



1401 WYNKOOP STREET, SUITE 500
DENVER, CO 80202

January 2, 2015

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Via e-mail to shareholderproposals@sec.gov

Re: Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
Shareholder Proposal of the Comptroller of the City of New York, et. al.
Exchange Act of 1934 - Rule 14a-8

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter is to inform you that Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (the "Company") intends to omit from its proxy statement and form of proxy for its 2015 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (collectively, its "2015 Proxy Materials") a shareholder proposal and statement in support thereof (the "Shareholder Proposal") received from the Comptroller of the City of New York, as custodian and/or trustee of the New York City Employees' Retirement System, the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, the New York City Teachers' Retirement System, the New York City Police Pension Fund, and the New York City Board of Education Retirement System, and also from the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust as co-sponsor (collectively, the "Proponents").

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), we have filed this letter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") no later than 80 calendar days before the date the Company plans to file its definitive 2015 Proxy Materials with the Commission, and have concurrently sent copies of this correspondence to the Proponents. Also included herewith is a copy of the Shareholder Proposal (Exhibit A).

Rule 14a-8(k) and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) provide that a proponent of a shareholder proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8 is required to send the subject company a copy of any correspondence that the proponent elects to submit to the Commission or the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Staff"). Accordingly, we are taking this opportunity to inform the Proponents that if the Proponents elect to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the Staff with respect to the Shareholder Proposal, a copy of that correspondence should be furnished concurrently to the undersigned pursuant to Rule 14a-8(k).

THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL

The Shareholder Proposal states:

RESOLVED: Shareholders of Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (the "Company") ask the board of directors (the "Board") to adopt, and present for shareholder approval, a "proxy access" bylaw. Such a bylaw shall require the Company to include in proxy materials prepared for a shareholder meeting at which directors are to be elected the name, Disclosure and Statement (as defined herein) of any person nominated for election to the board by a shareholder or group (the "Nominator") that meets the criteria established below. The Company shall allow shareholders to vote on such nominee on the Company's proxy card.

The number of shareholder-nominated candidates appearing in proxy materials shall not exceed one quarter of the directors then serving. This bylaw, which shall supplement existing rights under Company bylaws, should provide that a Nominator must:

- a) have beneficially owned 3% or more of the Company's outstanding common stock continuously for at least three years before submitting the nomination;
- b) give the Company, within the time period identified in its bylaws, written notice of the information required by the bylaws and any Securities and Exchange Commission rules about (i) the nominee, including consent to being named in the proxy materials and to serving as director if elected; and (ii) the Nominator, including proof it owns the required shares (the "Disclosure"); and
- c) certify that (i) it will assume liability stemming from any legal or regulatory violation arising out of the Nominator's communications with the Company shareholders, including the Disclosure and Statement; (ii) it will comply with all applicable laws and regulations if it uses soliciting material other than the Company's proxy materials; and (c) to the best of its knowledge, the required shares were acquired in the ordinary course of business and not to change or influence control at the Company.

The Nominator may submit with the Disclosure a statement not exceeding 500 words in support of the nominee (the "Statement"). The Board shall adopt procedures for promptly resolving disputes over whether notice of a nomination was timely, whether the Disclosure and Statement satisfy the bylaw and applicable federal regulations, and the priority to be given to multiple nominations exceeding the one-quarter limit.

BASIS FOR EXCLUSION

We hereby respectfully request that the Staff concur in our view that the Shareholder Proposal may be excluded from the 2015 Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(9) because the Shareholder Proposal directly conflicts with one of the Company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the Company's 2015 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (the "2015 Annual Meeting").

DISCUSSION

Rule 14a-8(i)(9) permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials "[i]f the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to stockholders at the same meeting." The Commission has stated that the proposals need not be "identical in scope or focus" in order for this exclusion to be available. Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018, n.27 (May 21, 1998).

