoke use of their proxy access bylaw:
a representation that the Eligible Shareholder (including each member of any group of shareholders that together is an Eligible Shareholder under this Section 11) (i) acquired the Required Shares in the ordinary course of business and not with the intent to change or influence control of the Corporation, and does not presently have such intent…

It is doubtful that hedge funds would be able to make such a representation for most of the stocks held in their portfolio. We saw this recently with the first attempt to implement proxy access. GAMCO Asset Management Inc. had to withdraw their filing from the National Fuel Gas Company, since prior Schedule 13D filings were a dead giveaway regarding intent.

NEE side-steps the facts by arguing that, “to date, only one shareholder has made an effort to utilize proxy access, and that shareholder was an institutional investor, not a public pension fund. There is no reason to believe the Proponent’s speculation that utilization of proxy access will be limited to public pension funds.”

Our Company fails to mention the “institutional investor” was a hedge fund and their attempted use of proxy access failed. Caught in another hyperbole, NEE claims there is “no reason to believe the Proponent’s unfounded speculation that the only investors willing to form a group with a public pension fund would be other public pension funds.” That is untrue. We have repeatedly indicated the “most likely funds to use proxy access are pension funds.” We have never said or written that proxy access will be exclusively used by public pension funds. Other institutional investors, especially SRI funds, and individual investors are likely to join in, especially if group nominating limitations are increased or eliminated.

NEE further notes, “public pension funds are no more like-minded with one another than they are with other investors and are no more likely to persuade each other to pursue a strategy for gaining board representation or electing a particular candidate than they are to persuade any other investor.”

Merriam-Webster defines “like-minded” as “having a like disposition or purpose.” The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) was founded by and is made up primarily by public pension funds. Clearly, public pension funds are more “like-minded” with each other than they are with other institutional investors. As CII members, they meet together, develop policies, commission reports, file comments to the SEC, write letters to public companies and co-file resolutions with each other. They do not typically pursue such activities with mainstream mutual funds to the same degree. See, for example, CII issue page on proxy access at http://www.cii.org/proxy_access. Note news reports threatening use of proxy access by public pension funds. (With new leverage, NYC’s Stringer could reshape boardrooms, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-financial-boards-idUSKBN14W1KI). Note that, with the exception of
individual investors, all proponents filing proxy access proposals last year were public pension funds or public pension fund consultants. (http://allianceadvisorsllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Alliance-Advisors-Newsletter-July-2016-2016-Proxy-Season-Review.pdf)

NEE goes on to claim, “Even if public pension funds were unwilling or unable to form nominating groups with anyone other than other public pension funds, there is no reason to believe that a group of 40 public pension funds would be materially easier to assemble that a group of 20.”

The attached spreadsheet of NEE shareholders holding 0.01% of shares or more was compiled by FactSet Research Systems. I have highlighted in yellow public pension funds and members of CII. Thirty-one held 2.98% of NEE’s outstanding shares. Limiting shareholders to twenty yields only a total of 2.81%. Obviously, for 31 shareholders holding 2.98% of NEE’s shares it will be materially easier to find 9 more shareholders and to assemble a group of 40 holding 3% than it would be for a group of 20 holding 2.81% to reach 3% without adding any additional members.

Refusing to consider the proposal as substantive does not make it non-substantive.

In advancing their fallacious arguments, the Company has not met the burden of proof required by Rule 14a-8(g).

**Conclusion**

As indicated in our prior letter, there is a huge difference between a group of twenty, which research by the Council of Institutional investors concludes cannot be reached by its members at most companies, and a group of forty or fifty. Bylaws with the proposed amendment could actually enable implementation of proxy access, while implementing the current provisions would be nearly impossible. NEE’s proxy access bylaws provide the illusion of proxy access, just like foods labeled with unregulated terms like “natural” provide the illusion of being healthy.

Reasonable people can differ as to what constitutes substantial implementation of proxy access, since proponents only have 500 words to describe what they want in bylaws that can easily run ten to twenty pages. However, once bylaws have been adopted, shareholders must be able to recommend substantive changes. The 2017 Proposal recommends a change to a single substantive area with the purpose of addressing a concern raised by CII and “to make NEE’s proxy access bylaws workable for more shareholders.” We were certainly aware of the existing bylaws when drafting our Proposal. NEE has done nothing to address the substantive request of the Proposal.
Based on the facts, as stated above, NEE has not met the burden of demonstrating objectively that the Company has substantially implemented the Proposal. The SEC must therefore conclude it is unable concur that NEE may exclude the Proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

Sincerely,

James McRitchie       Myra K. Young
Shareholder Advocate   NEE Shareholder

Attachment

cc: Scott Seeley, Corporate Secretary <Scott.Seeley@nexteraenergy.com>
John Chevedden
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<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Institutional Ownership View</th>
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<td>J.O. Hambro Capital Management Ltd.</td>
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<td>Activism Threat Level: Very low. J.O. Hambro Capital Management Ltd. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch</td>
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<td>Activism Threat Level: Very low. Beach Investment Counsel, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch</td>
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<td>Activism Threat Level: Very low. Cornerstone Capital Management Holdings LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch</td>
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<td>I. G. Investment Management Ltd.</td>
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<td>Donaldson Capital Management LLC</td>
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<td>Activism Threat Level: Very low. Donaldson Capital Management LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch</td>
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<td>Stifel Nicolaus &amp; Co., Inc. (Investment Management)</td>
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<td>Activism Threat Level: Very low. Stifel Nicolaus &amp; Co., Inc. (Investment Management) has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch</td>
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<td>Passport Capital LLC</td>
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Activism Threat Level: Very low. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. TDAM USA, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Bradley, Foster & Sargent, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Medium. Sterling Capital Management LLC has been involved in 3 activist campaigns against 2 different companies. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. SG Americas Securities LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. The Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Michigan has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Gateway Investment Advisers LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. First Asset Investment Management, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. National Investment Services, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. First National Trust Co. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. West Financial Services, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Ferguson Wellman Capital Management, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Greenwood Capital Associates LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Investment Portfolio) has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Kings Point Capital Management LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. The Washington Trust Co. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Schroder Investment Management (Hong Kong) Ltd. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Folger Nolan Fleming Douglas Capital Management, Inc. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Broadway National Bank Asset Management has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. DuPont Capital Management Corp. has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.

Activism Threat Level: Very low. Novare Capital Management LLC has never been involved in a publicly disclosed activist campaign. Source: FactSet SharkWatch.
January 10, 2017

**BY ELECTRONIC MAIL**

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission  
Division of Corporation Finance  
Office of Chief Counsel  
100 F Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20549  
shareholderproposals@sec.gov

Re: **NextEra Energy, Inc.—Shareholder Proposal of Myra K. Young**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are writing on behalf of the Company to respond to the letter submitted by the Proponent and James McRitchie on December 23, 2016, in which the Proponent objects to the Company’s omission from its 2017 Proxy Materials of the Proponent’s proposal requesting that the Board amend the Company’s Bylaws to increase from 20 to “40 or 50” the number of shareholders who may aggregate their stock holdings to meet the minimum ownership requirement in the Company’s proxy access bylaw. For ease of reference, capitalized terms used in this letter have the same meaning ascribed to them in our letter to the staff dated December 19, 2016.

**Substantial Implementation Does Not Require Additional Action by the Company**

The Proponent contends that, because the Proposal contains a numerical limit, substantial implementation “requires at least some positive movement in the direction of adopting what the proposal[] request[s].” Moreover, she argues, where a requested numerical limit is expressed as a range of values, substantial implementation requires that the “positive movement” establish a limit within the range. The Proponent’s argument clarifies why the Proposal calls for an aggregation limit of “40 to 50” rather than specifying the Proponent’s preferred limit, and why the Proposal expressly states that it “is worded to avoid” exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) by “explicitly specifying] a limit of 40 or 50 shareholders.”

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) does not require that a company change its existing policies or practices (or amend its bylaws) to establish that it has substantially implemented a proposal.
Instead, the rule allows a company to exclude a proposal if the company has already taken action or adopted policies, practices or procedures to address the underlying concerns and essential objectives of the proposal. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Mar. 25, 2015) and ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Jun. 20, 2005). This controlling principle does not change just because a proposal calls for a numerical limit or a “range of percentages.”

The Company’s proxy access bylaw contains many numerical limits. Shareholder nominations must be submitted to the Company within a period of 150 days to 120 days prior to the anniversary of the prior year’s annual meeting. A shareholder will be deemed to own loaned shares for purposes of the minimum ownership requirement only if the shares can be recalled within five business days. Shareholder nominations are limited to the greater of two directors or 20% of the Board. Nominating shareholders must own at least 3% of the Company’s outstanding stock, and must have continuously owned the stock for at least three years. If a shareholder were to propose an amendment to any of these numerical limits (e.g., to change the 150/120-day nomination period to 140/110), the Company would not necessarily have to make “some positive movement” toward the proposed new limit in order to be deemed to have substantially implemented it. Instead, whether the proposal would be deemed substantially implemented would depend on whether the Company’s existing numerical limit already achieved the essential objective of the proposal. That determination, in turn, would depend on the nature of the numerical limit and the materiality of the proposed amendment.

The Proponent cites several no-action letters in which the staff agreed that a company could exclude a proposal seeking adoption of a bylaw allowing holders of 10% to 25% (or 0% to 25%) of the company’s common stock to call a special meeting, after the company responded to the proposal by adopting a bylaw allowing holders of 25% of the common stock to call a special meeting. These letters do not, however, support the Proponent’s argument that a proposal seeking a numerical limit within a range may be substantially implemented only by adoption of a limit within the range. All but one of the letters cited by the Proponent involved a company that, prior to receiving the proposal, had no bylaw allowing shareholders to call a special meeting. In the remaining letter, Borders Group (Mar. 11, 2008), the company had a bylaw that allowed holders of 25% of the outstanding stock to call a special meeting, subject to certain procedural requirements, and the shareholder proposal requested that the company amend its bylaws to impose “no restriction . . . compared to the standard allowed by applicable law.” The staff deemed the proposal to have been substantially implemented even though the company took no new action to amend its bylaw. The letters cited by the Proponent therefore stand for the unremarkable proposition that, where a shareholder proposal requests that shareholders be given the right to call a special meeting, the company must grant shareholders that right, on some reasonable set of terms, in order to be deemed to have substantially implemented the proposal. The staff has taken the same position in the context of proxy access. See, e.g., Baxter International Inc. (Feb. 12, 2016); The Dun and Bradstreet Corp. (Feb. 12, 2016); Cardinal Health, Inc. (Jul. 20, 2016); Amazon.com Inc. (Mar. 3, 2016); and Time Warner Inc.
2016). Here, in contrast, the Company already has a proxy access bylaw, and the bylaw already has an aggregation limit.

Moreover, the special meeting letters cited by the Proponent addressed a minimum ownership requirement, not an aggregation limit. As we noted in our prior letter, the staff has taken a similar position in the proxy access context, concluding that a bylaw establishing a minimum ownership requirement of 5% of the outstanding common stock does not substantially implement a shareholder proposal calling for a 3% minimum ownership requirement. See NVR, Inc. (Mar. 25, 2016) and Oshkosh Corp. (Nov. 4, 2016). These letters, which are consistent with the special meeting letters cited by the Proponent, recognize that a minimum ownership requirement is among the most material terms of proxy access and that variations in the minimum ownership requirement can have a significant impact on the ability of shareholders to utilize proxy access.

An aggregation limit is significantly different in nature from a minimum ownership requirement. For that reason, whether a 20-shareholder aggregation limit compares favorably with a 40- or 50-shareholder aggregation limit is a fundamentally different question than whether a 5% minimum ownership requirement compares favorably with a 3% minimum ownership requirement. For the reasons set forth in our earlier letter and as explained further below, increasing the Company’s aggregation limit from 20 to 40 or 50 would do little to make proxy access more usable by any of the Company’s shareholders. Accordingly, the Company’s aggregation limit compares favorably with the Proposal, and the Proposal has been substantially implemented.

The Proposal Would Not Materially Enhance the Usability of Proxy Access

The Proponent argues that the Company’s aggregation limit does not compare favorably with the Proposal because a 40- or 50-shareholder aggregation limit would make it easier for public pension funds to form eligible nominating groups among themselves, without having to seek the support of any other investor. The impact of the Company’s aggregation limit on any particular category of investor is, we believe, irrelevant to whether the Proposal has been substantially implemented. As mentioned in our prior letter, proxy access was designed to give shareholders with a significant, long-term stake in a company the ability to nominate and elect directors. It was not designed to ensure greater success in nominating and electing directors to any specific class of investor.

Even if the impact of the Company’s aggregation limit on public pension funds were a relevant consideration, however, there is no reason to believe that implementation of the Proposal would enhance, in any significant way, the ability of public pension funds or any other shareholders to utilize proxy access. The Proponent’s statements to the contrary are based on the dubious assumptions that (1) public pension funds are the most likely users of proxy access, (2)
other large shareholders who might easily utilize proxy access, particularly hedge funds and large institutional investors, will not be willing to form a nominating group with public pension funds, and (3) assembling a group of 20 public pension funds that meet the minimum ownership requirement would be difficult, but assembling an eligible group of 40 or 50 public pension funds would not.

