October 4, 2012

Alan L. Dye
Hogan Lovells US LLP
alan.dye@hoganlovells.com

Re:  Walgreen Co.
     Incoming letter dated August 30, 2012

Dear Mr. Dye:

This is in response to your letters dated August 30, 2012, September 13, 2012, and September 20, 2012 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to Walgreen by John Chevedden. We also have received letters from the proponent dated August 31, 2012, September 13, 2012, and September 23, 2012. Copies of all of the correspondence related to this matter will be made available on our website at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8.shtml. For your reference, a brief discussion of the Division’s informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals is also available at the same website address.

Sincerely,

Ted Yu
Senior Special Counsel

cc:  John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
Response of the Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance

Re: Walgreen Co.
Incoming letter dated August 30, 2012

The proposal requests that the board take the steps necessary so that each shareholder voting requirement in the charter and bylaws that calls for a greater than simple majority vote be changed to require a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals. If necessary, this means the closest standard to a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals consistent with applicable laws.

There appears to be some basis for your view that Walgreen may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(10). Based on the information you have presented, it appears that Walgreen’s policies, practices, and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal and that Walgreen has, therefore, substantially implemented the proposal. Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if Walgreen omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10). In reaching this position, we have not found it necessary to address the alternative basis for omission upon which Walgreen relies.

Sincerely,

Ted Yu
Senior Special Counsel
DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE
INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by the Company in support of its intention to exclude the proposals from the Company's proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent's representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission, including argument as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure.

It is important to note that the staff's and Commission's no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action, does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the management omit the proposal from the company's proxy material.
August 30, 2012

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
shareholderproposals@sec.gov

Re: Walgreen Co. (Commission File No. 001-00604) - Shareholder Proposal
Submitted by John Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of Walgreen Co. (the "Company"), we are submitting this letter pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to notify the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") of the Company’s intention to exclude from its proxy materials for its January 2013 annual meeting of shareholders (the “2013 proxy materials”) a shareholder proposal and statement in support thereof (the “Proposal”) received from John Chevedden (the “Proponent”). We also request confirmation that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance will not recommend to the Commission that enforcement action be taken if the Company omits the Proposal from its 2013 proxy materials for the reasons discussed below.

A copy of the Proposal and related correspondence with the Proponent is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

In accordance with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) ("SLB No. 14D"), this letter and its exhibits are being delivered by e-mail to shareholderproposals@sec.gov. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), a copy of this letter and its exhibits also is being sent to the Proponent. Rule 14a-8(k) and SLB No. 14D provide that a shareholder proponent is required to send to the company a copy of any correspondence which the proponent elects to submit to the Commission or the staff. Accordingly, we hereby inform the Proponent that if the Proponent elects to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the staff relating to the Proposal, the Proponent should concurrently furnish a copy of that correspondence to the undersigned.
The Company currently intends to file its 2013 proxy materials with the Commission on or about November 19, 2012.

THE PROPOSAL

The Proposal requests that Walgreen shareholders approve the following:

"Shareholders request that our board take the steps necessary so that each shareholder voting requirement in our charter and bylaws that calls for a greater than simple majority vote be changed to require a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals. If necessary this means the closest standard to a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals consistent with applicable laws."

BASES FOR EXCLUSION

We believe that the Proposal may be excluded from the Company's 2013 proxy materials under Rules 14a-8(i)(10) because the Company has substantially implemented the Proposal. In addition, we believe that the Proposal may be excluded from the Company's 2013 proxy materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because it contains false and misleading statements in violation of Rule 14a-9.

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) – The Company Has Substantially Implemented The Proposal

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials if the company has substantially implemented the proposal. The Commission stated in 1976, in discussing a predecessor to Rule 14a-8(i)(10), that the exclusion is "designed to avoid the possibility of stockholders having to consider matters which already have been favorably acted upon by the management." Exchange Act Release No. 12598 (Jul. 7, 1976). For a matter presented by a proposal to have been acted upon favorably by management, it is not necessary that the proposal have been implemented in full or precisely as presented. See Exchange Act Release No. 20091 (Aug. 16, 1983).

Applying this standard, the staff has said that "a determination that the company has substantially implemented the proposal depends upon whether [the company's] particular policies, practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal." Texaco, Inc. (Mar. 28, 1991). In other words, substantial implementation under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) requires a company's actions to have satisfactorily addressed both the proposal's underlying concerns and its essential objective. See, e.g., Exelon Corp. (Feb. 26, 2010); Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. (Jan. 17, 2007); ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Jul. 3, 2006); Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 17, 2006); Talbots Inc. (Apr. 5, 2002); Masco Corp. (Mar. 29, 1999).

The Proposal asks that the Company's board take the steps necessary for each shareholder voting requirement in the Company's Amended and Restated Articles of
Incorporation ("Charter") and By-laws that requires a super-majority vote to be amended to require only a majority of votes cast for and against. As discussed below, the Company, which is an Illinois corporation, has already acted to address the Proposal’s underlying concerns and essential objectives by eliminating from its Charter and By-laws all super-majority vote requirements with a single exception, which was proposed for elimination by the Company at the January 12, 2011 annual meeting of shareholders (the "2011 annual meeting of shareholders") and, notwithstanding the board’s recommendation, not approved by the vote of shareholders required under the Charter and the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983, as amended (the "IBCA"). The Company replaced these super-majority voting provisions with majority voting requirements. The Proposal requests that each shareholder vote require “a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals.” The Proposal also provides, however, that the majority vote adopted may vary from that suggestion to be consistent with applicable law. The IBCA provides that a majority vote of shareholders means “the affirmative vote of the majority of the votes of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote on a matter,” and therefore the Company is unable to implement the Proponent’s preferred standard.

