

April 3, 2023

Ms. Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090

Proposed Rule: Order Competition Rule, Release No. 34-96495; File No. S7-31-22 (Dec. 14, 2022)

Dear Ms. Countryman:

We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback and comment regarding the SEC's proposed order competition rule as part of a broader suite of proposals to modify equity market structure. The proposed rule would require under certain conditions that retail orders be exposed through auctions rather than being internalized by a market maker, unless the pricing would result in mid-quote executions.

By way of background, the three authors of this comment letter are currently studying the impact of order-by-order competition in equity trading and the connection between the Commission's proposal and Retail Liquidity Programs (RLPs) that the Commission has approved over the last decade at various exchanges.¹ Chester Spatt served as Chief Economist of the Commission (2004-2007) during the adoption and implementation of Regulation NMS and served as a member of the Commission's Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee (EMSAC) from 2015 through 2018.² Both Ernst and Spatt also have examined in separate studies a range of regulatory and market design issues involving the equity and options markets, including latency and high-frequency trading as well as payment for order flow and Spatt also has studied the interaction between the order book and order flow, pre-opening trading and competition among markets.

Fundamental to understanding the SEC's proposal mandating order-by-order auctions for retail orders that would not otherwise receive mid-quote fill executions is the nature of competition. The current trading system relies upon ex-ante competition in which brokers route orders based on the average execution quality of venues. At every quarter, month, or even daily frequency, brokers evaluate venues; they reward the venues offering the best execution quality with a larger share of

¹ T. Ernst, C. Spatt, and J. Sun, 2023, "Would Order-by-Order Auctions be Competitive?" https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4300505.

² Spatt was one of the founders in the mid-1980s of the *Review of Financial Studies* (which quickly emerged as among the three leading journals in finance) and its second executive editor and served as President of both the Society for Financial Society and the Western Finance Association. Besides the EMSAC, he also has served as a member of both the Model Validation Council of the Federal Reserve System and the Advisory Committee of the Office of Financial Research as well as various non-governmental groups, such as the Systemic Risk Council, the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee and the Financial Economists Roundtable.

orders, and punish venues offering the worst execution quality with a smaller share of orders.³ Overwhelmingly, retail orders are sent directly to wholesalers rather than to exchanges—perhaps unsurprising, given the advantages in segmenting retail order flow. Furthermore, the nature of the competition is reinforced by the differences in price improvement that are obtained by different brokers due to the differential attractiveness of their respective orders.⁴ Analysis of SEC 605 reports shows that broker routing to wholesalers is consistent with competition.⁵ The broad point to note is that there is considerable competition in practice for orders from the brokers. All of this suggests that market segmentation is central to the quality of execution received by retail orders and the attractiveness that brokers associate with routing to wholesalers/market makers.

The competition described above reflects ex-ante competition among wholesaler/market makers. The above discussion and the low use of direct routing to exchanges, even absent payment for order flow,⁶ highlight that wholesalers directly compete with each other in the execution quality they deliver, as brokers have a best-execution obligation to route orders to the venues which offer the highest execution quality. This relates to an important part of our trading system, which greatly benefits retail investors, namely segmentation of orders which allows retail investors to obtain superior prices. This is embedded in our current trading system and is extremely important for retail investors.

Economic theory suggests that fully effective competition can arise on an ex-ante basis and does not require competition at an ex-post transactional level. Indeed, mechanism design theory in economics highlights that distortions are mitigated by full ex-ante commitment to a mechanism.⁷ In contrast, the Commission’s proposal appears to be predicated upon the view that ex-post competition, because it occurs at a final stage, will result in greater competition. This perspective ignores how competition at an initial stage would be altered by attempts to create more competition at a later stage. It is not compatible with economic theory simply to postulate that behavior at an earlier stage in a mechanism would be unaltered by adding additional stages to the specification of a game.

The three of us have a paper which directly compares two systems of trading: brokers routing, where a broker routes orders to wholesalers based on aggregate performance, and order-by-order auctions, where each order comes up for an individual auction. In the broker’s routing case, the wholesalers are ex-ante similar and competing with one another to influence the future share of orders routed to it. In our model this results in a full competitive solution in an extreme case. Even for particular securities or market conditions in which wholesalers don’t desire to trade, the

³ Execution quality is often measured as the total effective spread divided by the total quoted spread. An EQ ratio of 0 corresponds to mid-quote execution, while an EQ ratio of 1.0 corresponds to at-the-quote execution.

⁴ See C. Schwarz, B. Barber, X. Huang, P. Jorion, and T. Odean, 2022, “The ‘Actual Retail Price’ of Equity Trades.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4189239.

⁵ A. H. Dyhrberg, A. Shkilko, and I. M. Werner, 2022. “The Retail Execution Quality Landscape.” *Fisher College of Business Working Paper*, (2022-03), 014.

⁶ R. Battalio and R. Jennings, 2022, “Why Do Brokers Who Do not Charge Payment for Order Flow Route Marketable Orders to Wholesalers?” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4304124.

⁷ R. Myerson, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica* 47 (1979), 61-73 and M. Harris and R. Townsend, “Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information,” *Econometrica* 49 (1981), 33-64.

wholesalers recognize that the trades could affect the overall assessment of their performance. Ex-ante competition essentially puts the wholesalers in roughly equivalent conditions.

In contrast, order-by-order auctions would lead to a situation in which the wholesalers would be much more heterogeneous in their circumstances due to differences in the inventories and signals that they would possess. For example, some wholesalers would have relatively greater inventory or less favorable signals about a particular asset. Such wholesalers would then tend to bid less aggressively compared to those with lower specific inventory. This does point to how the auctions can lead to greater heterogeneity among the bidders and enhance allocative efficiency. This would be a fundamental potential advantage of the auctions. However, the auctions would be subject to greater adverse selection and the winner's curse, reflecting in part the costs associated with the unknown inventory and signals of other market makers. Much of the hope of the SEC with respect to order-by-order auctions is that these would attract greater competition than the existing wholesalers—such as participation by institutional investors, including leading mutual funds and hedge funds. Whether such participation would arise is unclear (especially since such investors have not found it attractive to participate at present as market makers), but in any case, it is important to recognize that the interests of such institutional investors tend to be one-sided (single directional) and that such interest would undercut the viability of participation of the traditional market makers due to their greater exposure to the resulting adverse selection and winner's curse created by one-sided interest. This is related to the fundamental point that one cannot simply add an additional stage to a mechanism without affecting the incentives. Our formal model suggests the greater allocative efficiency of auctions comes at a cost of decreased competition. Furthermore, the total efficiency can surprisingly be lower under order-by-order auctions if the new participants are sufficiently more informed than wholesalers.

The role of the winner's curse and adverse selection would make the order-by-order auctions especially awkward and problematic for relatively less liquid securities and stressed market conditions (add our citation). It would be much more difficult under such circumstances to force the participation of the wholesalers on favorable terms compared to the broker's routing system and ex-ante competition. This discussion reflects the theoretical analysis in our paper (attached and cited in footnote 1).

As is pointed out in our paper and independently by Allison Bishop,⁸ the presence of five Retail Liquidity Programs (RLPs) proposed by exchanges and approved by the SEC (during the last decade) to enhance trading opportunities for retail investors, provides a context to help further assess the interest and viability of order-by-order auctions. These programs were proposed by various exchanges to help provide a venue to facilitate retail executions. Our formal paper also includes an empirical analysis of these programs, which offer auction-like settings to facilitate retail executions. The broad takeaway from such programs is that while often there is a flag suggesting interest in such executions, the overall volume going through such programs is modest. This suggests that the frictions associated with one-sided institutional interest does not lead to much volume and trading opportunities for retail investors.


⁸ A. Bishop, January 6, 2023, "The SEC Isn't Mad at PFOF. They're Just Disappointed."

One particularly relevant program is the IEX Retail Liquidity Program in which any executions would occur at the mid-quote (the specific price is not identified in the other RLPs). This is especially germane because the availability of mid-quote executions would provide an exemption from the requirement of using order-by-order executions. The SEC's proposal uses CAT data to suggest there is often considerable institutional interest in trading at mid-quote at the time retail traders are trading. The proposal then uses this measurement to speculate about the institutional interest in bidding mid-quote in retail auctions. Our paper highlights that the IEX RLP already offers an opportunity for institutions to trade with retail traders at mid-quote, and offers an alternative gauge of interest.

We document that the IEX RLP has two-sided liquidity less than 5% of the trading day, suggesting institutional traders have relatively modest interest in trading directly with retail traders.⁹ Our paper analyzes a proprietary sample of retail trades from a large retail broker. We show that when a retail trader is seeking to buy and the IEX RLP has interest on the ask side, retail traders obtain far better prices than when there is no RLP interest. When a retail trader is seeking to buy and the IEX RLP has interest only on the bid side, retail trades obtain worse prices than when there is no RLP interest at all, consistent with our model prediction that institutional traders, who trade directionally, may increase adverse selection in order-by-order auctions.

We very much appreciate the opportunity to comment upon the SEC's proposal to mandate order-by-order auctions for many retail orders, which would dramatically transform the trading of retail securities, but not necessarily in a manner consistent with the interests of retail investors. To facilitate review of our more detailed analysis we have appended to this comment letter our underlying academic research paper.

Sincerely,



Chester Spatt

Pamela R. and Kenneth B. Dunn Professor of Finance, Tepper School, Carnegie Mellon Univ;
and former Chief Economist, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2004—2007)



Thomas Ernst

⁹ We note that institutional traders seeking to trade at midpoint must weigh the advantages of trading with a small retail order against any costs of informational leakage.

Assistant Professor of Finance, Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; and

Jian Sun

Jian Sun

Assistant Professor of Finance, Lee Kong Chian School of Bus., Singapore Management Univ.

Cc: Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman, SEC

Hon. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC

Hon. Caroline A. Crenshaw, Commissioner, SEC

Hon. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, SEC

Hon. Jaime. Lizárraga, Commissioner, SEC

Haoxiang Zhu, Director of the Division of Trading and Markets, SEC

Jessica Wachter, Director of the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, SEC

Mr. Robert Cook, President and CEO, FINRA

Mr. Robert Colby, Chief Legal Officer, FINRA

Mr. Jonathan Sokobin, Chief Economist, FINRA

Would Order-By-Order Auctions Be Competitive?*

Thomas Ernst,[†] Chester Spatt,[‡] and Jian Sun[§]

April 3, 2023

Abstract

Retail trading flow is segregated from non-retail flow in U.S. equities, consistent with market segmentation. We model theoretically two methods of executing segregated retail trades: a) broker's routing, whereby brokers evaluate and allocate orders based on each market maker's aggregate performance, and b) order-by-order auctions, where market makers bid on each individual order, a market structure recently proposed by the SEC. We find that order-by-order auctions improve allocative efficiency among market makers, but a winner's curse problem in the auction can reduce retail investor welfare, particularly at times of limited liquidity. Introducing more market participants who compete for retail orders can harm both total efficiency and investor welfare if these new market participants have superior information compared to incumbent wholesalers. Empirical analysis of Retail Liquidity Programs (RLP) currently offered by exchanges shows that these programs behave similarly to order-by-order auctions in our model.

*For helpful comments and feedback we are thankful to: Yashar Barardehi, Robert Battalio, Svetlana Bryzgalova, Pete Kyle, Terrence Hendershott, Dmitry Livdan, Mark Loewenstein and Bart Zhou Yueshen, along with seminar participants at the University of Maryland, Arizona State University, the Microstructure Exchange, and numerous anonymous industry participants.

[†]University of Maryland, Robert H. Smith School of Business: ternst@umd.edu

[‡]Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business: cspatt@andrew.cmu.edu

[§]Singapore Management University, Lee Kong Chian School of Business: jiansun@smu.edu.sg

I. Introduction

Retail order flow in U.S. equities is segregated, with retail brokers routing almost all their retail customer orders directly to market makers. These market makers assume a best execution obligation once they receive the order, whether they privately internalize trades off-exchange, or fill the retail orders from liquidity sourced from other sources, like exchanges or alternative trading systems (such as “dark pools”). Retail trades are attractive to market makers, either due to lower adverse selection, as in Battalio and Holden (2001), or due to their trades being less correlated, as in Baldauf, Mollner, and Yueshen (2022). In both cases market makers are willing to give retail investors better prices than the exchanges due to greater ability to segregate orders. Recently, the SEC has proposed a change in market structure with the goal of potentially increasing competition among market makers.¹ While previous academic work has explored *whether* retail flow should be segregated and its value, once segregated, the question of *how* retail flow should be executed is comparatively unexplored.

We model and evaluate empirically two distinct methods of executing segregated retail trades: broker’s routing and an order-by-order auction. Our broker’s routing model closely resembles the current market structure, with retail brokers determining where to route each order to maximize execution quality. While retail brokers use recent past competing market maker performance to inform routing decisions, they do not communicate with the market maker prior to routing each individual order. Our order-by-order auction models the SEC’s proposed Rule 615, which would mandate auctions for retail trades Securities and Exchange Commission (2022). These auctions would only be available for retail market orders, but any market participant could bid on each individual order, yet no one would be required to bid on any given order.

We evaluate both models with a focus on inventory cost and competition. In our model, a broker receives an order from a retail investor and chooses one market maker to execute the order. Executing the order incurs (marginal) inventory costs for market makers. We assume that each market maker i has a private liquidity signal y_i , and that inventory cost is affected by both the market maker’s private signal and the average signal of all market makers. Intuitively, each private

¹In remarks before the SIFMA Annual meeting, SEC Chair Gensler stated “I’ve also sought recommendations around how to instill greater competition for retail market orders on an order-by-order basis, through auctions. With greater competition, more market participants would have access to these retail market orders.” Gensler (2022).

signal can be thought of as the inventory position of market maker i , with a market maker's willingness to trade depending both on his private inventory and the aggregate liquidity of all market makers. To obtain the order, market participants submit their spreads simultaneously to the broker, and the one with the lowest bid obtains the order. The key difference between broker's routing and order-by-order auctions is the market participants' information set when they submit their spreads. We solve the market equilibrium under both trading mechanisms and then identify differences in welfare distribution, inventory-management, and order allocation efficiency that arise under each of the two market structures.

In the broker's routing setting, market makers only observe noisy signals of their liquidity signals when submitting their spreads. The symmetric equilibrium bid (spread) strategy is monotone in the noisy signal, which may be different from the true liquidity signal that determines inventory cost. The broker routes the order to the market maker who submits the lowest spread. This delivers a highly competitive outcome—with relatively low expected market maker profits—because market makers' bidding strategies rely less on their signals, which are just noisy versions of their true private liquidity signals. This closely mirrors the current system of order routing in equities, where market makers agree to accept order flow from brokers, but there is no pre-trade communication on individual orders. Brokers route to a market maker, and the market maker must accept the order. In practice, evaluation of trades is done on a periodic (e.g., daily, weekly, or monthly) basis, and market makers compete on the aggregate execution quality they deliver, rather than bidding against each other on each individual order. This is consistent with our setting that when they compete, they only observe noisy information about their true liquidity/shocks when receiving the order, and the spread is less sensitive to their true liquidity cost/positions. The broker's routing setting delivers strong competition, but the lack of communication on any specific trade means that a trade may be routed to a market maker who has observed high ex-post inventory cost, leading to inefficient order allocation and inventory management.

In the order-by-order auction model, in contrast, brokers bid after observing their true liquidity signals. This is motivated by the SEC proposal that all retail orders are auctioned order-by-order, and thus when market makers compete for individual retail orders, they already have accurate information about the marginal inventory cost of executing the order. In the auction, market makers' symmetric equilibrium bid (spread) is increasing in their private signals y_i , and thus in

equilibrium, the participant with the lowest realized inventory cost will always win the auction with the most aggressive bid, leading to the first best allocative efficiency. The common-value nature of the auction, however, creates a winner's curse problem; whichever participant wins the auction learns that all other participants had higher signals of cost. Consequently, market participants bid conservatively in the auction, and thus they will earn more profit from the auction because of the strategic concern.

The welfare comparison between broker's routing and order-by-order auctions is influenced by the trade-off between more efficient inventory management and the higher rent earned by market makers due to concerns about the winner's curse. The inventory cost has two components: the common-value component, which depends on the average liquidity signals of all market makers, and the independent private-value component, which depends only on the liquidity signal of each market maker. The equilibrium inventory cost associated with the common-value component does not depend on order allocation since it is the same for all market makers. However, order allocation does affect the equilibrium inventory cost due to the independent component. When switching from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions, the market maker with the lowest inventory cost obtains the order, leading to first-best inventory management. This results in a welfare gain that is shared by both market makers and investors. However, under order-by-order auctions, the winner's curse concern becomes more severe because all market makers now observe more accurate signals about the true liquidity signals. As a result, all market makers will bid more conservatively, which leads to them earning more positive rent due to concerns about the winner's curse. Since there is no welfare gain from order allocation for the common-value component, market makers earning more rent results in a welfare loss for investors.

Based on the above intuition, we show that both the total welfare and market makers' welfare must increase when switching from broker's routing to order-by-order competition. The change in investor welfare depends on the trade-off between the gain from more efficient order allocation and more rent earned by market makers due to the concern of winner's curse. We found that in the order-by-order auction setting, investor welfare can be lower in times of limited liquidity. This occurs because market makers' bidding strategies become more sensitive to their observed signals under order-by-order auctions. Limited liquidity leads to less pressure from auction competitors, which results in less aggressive bids and larger profits for trading against retail orders. While order-

by-order auctions have higher allocative efficiency than broker's routing, they have *less* competition than broker's routing.

We then extend our baseline model to include institutional traders, as a key objective of the SEC proposal is to enable institutional traders to trade directly with retail investors in auctions. While institutional traders can increase the number of bidders in an auction, we consider the friction that they also have superior information about the fundamental value of the asset. Incumbent wholesalers, who have an inventory signal but have no information about the fundamental value, respond by bidding more cautiously in the auction. As a result, the overall welfare of retail investors can further decline in the switch to order-by-order auctions. Moreover, we also find an interesting market segmentation result due to asymmetric information. When information asymmetries between institutional investors and incumbent wholesalers are sufficiently severe, only institutional investors will effectively compete for high-quality (low-cost) orders, while all market participants compete for low-quality (high-cost) orders. This leads to heterogeneous impacts of switching to order-by-order auctions on orders with different qualities.

Finally, we analyzed the impact of market design on the cross-sectional liquidity of stocks. Under our model of broker's routing, market makers compete (or commit to a spread) before observing the characteristics of each order. Brokers can evaluate wholesalers based on their performance across all orders, including different stock sizes and liquidity levels, allowing for cross-subsidization. In equilibrium, wholesalers may incur losses when trading small, high-cost stocks, which are compensated by profits from trading large, low-cost stocks. This results in smoothed trading costs across stocks. However, switching to order-by-order auctions can substantially decrease market makers' incentives to trade small stocks, leading to more variation in spreads among stocks. As a result, the decrease in retail investor welfare can be particularly severe for small, less liquid stocks.

