Abandon the Concept of Accredited Investors in Private Securities Offerings

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Abstract

Accredited investors as defined in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation D occupy a favored spot in the world of federal securities law and may participate in investment opportunities not available to other investors. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) views accredited investors as sophisticated and able to fend for themselves in making securities investments without the need for the main disclosure protections in the Securities Act.

Closer consideration of the accredited investor category raises questions about its continued vitality. It provides some benefits, but reasons for dispensing with the line between accredited and non-accredited investors are extremely strong. In particular, the SEC’s rationale for the category is deeply flawed, and many of the components of the category fail to effectuate even the flawed rationale.

A better regulatory approach would be to get rid of the category and rely on a short set of mandatory disclosures. This would guarantee the supply of essential information rather than depend on the voluntary choices of issuers and speculative assumptions about investor sophistication and access to information. It would also have several other advantages and would not add significant costs because issuers overwhelmingly already prepare and provide disclosure to accredited investors.

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Accredited investors occupy a favored spot in the world of federal securities law. Under the terms of a regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Rule 506 of Regulation D,\(^1\) accredited investors may participate in investment opportunities not available to other investors, such as investments in fast-growing high-technology companies that have not yet sold securities to the public and certain hedge funds and venture capital funds. A company using Rule 506, which is a private securities offering exempt from the section 5 registration requirement in the Securities Act, may sell securities of an unlimited dollar amount to an unlimited number of accredited investors, may use general advertising to reach them, and has no legal obligation to make any disclosures to them.

Accredited investors receive this treatment because the SEC views them as sophisticated and able to fend for themselves in making securities investments without the need for the main disclosure protections in the Securities Act.\(^2\) Many types of market participants within the definition of accredited investors certainly satisfy this standard, such as broker-dealers, registered investment companies, banks, and insurance companies, but many types do not do so in a consistent way, such as a corporation or nonprofit organization with total assets over $5 million. Thus, the SEC has misapplied the standard and, along the way, has misinterpreted it.

The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the history and basis for the accredited investor definition in Rule 506 transactions. It discusses the benefits of retaining the


accredited investor category and then describes several reasons for not keeping it. The reasons for dispensing with the line between accredited and non-accredited investors are extremely strong. In particular, as explored in detail, the SEC’s rationale for the accredited investor category is deeply flawed, and many of the components of the category fail to effectuate even the flawed rationale. This discussion goes further than earlier criticisms of the concept of accredited investors.

A better regulatory approach would be to rely on a minimum level of mandatory disclosures in private offerings and get rid of the accredited investor category. This would guarantee the supply of essential information rather than rely on the voluntary choices of issuers and speculative assumptions about investor sophistication and access to information. It would be more consistent with the leading judicial decisions of the relevant registration exemption. This approach would also broaden the sources of capital to include non-accredited investors. A system of mandatory disclosure would only negligibly increase regulatory burdens and costs because issuers overwhelmingly already prepare and provide disclosures to accredited investors.

To keep private offerings attractive and efficient, the mandatory disclosures do not need to be and should not be as lengthy as a prospectus in a registered offering or an annual report of a reporting company. The disclosure needs to provide essential information about a company and the securities being sold. The offering statement for a crowdfunding transaction, with some modifications, should be the model.

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3 This paper addresses only the utility of the accredited investor category for Rule 506 transactions and does not address the use of the accredited investor concept in other parts of the securities laws. See id. at 2598–99 (describing the use of the accredited investor definition in other areas of the federal securities laws).

As background, Part I of this paper briefly traces the history of the SEC rules that allowed sales of securities to accredited investors with no mandatory disclosure. Part II then discusses whether the distinction between accredited and non-accredited investors remains useful or should be eliminated and considers the benefits and costs of the accredited investor category. It shows that a variety of social costs and problems with the accredited investor definition substantially outweigh the benefits. Part III describes the main features of a private offering safe harbor that dispenses with the accredited investor category and returns to the original conception of the private offering exemption with reliance on actual disclosures. Part IV concludes.

I. History of the Accredited Investor Category

The definition of “accredited investor” was originally developed to implement the private offering exemption in section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act but over time has moved further and further away from the original conception. The evolution has led to a definition prompting many criticisms. This Part reviews these developments and the essential role of mandatory disclosure.5

A. The Disclosure Regime in the Securities Act

The heart of the Securities Act of 1933 was mandatory disclosure by a person selling securities. Section 5 required a person to have a registration statement in effect to sell a security, and

section 7 required the registration statement to have detailed and lengthy disclosures about the company issuing the securities and the securities themselves.6

The Securities Act did not restrict the potential buyers in a registered offering. Any person could buy. Under the Securities Act, the legal obligation of the issuer was to provide truthful and complete disclosure. If investors had full and true information about a company and its securities, they could make up their own minds about whether to buy. The law did not limit potential investors to landowners, financial institutions, or natural persons with a large net worth or with the ability to sustain the loss of the investment.7 The law did not limit the amount of money a person could invest.

The federal securities laws were to increase the flow of accurate information and not to protect investors in a paternalistic way from potentially bad investments. Investors were free to put their own resources at risk. They could buy securities in a company that looked risky or that proved to be successful or not successful. The Act respected the liberty and personal autonomy of potential investors. Investor protection was the spirit of the federal securities laws, but it was protection consistent with the country’s history and tradition of freedom and self-reliance.8

B. The Statutory Private Offering Exemption

The elaborate process for a registered public offering did not apply in certain circumstances. In sections 3 and 4 of the Act, Congress exempted certain types of securities and transactions from

7 Knight, supra note 5, at 4 (anyone can buy in the public markets).
8 See Michael Piwowar, Acting SEC Chairman, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2017, Washington, D.C.: Remembering the Forgotten Investor (Feb. 24, 2017) (“Unlike merit-based regimes, our system of disclosure comports well with American traditions of self-reliance, pioneering spirit, and rugged individualism. By arming investors with information, they can evaluate and make investment decisions that support more accurate valuations of securities and a more efficient allocation of capital.”); Knight, supra note 5, at 4 (the accredited investor category denies individuals the choice to take certain financial risks).
the registration process. The House report accompanying one of the main predecessors of the Act said the bill “carefully exempts from its application certain types of securities and securities transactions where there is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits are too remote.”

