July 2, 2007

Nancy M. Morris  
Secretary  
Securities & Exchange Commission  
100 F Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20549-1090

Re: File No. S7-12-07 -- Electronic Filing and Simplification of Form D

Dear Ms. Morris:

The Commission should go much further than the baby steps it has proposed regarding Form D. It should take this opportunity to eliminate the prohibition on “general solicitation and general advertising” for all private offerings as a first step to eliminating all securities regulations that violate the First Amendment. Since Regulation D was adopted as a safe harbor for private securities offerings in 1982, there have been many instances in which courts including the United States Supreme Court have found various restrictions on truthful commercial speech to violate the First Amendment. In fact, it is fair to say that virtually any prohibition on truthful nonmisleading communications about a public or private securities offering would probably be declared unconstitutional today.

Currently, Bulldog Investors is the target of a politically motivated enforcement action initiated by Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin, (dubbed by one blogger as “the Nifong of the North” -- see http://www.bluemassgroup.com/showDiary.do;jsessionid=18AFE22E9E885AB073EF8572E4E6581B?diaryId=6146). The complaint alleges that we violated that state’s prohibition on general solicitation and advertising of unregistered securities, i.e., interests in our hedge funds. Mr. Galvin’s silly complaint stems from our truthful response to an unsolicited inquiry by a visitor to the Bulldog Investors website. (The visitor falsely pretended to be a potential investor in order to entrap us.) The complaint is available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctbulldog/bulldogidx.htm.

We did nothing wrong. Therefore, in addition to contesting the enforcement action, we filed a complaint against Secretary Galvin in the Superior Court of Massachusetts for violating our right to free speech under color of state law. Our brief is attached. Suffolk County Superior Court Judge Ralph D. Gants has indicated that he will consider our First Amendment claim and our motion for a preliminary injunction promptly after the administrative hearing officer in makes a decision. (The administrative hearing officer is Mr. Galvin’s general counsel. This is the Galvinized version of due process.) In any event, we are confident that we will prevail when Judge Gants reviews the merits of our case.
In a press report about our case, former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said: “I think that the court cases have made it clear that in the absence of fraud it’s going to be very, very hard to clamp down on people’s right to speak” and “whether Mr. Goldstein has a claim in that regard, I don’t know, but I think that the Supreme Court has warned people to be very cautious of impinging on corporate rights to free speech.”

In short, since *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Com’n of N. Y.*, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), courts have applied a three-part test to a regulation that prohibits truthful nonmisleading commercial speech. For such a regulation to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the government must prove that the regulation (1) relates to a substantial government interest; (2) directly and materially advances the asserted state interest; and (3) is narrowly tailored. For example, in *Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman* 13 F. Supp.2d 51 (1998), the Washington D.C. District Court found that the FDA could not prohibit drug manufacturers from distributing journal articles that described so called “off label,” i.e., non-FDA approved uses of pharmaceuticals or medical devices, stating:

> If there is one fixed principle in the commercial speech arena, it is that “a State’s paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it.” 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497... To endeavor to support a restriction upon speech by alleging that the recipient needs to be shielded from that speech for his or her own protection, which is the gravamen of the FDA's claim here, is practically an engraved invitation to have the restriction struck.”

The *Central Hudson* test has been operational for twenty-seven years. There is no obvious reason to distinguish securities regulations that restrict truthful nonmisleading commercial speech from pharmaceutical or any other regulations that restrict truthful nonmisleading commercial speech.

The Commission should review the current state of commercial speech jurisprudence and then develop a comprehensive plan to eliminate any regulations that do not comport with it. A good place to begin is with the ban on general solicitation and advertising required by Regulation D.

Very truly yours,

Phillip Goldstein
Principal
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, SS

BULLDOG INVESTORS GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,
OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS, L.P.,
FULL VALUE PARTNERS L.P.,
OPPORTUNITY INCOME PLUS FUND, L.P.,
KIMBALL & WINTHROP, INC.,
FULL VALUE ADVISORS, LLC,
SPAR ADVISORS, LLC,
PHILLIP GOLDSTEIN,
STEVEN SAMUELS,
ANDREW DAKOS,
RAJEEV DAS &
LEONARD BLONESS,

PLAINTIFFS,

v.

WILLIAM GALVIN, SECRETARY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, &
PATRICK AHEARN, CHIEF OF ENFORCEMENT,
SECURITIES DIVISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH,

DEFENDANTS.

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND A 7-DAY SHORT ORDER OF NOTICE
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INTRODUCTION

Through causes of action created by the federal and Massachusetts civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and M.G.L.c. 12, §111, plaintiffs seek a short order of notice and, after a hearing, a preliminary injunction against enforcement against them by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, through an administrative complaint pending against plaintiffs\(^1\) or otherwise, of securities laws and regulations which on their face, and as applied to a website that will be referred to herein as the “Bulldog Investors website,” purport to proscribe and punish the constitutionally-protected dissemination of truthful information about several of the plaintiffs, some of which are Bulldog hedge funds.