Background

The Proponent submitted to the Company a proposal substantially similar to the Proposal for consideration by shareholders at the Company’s January 13, 2010 annual meeting of shareholders. That proposal was approved by the Company’s shareholders, and thereafter the Company’s board of directors determined to take action to implement it. Accordingly, the Company’s board approved, and the Company’s proxy materials for its 2011 annual meeting of shareholders included, two Company-sponsored proposals that together sought to amend the Charter to eliminate all super-majority voting requirements applicable to the Company. The Company’s By-laws did not then, and do not now, contain any super-majority voting requirements.

The first of the two proposals sought to lower certain default voting thresholds under the IBCA and to lower the voting threshold for amending the Charter in any manner that would materially alter the powers, preferences or special rights of the Company’s Series A Preferred

1 The prior proposal requested the Company’s shareholders approve the following resolution: “RESOLVED, Shareholders request that our board take the steps necessary so that each shareholder voting requirement in our charter and bylaws, that calls for a greater than simple majority vote, be changed to a majority of the votes cast for and against related proposals in compliance with applicable laws. This includes each 67% and 80% shareholder voting provision in our charter and/or bylaws.”
Stock (together, the “IBCA Proposal”). There were then, and are now, no shares of Series A Preferred Stock outstanding. Approval of the IBCA Proposal required the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of the Company’s stock entitled to vote.

The second proposal sought to eliminate a “fair price” provision contained in the Charter that generally required a super-majority vote for approval or authorization of certain “business combinations” with a “substantial shareholder” (the “Fair Price Proposal”). Approval of the Fair Price Proposal required the affirmative vote of at least 80% of the outstanding shares of the Company’s stock entitled to vote.

The Company’s board of directors unanimously recommended that shareholders approve both the IBCA Proposal and the Fair Price Proposal at the Company’s 2011 annual meeting of shareholders. At the meeting, the Company’s shareholders approved the IBCA Proposal (and the related Charter amendment was promptly implemented), but did not approve the Fair Price Proposal (which obtained the affirmative vote of holders of 79% of the outstanding shares entitled to vote). The IBCA Proposal and Fair Price Proposal are described briefly below and are described more fully in the Company’s proxy statement for the 2011 annual meeting of shareholders.

A. The IBCA Proposal.

The IBCA Proposal was fully implemented upon the Company’s filing of an amendment to the Charter following shareholder approval of the proposal. The Charter amendment eliminated super-majority voting requirements that previously applied to any proposal to:

- amend the Charter in any way that is subject to a shareholder vote pursuant to Section 10.20 of the IBCA;
- to merge the Company into another company, to consolidate the Company with another company, or to effect a share exchange under which the Company becomes a subsidiary of another company and its stock is exchanged for the stock of that other company (which would be the Company’s new parent), in a transaction that is subject to a shareholder vote pursuant to Section 11.20(a) of the IBCA;
- to sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of the Company’s assets outside the ordinary course of business in a transaction that is subject to a shareholder vote pursuant to Section 11.60 of the IBCA; or
- to voluntarily dissolve the Company in a transaction that is subject to a shareholder vote pursuant to Section 12.15(c) of the IBCA;
- to engage in a “business combination” with an “interested shareholder” within three years after the date the interested shareholder became an interested shareholder (unless certain conditions are satisfied), as provided in Section 11.75(a)(3) of the IBCA;
to engage in a business combination with an interested shareholder that does not meet the "fair price" requirements of Section 7.85 of the IBCA (generally, that the interested shareholder pay the higher of the highest price paid in the past two years by the interested shareholder for any of its shares or the market price of the shares on the first trading day after announcement of its status as an interested shareholder), subject to certain exceptions.

Each of the first four matters listed above now requires approval by a majority of all outstanding shares entitled to vote on the matter, which is the closest standard permitted by the IBCA to the majority standard sought by the Proposal. The fifth matter listed now requires approval by the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding voting stock that is not owned by the interested shareholder, and the final matter now requires approval by the affirmative vote of a majority of the combined voting power of the then outstanding shares of all classes and series of the Company entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting together as a single class, and a majority of the voting shares held by the disinterested shareholders.

B. The Fair Price Proposal.

The Charter contains, and contained at the time of the 2011 annual meeting of shareholders, a "fair price" provision in addition to the fair price provision in Section 7.85 of the IBCA (discussed in the preceding section). Article R-V, Section 3 of the Charter generally requires the vote of the holders of not less than 80% of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock for the approval or authorization of certain business combinations with a substantial shareholder (generally defined as a person who, together with any affiliates or associates, becomes the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of 10% or more of the outstanding common shares) of the Company. This separate shareholder approval requirement is not applicable if the business combination is approved by at least two-thirds of the directors who are not associated with the substantial shareholder or if certain “fair price” requirements (generally, that the substantial shareholder pay the highest price previously paid for any of its shares) and other conditions are met. This provision may be repealed or amended only by a vote of 80% of the Company’s outstanding common stock. The Fair Price Proposal would have eliminated the entire “fair price” provision entirely rather than reduce the super-majority voting requirement to a majority voting requirement. Despite the Company’s recommendation that its shareholders approve the Fair Price Proposal, however, the proposal did not receive the requisite level of shareholder support required for approval.