As support for her assertion that “public pension funds are the most likely users of proxy access,” the Proponent notes that public pension funds submit more shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 than do hedge funds and “mainstream funds like Vanguard, Fidelity and BlackRock.” It is not at all clear that users of Rule 14a-8 are more likely users of proxy access than any other category of investor. Rule 14a-8 has never provided a means of seeking board representation, which is a far more serious and ambitious undertaking than seeking a vote on a shareholder proposal. The vast majority of shareholder proposals fail to gain shareholder approval. Most users of Rule 14a-8 are aware of this and choose to submit “losing” proposals anyway, because it is an easy and inexpensive way for a proponent to achieve some other objective (e.g., to raise awareness of a particular social cause). Utilization of proxy access is a more time-consuming process, and requires the nominating shareholder(s) to identify qualified persons willing to serve as nominees to the board and willing to make the representations, warranties and undertakings required by proxy access bylaws. Given the nature of contested elections and the publicity they receive, shareholders and their potential nominees may not be as willing to undertake potentially losing campaigns as some shareholders are to promote proposals that have very low prospects for success. A more compelling argument may be made that the most likely users of proxy access will be the investors who have demonstrated a willingness to seek board representation, in contested elections or in direct negotiations with companies (i.e., hedge funds). According to the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, in 2010 and 2011, hedge funds undertook 65 proxy contests and sought board representation at 19 companies through negotiation. In addition, to date, only one shareholder has made an effort to utilize proxy access, and that shareholder was an institutional investor, not a public pension fund. There is thus no reason to believe the Proponent’s speculation that utilization of proxy access will be limited to public pension funds.

There also is no reason to believe the Proponent’s unfounded speculation that the only investors willing to form a group with a public pension fund would be other public pension funds. Public pension funds are no more like-minded with one another than they are with other investors, and they are no more likely to persuade each other to pursue a strategy for gaining

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1 See James R. Copland, 2015 Proxy Season Wrap-Up, ProxyMonitor (2015), http://www.proxymonitor.org/forms/2015Finding4.aspx, noting that the percentage of shareholder proposals gaining majority approval at the 250 largest U.S. corporations over the ten-year period 2006-2015 ranged from 4% to 17%.

board representation or electing a particular candidate than they are to persuade any other investor. Moreover, for a proxy access candidate to be elected, a nominating shareholder or shareholder group would need the support of a broad range of investors, including institutional investors and individual investors. As discussed in our prior letter, 85 shareholders of the Company held at least 1/20th of the 3% of the Company’s outstanding common stock required to utilize proxy access. Eighty-one of these 85 shareholders have held a substantial amount of Company stock continuously for the past three years. Any public pension fund (or other investor) wishing to utilize proxy access would merely have to combine with one or only a few of these shareholders to form a nominating group. This is true regardless of whether the aggregation limit is 20 shareholders or 50. Even if public pension funds were unwilling or unable to form nominating groups with anyone other than other public pension funds, there is no reason to believe that a group of 40 public pension funds would be materially easier to assemble than a group of 20. The Proponent cites a study by the Council of Institutional Investors for the proposition that “even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the 3% held for 3 years criteria at most companies examined.” As we noted in our prior letter, even if this statement were true, it does not mean that the 40 or 50 largest public pension funds could meet the 3%/3-year requirement. The stockholdings of the next largest 20 or 30 public pension funds would be increasingly small relative to the holdings of the largest 20, and they would be equally likely to fail to meet the three-year minimum holding period. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that increasing the number of public pension funds that could serve as a nominating group, as requested by the Proposal, would make proxy access more accessible to public pension funds or anyone else.

We continue to believe that the Proposal may be excluded from the 2017 Proxy Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(10). If you have any questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact me at (202) 637-5737 or Alan.Dye@hoganlovells.com.

Sincerely,

Alan L. Dye

cc: John Chevedden
Scott Seeley, NextEra Energy, Inc.
To Whom It May Concern:

This is in response to the December 19, 2016, letter, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by NextEra Energy, Inc. (“NEE” or the “Company”), which seeks assurance that Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”) will not recommend an enforcement action if the Company excludes my wife’s shareholder proposal (the “Proposal”) from its proxy statement for the 2017 annual meeting.

Because the Company has failed to demonstrate substantial implementation of the 2016 proposal, the Proposal may not be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) Background

Companies seeking to establish the availability of subsection (i)(10) have the burden of showing both the insubstantiality of any revisions made to the shareholder proposal and the actual implementation of the company alternative.¹

¹ The exclusion originally applied to proposals deemed moot. See Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976) (noting that mootness "has not been formally stated in Rule 14a- 8 in the past but which has informally been deemed to exist."). In 1983, the Commission determined that a proposal would be "moot" if substantially implemented. Exchange Act Release No. 20091 (August 16, 1983) ("The Commission proposed an interpretative change to permit the omission of proposals that have been 'substantially implemented by the issuer.' While the new interpretative position will add more subjectivity to the application of the provision, the Commission has determined that the previous formalistic application of this provision defeated its purpose."). The rule was changed to reflect this administrative interpretation in 1997. See Exchange Act Release No. 39093 (Sept. 18, 1997) (proposing to alter standard of mootness to "substantially implemented").
Where the shareholder specifies a range of percentages (10% to 25%), Staff has generally agreed the company "substantially" implements the proposal when it selects a percentage within the range, even if at the upper end. Likewise the Staff has found substantial implementation when the shareholder proposal includes no percentage or merely "favors" a particular percentage.

2016 No-Action Decisions

SEC Staff makes a distinction between substantial implementation as applied to initial bylaws and those seeking amendments to adopted bylaws. No-action letters issued by Staff have consistently denied exclusions of proposals to amend the terms of previously adopted bylaws. See H&R Block (July 21, 2016) and most recently Microsoft (September 27, 2016).

While it can be argued that if a company adopts 90% of what is requested in a shareholder proposal, the proposal has been substantially implemented, in cases involving proposed amendments, companies argued they had substantially implemented proposals even while taking no action to substantively address suggested amendments to their bylaws. See H&R Block (July 21, 2016), Microsoft (September 27, 2016), Apple (October 27, 2016) and others.

NEE attempts to mislead Staff by implying that no-action relief granted to Oshkosh (Nov. 4, 2016) and NVR (March 25, 2016) were somehow exceptional from other cases where proponents sought to amend existing bylaws. These were not exceptions but were consistent with the Staff interpretation that

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2 In cases where the staff allowed for the exclusion of a proposal, the shareholder proposal provided a range of applicable percentages and the company selected a percentage within the range. See Citigroup Inc. (Feb. 12, 2008) (range of 10% to 25%; company selected 25%); Hewlett-Packard Co. (Dec. 11, 2007) (range of 25% or less; company selected 25%). In General Dynamics, the proposal sought a bylaw that would permit shareholders owning 10% of the voting shares to call a special meeting. The management bylaw provided that a single 10% shareholder or a group of shareholders holding 25% could call special meetings. As a result, the provision implemented the proposal for a single shareholder but "differ[ed] regarding the minimum ownership required for a group of stockholders." General Dynamics Corp. (Feb. 6, 2009).

3 Borders Group, Inc. (Mar. 11, 2008) (no specific percentage contained in proposal; company selected 25%); Allegheny Energy, Inc. (Feb. 19, 2008) (no percentage stated in proposal; company selected 25%).

4 Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 19, 2009) (allowing for exclusion where company adopted bylaw setting percentage at 25% and where proposal called for a "reasonable percentage" to call a special meeting and stating that proposal "favors 10%"); 3M Co. (Feb. 27, 2008) (same).
“substantially implemented” requires at least some positive movement in direction of adopting what the proposals requested, unless already been implemented.

**NEE’s Objections**

NEE’s objections appear to rely almost entirely on the following argument:

Given the relative insignificance of the difference between the Company’s current aggregation limit and the one proposed by the Proponent, the Company does not need to amend its Bylaws as a condition to reliance on Rule 14-8(i)(10), because the Company’s current aggregation limit achieves the essential objectives of the Proposal.

What are the stated objectives of the Proposal?

…. to raise the current “shareholders and other persons whose ownership of shares of common stock of the Corporation is aggregated” from the current limit of 20 to a limitation of 40 or 50.

…the Council of Institutional Investors, “highlights the most troublesome provisions” in recent proxy access bylaws, such as the fact that even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the 3% held for 3 years criteria at most companies examined.

….to make NEE’s proxy access bylaws workable for more shareholders.

The objective of the proposal is clearly to raise the number of shareholders that can form a nominating group from 20 to 40 or 50 to avoid a problem highlighted by the Council of Institutional Investors by making NEE’s proxy access bylaws workable for more shareholders.

Refusing to consider the proposal as substantive does not make it non-substantive.

The Proposal clearly cites a study by the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) that found that public pensions would not be able to meet the 3% criterial for continuous ownership at most companies (*Proxy Access: Best Practices*, August 2015):

We note that without the ability to aggregate holdings even CII’s largest members would be unlikely to meet a 3% ownership requirement to nominate directors. Our review of current research found that even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares they would not meet the 3% criteria at most of the companies examined.
CII’s position is generally consistent with the view of the SEC. In 2010, the SEC considered, but rejected imposing a cap on the permitted number of members in a nominating group. The SEC found that individual shareowners at most companies would not be able to meet the minimum threshold of 3% ownership for proxy access unless they could aggregate their shares with other shareowners.

This is significant because public pension funds are the most likely users of proxy access. As we have seen recently with GAMCO’s attempt (First Proxy Access Failed: What Needs Fixed?, CorpGov.net, 12/13/2016), hedge funds are unlikely to be participants in proxy access. Additionally, mainstream funds like Vanguard, Fidelity and BlackRock have never even filed a proxy proposal, so would also be unlikely participants in nominating proxy access candidates.


In other words, proxy access is much more likely to be implemented if public pension funds can collaborate and form nominating groups within CII. Their research indicates they cannot reach the 3% criteria with a group limitation of 20. My calculations find they are much more likely to be able to do so with a group limit of 40 or 50.

NEE contends a 50-shareholder aggregation limit would create “an undue burden and expense on the Company to the detriment of other shareholders.” “The Proposal would at least double the effort and expense required to process information for a 20-shareholder group.” However, they neither provide any cost estimates nor do they provide any evidence, as required by Rule 14a-8(g).

Any administrative burden would fall much greater on proponents, required to document ownership. Verification by NEE would appear to be a rather simple matter of checking to see if documentation has been filed, unless they suspect banks, transfer agents and others will be providing fraudulent documents on behalf of their clients. If that is their suspicion, what is the basis?

NEE contends their largest 20 institutional shareholders own approximately 38% of the outstanding common stock. Maybe so, but how likely are any of these
shareholders to participate in forming a nominating group? As far as we know, no shareholders have ever attempted to form such a group, not even public pension funds. As indicated above, CII members seem more likely than most, since they meet together, formulate policies and have cooperated on winning the right to proxy access at companies like Bank of America.

While public funds seem to be the mostly likely to form nominating groups together, it is possible they could be joined by other funds. Which of those seem most likely to join? I would argue that if a fund has been involved in more than one activism campaign, their chance of joining a nominating group at least rises somewhat. Reviewing NEE’s institutional shareholders with the largest holdings in NEE, only 3 have ever been involved in more than one campaign - T. Row Price Associates, Norges Bank Investment Management, and Franklin Advisers.

NEE argues that, under their current bylaws, smaller shareholders could simply combine with up to 19 of the 85 shareholders that own at least 700,902 shares. Although 85 sounds like a lot, 9 sounds like a lot less. Only T. Row Price Associates, Norges Bank Investment Management, Franklin Advisers, Adage Capital Management LP, ClearBridge Investments LLC, New York State Common Retirement Fund, The California Public Employees Retirement System, California State Teachers' Retirement System, and Gabelli Funds LLC have ever participated in more than one activist campaign. And that includes hedge funds, which probably would not qualify under NEE’s bylaws.

NEE asserts, “There is no reason to believe, however, that a solicitation of the type that would be required to form a group of shareholders of the maximum permissible size would be more likely to attract support from 40 holders of 0.075 of the common stock than 20 holders of 0.15% of the common stock.” That is nonsense. CII studied its members and found 20 holders would not get them there at most companies. At NEE, less than 100 shareholders have 0.15% of the common stock, whereas over 150 hold 0.075%. Obviously, allowing 40 shareholders to form a group will result in a higher likelihood of a group actually forming that limiting groups to 20 members.

Another bit of faulty logic in NEE’s argument is their assumption that institutional ownership is stable and that its institutional shareholders have held for three years. However, that is far from true. In the last reporting period SSgA deceased their shareholdings by 4.6 million shares, while T. Rowe Price increased their’s by 5.8 million. Those are just two examples. I could provide many more. Achieving a group of 40 will be difficult; a group of 20 would be nearly impossible.

The Company has not met the burden of proof required by Rule 14a-8(g).

Conclusion

There is a huge difference between a group of twenty, which research by the
Council of Institutional investors concludes cannot be reached by its members at most companies, and a group of 40 or 50. Bylaws with the proposed amendment could actually be implemented, while implementing the current provisions would be nearly impossible. NEE’s proxy access bylaws provide the illusion of proxy access, just like foods labeled with unregulated terms like “natural” provide the illusion of being healthy.

Reasonable people can differ as to what constitutes substantial implementation of proxy access, since proponents only have 500 words to describe what they want in bylaws that can easily run ten to twenty pages. However, once bylaws have been adopted, shareholders must be able to recommend substantive changes. The 2017 Proposal recommends a change to a single substantive area with the purpose of addressing a concern raised by CII and “to make NEE’s proxy access bylaws workable for more shareholders.” Bylaws that specify more burdensome requirements than those requested in the Proposal cannot be said to “substantially” implement this purpose.