While order-by-order auctions only exist as an SEC proposal, we empirically evaluate an existing analogue, Retail Liquidity Programs (RLP). Both RLPs and the proposed auctions allow segmentation of retail flow, and are economically termed first-price sealed-bid auctions. Exchange RLPs allow market participants to provide liquidity to retail orders at will by posting hidden limit orders which are only accessible by retail investor orders. When there is at least one round lot (100 shares) of RLP interest, exchanges will disseminate an RPI Flag in the market data indicating the presence of RLP liquidity, though not revealing the exact size or price of the order. If multiple

participants post in an RLP, the participant with the most aggressively priced order will have first priority for any incoming retail market order, mirroring the potential competitiveness and allocative efficiency of an order-by-order auction. Unlike the broker’s routing system, where market makers must accept any flow the broker routes to them, posting limit orders in a RLP is entirely voluntary: there may be many market participants posting limit orders, or none at all.

Given the obvious parallels between RLPs and auctions, we investigate the extent to which empirical evaluation of existing RLPs can inform our model of proposed auctions, as well as the likely differences between them. Quote activity in RLPs is surprisingly high, with active quotes for averaging 25% of the day for stocks in the Russell 1000. Volumes, however, are small, with RLP trades comprising less than 0.5% of total equity trading volume. RLP usage is voluntary, while order-by-order auctions would be mandatory, so we investigate underlying reasons for low RLP usage. First, we find that price improvement in RLPs is, on average, less than 10% of the spread, while Dyhrberg, Shkilko, and Werner (2022) estimate that wholesalers give an average spread-improvement of 26%. Second, we find that RPI quote interest tends to occur during times when order imbalances are low, consistent with the voluntary nature of RLP liquidity provision. Third, we find that, under the pecking order theory of Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2017), RLPs would rank as high-cost high-immediacy venues in the pecking order of venues, with market makers already sourcing liquidity from them to the extent that liquidity is available. Price impacts of trades in RLP programs are more sensitive to volatility; when volatility is 1% higher, exchange sub-penny trades have a price impact ten basis points higher, while off-exchange trades have a price impact of only two basis points higher. Consistent with our model, market makers appear to consistently provide stable execution quality, while the RLPs function like order-by-order auctions in our model, with much more variation in outcomes.

While five exchanges operate RLPs, the RLP operated by IEX has a special feature: quotes in the IEX RLP can only be posted at the mid-quote. As a result, any order interest in the RLP reveals a specific price (midquote) available for retail trades. We show that the IEX RLP has two-sided liquidity less than 5% of the trading day, suggesting potentially low interest from institutional traders. With a proprietary sample of retail trades from a large retail broker, we show that retail investors obtain mid-quote pricing far more often when the IEX RLP has an active matching trade (e.g. a retail buy order when the RLP has a bid to sell at mid-quote). We also show that when the

IEX RLP only has same-direction liquidity (e.g. a retail buy order when the RLP only has a quote to buy at mid-quote), retail investors obtain worse prices than when there is no RLP interest at all, consistent with the adverse selection from opportunistic institutional investors which we model.

The SEC notion of an order-by-order auction seeks to “instill greater competition for retail market orders.” Under the current system of broker’s routing, each order is sent to a single market maker with no pre-trade communication, and competition is measured by aggregate execution quality. Switching to an order-by-order auction offers a tempting increase in allocative efficiency, as the market participant with the most optimistic signal always wins an auction. But this comes with a drawback, as the participant who wins by outbidding all competitors with less optimistic signals suffers the auction winner’s curse. Participants scale back their bids, and obtain increased welfare in the order-by-order system. Retail investor welfare can decrease in the switch to order-by-order trading, particularly for volatile stocks and stocks with few competing liquidity providers.

II. Prior Literature and Contribution

Several prior papers argue retail segmentation is optimal as a market design. Battalio and Holden (2001) argue retail investors have lower adverse selection, while Baldauf et al. (2022) argue retail investors are less correlated. Under both cases, it is optimal to segregate retail flow, but different mechanisms for segregating retail flow are not explored. Motivated by the recent SEC call for order-by-order competition, our paper provides a theoretical analysis into two possible methods of executing retail trades: the current system of broker’s routing, and a hypothetical order-by-order system. We show that the proposed order-by-order system would potentially increase allocative efficiency, but decreases retail investor welfare in less liquid stocks.

Several studies examine how retail participants themselves impact market liquidity. Eaton, Green, Roseman, and Wu (2022), for example, highlight how retail investors can increase order imbalances and volatility, while Parlour and Rajan (2003) argue segmentation decreases consumer welfare, as it leads to a subsidization of retail limit orders. We do not explore the market vs. limit order trade-off, but instead focus on retail marketable orders. Under the SEC vision, retail marketable orders would primarily interact with market maker and non-market maker limit orders through an order-by-order system similar to the current Retail Liquidity Programs. We empirically

analyze these RLP programs and find that they have low liquidity in small stocks and at volatile times, matching our model prediction of how order-by-order systems would function.

One possible analogue to order-by-order trading exists in the option markets, where a considerable share of volume executes in auctions. Bryzgalova, Pavlova, and Sikorskaya (2022) show that these auctions are correlated with retail trading measures, while Ernst and Spatt (2022) present empirical analysis of specific rules, such as a price-match guarantee and out-sized allocation, which prevent competition in option auctions. Hendershott, Khan, and Riordan (2022) present a model and empirical evidence that auctions in option markets are imperfectly competitive. Another possible analogue is in bond-markets, where Hendershott, Livdan, and Schürhoff (2021) highlight a winner’s curse in bond auctions; consistent to our model extension to opportunistic traders, they show that additional bidders do not always improve outcomes, due to the winner’s curse.

Several recent studies have looked at payment for order flow and segmentation. Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park (2018) show that a Canadian trade-at rule which decreases retail segmentation leads to liquidity improvements to lit markets but harms retail trade execution quality. Hu and Murphy (2022), Jain, Mishra, O’Donoghue, and Zhao (2020), and Schwarz, Barber, Huang, Jorion, and Odean (2022) all explore variation in execution quality among brokers. Market makers can offer two possible forms of superior prices: PFOF (payments from market makers to brokers) and price improvement (payments from market makers directly to retail customers). Brokers may or may not pass on the total extent of PFOF revenue back to their customers in the form of lower commissions, as documented in Battalio, Jennings, and Selway (2001), while Schwarz et al. (2022) and Battalio and Jennings (2022) highlight that brokers prioritize execution quality even along dimensions not reflected in SEC 605 reports. In our welfare analysis, we assume that market makers compete solely on price improvement, akin to PFOF being either zero or entirely passed through to retail investors. Our focus is not on the revenue split of PFOF vs. price improvement, but rather what form of market design delivers overall superior or inferior welfare to final retail investors.

Liquidity varies considerably in the cross-section of stocks. Corwin and Coughenour (2008) argue specialists allocate attention to more liquid stocks during times of market stress, while Foley, Liu, Malinova, Park, and Shkilko (2020) show how tying DMM assignments in large and small stocks can lead to substantial increases in liquidity for small stocks with little to no observed harm for large stocks. In an extension to our model, we show how broker’s routing can enable a similar

cross-subsidization, which is not possible under order-by-order auctions.

Previous studies (Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) and Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000)) show that market makers can earn positive profits when competing for orders. Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) emphasize the importance of order splitting in the duopoly case, while Biais et al. (2000) study common-value auctions where multiple market makers compete for an informed order. In both papers, the key friction is the asymmetric information from the liquidity demand side, which refers to informed traders. Our study also predicts that market makers will earn positive profits in both the broker’s routing and order-by-order auction settings. However, in contrast to the previous studies, there is no asymmetric information from the liquidity demand side in our model since retail orders are typically uninformed. In our model, market makers receive private signals about their inventory position, which weakens competition and ensures positive profits in equilibrium. Additionally, we extend our study to institutional traders who can privately obtain signals about asset quality and compete for order flows, as suggested by the SEC. We show that the additional adverse selection on the liquidity supply side may exacerbate market inefficiency, leading to a novel market segmentation prediction.

Our empirical analysis focuses on Retail Liquidity Programs (RLP) offered by several exchanges. Jain, Linna, and McInish (2021) provide an overview of the NYSE Retail Liquidity Program in 2015. Five exchanges now operate RLPs, and we analyze current RLP data through the lens of learning about potential execution quality under the SEC’s proposed order-by-order auctions. RLPs provide a competitive process for both traditional market makers and institutional investors to enter limit orders which offer potential price improvement to retail trades, but empirically suffer from the same winner’s curse problem we identify in our theoretical model.

III. Model

The model consists of only two dates, time 0 and time 1, and there is no discounting. There are three types of market players: a (retail) investor, a broker, and $N > 3$ ex-ante identical market makers indexed by $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$. Our focus is the strategic interactions among market makers, so we abstract away from agency problems between the investor and the broker, and assume that the broker’s objective is to maximize the investor’s welfare, which in our model is equivalent to

minimizing the spread.

At time 0, the broker receives a one unit sell order from the investor, and sends it to a market maker to execute the order by the end of time 0.² We assume that the retail investor is trading only for liquidity reasons, so there is no information about asset value contained in the direction of the order. If market maker i executes the order, it has to hold the position until time 1 which incurs (marginal) inventory cost ζ_i . The structure of ζ_i is specified later in this section. Let s_i be the half bid-ask spread offered by market maker i , then the profit that market maker i receives at time 1 is

$$s_i - \zeta_i.$$

We consider a tractable framework with linear equilibrium in the literature of common-value auctions (Klemperer (1999), Menezes and Monteiro (2004)). At time 0, each market maker i receives an i.i.d private liquidity shock y_i . For simplicity, we assume that y_i is drawn from an uniform distribution $U[-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$. The inventory cost ζ_i has the following structure

$$\zeta_i = c_0 + c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j + c_2 y_i,$$

where c_0 , c_1 and c_2 are positive constants. Since each market maker can only observe his own liquidity shock, the inventory cost ζ_i is not fully observed by market maker i . The cost function consists of three components. The first term c_0 is the unconditional expected inventory cost of executing the order, which is the same for all market makers. The second term

$$c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j$$

represents ζ_i 's exposure to the aggregate liquidity shock $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j$. When c_1 is higher, the inventory cost of executing the order is more sensitive to the aggregate liquidity shock. The third term

$$c_2 y_i$$

represents ζ_i 's exposure to the individual liquidity shock y_i , and the coefficient c_2 measures the

²The direction of the order does not change our results.

sensitivity. In our model, the coefficients (c_0, c_1, c_2) are exogenous, and are determined by stock characteristics. For example, a stock that is about to announce earnings may have a very high c_1 , with market makers very concerned about aggregate inventory imbalances. In contrast, a tick-constrained stock with low informational asymmetries may have a very low c_1 value, with market makers not very concerned about aggregate inventories.

A. Order-by-order Auction

First, we consider a hypothetical order-by-order auction mechanism. We model the order-by-order auction as a common-value auction. In order-by-order auctions, each market maker i submits the spread s_i after privately observing the realization of signal y_i at time 0, and thus it can choose its spread strategy according to its assessment of inventory cost. The broker observes spreads offered by all market makers, and sends the order to the winner with the lowest spread at the end of time 0. If more than one market makers submit the lowest spread, then the winner is chosen randomly among those who submit the lowest spread. At time 1, all players collect their payoffs. We focus on symmetric equilibria such that all market makers choose the same strategy.

Intuitively, when observing a higher signal realization y_i , the inventory cost ζ_i tends to be larger for market maker i , and thus it will submit a higher spread s_i . We conjecture (and verify later) that there exists a linear symmetric equilibria where all market makers choose the same strategy $s_i(y) = s(y)$ where

$$s = k_0 + k_1 y.$$

We solve the equilibrium using the standard mechanism design approach. Heuristically, suppose all market makers except market maker i follow the aforementioned equilibrium strategy. We consider market maker i 's expected profit $U(z, y)$ where y is the private signal observed by market maker i , and

$$\tilde{s} = k_0 + k_1 z$$

is the spread that market maker i submits to the broker. In equilibrium, we must have

$$\left. \frac{\partial U(z, y)}{\partial z} \right|_{z=y} = 0.$$

The following proposition summarizes our results.

Proposition 1. *In the model of order-by-order auctions, there exists a linear symmetric equilibrium in which the spread submitted by market maker $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ is*

$$s_i(y_i) = k_0 + k_1 y_i,$$

where

$$k_0 = c_0 + \frac{c_1}{4N} \left(N - 1 + \frac{2}{N} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2N}$$

and

$$k_1 = \frac{N-1}{N} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N+2}{N} + c_2 \right).$$

Proof. See Appendix. □

First, as we discussed earlier, the equilibrium strategy $s_i(y_i)$ is increasing in y_i with sensitivity

$$k_1 = \frac{N-1}{N} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N+2}{N} + c_2 \right).$$

This sensitivity k_1 is increasing in both c_1 and c_2 . When c_1 and c_2 are increasing, market maker i 's inventory cost is more sensitive to its private signal y_i . As a result, its spread s_i will also be more sensitive to the private signal y_i . The constant term k_0 is an increasing function of all three constants c_0 , c_1 and c_2 . Intuitively, k_0 is increasing in c_0 , as a higher expected inventory cost forces market makers to bid wider spreads. Furthermore, k_0 is also increasing in both c_1 and c_2 . Note that k_0 is the submitted spread when any market maker observes the average signal $y = 0$. When both c_1 and c_2 increase, the variation of inventory cost will be larger among market makers. As a result, the marginal cost of losing the bid from marginally increasing the spread is lower, which motivates the market maker to choose a higher spread. Intuitively, when market makers are ex-post more different from each other, they are consequently willing to choose a more aggressive equilibrium strategy. The monotonicity of the equilibrium spread also implies that the winner is always the market maker with lowest signal realization, and thus the lowest inventory cost. Order-by-order auctions therefore achieve the first-best outcome in terms of efficient allocation of the retail order,

as the retail order is always matched to the market maker with the lowest inventory cost.

B. Broker's routing

In this section, we consider the market equilibrium under broker's routing. In our model, we highlight the key difference between broker's routing and order-by-order auctions as market makers' different information sets when choosing spreads. Specifically, under broker's routing, market makers do not receive accurate signals about inventory cost when they compete. In practice, brokers and market makers establish long-term relationships. Market-maker performance is evaluated in the aggregate but not order-by-order, and market makers do not have a choice in when they want to accept order flow from the broker; when a broker sends, they must fulfill the order either by internalizing the order, or paying take fees to fill the order at the exchange. Focusing on this key difference, we model broker's routing by assuming that each market maker i only receives a noisy signal about y_i when submitting the spread s_i , and they are not able to adjust their offered spreads ex-post. Formally speaking, there is an additional stage, time -1, at which each market maker i receives a signal w_i . The signal w_i has the following structure. With probability p_0 , $w_i = y_i$; and with probability $1 - p_0$, w_i is drawn from a uniform distribution $U[-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$ which is uninformative and is independent of all other variables in the model. Each market maker i does not know whether w_i equals to y_i or not, and only understands that $w_i = y_i$ with probability p_0 . Under broker's routing, all market makers submit their spreads at the end of time -1.

We still focus on symmetric equilibria in this case. In the model of broker's routing, each market maker i only observes imperfect signal w_i when they submit their spread $t_i(w_i)$. Similar to our discussion in order-by-order auctions, we conjecture (and verify later) that there exists a linear symmetric equilibria where all market makers choose the same strategy $t(w)$, where

$$t = K_0 + K_1 w.$$

We refer readers to the appendix for more details and only present the equilibrium result.

Proposition 2. *In the model of broker's routing, there exists a linear symmetric equilibrium in*

which the spread submitted by market maker $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ is

$$t(w_i) = K_0 + K_1 w_i,$$

where

$$K_0 = c_0 + \frac{p_0}{4N^2} [(3 + N^2 - p_0 - Np_0) c_1 + 2Nc_2]$$

and

$$K_1 = \frac{N-1}{N} \left(c_2 p_0 + \frac{2c_1 p_0}{N} + \frac{c_1 (N-2) p_0}{2N} + \frac{c_1 (1-p_0) p_0}{2N} \right).$$

Proof. See Appendix. □

While we model broker's routing as a form of auction, it can also be natural to consider quantity competition in broker's routing (Kyle (1985), Baldauf et al. (2022)). Our goal here is to set up a comparable benchmark for order-by-order auctions which feature price competition, we likewise consider price competition for the broker's routing system.

We highlight the key difference between order-by-order auctions and broker's routing as the different information environment when they compete. In our model of broker's routing, if $p_0 = 1$, it becomes the model of order-by-order auctions. At the other extreme when $p_0 = 0$, market makers are homogeneously uninformed when they submit their spreads, as they have not yet observed their private signals. As a result, Bertrand competition obtains, and all market makers will earn zero expected profit in equilibrium. Therefore, the unique symmetric equilibrium spread in this case must be

$$t_i = \mathbb{E}(c_i) = \mathbb{E} \left(c_0 + c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j + c_2 y_i \right) = c_0$$

for all $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$.

Although all market makers earn a non-negative expected profit, their ex-post profit can be positive or negative, depending on the realized inventory cost. In other words, market makers will lose money on some trades. In contrast, the realized profit in order-by-order auctions must be non-negative for all market makers for all trades. Second, under broker's routing, the order will be obtained by the market maker with lowest signal w_i , who may not be the one with lowest inventory cost as w_i is just a noisy signal of y_i . As a result, welfare loss incurs due to inefficient inventory

management in equilibrium. We present more detailed welfare analysis in the next subsection.

C. Welfare analysis: Order-by-order auctions vs. broker's routing

In our model, the retail order is always executed, but inventory cost and equilibrium spreads differ between order-by-order auctions and broker's routing. We denote W_M , W_I and W_{total} as the market makers' expected profit, the investor's expected profit and the total welfare, respectively:

1. The expected total profit of all market makers W_M : the expected equilibrium spread minus the incurred inventory cost;
2. The expected total profit of the retail investor W_I : the expected negative equilibrium spread;
3. The total welfare W_{total} : the expected negative incurred inventory cost, which is $W_{total} = W_M + W_I$.

Under order-by-order auctions, the market maker with the lowest signal realization executes the order in equilibrium, so the expected total profit of all market makers is

$$W_M^{OBO} = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[k_0 + k_1 r - c_0 - c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j - c_2 r \mid \min_i y_i = r \right] \right\}.$$

The investor's expected profit is

$$W_I^{OBO} = -\mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[k_0 + k_1 r \mid \min_i y_i = r \right] \right\},$$

and the total welfare is

$$W_{total}^{OBO} = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[-c_0 - c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j - c_2 r \mid \min_i y_i = r \right] \right\}.$$

Total welfare is the sum of the welfare of market makers and investors: $W_{total}^{OBO} = W_M^{OBO} + W_I^{OBO}$.

Based on our equilibrium results, we obtain the following Lemma.

Lemma 1. *Under order-by-order auctions, the welfare outcomes of the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1 are*

$$W_M^{OBO} = \frac{1}{N+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 \right),$$

$$W_I^{OBO} = - \left[c_0 + \frac{1}{N(N+1)} c_1 - \frac{N-3}{2(N+1)} c_2 \right],$$

$$W_{total}^{OBO} = - \left(c_0 - \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right).$$

Proof. See Appendix. □

Order-by-order auctions implement the first best allocation, and the total welfare is

$$W_{total}^{OBO} = - \left(c_0 - \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right).$$

W_{total}^{OBO} is decreasing in the expected inventory cost c_0 . Total welfare under order-by-order auctions W_{total}^{OBO} is increasing in c_2 , because c_2 determines the variation of inventory cost among all market makers. When c_2 is higher, the expected lowest inventory cost will be lower, and thus the total welfare is higher. W_{total}^{OBO} is independent of c_1 , because the aggregate component

$$c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j$$

in the inventory cost always has zero mean. That is, aggregate contribution of the second component in the inventory cost is always zero, no matter how large is c_1 .