C. The Company’s Actions Have Substantially Implemented the Proposal.

The staff has previously permitted exclusion of a proposal seeking a simple majority voting standard where the company had, at a previous meeting of shareholders, proposed amendments to the company’s charter to eliminate super-majority voting requirements and had obtained the required approval for all of the proposed amendments except one. In Allegheny Energy, Inc. (Dec. 21, 2004), the company’s shareholders approved charter amendments eliminating “default” super-majority voting requirements applicable to certain business
combinations but failed to approve a shareholder proposal seeking to eliminate cumulative voting. Because the cumulative voting proposal failed to pass, the company remained subject to a state law requirement that no director could be removed from office without cause if the number of votes cast against removal would be sufficient to elect that director under cumulative voting. The effect of shareholders’ failure to approve the cumulative voting proposal was to retain a requirement for a super-majority vote to remove a director without cause. Following the shareholder vote, a shareholder submitted to the company a proposal requesting that the board take the steps necessary to eliminate all super-majority voting requirements. The staff agreed that the company’s prior action in submitting all super-majority voting requirements to a vote and succeeding in eliminating all but one of them constituted substantial implementation of the proposal.

Similarly, the staff has allowed exclusion of a proposal similar to the Proposal where the company planned to include in its proxy statement a management-sponsored proposal to eliminate from the charter all super-majority voting provisions except for one. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (Dec. 28, 2004), the company proposed to eliminate super-majority voting provisions relating to various matters but proposed to retain a requirement that holders of at least 75% of the outstanding voting stock approve any amendment seeking to classify the board of directors.

As in Allegheny Energy, the Company has taken all actions within its power to eliminate all super-majority voting requirements applicable under the Charter. The Company’s actions in recommending that shareholders approve the IBCA Proposal and the Fair Price Proposal constitute the sole steps necessary for the board to have taken to ensure that all super-majority voting requirements be eliminated from the Charter.

In addition, as in Allegheny Energy, the Company succeeded in eliminating all super-majority voting requirements other than one, with the single failure resulting from a vote of shareholders. The Company’s board does not have the power to amend the Charter unilaterally, and the board cannot ensure that sufficient shareholder support will be received to pass proposals that it recommends to shareholders for approval. Accordingly, the Proposal has been substantially implemented and therefore may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

**Rule 14a-8(i)(3) – The Proposal Materially False and Misleading in Violation of Rule 14a-9**

Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits exclusion of a shareholder proposal and supporting statement if either is contrary to the Commission’s proxy rules. One of the Commission’s proxy rules, Rule 14a-9, prohibits the making of false or misleading statements in proxy materials. The staff has indicated that a proposal is misleading, and therefore excludible under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), if “the resolution contained in the proposal is so inherently vague or indefinite that neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires.” See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (Sep. 15, 2004) (“SLB No. 14B”). Additionally, the staff has taken the position that a proposal is impermissibly vague and indefinite, and therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), where it is open to multiple
interpretations such that “any action ultimately taken by the [c]ompany upon implementation could be significantly different from the actions envisioned by shareholders voting on the proposal.” See *Fuqua Industries, Inc.* (Mar. 12, 1991).

**The Proposal Contains Materially False and Misleading Statements.**

The staff has previously permitted the exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) of proposals or supporting statements where the supporting statement contained false or misleading statements in violation of Rule 14a-9. In *Boise Cascade Corporation* (Jan. 23, 2001), for example, the staff permitted the company to exclude significant portions of a supporting statement relating to a proposal to separate the positions of chair and CEO because they dealt with “irrelevant issues and misleading allegations” that would incite shareholders rather than “educating them on the advantages or disadvantages of a separate Chair and CEO.” See also *Motorola, Inc.* (Jan. 12, 2011) (permitting exclusion of a proposal where the supporting statement contained internal inconsistencies regarding statements on equity retention); and *Energy East Corporation* (Feb. 12, 2007) (permitting exclusion of a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) where the focus of the proposal was executive compensation while the supporting statement addressed issues including director independence and plurality voting standards).

As discussed below, the Proposal’s supporting statement contains a number of false and misleading statements.

“2011 management proposal for simple majority voting...failed”

The Proposal’s supporting statement asserts that a “2011 management proposal for simple majority voting won an outstanding 96% of the yes and no votes [but] failed to the embarrassment of management.” The focus of the Proposal is on the elimination of super-majority voting requirements in the Company’s organizational documents. In that context, this statement suggests that the Company’s management submitted a single proposal to shareholders in 2011 aimed at eliminating super-majority voting and that the proposal did not obtain the required vote. As discussed above, the IBCA Proposal and the Fair Price Proposal each related to the question of simple majority voting. Shareholders approved one of these proposals. As a result, substantially all of the super-majority voting requirements applicable to the Company’s shareholders were changed to majority voting requirements. Therefore, the implication that the Company’s management put forth a single proposal, and that it “failed,” is false and misleading.

“a 1%-minority can frustrate the will of our 79%-shareholder majority”

The Proposal’s supporting statement asserts, in part, that “[c]urrently a 1%-minority can frustrate the will of our 79%-shareholder majority. Shares that do not vote should not be able to continue to dictate how our company is managed.” This statement is false and misleading because there is no action that the holders of one percent of the Company’s shares could take or prevent a majority of shareholders from taking. Further, this statement would be misleading even if the reference to “1%” were changed to “21%.” As discussed above, the circumstances in
which 21% of the shareholders could prevent any action are extremely narrow, as they only apply in the unlikely case of a business combination with a “substantial shareholder” that is not otherwise approved by two-thirds of disinterested directors or compliant with specified “fair price” and other requirements. There is no affirmative action that the holders of 21% of shares could take or prevent that would bind the Company in any way. The suggestion that any minority block of shareholders, particularly a 1% block, could “frustrate the will” of 79% of shareholders is inherently misleading. These statements represent an attempt by the Proponent to confuse the Company’s shareholders into believing that they have not already acted favorably on the underlying objectives of the Proposal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, it is our view that the Company may exclude the Proposal from its 2013 proxy materials pursuant to Rules 14a-8(i)(10) and 14a-8(i)(3). We request the staff’s concurrence in our view or, alternatively, confirmation that the staff will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the Company so excludes the Proposal.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact me at (202) 637-5737. When a written response to this letter is available, I would appreciate your sending it to me by e-mail at Alan.Dye@hoganlovells.com and by fax at (202) 637-5910.