One of the exemptions, now in section 4(a)(2), was for “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering,” often called the private offering exemption. Two main judicial decisions interpreted the exemption.

The leading authority is *SEC v. Ralston Purina*. The Supreme Court began by saying that the “design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions. The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory purpose.” The court then concluded that “the exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees,” who were employees of Ralston Purina, and that the “focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration. The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose.”

The court referred to the actual knowledge of the offerees of information that would be in a registration statement and to their access to that information. “Access” did not mean the ability of an outsider to ask or bargain for information and receive it. Rather, it was about “executive personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that the Act would make available in the form of a registration statement.”

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11 Id. at 124–25 (footnote omitted).
12 Id. at 126, 127.
13 Id. at 125–26.
The opinion also said that an “offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering,’” but that phrase has been misconstrued and taken out of context over the years. The question was whether a person needed the protections of the Act, and the protections of the Act were the disclosures in a registration statement. People able to fend for themselves were those possessing or having access to the information that would be in a registration statement. Being able to fend for yourself did not mean wealth, sophistication, or the ability to sustain a loss.

More than 20 years later, the Fifth Circuit in Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp. considered the private offering exemption and Ralston Purina. The Doran decision has become a leading authority and is featured in several securities regulation casebooks. The court decided that the private offering exemption did not apply unless “each offeree had been furnished information about the issuer that a registration statement would have disclosed or ... each offeree had effective access to such information.”

The Fifth Circuit drew a distinction between offerees who were furnished with the information a registration statement would provide and offerees who had access to that information. All offerees must have the information available in one of the two ways “as a necessary condition of gaining the private offering exemption.”

A high degree of business or legal sophistication of all offerees was not sufficient to qualify for the private offering exemption. “Sophistication is not a substitute of access to the

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14 Id. at 125.
15 Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
17 Doran, 545 F.2d at 897; see also Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959).
18 Doran, 545 F.2d at 903.
information that registration would disclose.”¹⁹ There “must be sufficient basis of accurate information upon which the sophisticated investor may exercise his skills.”²⁰

Sophistication of an offeree matters when an offeree is provided access to information but does not receive actual disclosure of information. The “investment sophistication of the offeree assumes added importance [when offered access], for it is important that he could have been expected to ask the right questions and seek out the relevant information.”²¹

The two cases established the principle that the private offering exemption applies when all offerees either have the information that would be in a registration statement or have access to that information. They can then fend for themselves. Investor sophistication is a consideration when an offeree has access but has not actually received the relevant information. As interpreted in these cases, the section 4(a)(2) private offering exemption was about offers to persons with or able to obtain the relevant disclosures and information and was not about special opportunities for the wealthy or financially sophisticated. It was not about systematically excluding broad swaths of the population from investment opportunities.

C. SEC Regulations to Implement the Private Offering Exemption

Judicial constructions of the private offering exemption in section 4(a)(2) did not provide the marketplace with the definiteness and certainty it demanded. The SEC addressed this problem with a series of rules leading to Regulation D and the concept of the accredited investor. As that category evolved, it grew further apart from appropriate disclosure and the court interpretations in _Ralston Purina_ and _Doran_.²²

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¹⁹ _Id._ at 902.
²⁰ _Id._ at 903.
²¹ _Id._ at 905.
²² A few paragraphs in this section appeared in substantially similar form in Vollmer, _supra_ note 4.
Early SEC efforts to bring more certainty to the private offering exemption followed the *Ralston Purina* principle of disclosure of or access to the information that would have been in a registration statement. That was true for a 1962 interpretation\(^\text{23}\) and for Rule 146, which was adopted in 1974. Rule 146 required substantial disclosures to each offeree unless the offeree had access to the information that would be in a registration statement. The SEC broadened the concept of access in *Ralston Purina* to mean an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining power that enabled the offeree to obtain information from the issuer to evaluate the merits and risks of the investment. The Rule also had provisions addressing an offeree’s ability to evaluate or bear the economic risks of the investment.\(^\text{24}\)

The SEC and Congress moved toward the current definition of accredited investor with developments in 1979 and 1980. The SEC proposed Rule 242 in 1979 and adopted it in 1980.\(^\text{25}\) The Rule had a category of accredited person, which included institutional investors and any person buying $100,000 or more of the offered securities. No disclosure document was needed if sales were made only to accredited persons. The SEC relied “on the ability of such persons to ask for and obtain the information they feel is necessary to their making an informed investment decision.”\(^\text{26}\) Also in 1980, Congress passed the Small Business Investment Incentive Act, which exempted offers and sales solely to accredited investors and defined accredited investors as one of five types of institutional entities or any person who—on the basis of factors such as financial

\(^{23}\) SEC, Non-Public Offering Exemption, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Nov. 16, 1962) (interpretation of private offering exemption, which depended mainly on “full disclosure of information” necessary to an informed investment decision).

\(^{24}\) 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d), (e & note (1979).


\(^{26}\) See SEC, Exemption of Limiting Offers and Sales by Corporate Issuers, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,258, 54,259 (Sept. 18, 1979) (proposed amendments to rules).
sophistication, net worth, knowledge and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under management—qualified as accredited under SEC rules.\textsuperscript{27}

The SEC then proposed Regulation D in 1981 and adopted it in 1982.\textsuperscript{28} It was a series of rules with exemptions and a safe harbor from the section 5 registration process for certain securities sales by issuers. It defined a category of accredited investors that included institutional investors, any person who purchased $150,000 of the securities so long as the purchase did not exceed 20 percent of the person’s net worth, and a natural person meeting either a net income or net worth test. The regulation also required that a non-accredited investor be sophisticated or have a sophisticated representative.

Under the current version of Regulation D, accredited investors continue to include legal entities and natural persons. For example, banks, registered broker-dealers, insurance companies, and registered investment companies are accredited investors. Tax-exempt charitable organizations, corporations, and partnerships with more than $5 million in total assets are accredited investors if they were not formed for the purpose of acquiring the offered securities. Individuals with a net worth of over $1 million excluding the value of a primary residence and individuals with an annual income of more than $200,000 or joint income of over $300,000 are accredited investors.\textsuperscript{29}

The SEC has explained that it has sought to be consistent with the basic criteria in \textit{Ralston Purina} and that the accredited investor definition encompasses those “persons whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or fend for themselves

\textsuperscript{28} SEC, Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982) (adoption of final rules).
\textsuperscript{29} See Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration process unnecessary.”