In this motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs contend that securities laws and regulations that condition the exemption of an issuer of securities from being deemed to have engaged in a “public offering” on refraining from truthful “advertising” or “solicitation” violate free speech and free press protections guaranteed by the federal and Massachusetts constitutions. See Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 370-372 (2002). Though Plaintiff Leonard Bloness does not desire to invest in hedge funds, he is an interested potential reader of the website so as to become more informed about hedge funds, and the Bulldog funds in particular. Mr. Bloness seeks a preliminary injunction because the prosecution of the Secretary’s administrative complaint infringes on his constitutional right to obtain access to and read truthful information about the Bulldog funds.

\(^1\) A copy of the defendants’ administrative complaint is attached as Exhibit 1 to the instant civil rights complaint.
The Secretary’s administrative complaint seeks the imposition of sanctions including a cease and desist order that would operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint against, and an equally unconstitutional “administrative fine” to impose deterrent punishment for, making certain truthful information accessible through the Bulldog Investors website.

The plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm every day that they are chilled and prevented from exercising their free speech and free press rights. But for the threat of sanctions and the litigation burden imposed by the Secretary, the Bulldog Investors website would continue to operate as it did prior to the Secretary’s action. However, the website’s continued operation is being chilled, deterred and prevented by the Secretary’s unconstitutional actions under color of Massachusetts law.

This court should issue a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of securities laws and regulations as instrumentalities of unconstitutional censorship and suppression of constitutionally-protected communications.

I. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO PREVENT INFRINGEMENT OF FREE SPEECH AND PRESS RIGHTS.

The federal and Massachusetts civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and M.G.L.c. 12, § 111) provide for injunctive relief for violations of federal and state constitutional rights committed by those acting under color of state law.² State agencies and

² 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”
municipalities are not immune from injunctions that proscribe violations of the First Amendment. See e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 410 Mass. 188 (1991) (Commissioner of Revenue enjoined from enforcing tax on newspapers that violated First Amendment); T&D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 423 Mass. 577 (1996) (upholding issuance of preliminary injunction where plaintiff asserted that its First Amendment rights were violated by city’s adult entertainment zoning ordinances).

Further, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their constitutional claims in administrative proceedings before seeking injunctive relief. See T&D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 3 Mass.L.Rep. 427, 1994 Mass. Super. LEXIS 5 (December 8, 1994), at *7, n.5, (“It is well settled that there is no requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies where, as here, the action is for a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[,]” citing Urbanizadora Versailles, Inc. v. Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1982) and Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)). In any event, Mr. Bloness is not a party to any administrative proceeding.

Preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate where (a) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits, (b) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted, (c) the harm likely to be suffered by the moving party if the injunction is denied is greater than the harm likely to be suffered by the defendant if the injunction is granted, and (d) if the injunction is

M.G.L.c. 12, § 11I provides: “Any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in section 11H, may institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief as provided for in said section, including the award of compensatory money damages. Any aggrieved person or persons who prevail in an action authorized by this section shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees in an amount to be fixed by the court.

[When asked to grant a preliminary injunction, the judge initially evaluates in combination the moving party’s claim of success on the merits. If the judge is convinced that failure to issue the injunction would subject the moving party to a substantial risk of irreparable harm, the judge must then balance this risk against any similar risk of irreparable harm which granting the injunction would create for the opposing party. What matters as to each party is not the raw amount of irreparable harm the party might conceivably suffer, but rather the risk of such harm in light of the party's chance of success on the merits.]

Packaging Indus. Group, Inc., 380 Mass. at 617 (footnotes omitted). If the balance of harms favor the plaintiffs, as is true here, they need only show a substantial possibility of success on the merits. “[I]f the moving party can demonstrate both that the requested relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to it and that granting the injunction imposes no substantial risk of such harm to the opposing party, a substantial possibility of success on the merits warrant issuing the injunction.” Id. at 617. n.12 (emphasis added).

A preliminary injunction should be granted because the plaintiffs meet either standard: a substantial likelihood or a substantial possibility that their free speech and press claims will prevail.
Irreparable harm from infringement of free speech and press rights is defined so as to require courts considering injunctive relief to immediately and urgently prevent any governmental attempt to censor or punish constitutionally-protected speech. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” T&D Video v. City of Revere, 423 Mass. supra at 582, citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-4 (1976) (plurality).

The balance of harms and equities strongly favors the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm from infringement of their free speech and press rights if the Secretary is not enjoined. The administrative complaint does not allege that any harm resulted from the plaintiffs’ alleged violations of the securities laws. Ordering injunctive relief will impose virtually no risk of harm to the defendants’ ability to protect the public. Issuance of the preliminary injunction will not prevent the defendants from using available law enforcement means that do not involve impermissible infringements on free speech and free press rights to prevent issuers of unregistered securities from selling them to unsophisticated persons who are not “accredited” investors as defined in the securities laws. The issuance of injunctive relief promotes the public interest by assuring that our constitutional rights to obtain and exchange important information and ideas are not infringed.