Sincerely,

Alan L. Dye

Enclosures

cc: John Chevedden
    Mark L. Dosier (Walgreen Co.)
Exhibit A

Copy of the Proposal and Related Correspondence
Mr. James A. Skinner  
Chairman of the Board  
Walgreen Co. (WAG)  
200 Wilmot Rd  
Deerfield IL 60015  
PH: 847 914-2500  
FX: 847-914-2804

Dear Mr. Skinner,

I purchased stock and hold stock in our company because I believed our company has unrealized potential. I believe some of this unrealized potential can be unlocked by making our corporate governance more competitive. And this will be virtually cost-free and not require lay-offs.

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is submitted for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements will be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and presentation of the proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication.

In the interest of company cost savings and improving the efficiency of the rule 14a-8 process please communicate via email.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,

John Chevedden  

Date

cc: Thomas J. Sabatino, Jr.  
Corporate Secretary  
FX: 847-914-3652  
Joseph H. Greenberg  

<Thomas.Sabatino@walgreens.com>  
<Joseph.Greenberg@walgreens.com>
Adopt Simple Majority Vote

Shareholders request that our board take the steps necessary so that each shareholder voting requirement in our charter and bylaws that calls for a greater than simple majority vote be changed to require a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals. If necessary this means the closest standard to a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals consistent with applicable laws.

A 2011 management Proposal for simple majority voting won an outstanding 96% of the yes and no votes. However this management proposal failed to the embarrassment of management. This overwhelming showing of support equaled 78% support when all the shares that did not vote were factored in. An 80% vote was required for passage. The shares that do not even vote should not be able to dictate how our company is managed.

Shareowners are willing to pay a premium for shares of corporations that have excellent corporate governance. Supermajority voting requirements have been found to be one of six entrenching mechanisms that are not positively related to company performance according to “What Matters in Corporate Governance” by Lucien Bebchuk of the Harvard Law School.

This proposal topic won from 74% to 88% support at Weyerhaeuser, Alcoa, Waste Management, Goldman Sachs, FirstEnergy, McGraw-Hill and Macy’s. The proponents of these proposals included Ray T. Chevedden and James McRitchie.

Currently a 1%-minority can frustrate the will of our 79%-shareholder majority. Shares that do not vote should not be able to continue to dictate how our company is managed.

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal to initiate improved governance and increase our competitiveness: Adopt Simple Majority Vote – Proposal 4.*
Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the proposal.

* Number to be assigned by the company.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including (emphasis added):

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

**We believe that it is appropriate under rule 14a-8 for companies to address these objections in their statements of opposition.**

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).
Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.
July 27, 2012

Via Federal Express Overnight Delivery and
Email:
FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
Mr. John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Re: Notice of Defect under Rule 14a-8
Shareholder Proposal for Walgreen Co. 2013 Annual Meeting

Dear Mr. Chevedden:

This letter acknowledges receipt on July 20, 2012 of your letter dated July 19, 2012, which seeks to submit a shareholder proposal for the 2013 annual meeting of shareholders of Walgreen Co. Based on our review of the information you provided, our records, and regulatory materials, we have been unable to conclude that your proposal meets the minimum ownership requirements of Rule 14a-8 for inclusion in Walgreens’ proxy materials, and unless you can demonstrate that you meet the requirements within 14 days of receiving this notice, we will be entitled to exclude your proposal from the company’s proxy materials for the upcoming Walgreen Co. annual meeting. We anticipate that the annual meeting will be held on January 9, 2013, and that we will mail our proxy materials on or around November 19, 2012.

To be eligible to have your shareholder proposal included in the company’s proxy statement, your proposal must comply with the requirements of Rule 14a-8 of Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including the requirement that you demonstrate that you satisfy the stock ownership requirements of Rule 14a-8(b). Rule 14a-8(b) states that, in order to be eligible to submit a proposal for the upcoming Walgreens Annual Meeting, you must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of Walgreen Co. common stock (the class of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting) for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. Rule 14a-8(b) also states that you must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting and must so indicate to us.

The company’s transfer agent has reviewed the list of record owners of the company’s common stock, and you are not listed as a registered owner of Walgreens common stock. Please note that Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) provides that a shareholder who is not a registered owner of company stock must provide proof of ownership by submitting a written statement "from the ‘record holder’ of
the securities (usually a broker or bank)," verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the shareholder held the required amount of securities continuously for at least one year. On October 18, 2011, the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F (SLB 14F), which provides that for Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) purposes, only DTC participants should be viewed as record holders of securities. Further, it states that if a shareholder's broker or bank is not on DTC's participant list, then that shareholder must provide two proof of ownership statements verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the required amount of securities were continuously held for at least one year - one from the shareholders' broker or bank confirming the shareholder's ownership, and the other from the DTC participant confirming the broker or bank's ownership.

Therefore, in order to submit your proposal for possible inclusion in the company’s proxy statement, you must provide us with confirmation in accordance with Rule 14a-8(b)(2) and SLB 14F that you have continuously held for at least one year by the date you submitted your proposal at least $2,000 in market value of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(f), you must provide us with these confirmation materials within 14 days after you receive this letter. If we do not receive the materials within that time, we intend to exclude your proposal. We have attached to this notice copies of Rule 14a-8 and SLB 14F for your convenience.

Please note that if you provide timely and adequate proof of ownership, Walgreens reserves the right to raise any substantive objections to your proposal at a later date. If we do so, we will notify and inform you of our reasons in accordance with SEC rules and regulations.