Based on the facts, as stated above, NEE has not met the burden of demonstrating objectively that the Company has substantially implemented the Proposal. The SEC must therefore conclude it is unable concur that NEE may exclude the Proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

Sincerely,

James McRitchie  Myra K. Young
Shareholder Advocate  NEE Shareholder

cc: Scott Seeley, Corporate Secretary <Scott.Seeley@nexteraenergy.com>
John Chevedden
December 19, 2016

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
shareholderproposals@sec.gov

Re: NextEra Energy, Inc.--Shareholder Proposal of John Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of NextEra Energy, Inc. (the "Company"), we are submitting this letter pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to notify the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") of the Company's intention to exclude from its proxy materials for its 2017 annual meeting of shareholders (the "2017 Proxy Materials") a shareholder proposal (the "Proposal") and statement in support thereof submitted by John Chevedden on behalf of Myra K. Young (the "Proponent"). We also request confirmation that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance will not recommend to the Commission that enforcement action be taken if the Company omits the Proposal from the 2017 Proxy Materials for the reasons discussed below.

A copy of the Proposal and related correspondence from the Proponent is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

In accordance with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) ("SLB No. 14D"), this letter and its exhibits are being delivered by e-mail to shareholderproposals@sec.gov. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), a copy of this letter and its exhibits also is being sent by e-mail to the Proponent. Rule 14a-8(k) and SLB No. 14D provide that a shareholder proponent is required to send the company a copy of any correspondence which the proponent elects to submit to the Commission or the staff. Accordingly, we hereby inform the Proponent that if the Proponent elects to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the staff relating to the
Proposal, the Proponent should concurrently furnish a copy of that correspondence to the undersigned.

The Company currently intends to file its definitive 2017 Proxy Materials with the Commission on or about March 27, 2017.

THE PROPOSAL

On November 24, 2016, the Company received from the Proponent, as an attachment to an e-mail, a letter submitting the Proposal for inclusion in the 2017 Proxy Materials. The Proposal reads as follows:

Resolved: Shareholders of NextEra Energy, Inc. ("NEE" or the "Company") ask the board of directors (the "Board") to amend its bylaws on "Proxy Access for Director Nominations" to raise the current "shareholders and other persons whose ownership of shares of common stock of the Corporation is aggregated" from the current limit of 20 to a limitation of 40 or 50.

BASIS FOR EXCLUSION

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) – The Proposal Has Been Substantially Implemented by the Company

A. Background

On October 14, 2016, the Company’s board of directors (the "Board") amended the Company’s bylaws to add a new Section 11, which permits a shareholder, or group of up to 20 shareholders, who have owned at least 3% or more of the Company’s outstanding common stock for at least three years to include in the Company’s proxy statement two director nominees or, if greater, nominees for 20% of the number of directors comprising the full Board. The amended and restated bylaws of the Company (the "Bylaws") were described in, and filed as an exhibit to, a Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the Commission on October 19, 2016. A copy of the Bylaws also is attached to this letter as Exhibit B.

Because Section 11 of the Bylaws already imposes a reasonable and appropriate limit on the number of shareholders who may aggregate their holdings to reach the 3% minimum ownership requirement (an “aggregation limit”), and that limit achieves the essential objective of the Proposal, the Company believes that it may exclude the Proposal on the ground that it has been substantially implemented.
B. Rule 14a-8(i)(10)

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials if the company has substantially implemented the proposal. In explaining the scope of a predecessor to Rule 14a-8(i)(10), the Commission said that the exclusion is "designed to avoid the possibility of shareholders having to consider matters which already have been favorably acted upon by the management." Exchange Act Release No. 12598 (Jul. 7, 1976) (discussing the rationale for adopting the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(i)(10), which provided as a substantive basis for omitting a shareholder proposal that "the proposal has been rendered moot by the actions of the management").

At one time, the staff interpreted the predecessor rule narrowly, considering a proposal to be excludable only if it had been "fully' effected" by the company. See Exchange Act Release No. 19135 at § II.B.5. (Oct. 14, 1982). By 1982, however, the Commission recognized that the staff's narrow interpretation of the predecessor rule "may not serve the interests of the issuer's security holders at large and may lead to an abuse of the security holder proposal process," because that interpretation enabled proponents to argue "successfully on numerous occasions that a proposal may not be excluded as moot in cases where the company has taken most but not all of the actions requested by the proposal." Id. Accordingly, the Commission adopted a revised interpretation of the rule to permit the omission of proposals that had been "substantially implemented." See Exchange Act Release No. 20091, at § II.E.6. (Aug. 16, 1983) (indicating that the staff's "previous formalistic application of" the predecessor rule "defeated its purpose" because the interpretation allowed proponents to obtain a shareholder vote on an existing company policy by changing only a few words of the policy). The Commission later codified this revised interpretation in Exchange Act Release No. 40018 at n.30 (May 21, 1998). Under the current version of Rule 14a-8(i)(10), a proposal will be deemed to have been substantially implemented if the company has already taken action to address the underlying concerns and essential objectives of the proposal. See, e.g., Exelon Corp. (Feb. 26, 2010); Exxon Mobil Corp. (Mar. 23, 2009); Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. (Jan. 17, 2007); ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Jul. 3, 2006); Talbots Inc. (Apr. 5, 2002); Exxon Mobil Corp. (Jan. 24, 2001); and The Gap, Inc. (Mar. 8, 1996).

Applying this standard, the staff has noted that "a determination that the company has substantially implemented the proposal depends upon whether [the company's] particular policies, practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal." Texaco, Inc. (Mar. 28, 1991). Even if a company's actions do not go as far as those requested by the shareholder proposal, they nonetheless may be deemed to "compare favorably" with the requested actions. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. (Sept. 26, 2013) (permitting exclusion of a proposal requesting elimination of supermajority voting requirements in the company's governing documents where the company had eliminated all but one of the supermajority voting requirements); Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 17, 2006) (permitting exclusion of a proposal
requesting that the company confirm the legitimacy of all current and future U.S. employees where the company had verified the legitimacy of 91% of its domestic workforce); and Masco Corp. (Mar. 29, 1999) (permitting exclusion of a proposal seeking adoption of a standard for independence of the company’s outside directors where the company had adopted a standard that, unlike the one specified in the proposal, added the qualification that only material relationships with affiliates would affect a director’s independence). In other words, a company may address adequately the underlying concerns and essential objectives of a shareholder proposal without implementing precisely the actions contemplated by the proposal.

Further, the staff has indicated in a number of no-action letters that a 20-person aggregation limit is consistent with the essential objective of proxy access. In Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (Feb. 12, 2016), for example, the staff allowed exclusion of a proposal requesting a 3%/3 year/25% proxy access bylaw, with “an unrestricted” number of shareholders allowed to aggregate, where the company adopted instead a 3%/3 year/25% bylaw with a 20-person aggregation limit. In allowing exclusion, the staff noted that the company’s bylaw achieved the “essential objective” of the proposal. Similarly, the staff has agreed in numerous instances that, where a shareholder proposal requests that the company adopt a proxy access bylaw allowing a holder of 3% of the outstanding common stock for three years to nominate up to 25% of the board, with no aggregation limit, the company will be deemed to have substantially implemented the proposal if it adopts a 3%/3 year proxy access bylaw limiting nominations to 20% of the board and imposing a 20-shareholder aggregation limit. See, e.g., Baxter International Inc. (Feb. 12, 2016); The Dun and Bradstreet Corp. (Feb. 12, 2016); Cardinal Health, Inc. (Jul. 20, 2016); Amazon.com Inc. (Mar. 3, 2016); and Time Warner Inc. (Feb. 12, 2016).

The staff has taken a similar position where a company that has already adopted a proxy access bylaw receives a shareholder proposal to amend the bylaw in limited respects, including for the purpose of eliminating a 20-person aggregation limit. In NVR, Inc. (Mar. 25, 2016), for example, a shareholder sought to amend the company’s proxy access bylaw in four respects: to reduce the minimum ownership requirement from 5% of the outstanding common stock to 3%; to provide that a shareholder would be deemed to own shares loaned to another person if the shareholder could recall the shares within five business days (as opposed to three business days); to eliminate a 20-shareholder aggregation limit; and to remove a requirement that a nominator represent that it will continue to hold the minimum required shares for at least one year after the annual meeting. The company revised its bylaw to implement the first two requested amendments but did not implement the other two (and therefore did not eliminate the aggregation limit). The staff nevertheless agreed that the proposal was excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(10), noting that the company’s “policies, practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal.” The staff reached the same conclusion on substantially similar facts in Oshkosh Corp. (Nov. 4, 2016).
C. The Company’s Bylaws Substantially Implement the Proposal

In each of the foregoing no-action letters relating to proxy access, the company responded to the shareholder’s proposal by amending its bylaws or other relevant documents in some respect. Where the proposal requested that the company adopt a proxy access bylaw, the company adopted a proxy access bylaw, but on terms that differed from the shareholder proposal. Where the proposal requested that the company amend an existing proxy access bylaw, the proposal requested amendment of multiple provisions, and the company implemented certain of the requested changes but not others. Rule 14a-8(i)(10) does not require, however, that a company change its existing policies or practices (or amend its bylaws) to establish that it has substantially implemented a proposal. Instead, the rule allows a company to exclude a proposal if the company has already taken action or adopted policies, practices or procedures to address the underlying concerns and essential objectives of the proposal. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Mar. 25, 2015) (permitting exclusion of a proposal requesting the company include in its executive compensation metrics a metric related to employee engagement, where the company already used a metric related to employee engagement for its compensation determinations); and ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Jun. 20, 2005) (permitting exclusion of a proposal requesting the company disclose its social, environmental and economic performance by issuing annual sustainability reports, when the company already prepared such a report annually).

In both NVR, Inc. and Oshkosh Corp., the shareholder proposal sought to reduce a 5% minimum ownership requirement to 3%. We believe that, in each case, the proponent’s proposed change to the minimum ownership requirement was deemed to be material to the proxy access bylaw as a whole, and that each company therefore had to adopt that amendment, at a minimum, to be deemed to have substantially implemented the proposal. Those letters do not support a conclusion, however, that a company must amend its bylaws in some respect in order to be deemed to have substantially implemented a proposal requesting a bylaw amendment. Instead, a proposed amendment will be deemed have been substantially implemented if the company’s existing bylaws already achieve the essential objective of the proposal.

Here, the only requested amendment to the Bylaws is an increase in the Company’s 20-shareholder aggregation limit. The difference between a 20-shareholder aggregation limit and a 40- or 50-shareholder limit is far less significant than the difference between a 5% minimum ownership requirement and a 3% minimum ownership requirement. Given the relative insignificance of the difference between the Company’s current aggregation limit and the one proposed by the Proponent, the Company does not need to amend its Bylaws as a condition to reliance on Rule 14a-8(i)(10), because the Company’s current aggregation limit achieves the essential objectives of the Proposal.

An aggregation limit is designed to minimize the burden on the company in reviewing and verifying the information and representations that each member of a shareholder group must
provide to establish the group’s eligibility, while assuring that all shareholders have a fair and reasonable opportunity to nominate director candidates by forming groups with like-minded shareholders who also own fewer than the minimum required shares. The Company’s aggregation limit achieves these dual objectives by assuring that any shareholder may form a group owning more than 3% of the common stock by combining with any of a large number of other shareholders, while avoiding the imposition on the Company and its other shareholders of the cost of processing nominations from a larger, more unwieldy group of shareholders.

There is no particular “science” to determining, for any company, the aggregation limit that will best achieve a balance between making proxy access reasonably available and avoiding a process that imposes an undue burden and expense on the Company to the detriment of other shareholders. Based on a review of proxy access bylaws adopted by public companies to date, approximately 89% of companies have a minimum ownership requirement of 3% of the outstanding common stock and an aggregation limit of 20 shareholders (with other companies having aggregation limits ranging from five to an unlimited number of shareholders). Under a 20-person aggregation limit, as long as at least one shareholder owns at least 3% of the outstanding common stock, any shareholder may utilize proxy access simply by forming a group with that shareholder. In addition, any 20 holders of at least 0.15% of the outstanding common stock may aggregate their holdings to meet the threshold. Between these two extremes, innumerable possibilities exist for a shareholder to form a group with any number of other shareholders, including shareholders who own even less than 0.15% of the common stock, to achieve aggregate ownership of 3% or more of the outstanding common stock. Accordingly, a 20-shareholder aggregation limit achieves the objective of making proxy access fairly and reasonably available to all shareholders, regardless of the size of their individual holdings.

The availability of proxy access to all shareholders under a 20-shareholder aggregation limit is particularly demonstrable in the Company’s case. Based on data from the investment research firm Morningstar, three of the Company’s institutional shareholders each owned more than 4% of the outstanding common stock as of September 30, 2016. Moreover, the largest 20 institutional shareholders of the Company own approximately 38% of the outstanding common stock, and each of these 20 institutional shareholders owns more than 0.7%. Assuming institutional ownership has been stable for three years, the concentration of significant shareholdings in 20 shareholders means that some of those shareholders may utilize proxy access individually, and that a small number of the others may easily form a group among themselves to make a proxy access nomination. For example, ten of the other largest shareholders own between 2.2% and 0.9% of the shares outstanding, and any three of those ten shareholders could form a group representing at least 3% of the Company’s outstanding shares. More importantly, any shareholder seeking to form a group to nominate a director candidate, regardless of the size

of its holdings, could achieve the minimum required ownership in any number of ways, by combining with one or a small number of the 20 largest investors. A shareholder group is not limited to these known institutional investors, of course, and a shareholder seeking to nominate a director candidate may approach any other shareholders to meet the 3% threshold. The 20-shareholder aggregation limit therefore does not unduly restrict any shareholder from forming a group to make a proxy access nomination.