FACTS

A. THE BULLDOG INVESTORS WEBSITE DOES NOT PROPOSE A TRANSACTION; MUCH LESS CREATE A RISK OF AN ILLEGAL TRANSACTION.
The Bulldog Investors website has been operational since June 9, 2005. Affidavit of Phillip Goldstein ("Goldstein Aff.") at ¶ 2. At no time have the plaintiffs engaged in any fraudulent or otherwise unlawful transaction involving the sale of an unregistered security to an unaccredited investor or anyone else. In their administrative proceeding, the defendants have not said otherwise. An issuer may lawfully sell an unregistered security to accredited investors. Investors in Bulldog Investors hedge funds must sign subscription agreements and be interviewed to verify their accredited investor status, as specified in Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)) and under Section 501(a) of SEC Rule D. 17 C.F.R. 230.501. Goldstein Aff. at ¶ 10. In sum and without contradiction of anything in the administrative complaint, there is no evidence that during the entire period the Bulldog Investors website was in operation, beginning on June 9, 2005, any harm sought to be prevented by any securities law has been suffered by any investor, or that any investor been put at risk of any such harm.

The Bulldog Investors website provided accurate, non-misleading information of interest to persons who do not necessarily desire to purchase unregistered securities issued by Bulldog funds, including journalists, academics, legislators, regulators, and others interested in hedge funds and the activities of Bulldog Investors.

B. THE BULLDOG INVESTORS WEBSITE AND E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS WITH BRENDAN HICKEY.

The Goldstein Affidavit states the following.

"Bulldog Investors" is an umbrella name for several private investment partnerships (or "hedge funds") including Opportunity Partners L.P., Full Value Partners L.P. and Opportunity Income Plus Fund L.P. Goldstein Aff. at ¶ 2.
The Bulldog Investors website referred to in the administrative complaint was activated on or about June 9, 2005. At no time could anyone engage in an investment transaction by communicating with or through the Bulldog Investors website. *Id.*

Attached to the Goldstein Affidavit as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the opening screen of the Bulldog Investors website. The administrative complaint alleges that passwords and information were provided to visitors to the Bulldog Investors website “simply after such persons acknowledge that he or she has read the website disclaimer.” Administrative Complaint at ¶ 50. (attached at Exhibit 1 to the Complaint) This is not accurate. No one could view any part of the website, other than the opening screen, a printable brochure and several press articles accessible from that screen, without expressly agreeing that the website did not constitute or include a solicitation to buy, or an offer to sell, any security. A true and accurate copy of the printable brochure is attached to the Goldstein Affidavit as Exhibit B. The pertinent language posted on the opening screen of the Bulldog Investors website states:

**Disclaimer**

*Please read the information below and click “I agree” at the bottom of the page.*

This website is issued by Bulldog Investors. The information is available for information purposes only and does not constitute solicitation as to any investment service or product and is not an invitation to subscribe for shares or units in any fund herein.

For the avoidance of doubt this website may not be used for the purpose of an offer or solicitation in any jurisdiction or in any circumstances in which such offer or solicitation is unlawful or not authorized. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information herein, Bulldog Investors accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of information, nor the reasonableness of the conclusions based upon such information, which has been obtained by third parties.
The pages referring specifically to investment products offered by Bulldog Investors are only available to view with a username and password, which can be obtained by contacting the company on the Registration Form provided. The value of investments and the income from them can fall as well as rise. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance and investors may not get back the full amount invested. Changes in the rates of exchange may affect the value of investments.

There is a button bearing the words, "I agree" which the website viewer could choose to push in order to communicate his agreement with the above-quoted conditions. Goldstein Aff. at ¶ 3. Only upon making this agreement could a website viewer obtain access to detailed financial performance information concerning any of the hedge funds. Id. at ¶ 4.

To obtain detailed financial performance information about specific hedge funds, a website visitor must have registered with Bulldog Investors, and requested such information by clicking a button entitled “Send Feedback.” Before that request could be made, however, anyone seeking to register must have again expressly agreed that the website, and information provided by the website, is not a solicitation to buy or an offer to sell. The text of this website registration page reads: “Before you submit your registration form, please confirm that you have read and agree with our Legal terms below.” The website viewer must place a checkmark in a box which is labeled “I Agree” in order to receive a password and further information from the Bulldog Investors website. Attached to the Goldstein Affidavit is a true and correct copy of the registration page by which a website visitor could make a request for information by expressing the visitor’s agreement that the visitor is neither being solicited to buy nor receiving an offer to sell any securities. Id. at ¶ 5.
Only after a website visitor has registered, agreed that the website and information provided is neither a solicitation nor an offer, and requested information by pressing the “Send Feedback” button, would Bulldog Investors provide information about particular funds, financial performance, and specific examples of investments. Id. at ¶ 6.

The defendants’ effort to suppress and censor information available through the Bulldog Investors website as a prohibited public “offer” of unregistered securities rings hollow when the even more detailed financial performance information, biographical information concerning managers and investment strategies concerning large numbers of hedge funds are available in frequently published sources online and at the Boston Public Library. See Affidavit of Ellen Rheaume and Elizabeth Rose, filed herewith.

The administrative complaint is predicated in part on Bulldog communications with an individual named Brendan Hickey of Quincy, Massachusetts. All communications on or about November 10, 2006, between Brendan Hickey and any plaintiff herein (which communications are documented in Exhibits B and C-1 through C-6 attached to the administrative complaint) occurred only after Mr. Hickey expressly agreed through the above described process that the information that he would receive via the Bulldog Investors website did not constitute a solicitation or offer to invest. Mr. Hickey was not offered anything for sale and did not purchase anything from any of the plaintiffs. Goldstein Aff. at ¶ 9.