Very truly yours,

Thomas J. Sabatino, Jr.
Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary

Enclosures
security holder's solicitation or communication and attesting that:

(i) The security holder will not use the list information for any purpose other than to solicit security holders with respect to the same meeting or action by consent or authorization for which the registrant is soliciting or intends to solicit or to communicate with security holders with respect to a solicitation commenced by the registrant; and

(ii) The security holder will not disclose such information to any person other than a beneficial owner for whom the request was made and an employee or agent to the extent necessary to effectuate the communication or solicitation.

(d) The security holder shall not use the information furnished by the registrant pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section for any purpose other than to solicit security holders with respect to the same meeting or action by consent or authorization for which the registrant is soliciting or intends to solicit or to communicate with security holders with respect to a solicitation commenced by the registrant; or disclose such information to any person other than an employee, agent, or beneficial owner for whom a request was made to the extent necessary to effectuate the communication or solicitation. The security holder shall return the information provided pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section and shall not retain any copies thereof or of any information derived from such information after the termination of the solicitation.

(e) The security holder shall reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by the registrant in performing the acts requested pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

Note 1 to §240.14a-7. Reasonably prompt methods of distribution to security holders may be used instead of mailing. If an alternative distribution method is chosen, the costs of that method should be considered where necessary rather than the costs of mailing.

Note 2 to §240.14a-7 When providing the information required by §240.14a-7(a)(1)(ii), if the registrant has received affirmative written or implied consent to delivery of a single copy of proxy materials to a shared address in accordance with §240.14a-3(e)(1), it shall exclude from the number of record holders those to whom it does not have to deliver a separate proxy statement.

§ 240.14a-8 Shareholder proposals.

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

(a) Question 1: What is a proposal? A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).

(b) Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible? (1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities...
through the date of the meeting.

(2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:

(i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or

(ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D (§240.13d-101), Schedule 13G (§240.13d-102), Form 3 (§249.103 of this chapter), Form 4 (§249.104 of this chapter) and/or Form 5 (§249.105 of this chapter), or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:

(A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;

(B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and

(C) Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.

(c) Question 3: How many proposals may I submit? Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.

(d) Question 4: How long can my proposal be? The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.

(e) Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal? (1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (§249.308a of this chapter), or in shareholder reports of investment companies under §270.30d-1 of this chapter of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.

(2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(3) If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(f) Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section? (1) The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification.
company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as
if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to
exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under §240.14a-8 and provide you with a
copy under Question 10 below, §240.14a-8(i).

(2) If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of
shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy
materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.

(g) Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be
excluded? Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to
exclude a proposal.

(h) Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders’ meeting to present the proposal? (1) Either
you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must
attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a qualified
representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative,
follow the proper state law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.

(2) If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the
company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may
appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.

(3) If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause,
the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings
held in the following two calendar years.

(i) Question 9: If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company
rely to exclude my proposal? (1) Improper under state law: If the proposal is not a proper subject for
action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s organization;

Note to paragraph (i)(1): Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not
considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by
shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or
requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law.
Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is
proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

(2) Violation of law: If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state,
federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

Note to paragraph (i)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a
proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law would
result in a violation of any state or federal law.

(3) Violation of proxy rules: If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the
Commission’s proxy rules, including §240.14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading
statements in proxy soliciting materials;

(4) Personal grievance; special interest: If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or
grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to
further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;

(5) Relevance: If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the
company’s total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net
earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the
company’s business;

(6) Absence of power/authority: If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the
proposal;

(7) Management functions: If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary
(i) The proposal;

(ii) An explanation of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should, if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule; and

(iii) A supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law.

(k) Question 11: May I submit my own statement to the Commission responding to the company's arguments?

Yes, you may submit a response, but it is not required. You should try to submit any response to us, with a copy to the company, as soon as possible after the company makes its submission. This way, the Commission staff will have time to consider fully your submission before it issues its response. You should submit six paper copies of your response.

(l) Question 12: If the company includes my shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, what information about me must it include along with the proposal itself?

(1) The company's proxy statement must include your name and address, as well as the number of the company's voting securities that you hold. However, instead of providing that information, the company may instead include a statement that it will provide the information to shareholders promptly upon receiving an oral or written request.

(2) The company is not responsible for the contents of your proposal or supporting statement.

(m) Question 13: What can I do if the company includes in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should not vote in favor of my proposal, and I disagree with some of its statements?

(1) The company may elect to include in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against your proposal. The company is allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view, just as you may express your own point of view in your proposal's supporting statement.

(2) However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, §240.14a-9, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.

(3) We require the company to send you a copy of its statements opposing your proposal before it sends its proxy materials, so that you may bring to our attention any materially false or misleading statements, under the following timeframes:

(i) If our no-action response requires that you make revisions to your proposal or supporting statement as a condition to requiring the company to include it in its proxy materials, then the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 5 calendar days after the company receives a copy of your revised proposal; or

(ii) In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before it files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under §240.14a-8.


§ 240.14a-9 False or misleading statements.
Shareholder Proposals

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F (CF)

Action: Publication of CF Staff Legal Bulletin

Date: October 18, 2011

Summary: This staff legal bulletin provides information for companies and shareholders regarding Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Supplementary Information: The statements in this bulletin represent the views of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Division”). This bulletin is not a rule, regulation or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”). Further, the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content.

Contacts: For further information, please contact the Division’s Office of Chief Counsel by calling (202) 551-3500 or by submitting a web-based request form at https://tts.sec.gov/cgi-bin/corp_fin_interpretive.