Costs incurred from the parameter c_0 are borne exclusively by the investor and do not factor into market makers' welfare. An increase in the aggregate liquidity parameter c_1 leads to an improvement in market makers' welfare as each market maker's private information becomes more relevant in the calculation of inventory costs, resulting in a more diverse bidding strategy. This, in turn, leads to market makers earning a higher information rent from the auction. Since c_1 has no impact on total welfare, when c_1 increases, investor welfare will decrease due to market makers earning higher information rents. On the other hand, an increase in c_2 has the same impact on both the investor's and market makers' welfare. Both parties benefit from an increase in c_2 as it reduces the correlation in market makers' inventory costs, leading to an overall improvement in total welfare, which is shared between the investor and market makers.

Under broker's routing, all welfare calculations are similar, except that market makers only observe noisy signals about y_i . For simplicity of exposition, we skip the intermediate steps and

only present the final results.

Lemma 2. *Under broker's routing, the welfare outcomes of the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 2 are*

$$W_M^{BR} = \frac{p_0 (2c_1 - p_0 c_1 + N c_2)}{N (1 + N)},$$

$$W_I^{BR} = - \left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2 - p_0) c_1 - (N - 3) N c_2}{2N (1 + N)} \right],$$

$$W_{total}^{BR} = W_M^{BR} + W_I^{BR} = - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N - 1}{N + 1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right).$$

Proof. See Appendix. □

Having solved for welfare outcomes in the model of broker's routing setting and order-by-order auctions, we next compare welfare between the two systems in the following proposition.

Proposition 3. $W_{total}^{BR} < W_{total}^{OBO}$; $W_M^{BR} < W_M^{OBO}$; $W_I^{BR} < W_I^{OBO}$ if and only if $\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{2(1-p_0)}{N(N-3)}$.

Proof. See Appendix. □

Proposition 3 is a direct result of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Note that the only aggregate welfare loss in this setting is from inefficient inventory management. The total welfare improvement

$$W_{total}^{OBO} - W_{total}^{BR} = (1 - p_0) \frac{N - 1}{N + 1} \frac{c_2}{2}$$

is increasing in N and decreasing in p_0 . Intuitively, when the ex-ante signal is less noisy (p_0 is higher), the order is more likely to be obtained by the market maker with the lowest inventory cost, and thus the welfare loss will be lower. The magnitude of welfare improvement also depends on the number of market makers. When there are more maker makers, the first best allocation will be more efficient as their inventory costs are not perfectly correlated. Order-by-order auctions implement the first best outcome, while the outcome of broker's routing depends on the precision of the ex-ante signal, and is less sensitive to the number of market makers. Consequently, the welfare improvement from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions is higher when there are more market makers. Finally, it is worth noting that the welfare improvement resulting from

order-by-order auctions is also increasing in c_2 . This is because, when c_2 is higher, the market makers' ex-post inventory cost will be more diverse. This means that the first best allocation, which minimizes the inventory cost, will be more efficient. However, while order-by-order auctions are capable of implementing the first best allocation, broker routing is not. As a result, the total welfare difference between these two mechanisms is larger when c_2 is higher.

Market maker profit W_M is higher under order-by-order auctions, and the difference is:

$$W_M^{OBO} - W_M^{BR} = \frac{1}{N+1} \left((1-p_0)^2 \frac{c_1}{N} + (1-p_0)c_2 \right).$$

The difference in market-maker welfare $W_M^{OBO} - W_M^{BR}$ is increasing in c_1 and c_2 . When c_1 and c_2 are higher, the private signals that market makers observe become more important in their inventory cost. Market makers are, effectively, more different ex-post. The ex-post heterogeneity generates the expected positive profit they earn under order-by-order auctions. The difference $W_M^{OBO} - W_M^{BR}$ is also increasing in $(1-p_0)$, as the precision of the noisy signal in the model of broker's routing determines the competitiveness of the market. When the signal is noisier, i.e., $(1-p_0)$ is higher, the market under broker's routing is more competitive, resulting in a lower expected equilibrium spread, and thus the difference in spreads under these two mechanisms will be larger.

The contrast between W_I^{BR} and W_I^{OBO} depends on the level of $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$, reflecting the trade-off between more efficient inventory management and higher rent earned by market makers due to the concerns about winner's curse. The winner's curse concern arises from the common-value component in the inventory cost. When market makers bid, they must consider that winning is conditional on other market makers observing relatively high-cost signals, which can lead to market makers bidding more conservatively in equilibrium. This effect tends to increase the equilibrium spread, which ultimately hurts investors. On the other hand, when the common-value part is equal to zero, or $c_1 = 0$, the winner's curse concern disappears, and we can show that investors will always benefit from switching from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions, as the benefit from more efficient allocation dominates. The following Lemma highlights this effect.

Lemma 3. *When $c_1 = 0$, the inventory costs of market makers become mutually independent, and we must have $W_I^{BR} < W_I^{OBO}$.*

Proof. This is a direct result of Proposition 3. □

When there is a common-value component in the inventory cost, that is, when $c_1 > 0$, market participants bid conservatively in equilibrium due to concerns about the winner’s curse problem. This strategic behavior leads to more profit for market participants but ultimately harms investor welfare. The severity of this effect is greater when market participants’ information is more precious, as confirmed by the following result:

$$\frac{\partial^2 W_I^{BR}}{\partial c_1 \partial p_0} = -\frac{2(1-p_0)}{N(1+N)} < 0.$$

When the parameter of the common-value component c_1 increases, the investor’s welfare will decrease. The above result shows that this effect is more severe when the precision p_0 is higher. Note that our order-by-order auction model is equivalent to the broker’s routing model when $p_0 = 1$, this implies that when c_1 is higher, investor’s welfare is more likely to be lower under order-by-order auctions, which is our prediction in Proposition 3.

A direct result from Proposition 3 is that switching to order-by-order auctions has heterogeneous impacts on stocks with different inventory cost structures. Compared to small, illiquid stocks, large, liquid stocks usually can be executed by the market makers and thus rely less on the interdealer market.³ As a result, $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$ will be relatively larger for large liquid stocks and the smaller stock is more likely to breach the threshold $\frac{2(1-p_0)}{N(N-3)}$. Order-by-order auctions are therefore more likely to harm investor welfare in small illiquid stocks compared to large liquid stocks.

We do not directly model the endogenous entry of market makers, but our model gives implications for how market competition and liquidity provision change welfare outcomes in partial equilibrium analysis. Proposition 3 implies that when the number of market makers N is small, the investor’s welfare is likely lower upon switching to order-by-order auctions. Here N measures the number of active market makers who provide liquidity. During time periods when market makers are not willing to provide liquidity (for example, due to market uncertainty or high inventory cost), our model predicts that switching to order-by-order auctions will be more likely to hurt investors. If investor protection is more important during market distress, our result highlights the unintended negative effect of order-by-order auctions during time periods when liquidity provision is limited.

³See a microfoundation of this intuition in the appendix.

D. *The role of institutional traders*

In the order-by-order proposal released by the SEC, the entry of institutional traders has been highlighted as a key feature of order-by-order auctions.⁴ The SEC hopes that, relative to the current broker’s routing system, order-by-order auctions will allow institutional traders to increase competition for retail trades.⁵ This hope, however, ignores the fact that institutional traders usually have superior information about asset quality compared to wholesalers (eg. Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Allowing institutional traders to compete for retail orders may increase informational asymmetry among bidders in order-by-order auctions, and lead to a less efficient equilibrium outcome. In this section, we build a model to examine this extension and show that the entry of institutional investors brings in more adverse selection, can harm market outcomes.

To extend our model to include institutional traders, we make two (minimal) changes in the baseline model. First, apart from the N wholesalers⁶ who always provide market-making service, there are $N_0 \geq 2$ institutional traders who can also provide liquidity only in order-by-order auctions. This is consistent with the market design suggested in the SEC proposal, in which institutional investors are absent in the current broker’s routing system, but can be active and provide more competition in order-by-order auctions. We assume that institutional traders $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N_0\}$ also receive i.i.d private signals y_i at time 0, which follows uniform distribution $U[-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$. The private signal y_i plays a similar role as that for wholesalers, as discussed later in the model.

Second, we consider the following (new) inventory cost structure

$$\tilde{\zeta}_i = \tilde{c}_0 + c_1 \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \sum_{j=1}^{\tilde{N}} y_j + c_2 y_i, \tag{1}$$

where \tilde{c}_0 is a random variable that can be $c_0 - \delta_c$ or $c_0 + \delta_c$ ⁷ with equal probabilities, and \tilde{N} is the number of active market makers. In broker’s routing, we only have wholesalers competing for

⁴As the SEC chairman Gary Gensler mentioned, “...individual investors don’t necessarily get the best prices that they could get if institutional investors, like pension funds, could systematically and directly compete for their orders.” Gensler (2021)

⁵A “wholesaler is often chosen by a formula that depends on past execution quality of the wholesaler, its relationship with the broker-dealer, and other factors. In addition, the bilateral nature of the wholesaler business model not only restricts contemporaneous competition among wholesalers, it also restricts opportunities for other market participants” Securities and Exchange Commission (2022).

⁶These are the market makers in our baseline model.

⁷Without loss of generality, we assume $\delta_c \geq 0$.

retail orders, so $\tilde{N} = N$; and in order-by-order auctions, both wholesalers and institutional traders can compete for retail orders, so $\tilde{N} = N + N_0$ in this case. Note that $\mathbb{E}(\tilde{c}_0) = c_0$, that is, the unconditional expectation of inventory cost remains the same in this extension.

Institutional traders have an information advantage over wholesalers. Specifically, all institutional traders can observe the realization of \tilde{c}_0 at time 0, while wholesalers only know the distribution of \tilde{c}_0 . This implies that when competing for retail orders, institutional traders can condition their bids on the realization of \tilde{c}_0 , while wholesalers can only use distributional information of \tilde{c}_0 .⁸ This information asymmetry captures the nature that institutional traders are more informed of the characteristics of assets traded, market conditions or future price movement, and can change wholesalers' behavior in equilibrium due to concern about the adverse selection problem.

We first consider the market equilibrium in the broker's routing system. Since institutional investors are absent in broker's routing, the only difference between this extension and our baseline model is the structure of inventory cost. The additional randomness in the inventory cost (1) has no impact on market equilibrium, because all wholesalers are risk neutral and thus only care about the expectation of the \tilde{c}_0 . Recall that $\mathbb{E}(\tilde{c}_0) = c_0$, which is the same as in the baseline model.

Proposition 4. *With inventory cost structure (1), under broker's routing, the equilibrium bidding strategies and welfare outcomes are the same as characterized by Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.*

The market equilibrium is unchanged under broker's routing, thus we view it as a suitable benchmark of the (new) model with institutional traders. However, the equilibrium does change under order-by-order auctions due to the entry of institutional traders. First, consider the case when $\delta_c = 0$, when institutional traders have no informational advantage compared to wholesalers. In this case, the only effect is enhanced the competition in order-by-order auctions, which is a direct result of the increased number of bidders competing for the retail order. With Proposition 1 obtained in our baseline model, to obtain the new market equilibrium, we simply replace the number of bidders N in the baseline model with $(N + N_o)$, because institutional traders are ex-ante identical to wholesalers in this special case. The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium strategies.

⁸We can also interpret $\pm\delta_c$ as private information of asset quality, and keep the inventory cost structure unchanged. This will not change our model outcomes.

Proposition 5. *When there are N_0 institutional traders and $\delta_c = 0$, under order-by-order auctions, there exists a linear symmetric equilibrium in which the spread submitted by wholesaler or institutional trader i is*

$$\tilde{s}_i(y_i) = \tilde{k}_0 + \tilde{k}_1 y_i$$

where

$$\tilde{k}_0 = c_0 + \frac{c_1}{4(N + N_0)} \left(N + N_0 - 1 + \frac{2}{N + N_0} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2(N + N_0)}$$

and

$$\tilde{k}_1 = \frac{N + N_0 - 1}{N + N_0} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N + N_0 + 2}{N + N_0} + c_2 \right).$$

We consider the total welfare \tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} , the investor's welfare \tilde{W}_I^{OBO} , and wholesalers' welfare \tilde{W}_W^{OBO} . Institutional traders' welfare \tilde{W}_{IT}^{OBO} satisfies

$$\tilde{W}_{IT}^{OBO} = \tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} - \tilde{W}_I^{OBO} - \tilde{W}_W^{OBO}.$$

Denote the total welfare, the investor's welfare, and wholesalers' welfare under broker's routing as \tilde{W}_{total}^{BR} , \tilde{W}_I^{BR} , and \tilde{W}_W^{BR} , respectively. We then compare welfare outcomes under broker's routing and order-by-order auctions in this extension.

Proposition 6. *When there are N_0 institutional traders and $\delta_c = 0$, we have the following results on welfare comparison:*

1. $\tilde{W}_{total}^{BR} < \tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO}$;
2. $\tilde{W}_W^{BR} < \tilde{W}_W^{OBO}$ if and only if $\frac{N(N+1)}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} > p_0$ and $\frac{c_2}{c_1} > -\frac{1}{N+N_0} \frac{\frac{N(N+1)}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - p_0 \frac{(N+N_0)(2-p_0)}{N}}{\frac{N(N+1)}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - p_0}$;
3. $\tilde{W}_I^{BR} < \tilde{W}_I^{OBO}$ if and only if $\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(1+N+N_0)} - \frac{p_0(2-p_0)}{N(N+1)}}{\frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{p_0(N-3)}{2(N+1)}}$.

When institutional traders provide liquidity in order-by-order auctions but have no informational advantage, the total welfare unambiguously improves when switching from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions. Since the order is always obtained by the market maker with the lowest ex-post inventory cost under order-by-order auctions and their inventory costs are not perfectly correlated, having institutional traders in order-by-order auctions always makes the order allocation

more efficient. The effect on investor's welfare is ambiguous, which is higher under order-by-order auctions if and only if $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$ is greater than a threshold

$$\frac{\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(1+N+N_0)} - \frac{p_0(2-p_0)}{N(N+1)}}{\frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{p_0(N-3)}{2(N+1)}},$$

qualitatively similar to the Proposition 3 in the baseline model. If

$$\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(1+N+N_0)} - \frac{p_0(2-p_0)}{N(N+1)} < 0, \quad (2)$$

the threshold is always negative, and the investor's welfare always improve under order-by-order auctions, irrespective of the level of $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$. Condition (2) concerns the number of new institutional traders providing liquidity under order-by-order auctions. Under the joint assumption that institutional traders have no informational advantage when they compete for retail orders (i.e., when $\delta_c = 0$) and that order-by-order auctions can attract sufficiently many institutional traders, investors will unambiguously benefit from switching to order-by-order auctions, as the benefit of efficient inventory management will dominate any decreases in competition. This is precisely the intuition motivating the SEC's proposal on order-by-order auctions, and our above results highlight the underlying assumptions required for it to hold.

After switching to order-by-order auctions, the wholesalers' welfare is increasing if and only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the number of new institutional investors N_0 has to be low enough, i.e.,

$$\frac{N(N+1)}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} > p_0.$$

Unconditionally, all wholesalers and institutional traders can obtain the order with equal probabilities. When there are sufficiently many institutional investors, the wholesalers' welfare mechanically decreases due to the competition. When there are sufficiently many new institutional traders in order-by-order auctions, the wholesalers will surely be worse off.

Second, $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$ must exceed the threshold:

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{-\frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)}{\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N}}. \quad (3)$$

Note that wholesalers' welfare unambiguously improves from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions in our baseline model. However, with the entry of institutional traders, the wholesalers' welfare increases only when

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1}$$

is sufficiently high, because the entry of new institutional traders also decreases the total welfare of all market makers (wholesalers and institutional traders). When $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$ is sufficiently high, the market makers' inventory cost will be more heterogeneous ex-post, creating more information rent for them. So the wholesalers' welfare is higher under order-by-order auctions only when $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$ is sufficiently high.

We next consider the case when institutional investors have at least some informational advantage, that is, when $\delta_c > 0$. We still focus on symmetric linear strategies where all institutional traders choose the same linear strategy and all wholesalers choose the same linear strategy. When $\delta_c > 0$, institutional traders can condition their bids on the realization of \tilde{c}_0 . Intuitively, when observing $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$, institutional traders will submit lower bids, and when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 + \delta_c$, they will submit higher bids. In contrast, wholesalers cannot condition their spreads on the realizations of \tilde{c}_0 , but just the distributional information c_0 . Wholesalers are more likely to win auctions when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 + \delta_c$ than when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$, as institutional traders will bid more aggressively in the latter case. This leads to adverse selection for wholesalers, as they are more likely to win auctions when $\tilde{c}_0 > E(\tilde{c}_0)$. A winner's curse argument implies that wholesalers will submit more conservative bids in equilibrium. When δ_c is sufficiently large, the winner's curse concern becomes so severe, such that all wholesalers will be completely out of competition for high-quality (low-cost) stocks, and can only obtain the retail order when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 + \delta_c$. Consequently, when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$, institutional traders will face no competition from wholesalers, which can reduce retail investor welfare. The following proposition formalizes this intuition:

Proposition 7. *Let $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$ and $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$ be two bidding strategies, where*

$$\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c) = \tilde{k}_0^-(\delta_c) + \tilde{k}_1^-(\delta_c) y_i$$

with

$$\tilde{k}_0^-(\delta_c) = c_0 - \delta_c + \frac{c_1}{4N_0} \left(N_o - 1 + \frac{2}{N_0} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2N_0}$$

$$\tilde{k}_1^-(\delta_c) = \frac{N_0 - 1}{N_0} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N_0 + 2}{N_0} + c_2 \right),$$

and

$$\tilde{b}^+(y; \delta_c) = \tilde{k}_0^+(\delta_c) + \tilde{k}_1^+(\delta_c) y$$

with

$$\tilde{k}_0^+(\delta_c) = c_0 + \delta_c + \frac{c_1}{4(N + N_0)} \left(N + N_0 - 1 + \frac{2}{N + N_0} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2(N + N_0)}$$

$$\tilde{k}_1^+(\delta_c) = \frac{N + N_0 - 1}{N + N_0} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N + N_0 + 2}{N + N_0} + c_2 \right).$$

When there are N_0 institutional traders, there exists a threshold $\underline{\delta} > 0$, such that when $\delta_c > \underline{\delta}$, there exists an equilibrium of order-by-order auctions in which

1. the wholesalers always choose bidding strategy $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$;
2. institutional traders choose bidding strategy $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$ when observing $c_0 + \delta_c$ and $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$ when observing $c_0 - \delta_c$.

The threshold $\underline{\delta}$ satisfies the following condition

$$\tilde{k}_0^- + \tilde{k}_1^- \frac{1}{2} < \tilde{k}_0^+ - \tilde{k}_1^+ \frac{1}{2}.$$

This implies that when the true state is $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$, the highest possible spread offered by institutional traders is still lower than the lowest possible spread offered by wholesalers, and thus wholesalers will never obtain the order in this case, irrespective of their signal realizations. When the true state is $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 + \delta_c$, wholesalers and institutional traders will choose the symmetric bidding strategy $\tilde{b}^+(y; \delta_c)$, and thus all players will obtain the order with equal probabilities in this case.