No person can invest in any of the Bulldog Investors funds without first obtaining a private placement memorandum and a written limited partnership agreement, and then executing a subscription agreement issued by these limited partnerships which must be subsequently approved by a principal of the general partner. At no time could anyone
obtain copies of any these documents solely by communicating with or through the Bulldog Investors website. *Id.* at ¶ 10.

In fact, no person may invest in any of the Bulldog Investors funds without (a) first speaking to and being approved by a principal of the fund’s general partner and (b) approval by the general partner of a signed subscription agreement certifying, among other things, that the investor is an “accredited investor” as defined in Rule 501(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. *Id.*

Mr. Hickey never asked for and was never offered by, or received from, any plaintiff copies of, or information concerning, any limited partnership agreement, private placement memorandum or subscription agreement issued by any of the Bulldog Investors funds. *Id.* at ¶ 11.

These facts establish the following:

- The Bulldog Investors website had been functioning since June 9, 2005 without a single illegal transaction occurring.

- In view of the website disclaimer agreement mechanism which functioned at all times, no transaction was being proposed.

- The website communicated for non-transactional, information purposes only.

- Through the above-described exchange of e-mails, Brendan Hickey obtained Bulldog Investors website-sourced information about particular hedge funds, but only after expressly agreeing that no solicitation or offer was being made.

C. THE DEFENDANTS’ ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AND PROCEEDINGS SEEK TO IMPOSE A PRIOR RESTRAINT ON PLAINTIFFS’ SPEECH AND TO PUNISH THEM FOR THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY-PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS.
On or about January 31, 2007, the Secretary and Mr. Ahearn caused the administrative complaint to be filed in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth and to be served on the respondents, all of whom are plaintiffs in this civil rights action. A copy of the administrative complaint is attached to the instant civil rights complaint as Exhibit 1.

The administrative complaint alleges that exemption of securities from registration is conditioned on issuers of unregistered securities refraining from communications that constitute “advertising” or “solicitation.” Conversely, the administrative complaint alleges that the securities regulations provide that any “advertising” or “solicitation” constitute a public “offer,” thereby triggering registration requirements. The defendants allege that the Bulldog Investors website’s communications were “advertising” and “solicitation” that constituted an illegal public “offer” of unregistered securities.

The administrative complaint alleges that the website and Hickey e-mail chain constituted an illegal public offer to sell and/or solicitation to buy unregistered securities in Bulldog hedge funds in violation of M.G.L. c. 110A, § 301, even though there is no evidence to support a conclusion or finding that, at any time since its inception on June 9, 2005, the Bulldog Investors website (1) proposes a transaction; (2) communicates any false or misleading information; (3) has ever influenced anyone to engage in an illegal transaction involving an unaccredited investor or anyone else; (4) creates a risk that anyone will be influenced or encouraged to engage in an illegal transaction.

The defendants assert that certain securities laws and regulations empower them to censor and suppress the plaintiffs’ truthful communications because these
communications are deemed to be a public “offer” of unregistered securities that defeats the exemption that otherwise allows the securities to be issued and sold without registration and compliance with many other regulatory requirements. Specifically, the defendants assert in the administrative complaint and proceeding that a security issuer’s truthful communications that they deem to be a “solicitation of an offer to buy” or “advertising” are sufficient to constitute a public “offer,” and that such communications may be subjected to a prior restraint and punished unless the securities are registered. The Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act defines “offer” of “offer to sell” as to include “a solicitation of an offer to buy” as follows:

‘Offer’ or ‘offer to sell’ included every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110A, § 401 (i) (2). The state and federal definitions of “offer” are nearly identical. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (“The term ‘offer to sell,’ ‘offer for sale,’ or ‘offer’ shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”)

Most significantly for the instant constitutional claims, the defendants seek to suppress and censor as a prohibited public “offer” any communication by an issuer of unregistered securities that includes truthful information that “even though not couched in terms of an express offer, condition the public mind or arouse public interest in the particular securities.” In so doing, the defendants rely upon and seek to enforce an unconstitutionally broad SEC interpretation of what constitutes an “offer.” See Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 SEC 843, 850-51, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 5870 (Feb. 9, 2007). The defendants’ seek to enforce this sweepingly broad interpretation of “offer” in the Enforcement Section’s Memorandum In Support of Its Motion for Summary Decision filed on March 1, 2007, in the administrative proceeding. A copy of that lengthy memorandum will be provided to the Court upon request.

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The SEC in that proceeding further described the broad scope of “offer” as follows:

These are broad definitions, and designedly so. It is apparent that they are not limited to communications which constitute an offer in the common law contract sense, or which on their face purport to offer a security.

Id. At 848.

The defendants further assert that “general solicitation or general advertising” and “an offer toward a specific investor (allegedly to Mr. Hickey)” by an issuer of unregistered securities violates Section 506(b)(1) [17 CFR 230.506(b)(1)] and Section 502(c) [17 CFR 230.502(c)] of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933. According to the administrative complaint, “advertising” by an issuer of unregistered securities also violates M.G.L. c. 110A, § 402(b)(9), because such “advertising” is deemed to be an “offer” to more than 25 persons. The Bulldog investors website is also alleged to have been an offer by an issuer of unregistered securities by means of “general advertising” in violation of 950 CMR § 14.402(B)(9). See Administrative complaint ¶¶ 67-80 at pp. 13-16.