A. The purpose of this bulletin

This bulletin is part of a continuing effort by the Division to provide guidance on important issues arising under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. Specifically, this bulletin contains information regarding:

• Brokers and banks that constitute “record” holders under Rule 14a-8 (b)(2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8;

• Common errors shareholders can avoid when submitting proof of ownership to companies;

• The submission of revised proposals;

• Procedures for withdrawing no-action requests regarding proposals submitted by multiple proponents; and

• The Division’s new process for transmitting Rule 14a-8 no-action responses by email.

You can find additional guidance regarding Rule 14a-8 in the following

bulletins that are available on the Commission's website: SLB No. 14, SLB No. 14A, SLB No. 14B, SLB No. 14C, SLB No. 14D and SLB No. 14E.

B. The types of brokers and banks that constitute "record" holders under Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

1. Eligibility to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

To be eligible to submit a shareholder proposal, a shareholder must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the shareholder meeting for at least one year as of the date the shareholder submits the proposal. The shareholder must also continue to hold the required amount of securities through the date of the meeting and must provide the company with a written statement of intent to do so.1

The steps that a shareholder must take to verify his or her eligibility to submit a proposal depend on how the shareholder owns the securities. There are two types of security holders in the U.S.: registered owners and beneficial owners.2 Registered owners have a direct relationship with the issuer because their ownership of shares is listed on the records maintained by the issuer or its transfer agent. If a shareholder is a registered owner, the company can independently confirm that the shareholder’s holdings satisfy Rule 14a-8(b)’s eligibility requirement.

The vast majority of investors in shares issued by U.S. companies, however, are beneficial owners, which means that they hold their securities in book-entry form through a securities intermediary, such as a broker or a bank. Beneficial owners are sometimes referred to as “street name” holders. Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) provides that a beneficial owner can provide proof of ownership to support his or her eligibility to submit a proposal by submitting a written statement “from the ‘record’ holder of [the] securities (usually a broker or bank),” verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the shareholder held the required amount of securities continuously for at least one year.3

2. The role of the Depository Trust Company

Most large U.S. brokers and banks deposit their customers’ securities with, and hold those securities through, the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), a registered clearing agency acting as a securities depository. Such brokers and banks are often referred to as “participants” in DTC.4 The names of these DTC participants, however, do not appear as the registered owners of the securities deposited with DTC on the list of shareholders maintained by the company or, more typically, by its transfer agent. Rather, DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co., appears on the shareholder list as the sole registered owner of securities deposited with DTC by the DTC participants. A company can request from DTC a “securities position listing” as of a specified date, which identifies the DTC participants having a position in the company’s securities and the number of securities held by each DTC participant on that date.5

3. Brokers and banks that constitute “record” holders under Rule
14a-8(b)(2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

In *The Hain Celestial Group, Inc.* (Oct. 1, 2008), we took the position that an introducing broker could be considered a "record" holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). An introducing broker is a broker that engages in sales and other activities involving customer contact, such as opening customer accounts and accepting customer orders, but is not permitted to maintain custody of customer funds and securities. Instead, an introducing broker engages another broker, known as a "clearing broker," to hold custody of client funds and securities, to clear and execute customer trades, and to handle other functions such as issuing confirmations of customer trades and customer account statements. Clearing brokers generally are DTC participants; introducing brokers generally are not. As introducing brokers generally are not DTC participants, and therefore typically do not appear on DTC's securities position listing, Hain Celestial has required companies to accept proof of ownership letters from brokers in cases where, unlike the positions of registered owners and brokers and banks that are DTC participants, the company is unable to verify the positions against its own or its transfer agent's records or against DTC's securities position listing.

In light of questions we have received following two recent court cases relating to proof of ownership under Rule 14a-8 and in light of the Commission's discussion of registered and beneficial owners in the Proxy Mechanics Concept Release, we have reconsidered our views as to what types of brokers and banks should be considered "record" holders under Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). Because of the transparency of DTC participants' positions in a company's securities, we will take the view going forward that, for Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) purposes, only DTC participants should be viewed as "record" holders of securities that are deposited at DTC. As a result, we will no longer follow Hain Celestial.

We believe that taking this approach as to who constitutes a "record" holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) will provide greater certainty to beneficial owners and companies. We also note that this approach is consistent with Exchange Act Rule 12g5-1 and a 1988 staff no-action letter addressing that rule, under which brokers and banks that are DTC participants are considered to be the record holders of securities on deposit with DTC when calculating the number of record holders for purposes of Sections 12(g) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act.

Companies have occasionally expressed the view that, because DTC's nominee, Cede & Co., appears on the shareholder list as the sole registered owner of securities deposited with DTC by the DTC participants, only DTC or Cede & Co. should be viewed as the "record" holder of the securities held on deposit at DTC for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). We have never interpreted the rule to require a shareholder to obtain a proof of ownership letter from DTC or Cede & Co., and nothing in this guidance should be construed as changing that view.

How can a shareholder determine whether his or her broker or bank is a DTC participant?

Shareholders and companies can confirm whether a particular broker or bank is a DTC participant by checking DTC’s participant list, which is currently available on the Internet at http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/membership/directories/dtc/alpha.pdf.

What if a shareholder’s broker or bank is not on DTC’s participant list?

The shareholder will need to obtain proof of ownership from the DTC participant through which the securities are held. The shareholder should be able to find out who this DTC participant is by asking the shareholder’s broker or bank.²

If the DTC participant knows the shareholder’s broker or bank’s holdings, but does not know the shareholder’s holdings, a shareholder could satisfy Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) by obtaining and submitting two proof of ownership statements verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the required amount of securities were continuously held for at least one year – one from the shareholder’s broker or bank confirming the shareholder’s ownership, and the other from the DTC participant confirming the broker or bank’s ownership.

How will the staff process no-action requests that argue for exclusion on the basis that the shareholder’s proof of ownership is not from a DTC participant?