The Company will include in the 2015 Proxy Materials, and present for shareholder approval at the 2015 Annual Meeting, a proposal to adopt bylaw provisions allowing proxy access to qualifying Company shareholders for director nominations (the "Company Proposal"). More specifically, the Company Proposal will include amendments to the Company's bylaws to permit any shareholder (but not a group of shareholders) owning 8% or more of the Company's common stock for five years to nominate candidates for election to the Board and require the Company to list such nominees in the Company's proxy statement. Under the Company Proposal, such a shareholder would be permitted to nominate the greater of (x) one director or (y) 10% of the Board, rounding down to the nearest whole number of Board seats. The specific text of the proposed bylaw amendments implementing the Company Proposal will be included in the 2015 Proxy Materials.

The Shareholder Proposal, which seeks the adoption of bylaw amendments that would provide proxy access to holders of 3% of the Company's shares for three years, directly conflicts with the Company Proposal, which seeks the adoption of bylaw amendments that would provide proxy access to holders of 8% of the Company's shares for five years.

The Staff has recently permitted the exclusion of a shareholder proposal for proxy access with 3%/3-year qualification requirements, based on a company's intent to seek shareholder approval of a company-sponsored proxy access proposal with higher qualification requirements. *See Whole Foods Market, Inc.* (December 1, 2014). The Company believes that the facts in the present instance are substantially the same as those in *Whole Foods Market, Inc.*, with the only difference being the Company Proposal's 8% ownership threshold (as opposed to the 9% threshold being proposed by Whole Foods). Because the Shareholder Proposal calls for a proxy access bylaw with requirements for ownership levels, aggregation of ownership, and duration of ownership, and for limits on the number of directors that may be nominated, all of which are different from those proposed in the Company Proposal, the Company believes that inclusion of the Shareholder Proposal and the Company Proposal in the 2015 Proxy Materials would present alternative and conflicting decisions for the Company's shareholders and would create the potential for inconsistent and ambiguous results. That was the basis for exclusion of the proposal at issue in *Whole Foods Market, Inc.* and we believe it is equally applicable here.

In addition, allowing exclusion of the Shareholder Proposal would also be consistent with numerous recent no-action letters permitting exclusion of shareholder proposals in analogous circumstances. *See, e.g., United Natural Foods, Inc.* (September 10, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking the right for holders of 15% of the company's outstanding common stock to be able to call a special meeting of shareholders when a company-sponsored proposal would permit holders owning on a net long basis 25% of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock to call a special meeting of shareholders); *Stericycle, Inc.* (March 7, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking the right for holders of 15% of the company's outstanding common stock to be able to call a special meeting of shareholders when a company-sponsored proposal would permit holders owning on a net long basis 25% of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock to call a special meeting of shareholders); *Yahoo!, Inc.* (March 6, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking the right for holders of 15% of the company's outstanding common stock to be able to call a special meeting of shareholders when a company-sponsored proposal would permit holders owning on a net long basis 25% of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock to call a special meeting of shareholders); *Verisign, Inc.* (February 24, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking the right for holders of 15% of the company's outstanding common stock to be able to call a special meeting of shareholders when a company-sponsored proposal would permit holders owning on a net long basis 35% of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock for at least one year to call a special meeting of shareholders); *Quest Diagnostics Incorporated* (February 19, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking the right for holders of 15% of the company's outstanding common stock to be able to call a special meeting of shareholders when a company-sponsored proposal would permit holders owning on a net long basis 25% of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock for at least one year to call a special meeting of shareholders); and *Kansas City Southern* (January 22, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking the right for holders of 15% of the company's outstanding common stock to be able to call a special meeting of shareholders when a company-sponsored proposal would permit holders owning on a net long basis 25% of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock for at least one year to call a special meeting of shareholders).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we believe that the Shareholder Proposal may be excluded from the Company's 2015 Proxy Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(9). Accordingly, we respectfully request that the Staff confirm that it would not recommend enforcement action if the Company omits the Shareholder Proposal from its 2015 Proxy Materials.

If the Staff has any questions with respect to the foregoing, please do not hesitate to call the undersigned at (303) 222-5978.

Sincerely,

CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC.