In sum, the defendants’ administrative complaint and proceedings seek to censor and punish the communication of truthful information about a product (namely unregistered securities) that may be lawfully sold to accredited investors: (1) no matter how disconnected or remote the communication may be from the consummation of any sale or transaction involving unregistered securities, much less an illegal sale or transaction, and (2) no matter how non-existent the risk created by the communication
that an unregistered security might be unlawfully sold to an unaccredited Massachusetts investor.  

As explained below, the sweeping overbreadth of the prohibitions of communications sought to be enforced by the defendants cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. Plaintiffs contend that, on their face and as applied to the Bulldog Investors website and the e-mail chain involving Brendan Hickey through the prosecution of the defendants’ administrative complaint, the above provisions of the securities laws and regulations infringe on their free speech and free press rights.

If not enjoined by this Court, the censorial effect of the defendants’ proceeding cannot be doubted. The administrative complaint seeks a cease and desist order that would operate as a prior restraint upon the respondents from making truthful information accessible to visitors to the Bulldog Investors website. The administrative complaint also seeks the imposition of an administrative fine in amount to be determined by the Secretary to punish and coerce the respondents from making truthful information accessible to visitors to the Bulldog Investors website. See Administrative Complaint at pp. 17-18.

Plaintiffs' communications are also being burdened by the expenditure of time and money to defend the administrative proceeding. On February 21, 2007, the respondents named in the administrative complaint filed and served a pleading entitled Answer and Affirmative Defenses in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The affirmative defenses included, among others, an assertion that the conduct alleged in the administrative complaint is protected by the free speech and free press guarantees in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article XVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. On February 23, 2007, the Secretary appointed Laurie Flynn, the Chief Legal Counsel to the Secretary, to serve as Presiding Officer for the adjudicatory hearing concerning the administrative complaint.

On March 1, 2007, the Secretary's Enforcement Section filed and served a document entitled Motion for Summary Decision with an accompanying memorandum and exhibits. In the Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Decision, the Secretary's Enforcement Section contends that Secretary's Presiding Officer lacks authority to decide the merits of the respondents' constitutional defenses to the administrative complaint.

The respondents named in the administrative complaint must file their opposition to the Motion for Summary Decision on or before March 26, 2007, and a hearing on the Motion for Summary Decision is scheduled to occur on April 11, 2007.

D. **PLAINTIFFS ARE SUFFERING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM UNLESS THEIR REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED.**

Due to the pending administrative action the Bulldog Investors website is currently unavailable to the public. Bulldog Investors does not intend to make it
available until the threat of sanctions sought by the defendants' administrative complaint is lifted. But for the threat of such litigation and sanctions, including fines, the website would be re-activated so that anyone can obtain truthful information about the Bulldog hedge funds even if they cannot or do not intend to invest in them. Goldstein Aff. at ¶ 21-22. Similarly, but for the suppressive effect of the administrative complaint, plaintiff Leonard Bloness would have access to and would read the information published by the Bulldog Investors website. Affidavit of Leonard Bloness ("Bloness Aff.") at ¶ 3. Manifestly, plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm to their free speech and press rights if the requested preliminary injunction is not granted. T&D Video v. City of Revere, 423 Mass. supra at 582, citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-4 (1976) (plurality).

E. DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY TO THE DEFENDANTS OF MEANS THAT DO NOT INFRINGE ON FREE SPEECH TO PREVENT AND DETER ISSUERS OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES FROM UNLAWFULLY SELLING THEM TO UNACCREDITED INVESTORS, THE DEFENDANTS WOULD SUFFER LESS HARM FROM THE ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTION THAN THE PLAINTIFFS WOULD SUFFER IF THE INJUNCTION IS DENIED, AND AN INJUNCTION WILL PROMOTE THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITHOUT HARMING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES TO UNACCREDITED INVESTORS.

Obviously, the defendants presently have authority to bring an enforcement action against an issuer who unlawfully sells an unregistered security to a Massachusetts investor who is not accredited. If the preliminary injunction is granted, the defendants' ability to enforce the securities laws that make such sales illegal would suffer no cognizable harm if issuers of unregistered securities were allowed to freely disseminate, as the plaintiffs have done, truthful information that "even though not couched in terms of an express offer," do no more than "condition the public mind or arouse public interest
in the particular securities.” In fact, the allegedly dangerous information that is the subject of the administrative complaint which was available on the Bulldog Investors website is currently accessible to the public on the Secretary’s own website.

On the other hand, it is difficult to overstate the paramount public interest in the free exchange of ideas and information about unregistered securities, including the Bulldog funds, which would be effectuated by the issuance of the preliminary injunction.

II. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO PROTECT THE PLAINTIFFS’ FREE SPEECH AND PRESS RIGHTS.

A. THE RIGHT TO PUBLISH AND TO RECEIVE INFORMATION ABOUT FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IS FULLY PROTECTED BY THE FEDERAL AND MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONS.