If we interpret the random variable \tilde{c}_0 as the heterogeneous quality of stocks, then in equilibrium, institutional traders compete effectively only for retail orders of high-quality stocks, while all market makers compete for orders of low-quality stocks. The market for low-quality stocks becomes more competitive due to an increase in the number of bidders, while the market for high-quality stocks may become less competitive as institutional traders are the only effective bidders. The presence of adverse selection can weaken competition and potentially harm total welfare, as our following proposition illustrates.

Proposition 8. *When there are N_0 institutional traders and $\delta_c > \underline{\delta}$, we have the following results on welfare comparison:*

1. $\tilde{W}_{total}^{BR} < \tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO}$ if and only if $N_0 > \underline{N}_0$, where \underline{N}_0 is a constant solved in appendix by (B6);
2. $\tilde{W}_W^{BR} < \tilde{W}_W^{OBO}$ if and only if $p_0 < \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1+N}{N+N_0+1}$ and $\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{-\frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)}{\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N}}$;
3. $\tilde{W}_I^{BR} < \tilde{W}_I^{OBO}$ if and only if $p_0 < \frac{1 - \frac{2}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{2}{N_0+1}}{1 - \frac{4}{N+1}}$ and $\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{2p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)}}{1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N+1} - \frac{2}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{2}{N_0+1}}$.

The comparison of total welfare between broker's routing and order-by-order auctions is complicated by the presence of adverse selection. The transition from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions results in an improvement in total welfare only when there is a sufficient number of institutional traders providing liquidity. However, the absence of wholesalers can result in a decrease in market competitiveness for high quality stocks, leading to an inefficient outcome for their trading. While low quality stocks may experience an increase in market competitiveness, this gain may not be enough to offset the welfare loss from the trading of high quality stocks. Dyhrberg et al. (2022), using SEC 605 reports, show that while total institutional trading in S&P 500 stocks exceeds retail investor volume, institutional trading volume drops off for less liquid stocks. For the least liquid tercile of US equities, they find that retail investor trading volume is four times (median) to seven times (average) as large as institutional trading volume, raising questions about whether order-by-order auctions would garner enough institutional interest to clear the thresholds set in Proposition 8.

In accordance with Proposition 6, the welfare effects on both investors and wholesalers are similar. Both parties are likely to benefit from stocks with a high $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$. As previously noted in our baseline model (and appendix), stocks with a high $\frac{c_2}{c_1}$ tend to be large and highly liquid, leading to welfare losses for small, illiquid stocks.⁹

E. Heterogeneous stocks and cross-subsidization

In our baseline model, we consider a unit order from a single stock, and the equilibrium and welfare outcomes depend on parameters (c_0, c_1, c_2) . In this section, we extend our baseline model to heterogeneous stocks with different characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) . For order-by-order auctions, this

⁹This is also in line with the concerns expressed by practitioners, who generally believe that the transition to order-by-order auctions may negatively impact small and illiquid stocks, as noted in SIFMA (2022).

extension is straightforward, as the stock characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) is publicly observable when market makers compete. Then the market equilibrium (spread, allocation, and welfare outcomes) can still be captured by our baseline model. The extension, however, is less straightforward for broker's routing. This is because broker's routing features the long-term relationship between brokers and market makers, and thus the competition among market makers happens before the order actually arrives and the order characteristics are observed. As a result, market outcomes among heterogeneous stocks under broker's routing will be less differentiated compared to that under order-by-order auctions. Our model predicts that compared to order-by-order auctions, there is less variation in equilibrium spreads among stocks under broker's routing. Based on this observation, we can also highlight a cross-subsidization effect: under broker's routing, the equilibrium spreads of high-cost stocks are relatively low (compared to that under order-by-order auctions), while the equilibrium spreads of low-cost stocks are relatively high. This cross-subsidization effect implies that switching from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions not only changes the retail investors' total welfare, but also changes the welfare distribution when retail investors have different portfolio holdings.

To capture this idea, we consider a pool of orders characterized by a joint cumulative distribution $G(c_0, c_1, c_2)$, and the realization of (c_0, c_1, c_2) is independent of all other variables in the model. For simplicity, we assume that G has full support on $(0, \infty) \times (0, \infty) \times (0, \infty)$, and is continuously differentiable everywhere. We consider a model with the following timeline:

1. At time -1, the cumulative distribution function $G(c_0, c_1, c_2)$ becomes public information, and each market maker i observes his private noisy signal w_i ;
2. At time 0, an order with characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) is drawn from distribution G , and each market maker i observes his private signal y_i . The broker then sends the order (c_0, c_1, c_2) to one market maker which is determined by the allocation mechanism;
3. At time 1, all random variables are realized and all market participants collect their payoffs.

As we discussed in the baseline model, under broker's routing, market makers compete and submit their spreads at time -1, while under order-by-order competition, they submit their spreads at time

0. We first introduce the following variables

$$\bar{c}_0 = \iiint c_0 dG(c_0, c_1, c_2) = \mathbb{E}(c_0),$$

$$\bar{c}_1 = \iiint c_1 dG(c_0, c_1, c_2) = \mathbb{E}(c_1),$$

$$\bar{c}_2 = \iiint c_2 dG(c_0, c_1, c_2) = \mathbb{E}(c_2).$$

Under order-by-order auctions, since order characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) are public, the equilibrium and welfare outcomes are the same as characterized by Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 in our baseline model.

Under broker's routing, since only distributional information G is available when market makers compete at time -1, the equilibrium strategy will only depend on the distributional information G but not the specific order characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) . The new equilibrium of broker's routing is characterized by the following Proposition.

Proposition 9. *In the extension of heterogeneous stocks, under broker's routing, there exists an equilibrium in which every market maker who observes signal w chooses to submit spread*

$$\bar{T}(w) = \bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 w$$

where

$$\bar{K}_0 = \bar{c}_0 + \frac{p_0}{4N^2} [(3 + N^2 - p_0 - Np_0) \bar{c}_1 + 2N\bar{c}_2]$$

and

$$\bar{K}_1 = \frac{N-1}{N} \left(\bar{c}_2 p_0 + \frac{2\bar{c}_1 p_0}{N} + \frac{\bar{c}_1 (N-2) p_0}{2N} + \frac{\bar{c}_1 (1-p_0) p_0}{2N} \right).$$

Since all market makers are risk neutral and the equilibrium is linear in the baseline model, we still obtain a linear equilibrium in this extension. Consider K_0 and K_1 in the baseline model as functions of (c_0, c_1, c_2) , the equilibrium strategy in this extension satisfies

$$\bar{T}(w) = \mathbb{E}(t(w)) = \mathbb{E}(K_0 + K_1 w) = \bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 w.$$

Then market makers choose an “average” bidding strategy in this extension. Note that both K_0 and K_1 are increasing functions of c_0 , c_1 and c_2 , this result implies that, compared to our baseline model results, the equilibrium spread in this extension is relatively low for stocks with high inventory cost characteristics, and high for stocks with low inventory cost characteristics.

The welfare impacts are also heterogeneous. To be specific, we consider the welfare outcomes for any specific order with characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) . The following Lemma summarizes our results.

Lemma 4. *In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 9, the investor’s welfare \bar{W}_I^{BR} , the total welfare \bar{W}_{total}^{BR} and market makers’ welfare \bar{W}_M^{BR} are*

$$\bar{W}_{heter,I}^{BR} = - \left[\bar{c}_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1 - (N-3)N\bar{c}_2}{2N(1+N)} \right],$$

$$\bar{W}_{heter,total}^{BR} = - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right),$$

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{W}_{heter,M}^{BR} &= \bar{W}_{heter,total}^{BR} - \bar{W}_{heter,I}^{BR} \\ &= (\bar{c}_0 - c_0) + \frac{p_0}{2(N+1)} [(N-1)c_2 - (N-3)\bar{c}_2] + p_0 \frac{(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1}{N(1+N)}. \end{aligned}$$

The total welfare in Lemma 4 is the same as that in the baseline model. Note that in our model, the total welfare is only determined by inventory cost but not the equilibrium spread, as the spread is just a transfer between market makers and the investor. Since the order is always obtained by the market maker with the lowest signal w_i , and introducing heterogeneity in stocks does not change allocative efficiency, we conclude that the total welfare is the same as that in the baseline model for any order (c_0, c_1, c_2) in this extension. However, the equilibrium spread does change. Specifically, now the investor’s welfare (which is the negative expected equilibrium spread) becomes

$$- \left[\bar{c}_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1 - (N-3)N\bar{c}_2}{2N(1+N)} \right]$$

which only depends on the average levels $(\bar{c}_0, \bar{c}_1, \bar{c}_2)$ but not order characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) . Note

that under order-by-order auctions, the investor's welfare is

$$- \left[c_0 + \frac{1}{N(N+1)} c_1 - \frac{N-3}{2(N+1)} c_2 \right]$$

which depends on order characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) . Then investors will be worse off after switching to order-by-order auctions if for their orders, c_0 is high, c_1 is high, or c_2 is low. This highlights our cross-subsidization effect under broker's routing that market makers charge low equilibrium spreads for high-cost stocks and high equilibrium spreads for low-cost stocks. This cross-subsidization effect also implies that switching from broker's routing to order-by-order auctions may have unintended effects on retail investors' welfare distribution. For example, investors who mainly trade small, illiquid stocks with high average inventory cost c_0 will be worse off after switching to order-by-order auctions, while those who trade large, liquid stocks with low average inventory cost c_0 will be better off.

The market maker's welfare is

$$(\bar{c}_0 - c_0) + \frac{p_0}{2(N+1)} [(N-1)c_2 - (N-3)\bar{c}_2] + p_0 \frac{(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1}{N(1+N)}$$

which depends on the difference between order characteristics (c_0, c_1, c_2) and the average levels $(\bar{c}_0, \bar{c}_1, \bar{c}_2)$. Under order-by-order auctions, the market maker welfare is

$$\frac{1}{N+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 \right)$$

which is always positive. However, under broker's routing, market makers make more profit from stocks with relatively low inventory cost, and incur loss from stocks with high average inventory cost, and the welfare (or net profit) from executing a specific order may be negative. This is consistent with our observation that under the current broker's routing system, market makers sometimes lose by providing liquidity for small, illiquid stocks but they can make a profit from executing large liquid stocks. On average, they can make positive expected profit from market making. Our result implies that, after switching to order-by-order auctions, market makers will only submit spreads that are high enough such that they can earn a positive expected profit on every individual order.

IV. Retail Liquidity Programs

While order-by-order auctions are only a proposal, the exchanges currently run retail liquidity programs which serve a similar function. Allison Bishop, founder of proof trading, notes “Exchanges already have ways for retail orders to be identified and treated specially by market makers, called retail liquidity programs (RLPs)... [which] can deliver a similar benefit to retail investors through order-by-order competition among market makers and institutional investors.” Bishop (2022) Given the comparisons drawn by industry participants between the auctions and existing RLPs, we empirically investigate the RLPs and how they inform proposed auctions.

In approving RLPs, the SEC itself has frequently highlighted the same features that it has highlighted for proposing order-by-order competition, namely to increase the number of market participants interacting with retail orders. These RLP limit orders are only accessible to incoming market orders from retail investors, preserving the segmentation of retail investors, and also have entirely voluntary participation: market makers may chose to stop bidding for incoming orders at any time. Furthering the economic parallel, both the RLPs and proposed auctions would function as sealed-bid first-price auctions.¹⁰

Several exchanges have developed retail liquidity programs (RLP). These programs enable market makers to enter hidden limit orders which improve on the NBBO but are only accessible to retail market orders. While the orders are hidden, if there is more than one round lot of interest at a price which improves the NBBO, the exchange will disseminate an indicative flag highlighting that there is a resting limit order, but it will not indicate the price or size of the order. We analyze RLPs as a way to gain insight into how the order-by-order system would function, and identify similarities, as well as key differences, between the existing RLPs and the proposed auctions.

A. Program Details

NYSE was the first to operate a RLP, on August 1, 2012.¹¹ The NYSE RLP was initially approved as a pilot and given several temporary pilot extensions until permanent approval on

¹⁰Existing RLPs are a continuous double auction, with incoming retail market order matching against the best-priced limit order (first-price) and all bids hidden (sealed), though an indicator for 100 shares of interest is disseminated. The order-by-order auctions are proposed as sealed-bid first-price auctions.

¹¹The introduction of the data field for the RLP led to the \$400 million trading glitch at Knight Capital Group on the first day that the new data field was active.

February 15, 2019. Any NYSE member can submit a Retail Price Improvement Order (RPI). An RPI order can be submitted in \$0.001 increments, and must improve the best bid or offer on the NYSE or NYSE Arca book by at least \$0.001. The size and exact price of resting RPI orders are non-displayed, but the orders do trigger indicative messages on the SIP and NYSE proprietary data feeds indicating whether there is any RPI interest at the ask, any RPI interest at the bid, or any RPI interest at both. Incoming marketable retail orders can trade against resting RPI orders. Incoming retail orders will first trade against the best-priced orders; if there is a non-displayed order which is not RPI at the mid-quote, the retail order would trade against the mid-quote interest before trading against any RPI orders priced between the mid-point and near side. Retail marketable orders can be set to only trade against RPI and non-displayed orders, or to trade against any RPI and non-displayed orders and then subsequently against the displayed best quotes up to the limit price.

The NYSE Retail Liquidity Program charges no trading fee to qualifying retail market orders. The NYSE RLP program also pays \$0.0003 credit to a Retail Liquidity Provider whenever their RPI limit order fills a retail market order. To qualify as a Retail Liquidity Provider on the NYSE, a firm must maintain a resting RPI order which improves the best bid or offer for at least 5% of the trading day.

This 5% rule distinguishes the NYSE Retail Liquidity Program from those offered by NASDAQ and BATS, with both competing programs being developed shortly after the NYSE program. The BATS program was approved as a pilot on November 27, 2012, while the NASDAQ program was approved as a pilot on February 15, 2013. Both programs have no requirement to provide liquidity for a certain percentage of the trading day, and are therefore potentially more accessible to non-market-making firms. In approving the NASDAQ RLP, the SEC notes that "the Program might also create a desirable opportunity for institutional investors to interact with retail order flow that they are not able to reach currently. Today, institutional investors often do not have the chance to interact with marketable retail orders that are executed pursuant to internalization arrangements. Thus, by submitting RPI Orders, institutional investors may be able to reduce their possible adverse selection costs by interacting with retail order flow" SEC (2013). The SEC identifies the same desirable feature, that of more potential counter parties for retail trades, that are highlighted in a potential move to order-by-order competition.

The Investors Exchange (IEX) offers a retail liquidity program whereby retail liquidity providers can enter hidden mid-point peg limit orders which are only available to retail market orders. All mid-point peg orders enter the same time priority queue, whether or not they are only available to retail investors, and both have queue priority over the IEX D-limit order, which is the discretionary limit order which takes advantage of the IEX speed bump to reprice when it detects a crumbling quote. The IEX RLP only takes mid-point orders, and disseminates a RLP indicative flag when there is at least one round lot of RLP interest. All eligible retail orders have no trading fees, either for the retail broker or the retail liquidity provider.

The IEX RLP is the most recent program, first offering the RLP trading functionality on October 1, 2019. IEX initially had no RLP indicators, but added indicators on October 13, 2021. Unlike other retail liquidity programs, the IEX program only allows mid-quote prices. Therefore, while the size available is hidden, an advertised RLP indicator from IEX confirms that at least 100 shares are available at the specific price of the mid-quote. To offer RLP indicators, the program required an approved exemption from SEC Rule 242.602, as the RPI would indicate a specific price and a minimum quantity of shares, but would not be accessible to non-retail marketable orders.

The Members Exchange MEMX applied to create an RLP program, but was denied by the SEC on February 14, 2022. The MEMX proposal differed from previous proposals in the determination of price-time priority. Under the MEMX proposal, incoming retail market orders first interact with hidden RPI orders before interacting with hidden non-RPI orders, even if the hidden non-RPI are at the same price level and have time priority. MEMX argued that because hidden RPI orders do contribute to the dissemination of the RPI interest indicator, they should have priority over hidden non-RPI orders at each price level, analogous to standard practice of non-hidden orders having priority over hidden orders at each price level. The SEC disagreed, and ruled that the change in priority would violate Section (6)(b)(5) and Section 11A of the Exchange Act.¹²

¹²Ironically, in the Order-by-Order proposal from the SEC, auctions must give auction responses higher priority than hidden limit orders (Securities and Exchange Commission (2022), Proposed Rule 615 Section IV C.5.) In other words, MEMX's RLP application was denied because it proposed giving resting RPI orders priority over hidden resting limit orders, but auctions would be *required* to give auction responses priority over hidden resting limit orders.

B. Data and Summary Statistics


We obtain NYSE TAQ (Trade and Quote) data from January 1, 2019 to May 30, 2022. We examine all securities in the Russell 3000 index, as well as the 100 most frequently traded ETFs, provided these securities are priced above \$1 per share. To exclude fractional shares, as documented by Bartlett, McCrary, and O’Hara (2022), we exclude any orders for exactly 1 share, as these may be orders for a fractional share which rounds up to 1 share.

Retail Liquidity Program (RLP) Indicators are distributed through the SIP, and are available in TAQ Data. As indicators may be disseminated even when an exchange’s visible posted best bid or offer (BBO) is not at the official NBBO, we obtain retail indicator flags from the TAQ Quotes file. For each trade occurring at an exchange with an RLP, we check whether the trade occurred with an active RPI Flag by matching the RLP quotes for that exchange using the participant timestamp. We also construct an indicator for whether any RLP from the five different programs is active at any point in time, and match this to both on-exchange and off-exchange trades using the participant timestamps.

Retail Liquidity Programs have indicative interest for a large portion of the trading day. Figure 1 plots the percentage of time, by asset, that there is at least one-sided RPI interest. ETFs often have resting RPI orders for 50 to 75% of the trading day. For stocks of the Russell 1000, NYSE, CBOE, and NASDAQ have resting RPI orders for over 20% of the day. For stocks of the Russell 2000, both CBOE and NASDAQ have resting RPI orders for over 20% of the day. While some of the differences in RPI shares across assets may come from the different rules, as outlined in section V.A, there is also a considerable listing-exchange advantage. NYSE Arca’s retail liquidity program, for example, has RPI interest for less than 20% of the trading day for Russell 1000 or Russell 2000 stocks, but has RPI interest for over 75% of the trading day for ETFs in our sample.

