Aug. 11, 2023
I fully support this proposal and any other that brings transparency to the market. The Archegos collapse lays bare the lurking dangers of these types of contracts. It bewilders me that other comments use Archegos or the investing public's usage of similar disclosures as justification to prevent or avoid more transparency. They are "talking their book" so-to-speak and this only further proves the point that there the dangers of these contracts. Whether you agree with that point or not, it is undeniable that those against this rule proposal are against fairer and more transparent markets. One must ask why anyone would be against that. Moreover, I feel it tedious to even have address the pretense that liquidity is endangered by this proposed rule. This false flag is the same one that has been used for the past two decades and the other practices that it has been used to justify included: Naked short selling, Payment for order flow, dark pools, and so on. It might as well be a siren song for those who seek an unfair advantage over the those the SEC is meant to protect. Even I, who has no practical experience with these contracts can plainly see that the opaqueness of these contracts make it easy to manipulate the stocks contained within them, and that is fundamentally unfair to those who cannot access these types of contracts. More transparency will at least allow the public to see who wishes to manipulate certain stocks and make decisions based on that. I would like to reiterate the points of another comment's that would help this proposal reach a fairer market for all: (1) The threshold should be lowered to $100 million / $200 million gross in order for more fraud to be detected. (2) This rule should be applied internationally so firms cannot evade the rules by hiding behind borders. (3) The Commission should follow the precedent in Rule 13h-1, which identifies large traders using the traders entire position in all NMS securities. The overall picture of a traders appetite for excessive risk can only be formed by looking at their total swap position. Allowing large traders to take on excessive risk via swaps in many different individual securities while avoiding reporting requirements is against the spirit of the rule, and goes against the Commissions prior rulemaking. (4) Security-Based Swap Position should include all security-based swaps based on the same underlying security or reference entity, regardless of whether they are debt (including CDS) or equity-based, so that funds and firms cannot evade reporting requirements by using different types of complex financial instruments. Thank you, Adam Whitehurst