Such persons have “the ability to assess an investment opportunity—which includes the ability to analyze the risks and rewards, the capacity to allocate investments in such a way as to mitigate or avoid risks of unsustainable loss, or the ability to gain access to information about an issuer or about an investment opportunity—or the ability to bear the risk of a loss.”

The category of accredited investors plays an important role in the operation of the safe harbor from registration in Rule 506 of Regulation D. One part of the Rule, Rule 506(c), allows an issuer to sell an unlimited dollar amount of securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors using general solicitation or advertising as long as all buyers are accredited investors and the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify that they are. The other part of the Rule, Rule 506(b), allows an issuer to sell an unlimited dollar amount of securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 non-accredited investors as long as the non-accredited investors are sophisticated or have sophisticated representatives and as long as the issuer does not use general solicitation or advertising. The SEC explained that qualifying “as an accredited investor is significant because accredited investors may, under Commission rules, participate in investment opportunities that are generally not available to non-accredited investors, such as investments in private companies and offerings by certain hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds.”

One other provision in Regulation D sets accredited investors apart. The regulation states that sales made only to accredited investors do not need any disclosures. Current Rule 502(b)(1) states: “If the issuer sells securities under Rule 506(b) to any purchaser that is not an accredited

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30 Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2577.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2574–75.
investor, the issuer shall furnish the information specified [in another part of the Rule] to such purchaser a reasonable time prior to sale. The issuer is not required to furnish the specified information to purchasers when it sells securities . . . to any accredited investor.” The Rule has a note referring to the “anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws” and encouraging issuers to provide information to accredited investors when they provide information to non-accredited investors.

The net effect is striking. Issuers may use Rule 506 to sell an unlimited dollar amount of securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors, and the issuers have no legal obligation to disclose anything.

The private offering exemptions in Rules 506(b) and 506(c) of Regulation D are extremely popular, with the market showing a decided preference for Rule 506(b) transactions that do not include any non-accredited investors. In 2018, the amount raised using Rule 506(b) was $1.5 trillion, and the amount raised using Rule 506(c) was $211 billion. These amounts were mostly for pooled investment funds. The amount raised under Rule 506 exceeded the amount raised in registered public offerings in 2018, which was $1.4 trillion. In 2019, the amount raised under Rule 506 was $1.56 trillion, and the amount raised in public offerings was $1.2 trillion. Only a small percentage of Rule 506(b) transactions have included non-accredited investors. The SEC Concept Release said that “issuers reported non-accredited investors as participating in only six percent of Rule 506(b) offerings in each of 2015, 2016, 2017, and

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33 Id. at 2576–77, 2603–04.
One study found that 88 percent of Rule 506 offerings of $1 million or less were limited to accredited investors.\textsuperscript{36}

In January 2020, the SEC proposed amendments to the regulatory definitions to create new categories of natural persons and legal entities that would qualify as accredited investors. For example, the new definitions would cover natural persons with certain professional certifications or credentials from an accredited educational institution, such as broker-dealer employees holding a specified professional license. It would allow certain employees at private investment funds to invest in the funds. It would add new legal entities such as limited liability companies that have total assets in excess of $5 million and were not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities being offered. The SEC also proposed treating registered investment advisers as accredited investors.\textsuperscript{37} The SEC does not know the number of current accredited investors and does not know how many more accredited investors would exist if the agency adopts the new definitions.\textsuperscript{38}

When proposing the expansion of the types of permissible accredited investors, the SEC reasoned it had not detected particular problems of misconduct in sales to accredited buyers. It said: “we are not aware of widespread problems or abuses associated with Regulation D offerings to accredited investors” and “we are not aware from our enforcement experience or

\textsuperscript{35} Concept Release, supra note 5, at 30,467 n.47; see also Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2601.


\textsuperscript{37} See Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2579–87.

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 2601 (“We are not able to directly estimate the number of current accredited investors that would be affected by the proposed amendments as precise data on the number of individuals and entities that currently qualify as accredited investors are not available to us.”), 2602 (“We are not able to directly estimate the number of individuals who may newly qualify as accredited investors as a result of the proposed” amendments.), 2603 (“[W]hile we have information to estimate the number of some categories of institutional accredited investors, we lack comprehensive data that will allow us to estimate the unique number of investors across all categories of institutional accredited investors.”).
otherwise of disproportionate fraud” as inflation increased the number of natural persons qualifying as accredited investors.  

The proposals were each minor enlargements of the definition of an accredited investor. The SEC noted that it had received public comments recommending the elimination of the definition completely, but the SEC’s explanation of the proposals did not refute or give serious consideration to that option. The next Part of the paper ventures into that discussion.

II. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Accredited Investor Category

Aside from its long pedigree, does the category of accredited investors continue to be useful? Do strong reasons remain for maintaining a category of accredited investors, or could the category be abandoned with net benefits to capital formation and investor protection? That is the topic of this portion of the paper. It discusses the benefits of retaining the accredited investor category and then describes several reasons for not keeping it. The reasons for dispensing with the line between accredited and non-accredited investors are extremely strong. In particular, as explored in detail, the SEC’s rationale for the accredited investor category is deeply flawed, and many of the components of the category fail to effectuate even the flawed rationale.

A. Reasons to Keep the Accredited Investor Category

There are reasons to keep the accredited investor category; it produces some benefit. Issuers selling to accredited investors do not need to incur the costs of providing a list of mandatory disclosures. Regulation D does not require any disclosures to accredited investors.

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39 Id. at 2594, 2600.
40 See id. at 2575–77.
It also does not forbid an issuer from making disclosures to accredited investors, and anecdotal evidence revealed that practitioners often made disclosures even when the only buyers were accredited investors.\(^{41}\) That led me to collect data about the actual disclosure practice in private securities offerings to accredited investors by interviewing lawyers with extensive and recent experience representing participants in those offerings.