While the percentage of the trading day with RPI interest is considerable, the volumes executed through RPI programs are diminutive. Figure 2 depicts the trading volume split of trades when the exchange’s RPI Flag is active, and the trading volume split when it is not. Sub-penny executions are less than 1% of total trading volume at exchanges, even when the RPI Flag is active. On-exchange mid-quote trading volume is considerably higher when the RPI Flag is active, but still represents less than 5% of total trading volume. Furthermore, this mid-quote volume is a mixture of both

Figure 1. Time Share of Retail Liquidity Programs. We plot the average time that an RPI indicator is active, measured as percentage of time active out of the total trading day. Our sample can be divided into three groups: stocks in the Russell 1000 index, stocks in the Russell 2000 index, and ETFs from our sample. We provide a fourth (overlapping) group, “Tick Constrained”, comprised of any stock or ETF which meets the criteria of having a quoted bid-ask spread of one penny at least 50% of the day for at least one-third of the days of our sample.



retail interest, including from the IEX RLP which only allows retail RPI orders to be priced at mid-quote, and non-RLP program hidden mid-quote liquidity. The vast majority of mid-quote and sub-penny trading occurs off-exchange. When RPI Flags are active, a larger share of off-exchange volume occurs at sub-penny or mid-quote prices. Table I presents the exact total volumes in our sample executed when RPI programs are active, and when they are not. Note that exchange sub-penny volume when there is no RPI Flag is small but non-zero, which arise when there is an odd-lot limit order in the RLP program.¹³

There is a considerable discrepancy between the share of time that retail liquidity programs have RPL flags active, and the share of trading volume which executes in RLP. Figure 3 highlights that RPI interest is much lower in the morning, and increases throughout the day for most RLP programs. Across each time interval, the IEX RLP is active for a notably smaller percentage of time relative to any competing RLPs, as the IEX RLP requires orders to be placed at mid-quote, while

¹³When there is odd-lot limit order interest, the RLP flag will not be disseminated (as there are less than 100 shares of interest) but retail market orders can still execute against this odd-lot volume. Another possible explanation for this discrepancy is inaccuracy in the timestamp-based matching of the sort described by Schwenk-Nebbe (2021), who show that the exchange processing and dissemination of quotes is typically several microseconds faster than that of trades.

Table I: Summary Volumes By Each Price Increment. This table presents summary total trading volume (in billions of dollars) in our sample for each sub-penny category of trade: at-quote, mid-quote, and sub-penny. Panel A of Figure presents volume for exchange trades. We define an RPI Flag as active if there is contemporaneous RLP interest at the exchange where trade occurs. Panel B presents the volume for off-exchange trades. Note that Panel B is off-exchange trades only, and we define the RPI Flag as active if there is contemporaneous RLP interest at any exchange with an RLP program.

Our sample can be divided into three asset groups: stocks in the Russell 1000 index, stocks in the Russell 2000 index, and ETFs from our sample. We provide a fourth (overlapping) asset group, “Tick Constrained”, comprised of any stock or ETF which meets the criteria of having a quoted bid-ask spread of one penny at least 50% of the the day for at least one-third of the days of our sample.


Panel A: Exchange Trades

Asset Class	RLP Flag	Volume			Percent		
		Mid-quote	At Quote	Sub-penny	Mid-quote	At Quote	Sub-penny
ETF	Active	2259	35868	414	3.2	51	0.6
ETF	None	317	9160	55	0.5	13	0.1
Russell_1000	Active	3162	60890	235	1.7	32	0.1
Russell_1000	None	1933	50111	99	1.0	27	0.1
Russell_2000	Active	283	5376	13	1.5	28	0.1
Russell_2000	None	306	6012	2.6	1.6	31	0.01
TickConstrained	Active	2767	40510	400	3.3	48	0.5
TickConstrained	None	676	12773	67	0.8	15	0.1

Panel B: Off-Exchange Trades

Asset Class	RLP Flag	Volume			Percent		
		Mid-quote	At Quote	Sub-penny	Mid-quote	At Quote	Sub-penny
ETF	Active	3626	9070	5751	5.2	13	8.2
ETF	None	537	1909	1134	0.8	2.7	1.6
Russell_1000	Active	8638	20795	10127	4.6	11	5.4
Russell_1000	None	5895	16953	8756	3.1	9.0	4.7
Russell_2000	Active	743	2161	822	3.8	11	4.2
Russell_2000	None	723	2107	833	3.7	11	4.3
TickConstrained	Active	4740	9643	6456	5.6	12	7.7
TickConstrained	None	1257	3079	1869	1.5	3.7	2.2


Figure 2. Volume Share of Venues. We plot the percentage of volume which executes either at the quote, at the mid-quote, or at a sub-penny price for both on-exchange and off-exchange venues. On both types of venues, a higher percentage of volume occurs at the quote when there is no RPI Flag active, and a higher share of volume executes at sub-penny and mid-quote prices when the RPI Flag is active.



competitor programs only require a minimum of 10 mils of improvement relative to the NBBO. The RLP flags also display no indication of the size available, with the flag only indicating whether there is at least one round lot.

The total volume share of Retail Liquidity Programs is stable during our sample period. As Panel A of Figure 4 depicts, on-exchange sub-penny retail trades average below 0.2% of total

Figure 3. Intra-day Time Share. We plot the average share of time that the RPI Flag is active throughout the trading day on January 3, 2022. For each exchange, we divide the trading day into 30-minute intervals and calculate the average across stocks of the percentage of time for which the RPI Flag is active. One-sided liquidity is the percentage of time for which there is a quote on either the bid, the ask, or both, and therefore includes the time for which there is two-sided liquidity (i.e., a flag indicating RPI interest on both the bid and ask at the same time).




volume for the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 stocks in our sample. The volume share of ETFs and tick-constrained stocks is slightly higher, fluctuating between 0.2% to 0.5% of total trading volume. We define a stock as tick-constrained if it has a one penny bid-ask spread for at least 50% of the trading day for at least one-third of the trading days in our sample. For these stocks, competition for a marketable order is potentially larger due to the tick constraint, with increased


interest in providing liquidity in an RLP. In Panel B of Figure 4, we plot the volume of any exchange sub-penny or mid-quote executions while the RPI Flag is active. This will include some non-retail hidden liquidity, as well as retail trading at mid-quote, which is crucial as the IEX RLP only allows pricing retail price improvement at mid-quote. For ETFs and tick-constrained stocks, exchange sub-penny and mid-quote volume when the RPI Flag is active is around 0.5% to 1.0% of trading volume. While this is a small share of total trading volume, it represents a much larger fraction of retail-only trading volume.

Figure 4. Volume Share of Sub-penny Retail Liquidity Programs. For each day, we plot the share of volume which executes in a retail liquidity program, out of total volume. Our sample can be divided into three groups: stocks in the Russell 1000 index, stocks in the Russell 2000 index, and ETFs from our sample. We provide a fourth (overlapping) group, “Tick Constrained”, comprised of any stock or ETF which meets the criteria of having a quoted bid-ask spread of one penny at least 50% of the day for at least one-third of the days of our sample. Panel A presents the volume share of only exchange sub-penny executions while a RLP indicator is active, while Panel B presents the volume share of all exchange sub-penny or mid-quote executions while a RLP indicator is active.

Panel A: Volume Share for Exchange Sub-penny (Non-Midquote) Executions with an RPI Flag Active



Panel B: Volume Share for Exchange Sub-penny or Mid-quote Executions with an RPI Flag Active



C. RLP Program Usage and Market Conditions

Our model highlights a welfare gains or losses of order-by-order auctions compared to broker’s routing hinges on the number of bidders as well as the stock-specific characteristics. While predictions about the order-by-order auctions are inherently speculative, we examine the closely analogous existing RLPs and the extent to which current RLP usage is, or is not, predictive of the proposed order-by-order auctions.

The current structure of exchange retail liquidity programs has this same at-will feature of liquidity provision, with liquidity-providing participants in the program under no obligation to guarantee execution of retail trades.¹⁴ Consequently, exchange retail programs offer insight into the potential workings of an order-by-order model, where market makers are under no obligation to participate for all orders. While many market makers may wish to provide liquidity for orders in large stocks during periods of low volatility, our model suggests this does not hold true for smaller or less liquid stocks. Motivated by this reasoning, we estimate the following regression.

REGRESSION 1: *For each asset i :*

$$\begin{aligned} RPI_Volume_Share_i = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Percent_Time_At_Minimum_Spread_i + \alpha_2 Market_Cap_i \\ & + \alpha_3 Average_Volume_i + \epsilon_{ijkt} \end{aligned}$$

Results of Regression 1 are presented in Table II. We estimate volume as a percentage of total volume, and as a percentage of total sub-penny volume. Exchange RLP volume is considerably larger when assets spend a larger percentage of the day at the minimum bid-ask spread, is considerably larger for larger market-cap stocks, and is considerably larger for stocks with higher average trading volume. Proposition 3 highlights that small, less liquid stocks would struggle in the order-by-order auction format, and consistent with that, RLP volumes are considerably lower for these stocks.

Retail investors placing market orders may arrive at any time in the day, including during periods of stress. Even under the generous assumption that their orders are uncorrelated with aggregate institutional order flow, half their order flow would be in the same direction as aggregate

¹⁴We note that the NYSE RLP does have a requirement that retail liquidity providers provide price-improving RPI limit orders for at least 5% of the trading day on a certain fraction of trading days to qualify for superior trading fee / rebate pricing. As Figure 1 makes clear, this threshold is low compared to the percentage of time that RPI orders are active.

Table II: Cross-Sectional Variation in Volume Shares. This table estimates Regression 1 with sub-penny volume, measured as a percentage of all volume, and as a percentage of sub-penny priced volume. For stock i on date t , *Percent Time At Minimum Spread* $_{it}$ measures the percentage of the trading day with a quoted bid-ask spread of one penny, *Volatility* $_{it}$ measures the standard deviation of 15-minute returns, *Market Cap* measures the market capitalization of the stock in billions, and *Average Volume* measures the average trading volume in billions. Observations are at the stock (or ETF) level for the sample of securities described in Section VB.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percentage of All Volume (1)	Percentage of Only Sub-penny Volume (2)
Market Cap	0.120*** (0.035)	0.926** (0.417)
Percent Time at Minimum Spread	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.013*** (0.001)
Average Volume	0.041*** (0.004)	0.380*** (0.042)
Constant	0.058*** (0.002)	0.931*** (0.030)
Observations	2,590	2,590
R ²	0.159	0.108
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

institutional order flow. To investigate the relationship between retail liquidity program volume and price movements, we estimate Regression 2 with volume and price impacts, with fixed effects for each stock and date, and present the results in Table III. We directly compare on-exchange sub-penny trades with off-exchange sub-penny trades, as these off-exchange trades are the closest analogue to on-exchange trades. Barardehi, Bernhardt, Da, and Warachka (2022) document, however, that sub-penny trading may be driven not by the activity of retail investors, but the extent to which better improvement opportunities (such as mid-quote trading) are not available.

REGRESSION 2: *For each asset i on date t :*

$$\begin{aligned} VolumeShare_{it} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Percent_Time_At_Minimum_Spread_{it} + \alpha_2 Volatility_{it} \\ & + \alpha_3 Average_Volume_i + \alpha_4 Absolute_Intraday_Return_{it} + X + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Retail liquidity programs offer less price improvement on average than off-exchange wholesalers offer. Across our sample, the average sub-penny improvement received in RLP programs averages 11 hundredths of a cent. Across sub-penny off-exchange trades, the average sub-penny price improvement is 19 hundredths of a cent, though some of these trades may not be retail. Using SEC Rule 605 reports, Dyhrberg et al. (2022) estimate for retail trades in S&P 500 stocks, wholesalers offer, on average, 27% of the quoted half-spread as price improvement.¹⁵ Under the pecking-order theory of Menkveld et al. (2017), investors target low-cost-low-immediacy venues first, and if they fail to find liquidity, they access higher-cost-higher-immediacy venues, particularly at times of market stress or volatility. Consistent with this prediction, we find that on-exchange trading in RLP programs is very sensitive to intra-day volatility, with larger volatility being associated with more exchange sub-penny trading. For off-exchange trading, the opposite is true, with larger volatility associated with less off-exchange sub-penny trading.

While the average price improvement given by RLP programs is less than the average improvement given by wholesalers or the average price improvement received by retail investors¹⁶. Routing to an RLP is voluntary, unlike the order-by-order auctions. While RLP programs currently reflect a high-

¹⁵Within RLP trades, we estimate sub-penny improvement at 11.0 hundredths of a cent across all trades, and 10.8 hundredths of a cent among S&P 500 trades. Given that around 80% of RLP volume occurs in S&P 500 stocks, the 27% of the quoted half-spread is the more appropriate benchmark.

¹⁶Schwarz et al. (2022) estimate retail investors receive an average of 33% of the bid-ask spread

cost trading venue in the pecking order (where “cost” reflects the low level of price improvement given), this position may change if routing to the auction becomes mandatory.

Table III: Panel Variation in Volume and Price Impact. This table estimates Regression 2 with sub-penny volume, expressed as a percentage of total trading volume, and price impact, measured in basis points 30 seconds after trade. Observations are at the stock-day level. Volatility measures the standard deviation of 15-minute price changes. Percent time at Minimum Spread measures the percentage of time the stock spread is a single tick, while absolute intraday return measures the absolute value of the intraday return. We include a fixed effect for each stock and date, and cluster standard errors by stock and by date. Note that Price Impact cannot be calculated when there is zero volume, thus Columns 4, 5, and 6 differ in the number of stock-days with zero volume in each category.


	Dependent Variable:						
	<i>Volume</i>			<i>Price Impact</i>			
	Venue: RPI Active:	Exchange TRUE (1)	Off TRUE (2)	Off FALSE (3)	Exchange TRUE (4)	Off TRUE (5)	Off FALSE (6)
Percent Time At Minimum Spread		0.001 (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.021 (0.021)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.072* (0.037)
Volatility		6.592*** (0.510)	-2.464*** (0.261)	-4.128*** (0.471)	9.520** (4.582)	2.281*** (0.381)	1.221 (0.745)
Absolute Intraday Return		1.324*** (0.041)	-0.819*** (0.034)	-0.505*** (0.032)	-0.650 (0.662)	0.251 (0.306)	-0.162 (0.127)
Observations		1,965,888	1,965,888	1,965,888	682,727	1,771,969	1,885,905
R ²		0.417	0.248	0.380	0.013	0.002	0.003
Residual Std. Error		38.068	27.755	31.363	392.416	403.481	438.930

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

While the Retail Liquidity Programs are the only way that on-exchange trades can be priced in sub-penny increments, retail trades can trade in a variety of methods, with Barber, Huang, Jorion, Odean, and Schwarz (2022) estimating that less than 35% of retail trading takes place at sub-penny prices. Figure 5 depicts the distribution of order sizes for on-exchange and off-exchange sub-penny orders, as a fraction of the NBBO. While a large fraction of sub-penny trades in both venues are odd-lot trades, a far larger share of off-exchange sub-penny trades are for a quantity of shares larger than available at the best bid or offer. Over 2.1% of off-exchange sub-penny trades are for more than 5 times the available shares than the respective national best bid or offer, while only 0.7% of

on-exchange sub-penny are for larger than the respective national best bid or offer.

Figure 5. Size Distribution. We plot the distribution of order sizes, as a percentage of the NBBO, for all sub-penny trades occurring in the stocks of our sample on January 3, 2022. We truncate the distribution of orders at 5 times the NBBO. Of all sub-penny trades, 2.1% of all off-exchange sub-penny trades are larger than five times the NBBO, while 0.7% of on-exchange sub-penny trades are larger than five times the NBBO.




In the economic analysis for the proposed Order-by-Order Competition Rule, the SEC argues that orders with lower price impact are equivalent to lower adverse selection risk: “Marketable orders internalized by wholesalers feature lower price impacts, i.e., have lower adverse selection risk.” Securities and Exchange Commission (2022) As one measure of adverse selection, we explore the pattern of order imbalances for on-exchange RLP trades and off-exchange sub-penny trades, depicted in Figure 6. When the retail flag is active, order imbalances are tightly clustered around a near-zero imbalance, with as many buys arriving as sells. When the retail flag is not active, order imbalances have a distribution with a much larger variance, with a much greater likelihood of large positive or negative order imbalances. This is consistent with the entirely discretionary nature of the RLPs. The SEC views the opportunity for “institutional investors to interact with retail flow” as desirable¹⁷, but it is important to note that institutional investors may be eager to buy from retail investors at times, or sell to retail investors at times, but unlikely to want to stand ready to buy or sell to retail investors at any time on demand. Proposition 3 of our model highlights that

¹⁷See SEC (2013).

when auctions have few participants, retail welfare is lower under auctions than the current system of broker's routing.

Figure 6. Distribution of Order Imbalances. For each stock-day observation, we calculate the total order imbalance among trades occurring when the RPI Flag is active, and the total order imbalance among trades occurring when the RPI Flag is not active. For stock i on date t with flag j , imbalance is calculated as $Imbalance_{ijt} = \frac{\sum Buy_{ijt} - \sum Sell_{ijt}}{\sum Buy_{ijt} + \sum Sell_{ijt}}$. We plot the distribution of imbalances, with the tails truncated to an imbalance of $\pm 50\%$. Panel A presents the imbalance distribution for ETFs, Panel B for stocks in the Russell 1000 Index, Panel C for stocks of the Russell 2000 Index, and Panel D for stocks and ETFs which are tick-constrained, defined as having at a one-penny bid-ask spread least 50% of the trading day for at least one-third of the trading days in our sample.




We also investigate the interaction between RLP trading volume and prior or subsequent quoted


bid-ask spreads, both when the RPI Flag is active and inactive. Figure 7 presents the ratio of quoted spreads before and after trades. We first divide trading volume into on-exchange and off-exchange trades, and then further divide volume into sub-penny, mid-quote, and at-quote bins. For each individual stock, we observe the quoted bid-ask spread q_{t+i} , where i can be ± 30 seconds, ± 3 milliseconds, or ± 1 milliseconds. We then calculate the average spread \bar{q}_{t+i} separately for when the RPI Flag is or is not active, and plot the ratio $\frac{\bar{q}_i}{\bar{q}}$. When the retail flag is active, off-exchange spreads are very stable, with the same bid-ask spread before and after a trade. When the retail flag is not active, off-exchange spreads before and after a trade tend to be around 2 to 4% wider on average, for all categories of pricing. The large discrepancy in quoted spread ratios before and after a trade provides additional suggestive evidence for the pecking order of Menkveld et al. (2017). The discrepancy in spread ratios around the timing of on-exchange mid-quote and sub-penny trades occur at a momentarily liquid time, when quoted spreads are narrow. In contrast with on-exchange trading, the off-exchange trading spread ratios are far more consistent, with the quoted spread width at the time of trades being very similar to the quoted spread width before or after the trade.

Figure 7. Spread Ratios Around Trades. We plot the change in spreads around the timing of a trade, separately for trades occurring when the RPI Flag is active, and trades occurring when it is not active. For trades occurring at time t , we calculate the quoted spread q_t as well as the quoted spread q_{t+i} occurring at a time-offset of i . We then calculate the mean quoted spreads \bar{q} and \bar{q}_{+i} , and plot their ratio $r = \frac{\bar{q}_i}{\bar{q}}$. We consider time offsets of 30 seconds prior to trade, 3 milliseconds prior to trade, 1 millisecond prior to trade, 1 millisecond after trade, 3 milliseconds after trade, and 30 seconds after trade.

Panel A: Spread Ratio For Exchange Trades



Panel B: Spread Ratio For Off-Exchange Trades



D. SEC Proposal And Current RLP Usage

Proposition 8 of our model highlights that if order-by-order auctions fail to attract sufficient volume, retail welfare will be worse under order-by-order auctions. As a result, the estimates of institutional interest in trading with retail investors in a sealed-bid auction setting are highly consequential in evaluating the SEC proposal. The SEC’s economic analysis of the Proposed Rule 615 suggests that under the new auction format, institutional traders would give retail investors better trade prices.¹⁸ While the SEC’s analysis uses CAT data, the IEX RLP offers an alternative method for estimation of the interest of institutions in trading with retail at mid-quote. The IEX RLP allows market participants to post limit orders priced at the mid-quote which are only available to retail investors.