The staff will grant no-action relief to a company on the basis that the shareholder’s proof of ownership is not from a DTC participant only if the company’s notice of defect describes the required proof of ownership in a manner that is consistent with the guidance contained in this bulletin. Under Rule 14a-8(f)(1), the shareholder will have an opportunity to obtain the requisite proof of ownership after receiving the notice of defect.

C. Common errors shareholders can avoid when submitting proof of ownership to companies

In this section, we describe two common errors shareholders make when submitting proof of ownership for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2), and we provide guidance on how to avoid these errors.

First, Rule 14a-8(b) requires a shareholder to provide proof of ownership that he or she has "continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal" (emphasis added).¹⁰ We note that many proof of ownership letters do not satisfy this requirement because they do not verify the shareholder’s beneficial ownership for the entire one-year period preceding and including the date the proposal is submitted. In some cases, the letter speaks as of a date before the date the proposal is submitted, thereby leaving a gap between the date of the verification and the date the proposal is submitted. In other cases, the letter speaks as of a date after the date the proposal was submitted but covers a period of only one year, thus failing to verify the shareholder’s beneficial ownership over the required full
one-year period preceding the date of the proposal’s submission.

Second, many letters fail to confirm continuous ownership of the securities. This can occur when a broker or bank submits a letter that confirms the shareholder’s beneficial ownership only as of a specified date but omits any reference to continuous ownership for a one-year period.

We recognize that the requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) are highly prescriptive and can cause inconvenience for shareholders when submitting proposals. Although our administration of Rule 14a-8(b) is constrained by the terms of the rule, we believe that shareholders can avoid the two errors highlighted above by arranging to have their broker or bank provide the required verification of ownership as of the date they plan to submit the proposal using the following format:

"As of [date the proposal is submitted], [name of shareholder] held, and has held continuously for at least one year, [number of securities] shares of [company name] [class of securities]."11

As discussed above, a shareholder may also need to provide a separate written statement from the DTC participant through which the shareholder’s securities are held if the shareholder’s broker or bank is not a DTC participant.

D. The submission of revised proposals

On occasion, a shareholder will revise a proposal after submitting it to a company. This section addresses questions we have received regarding revisions to a proposal or supporting statement.

1. A shareholder submits a timely proposal. The shareholder then submits a revised proposal before the company’s deadline for receiving proposals. Must the company accept the revisions?

Yes. In this situation, we believe the revised proposal serves as a replacement of the initial proposal. By submitting a revised proposal, the shareholder has effectively withdrawn the initial proposal. Therefore, the shareholder is not in violation of the one-proposal limitation in Rule 14a-8 (c).12 If the company intends to submit a no-action request, it must do so with respect to the revised proposal.

We recognize that in Question and Answer E.2 of SLB No. 14, we indicated that if a shareholder makes revisions to a proposal before the company submits its no-action request, the company can choose whether to accept the revisions. However, this guidance has led some companies to believe that, in cases where shareholders attempt to make changes to an initial proposal, the company is free to ignore such revisions even if the revised proposal is submitted before the company’s deadline for receiving shareholder proposals. We are revising our guidance on this issue to make clear that a company may not ignore a revised proposal in this situation.13

2. A shareholder submits a timely proposal. After the deadline for receiving proposals, the shareholder submits a revised proposal. Must the company accept the revisions?
No. If a shareholder submits revisions to a proposal after the deadline for receiving proposals under Rule 14a-8(e), the company is not required to accept the revisions. However, if the company does not accept the revisions, it must treat the revised proposal as a second proposal and submit a notice stating its intention to exclude the revised proposal, as required by Rule 14a-8(j). The company’s notice may cite Rule 14a-8(e) as the reason for excluding the revised proposal. If the company does not accept the revisions and intends to exclude the initial proposal, it would also need to submit its reasons for excluding the initial proposal.

3. If a shareholder submits a revised proposal, as of which date must the shareholder prove his or her share ownership?

A shareholder must prove ownership as of the date the original proposal is submitted. When the Commission has discussed revisions to proposals,14 it has not suggested that a revision triggers a requirement to provide proof of ownership a second time. As outlined in Rule 14a-8(b), proving ownership includes providing a written statement that the shareholder intends to continue to hold the securities through the date of the shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8(f)(2) provides that if the shareholder “fails in [his or her] promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of [the same shareholder’s] proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.” With these provisions in mind, we do not interpret Rule 14a-8 as requiring additional proof of ownership when a shareholder submits a revised proposal.15

E. Procedures for withdrawing no-action requests for proposals submitted by multiple proponents

We have previously addressed the requirements for withdrawing a Rule 14a-8 no-action request in SLB Nos. 14 and 14C. SLB No. 14 notes that a company should include with a withdrawal letter documentation demonstrating that a shareholder has withdrawn the proposal. In cases where a proposal submitted by multiple shareholders is withdrawn, SLB No. 14C states that, if each shareholder has designated a lead individual to act on its behalf and the company is able to demonstrate that the individual is authorized to act on behalf of all of the proponents, the company need only provide a letter from that lead individual indicating that the lead individual is withdrawing the proposal on behalf of all of the proponents.

Because there is no relief granted by the staff in cases where a no-action request is withdrawn following the withdrawal of the related proposal, we recognize that the threshold for withdrawing a no-action request need not be overly burdensome. Going forward, we will process a withdrawal request if the company provides a letter from the lead filer that includes a representation that the lead filer is authorized to withdraw the proposal on behalf of each proponent identified in the company’s no-action request.16

F. Use of email to transmit our Rule 14a-8 no-action responses to companies and proponents

To date, the Division has transmitted copies of our Rule 14a-8 no-action responses, including copies of the correspondence we have received in connection with such requests, by U.S. mail to companies and proponents.
We also post our response and the related correspondence to the Commission’s website shortly after issuance of our response.