Michael McGawn
Corporate Compliance Counsel
(303) 222-5978

Cc: Michael Garland, City of New York Office of the Comptroller
(via e-mail to mgarlan@comptroller.nyc.gov)

Meredith Miller, UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust
(via e-mail to mamiller@rhac.com)

Exhibit A



CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
SCOTT M. STRINGER

Michael Garland
ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND
GOVERNANCE

MUNICIPAL BUILDING
ONE CENTRE STREET, ROOM 629
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10007-2341

TEL: (212) 669-2517
FAX: (212) 669-4072
MGARLAN@COMPTROLLER.NYC.GOV

October 20, 2014

Mr. Monty Moran
Co-CEO, Secretary and Director
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
1401 Wynkoop Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80202

Dear Mr. Moran:

I write to you on behalf of the Comptroller of the City of New York, Scott M. Stringer. The Comptroller is the custodian and a trustee of the New York City Employees' Retirement System, the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, the New York City Teachers' Retirement System, and the New York City Police Pension Fund, and custodian of the New York City Board of Education Retirement System (the "Systems"). The Systems' boards of trustees have authorized the Comptroller to inform you of their intention to present the enclosed proposal for the consideration and vote of stockholders at the Company's next annual meeting.

Therefore, we offer the enclosed proposal for the consideration and vote of shareholders at the Company's next annual meeting. It is submitted to you in accordance with Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and I ask that it be included in the Company's proxy statement.

Letters from The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and State Street Bank and Trust Company certifying the Systems' ownership, for over a year, of shares of Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. common stock are enclosed. Each System intends to continue to hold at least \$2,000 worth of these securities through the date of the Company's next annual meeting.

We would be happy to discuss the proposal with you. Should the Board of Directors decide to endorse its provision as corporate policy, we will withdraw the proposal from consideration at the annual meeting. If you have any questions on this matter, please feel free to contact me at (212) 669-2517.

Sincerely,

Michael Garland

Enclosure

RESOLVED: Shareholders of Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (the "Company") ask the board of directors (the "Board") to adopt, and present for shareholder approval, a "proxy access" bylaw. Such a bylaw shall require the Company to include in proxy materials prepared for a shareholder meeting at which directors are to be elected the name, Disclosure and Statement (as defined herein) of any person nominated for election to the board by a shareholder or group (the "Nominator") that meets the criteria established below. The Company shall allow shareholders to vote on such nominee on the Company's proxy card.

The number of shareholder-nominated candidates appearing in proxy materials shall not exceed one quarter of the directors then serving. This bylaw, which shall supplement existing rights under Company bylaws, should provide that a Nominator must:

- a) have beneficially owned 3% or more of the Company's outstanding common stock continuously for at least three years before submitting the nomination;
- b) give the Company, within the time period identified in its bylaws, written notice of the information required by the bylaws and any Securities and Exchange Commission rules about (i) the nominee, including consent to being named in the proxy materials and to serving as director if elected; and (ii) the Nominator, including proof it owns the required shares (the "Disclosure"); and
- c) certify that (i) it will assume liability stemming from any legal or regulatory violation arising out of the Nominator's communications with the Company shareholders, including the Disclosure and Statement; (ii) it will comply with all applicable laws and regulations if it uses soliciting material other than the Company's proxy materials; and (c) to the best of its knowledge, the required shares were acquired in the ordinary course of business and not to change or influence control at the Company.

The Nominator may submit with the Disclosure a statement not exceeding 500 words in support of the nominee (the "Statement"). The Board shall adopt procedures for promptly resolving disputes over whether notice of a nomination was timely, whether the Disclosure and Statement satisfy the bylaw and applicable federal regulations, and the priority to be given to multiple nominations exceeding the one-quarter limit.