To illustrate the ease of forming a nominating group, as of September 30, 2016, the Company had 467,267,977 shares of common stock outstanding. Based on that number, to meet the 3% minimum ownership requirement, a shareholder or group of shareholders would have to own, and to have owned continuously for at least three years, 14,018,040 shares. A group requiring 20 shareholders would therefore hold an average of approximately 700,902 shares per member. According to NASDAQ, as of September 30, 2016, 85 shareholders owned at least 700,902 shares.\(^2\) There are innumerable combinations that would allow the Company’s 85 largest shareholders to form 20-shareholder groups (or smaller groups) for the purpose of making a proxy access nomination. And, again, smaller shareholders could combine with up to 19 of these 85 shareholders, in innumerable combinations, to form a nominating group.

The Company’s 20-shareholder aggregation limit therefore provides abundant opportunities for all holders of less than 3% of the common stock to combine with other shareholders to reach the 3% minimum ownership requirement. To be clear, the Proposal’s requested 40- or 50-shareholder limit would not double the number of shareholders who might be able to utilize proxy access. Instead, it would simply reduce by half the average number of shares each member of a group would need to own if the maximum number of shareholders were needed to form an eligible group. In other words, any increase in the aggregation limit merely increases the inestimable number of shareholder combinations that could yield a group owning more than 3% of the common stock. It is impossible to know whether those additional combinations would enhance, much less materially enhance, the availability of proxy access to the Company’s shareholders. There is no reason to believe, however, that a solicitation of the type that would be required to form a group of shareholders of the maximum permissible size would be more likely to attract support from 40 holders of 0.075% of the common stock than 20 holders of 0.15% of the common stock.

The Company’s 20-shareholder aggregation limit also achieves the objective of limiting the burden and expense to the Company of reviewing and processing eligibility and other information provided by the members of a nominating group. The Proposal would at least double the effort and expense required to process information for a 20-shareholder group,

without increasing proportionately the likelihood that a shareholder will be able to form a nominating group.

The Commission noted in its 2010 release adopting a proxy access rule that a 3% ownership threshold is achievable at most large companies (and therefore most likely to occur) by aggregating a small number of investors. See Release No. 33-9136 (2010). While the Commission’s rule did not impose a limit on the number of shareholders who could form a group to meet the minimum ownership requirement, the Commission took into account the ease of aggregating holdings in reaching a conclusion that the minimum ownership requirement should be set at 3%. In the text of the adopting release, at notes 235-245, the Commission addressed aggregation by noting:

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"...we considered the data in the [Memorandum from the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation regarding the Share Ownership and Holding Period Patterns in 13F data (November 24, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-576.pdf] to be the most pertinent to our selection of a uniform minimum ownership percentage. We received additional data relating to large companies, however, that offer some additional indication about the number of shareholders potentially available to form a group to meet the 3% ownership threshold. One study indicated that in the top 50 companies by market capitalization as of March 31, 2009, the five largest institutional investors held from 9.1% to 33.5% of the shares, and an average of 18.4% of the shares. That same study found that among a sample of 50 large accelerated filers, the median number of shareholders holding at least 1% of the shares for at least one year was 10.5, with 45 of the 50 companies in the sample having at least seven such shareholders. Another study that was reported to us similarly suggests relatively high concentration of share ownership. According to that analysis of S&P 500 companies, 14 institutional investors could satisfy a 1% threshold at more than 100 companies, eight could meet that threshold at over 200 companies, five could meet it at over 300 companies, and three could meet it at 499 of the 500. Information from specific large issuers likewise suggests the achievability of shareholder groups aggregating 3%.” (footnotes omitted).
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The concentration of ownership of the common stock of large public companies makes it highly unlikely that increasing the aggregation limit from 20 to 40 or 50 at those companies would enhance the ability of shareholders to form nominating groups. The Proposal’s supporting statement states that “even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the 3% held for 3 years criteria at most companies examined” by the Council of Institutional Investors. While this statement regarding pension funds is of little relevance to the Company given the Company’s shareholder base, the statement, even if true (and we do not know whether it is or not), also does not support a conclusion that the 40 or 50
largest public pension funds (or any other category of investor) could aggregate their holdings to meet the 3%/3-year requirement. There simply is no reason to accept the assumption, implicit in the Proposal, that a 40- or 50-shareholder aggregation limit will make proxy access available to shareholders who would be unable to use it under a 20-shareholder aggregation limit. There also is no reason to believe that pension funds would be unwilling to form a nominating group, among themselves or with other shareholders. When Bank of America, for example, adopted proxy access, it did so with the public support of the New York City Pension Funds, California Public Employees’ Retirement System and California Teachers’ Retirement System, which are among the largest public pension funds in the U.S. ³ Bank of America’s proxy access bylaw includes a 20-shareholder aggregation limit.

A 20-shareholder aggregation limit has achieved a consensus among companies that have adopted proxy access. The limit is designed to make proxy access available to all shareholders by allowing them to form groups with a broad class of shareholders, without also creating a process that is burdensome, complex, unwieldy and expensive. Of the over 200 public companies that adopted proxy access between January 2015 and June 2016, over 90% adopted an aggregation limit of 20 shareholders or fewer.

Twenty shareholders is the threshold adopted in the bylaws of T. Rowe Price Group, Inc., State Street Corporation, and Blackrock, Inc., the publicly traded parent companies of some of the largest institutional shareholders in the United States. Similarly, Institutional Shareholder Services—a leading proxy advisory firm—has stated that, in reviewing whether a company has satisfactorily implemented proxy access in response to a shareholder proposal, it does not view a 20-shareholder aggregation limit as a material restriction or one that “unnecessarily restrict[s] the use of a proxy access right” (although it will treat a limit that is lower than 20 shareholders as unduly restrictive). ⁴

In making its own determination regarding the appropriate terms of the Company’s proxy access bylaw, the Board reached a similar conclusion that 20 shareholders is the most appropriate aggregation limit to achieve the dual purposes of an aggregation limit. Before adopting the Company’s proxy access bylaw, the Board solicited input regarding the bylaw from the Company’s largest institutional shareholders. In no case did any shareholder object to or suggest a revision of the 20-shareholder aggregation limit. In light of this, the Board concluded that the 20-shareholder aggregation limit balanced appropriately the Company’s interests in

efficiency and keeping costs low while also providing a workable proxy access bylaw that is accessible by all shareholders.

The Company recognizes that the existence of a consensus regarding the appropriateness of a 20-shareholder aggregation limit does not mean that the Company’s proxy access bylaw substantially implements the Proposal. The consensus does, however, support a conclusion that a 20-shareholder aggregation limit affords shareholders ample opportunity to combine with other shareholders to form a nominating group. For this reason, as well as all of the other reasons stated above, the Proposal’s 40- or 50-shareholder aggregation limit does little to make proxy access more available to or usable by the Company’s shareholders.

The Proponent states that the Proposal “is worded to avoid” the possibility that the staff will allow exclusion of the Proposal based on substantial implementation because the Proposal “explicitly specifies a limit of 40 or 50 shareholders.” That conclusion, however, does not follow. The standard under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) is not whether a company has implemented a proposal in exactly the manner requested by the proponent. Instead, the question is whether the company’s particular policies, practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal. The Company’s proxy access bylaw compares favorably with the Proposal and achieves the essential objective of the Proposal. Accordingly, the Proposal has been substantially implemented under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, the Company believes that the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10). The Company requests the staff’s concurrence in the Company’s view or, alternatively, confirmation that the staff will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the Company excludes the Proposal from its 2017 Proxy Materials.

In accordance with SLB 14F, Part F, please send your response to this letter by email to alan.dye@hoganlovells.com.

Very truly yours,

Alan L. Dye
alan.dye@hoganlovells.com

Enclosures
cc: John Chevedden
    Scott Seeley (NextEra Energy, Inc.)
Exhibit A

Copy of the Proposal and Related Correspondence
Mr. W. Scott Seeley  
Corporate Secretary  
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NEE)  
700 Universe Boulevard  
Juno Beach, FL 33408  
PH: 561-694-4000  
PH: 561-691-7721  
FX: 561-694-4999  
FX: 561-691-7702  
Scott Seeley@nexteraenergy.com

Dear Corporate Secretary,

I am pleased to be a shareholder in NextEra Energy, Inc. (NEE) and appreciate the leadership our company has shown. However, I also believe NextEra has unrealized potential that can be unlocked through low or no cost corporate governance reform.

I am submitting a shareholder proposal for a vote at the next annual shareholder meeting. The proposal meets all Rule 14a-8 requirements, including the continuous ownership of the required stock value for over a year and I pledge to continue to hold the required amount of stock until after the date of the next shareholder meeting. My submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication.

This letter confirms that I am delegating John Chevedden to act as my agent regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal, including its submission, negotiations and/or modification, and presentation at the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications regarding my rule 14a-8 proposal to John Chevedden to facilitate prompt communication. Please identify me as the proponent of the proposal exclusively.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in responding to this proposal. Please acknowledge receipt of my proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,

Myra K. Young

November 23, 2016

cc: Jodie Murphy <jodie.murphy@nexteraenergy.com>  
PH: 561-691-7323  
investors@nexteraenergy.com  
cc: John Chevedden
RESOLVED: Shareholders of NextEra Energy, Inc. ("NEE" or the "Company") ask the board of directors (the "Board") to amend its bylaws on "Proxy Access for Director Nominations" to raise the current "shareholders and other persons whose ownership of shares of common stock of the Corporation is aggregated" from the current limit of 20 to a limitation of 40 or 50.

SUPPORTING STATEMENT: The SEC's universal proxy access Rule 14a-11 (https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf) was vacated after a court decision regarding the SEC's cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, proxy access rights must be established on a company-by-company basis.

Proxy Access in the United States: Revisiting the Proposed SEC Rule (http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2014.n9.1) a cost-benefit analysis by CFA Institute, found proxy access would "benefit both the markets and corporate boardrooms, with little cost or disruption," raising US market capitalization by up to $140.3 billion.

Public Versus Private Provision of Governance: The Case of Proxy Access (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635695) found a 0.5 percent average increase in shareholder value for proxy access targeted firms.

Proxy Access: Best Practices (http://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/08_05_15_Best%20Practices%20Proxy%20Access.pdf) by the Council of Institutional Investors, "highlights the most troublesome provisions" in recent proxy access bylaws, such as the fact that even if the 20 largest public pension funds were able to aggregate their shares, they would not meet the 3% held for 3 years criteria at most companies examined.

Many corporate boards have adopted proxy access bylaws with troublesome provisions that significantly impair the ability of shareholders to form nominating groups. The most common troublesome provision is limiting the number of shareholders that can form a nominating group to 20 members. Companies can thus appear to have a workable form of proxy access but that limitation makes implementation problematic and less attractive.

SEC staff members have granted "no-action" relief to several companies with bylaws limiting proxy access to groups of 20 shareholders based on "substantial implementation," even though the group of 20 limitation makes actual implementation highly unlikely. This proposal is worded to avoid that possibility by explicitly specifying a limit of 40 or 50 shareholders as the number of shareholders that can aggregate their shares to implement proxy access.

End the game-playing. Ask the Board to adopt THE provision that frightens entrenched boards and managers the most. Vote to make NEE's proxy access bylaws workable for more shareholders.

Increase Shareholder Value
Vote to Amend Shareholder Proxy Access – Proposal [4]
Myra K. Young, sponsored this proposal.

Notes:
This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including (emphasis added):

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(l)(3) in the following circumstances:

• the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
• the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
• the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
• the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

We believe that it is appropriate under rule 14a-8 for companies to address these objections in their statements of opposition.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

The stock supporting this proposal will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email
11/27/2016

Myra K Young

***FISMA & OMB MEMORANDUM M-07-16***

Re: Your TD Ameritrade Account Ending in

Dear Myra K Young,

Pursuant to your request, this letter is to confirm that as of the date of this letter, Myra K Young held, and had held continuously for at least thirteen months, 100 shares of Nextera Energy Inc. (NEE) common stock in her account ending in 00188. The DTC clearinghouse number for TD Ameritrade is 0188.

If we can be of any further assistance, please let us know. Just log in to your account and go to the Message Center to write us. You can also call Client Services at 800-669-3900. We're available 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Sincerely,

William Walker
Resource Specialist
TD Ameritrade

This information is furnished as part of a general information service and TD Ameritrade shall not be liable for any damages arising out of any inaccuracy in the information. Because this information may differ from your TD Ameritrade monthly statement, you should rely only on the TD Ameritrade monthly statement as the official record of your TD Ameritrade account.

Market volatility, volume, and system availability may delay account access and trade executions.

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Exhibit B

Copy of the Amended and Restated Bylaws of NextEra Energy, Inc.
ARTICLE I. MEETINGS OF SHAREHOLDERS

Section 1. Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the shareholders of the Corporation shall be held at the time and place designated by the board of directors of the Corporation.

Section 2. Special Meetings. Special meetings of the shareholders may be called by the chairman of the board of directors or the president or the secretary of the Corporation and shall be called upon the written request of a majority of the entire board of directors or the holder or holders of not less than 20% of all the outstanding shares of stock of the Corporation entitled to vote on the matter or matters to be presented at the meeting. Such request shall state the purpose or purposes of the proposed meeting. No business shall be conducted at any special meeting other than the business for which the special meeting is called as set forth in the notice of the special meeting. Special meetings shall be held at the time and place designated by the chief executive officer of the Corporation.

Section 3. Place and Presiding Officer. Meetings of the shareholders may be held within or without the State of Florida.

Meetings of the shareholders may be presided over by the chairman of the board, the president or any vice president. The secretary of the Corporation, or any person chosen by the person presiding over the shareholders' meeting, shall act as secretary for the meeting.