Figure 3 shows that the IEX RLP has, on average, any RLP interest less than 20% of the trading day. Furthermore, the IEX RLP has two-sided interest less than 5% of the trading day. Based on the SEC CAT estimates of non-displayed hidden mid-quote liquidity, there must be a large fraction of institutional traders who desire trading at midpoint, but do not currently post in the IEX RLP program. This raises a question: why do these institutions not use the IEX RLP, and what does that suggest for their interest in using order-by-order auctions?

One natural possibility is that the institutional traders posting hidden mid-quote liquidity are not seeking to trade with retail investors, particularly as individual retail orders are often small. Another possibility is that institutional traders have concerns over information leakage, but historical variations in the IEX RLP allow us to further investigate this possibility, as changed the rules around the dissemination of an indicator for hidden interest.

Figure 8 plots mid-quote trading volume at IEX; total hidden mid-quote orders at IEX (both RLP-only and traditional hidden orders) comprise around 1% to 1.5% of total U.S. equity trading volume, with no obvious change in this volume around the time the IEX RLP is created on October 1, 2019. The IEX RLP began distributing an indicator message when RLP volume is available on October 13, 2021. We note that of the mid-quote volume occurring at IEX, the share of mid-

¹⁸The SEC reports that “On average, 51% of the shares of individual investor marketable orders internalized by wholesalers are executed at prices less favorable than the NBBO midpoint (Wholesaler Pct Exec Shares Worse Than Midpoint). Out of these individual investors shares that were executed at prices less favorable than the midpoint, on average, 75% of these shares could have hypothetically executed at a better price against the non-displayed liquidity resting at the NBBO midpoint on exchanges and NMS Stock ATs.” Securities and Exchange Commission (2022)

quote orders which are retail orders trading with RLP liquidity is only around 0.05% to 0.10% of total U.S. equities trading volume.¹⁹ Total mid-quote volume does not appreciably change in the month following the introduction of the IEX RLP indicator, which suggests concerns over information leakage from the RLP indicator alone are not the primary determinant in posting RLP limit orders.

Order-by-order auctions would also differ in the nature of their post-trade transparency. Current mid-quote liquidity offers no indication of trade direction: a mid-quote trade between an institutional investor and retail investor would not indicate which party was the buyer. In the proposed order-by-order auctions, the retail investor trade direction, and by extension any auction counter-party's trade direction, would be revealed. Analogously, RLPs can reveal direction if the RLP is one-sided, or if the retail market order consumes all liquidity in the RLP, resulting in the dissemination of a new RLP indicator.²⁰ As Figure 8 highlights, total mid-quote volume is over 10 times higher than RLP mid-quote volume, which may, in part, reflect concerns from institutional investors over post-trade transparency.

Another possibility for the low usage of the IEX RLP is that posting in the IEX RLP does not facilitate trading with retail at mid-quote. We investigate this claim by looking at the distribution of trade prices as a function of the IEX RLP status. Figure 9 presents the pattern of trade prices as a function of the IEX RLP status. When the IEX RLP has two-sided liquidity (that is, interest in both buying from retail or selling to retail at the mid-quote), trading at mid-quote, whether by retail or non-retail participants, comprises over 50% of all trading volume. There is also no volume at other exchange RLPs, consistent with the IEX's superior price. There are some off-exchange trades at mid-quote when the IEX RLP has two-sided liquidity, though Battalio, Jennings, Saglam, and Wu (2022) document that many sub-penny trades are non-retail.

To further investigate usage of the IEX RLP, we obtain a sample of trades for a large retail

¹⁹From the TAQ data, it is impossible to determine the exact portion of orders that are retail orders in the IEX RLP program, but we can estimate an upper and lower bound. For the upper bound, we count all mid-quote orders which occur when the IEX retail flag is active, though some of this volume may include non-retail mid-quote orders interacting with hidden mid-quote liquidity. For the lower bound, we measure mid-quote volume which has a simultaneous message update for the RLP program; this measures only retail orders which consume the available RLP liquidity (necessitating an updated RLP message), but will miss retail orders which do not consume all available RLP liquidity and therefore send no update message.

²⁰For example, if there is two-sided RLP liquidity, but there is a message of a mid-quote trade and a simultaneous message that the RLP liquidity is only on the bid side, market participants could infer that there was a retail order to sell. A standard hidden mid-quote order (not an RLP limit order) would avoid this information leakage.

brokerage. Our sample covers all retail orders for 100 shares or less on three days (March 13, 14, and 16) in a set of liquid symbols.²¹ Figure 10 plots the cumulative distribution function of price improvement (measured as a percentage of the quoted bid-ask spread) of orders. A price improvement of 50% would correspond to execution at the NBBO mid-quote. When the IEX RLP is active, retail investors receive more price improvement: 75% of orders receive mid-quote or better when the flag is active, compared to 60% of orders when the flag is not active.

The share of retail orders receiving mid-quote when the IEX RLP is active is less than 100%. One potential explanation is the IEX speed-bump: we match the IEX RLP's participant timestamp with the broker's execution timestamp. We do not have access to the market view of the wholesaler at the time the order was routed, nor can we measure the average fill rate for orders routed to the IEX RLP. A second potential explanation is that not all wholesalers connect to, or route to, the IEX RLP. While the IEX RLP flag indicates at least 100 shares are available at mid-quote, it is only available for a very short period of the trading day. Furthermore, we note that while retail orders are sometimes filled at a price worse than mid-quote when the IEX RLP is active, retail orders are also sometimes filled at prices *better* than mid-quote, even when the IEX RLP is not active.

When the IEX RLP interest is one-sided and the same direction as retail investor trade, we find that retail investors receive less price improvement.²² When the IEX RLP interest is same-direction, retail investors obtain 5% less price improvement than when the IEX RLP has no interest at all. Proposition 6 in our model highlights that institutional traders can decrease retail investor welfare, as the presence of institutional traders can increase adverse selection, and lead wholesalers to bid more cautiously. While routing to the IEX RLP is voluntary, wholesalers currently appear to provide less price improvement when the IEX RLP has same-direction interest, and no matching interest, to a retail investor order, consistent with our model intuition.

²¹The symbols are: AAPL, AMZN, CRDO, DIA, GOOG, IVV, IWM, JPM, MU, PPG, QQQ, SGH, SPY, V, VICR, and VOO.

²²For example, interest on the ask side in the IEX RLP, and not the bid, when there is a retail sell order, or interest on the bid side in the IEX RLP, and not the ask, when there is a retail buy order. Note that 'bid' and 'ask' refer to the limit order interest in buying or selling, and the price in the IEX RLP is always the NBBO mid-quote.

Figure 8. IEX Midquote Volume and Key RLP Rule Changes. The IEX Retail Liquidity Program was introduced on October 1, 2019, with only hidden discretionary midpoint-peg orders. On October 13, 2021, the Retail Liquidity Program changed the RLP order type to a midpoint-peg order and began dissemination of an indicator of whether there was RLP interest. On November 22, 2021, the requirement that retail investors submit no more than 390 orders per day was lifted. We plot total midquote volume on IEX (as a percentage of total equities trading volume) with the solid red line. We plot midquote volume which occurs during the time that the IEX RLP is active with the dotted green line. We plot the total midquote volume which occurs simultaneously with an RLP message with the dashed blue line.





Figure 9. Volume Share of Off-Exchange Sub-Penny Prices. For each possible sub-penny price increment, we plot the volume occurring at this price increment, as a percentage share of all volume occurring on that venue. We use data from trades occurring on January 3, 2022, and separate trade volume into three categories: trades occurring when the IEX RLP has no interest, trades occurring when the IEX RLP has one-sided interest, and trades occurring when the IEX RLP has two-sided interest. Trades are restricted to be 100 shares or less, as the RLP only indicates availability for at least 100 shares. Panel A presents the distribution of trades for off-exchange trades. Panel B presents the distribution of trades for on-exchange trades. Note that on-exchange sub-penny trades can only occur in increments of tenths of a cent.


Panel A: Price Improvement Distribution for Off-Exchange Trades



Panel B: Price Improvement Distribution for On-Exchange Trades



Figure 10. Retail Trades and the IEX RLP. We obtain a sample trades of retail investors from a large retail brokerage. Our sample covers all retail orders for 100 shares or less on three days (March 13, 14, and 16) in a set of liquid symbols. We plot the empirical cumulative distribution function of price improvement (as a percentage of the quoted spread), received by retail orders. Active refers to either two-sided IEX RLP interest, bid interest at the time of a retail sell order, or ask interest at the time of a retail buy order. None refers to no active RLP flag. Same-direction refers to only RLP bid interest at the time of a retail sell order, or only RLP ask interest at the time of a retail buy order.



V. Conclusion

In the current market structure, retail brokers set up relationships with market makers, and send individual orders to individual market makers. While market makers are evaluated on the aggregate execution quality they deliver, there is no pre-trade communication over individual orders. The SEC concept for order-by-order auctions would require each individual order to be exposed in a bidding process.

Our model shows that a switch to order-by-order auctions comes with trade-offs. Allocative efficiency is improved, as order-by-order auctions ensure that an incoming retail market order is always routed to the market maker who has observed the lowest cost signal. Given the common-value nature of the auction, however, there is a winner's curse. Market makers obtain higher profits in the auction relative to the broker's routing system. Retail investors can be worse off in the switch to order-by-order auctions, particularly in illiquid stocks or at times when interest in voluntary liquidity provision is low, as market participants could opt not to provide any liquidity in the auction.

Our model focuses on inventory cost and competition, and abstracts away from asymmetric information. In bidding in order-by-order auctions, market makers only worry about aggregate inventories. In practice, some market participants bidding in order-by-order auctions may be seeking to trade directionally based on asset price information; this behavior would amplify the winner's curse problem in auctions. We also leave out a consideration of the trade correction and execution guarantees that market makers provide to brokers, which order-by-order auctions would not have.

We empirically evaluate Retail Liquidity Programs (RLPs) to gain insight into how an order-by-order auction would function. Much like the proposed order-by-order auctions, these RLPs allow any market participant to bid potential price improvement to incoming retail market orders. While these RLPs offer potential price improving liquidity, this liquidity is very rarely offered in less liquid stocks, and disappears in times of volatility. As in our theoretical model of order-by-order auctions, observed trades in RLP programs tend to occur at times of lower volatility, on one side of the market, and times when order imbalances are smaller.

REFERENCES

- Baldauf, Markus, Joshua Mollner, and Bart Z. Yueshen, 2022, Siphoned Apart: A Portfolio Perspective on Order Flow Fragmentation, *Available at SSRN 4173362* .
- Barardehi, Yashar, Dan Bernhardt, Zhi Da, and Mitch Warachka, 2022, Institutional Liquidity Demand and the Internalization of Retail Order Flow: The Tail Does Not Wag the Dog .
- Barber, Brad M, Xing Huang, Philippe Jorion, Terrance Odean, and Christopher Schwarz, 2022, A (Sub) penny For Your Thoughts: Tracking Retail Investor Activity in TAQ, *Available at SSRN 4202874* .
- Bartlett, Robert P, Justin McCrary, and Maureen O’Hara, 2022, A Fractional Solution to a Stock Market Mystery, *Available at SSRN* .
- Battalio, Robert, and Craig W Holden, 2001, A Simple Model of Payment for Order Flow, Internalization, and Total Trading Cost, *Journal of Financial Markets* 4, 33–71.
- Battalio, Robert, and Robert Jennings, 2022, Why do Brokers who do not Charge Payment for Order Flow Route Marketable Orders to Wholesalers?, Technical report, Working Paper.
- Battalio, Robert, Robert Jennings, Mehmet Saglam, and Jun Wu, 2022, Identifying Market Maker Trades as “Retail” From TAQ: No Shortage of False Negatives and False Positives .
- Battalio, Robert, Robert Jennings, and Jamie Selway, 2001, The Relationship Among Market-making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders, *Journal of Financial Services Research* 19, 39–56.
- Bernhardt, Dan, and Eric Hughson, 1997, Splitting orders, *The Review of Financial Studies* 10, 69–101.
- Biais, Bruno, David Martimort, and Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000, Competing mechanisms in a common value environment, *Econometrica* 68, 799–837.
- Bishop, Allison, 2022, “The SEC Isn’t Mad at PFOF. They’re Just Disappointed.”, Proof Trading, [Accessed: 2022 02 01].

- Bryzgalova, Svetlana, Anna Pavlova, and Taisiya Sikorskaya, 2022, Retail Trading in Options and the Rise of the Big Three Wholesalers, *Available at SSRN* .
- Comerton-Forde, Carole, Katya Malinova, and Andreas Park, 2018, Regulating dark trading: Order flow segmentation and market quality, *Journal of Financial Economics* 130, 347–366.
- Corwin, Shane A, and Jay F Coughenour, 2008, Limited attention and the allocation of effort in securities trading, *The Journal of Finance* 63, 3031–3067.
- Dyhrberg, Anne Haubo, Andriy Shkilko, and Ingrid M Werner, 2022, The Retail Execution Quality Landscape, *Fisher College of Business Working Paper* 014.
- Eaton, Gregory W, T Clifton Green, Brian S Roseman, and Yanbin Wu, 2022, Retail Trader Sophistication and Stock Market Quality: Evidence from brokerage outages, *Journal of Financial Economics* 146, 502–528.
- Ernst, Thomas, and Chester S Spatt, 2022, Payment for Order Flow and Asset Choice, *NBER Working Paper 29883* .
- Foley, Sean, Anqi Liu, Katya Malinova, Andreas Park, and Andriy Shkilko, 2020, Cross-Subsidizing Liquidity, Technical report, Working Paper, Macquarie University.
- Gensler, Gary, 2021, “Prepared Remarks at the Global Exchange and FinTech Conference”, Speech: Prepared Remarks at the Global Exchange and FinTech Conference [Accessed: 2022 08 29].
- Gensler, Gary, 2022, “Competition and the Two SECs:”, Remarks Before the SIFMA Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. [Accessed: 2022 11 01].
- Glosten, Lawrence R, and Paul R Milgrom, 1985, Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders, *Journal of financial economics* 14, 71–100.
- Hendershott, Terrence, Saad Ali Khan, and Ryan Riordan, 2022, Option Auctions, *Working Paper* .
- Hendershott, Terrence, Dmitry Livdan, and Norman Schürhoff, 2021, All-to-all liquidity in corporate bonds, *Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper* .

- Hu, Edwin, and Dermot Murphy, 2022, Competition for Retail Order Flow and Market Quality, *Available at SSRN 4070056* .
- Jain, Pankaj K, Jared A Linna, and Thomas H McInish, 2021, An examination of the NYSE’s retail liquidity program, *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 80, 367–373.
- Jain, Pankaj K, Suchi Mishra, Shawn O’Donoghue, and Le Zhao, 2020, Trading Volume Shares and Market Quality in a Zero Commission World, *Available at SSRN 3741470* .
- Klemperer, Paul, 1999, Auction theory: A guide to the literature, *Journal of economic surveys* 13, 227–286.
- Kyle, Albert S, 1985, Continuous auctions and insider trading, *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society* 1315–1335.
- Menezes, Flavio M, and Paulo K Monteiro, 2004, *An introduction to auction theory* (OUP Oxford).
- Menkveld, Albert J, Bart Zhou Yueshen, and Haoxiang Zhu, 2017, Shades of darkness: A pecking order of trading venues, *Journal of Financial Economics* 124, 503–534.
- Parlour, Christine A., and Uday Rajan, 2003, Payment for Order Flow, *Journal of Financial Economics* 68, 379–411.
- Schwarz, Christopher, Brad M Barber, Xing Huang, Philippe Jorion, and Terrance Odean, 2022, The ‘Actual Retail Price’ of Equity Trades, *Available at SSRN 4189239* .
- Schwenk-Nebbe, Sander, 2021, The Participant Timestamp: Get The Most Out Of TAQ Data, *Available at SSRN 3984827* .
- SEC, 2013, Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, to Establish the Retail Price Improvement Program on a Pilot Basis until 12 Months from the Date of Implementation.
- SIFMA, 2022, “SIFMA Equity Market Structure Roundtable ”, Washington, D.C. [Accessed: 2023 12 01].
- Securities and Exchange Commission, 2022, “Order Competition Rule”, Proposal for Rule 615. [Accessed: 2022 12 16].

Appendix A. A microfoundation of inventory cost structure ζ_i

In our baseline model, we assume that the marginal inventory cost for market maker i to execute a sell order is

$$\zeta_i = c_0 + c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j + c_2 y_i.$$

In this section, we provide a microfoundation of this formulation, and illustrate the relations between stock liquidity and cost parameters c_0 , c_1 and c_2 .

We consider a one-period framework, with time $t = 0, 1$. There are N market makers labeled by $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$. For any market maker i , if its total net long position is z_i from time 0 to time 1, then it incurs a total inventory cost

$$\frac{1}{2} \gamma z_i^2$$

during this time period, and thus the marginal cost of executing the sell order is γz_i .²³ We assume that at the beginning of time 0, each market maker i 's net long position is y_i . The sell order is then assigned to one of the N market makers according to a trading mechanism (broker's routing or order-by-order auctions). If market maker i obtains the sell order, it has to execute the order by internalizing it, routing it to other market makers (inter-dealer market), or sending it to the exchange. Right after market maker i receives the sell order, with probability $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, an inventory shock arrives, the market maker can not internalize the order, and has to either send the order to the exchange or execute it through the inter-dealer market. With probability η , there is active trading of the stock on the exchange, and market maker i can send the order to the exchange and close the position at cost \bar{s} . With probability $(1 - \eta)$, the market maker i can only send the order (randomly) to another market maker j . In this case, the cost is

$$\gamma_0 + \gamma y_j$$

where γ_0 is the fixed cost of connecting to another market maker and γy_j is the price charged by market maker j . For simplicity, we assume that market maker j offers competitive price γy_j which is its marginal inventory cost. For simplicity, we make two implicit assumptions here. First, \bar{s} is large enough, so it's always optimal for the market maker to internalize the order when the

²³This quadratic cost structure is commonly used in the literature (eg. Baldauf Mollner and Yuezheng 2022).

inventory shock is absent, and second, γ_0 is large enough so it's always optimal for the market maker to send the order to the exchange but not other market makers if possible.

Then the expected (marginal) cost of market maker i obtaining the sell order is

$$(1 - \alpha) \gamma y_i + \alpha \left[\eta \bar{s} + (1 - \eta) \frac{1}{N - 1} \sum_{j \neq i} (\gamma_0 + \gamma y_j) \right].$$

The above cost can be rewritten as

$$[\alpha \eta \bar{s} + (1 - \eta) \gamma_0] + \frac{1}{N} \left(\frac{\alpha (1 - \eta) \gamma N}{N - 1} \right) \sum_j y_j + \left((1 - \alpha) \gamma - \frac{\alpha (1 - \eta) \gamma}{N - 1} \right) y_i.$$

Let

$$c_0 = \alpha \eta \bar{s} + (1 - \eta) \gamma_0,$$

$$c_1 = \frac{\alpha (1 - \eta) \gamma N}{N - 1},$$

and

$$c_2 = (1 - \alpha) \gamma - \frac{\alpha (1 - \eta) \gamma}{N - 1},$$

then the marginal cost for market maker i to execute the sell order is

$$c_0 + c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j + c_2 y_i.$$

Stock liquidity is linked to the parameter η in our microfoundation. When a stock is more liquid, it's more likely to have active trading on the exchange at that moment, and thus η will be larger.