The defendants’ administrative complaint and proceeding seeks to apply securities laws and regulations so as to impose broad advertising and solicitation bans that virtually never survive First Amendment review. “To endeavor to support a restriction upon speech by alleging that the recipient needs to be shielded from that speech for his or her own protection, which is the gravamen of [the defendants’] claim here, is practically an engraved invitation to have the restriction struck.” Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp. 2d. 51, 58 (D.D.C. 1998) (bracketed words supplied). These bans are content-based attempts to censor speech on financial and investment-related subjects. Communications concerning securities-related subject matter (including communications concerning unregistered securities and Bulldog Investors securities in particular), are no less entitled to the fullest First Amendment and Article XVI protection than communications that do not concern securities.
In *Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976), the Court held that speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" was protected by the First Amendment, and struck down a ban on price advertising regarding prescription drugs. The Court observed that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information" may be as keen as, or keener than, his interest in "the day's most urgent political debate," id. at 763, and that "the proper allocation of resources" in our free enterprise system requires that consumer decisions be "intelligent and well informed," id. at 765. The Court also explained that, unless consumers are kept informed about the operations of the free market system, they cannot form "intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered."

*Ibid.* See also id. at 765-766, n. 19-20. The Court sharply rebuffed the State's argument that consumers would make irresponsible choices if they were able to choose between higher priced but higher quality pharmaceuticals accompanied by high quality prescription monitoring services resulting from a "stable pharmacist-customer relationship," id. at 768, on the one hand, and cheaper but lower quality pharmaceuticals unaccompanied by such services, on the other:

The State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance. The advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed people will have to the free flow of drug price information.

... 

There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests, if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them. ... It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.
Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other ways. But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering. In this sense, the justifications Virginia has offered for suppressing the flow of prescription drug price information, far from persuading us that the flow is not protected by the First Amendment, have reinforced our view that it is. "Id. at 769-770 (citation omitted).

Regulators may protect the state interest in preventing issuers of unregistered securities from selling them to unaccredited investors. They may not prevent public, educational and media acquisition of nothing more than information about unregistered securities.

B. REQUIRING AN ISSUER TO REGISTER SECURITIES AS A PRECONDITION TO COMMUNICATING INFORMATION ABOUT THEM THAT "EVEN THOUGH NOT COUCHED IN TERMS OF AN EXPRESS OFFER" DOES NO MORE THAN "CONDITION THE PUBLIC MIND OR AROUSE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE PARTICULAR SECURITIES" IMPOSES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPEECH-LICENSING REQUIREMENT.

Unless enjoined, the defendants' administrative complaint and proceeding seeks to punish and deter the plaintiffs from publishing and receiving information about securities and securities-related services unless the securities are registered. Plaintiff Leonard Bloness has a clear constitutional right to read and receive information available via the Bulldog Investors website.

Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear from the decided cases. In *Lamont v. Postmaster General*, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Court upheld the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad. More recently, in *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972), we acknowledged that this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to "receive information and ideas," and that freedom of speech "necessarily protects the right to receive." And in *Procunier v. Martinez*, 416 U.S. 396, 408-409 (1974), where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, we thought it
unnecessary to assess the First Amendment rights of the inmates themselves, for it was reasoned that such censorship equally infringed the rights of noninmates to whom the correspondence was addressed. There are numerous other expressions to the same effect in the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 537, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees.


C. UNLESS ENJOINED, THE DEFENDANTS WOULD SEEK TO IMPOSE AN UNCONSTITIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT ON SPEECH.
The cease and desist order sought in the defendants' administrative proceeding would broadly and prospectively prohibit plaintiffs from communicating truthful information about unregistered securities issued by the Bulldog funds which may be lawfully sold to accredited investors. If the prior restraint against publication of the Pentagon Papers failed to survive strict First Amendment scrutiny, there can be no doubt that the order sought to be imposed by the defendants would be constitutionally infirm. *New York Times Co. v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); *Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

**D. THE BROAD CONTENT-BASED BAN ON COMMUNICATIONS SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANTS MUST OVERCOME STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY, INCLUDING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENT.**

The sweepingly broad prohibition sought by the defendants on communications to the public concerning unregistered securities-related subject matter, including communications concerning securities issued by the Bulldog funds, is a content-based speech ban that must overcome strict scrutiny, including the requirement that the government use the least restrictive means to advance a compelling government interest. *United States v. Playboy Entm't Group*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); *Benefit v. Cambridge*, 424 Mass. 918, 926 n.6 (1997); *Boston v. Back Bay Cultural Ass'n*, 418 Mass. 175, 182 (1994). As we have noted, there are certainly far less restrictive and effective means to prevent issuers of unregistered securities from selling them to unaccredited investors without imposing the ban on speech sought to be imposed by the defendants.