Section 4. Notice. Written notice stating the place, day and hour of the meeting and, in the case of a special meeting, the purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called, shall be given not less than ten nor more than sixty days before the meeting, personally, by United States mail, or in such other manner as may be permitted by law, by or at the direction of the chairman of the board, the president, the secretary, or the officer or persons calling the meeting. If mailed, such notice shall be deemed to be given when deposited in the United States mail addressed to the shareholder at his or her address as it appears on the stock transfer books of the Corporation, with postage thereon prepaid.

Section 5. Notice of Adjourned Meetings. When a meeting is adjourned to another time or place, it shall not be necessary to give any notice of the adjourned meeting if the time and place to which the meeting is adjourned are announced at the meeting at which the adjournment is taken, and at the adjourned meeting any business may be transacted that might have been transacted on the original date of the meeting.
If, however, after the adjournment the board of directors fixes a new record date for the adjourned meeting, a notice of the adjourned meeting shall be given as provided in Section 4 of this Article I to each shareholder of record on the new record date entitled to vote at such meeting.

Section 6. Closing of Transfer Books and Fixing Record Date. For the purpose of determining shareholders entitled to notice of, or to vote at, any meeting of shareholders or any adjournment thereof, or entitled to receive payment of any dividend, or in order to make a determination of shareholders for any other purpose, the board of directors may provide that the stock transfer books shall be closed for a stated period not to exceed, in any case, sixty days (or such longer period as may from time to time be permitted by law). If the stock transfer books shall be closed for the purpose of determining shareholders entitled to notice of, or to vote at, a meeting of shareholders, such books shall be closed for at least ten days immediately preceding such meeting.

In lieu of closing the stock transfer books, the board of directors may fix in advance a date as the record date for any determination of shareholders, such date in any case to be not more than sixty days (or such longer period as may from time to time be permitted by law) and, in case of a meeting of shareholders, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the particular action requiring such determination of shareholders is to be taken.

If the stock transfer books are not closed and no record date is fixed for the determination of shareholders entitled to notice of or to vote at a meeting of shareholders, or shareholders entitled to receive payment of a dividend, the date on which notice of the meeting is mailed or the date on which the resolution of the board of directors declaring such dividend is adopted, as the case may be, shall be the record date for such determination of shareholders.

When a determination of shareholders entitled to vote at any meeting of shareholders has been made as provided in this Section 6, such determination shall apply to any adjournment thereof, unless the board of directors fixes a new record date for the adjourned meeting.

Section 7. Shareholder Quorum and Voting.

(a) Quorum and General Voting Requirements. A majority of the total number of shares outstanding and entitled to vote, present in person or represented by proxy thereat, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of shareholders for the transaction of business, except as otherwise provided by the Florida Business Corporation Act or by the Corporation's Articles of Incorporation, as amended and restated from time to time (the "Charter"). If a specified item of business is required to be voted on by a class or series of shares, a majority of the total number of shares outstanding and entitled to vote of such class or series, present in person or represented by proxy thereat, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of shareholders for the transaction of such item of business by such class or series. If, however, a quorum does not exist at a meeting, the holders of a majority of the shares present at such meeting and entitled to vote may adjourn the meeting from time to time, without notice other than by announcement at the meeting,
until the requisite number of shares entitled to vote shall be present. At any such adjourned meeting at which a quorum exists, any business may be transacted which might have been transacted at the meeting as originally noticed. After a quorum has been established at a meeting, the subsequent withdrawal of shareholders, so as to reduce the number of shares entitled to vote at the meeting below the number required for a quorum, shall not affect the validity of any action taken at the meeting or any adjournment thereof.

For purposes of this Section 7, (1) shares entitled to vote on any item of business presented for action by shareholders at a meeting, present in person or represented by proxy thereat, shall be counted for purposes of establishing a quorum for the transaction of all business at such meeting, and (2) broker non-votes, if any, with respect to any item of business shall not count as shares entitled to vote on that item of business.

If a quorum exists, action on a matter (other than the election of directors) shall be approved by the shareholders of the Corporation if the votes cast by shareholders present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the matter favoring such action exceed the number of votes cast by such shareholders opposing such action.

(b) **Election of Directors.** If a quorum exists, a nominee for director shall be elected to the board of directors if the votes cast for such nominee’s election by shareholders present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the matter exceed the votes cast by such shareholders against such nominee’s election; provided, however, that if the number of persons considered by the shareholders for election as directors exceeds the total number of directors to be elected, directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes cast; and further provided that all persons considered for election (other than those recommended for nomination by or at the direction of the board of directors or any duly authorized committee thereof) shall have met all applicable requirements and procedures in being placed in nomination and considered for election, including without limitation the requirements set forth in these bylaws and in all applicable laws, rules and regulations.

(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 7, any item of business may require a greater or different vote (i) by express provision of the Florida Business Corporation Act or the Charter, or (ii) to the extent permitted by the Florida Business Corporation Act, by express provision of these bylaws or by action of the board of directors, in which event such greater or different vote requirement shall govern or, if so provided in such a requirement or action of the board of directors, shall apply in addition to the vote otherwise required.

**Section 8. Inspectors of Election.** Prior to each meeting of shareholders, the board of directors shall appoint not less than one nor more than five inspectors of election who shall have such duties and perform such functions in connection with the meeting as shall be determined by the board of directors.
Section 9. Notice of Shareholder Business and Director Nominations.

(a) (1) General. Nominations of persons for election to the board of directors of the Corporation and the proposal of any other business to be considered by the shareholders of the Corporation may be made at any annual meeting of shareholders, only (i) pursuant to the Corporation's notice of meeting (or any supplement thereto), (ii) by or at the direction of the board of directors (or any duly authorized committee thereof) or (iii) by any shareholder of the Corporation who (A) is a shareholder of record at the time of the giving of the notice provided for in this Section 9 and at the time of the annual meeting, (B) is entitled to vote at the annual meeting on the election of directors or proposal and (C) complies with the notice procedures set forth in this Section 9 as to such business or nomination. Clause (iii) of this Section 9(a)(1) or Article I Section 11 of these bylaws shall be the exclusive means for a shareholder to make nominations or submit other business (other than matters properly brought under Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") and included in the Corporation's notice of meeting) before an annual meeting of shareholders.

(2) Timely Notice. Without qualification or limitation, for any nominations or any other business to be properly brought before an annual meeting by a shareholder of the Corporation pursuant to Section 9(a)(1)(iii) hereof, the shareholder previously must have given timely notice thereof in proper written form (as more fully described in Section 9(a)(3) hereof) to the secretary of the Corporation and any such other business must constitute a proper matter for shareholder action. To be timely, a shareholder's notice must be delivered to the secretary of the Corporation in person or by facsimile, or sent by U.S. certified mail and received by the secretary of the Corporation, at the principal executive offices of the Corporation, not earlier than the opening of business on the 120th day prior to the first anniversary of the date of the Corporation’s immediately preceding annual meeting; provided, however, that in the event that the date of the annual meeting is more than 30 days earlier or more than 60 days later than such first anniversary date, notice by the shareholder to be timely must be so delivered or received not earlier than the opening of business on the 120th day prior to the date of such annual meeting and not later than the close of business on the later of the 90th day prior to the date of such annual meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement of the date of such annual meeting is first made by the Corporation. In no event shall any adjournment or postponement of an annual meeting or the public announcement thereof commence a new time period (or extend any time period) for the giving of notice by a shareholder as described above.

(3) Notice in Proper Written Form. To be in proper written form, a shareholder's notice to the secretary of the Corporation (whether given pursuant to Section 9(a) or Section 9(b) hereof) must set forth in writing:

(A) as to the shareholder giving the notice and the beneficial owner, if any, on whose behalf the nomination or proposal is made:
(i) the name and address of such shareholder as they appear on the Corporation’s books, and of such beneficial owner, if any;

(ii) information about all holdings or other interests in the Corporation’s securities, including without limitation:

(a) the class or series and number of shares of the Corporation which are, directly or indirectly, owned of record and/or owned beneficially by the shareholder and such beneficial owner, if any, and a representation that the shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, will notify the Corporation in writing of the class or series and number of such shares owned of record and beneficially as of the record date for the meeting, promptly following the later of the record date and the date notice of the record date is first publicly announced;

(b) any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right, or similar right with an exercise or conversion privilege or a settlement payment or mechanism at a price related to any class or series of shares of the Corporation or with a value derived in whole or in part from the value of any class or series of shares of the Corporation, whether or not such instrument or right shall be subject to settlement in the underlying class or series of capital stock of the Corporation or otherwise (a “Derivative Instrument”) directly or indirectly owned beneficially by such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, and any other direct or indirect opportunity to profit or share in any profit derived from any increase or decrease in the value of shares of the Corporation;

(c) any proxy, contract, arrangement, understanding or relationship pursuant to which such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, has a right to vote any shares of any security of the Corporation;

(d) any short interest in any security of the Corporation (for purposes hereof, a person or entity shall be deemed to have a short interest in a security if such person or entity directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise, has the opportunity to profit or share in any profit derived from any decrease in the value of the subject security);

(e) any rights to dividends on the shares of the Corporation owned beneficially by such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, that are separated or separable from the underlying shares of the Corporation;

(f) any proportionate interest in shares of the Corporation or Derivative Instruments held, directly or indirectly, by (X) a general or limited partnership in which such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, is a general partner or, directly or indirectly, beneficially owns an
interest in a general partner or (Y) a limited liability company in which such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, is a managing member or, directly or indirectly, beneficially owns an interest in a managing member or (Z) another entity or enterprise in which such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, serves in a similar management capacity or directly or indirectly, beneficially owns an interest in an entity or enterprise that serves in such a management capacity; and

(g) any performance-related fees (other than an asset-based fee) that such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, is entitled to based on any increase or decrease in the value of shares of the Corporation or Derivative Instruments, if any, as of the date of such notice, including without limitation any such interests held by such shareholder's and beneficial owner's, if any, affiliates, any person or entity with whom such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, is acting in concert or members of such shareholder's and beneficial owner's, if any, immediate family sharing the same household (which information shall be supplemented by such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, not later than ten (10) days after the later of the record date for the annual meeting or the date on which the record date for the annual meeting is first publicly announced to disclose such ownership as of the record date);

(iii) a representation that the shareholder is a holder of record of stock of the Corporation entitled to vote at such annual meeting on the matter proposed and intends to appear in person or by proxy at such meeting to propose such nomination or other business;

(iv) if the shareholder intends to solicit proxies in support of such shareholder's proposal, a representation to that effect; and

(v) any other information relating to such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, that would be required to be disclosed in a proxy statement or other filings required to be made in connection with solicitations of proxies for, as applicable, the proposal and/or for the election of directors in a contested election pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.

(B) if the notice relates to any business that the shareholder proposes to bring before the meeting other than a nomination of a director or directors:

(i) a brief description of the business desired to be brought before the meeting, the text of the proposal or business (including the text of any resolutions proposed for consideration), the reasons for conducting such business at the meeting, any material interest of such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, in such business and, in the event that such
business includes a proposal to amend the Charter or by-laws of the Corporation, the language of the proposed amendment; and

(ii) a description of all agreements, arrangements and understandings between such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, and any other person or persons (including the names of such persons) in connection with the proposal of such business by such shareholder.

(C) If the shareholder proposes to nominate a person for election to the board of directors, as to each such person whom the shareholder proposes to nominate:

(i) all information relating to such person that would be required to be disclosed in a proxy statement or other filings required to be made in connection with solicitations of proxies for the election of directors in a contested election pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder (including such person’s written consent to being named in the proxy statement as a nominee and to serving as a director if elected); and

(ii) a description of all direct and indirect compensation and other material monetary agreements, arrangements and understandings during the past three years, and any other material relationships, between or among such shareholder and beneficial owner, if any, and their respective affiliates and associates, or others acting in concert therewith, on the one hand, and each proposed nominee, and his or her respective affiliates and associates, or others acting in concert therewith, on the other hand, including without limitation all information that would be required to be disclosed pursuant to Rule 404 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under Regulation S-K (or any successor rule or regulation) if the shareholder making the nomination and any beneficial owner on whose behalf the nomination is made, if any, or any affiliate or associate thereof or person acting in concert therewith, were the “registrant” for purposes of such rule and the nominee were a director or executive officer of such “registrant”; and

(D) with respect to each nominee for election to the board of directors, include a completed and signed questionnaire, representation and agreement as required by Article 1, Section 10 hereof. The Corporation may require any proposed nominee to furnish such other information as may reasonably be required by the Corporation to determine the eligibility of such proposed nominee to serve as an independent director of the Corporation or that could be material to a reasonable shareholder’s understanding of the independence, or lack thereof, of such nominee.

(4) Notwithstanding anything in Section 9(a)(2) above to the contrary, in the event that the number of directors to be elected to the board of directors at an annual meeting of the
shareholders is increased in accordance with Article II, Section 2 and there is no public announcement naming all of the nominees for directors or specifying the size of the increased board of directors made by the Corporation at least 90 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting, a shareholder's notice required by this Section 9 shall also be considered timely, but only with respect to nominees for any new positions created by such increase, if it shall be delivered to the secretary of the Corporation in person or by facsimile, or sent by U.S. certified mail and received by the secretary of the Corporation, at the principal executive offices of the Corporation, not later than the close of business on the 10th day following the day on which such public announcement is first made by the Corporation.

(5) For purposes of this Section 9, (a) an “affiliate” of, or person “affiliated” with, a specified person, is a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified, and (b) an “associate”, when used to indicate a relationship with any person, means (i) a corporation or organization of which such person is an officer or partner or is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of equity securities, (ii) any trust or other estate in which such person has a substantial beneficial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a similar capacity, and (iii) any relative or spouse of such person, or any relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such person or who is a director or officer of the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries.