As a result, the ratio

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} = \frac{N - 1}{\alpha \gamma N} \left((1 - \alpha) \frac{\gamma}{1 - \eta} - \frac{\alpha \gamma}{N - 1} \right)$$

will be larger. We utilize this interpretation in our discussions of model implications.

Appendix B. Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

Consider any $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ and $(x, y) \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}] \times [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$, let

$$G(x|y) = \text{Prob} \left[\min_{-i} y_{-i} \leq x | y_i = y \right]$$

and

$$g(x|y) = \frac{dG(x|y)}{dx}.$$

It's easy to show

$$G(x|y) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - x \right)^{N-1},$$

$$g(x|y) = (N-1) \left(\frac{1}{2} - x \right)^{N-2}.$$

Let

$$\begin{aligned} v(x, y) &= \mathbb{E} \left[c_i | \min_{-i} y_{-i} = x, y_i = y \right] \\ &= c_0 + c_1 \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j | \min_{-i} y_{-i} = x, y_i = y \right] + c_2 \mathbb{E} \left[y_i | \min_{-i} y_{-i} = x, y_i = y \right] \\ &= c_0 + \left(\frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 \right) y + \frac{c_1}{N} x + c_1 \frac{N-2}{N} \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + x \right) \\ &= \left(c_0 + c_1 \frac{N-2}{4N} \right) + \frac{c_1}{2} x + \left(\frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 \right) y. \end{aligned}$$

We focus on symmetric equilibria. Suppose market maker i 's opponents use a continuous, increasing strategy $\beta(y)$ at time 0. And suppose market maker i observes signal y and reports signal z , its expected profit is

$$\begin{aligned} U_i(z, y) &= \text{Prob} \left(z \leq \min_{-i} y_{-i} | y \right) \left[\beta(z) - \mathbb{E} \left(c | z \leq \min_{-i} y_{-i}, y_i = y \right) \right] \\ &= [1 - G(z|y)] \left[\beta(z) - \frac{1}{1 - G(z|y)} \int_z^{\frac{1}{2}} g(x|y) v(x, y) dx \right] \\ &= [1 - G(z|y)] \beta(z) - \int_z^{\frac{1}{2}} g(x|y) v(x, y) dx. \end{aligned}$$

Market maker i 's optimization condition (necessary condition) is

$$\left. \frac{\partial U_i(z, y)}{\partial z} \right|_{z=y} = 0.$$

This is

$$-g(y|y) \beta(y) + (1 - G(y|y)) \beta'(y) + g(y|y) v(y|y) = 0.$$

Simplifying the condition, we get

$$-\beta(y) + \left(\frac{1 - G(y|y)}{g(y|y)} \right) \beta'(y) + v(y|y) = 0. \quad (\text{B1})$$

We first conjecture that $\beta(y)$ is linear, i.e., there exist k_0, k_1 such that

$$\beta(y) = k_0 + k_1 y.$$

Substitute this into (B1), we have

$$-(k_0 + k_1 y) + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - y}{N - 1} k_1 + \left(c_0 + c_1 \frac{N - 2}{4N} \right) + \frac{c_1}{2} y + \left(\frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 \right) y = 0.$$

Then k_0, k_1 are solved by

$$-k_0 + \frac{\frac{1}{2} k_1}{N - 1} + c_0 + c_1 \frac{N - 2}{4N} = 0,$$

$$-k_1 - \frac{k_1}{N - 1} + \frac{c_1}{2} + \frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 = 0.$$

Then we get

$$k_1 = \frac{N - 1}{N} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N + 2}{N} + c_2 \right),$$

$$k_0 = c_0 + \frac{c_1}{4N} \left(N - 1 + \frac{2}{N} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2N}.$$

It's easy to check that

$$\left. \frac{\partial U_i(z, y)}{\partial z} \right|_{z=y} = 0$$

is also the sufficient condition in the optimization problem in this linear equilibrium because of the linearity of the equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 2

Consider any $i \in \{1, 2 \dots N\}$ and $(x, w) \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}] \times [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$, let

$$G_0(x|w) = \text{Prob} \left[\min_{-i} w_{-i} \leq x | w_i = w \right]$$

and

$$g_0(x|w) = \frac{dG(x|w)}{dx}.$$

It's easy to show

$$G(x|w) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - x \right)^{N-1},$$

$$g(x|w) = (N-1) \left(\frac{1}{2} - x \right)^{N-2}.$$

Let

$$\begin{aligned} v(x, w) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\zeta_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w \right] \\ &= p_0 \mathbb{E} \left[\zeta_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w; \exists j \neq i, w_j = y_j = x \right] \\ &\quad + (1 - p_0) p_0 \mathbb{E} \left[c_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = y; \nexists j \neq i, w_j = y_j = x \right] \\ &= p_0 \left[c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{x + (N-2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \right] \\ &\quad + (1 - p_0) \left[c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{(N-1) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \right] \\ &= c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 x + (1 - p_0) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} \right) + (N-2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w. \end{aligned}$$

We focus on symmetric equilibria. Suppose all of market maker i 's opponents use a continuous, increasing bid strategy

$$B(w) = K_0 + K_1 w$$

at time 0. When market maker i observes signal w and reports signal z , its expected profit is

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i(z, w) &= \text{Prob} \left(z \leq \min_{-i} w_{-i} | w_i = w \right) \left[B(z) - \mathbb{E} \left(\zeta_i | z \leq \min_{-i} w_{-i}, w_i = w \right) \right] \\
&= [1 - G(z|w)] \left[B(z) - \frac{1}{1 - G(z|w)} \int_z^1 g(x|w) v(x, w) dx \right] \\
&= [1 - G(z|w)] B(z) - \int_z^1 g(x|w) v(x, w) dx.
\end{aligned}$$

Market maker i 's marginal incentive is characterized by

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial U_i(z, w)}{\partial z} &= -g(z|w) B(z) + (1 - G(z|w)) B'(z) + g(z|w) v(z|w) \\
&= g(z|w) \left[-B(z) + \left(\frac{1 - G(z|w)}{g(z|w)} \right) B'(z) + v(z|w) \right] \\
&= g(z|w) \left[\begin{array}{c} -K_0 - K_1 z + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - z}{N-1} K_1 + c_0 \\ + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 z + (1-p_0) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + z}{2} \right) + (N-2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + z}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \end{array} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

We conjecture that in equilibrium we have

$$\left. \frac{\partial U_i(z, w)}{\partial z} \right|_{z=w} = 0. \tag{B2}$$

This implies

$$-(K_0 + K_1 w) + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - w}{N-1} K_1 + c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 w + (1-p_0) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + w}{2} \right) + (N-2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + w}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w = 0.$$

Since the above condition holds for all w , then K_0, K_1 are solved by

$$\begin{aligned}
-K_0 + \frac{\frac{1}{2} K_1}{N-1} + c_0 + c_1 \frac{N-2}{4N} p_0 + \frac{c_1 (1-p_0) p_0}{4N} &= 0, \\
-K_1 - \frac{K_1}{N-1} + c_2 p_0 + \frac{2c_1 p_0}{N} + \frac{c_1 (N-2) p_0}{2N} + \frac{c_1 (1-p_0) p_0}{2N} &= 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Then we get

$$K_1 = \frac{N-1}{N} \left(c_2 p_0 + \frac{2c_1 p_0}{N} + \frac{c_1 (N-2) p_0}{2N} + \frac{c_1 (1-p_0) p_0}{2N} \right), \quad (\text{B3})$$

$$K_0 = c_0 + \frac{p_0}{4N^2} [(3 + N^2 - p_0 - Np_0) c_1 + 2Nc_2]. \quad (\text{B4})$$

We also need to verify that condition (B2) is a sufficient condition for optimization. Note that $g(z|w) > 0$ and

$$-K_0 - K_1 z + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - z}{N-1} K_1 + c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 z + (1-p_0) p_0^{\frac{1}{2}+z} \right) + (N-2) p_0^{\frac{1}{2}+z} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w$$

is linear in z , then it's clear that with (B3) and (B4), we must have that for all w ,

$$\frac{\partial U_i(z, w)}{\partial z} < 0 \iff z > w,$$

confirming that (B2) is a sufficient condition for optimization.

Proof of Lemma 1

First we introduce the random variable

$$r = \min_i y_i \in \left[-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right]$$

and its CDF

$$H(r) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^N$$

and PDF

$$h(r) = N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^{N-1}.$$

Then the total expected profit of market makers is

$$\begin{aligned}
W_M^{OBO} &= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[k_0 + k_1 r - c_0 - c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j - c_2 r \mid \min_i y_i = r \right] \right\} \\
&= \mathbb{E} \left\{ k_0 + k_1 r - c_0 - c_1 \left(\frac{r + (N-1) \left(\frac{1}{2} + r \right) \frac{1}{2}}{N} \right) - c_2 r \right\} \\
&= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \frac{\left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right) (c_1 + c_2 N)}{N^2} \right\} \\
&= \int_{-\frac{1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}} \frac{\left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right) (c_1 + c_2 N)}{N^2} N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^{N-1} dr \\
&= \frac{1}{N+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N} + c_2 \right).
\end{aligned}$$

The expected total profit of investors W_I is

$$\begin{aligned}
W_I^{OBO} &= -\mathbb{E} \left[k_0 + k_1 r \mid \min_i y_i = r \right] \\
&= -\int_{-\frac{1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}} (k_0 + k_1 r) N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^{N-1} dr \\
&= -\left[c_0 + \frac{1}{N(N+1)} c_1 - \frac{N-3}{2(N+1)} c_2 \right]
\end{aligned}$$

and the total welfare W_{total} is

$$\begin{aligned}
W_{total}^{OBO} &= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[-c_0 - c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j - c_2 r \mid \min_i y_i = r \right] \right\} \\
&= W_M^{OBO} + W_I^{OBO} \\
&= -\left(c_0 - \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Proof of Lemma 2

We introduce the random variable

$$r = \min_i w_i \in \left[-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right]$$

and its CDF

$$H(r) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - r\right)^N$$

and PDF

$$h(r) = N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r\right)^{N-1}.$$

Then the total expected profit of market makers is

$$\begin{aligned} W_M^{BR} &= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[t(r) - c_0 - c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j - c_2 y_i | w_i = \min_j w_j = r \right] \right\} \\ &= \mathbb{E} \left\{ K_0 + K_1 r - c_0 - c_1 \left(\frac{p_0 r + (N-1)p_0 \left(\frac{1}{2} + r\right) \frac{1}{2}}{N} \right) - c_2 p_0 r \right\} \\ &= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \frac{p_0}{4N^2} [2Nc_2(1-2r) + c_1(3-p_0)(1-2r) + c_1N(1-p_0)(1+2r)] \right\} \\ &= \int_{-\frac{1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}} \frac{p_0}{4N^2} [2Nc_2(1-2r) + c_1(3-p_0)(1-2r) + c_1N(1-p_0)(1+2r)] N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r\right)^{N-1} dr \\ &= \frac{p_0(2c_1 - p_0c_1 + Nc_2)}{N(1+N)}. \end{aligned}$$

The expected total profit of investors W_I is

$$\begin{aligned} W_I^{BR} &= -\mathbb{E} \left[K_0 + K_1 r | \min_i w_i = r \right] \\ &= -\int_{-\frac{1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}} (K_0 + K_1 r) N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r\right)^{N-1} dr \\ &= -\left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \right], \end{aligned}$$

and the total welfare W_{total} is

$$\begin{aligned} W_{total}^{BR} &= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[-c_0 - c_1 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N y_j - c_2 y_i | w_i = \min_j w_j = r \right] \right\} \\ &= -\left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Proposition 3

Both $W_{total}^{BR} < W_{total}^{OBO}$ and $W_M^{BR} < W_M^{OBO}$ are obvious. And

$$\begin{aligned} & W_I^{BR} < W_I^{OBO} \\ \iff & - \left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \right] < - \left[c_0 + \frac{1}{N(N+1)}c_1 - \frac{N-3}{2(N+1)}c_2 \right] \\ \iff & \frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{2(1-p_0)}{N(N-3)}. \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Proposition 4

Since wholesalers are not able to observe the realization of \tilde{c}_0 , they can condition their strategies only on the distributional information about \tilde{c}_0 . We still focus on symmetric equilibria in this case, and conjecture that all wholesalers uses the same bidding strategy

$$\tilde{\beta}(y) = \tilde{k}_0 + \tilde{k}_1 y,$$

with $\tilde{k}_1 > 0$. Similar to our baseline model, the wholesaler with lowest signal realization obtains the order in equilibrium. We follow the proof of Proposition 2, notably, the function $\tilde{v}(x, w) = \mathbb{E} \left[\tilde{\zeta}_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w \right]$ now becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{v}(x, w) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\tilde{\zeta}_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w \right] \\ &= p_0 \mathbb{E} \left[\tilde{\zeta}_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w; \exists j \neq i, w_j = y_j = x \right] \\ &\quad + (1-p_0) p_0 \mathbb{E} \left[\tilde{\zeta}_i | \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = y; \nexists j \neq i, w_j = y_j = x \right] \\ &= p_0 \left[c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{x + (N-2)p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2}+x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \right] \\ &\quad + (1-p_0) \left[c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{(N-1)p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2}+x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \right] \\ &= c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 x + (1-p_0)p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2}+x}{2} \right) + (N-2)p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2}+x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w, \end{aligned}$$

which implies that

$$\tilde{v}(x, w) = v(x, w).$$

The rest of the proof follows the proof of Proposition 2. So the equilibrium strategy is the same as that in the baseline model.

Similarly, note that

$$\mathbb{E}(\tilde{c}_0) = c_0,$$

the proof of welfare computation follows our proof of Lemma 2, and thus all welfare outcomes are the same as that in our baseline model.

Proof of Proposition 5

When $\delta_c = 0$, the institutional traders and wholesalers receive i.i.d signals, and they are symmetric. We first conjecture that all market makers choose the same linear equilibrium strategy

$$\tilde{\beta}_i(y_i; \delta_c = 0) = \tilde{k}_0(\delta_c = 0) + \tilde{k}_1(\delta_c = 0)y_i.$$

The number of market makers is $N + N_0$. We follow the proof of Proposition 1, the function $v(x, y)$ now becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{v}(x, y) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\tilde{\zeta}_i \mid \min_{-i} y_{-i} = x, y_i = y \right] \\ &= c_0 + c_1 \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N+N_0} y_j \mid \min_{-i} y_{-i} = x, y_i = y \right] + c_2 \mathbb{E} \left[y_i \mid \min_{-i} y_{-i} = x, y_i = y \right] \\ &= c_0 + \left(\frac{c_1}{N + N_0} + c_2 \right) y + \frac{c_1}{N + N_0} x + c_1 \frac{N + N_0 - 2}{N + N_0} \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + x \right) \\ &= \left(c_0 + c_1 \frac{N + N_0 - 2}{4(N + N_0)} \right) + \frac{c_1}{2} x + \left(\frac{c_1}{N + N_0} + c_2 \right) y, \end{aligned}$$

which is the $v(x, y)$ function with $(N + N_0)$ wholesalers. For the rest of the proof, we follow the proof of Proposition 1, and we can show that the equilibrium strategy is equivalent to that in Proposition 1 with the number of wholesalers being $N + N_0$.

Proof of Proposition 6

Since the equilibrium of broker's routing is the same as that in the baseline model, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_{total}^{BR} &= - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right), \\ \tilde{W}_I^{BR} &= - \left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \right],\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\tilde{W}_W^{BR} = \frac{p_0(2c_1 - p_0c_1 + Nc_2)}{N(1+N)}.$$

For order-by-order auctions, the welfare outcomes are

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} &= - \left(c_0 - \frac{N+N_0-1}{N+N_0+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right), \\ \tilde{W}_I^{OBO} &= - \left[c_0 + \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 \right],\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\tilde{W}_W^{OBO} = \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N+N_0} + c_2 \right).$$

First, it's obvious that

$$\tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} > \tilde{W}_{total}^{BR},$$

because $p_0 \in (0, 1)$ and $N_0 > 1$. Second,

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_W^{BR} &< \tilde{W}_W^{OBO} \\ \iff \frac{p_0(2c_1 - p_0c_1 + Nc_2)}{N(1+N)} &< \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N+N_0} + c_2 \right) \\ \iff \frac{p_0 \left(2 - p_0 + N \frac{c_2}{c_1} \right)}{N(1+N)} &< \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{1}{N+N_0} + \frac{c_2}{c_1} \right) \\ \iff \frac{p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)} + \frac{p_0}{1+N} \frac{c_2}{c_1} &< \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{1}{N+N_0} + \frac{c_2}{c_1} \right) \\ \iff \left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} &> - \left(\frac{N}{(N+N_0)^2} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)} \right) \\ \iff \left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} &> - \frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)\end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} > \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N},$$

we know that

$$\left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} > -\frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)$$

is equivalent to

$$\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} > 0 \iff p_0 < \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1+N}{N+N_0+1}$$

and

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{-\frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)}{\frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N}}.$$

Finally,

$$\begin{aligned} & \tilde{W}_I^{BR} < \tilde{W}_I^{OBO} \\ \iff & - \left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \right] < - \left[c_0 + \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 \right] \\ \iff & p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} > \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 \\ \iff & p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0) - (N-3)N \frac{c_2}{c_1}}{2N(1+N)} > \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} \frac{c_2}{c_1} \\ \iff & \left(\frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} - p_0 \frac{(N-3)}{2(1+N)} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - p_0 \frac{(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)} \\ \iff & \frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)}}{\frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} - p_0 \frac{(N-3)}{2(1+N)}}. \end{aligned}$$

The last inequality holds because we always have $\frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} - p_0 \frac{(N-3)}{2(1+N)} > 0$.

Proof of Proposition 7

We need to verify that this is indeed an equilibrium. Let $\underline{\delta} = \max\{\delta_{c1}, \delta_{c2}\}$ where δ_{c1} is defined by (??) and δ_{c2} is defined by (B5).

Let δ_{c1} be the value that satisfies

$$k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} = k_0^+ - k_1^+ \cdot \frac{1}{2},$$

i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} & c_0 - \delta_{c1} + \frac{c_1}{4N_0} \left(N_0 - 1 + \frac{2}{N_0} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2N_0} + \frac{N_0 - 1}{N_0} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N_0 + 2}{N_0} + c_2 \right) \frac{1}{2} \\ = & c_0 + \delta_{c1} + \frac{c_1}{4(N + N_0)} \left(N + N_0 - 1 + \frac{2}{N + N_0} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2(N + N_0)} - \frac{N + N_0 - 1}{N + N_0} \left(\frac{c_1}{2} \frac{N + N_0 + 2}{N + N_0} + c_2 \right) \frac{1}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Then when $\delta_c > \delta_{c1}$,

$$\left[k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} \right] \cup \left[k_0^+ - k_1^+ \cdot \frac{1}{2}, k_0^+ + k_1^+ \cdot \frac{1}{2} \right] = \emptyset.$$

This implies that the under the equilibrium conjectured, when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$, only institutional traders can obtain the order no matter what signals market participants observe.