In order to accelerate delivery of staff responses to companies and proponents, and to reduce our copying and postage costs, going forward, we intend to transmit our Rule 14a-8 no-action responses by email to companies and proponents. We therefore encourage both companies and proponents to include email contact information in any correspondence to each other and to us. We will use U.S. mail to transmit our no-action response to any company or proponent for which we do not have email contact information.

Given the availability of our responses and the related correspondence on the Commission’s website and the requirement under Rule 14a-8 for companies and proponents to copy each other on correspondence submitted to the Commission, we believe it is unnecessary to transmit copies of the related correspondence along with our no-action response. Therefore, we intend to transmit only our staff response and not the correspondence we receive from the parties. We will continue to post to the Commission’s website copies of this correspondence at the same time that we post our staff no-action response.

1 See Rule 14a-8(b).

2 For an explanation of the types of share ownership in the U.S., see Concept Release on U.S. Proxy System, Release No. 34-62495 (July 14, 2010) [75 FR 42982] (“Proxy Mechanics Concept Release”), at Section II.A. The term “beneficial owner” does not have a uniform meaning under the federal securities laws. It has a different meaning in this bulletin as compared to “beneficial owner” and “beneficial ownership” in Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act. Our use of the term in this bulletin is not intended to suggest that registered owners are not beneficial owners for purposes of those Exchange Act provisions. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-12598 (July 7, 1976) [41 FR 29982], at n.2 (“The term ‘beneficial owner’ when used in the context of the proxy rules, and in light of the purposes of those rules, may be interpreted to have a broader meaning than it would for certain other purpose[s] under the federal securities laws, such as reporting pursuant to the Williams Act.”).

3 If a shareholder has filed a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 or Form 5 reflecting ownership of the required amount of shares, the shareholder may instead prove ownership by submitting a copy of such filings and providing the additional information that is described in Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(ii).

4 DTC holds the deposited securities in “fungible bulk,” meaning that there are no specifically identifiable shares directly owned by the DTC participants. Rather, each DTC participant holds a pro rata interest or position in the aggregate number of shares of a particular issuer held at DTC. Correspondingly, each customer of a DTC participant – such as an individual investor – owns a pro rata interest in the shares in which the DTC
participant has a pro rata interest. See Proxy Mechanics Concept Release, at Section II.B.2.a.


7 See KBR Inc. v. Chevedden, Civil Action No. H-11-0196, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36431, 2011 WL 1463611 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2011); Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723 (S.D. Tex. 2010). In both cases, the court concluded that a securities intermediary was not a record holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b) because it did not appear on a list of the company's non-objecting beneficial owners or on any DTC securities position listing, nor was the intermediary a DTC participant.

8 Techne Corp. (Sept. 20, 1988).

9 In addition, if the shareholder's broker is an introducing broker, the shareholder's account statements should include the clearing broker's identity and telephone number. See Net Capital Rule Release, at Section II.C.(iii). The clearing broker will generally be a DTC participant.

10 For purposes of Rule 14a-8(b), the submission date of a proposal will generally precede the company's receipt date of the proposal, absent the use of electronic or other means of same-day delivery.

11 This format is acceptable for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b), but it is not mandatory or exclusive.

12 As such, it is not appropriate for a company to send a notice of defect for multiple proposals under Rule 14a-8(c) upon receiving a revised proposal.

13 This position will apply to all proposals submitted after an initial proposal but before the company's deadline for receiving proposals, regardless of whether they are explicitly labeled as "revisions" to an initial proposal, unless the shareholder affirmatively indicates an intent to submit a second, additional proposal for inclusion in the company's proxy materials. In that case, the company must send the shareholder a notice of defect pursuant to Rule 14a-8(f)(1) if it intends to exclude either proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on Rule 14a-8(c). In light of this guidance, with respect to proposals or revisions received before a company's deadline for submission, we will no longer follow Layne Christensen Co. (Mar. 21, 2011) and other prior staff no-action letters in which we took the view that a proposal would violate the Rule 14a-8(c) one-proposal limitation if such proposal is submitted to a company after the company has either submitted a Rule 14a-8 no-action request to exclude an earlier proposal submitted by the same proponent or notified the proponent that the earlier proposal was excludable under the rule.

Because the relevant date for proving ownership under Rule 14a-8(b) is the date the proposal is submitted, a proponent who does not adequately prove ownership in connection with a proposal is not permitted to submit another proposal for the same meeting on a later date.

Nothing in this staff position has any effect on the status of any shareholder proposal that is not withdrawn by the proponent or its authorized representative.

Mr. Sabatino,

Attached is rule 14a-8 proposal stock ownership letter. Please let me know tomorrow whether there is any question.

Sincerely,

John Chevedden
August 9, 2012

John R. Chevedden

Via facsimile

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is provided at the request of Mr. John R. Chevedden, a customer of Fidelity Investments.

Please accept this letter as confirmation that according to our records Mr. Chevedden has continuously owned no less than 200 shares of Oshkosh Corp. (CUSIP: 688239201, trading symbol: OSK) and 200 shares of the Walgreen Company (CUSIP: 931422109, trading symbol: WAG) since July 1, 2011. These shares are registered in the name of National Financial Services, LLC, a DTC participant (DTC number: 0226) and Fidelity affiliate.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any questions regarding this issue, please feel free to contact me by calling 800-800-6890 between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time (Monday through Friday). Press 1 when asked if this call is a response to a letter or phone call; press *2 to reach an individual, then enter my 5 digit extension 27937 when prompted.

Sincerely,

George Stasinopoulos
Client Services Specialist

Our File: W954692-09AUG12