(b) **Special Meetings of Shareholders.** Only such business shall be conducted at a special meeting of shareholders as shall have been brought before the meeting pursuant to the Corporation's notice of meeting. Nominations of persons for election to the board of directors may be made at a special meeting of shareholders at which directors are to be elected pursuant to the Corporation's notice of meeting (i) by or at the direction of the board of directors (or any duly authorized committee thereof) or (ii) provided that the board of directors has determined that directors shall be elected at such meeting, by any shareholder of the Corporation who (i) is a shareholder of record at the time of the giving of notice provided for in this Section 9 and at the time of the special meeting, (ii) is entitled to vote at the meeting for the election of directors and (iii) complies with the notice procedures set forth in this Section 9 as to such nomination. In the event a special meeting of shareholders is properly called by the Corporation for the purpose of electing one or more directors to the board of directors, any such shareholder may nominate a person or persons (as the case may be), for election to such position(s) as specified in the Corporation's notice of meeting, if the shareholder’s notice required by Sections 9(a)(2) and 9(a)(3) hereof with respect to any nomination (including the completed and signed questionnaire, representation and agreement required by Section 9(a)(3)(D) hereof) shall be delivered to the secretary of the Corporation in person or by facsimile, or sent by U.S. certified mail and received by the secretary of the Corporation, at the principal executive offices of the Corporation, not earlier than the opening of business on the 120th day prior to such special meeting and not later than the close of business on the later of the 90th day prior to such special meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement is first made by the Corporation of the date of such special meeting and of the fact that directors are to be elected. In no event
shall any adjournment or postponement of a special meeting or the public announcement thereof commence a
new time period (or extend any time period) for the giving of notice by a shareholder as described above.

(c) If the notice requirements set forth in this Section 9 are satisfied by a shareholder and such
shareholder's nominee or proposal has been included in a proxy statement that has been prepared by
management of the Corporation to solicit proxies for the applicable meeting of shareholders and such
shareholder does not appear or send a qualified representative to present such nominee or proposal at such
meeting, the Corporation need not present such nominee or proposal for a vote at such meeting notwithstanding
that proxies in respect of such vote may have been received by the Corporation. For purposes of this Section 9, to
be considered a qualified representative of the shareholder, a person must be authorized by a writing executed by
such shareholder or an electronic transmission (as defined in the Florida Business Corporation Act) delivered by
such shareholder to the secretary of the Corporation (in the case of a writing, delivered in person or by facsimile,
and sent by U.S. certified mail and received, at the principal executive offices of the Corporation) to act for such
shareholder as proxy at the meeting of shareholders and such person must produce such writing or electronic
transmission, or a reliable printed reproduction of such writing or electronic transmission, at the meeting of
shareholders.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in the Corporation’s Charter, only such persons as are nominated in
accordance with the procedures set forth in this Article I, Section 9 or are chosen to fill any vacancy occurring in
the board of directors in accordance with Article II, Section 3 shall be eligible to serve as directors and only such
business shall be conducted at a meeting of shareholders as shall have been brought before the meeting in
accordance with the procedures set forth in this Article I, Section 9. Except as otherwise provided by law, the
Charter or these bylaws, the chairman of the meeting shall have the power and duty to determine whether a
nomination or any business proposed to be brought before the meeting was made or proposed, as the case may
be, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Article I, Section 9, and, if any proposed nomination or
business is not in compliance with this Article I, Section 9, to declare that such defective proposal or nomination
shall be disregarded.

(e) For purposes of this Section 9, “public announcement” shall mean disclosure in a press release
reported by the Dow Jones News Services, Associated Press or comparable national news service, in a
document publicly filed by the Corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 13,
14 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, or posted on the
Corporation’s website.

(f) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 9, a shareholder shall also comply with all
applicable requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, and all applicable rules
and requirements of the NYSE or, if the Corporation's shares are not listed on the NYSE, the applicable rules and
requirements of the primary securities exchange or quotation system on which the Corporation's shares are listed
or quoted, in each case with respect to the matters set forth in this Section 9;
provided, however, that any references in these bylaws to the Exchange Act or the rules promulgated thereunder are not intended to and shall not limit the requirements applicable to nominations or proposals as to any other business to be considered pursuant to Section 9(a)(1)(iii) or Section 9(b) hereof. Nothing in this Section 9 shall be deemed to affect any rights (i) of shareholders to request inclusion of proposals in the Corporation's proxy statement pursuant to Rule 14a-8 (or any successor provision) under the Exchange Act or (ii) of the holders of any series of stock having preference over the common stock as to dividends or upon liquidation, if and to the extent provided for under law, the Charter or these bylaws.

Section 10. Submission of Questionnaire, Representation and Agreement.

To be eligible to be a nominee for initial election as a director of the Corporation, a person must deliver (in accordance with the time periods prescribed for delivery of notice under Section 9 of this Article I) to the secretary of the Corporation in person or by facsimile, or sent by U.S. certified mail and received by the secretary of the Corporation, at the principal executive offices of the Corporation, a written questionnaire with respect to the background and qualification of such person and the background of any other person or entity on whose behalf the nomination is being made (which questionnaire shall be provided by the secretary upon written request) and a written representation and agreement (in the form provided by the secretary upon written request) that such person

(i) is not and will not become a party to (A) any agreement, arrangement or understanding with, and has not given any commitment or assurance to, any person or entity as to how such person, if elected as a director of the Corporation, will act or vote on any issue or question (a “Voting Commitment”) that has not been disclosed to the Corporation or (B) any Voting Commitment that could limit or interfere with such person’s ability to comply, if elected as a director of the Corporation, with such person’s fiduciary duties under applicable law,

(ii) is not and will not become a party to any agreement, arrangement or understanding with any person or entity other than the Corporation with respect to any direct or indirect compensation, reimbursement or indemnification in connection with service or action as a director that has not been disclosed therein, and

(iii) in such person’s individual capacity and on behalf of any person or entity on whose behalf the nomination is being made, would be in compliance, if elected as a director of the Corporation, and will comply with, applicable law and all applicable publicly disclosed corporate governance, business conduct, ethics, conflict of interest, corporate opportunities, confidentiality and stock ownership and trading policies and guidelines of the Corporation.
Section 11. Proxy Access for Director Nominations.

(a) **General.** The Corporation shall include in its proxy statement for an annual meeting of shareholders the name, together with the Required Information (as defined below), of any person nominated for election (a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the board of directors by a shareholder that satisfies, or by a group of no more than twenty (20) shareholders that satisfy, the requirements of this Section 11 (an “Eligible Shareholder”), and that expressly elects at the time of providing the notice required by this Section 11 (the “Nomination Notice”) to have its nominee included in the Corporation’s proxy materials pursuant to this Section 11.

(b) **Timely Notice.** To be timely, a shareholder’s Nomination Notice must be delivered to or mailed and received by the secretary of the Corporation at the principal executive offices of the Corporation not earlier than the opening of business on the 150th day prior to and not later than the close of business on the 120th day prior to the first anniversary of the date the Corporation commenced mailing of its proxy materials in connection with the most recent annual meeting of shareholders; provided, however, that in the event that the annual meeting is called for a date that is more than 30 days earlier or more than 60 days later than such first anniversary date, to be timely the Nomination Notice must be so received on the later of the close of business on the 120th day prior to the date of such annual meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement of the date of such annual meeting is first made by the Corporation. In no event shall any adjournment or postponement of an annual meeting or the public announcement thereof commence a new time period (or extend any time period) for the giving of a Nomination Notice as described above.

(c) **Required Information.** For purposes of this Section 11, the “Required Information” that the Corporation will include in its proxy statement is (i) the information concerning the Shareholder Nominee and the Eligible Shareholder that is required to be disclosed in the Corporation’s proxy statement by the rules and regulations promulgated under the Exchange Act; and (ii) if the Eligible Shareholder so elects, a Statement (as defined below). To be timely, the Required Information must be delivered to or mailed and received by the secretary of the Corporation within the time period specified in this Section 11 for providing the Nomination Notice.

(d) **Number of Nominees.** The number of Shareholder Nominees (including Shareholder Nominees that were submitted by an Eligible Shareholder for inclusion in the Corporation’s proxy solicitation materials pursuant to this Section 11 but either are subsequently withdrawn or that the board of directors decides to nominate as board of director nominees) appearing in the Corporation’s proxy materials with respect to an annual meeting of shareholders shall not exceed the greater of (1) two or (2) twenty percent (20%) of the number of directors in office as of the last day on which a Nomination Notice may be delivered pursuant to this Section 11, or if such amount is not a whole number, the closest whole number below twenty percent (20%). In the event that the number of Shareholder Nominees submitted by all Eligible Shareholders pursuant to this Section 11 exceeds this maximum number, each Eligible Shareholder will select one Shareholder Nominee for inclusion in the Corporation’s proxy materials until the maximum number is reached, choosing in order of the amount (largest to
smallest) of shares of the common stock of the Corporation each Eligible Shareholder disclosed as owned in its respective Nomination Notice submitted to the Corporation and confirmed by the Corporation. If the maximum number is not reached after each Eligible Shareholder has selected one Shareholder Nominee, this selection process will continue as many times as necessary, following the same order each time, until the maximum number is reached. In the event that two or more Eligible Shareholders disclose ownership of the same number of shares of common stock of the Corporation, such Eligible Shareholders will choose in the order of receipt of their respective Nomination Notice by the secretary of the Corporation.

(e) (1) **Share Ownership for Eligibility to Make Nominations.** For purposes of this Section 11, an Eligible Shareholder shall be deemed to “own” only those outstanding shares of the common stock of the Corporation as to which the shareholder possesses both (A) the full voting and investment rights pertaining to the shares and (B) the full economic interest in (including the opportunity for profit and risk of loss on) such shares; provided that the number of shares calculated in accordance with clauses (A) and (B) shall not include any shares (C) sold by such shareholder or any of its affiliates in any transaction that has not been settled or closed, (D) borrowed by such shareholder or any of its affiliates for any purposes or purchased by such shareholder or any of its affiliates pursuant to an agreement to resell or (E) subject to any option, warrant, forward contract, swap, contract of sale, or other derivative or similar agreement entered into by such shareholder or any of its affiliates, whether any such instrument or agreement is to be settled with shares or with cash based on the notional amount or value of shares of outstanding common stock of the Corporation, in any such case which instrument or agreement has, or is intended to have, the purpose or effect of (i) reducing in any manner, to any extent or at any time in the future, such shareholder’s or any of its affiliate’s full right to vote or direct the voting of any such shares, and/or (ii) hedging, offsetting or altering to any degree gain or loss arising from the full economic interest in such shares by such shareholder or affiliate. For purposes of this Section 11, the terms “affiliate” or “affiliates” shall have the meaning ascribed to them under the rules and regulations promulgated under the Exchange Act.

(2) **Shares Held by Nominees.** A shareholder shall “own” shares held in the name of a nominee or other intermediary so long as the shareholder retains the right to instruct how the shares are voted with respect to the election of directors and possesses the full economic interest in the shares, as set forth in Section 11(e)(1) above. A person’s ownership of shares shall be deemed to continue during any period in which (A) the person has loaned such shares, provided that the person has the power to recall such loaned shares on five business days’ notice or (B) the person has delegated any voting power by means of a proxy, power of attorney or other instrument or arrangement that is revocable at any time by the person. The terms “owned,” “owning” and other variations of the word “own” shall have correlative meanings. Whether outstanding shares of the common stock of the Corporation are “owned” for these purposes shall be determined by the board of directors, a committee thereof or an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant to Section 11(m) hereof, which determination shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its shareholders, any Shareholder Nominee and any other person.
(f) (1) **Ownership Amount and Period of Ownership.** An Eligible Shareholder must have owned (as defined above in Section 11(e)) continuously for at least three (3) years that number of shares of common stock as shall constitute three percent (3%) or more of the outstanding common stock of the Corporation (the “Required Shares”) as of both (1) a date within seven (7) days prior to the date of the Nomination Notice and (2) the record date for determining shareholders entitled to vote with respect to the election of directors at the annual meeting.

(2) **Members of the Group.** For purposes of satisfying the foregoing ownership requirement under this Section 11, (A) the shares of the common stock of the Corporation owned by one or more shareholders, or by the person or persons who own shares of the common stock of the Corporation and on whose behalf any shareholder is acting, may be aggregated, provided that the number of shareholders and other persons whose ownership of shares of common stock of the Corporation is aggregated for such purpose shall not exceed twenty (20), and (B) a group of funds under common management and investment control shall be treated as one shareholder or person for this purpose. No person may be a member of more than one group of persons constituting an Eligible Shareholder under this Section 11. For the avoidance of doubt, if a group of shareholders aggregates ownership of shares in order to meet the requirements under this Section 11, all shares held by each shareholder constituting their contribution to the foregoing 3% threshold must be held by that shareholder continuously for at least three (3) years, and evidence satisfactory to the Corporation of such continuous ownership shall be provided.