We first verify that it's optimal for any institutional trader to choose $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$ if observing $c_0 + \delta_c$, giving other market participants' strategies. When $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$, it's clear that $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$ is an equilibrium if we only have N_0 institutional traders in the market, as suggested by Proposition 1. This is essentially the baseline model of order-by-order auctions with N_0 bidders and unconditional expected inventory cost being $c_0 - \delta_c$. This means that it's optimal for any institutional trader to choose $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$ if there are only $N_0 - 1$ other institutional traders who also choose $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$ and no wholesalers in the market. Adding N wholesalers choosing $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$ does not change this optimality, because given other institutional traders' choice $\tilde{s}^-(y; \delta_c)$, the N wholesalers will never obtain any order in any state when $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 - \delta_c$.

Then we verify that it's optimal for any institutional trader to choose $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$ if observing $c_0 + \delta_c$, given other market participants' strategies. Following our Proposition 1 in the baseline model of order-by-order auctions, $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$ is an equilibrium with $N + N_0$ market makers and unconditional expected inventory cost being $c_0 + \delta_c$. So it's optimal for any institutional trader to choose $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$ if there are other $N + N_0 - 1$ market makers also choosing $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$.

Finally, we verify that it's optimal for any wholesaler i to choose $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$, given other market

participants' strategies. Suppose the wholesaler i observes a signal y_i , then the wholesaler's utility is

$$U_i = \frac{1}{2}U_1(s_i) + \frac{1}{2}U_2(s_i),$$

where U_1 (U_2) is wholesaler i 's profit when the state is $c_0 - \delta_c$ ($c_0 + \delta_c$). It's clear that for any y_i , we have

$$\tilde{s}^+(y_i; \delta_c) = \arg \max_{s_i \in (k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, \infty)} U_i,$$

this is because when $s_i \in (k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, \infty)$,

$$\left[k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} \right] \cup \left[k_0^+ - k_1^+ \cdot \frac{1}{2}, k_0^+ + k_1^+ \cdot \frac{1}{2} \right] = \emptyset,$$

and thus we always have

$$U_1(s_i) = 0.$$

And

$$\tilde{s}^+(y_i; \delta_c) = \arg \max_{s_i \in (k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, \infty)} U_2.$$

It's also clear that wholesaler will never choose $s_i < k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}$, as any $s_i < k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}$ is dominated by $s_i = k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}$. Suppose that wholesaler choose

$$s_i \in \left[k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} \right].$$

Note that

$$k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[(c_0 - \underline{\delta}_c) - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right] > 0,$$

and the upper bound of the profit in the case $c_0 - \delta_c$ is

$$k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[(c_0 - \underline{\delta}_c) - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right]$$

because $k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}$ is the highest spread in $s_i \in [k_0^- - k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}, k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2}]$ and $(c_0 - \underline{\delta}_c) - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2}$ is the lowest inventory cost. Besides, in the case $c_0 + \delta_c$, the wholesaler i will obtain the order with

probability one. And the maximal profit is

$$k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[(c_0 + \underline{\delta}_c) - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right].$$

Then

$$U_1 \leq k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[(c_0 - \underline{\delta}_c) - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right].$$

And

$$U_2 \leq k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[(c_0 + \underline{\delta}_c) - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right].$$

Then

$$U_i \leq \frac{1}{2}U_1 + \frac{1}{2}U_2 \leq k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[c_0 - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right].$$

Then

$$U_i < 0 \iff k_0^- + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \left[c_0 - \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right] < 0 \iff \delta_c < \delta_{c2},$$

where

$$\delta_{c2} = \frac{c_1}{4(\tilde{N} - N)} \left((\tilde{N} - N) - 1 + \frac{2}{\tilde{N} - N} \right) + \frac{c_2}{2(\tilde{N} - N)} + k_1^- \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2}. \quad (\text{B5})$$

Then when

$$\delta_c > \underline{\delta} = \max \{ \delta_{c1}, \delta_{c2} \},$$

we have

$$\tilde{s}^+(y_i; \delta_c) = k_0^+ + k_1^+ y_i = \arg \max_{s_i \in (-\infty, \infty)} U_i.$$

This implies that it's optimal for any wholesaler i to choose $\tilde{s}^+(y; \delta_c)$, given other market participants' strategies.

Proof of Proposition 8

Since the equilibrium of broker's routing is the same as that in the baseline model, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_{total}^{BR} &= - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right), \\ \tilde{W}_I^{BR} &= - \left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \right],\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\tilde{W}_W^{BR} = \frac{p_0(2c_1 - p_0c_1 + Nc_2)}{N(1+N)}.$$

For order-by-order auctions, the welfare outcomes are

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} &= -\frac{1}{2} \left(c_0 + \delta_c - \frac{N+N_0-1}{N+N_0+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \left(c_0 - \delta_c - \frac{N_0-1}{N_0+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right) \\ &= -c_0 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{N+N_0-1}{N+N_0+1} + \frac{N_0-1}{N_0+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{2},\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_I^{OBO} &= -\frac{1}{2} \left[c_0 + \delta_c + \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 \right] \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2} \left[c_0 - \delta_c + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N_0-3}{2(N_0+1)} c_2 \right] \\ &= -c_0 - \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N_0-3}{2(N_0+1)} c_2 \right]\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\tilde{W}_W^{OBO} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N+N_0} + c_2 \right).$$

First,

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} &> \tilde{W}_{total}^{BR} \\ \iff -c_0 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{N+N_0-1}{N+N_0+1} + \frac{N_0-1}{N_0+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{2} &> - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right) \\ \iff \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{N+N_0-1}{N+N_0+1} + \frac{N_0-1}{N_0+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{2} &> p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2}.\end{aligned}$$

Then LHS of the above condition is increasing in N_0 , let \underline{N}_0 be the solution of

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{N + \underline{N}_0 - 1}{N + \underline{N}_0 + 1} + \frac{\underline{N}_0 - 1}{\underline{N}_0 + 1} \right) \frac{c_2}{2} = p_0 \frac{N - 1}{N + 1} \frac{c_2}{2}, \quad (\text{B6})$$

then

$$N_0 > \underline{N}_0 \iff \tilde{W}_{total}^{OBO} > \tilde{W}_{total}^{BR}.$$

Second,

$$\begin{aligned} & \tilde{W}_W^{BR} < \tilde{W}_W^{OBO} \\ \iff & \frac{p_0 (2c_1 - p_0 c_1 + N c_2)}{N(1+N)} < \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{c_1}{N+N_0} + c_2 \right) \\ \iff & \frac{p_0 \left(2 - p_0 + N \frac{c_2}{c_1} \right)}{N(1+N)} < \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{1}{N+N_0} + \frac{c_2}{c_1} \right) \\ \iff & \frac{p_0 (2 - p_0)}{N(1+N)} + \frac{p_0}{1+N} \frac{c_2}{c_1} < \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \left(\frac{1}{N+N_0} + \frac{c_2}{c_1} \right) \\ \iff & \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} > - \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{(N+N_0)^2} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0 (2 - p_0)}{N(1+N)} \right) \\ \iff & \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} > - \frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2 - p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} > \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2 - p_0)(N+N_0)}{N},$$

we know that

$$\left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} > - \frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2 - p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)$$

is equivalent to

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N} > 0 \iff p_0 < \frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1+N}{N+N_0+1}$$

and

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{-\frac{1}{N+N_0} \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{(1+N)} \frac{(2-p_0)(N+N_0)}{N} \right)}{\frac{1}{2} \frac{N}{N+N_0} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{p_0}{1+N}}.$$

Finally,

$$\begin{aligned} & \tilde{W}_I^{BR} < \tilde{W}_I^{OBO} \\ \Leftrightarrow & - \left[c_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \right] \\ & < -c_0 - \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N_0-3}{2(N_0+1)} c_2 \right] \\ \Leftrightarrow & p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)c_1 - (N-3)Nc_2}{2N(1+N)} \\ & > \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} c_2 + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} c_1 - \frac{N_0-3}{2(N_0+1)} c_2 \right] \\ \Leftrightarrow & p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0) - (N-3)N \frac{c_2}{c_1}}{N(1+N)} \\ & > \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{N+N_0-3}{2(N+N_0+1)} \frac{c_2}{c_1} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{N_0-3}{2(N_0+1)} \frac{c_2}{c_1} \\ \Leftrightarrow & p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)} - p_0 \left(1 - \frac{4}{N+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} \\ & > \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{4}{N+N_0+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{4}{N_0+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} \\ \Leftrightarrow & \left(1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N+1} - \frac{2}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{2}{N_0+1} \right) \frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{2p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)}. \end{aligned} \tag{B7}$$

We want to show that if

$$1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N+1} - \frac{2}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{2}{N_0+1} \leq 0,$$

we must have

$$\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{2p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)} > 0.$$

Since $N > 3$, then both

$$1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N+1} - \frac{2}{N+N_0+1} - \frac{2}{N_0+1}$$

and

$$\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{2p_0(2-p_0)}{N(1+N)} > 0$$

are decreasing in $p_0 \in (0, 1)$. Then it's sufficient to show the above argument holds when $p_0 = 1$,

i.e., we need to show that if

$$\frac{1}{N+N_0+1} + \frac{1}{N_0+1} \geq \frac{2}{N+1},$$

we must have

$$\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} > \frac{2}{N(1+N)}.$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} + \frac{1}{N_0+1} \geq \frac{2}{N+1} &\iff \frac{1}{N_0+1} - \frac{1}{N+1} \geq \frac{1}{N+1} - \frac{1}{N+N_0+1} \\ &\iff \frac{N-N_0}{(N_0+1)(N+1)} \geq \frac{N_0}{(N+1)(N+N_0+1)}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} > \frac{2}{N(1+N)} \\ \iff &\frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{N(1+N)} > \frac{1}{N(1+N)} - \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} \\ \iff &\frac{1}{N_0(N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{N(N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N(N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{N(1+N)} \\ &> \frac{1}{N(1+N)} - \frac{1}{N(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N(N+N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} \\ \iff &\frac{N-N_0}{N_0N(N_0+1)} + \frac{1}{N(N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{N(1+N)} > \frac{1}{N(1+N)} - \frac{1}{N(N+N_0+1)} + \frac{N_0}{N(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)}. \end{aligned}$$

We already know that

$$\frac{1}{N(N_0+1)} - \frac{1}{N(1+N)} \geq \frac{1}{N(1+N)} - \frac{1}{N(N+N_0+1)},$$

then it's sufficient to show

$$\frac{N-N_0}{N_0N(N_0+1)} > \frac{N_0}{N(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)} \iff \frac{N-N_0}{N_0(N_0+1)} > \frac{N_0}{(N+N_0)(N+N_0+1)}.$$

Since

$$\frac{N - N_0}{(N_0 + 1)(N + 1)} \geq \frac{N_0}{(N + 1)(N + N_0 + 1)},$$

we have

$$\frac{N - N_0}{N_0(N_0 + 1)} \geq \frac{1}{N_0} \frac{N_0(1 + N)}{(N + 1)(N + N_0 + 1)} = \frac{1}{(N + N_0 + 1)} > \frac{N_0}{(N + N_0)(N + N_0 + 1)}.$$

Then we show that for the condition (B7), if the LHS

$$1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N + 1} - \frac{2}{N + N_0 + 1} - \frac{2}{N_0 + 1} \leq 0,$$

the RHS

$$\frac{1}{(N + N_0)(N + N_0 + 1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0 + 1)} - \frac{2p_0(2 - p_0)}{N(1 + N)}$$

must be positive. Then the solution to the condition (B7) is

$$1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N + 1} - \frac{2}{N + N_0 + 1} - \frac{2}{N_0 + 1} > 0 \iff p_0 < \frac{1 - \frac{2}{N + N_0 + 1} - \frac{2}{N_0 + 1}}{1 - \frac{4}{N + 1}},$$

and

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} > \frac{\frac{1}{(N + N_0)(N + N_0 + 1)} + \frac{1}{N_0(N_0 + 1)} - \frac{2p_0(2 - p_0)}{N(1 + N)}}{1 - p_0 + \frac{4p_0}{N + 1} - \frac{2}{N + N_0 + 1} - \frac{2}{N_0 + 1}}.$$

Proof of Proposition 9

Consider any $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ and $(x, w) \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}] \times [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}]$, let

$$G_0(x|w) = \text{Prob} \left[\min_{-i} w_{-i} \leq x | w_i = w \right]$$

and

$$g_0(x|w) = \frac{dG(x|w)}{dx}.$$

It's easy to show

$$G(x|w) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - x \right)^{N-1},$$

$$g(x|w) = (N - 1) \left(\frac{1}{2} - x \right)^{N-2}.$$

Let

$$\begin{aligned}
v(x, w) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\zeta_i \mid \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w \right] \\
&= p_0 \mathbb{E} \left[\zeta_i \mid \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = w; \exists j \neq i, w_j = y_j = x \right] \\
&\quad + (1 - p_0) \mathbb{E} \left[c_i \mid \min_{-i} w_{-i} = x; w_i = y; \nexists j \neq i, w_j = y_j = x \right] \\
&= p_0 \left[\mathbb{E}(c_0) + \mathbb{E}(c_1) \left(\frac{x + (N - 2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + \mathbb{E}(c_2) p_0 w \right] \\
&\quad + (1 - p_0) \left[c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{(N - 1) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \right] \\
&= \bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 x + (1 - p_0) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} \right) + (N - 2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2} + x}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + \bar{c}_2 p_0 w.
\end{aligned}$$

We focus on symmetric equilibria. Suppose all of market maker i 's opponents use a continuous, increasing bid strategy

$$\bar{B}(w) = \bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 w$$

at time 0. When market maker i observes signal w and reports signal z , its expected profit is

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i(z, w) &= \text{Prob} \left(z \leq \min_{-i} w_{-i} \mid w_i = w \right) \left[\bar{B}(z) - \mathbb{E} \left(\zeta_i \mid z \leq \min_{-i} w_{-i}, w_i = w \right) \right] \\
&= [1 - G(z|w)] \left[\bar{B}(z) - \frac{1}{1 - G(z|w)} \int_z^1 g(x|w) v(x, w) dx \right] \\
&= [1 - G(z|w)] \bar{B}(z) - \int_z^1 g(x|w) v(x, w) dx.
\end{aligned}$$

Market maker i 's marginal incentive is characterized by

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\partial U_i(z, w)}{\partial z} \\
&= -g(z|w) \bar{B}(z) + (1 - G(z|w)) \bar{B}'(z) + g(z|w) v(z|w) \\
&= g(z|w) \left[-\bar{B}(z) + \left(\frac{1 - G(z|w)}{g(z|w)} \right) \bar{B}'(z) + v(z|w) \right] \\
&= g(z|w) \left[-\bar{K}_0 - \bar{K}_1 z + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - z}{N - 1} \bar{K}_1 + c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 z + (1 - p_0) p_0^{\frac{1}{2} + z} \right) + (N - 2) p_0^{\frac{1}{2} + z} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w \right].
\end{aligned}$$

We conjecture that in equilibrium we have

$$\left. \frac{\partial U_i(z, w)}{\partial z} \right|_{z=w} = 0. \tag{B8}$$

This implies

$$-\left(\bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 w \right) + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - w}{N - 1} \bar{K}_1 + \bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 w + (1 - p_0) p_0^{\frac{1}{2} + w} \right) + (N - 2) p_0^{\frac{1}{2} + w} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + \bar{c}_2 p_0 w = 0.$$

Since the above condition holds for all w , then \bar{K}_0, \bar{K}_1 are solved by

$$\begin{aligned}
& -\bar{K}_0 + \frac{\frac{1}{2} \bar{K}_1}{N - 1} + c_0 + c_1 \frac{N - 2}{4N} p_0 + \frac{c_1 (1 - p_0) p_0}{4N} = 0 \\
& -\bar{K}_1 - \frac{\bar{K}_1}{N - 1} + c_2 p_0 + \frac{2c_1 p_0}{N} + \frac{c_1 (N - 2) p_0}{2N} + \frac{c_1 (1 - p_0) p_0}{2N} = 0
\end{aligned}$$

Then we get

$$\bar{K}_1 = \frac{N - 1}{N} \left(\bar{c}_2 p_0 + \frac{2\bar{c}_1 p_0}{N} + \frac{\bar{c}_1 (N - 2) p_0}{2N} + \frac{\bar{c}_1 (1 - p_0) p_0}{2N} \right), \tag{B9}$$

$$\bar{K}_0 = \bar{c}_0 + \frac{p_0}{4N^2} \left[(3 + N^2 - p_0 - Np_0) \bar{c}_1 + 2N\bar{c}_2 \right]. \tag{B10}$$

We also need to verify that condition (B8) is a sufficient condition for optimization. Note that

$g(z|w) > 0$ and

$$-\bar{K}_0 - \bar{K}_1 z + \frac{\frac{1}{2} - z}{N-1} \bar{K}_1 + c_0 + c_1 \left(\frac{\left(p_0 z + (1-p_0) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2}+z}{2} \right) + (N-2) p_0 \frac{\frac{1}{2}+z}{2} + p_0 w}{N} \right) + c_2 p_0 w$$

is linear in z , then it's clear that with (B9) and (B10), we must have that for all w ,

$$\frac{\partial U_i(z, w)}{\partial z} < 0 \iff z > w,$$

confirming that (B8) is a sufficient condition for optimization.

Proof of Lemma 4

We introduce the random variable

$$r = \min_i w_i \in \left[-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right]$$

and its CDF

$$H(r) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^N$$

and PDF

$$h(r) = N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^{N-1}.$$

First, we know that in our baseline model of broker's routing, the total welfare is

$$W_{total}^{BR} = - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right).$$

The total welfare only depends on inventory allocation but not equilibrium spread, as the equilibrium spread is just a transfer between market makers and investors. In our extension of heterogeneous stocks, it is still the market maker with lowest liquidity signal realization y that obtains the order, so the order allocation is the same as that in our baseline model for any stocks (c_0, c_1, c_2) . Then

the total welfare in this extension satisfies

$$W_{heter,total}^{BR} = W_{total}^{BR} = - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right).$$

Since the equilibrium bidding strategy is

$$T(w) = \bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 w,$$

the investor's welfare is

$$\begin{aligned} W_{heter,I}^{BR} &= -\mathbb{E} \left[\bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 r \mid \min_i w_i = r \right] \\ &= - \int_{-\frac{1}{2}}^{\frac{1}{2}} (\bar{K}_0 + \bar{K}_1 r) N \left(\frac{1}{2} - r \right)^{N-1} dr \\ &= - \left[\bar{c}_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1 - (N-3)N\bar{c}_2}{2N(1+N)} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

By

$$W_{heter,M}^{BR} = W_{heter,total}^{BR} - W_{heter,I}^{BR},$$

we know

$$\begin{aligned} W_{heter,M}^{BR} &= - \left(c_0 - p_0 \frac{N-1}{N+1} \frac{c_2}{2} \right) + \left[\bar{c}_0 + p_0 \frac{2(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1 - (N-3)N\bar{c}_2}{2N(1+N)} \right] \\ &= (\bar{c}_0 - c_0) + \frac{p_0}{2(N+1)} [(N-1)c_2 - (N-3)\bar{c}_2] + p_0 \frac{(2-p_0)\bar{c}_1}{N(1+N)}. \end{aligned}$$