My survey of experienced practitioners showed that the deals sold to accredited investors always involved the supply of some information. The minimum was investor due diligence on founders or corporate records, and the maximum was a placement memorandum resembling a prospectus for a registered offer. Various factors, such as the nature of the buyers and the maturity and risks of the company’s business, were important considerations in determining the amount of disclosure. Other factors were the size of the offering and the amount of legal and accounting fees the issuer was able to spend on preparation of disclosure. Transactions with a financial intermediary or sales to less sophisticated accredited investors had more extensive disclosures. Sales to venture capital buyers often did not have a specially prepared disclosure document but involved a stock purchase agreement with representations and warranties from the issuer together with a disclosure schedule to modify or qualify the representations and warranties.\(^{42}\)

As a result, the real benefit of Rule 506 sales solely to accredited investors is that issuers have flexibility about the extent of the disclosures they make. They are able to decide on the disclosures that fit their company and target market of investors. They are free to conform disclosures to meet a series of factors, including the stage of development they are in, the level of sophistication of the buyers, and the amount of resources the company has. The current regulatory

\(^{41}\) See Concept Release, supra note 5, at 30,480 (stating that “issuers and funds conducting private accredited investor-only offerings often provide prospective purchasers with information about the issuer”).

\(^{42}\) See Vollmer, supra note 4.
structure allows the marketplace to set the right amount of voluntary disclosure. That freedom of choice and freedom from regulatory command is an attractive feature of the current system.

The practice of the legal experts who responded to the survey shows that the system is working in a commendable way. The practitioners deserve credit for making judgments about the types of buyers, companies, and transactions that need little, medium, or major disclosure. The interests of the issuers in getting a good price for the securities and avoiding liability no doubt were motivating factors, but the lawyers in the survey also acted to fill a gap in the law, exceeding minimum legal standards and providing higher levels of investor protection in keeping with general principles of the federal securities laws.

Nonetheless, the voluntary disclosures did not provide all the benefits of a mandatory disclosure system. Mandatory disclosures assure a minimum amount of key information. They are consistent and predictable and allow comparability between similar issuers. They reduce the need for investors to incur duplicative costs to obtain the information covered by the obligatory items. The disclosure decisions described by the survey respondents sounded reasonable, but the disclosures varied widely and were subject to the issuer’s discretion and resource constraints.

The evidence from the survey has implications for Rule 506 private offerings because the information from the survey blurs the line between sales to accredited investors and sales to non-accredited investors. Under Rule 506, a major difference is that no disclosures to accredited investors are required while disclosures to non-accredited investors are required. The ubiquity of issuer disclosures in private offerings to accredited investors goes a long way toward erasing the difference between accredited investors and non-accredited investors. The other major

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43 See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 16, at 26–30 (discussing the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure).
The distinction is that an issuer may not use a general solicitation or general advertising if a non-accredited investor buys.

**B. Reasons to Eliminate the Accredited Investor Category**

The reasons to consider eliminating the accredited investor category make up a much longer list and far outweigh the benefits from the current system. The distinction in Rule 506 between accredited investors and non-accredited investors is not good policy, does not serve its intended objectives, and does not provide a net regulatory benefit.\(^{44}\)

1. **Negative consequences from the accredited investor category.** The accredited investor rules have adverse effects. They exclude many investors from private offerings. As a legal and practical matter, non-accredited investors do not participate in Rule 506 offerings. Rule 506(c) does not allow any non-accredited buyers. Rule 506(b) limits the number of non-accredited buyers in a transaction to 35, but in any event only 6 percent of Rule 506(b) transactions have non-accredited buyers.\(^ {45}\) Given that, in recent years, Rule 506 transactions raised more money than registered offerings or exempt transactions in which non-accredited investors may buy, non-accredited investors do not participate in a large segment of primary offerings to raise capital.

   Recently, the objection has been that non-accredited investors have been excluded from attractive investment opportunities in growing private companies.\(^ {46}\) The exclusion has chafed

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\(^{44}\) Some of the following points are from a comment I submitted to the SEC in response to the Concept Release. Vollmer, *supra* note 5, at 5–9.

\(^{45}\) Concept Release, *supra* note 5, at 30,467 n.47; see also Accredited Investor Release, *supra* note 2, at 2601.

\(^{46}\) See Accredited Investor Release, *supra* note 2, at 2577 (“There may be investment opportunities, particularly with respect to early stage and high growth firms, in the Regulation D market that are not available to investors in registered securities offerings.”); Concept Release, *supra* note 5, at 30,467.
more as high-growth companies have remained private much longer.\(^{47}\) The chairman of the SEC objected to the accredited investor concept because it limits the ability of the bulk of retail investors to invest in startups during their high-growth phase. In June 2018 testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, Chairman Clayton said, “Because it is generally difficult and expensive for Main Street investors to invest in private companies, they will not have the opportunity to participate in the growth phase of these companies to the extent they choose not to enter our public markets or do so only later in their life cycle.”\(^{48}\) The Treasury Department raised similar concerns in an October 2017 report: “To the extent that companies decide not to go public due to anticipated regulatory burdens, regulatory policy may be unintentionally exacerbating wealth inequality in the United States by restricting certain investment opportunities to high income and high net worth investors.”\(^{49}\) According to this view, the accredited investor category divides the universe of investors into favored and disfavored classes.

The definitions of accredited investors involve governmental classifications of the investing public, embracing some and excluding others. Part of the discussion below demonstrates that the SEC’s definitions necessarily engage in drawing fine lines between different types of investors and inevitably end up with arbitrary and irrational distinctions. Sorting investors into the favored and disfavored classes heightens government intrusion into and control of private decisions and capital allocation. Definitions based on sophistication,
financial acumen, wealth, or ability to bear a loss are over- and under-inclusive and pry into personal privacy.

This governmental intervention reduces the personal liberty and autonomy of investors. The fundamental reform of the Securities Act, the need for an effective registration statement making a series of mandatory disclosures to sell securities, was to increase the flow of accurate information, not to protect investors in a paternalistic way from potentially bad investments. The Securities Act allowed any person to buy a security in a registered offering. If investors had true information about a company and its securities, they could make up their own minds about whether to buy. The law did not limit potential investors to financial institutions or natural persons with a large net worth or with the ability to sustain the loss of the investment. The evolution of the accredited investor definition is not consistent with legislation aimed at transmitting enough information to allow investors to make their own choices and protect themselves. A comment sent by a private person to the SEC about the exemptions from the registration requirement made the point when it argued for the abolition of the accredited investor category to “increase the freedom and liberty of the American public.”