(3) **Additional Information Required to be Delivered.** Within the time period specified in this Section 11 for providing the Nomination Notice, an Eligible Shareholder must provide the following information in writing to the secretary of the Corporation (in a form reasonably to be specified by the secretary of the Corporation):

(A) one or more written statements from the record holder of the shares (and from each intermediary through which the shares are or have been held during the requisite three-year holding period) verifying that, as of a date within seven days prior to the date of the Nomination Notice, the Eligible Shareholder owns, and has owned continuously for the preceding three years, the Required Shares, and the Eligible Shareholder’s agreement to provide, within five business days after the record date for the annual meeting, written statements from the record holder and intermediaries verifying the Eligible Shareholder’s continuous ownership of the Required Shares through the record date;

(B) the written consent of each Shareholder Nominee to being named in the proxy statement as a nominee and to serving as a director if elected, together with the information and representations that would be required to be set forth in a shareholder’s notice of a nomination pursuant to Section 9(a)(3) hereof;

(C) a copy of the Schedule 14N (or any successor form or schedule) that has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as required by Rule 14a-18 under the Exchange Act (or any successor rule or regulation);
(D) a representation that the Eligible Shareholder (including each member of any group of shareholders that together is an Eligible Shareholder under this Section 11) (i) acquired the Required Shares in the ordinary course of business and not with the intent to change or influence control of the Corporation, and does not presently have such intent, (ii) has not nominated and will not nominate for election to the board of directors at the annual meeting any person other than the Shareholder Nominee(s) being nominated pursuant to this Section 11, (iii) has not engaged and will not engage in, and has not and will not be a “participant” in another person’s, “solicitation” within the meaning of Rule 14a-1(l) under the Exchange Act (or any successor rule or regulation), in support of the election of any individual as a director at the annual meeting other than its Shareholder Nominee or a nominee of the board of directors, (iv) will not distribute to any shareholder any form of proxy for the annual meeting other than the form distributed by the Corporation and (v) in the case of a nomination by a group of shareholders that together is an Eligible Shareholder, the designation by all group members of one group member that is authorized to act on behalf of all such members with respect to the nomination and matters related thereto, including any withdrawal of the nomination; and

(E) an undertaking that the Eligible Shareholder agrees to (i) own the Required Shares through the date of the annual meeting, (ii) assume all liability stemming from any legal or regulatory violation arising out of the Eligible Shareholder’s communications with the shareholders of the Corporation or out of the information that the Eligible Shareholder provided to the Corporation, (iii) indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Corporation and each of its directors, officers and employees individually against any liability, loss or damages in connection with any threatened or pending action, suit or proceeding, whether legal, administrative or investigative, against the Corporation or any of its directors, officers or employees arising out of any nomination, solicitation or other activity by the Eligible Shareholder in connection with its efforts to elect the Shareholder Nominee pursuant to this Section 11, (iv) comply with all other laws and regulations applicable to any solicitation in connection with the annual meeting and (v) provide to the Corporation prior to the annual meeting such additional information as may be necessary or required with respect to (iv) above.

(g) Eligible Shareholder Statement; Company Statement. The Eligible Shareholder may provide to the secretary of the Corporation, at the time the information required by this Section 11 is provided, a written statement for inclusion in the Corporation’s proxy statement for the annual meeting, not to exceed five hundred (500) words, in support of the Shareholder Nominee’s candidacy (the “Statement”). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Section 11, the Corporation may omit from its proxy materials any information or Statement (or portion thereof) that it, in good faith, believes would violate any applicable law or regulation or be materially misleading or inappropriate. The Corporation may solicit against, and include in the Corporation’s proxy statement its own statement relating to, any Shareholder Nominee.
(h) **Shareholder Nominee Information and Representations.** Within the time period specified in this Section 11 for delivering the Nomination Notice, a Shareholder Nominee must deliver to the secretary of the Corporation, in a form reasonably to be specified by the secretary of the Corporation, a written representation and agreement that the Shareholder Nominee (1) is not and will not become a party to any agreement, arrangement or understanding with, and has not given any commitment or assurance to, any person or entity as to how such person, if elected as a director of the Corporation, will vote or otherwise act on any matter that has not been disclosed to the Corporation or any commitment that could interfere with the nominee’s ability to comply, if elected as a director of the Corporation, with such person’s fiduciary duties under applicable law, (2) is not and will not become a party to any agreement, arrangement or understanding with any person or entity other than the Corporation with respect to any direct or indirect compensation, reimbursement or indemnification in connection with service or action as a director that has not been disclosed to the Corporation, (3) will act as a representative of all of the shareholders of the Corporation while serving as a director, (4) will provide statements and other information in all communications with and by the Corporation that are or will be true and correct in all material respects and shall not omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, and (5) will comply with all the Corporation’s corporate governance, conflict of interest, confidentiality and stock ownership and trading policies and guidelines, and any other Corporation policies and guidelines applicable to directors, as well as any applicable law, rule or regulation or listing standards of the primary U.S. securities exchange upon which the common stock of the Corporation is listed. At the request of the Corporation, the Shareholder Nominee must submit all completed and signed questionnaires required of the Corporation’s directors and officers. The Corporation may request such additional information as necessary to permit the board of directors, or a committee thereof or an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant to Section 11(m) hereof, to determine if each Shareholder Nominee is independent under the listing standards of the primary U.S. securities exchange upon which the common stock of the Corporation is listed, any applicable rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission and any publicly disclosed standards used by the board of directors, or a committee thereof, in determining and disclosing the independence of the Corporation’s directors (the “Applicable Independence Standards”) and otherwise meets the criteria for non-employee directors, as set forth in the Corporation’s Corporate Governance Principles & Guidelines, as amended from time to time, which determination shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its shareholders, any Shareholder Nominee and any other person. If the board of directors, a committee thereof or an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant to Section 11(m) hereof determines that the Shareholder Nominee is not independent under the Applicable Independence Standards or does not meet the criteria for non-employee directors, as set forth in the Corporation’s Corporate Governance Principles & Guidelines, as amended from time to time, the Shareholder Nominee will not be eligible for inclusion in the Corporation’s proxy materials. In the event that any information or communication provided by an Eligible Shareholder or a Shareholder Nominee ceases to be true and correct in all material respects or omits a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, each Eligible
Shareholder or Shareholder Nominee, as the case may be, shall promptly notify the secretary of the Corporation of all defects in such previously provided information and of the information that is required to correct all such defects.

(i) **Reserved.**

(j) **Disqualification of Shareholder Nominees.** The Corporation shall not be required to include, pursuant to this Section 11, any Shareholder Nominee in its proxy materials for any meeting of shareholders (1) for which the secretary of the Corporation receives a notice that a shareholder has nominated a person for election to the board of directors pursuant to the advance notice requirements for shareholder nominees for director set forth in Section 9 hereof and such shareholder does not expressly elect, at the time of providing the shareholder’s notice required by Section 9 hereof, to have its nominee included in the Corporation’s proxy materials pursuant to this Section 11, (2) if the Eligible Shareholder who has nominated such Shareholder Nominee has engaged in or is currently engaged in, or has been or is a “participant” in another person’s, “solicitation” within the meaning of Rule 14a-1(l) under the Exchange Act (or any successor rule or regulation), in support of the election of any individual as a director at the meeting other than its Shareholder Nominee(s) or a nominee of the board of directors, (3) who is not independent under the Applicable Independence Standards, as determined by the board of directors, a committee thereof or an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant to Section 11(m) hereof, which determination shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its shareholders, any Shareholder Nominee and any other person, (4) whose election as a member of the board of directors would cause the Corporation to be in violation of these Bylaws, the Charter, the listing standards of the primary U.S. securities exchange upon which the common stock of the Corporation is listed, or any applicable law, rule or regulation, (5) who is an employee or director of a competitor or significant (or potentially significant) customer, supplier, contractor, counselor or consultant, (6) who is a named subject of a pending criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor offenses) or has been convicted in such a criminal proceeding within the past ten years, (7) who is subject to any order, judgment, decree or other disqualification of the type specified in Rule 506(d) of Regulation D promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (or any successor rule or regulation), (8) if such Shareholder Nominee or the applicable Eligible Shareholder shall have provided information to the Corporation with respect to such nomination that was untrue in any material respect or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading, as determined by the board of directors, a committee thereof or an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant to Section 11(m) hereof, which determination shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its shareholders, any Shareholder Nominee and any other person, (9) who is a director or officer of any public utility company or other entity regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Public Utilities Commission of Texas, (10) whose then-current business or personal interests place the Shareholder Nominee in a conflict of interest with the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, or (11) if the Eligible Shareholder or applicable Shareholder Nominee otherwise contravenes any of the agreements or representations made by such Eligible Shareholder or Shareholder Nominee or otherwise fails to comply with its obligations pursuant to this Section 11.
(k) **Effect of Breach of Agreements.** Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this Section 11, the board of directors, a committee thereof, an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant Section 11(m) hereof, or the person presiding at the meeting shall declare a nomination by an Eligible Shareholder to be invalid, which determination shall be conclusive and binding on the Corporation and its shareholders, any Shareholder Nominee and any other person, and such nomination shall be disregarded notwithstanding that proxies may have been received by the Corporation that cast votes “for” the election of such Eligible Shareholder’s Shareholder Nominee(s), if (1) the Shareholder Nominee(s) and/or the applicable Eligible Shareholder shall have breached its or their obligations, agreements or representations contemplated under this Section 11, as determined by the board of directors, a committee thereof, an officer of the Corporation designated pursuant to Section 11(m) hereof or the person presiding at the annual meeting of shareholders, or (2) the Eligible Shareholder (or a qualified representative thereof) does not appear at the annual meeting of shareholders to present any nomination pursuant to this Section 11.

(l) **Obligation to File Soliciting and Communication Materials.** The Eligible Shareholder (including any person who owns shares of common stock of the Corporation that constitute part of the Eligible Shareholder’s ownership for purposes of satisfying Section 11(f) hereof) shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission any solicitation materials or other communication with the Corporation’s shareholders relating to the annual meeting at which the Shareholder Nominee will be nominated, regardless of whether (1) any filing of such materials or other communication is required under Regulation 14A of the Exchange Act (or any successor regulation) or (2) any exemption from filing is available for such materials or other communication under Regulation 14A of the Exchange Act (or any such successor rule or regulation).

(m) **Authority for Implementation.** Any determination to be made with respect to the satisfaction of any term or condition of this Section 11, or the resolution of any dispute with respect thereto, shall be made by the board of directors, a committee thereof or any officer designated by the board of directors or a committee thereof and any such determination or resolution shall be final and binding on the Corporation, any Eligible Shareholder, any Shareholder Nominee and any other person so long as made in good faith (without any further requirements). The person presiding at the annual meeting of shareholders, in addition to making any other determinations that may be appropriate to the conduct of the meeting, shall have the power and duty to determine whether a Shareholder Nominee has been nominated in accordance with the provisions of this Section 11 and, if not so nominated, shall direct and declare at the meeting that such Shareholder Nominee shall not be considered for election as a director at the meeting.
ARTICLE II. DIRECTORS

Section 1. Function. All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the Corporation shall be managed under the direction of, the board of directors.

Section 2. Number. The number of directors of the Corporation shall not be less than three nor more than sixteen. The authorized number of directors, within the limits above specified, shall be determined by the affirmative vote of a majority of the entire board of directors given at a regular or special meeting thereof. No decrease in the number of directors constituting the board of directors shall shorten the term of any incumbent director.

At each annual meeting the shareholders shall elect directors to hold office until the next succeeding annual meeting. Each director so elected shall hold office for the term of which he or she is elected and until his or her successor shall have been elected and qualified or until his or her earlier resignation, retirement, removal from office or death. No person who shall have attained the age of 72 years by the date of election shall be eligible for election as a director of the Corporation, provided, however, that the board of directors is authorized, in circumstances it deems appropriate and by unanimous approval of all of the directors then in office (except the director whose qualification is the subject of the action), to render a director then in office (the “Affected Director”) eligible for election as a director of the Corporation until either the date of election next following the Affected Director’s 73rd birthday or the date of election next following the Affected Director’s 74th birthday, and no director who shall have attained the age of 70 years by the date of election shall be eligible for election as chairman of the board of directors; provided, however, that these limitations shall not be applied in a manner which would cause the involuntary retirement of an employee of the Corporation.

Section 3. Vacancies. Any vacancy occurring in the board of directors, including any vacancy created by reason of an increase in the number of directors, shall be filled only by a majority vote of the directors then in office, and directors so chosen shall hold office for a term expiring at the next annual meeting of shareholders.

Section 4. Removal. A director may be removed by the majority vote of the entire board of directors. A director may also be removed by shareholders.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and except as otherwise provided by law, in the event that holders of any class or series of Preferred Stock are entitled, voting separately as a class, to elect one or more directors, only the holders of that class or series may participate in a vote with respect to the removal by shareholders of a director so elected.

Section 5. Quorum and Voting. A majority of the number of directors fixed by, or in the manner provided in, these bylaws shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business; provided, however, that whenever, for any reason, a vacancy occurs in the board of directors, the quorum shall consist of a majority of the remaining directors until
the vacancy has been filled. The act of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors.

Section 6. Executive and Other Committees. The board of directors, by resolution adopted by a majority of the entire board of directors, may designate from among its members an executive committee and one or more other committees. Each committee of the board of directors shall have such powers and functions as may be delegated to it by resolution adopted by the entire board of directors, except as prohibited by law.

The board of directors, by resolution adopted in accordance with this Section 6, shall designate a chairman for each committee it establishes who shall preside at all meetings of the committee and who shall have such additional duties as shall from time to time be designated by the board of directors.

The board of directors, by resolution adopted in accordance with this Section 6, may designate one or more directors as alternate members of any such committee, who may act in the place and stead of any absent member or members at any meeting of such committee.