SUPPORTING STATEMENT

We believe proxy access is a fundamental shareholder right that will make directors more accountable and contribute to increased shareholder value. The CFA Institute's 2014 assessment of pertinent academic studies and the use of proxy access in other markets similarly concluded that proxy access:

- Would "benefit both the markets and corporate boardrooms, with little cost or disruption."
- Has the potential to raise overall US market capitalization by up to \$140.3 billion if adopted market-wide. (<http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2014.n9.1>)

The proposed bylaw terms enjoy strong investor support – votes for similar shareholder proposals averaged 55% from 2012 through September 2014 – and similar bylaws have been adopted by companies of various sizes across industries, including Chesapeake Energy,

Hewlett-Packard, Western Union and Verizon.

We urge shareholders to vote FOR this proposal.



November 11, 2014

Mr. Monty Moran
Co-CEO, Secretary and Director
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
1401 Wynkoop Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80202

Dear Mr. Moran:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust (the “Trust”) is co-sponsoring the resolution submitted by the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System, the New York City Police Pension Fund, and the New York City Board of Education Retirement System on October 20, 2014, for inclusion in Chipotle Mexican Grill’s (the “Company”) 2015 proxy statement. A copy of the resolution is attached.

The Trust is the beneficial owner of more than \$2,000 in market value of the Company’s stock and has held such stock continuously for over one year. Furthermore, the Trust intends to continue to hold the requisite number of shares through the date of the 2015 annual meeting. Proof of ownership will be sent by the Trust’s custodian, State Street Bank and Trust Company, under separate cover.

Please contact me at (734) 887-4964 or via email at mamiller@rhac.com if you have any questions or would like to further discuss the issues raised herein.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Meredith Miller".

Meredith Miller
Chief Corporate Governance Officer
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust

RESOLVED: Shareholders of Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (the "Company") ask the board of directors (the "Board") to adopt, and present for shareholder approval, a "proxy access" bylaw. Such a bylaw shall require the Company to include in proxy materials prepared for a shareholder meeting at which directors are to be elected the name, Disclosure and Statement (as defined herein) of any person nominated for election to the board by a shareholder or group (the "Nominator") that meets the criteria established below. The Company shall allow shareholders to vote on such nominee on the Company's proxy card.

The number of shareholder-nominated candidates appearing in proxy materials shall not exceed one quarter of the directors then serving. This bylaw, which shall supplement existing rights under Company bylaws, should provide that a Nominator must:

- a) have beneficially owned 3% or more of the Company's outstanding common stock continuously for at least three years before submitting the nomination;
- b) give the Company, within the time period identified in its bylaws, written notice of the information required by the bylaws and any Securities and Exchange Commission rules about (i) the nominee, including consent to being named in the proxy materials and to serving as director if elected; and (ii) the Nominator, including proof it owns the required shares (the "Disclosure"); and
- c) certify that (i) it will assume liability stemming from any legal or regulatory violation arising out of the Nominator's communications with the Company shareholders, including the Disclosure and Statement; (ii) it will comply with all applicable laws and regulations if it uses soliciting material other than the Company's proxy materials; and (c) to the best of its knowledge, the required shares were acquired in the ordinary course of business and not to change or influence control at the Company.

The Nominator may submit with the Disclosure a statement not exceeding 500 words in support of the nominee (the "Statement"). The Board shall adopt procedures for promptly resolving disputes over whether notice of a nomination was timely, whether the Disclosure and Statement satisfy the bylaw and applicable federal regulations, and the priority to be given to multiple nominations exceeding the one-quarter limit.

SUPPORTING STATEMENT

We believe proxy access is a fundamental shareholder right that will make directors more accountable and contribute to increased shareholder value. The CFA Institute's 2014 assessment of pertinent academic studies and the use of proxy access in other markets similarly concluded that proxy access:

- Would "benefit both the markets and corporate boardrooms, with little cost or disruption."
- Has the potential to raise overall US market capitalization by up to \$140.3 billion if adopted market-wide. (<http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2014.n9.1>)

The proposed bylaw terms enjoy strong investor support – votes for similar shareholder proposals averaged 55% from 2012 through September 2014 – and similar bylaws have been adopted by companies of various sizes across industries, including Chesapeake Energy,

including Chesapeake Energy, Hewlett-Packard, Western Union and Verizon.

We urge shareholders to vote FOR this proposal.