Another disadvantage of the accredited investor rules is that they increase compliance and enforcement costs. Issuers in Rule 506 transactions either must have a reasonable belief or must take reasonable steps to verify that a buyer is an accredited investor. Issuers therefore must use verification procedures. The obligation to use reasonable verification steps under Rule 506(c) drew complaints about the costs and burdens, leading the SEC to propose some minor relief from the requirement. A further cost is that issuers can make mistakes when using verification

52 Exemption Release, supra note 34, at 17,980–81.
methods or identifying accredited investors, which creates the risk of losing the exemption or being embroiled in an enforcement investigation or proceeding.

2. Flaws in the rationale and definition of accredited investors. In addition to these negative consequences, the accredited investor category is badly conceptualized and poorly implemented. First, mandatory disclosure was the main reform of the Securities Act, and the absence of a disclosure requirement in Regulation D for accredited investors is not consistent with that reform. Although the registration requirement was and is subject to exemptions, the regulatory emphasis should lean toward disclosure obligations and against exceptions from disclosure.

Second, the definition of accredited investors does not comport with the type of offeree or buyer needed to qualify for the private offering exemption in section 4(a)(2) under the leading court decisions. The leading judicial interpretation applied the section 4(a)(2) exemption to those able to fend for themselves, but that phrase has been misapplied. People able to fend for themselves were those possessing or having access to the information that would be in a registration statement. Sophistication of an offeree played a role when the offeree was provided access to information but did not receive actual disclosure of information. Being able to fend for yourself did not mean wealth or the ability to sustain a loss.

Over time, the definition of an accredited investor expanded and changed and now is not closely correlated with a person who has information or access to it. Under the current definition, a natural person is an accredited investor based on net worth of $1 million excluding primary residence or annual income of $200,000 to $300,000, and legal entities such as corporations, partnerships, and nonprofit institutions are accredited investors if they have total assets over $5

million and were not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the offered securities. Banks, broker-dealers, and insurance companies are accredited investors. Those criteria and types of entities do not provide a rational connection to an investor’s possession of the information that would be in a company’s registration statement or to a position or relationship with the issuer that makes the information available to an investor. Involvement in the financial system, wealth, or assets have no bearing on a person’s actual knowledge about a particular company. Sophistication and access to information are discussed below. The accredited investor definition therefore has lost its relationship to the private offering exemption in section 4(a)(2).

Third, the SEC’s rationale for the accredited investor category is not cohesive and consistent. The SEC gave this explanation: “The characteristics of an investor encompassed within this standard . . . include the ability to assess an investment opportunity—which includes the ability to analyze the risks and rewards, the capacity to allocate investments in such a way as to mitigate or avoid risks of unsustainable loss, or the ability to gain access to information about an issuer or about an investment opportunity—or the ability to bear the risk of a loss.” In essence, the SEC’s reasons to set accredited investors apart are sophistication and experience with financial investments or the capacity to lose money, but the reasons are flawed.

Ability to bear a loss is an odd factor and does not deserve much weight. It is not connected with knowledge of the information that would be in a registration statement, financial sophistication, understanding of the risks and rewards of an investment, or the experience or knowledge to ask the issuer the right questions. The SEC conceded that an investment loss of an investor who is sophisticated but who lacks a high net worth or income could be significant. Even wealth and income are not closely aligned with the ability to lose

54 Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2577.
55 Id. at 2583.
money. People tend to have low wealth at younger ages, build wealth during peak working and earning years, and then spend their saved money during retirement.\(^{56}\) As a result, people are likely to have more wealth toward the time they can least afford to lose it. In addition, the wealth and income tests are not tied to the amount of a person’s investments. No matter how wealthy a person is, he or she is unlikely to be able to bear a loss that exceeds the person’s net worth or annual income. An individual with a net worth of $4.5 million would face hardship from an investment loss of $5 million.\(^{57}\)

The dominant theme in the SEC’s accredited investor approach is a person’s ability to assess and analyze the risks and rewards of an investment opportunity and avoid bad choices, but this emphasis on financial sophistication is not consistent with the absence of a mandatory disclosure requirement for sales to accredited investors. No matter how sophisticated, an investor is not capable of evaluating an investment opportunity with little or no information about the investment. There “must be sufficient basis of accurate information upon which the sophisticated investor may exercise his skills.”\(^{58}\)

This means that the SEC’s reason for giving special treatment to sophisticated investors places great—but inadequately justified—weight on their presumed ability to request and obtain the necessary information. The SEC included “the ability to gain access to information about an issuer or about an investment opportunity” as one characteristic of financial sophistication. The Doran decision connected sophistication with the ability to request the right kind and amount of information: The “investment sophistication of the offeree assumes added importance [when


\(^{57}\) See Knight, *supra* note 5, at 13.

\(^{58}\) Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977).
offered access], for it is important that he could have been expected to ask the right questions and seek out the relevant information.”

The SEC also relied on that assumption about sophisticated investors in proposing a private offering rule adopted in 1980.

Despite the obvious importance of a person’s ability to request relevant information given the lack of required disclosures, the SEC devoted almost no attention to this factor in its three recent lengthy reviews of the accredited investor category. The SEC did not produce evidence that each of the different types of accredited investors in fact knows what information to demand from securities issuers. It did not produce evidence that accredited investors actually request information and obtain it. The SEC did not discuss data on whether issuers refuse requests in certain situations or from certain types of accredited investors, such as natural persons. The SEC did not discuss the utility or effectiveness of Rule 502(b)(v), which requires an issuer in a Rule 506(b) transaction to make available an opportunity to ask questions and receive answers. It did not discuss or explain why that opportunity exists in Rule 506(b) transactions but not in Rule 506(c) transactions, in which all buyers must be accredited investors. The SEC did not test or sustain the theory that financial sophistication results in appropriate disclosure.