Section 7. Meetings. Regular meetings of the board of directors shall be held without notice at the location of and immediately after the adjournment of the annual meeting of shareholders in each year, and at such other time and place, as may be determined by the board of directors. Notice of the time and place of special meetings of the board of directors shall be given to each director either by personal delivery, e-mail, facsimile, reputable overnight delivery service, telegram, cablegram, or by telephone at least two days prior to the meeting. Notice may also be given through the postal service if mailed at least five days prior to the meeting.

Notice of a meeting of the board of directors need not be given to any director who signs a waiver of notice either before or after the meeting. Attendance of a director at a meeting shall constitute a waiver of notice of such meeting and a waiver of any and all objections to the place of the meeting, the time of the meeting, or the manner in which it has been called or convened, except when a director states, at the beginning of the meeting, any objection to the transaction of business because the meeting is not lawfully called or convened.

Except as otherwise provided in the Charter, neither the business to be transacted at, nor the purpose of, any regular or special meeting of the board of directors need be specified in the notice or waiver of notice of such meeting.

A majority of the directors present, whether or not a quorum exists, may adjourn any meeting of the board of directors to another time and place. Notice of any such adjourned meeting shall be given to the directors who were not present at the time of the adjournment and, unless the time and place of the adjourned meeting are announced at the time of adjournment, to the other directors.
Meetings of the board of directors may be called by the chairman of the board, the president, or by any two directors. Regular meetings of committees shall be held on the schedule approved by the Board. Special meetings of committees may be called by the chairman of the board, the chairman of such committee or any two members of such committee.

Members of the board of directors may participate in a meeting of such board by means of a conference telephone or similar communications equipment by means of which all persons participating in the meeting can hear each other at the same time. Participation by such means shall constitute presence in person at a meeting.

Meetings of the board of directors shall be presided over by the chairman of the board, or if such position is vacant or such person is absent, by the lead director (if such a position shall have been duly established by the board of directors), or, if such position is vacant or such person is absent, by the chief executive officer designated as such by the board of directors pursuant to Article III, Section 1 of these bylaws. If none of the chairman of the board, the lead director or the chief executive officer is present, the directors shall elect a chairman for the meeting from one of their members present.

Section 8. **Action Without a Meeting.** Any action required to be taken at a meeting of the directors or any action which may be taken at a meeting of the directors or a committee thereof, may be taken without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so to be taken, signed by all of the directors or all the members of the committee, as the case may be, is filed in the minutes of the proceedings of the board or of the committee. Such consent shall have the same effect as a unanimous vote.

ARTICLE III. OFFICERS

Section 1. **Types.** The officers of the Corporation shall consist of a chairman of the board, a president, a secretary, a treasurer and such vice presidents and other officers as may be appointed by the board of directors or by a duly appointed officer authorized by these bylaws or by resolution of the board of directors to appoint officers.

The chief executive officer of the Corporation shall be either the chairman of the board or the president as determined by the board of directors.

The chief executive officer of the Corporation shall have the authority to appoint one or more assistant treasurers, assistant controllers and assistant secretaries.

Section 2. **Appointment and Term.** The officers of the Corporation shall be appointed by the board of directors or by a duly appointed officer authorized to appoint officers. Each officer shall hold office until the first board of directors meeting immediately following the annual shareholders' meeting next occurring after his or her appointment to office and until his or her successor shall have been appointed or until his or her earlier resignation, retirement, removal from office or death.
Section 3. Duties. All officers of the Corporation shall have such authority and shall perform such duties as generally pertain to their respective offices and shall have such additional authority and perform such additional duties as may from time to time be determined by resolution of the board of directors.

Section 4. Removal of Officers. Any officer may be removed by the board of directors at any time with or without cause. Any officer appointed by the chief executive officer may be removed by the chief executive officer at any time with or without cause.

Removal of any officer shall be without prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed; provided, however, the appointment of any officer shall not of itself create contract rights.

ARTICLE IV. STOCK CERTIFICATES

Shares in the Corporation may but need not be represented by certificates. Certificates representing shares in the Corporation shall be signed by the chairman of the board, the chief executive officer, the president or a vice president and by the secretary or an assistant secretary. In addition, such certificates may be signed by a transfer agent or a registrar (other than the Corporation itself) and may be sealed with the seal of the Corporation or a facsimile thereof. Any or all of the signatures on such certificates may be facsimile. In case any officer, transfer agent or registrar who has signed or whose facsimile signature has been placed upon a certificate shall have ceased to be such officer, transfer agent or registrar before such certificate is issued, such certificate may be issued by the Corporation with the same effect as if he or she were such officer, transfer agent or registrar at the date of its issuance.

Each certificate representing shares shall state upon the face thereof: the name of the Corporation; that the Corporation is organized under the laws of Florida; the name of the person or persons to whom issued; and the number and class of shares and the designation of the series, if any, which such certificate represents.

The board of directors of the Corporation may authorize the issuance of some or all of the shares of any or all of its classes or series without certificates. Any such authorization shall not affect shares already represented by certificates until they are surrendered to the Corporation.

ARTICLE V. DIVIDENDS

The board of directors of the Corporation may, from time to time, declare, and the Corporation may pay, dividends on its outstanding shares in the manner and upon the terms and conditions provided by law and by the Charter.
ARTICLE VI. INDEMNIFICATION/ADVANCEMENT OF EXPENSES

Section 1. Right to Indemnification. Each person who was or is made a party or is threatened to be made a party to or was or is called as a witness or was or is otherwise involved in any Proceeding in connection with his or her status as an Indemnified Person, shall be indemnified and held harmless by the Corporation to the fullest extent permitted under the Florida Business Corporation Act (the "Act"), as the same now exists or may hereafter be amended (but, in the case of any such amendment, only to the extent that such amendment permits the Corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than the Act permitted the Corporation to provide prior to such amendment). Such indemnification shall cover all expenses incurred by an Indemnified Person (including, but not limited to, attorneys’ fees and other expenses of litigation) and all liabilities and losses (including, but not limited to, judgments, fines, ERISA or other excise taxes or penalties and amounts paid or to be paid in settlement) incurred by such person in connection therewith.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, except with respect to indemnification specified in Section 3 of this Article VI, the Corporation shall indemnify an Indemnified Person in connection with a Proceeding (or part thereof) initiated by such person only if authorization for such Proceeding (or part thereof) was not denied by the board of directors of the Corporation prior to 60 days after receipt of notice thereof from such person.

For purposes of this Article VI:

(i) a "Proceeding" is an action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, and any appeal therefrom;

(ii) an "Indemnified Person" is a person who is, or who was (whether at the time the facts or circumstances underlying the Proceeding occurred or were alleged to have occurred or at any other time), (A) a director or officer of the Corporation, (B) a director, officer or other employee of the Corporation serving as a trustee or fiduciary of any employee benefit plan of the Corporation, (C) an agent or non-officer employee of the Corporation as to whom the Corporation has agreed to grant such indemnity, or (D) serving at the request of the Corporation in any capacity with any entity or enterprise other than the Corporation and as to whom the Corporation has agreed to grant such indemnity.

Section 2. Expenses. Expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by an Indemnified Person in defending or otherwise being involved in a Proceeding in connection with his or her status as an Indemnified Person shall be paid by the Corporation in advance of the final disposition of such Proceeding, including any appeal therefrom, (i) in the case of (A) a director or officer, or former director or officer, of the Corporation or (B) a director, officer or other employee, or former director, officer or other employee, of the Corporation serving as a trustee or fiduciary of any employee benefit plan of the Corporation, upon receipt of an undertaking ("Undertaking") by or on behalf of
such person to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that he or she is not entitled to be indemnified by the Corporation; or (ii) in the case of any other Indemnified Person, upon such terms and as the board of directors, the chairman of the board or the president of the Corporation deems appropriate.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in connection with a Proceeding (or part thereof) initiated by such person, except a Proceeding authorized by Section 3 of this Article VI, the Corporation shall pay said expenses in advance of final disposition only if authorization for such Proceeding (or part thereof) was not denied by the board of directors of the Corporation prior to 60 days after receipt of a request for such advancement accompanied by an Undertaking.

A person to whom expenses are advanced pursuant to this Section 2 shall not be obligated to repay such expenses pursuant to an Undertaking until the final determination of any pending Proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction concerning the right of such person to be indemnified or the obligation of such person to repay pursuant to such Undertaking.

Section 3. Protection of Rights. If a claim for indemnification under Section 1 of this Article VI is not promptly paid in full by the Corporation after a written claim has been received by the Corporation or if expenses pursuant to Section 2 of this Article VI have not been promptly advanced after a written request for such advancement accompanied by an Undertaking has been received by the Corporation (in each case, except if authorization thereof was denied by the board of directors of the Corporation as provided in Article VI, Section 1 and Section 2, as applicable), the Indemnified Person may at any time thereafter bring suit against the Corporation to recover the unpaid amount of the claim or the advancement of expenses. If successful, in whole or in part, in such suit, such Indemnified Person shall also be entitled to be paid the reasonable expense thereof. It shall be a defense to any such action (other than an action brought to enforce a claim for expenses incurred in defending any Proceeding in advance of its final disposition where the required Undertaking has been tendered to the Corporation) that indemnification of the Indemnified Person is prohibited by law, but the burden of proving such defense shall be on the Corporation. Neither the failure of the Corporation (including its board of directors, independent legal counsel, or its shareholders) to have made a determination, if required, prior to the commencement of such action that indemnification of the Indemnified Person is proper in the circumstances, nor an actual determination by the Corporation (including its board of directors, independent legal counsel, or its shareholders) that indemnification of the Indemnified Person is prohibited, shall be a defense to the action or create a presumption that indemnification of the Indemnified Person is prohibited.

Section 4. Miscellaneous.

(i) Power to Request Service and to Grant Indemnification. The chairman of the board or the president or the board of directors may request any director, officer, agent or employee of the Corporation to serve as its representative in the position of a director or officer (or in a substantially similar
capacity) of an entity or enterprise other than the Corporation, and may grant to such person indemnification by the Corporation as described in Section 1 of this Article VI.

(ii) **Non-Exclusivity of Rights.** The rights conferred on any person by this Article VI shall not be exclusive of any other rights which such person may have or hereafter acquire under any statute, provision of the Charter, bylaw, agreement, vote of shareholders or disinterested directors or otherwise. The board of directors shall have the authority, by resolution, to provide for such indemnification of employees or agents of the Corporation or others and for such other indemnification of directors, officers, employees or agents as it shall deem appropriate.

(iii) **Insurance Contracts and Funding.** The Corporation may maintain insurance, at its expense, to protect itself and any director, officer, employee or agent of or person serving in any other capacity with, the Corporation or another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise (including serving as a trustee or fiduciary of any employee benefit plan) against any expenses, liabilities or losses, whether or not the Corporation would have the power to indemnify such person against such expenses, liabilities or losses under the Act. The Corporation may enter into contracts with any director, officer, agent or employee of the Corporation in furtherance of the provisions of this Article VI, and may create a trust fund, grant a security interest or use other means (including, without limitation, a letter of credit) to ensure the payment of such amounts as may be necessary to effect the advancing of expenses and indemnification as provided in this Article VI.

(iv) **Contractual Nature.** The provisions of this Article VI shall continue in effect as to a person who has ceased to be a director, officer, agent or employee and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and administrators of such person. This Article VI shall be deemed to be a contract between the Corporation and each person who, at any time that this Article VI is in effect, serves or served in any capacity which entitles him or her to indemnification hereunder and any repeal or other modification of this Article VI or any repeal or modification of the Act, or any other applicable law shall not limit any rights of indemnification with respect to Proceedings in connection with which he or she is an Indemnified Person, or advancement of expenses in connection with such Proceedings, then existing or arising out of events, acts or omissions occurring prior to such repeal or modification, including without limitation, the right to indemnification for Proceedings, and advancement of expenses with respect to such Proceedings, commenced after such repeal or modification to enforce this Article VI with regard to Proceedings arising out of acts, omissions or events arising prior to such repeal or modification.

(v) **Savings Clause.** If this Article VI or any portion hereof shall be invalidated or held to be unenforceable on any ground by any court of competent jurisdiction, the decision of which shall not have been reversed on appeal, the
Corporation shall nevertheless (A) indemnify each Indemnified Person as to costs, charges and expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement and (B) advance expenses in accordance with Section 2 of this Article VI, in each case with respect to any Proceeding in connection with which he or she is an Indemnified Person, including an action by or in the right of the Corporation, to the fullest extent permitted by any applicable portion of this Article VI that shall not have been invalidated or held to be unenforceable and as permitted by applicable law.

ARTICLE VII. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SECURITIES OF OTHER CORPORATIONS

Unless otherwise directed by the board of directors, the chief executive officer or his or her designee shall have power to vote and otherwise act on behalf of the Corporation, in person or by proxy, at any meeting of shareholders of or with respect to any action of shareholders of any other corporation in which the Corporation may hold securities and to otherwise exercise any and all rights and powers which the Corporation may possess by reason of its ownership of securities in such other corporation.

ARTICLE VIII. AMENDMENT

The power to adopt, alter, amend or repeal bylaws shall be vested in the board of directors. Bylaws adopted by the board of directors may be repealed or changed, and new bylaws may be adopted by shareholders, only if such repeal, change or adoption is approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the then outstanding Voting Stock (as defined in the Charter), voting together as a single class.

ARTICLE IX. CONTINUING EFFECT OF BYLAW PROVISIONS

Any provisions contained in these bylaws which, at the time of its adoption, was authorized or permitted by applicable law shall continue to remain in full force and effect until such time as such provision is specifically amended in accordance with these bylaws, notwithstanding any subsequent modification of such law (except to the extent such bylaw provision expressly provides for its modification by or as a result of any such subsequently enacted law).

(Amended and restated effective October 14, 2016)