**E. THE PLAINTIFFS’ SPEECH IS NOT COMMERCIAL SPEECH TO WHICH LOWER FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY WOULD APPLY.**
The core notion of commercial speech is "speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." *Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, supra, 425 U.S. at 762, quoting, *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n.*, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). The record shows that no one may invest in the Bulldog funds without being interviewed and signing a written subscription agreement warranting that they are an accredited investor. Goldstein Aff. at ¶ 10. No one, including Brendan Hickey, could obtain detailed financial performance information from the Bulldog Investors website without expressly agreeing that the website did not constitute or include a solicitation to buy, or an offer to sell, any security. Goldstein Aff. at ¶¶ 5, 6 and 9.5 The Bulldog Investors website provided accurate, non-misleading information of interest to persons who do not desire to purchase unregistered securities issued by Bulldog funds, including journalists, academics, legislators, regulators, and others interested in hedge funds, including Plaintiff Leonard Bloness. Bloness Aff. at ¶¶ 2-3. Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ speech includes discussion of shareholder activist strategies, which constitute an important form of political, economic and financial democracy and debate.6 See pages from Bulldog Investors Website, attached to this

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5 Such agreements, sometimes referred to as “click-wrap agreements,” are valid and enforceable contracts. See, e.g., *Waters v. Earthlink, Inc.*, No. BACV01-11887WGY, 2006 WL 1843583, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 19, 2006) (“A click-wrap agreement insures that a party clicks his agreement to a contract before proceeding to use certain electronic material.”); *Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc.*, 425 F. Supp.2d 756, 783 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“The Court finds that clickwrap licenses, such as at issue here, are valid and enforceable contracts.”); *Seibert v. Amateur Athletic Union of U.S., Inc.*, 422 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039-1040 (D. Minn. 2006) (“The AAU requires that those wishing to become members “click” on the page which states that any disputes are subject to arbitration. This Court finds that the ‘click’ represents assent to the contract, including the arbitration clause. Most courts which have considered the issue have upheld . . . clauses in so-called ‘clickwrap’ or ‘shrinkwrap’ form contracts. These occur when the terms are provided online, or only after plaintiffs have manifested assent.”)

6 Public debate about shareholder activism and strategies is intense and widespread. Ethiopis Tafara, Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks on UK and US Approaches to Corporate Governance and on the Market for Corporate Control, Madrid, Spain and London, England (February 8-9, 2007) available at
Complaint as Exhibit 1 and to the Administrative Complaint as Exhibit A, at *3-5

Bulldog presentation, attached to Administrative Complaint as Exhibit C-3, at *3-4, 6-13; Dear Partner letter, attached to Administrative Complaint as Exhibit C-4, Press articles entitled “Activism Boosts Manager’s Returns,” and “Blair Seeks to Raise $180M,” attached to Administrative Complaint as Exhibit C-6 (discussions of shareholder activism investment strategies and its benefits). On this record, no commercial transaction is being proposed so as to make the commercial speech standard of review applicable.

F. EVEN IF THE SPEECH AT ISSUE IS DEEMED TO BE COMMERCIAL SPEECH, THE DEFENDANTS’ ENFORCEMENT ACTION UNCONSTITUTIONALLY RESTRICTS THE PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHTS TO SPEAK AND RECEIVE INFORMATION CONCERNING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES ISSUED BY THE BULLDOG FUNDS.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that five Justices (Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Thomas and Scalia) have expressed doubt that a less strict level of First Amendment scrutiny should apply to commercial speech. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001). Justice Thomas summarized the reasons for doubt that the commercial speech standard will remain the law:

In case after case following Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court, and individual Members of the Court, have continued to stress the importance of free dissemination of information about commercial choices in a market

economy; the antipaternalistic premises of the First Amendment; the impropriety of manipulating consumer choices or public opinion through the suppression of accurate "commercial" information; the near impossibility of severing "commercial" speech from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking; and the dangers of permitting the government to do covertly what it might not have been able to muster the political support to do openly.


Even if the communications at issue here could be deemed commercial speech under existing federal constitutional standards, this Court should decline to apply lowered scrutiny because Article XVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights can and should be interpreted to provide greater protection to free speech than the First Amendment. 

Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 190-191 (2005) (“Federal rule [did] not adequately protect the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts under art. 16.”).

G. EVEN IF THE COMMUNICATIONS AT ISSUE ARE DEEMED TO BE COMMERCIAL SPEECH TO WHICH LOWER FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY APPLIES, THE DEFENDANTS’ ENFORCEMENT ACTION SHOULD BE ENJOINED AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The Supreme Court established a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of a ban on commercial speech. First, the speech must not be misleading or propose an illegal transaction. Second, the government must have a substantial interest to be achieved by restricting the speech. 7 Third, the regulation must directly advance the substantial state interest. Fourth, the regulation cannot be more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest. 


7 Unlike the rational basis test, the court is not permitted to substitute its own perceived state interests for those articulated by the government. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).
Nothing in the record provides a basis for the government to argue, much less a basis for a judicial finding, that the communications at issue were false, misleading, or concern an illegal transaction. Unregistered securities issued by Bulldog Funds may be sold lawfully to accredited investors. Hence, the communications concern the sale of a lawful product or service.

The governmental interest served by the ban on communications is to prevent issuers of unregistered securities from selling them to unaccredited investors. That interest is arguably substantial because of concern that unaccredited investors are not sophisticated enough about securities and markets and wealthy enough to evaluate and bear the risk of investing in unregistered securities.