The results of my survey of practitioners experienced in private offerings to accredited investors fill this gap to some extent. Survey respondents said that issuers typically provided prospective buyers with an opportunity to ask questions and receive answers and additional information and that potential buyers have taken up this offer and have sometimes recommended or suggested items for disclosure. In addition, the main result of the survey was

59 Id. at 905.
60 See SEC, Exemption of Limiting Offers and Sales by Corporate Issuers, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,258, 54,259 (Sept. 18, 1979) (proposing a category of accredited persons and referring to their ability “to ask for and obtain the information they feel is necessary to their making an informed investment decision”).
that issuers provided some form of information or disclosures in nearly every private offering to accredited investors.62

On the surface, the practice of making voluntary disclosures to accredited investors appears to support the idea that sophisticated investors seek out and obtain information relevant to an investment, but the interviews during the survey conveyed that the issuers rather than the investors initiated the disclosures and the issuers adjusted the extent of the disclosures to different audiences. My sense from the interviews was that issuers and their lawyers prompted the disclosures and made them of their own volition at least in part to provide essential information to potential buyers. Several survey respondents said that Form S-1 and Regulation S-K were guides for the disclosures, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws acted as a major influence on the level of voluntary disclosures. Years of experience with registered offerings and reporting companies set standards for appropriate disclosure. One respondent said that when “the resources are available, the preference is to provide substantially the same level of disclosure that would be provided if the offering also would be placed with non-accredited investors. SEC-mandated line-item disclosures provide a roadmap to material disclosures required to satisfy the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.” Another survey respondent differed and attributed the influence of standard securities law disclosures to the expectations of investors, who have become accustomed to those disclosures. Causes and effects are difficult to separate—issuers and their advisers could be making disclosures at their initiative because of experience with and expectations about investor demand—but lawyers in the survey more frequently cited the preferences of issuers for the voluntary disclosures. For these reasons, there is not strong support for the view that the types of

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62 See Vollmer, supra note 4.
persons classified as accredited investors have and exercise the ability to seek out and obtain information relevant to an investment.

The fourth problem with the SEC’s conception of accredited investors is that several of the types of persons in the current and proposed definition do not meet the financial sophistication criteria of the SEC’s standard. That is not to say that all types fail the test; many easily qualify as financially sophisticated, such as banks, broker-dealers, and insurance companies. Other parts of the definition do not provide the same assurance, such as the wealth and income tests for natural persons. Those criteria do not provide a rational connection to an investor’s ability to fend for him- or herself by having knowledge of information in a registration statement or having an ability to ask for and obtain the information he or she felt necessary to making an informed investment decision.63

The income and wealth tests for qualifying a natural person as an accredited investor in Regulation D have been criticized for a wide variety of reasons.64 Income and wealth are not effective ways of identifying the persons who understand the risks of buying securities and are not even effective ways of defining a population of persons sufficiently sophisticated to request relevant disclosures. An individual may acquire high compensation or wealth in many ways other than actions that provide a basis for evaluating an investment opportunity. The financial tests include individuals who have no ability to evaluate securities investments and exclude individuals who do have the ability.

63 Concept Release, supra note 5, at 30,475.
The SEC acknowledged that commenters had “the view that the income and net worth tests fail to identify correctly those individuals who should be accredited investors” but asserted its belief that “the use of financial thresholds as one method of qualifying as an accredited investor is appropriate.”\textsuperscript{65} The SEC referred to a 2015 staff report that discussed several academic studies relating wealth to sophistication, but the studies are a flimsy basis for maintaining the wealth and income tests. The studies produced some data to show that wealthier investors engaged in questionable investment behavior, such as delayed sales of losing investments and limited diversification of portfolios, less frequently than lower-income subjects, but the results were only that the wealthier did better than the less wealthy and did not establish that wealthier individuals were capable of analyzing the risks and rewards of investment opportunities. For example, one survey the staff discussed “found that higher income individuals correctly answered 3.5 out of five questions on a financial literacy quiz compared to only 2.2 correct responses for lower income individuals.”\textsuperscript{66} The staff report was obliged to concede that the studies did no more than “lend support to the theory that wealth is correlated to financial sophistication” and admitted that the “reasons underlying the correlation between wealth and sophistication found in the studies and surveys are not definitively known.”\textsuperscript{67}

At least one of the recently proposed additions to the accredited investor category remains detached from the standards the SEC set out, and it highlights the irrationality of including some legal entities already defined to be accredited investors. According to current Rule 501(a)(3), accredited investors include corporations, partnerships, and nonprofit

\textsuperscript{65} Accredited Investor Release, \textit{supra} note 2, at 2593; \textit{see also} Concept Release, \textit{supra} note 5, at 30,475. 
\textsuperscript{67} Id. at 44–46; \textit{see also} Knight, \textit{supra} note 5, at 14 & n.50 (“evidence is mixed”).
organizations that were not formed to make the specific investment and that have over $5 million in assets. The SEC proposes to add limited liability companies to this provision.\(^6\)

The rules for forming an LLC provide no assurance of financial sophistication. A single individual with a very small net worth or income may create an LLC to conduct a personal business. The only qualification is that the person needs to be 18 years old. The formation process is cheap, simple, and easy. With minor variations, the same is true for corporations and partnerships.\(^6\) The owners and managers of an LLC, corporation, or partnership do not need to demonstrate any knowledge, education, experience, or ability to evaluate investments or even to conduct the business of the company. The only connection of LLCs, corporations, and partnerships with the ability to evaluate the risks and benefits of a possible purchase of securities is that they are forms of business entities, but the purposes of the different forms of business organization (consolidation of skills and financial resources and management of liability and taxation) are entirely distinct from identifying the ability to evaluate the risks and rewards of a securities investment. The correlation of the business forms to investment ability and acumen is tenuous.

The need to own assets worth more than $5 million does not save the category. Acquiring $5 million in assets is not a sufficient marker of the capability of sophisticated financial analysis.\(^7\)

The provision defining corporations, partnerships, and nonprofit organizations as accredited investors is overbroad. Adding LLCs would be consistent with treating corporations

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\(^6\) Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2587.


\(^7\) See Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2588 (observing that an entity might “have $5 million in non-financial assets such as land, buildings, and vehicles, but not have any investment experience”).
and partnerships as accredited investors but equally irrational. Little supports the SEC’s assertion that these entities “should be considered to have the requisite financial sophistication to qualify as accredited investors.” Qualification should depend on characteristics that more reliably connect a particular business with investment capacity.

Other recently proposed categories of accredited investors do a much better job of corresponding to a person capable of meaningful investment analysis. These include registered investment advisers and natural persons with certain certifications as a securities professional. Nonetheless, expanding the types of persons who qualify as accredited investors continues to require the government to engage in problematic line-drawing. The SEC acknowledged that. Including individuals with some professional credentials excludes individuals with many comparable credentials. Including LLCs and corporations with $5 million of assets but requiring other entities to own investments in excess of $5 million might draw an unnecessary distinction. As discussed above, the objection to this line-drawing is that it involves the government in making indefensible distinctions that favor some and work to the detriment of the personal liberty of the disfavored group.

The list of reasons to discontinue the category of accredited investors for private offerings is long. The category imposes several social costs on the regulatory system, such as the segmentation of the investing public, the infringement on personal liberty, and the added compliance costs, and is in many ways divorced from its objectives. The costs and complications of keeping the accredited investor category seem to be far greater than the benefits. If types of accredited investors do not possess proper information about a company, do

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71 Id. at 2587.
72 Id. at 2582.
73 Id. at 2588 (request for comment 24).
not know enough to demand the right kinds of information, and lack the education or experience to analyze the financial implications of a purchase of a security, then they are not different from non-accredited investors in a way that is relevant to satisfying the section 4(a)(2) private offering exemption. If they are not different in a legally relevant way from non-accredited investors, the distinction should be eliminated. Getting rid of the accredited investor classification would generate various economic benefits and would pave the way to a better regulatory safe harbor for private offerings.

III. Possible Approaches to the Elimination of the Accredited Investor Category

What would be a better approach to a private offering safe harbor if the accredited investor category were abolished? The leading judicial decisions on section 4(a)(2) and the results of my survey of private offering practitioners prompt some possibilities.

One would be a private offering exemption that removes the difference between accredited and non-accredited investors, continues not to require any disclosures, and continues to rely on issuers to provide sufficient voluntary disclosures. Offerings would be open to all investors.

Under this exemption, issuers would likely continue to make voluntary disclosures, but the potential buyers would be all types of investors and not just those with a patina of sophistication. As today, the disclosures would not necessarily produce all the benefits that mandatory disclosures generate: supply of a minimum amount of essential information,

74 The SEC’s proposal to expand the definition of accredited investors describes the economic costs and benefits for investors and issuers of a larger investor base for Rule 506 transactions. See Accredited Investor Release, supra note 2, at 2600, 2604–08 (“[T]he proposed amendments, by expanding the pool of accredited investors, would improve the ability of issuers to raise capital in the exempt markets and reduce competition among issuers for investors, thus reducing the cost of capital.”). Removing the accredited investor category entirely would have several of the same effects.
consistency, predictability, and comparability. The flexibility and discretion of a voluntary disclosure system could but probably would not meet the requirements of the section 4(a)(2) private offering exemption: knowledge or actual receipt of or ready access to the essential information that would be in a thorough company disclosure.

The real problem with an exemption of this sort, however, is that it would go down a path toward repeal of the registered offering in the Securities Act. In the Securities Act, Congress replaced a system of voluntary disclosures from issuers with the registered offer requiring a list of mandatory disclosures to offerees of all types. An exemption open to all investors and reliant on issuer decisions about disclosures would undo much of that reform, which has become an entrenched and valued part of federal securities regulation. Circumventing it with an exemption would not be acceptable as a legal or policy matter.

Another possible approach to a private offering safe harbor is to eliminate the category of accredited investors but require delivery of a solid disclosure document. If the accredited investor concept is abandoned, a rule-based private offering exemption should return to the central idea for the private offering exemption in section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act as construed in *Ralston Purina* and *Doran*. The central idea is knowledge or actual receipt of the information that would be in a robust disclosure document or access to that information. The exemption proposed here would rely on the delivery of essential disclosures and would not rely on a person’s access to the information or a person’s sophistication and ability to request the necessary information. This would avoid possible disagreements over the meaning of “access” to the appropriate disclosures by requiring delivery of them.

The disclosure obligation of the new exemption should provide essential company and security information to buyers but avoid the high costs associated with more extensive
disclosures, such as those in a registered offer, a Regulation A offer, or a sale under Rule 506(b) to a non-accredited investor.\textsuperscript{75} The burdensome disclosure obligation for a Rule 506(b) sale to a non-accredited investor is the reason not to eliminate the accredited investor category and extend the current disclosure obligation in Rule 506 to all investors. The test for appropriate disclosure should be the basic information that any investor would require before investing but not the excessive detail and coverage that a registration statement has come to include over time. The new exemption would streamline disclosure of core company information to a prospective buyer, and that disclosure would both satisfy the private offering exemption and dispense with the need for an accredited investor limitation.

A reporting company would need to provide a potential buyer with its main recent public filings and material recent developments. The model for disclosure by a non-reporting company would be the initial offering statement required by Regulation CF, which governs crowdfunding transactions.\textsuperscript{76} With some deletions and modifications, the crowdfunding disclosures are a reasonable model for a new private offering exemption because crowdfunding is open to all investors and is aimed at very small startup companies, which are not able to afford the preparation of more extensive disclosures. The mandatory disclosures cover only basic information such as the background of officers and directors, the business of the issuer, the material risk factors, a description of the intended use of proceeds, and the terms of the securities being offered.\textsuperscript{77} Some of the obligatory disclosures for a crowdfunding offer are irrelevant or too burdensome, such as disclosures related to the target amount of the offering and the need for

\textsuperscript{75} For a discussion of the costs of a registered offering and certain exempt offerings, see Vollmer, supra note 5, at 10–11. A registration statement must comply with section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, and associated statutes and regulations. A Regulation A transaction must comply with 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 to 263.

\textsuperscript{76} 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1; 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100 to 503.

\textsuperscript{77} See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 227.201.
audited financial statements from companies not able to afford them, and the new exemption should delete them or scale them back.

The only part of Regulation CF that the new exemption would adopt would be the offering statement on Form C,78 with the modifications and exclusions just described. The other features of the crowdfunding exemption, such as the rules for intermediaries and investors and the remaining rules for issuers, would not be incorporated.79

In 2019, the SEC staff used several sources of information to estimate the costs incurred by issuers in conducting equity crowdfunding campaigns during the first two and a half years of the operation of Regulation CF. The costs included an internet site, issuer disclosures, film, video, marketing firm, lawyer, and accountant but excluded the cost of the intermediary broker-dealer or portal. The average cost of disclosures was $6,218. If all of the legal and accounting costs were attributed to the initial disclosures and added to the cost of disclosures, the average