With respect to Central Hudson's third prong, "the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose." 447 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added). The ban sought to be enforced here would apply to any communication by an issuer of unregistered securities that includes information that "even though not couched in terms of an express offer," does no more than "condition the public mind or arouse public interest in the particular securities.” Manifestly, the ban sought to be enforced by the defendants does not directly advance a government interest in preventing an issuer of unregistered securities from selling them to unaccredited investors. Because the ban applies (1) no matter how disconnected or remote the communication may be from the consummation of any sale or transaction involving unregistered securities, much less an illegal sale or transaction, and (2) no matter how remote the risk created by the communication that an unregistered security might be unlawfully sold to an unaccredited
Massachusetts investor, it advances the government’s interest, at most, only in an indirect, ineffective, unfocused and remote manner.

*Central Hudson’s* fourth prong (whether the restriction is “not more extensive than necessary” to serve the government’s interest, 447 U.S. at 566) is the most demanding and invalidates virtually all restrictions on truthful advertising of lawful products and services. The Court has elaborated the fourth prong by holding that “if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, it must do so.” *Thompson v. Western States Medical Center*, supra, 535 U.S. at 371. Here, the defendants seek to enforce a ban on communications that do no more than “condition the public mind or arouse public interest in the particular securities.” This is anything but a non-speech-restrictive means of preventing issuers of unregistered securities from selling them to unaccredited investors, and broadly suppresses an issuer’s communications with persons who have no interest in purchasing unregistered securities, including journalists, academics, and the intellectually curious such as plaintiff Leonard Bloness. Indeed, the evidence will show that Mr. Hickey sought to obtain information from the Bulldog Investors website, not with any thought of purchasing securities, but solely for the purpose of using it in a lawsuit.

The *Thompson* case controls here because its facts and analysis fit this case tightly. In *Thompson*, “compounded” drugs created by a pharmacy by mixing, combining, or altering ingredients so as to customize them for a narrow category of patients for whom they are prescribed by a doctor, are exempt from regulatory requirements imposed on all new drugs by amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDAMA”), just as unregistered securities (which may be sold only to accredited
investors) are exempt from registration and other requirements imposed by the securities laws and regulations. The FDAMA exempted “compounded” drugs so long as prescriptions for them were “unsolicited” and that providers of them “not advertise or promote the compounding of any drug, class of drug, or type of drug” just as the securities laws and regulations sought to be enforced here ban similar communications with respect to unregistered securities. 535 U.S. at 364-5. The Court held that the FDAMA could not constitutionally condition the exemption of a pharmacy that produces compounded drugs from FDA regulation (here, an issuer of unregistered securities exemption from securities law requirements) on refraining from advertising and solicitation for failure to satisfy the Central Hudson test’s final prong. Id. 371-373 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort. Yet it seems to have been the first strategy the government thought to try.”).

The FDAMA restricted advertising and solicitation “of course, not just to those who do not need compounded drugs, but to those who do need compounded drugs and their doctors.” Id. 375-376. Here, the securities laws, as applied to the Bulldog Investors website and communications with Brendan Hickey, ban “advertising” and “solicitation” to accredited and unaccredited investors alike. The Court rejected government arguments that the FDAMA’s bans would reduce demand for unregulated drugs from patients for whom such drugs are inappropriate or even potentially harmful because they have no way to evaluate the risks to health posed by such drugs. This Court should reject similar arguments to support broad bans on “solicitation” and “advertising” of unregistered securities.
The truthful communications the defendants seek to ban are useful and beneficial to both accredited and unaccredited investors including Mr. Bloness, to financial journalists, academia, shareholder activists, and the merely curious. The Thompson opinion teaches that the defendants' broad bans on useful communications cannot survive free speech and free press scrutiny. "If the Government's failure to justify its decision to regulate speech were not enough to convince us that the FDAMA's advertising restrictions were unconstitutional, the amount of beneficial speech prohibited by the FDAMA would be." Id. 376.

The defendants seek to restrict issuers of unregistered securities from communicating any information about such securities to anyone who is not an accredited investor. Their rationale is that unless this unconstitutionally overbroad restriction is enforced, an unaccredited investor might be induced or tempted to buy unregistered securities from the issuer even if the issuer (like Bulldog Investors) does not permit unaccredited investors to purchase its securities. This makes no sense. Moreover, the government cannot enforce a sweepingly overbroad, prophylactic prohibition against issuers’ communications about unregistered securities to prevent unaccredited investors from buying unregistered securities, because such a "fence around the law" suppresses constitutionally-protected speech.

The First Amendment and Article XVI do not permit truthful communications about lawfully saleable unregistered securities to be confined, by the defendants' unconstitutional threat of a cease and desist order and a fine, to word-of-mouth circulation among the rich. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), the Court invalidated for failure to comply with the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test
Massachusetts regulations that banned outdoor and point-of-sale advertising of tobacco products near schools even though Massachusetts had a substantial interest in suppressing tobacco sales to children. *Lorillard* forbids a government-enforced restriction of an issuer's advertising of, or solicitations to buy, its unregistered securities so that the communications reach only the rich.

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have shown far more than a substantial likelihood that their free speech and free press claims will prevail. Alternatively, because the balance of harms and equities favor them strongly, the plaintiffs certainly have shown a substantial possibility that these claims will succeed. The plaintiffs should neither be burdened by the threat of government imposed sanctions for exercising their constitutional rights to reactivate the Bulldog Investor website, nor should they be burdened by having to expend time and money to oppose the administrative complaint. The movants' motion for a preliminary injunction should be allowed.

Respectfully submitted,

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