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78 See 17 C.F.R. § 227.203(a)(1).
Commentators criticized the costs and regulatory burdens associated with the crowdfunding exemption. See Usha R. Rodrigues, Financial Contracting with the Crowd, 69 EMORY L.J. 397, 411–18, 440 (2019) (discussing difficulty and expense of using Regulation CF and saying “equity crowdfunding under the SEC’s rules and regulations is an arduous process,” has “daunting complexity,” and is unworkable and broken); Patricia H. Lee, Access to Capital or Just More Blues? Issuer Decision-Making Post SEC Crowdfunding Regulation, 18 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 19 (2016); Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 217, 251–55 (2015); Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493 (2014); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011). The basis for the concern that the costs of using the crowdfunding exemption would exceed the benefits was mostly the combination of the many layers of regulatory requirements and not the costs of preparing the initial offering statement. See Lee, supra, at 19, 38. One writer noted that the crowdfunding disclosure requirements are much less extensive than those for a registered offering. He cited some critics of crowdfunding who said there would be too little disclosure, opening the floodgates to securities fraud (which does not seem to have happened), and he cited other critics who complained there would be too much required disclosure, making crowdfunding too expensive for small issuers to use. Dorff, supra, at 506, 508. The reviews of the crowdfunding exemption were not all negative. See Qing Burke, “Determinants of Securities Crowdfunding Success under SEC Regulation Crowdfunding” (Miami University of Ohio, Working Paper, Sept. 20, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3425853 (finding that 63 percent of companies conducting securities crowdfunding campaigns from 2016 to 2018 successfully raised capital and that ventures that have higher revenue and larger management teams, are older in firm age, and are located in California or New York are more likely to receive funds from crowdfunding investors).
cost of the disclosures was $12,804. These data give some idea of the likely modest cost of preparing a disclosure document of the type proposed for the new exemption.

The required disclosures would be a minimum. Issuers would know what disclosures needed to be made but would be free to supplement required disclosures with additional information. Investors and issuers would retain the ability to negotiate other aspects of the sale process, such as the terms of the securities, additional disclosures, or access to books and records for due diligence. Obligatory disclosures would not be likely to increase over time. They would be fixed in an SEC regulation and not easily expanded by private plaintiffs, courts, or informal SEC action.

Issuers would be free to sell to any buyer, including a person who is a non-accredited investor under current law. Some issuers might prefer to sell a private tranche only to buyers they know or buyers that meet the current standards for accredited investors. They could do that. The goal of the new approach is to increase the capital base and the flexibility of an issuer.

Requiring an initial disclosure document would impose a compliance cost that current Rule 506 does not impose. Three factors justify the cost. First, the results of the survey of lawyers experienced with private offerings to accredited investors show that the actual practice of most issuers is to incur the cost and burden of preparing a set of disclosures. Making a reasonable set of disclosures mandatory would not significantly increase the costs. Second, disclosure is the essence of the approach of the federal securities laws, and Rule 506 has strayed too far from that concept. Third, the proposed disclosures would be significantly reduced from the disclosures

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80 SEC Staff, Regulation Crowdfunding 14, 23, 25 (June 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation-crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf. The total cost of a crowdfunding campaign, again excluding the cost of the intermediary, was approximately 5.3 percent of the amount raised, and the average total cost was $22,479. Id. The average cash compensation paid to intermediaries in these crowdfunding offerings was 5.7 percent of the offering proceeds. Id. at 47. The SEC staff found little evidence of fraud or misconduct in equity crowdfunding transactions. Id. at 42–44.

81 See Vollmer, supra note 4.
required in other parts of the federal securities laws. The idea for the new exemption is to require core company and security information, but not anything like the disclosures mandated by registered offers or most other exempt offerings. The cost of preparing the envisioned disclosure document is meant to be manageable for startup and small companies and is not meant to be so sizable that use of the new exemption would be prohibitively expensive.

The proposed exemption has many more details but, in general, would have very few restrictions and limitations. The intent would be to offer a simple, streamlined, and flexible method of raising capital to a broad range of issuers and all potential investors based on delivery of a reasonable but not unduly costly set of disclosures.

The contemplated private offering safe harbor would be different from a registered offer to the public. The main difference would be the substantially reduced disclosure obligation, and the reason for that difference is the high cost of preparing a registration statement. Other differences could be considered to maintain separation from public offerings. If the SEC believes the new exemption would tread too much into the territory of registered offerings, it could consider a prohibition on the use of general solicitations or a limit on the amount of money that could be raised with the exemption. It could treat securities sold under the exemption as restricted securities for resale purposes. Adding any of these restrictions would not be desirable, but some might want a greater distinction between exempt private offerings and registered offerings.

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82 The comment submitted to the SEC described the details. See Vollmer, supra note 5, at 11–15.
IV. Conclusion

The private offering safe harbor in Rule 506 of Regulation D created a type of buyer called accredited investors and simplified sales to them. One simplification was to omit mandatory disclosures to accredited investors.

On examination, keeping the accredited investor category seems to entail costs and complications that exceed the benefits. The theory for the accredited investor category was that it would implement the statutory private offering exemption in a regulatory safe harbor, but, over time, the definition of an accredited investor expanded and changed and is no longer closely correlated with the original concept. Many types of accredited investors do not possess the information about a company and securities offering that would be in a solid set of disclosures and do not have the positions or capacity to have ready access to that information. Under the current approach, the criteria for accredited investors are financial sophistication, moderate financial resources, or the capacity to lose money, yet several of the types of persons in the existing and proposed definition do not meet the financial sophistication or other criteria of the SEC’s standard.

Maintaining the category of accredited investors also imposes serious costs. Non-accredited investors have been excluded from attractive investment opportunities in growing private companies. The distinction between accredited investors and non-accredited investors therefore sorts sources of capital into favored and disfavored classes and reduces the personal liberty and autonomy of non-accredited investors. Obeying the rules on accredited investors also increases compliance and enforcement costs.

The SEC should consider developing a private offering safe harbor that removes the distinction between accredited and non-accredited investors and is open to all investors. If it did
so, the exemption should require a disclosure document delivered to all offerees, but the set of mandatory disclosures should be much more streamlined and shorter than the disclosures in a registration statement or a public company’s annual report. The use of an obligatory disclosure document would return the regulatory private offering exemption much closer to the original understanding in the courts of the statutory private offering exemption. The cost and burden of preparing disclosures should not pose a significant regulatory disincentive to private offerings because evidence from a survey of experienced practitioners showed that issuers currently incur the costs of preparing disclosures in a high percentage of transactions even though the law does not require any disclosures.