The SEC should seek to reduce investor confusion, the only way this could be done is not by adding additional layers or complexity to an already complex industry.  The SEC should propose a uniform fiduciary standard for any firm that holds itself out as a fiduciary in the broadest sense.  If a firm does not hold itself out as a fiduciary and makes it clear that it is not a fiduciary then the public will be informed enough to make a decision about the services being rendered and that this firm and its representatives are acting in their own interests and not theirs.  What is currently happening and what the Commission is proposing just leads to additional regulatory arbitrage, plain and simple. Following the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and 1934, the dual 40 acts were released for a reason.  I would assume it was to reduce confusion and put a line in the sand between salespersons, fiduciaries and fiduciaries of pooled funds.  Well here we are again…਀
Regulation Best Interest਀
Prior to the proposed Regulation Best Interest (“BI”), the Commission has participated in various studies that highlighted that the public doesn’t understand the differences between a broker-dealer and an investment adviser and thinks both have a requirement to put their interests before their own.  Even “financial advisors” whether a registered representative or an investment adviser representative are confused.  Many well intended financial advisors will say they always do what’s in the best interests of their clients regardless of what “hat” they wear. That is until they are confronted with a decision that will impact their compensation or reputation. The 12b-1 debacle is a good example of what the SEC believed is thorough and complete disclosures and what most of the industry thought it was.  So much so that the SEC had an initiative to have advisers self-reports because they don’t have the manpower to collect all those juicy fines and client rebates themselves through exams and enforcement.    ਀
Continuing Education਀
As stated earlier financial advisors don’t understand the concept of a fiduciary in practical terms.  As an idyllic standard they do, but as days turn into weeks and weeks into years, the minute by minute decisions related to their compensation, conflicts & disciplinary events (also voluminous arbitration records), many are clueless how these factors interact with their fiduciary duty.  Advisors already have state licensing/education requirements, it’s redundant to what already is happening (don’t forget NSMIA).  What RIAs need is a requirement akin to FINRA in terms of associated individuals of the RIA i.e. heightened supervision. The topic of “bad actors” joining RIAs because they can’t find a b/d that will take them in is a very real issue.  The SEC should focus on this instead of exam requirements or at least focus on continuing education on the topic of being a fiduciary based on the SEC’s definition as evidenced by exams, enforcements and rulemaking.  Compliance consultants have a lock on the industry and if the SEC visited RIAs as frequent as FINRA does RIAs would have to staff up their compliance departments instead of having a one-man compliance department that has to justify why they need additional resources for their burgeoning practices.਀
Form CRS਀
Form CRS should only be put in place for RIAs only if it can be utilized instead of the Form ADV Part 2A.  Most RIAs spend a significant amount of time and money into the creation and maintenance of the Form ADV Part 2a, wrap brochures, etc.  Clients do not read these documents let alone understand them, most advisors do not understand them because they stem from best practices, enforcement cases, rules etc.  Clients and many advisors do not have the ability or requisite experience to understand because the latter is focusing focus on cultivating relationships, managing money, managing staff (you know the business) and also managing compliance.  Try testing a group of the public, advisors and compliance officers separately, pick out a topic out of a few random ADV Part 2As that spans more than a few sentences.  Ask them to give examples of these topics and why they are important, if you get 50% right out of any group but the compliance group (hopefully) please move forward with the proposal on the Form CRS.਀
Titles - Adviser vs Advisor vs Ed Visor਀
Titles are not the problem, the industry will just find more titles that are confusing to the public, financial consulting, financial coach, wealth guru, sr. investment specialist, blah, blah blah.  The SEC should make a firm that represents itself as an adviser in any way should be beholden to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or similar state rules.  Congress sought to reduce the confusion by having separate regulatory regimes for when one is acting as broker-dealer or an RIA, plain and simple.  Dual registrants need a uniform standard across the board, that is the real issue, many advisors are already registered with both an RIA and a BD, clients don’t understand the difference.  ਀䴀愀礀戀攀 琀栀攀 匀䔀䌀 琀栀椀渀欀猀 琀栀椀猀 椀猀 眀栀愀琀 愀渀 愀搀瘀椀猀攀爀 猀栀漀甀氀搀 搀漀 眀栀攀渀 猀攀氀氀椀渀最 愀 瘀愀爀椀愀戀氀攀 愀渀渀甀椀琀礀㨀
਀ᰀ䠠攀礀 䤀 愀洀 渀漀眀 愀挀琀椀渀最 愀猀 愀 爀攀最椀猀琀攀爀攀搀 爀攀瀀 漀昀 愀 戀爀漀欀攀爀ⴀ搀攀愀氀攀爀 愀渀搀 䤀 愀洀 猀攀氀氀椀渀最 礀漀甀 琀栀椀猀 瘀愀爀椀愀戀氀攀 愀渀渀甀椀琀礀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 䤀 琀栀椀渀欀 椀琀ᤀ猠 最漀漀搀 昀漀爀 礀漀甀 愀渀搀 戀礀 琀栀攀 眀愀礀Ⰰ 椀琀 瀀愀礀猀 洀攀 ㌀─ 甀瀀昀爀漀渀琀 漀爀 㔀　戀瀀猀 甀渀琀椀氀 礀漀甀 最攀琀 爀椀搀 漀昀 洀攀 漀爀 䤀琀⸀ᴀ† 
਀㌀ 礀攀愀爀猀 氀愀琀攀爀☀⸠
਀ᰀ䠠攀礀 椀琀ᤀ猠 戀攀攀渀 琀栀爀攀攀 礀攀愀爀猀 猀椀渀挀攀 䤀 猀漀氀搀 礀漀甀 琀栀愀琀 愀渀渀甀椀琀礀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 礀漀甀 眀愀渀琀攀搀 猀漀洀攀 椀渀挀漀洀攀 最甀愀爀愀渀琀攀攀猀 ⠀漀昀 挀漀甀爀猀攀 最甀愀爀愀渀琀攀攀猀 愀爀攀 漀渀氀礀 最漀漀搀 愀猀 琀栀攀 昀椀爀洀 猀瀀漀渀猀漀爀椀渀最 琀栀攀洀 㨀䐀⤀Ⰰ 渀漀眀 䤀 挀愀渀 洀愀渀愀最攀 琀栀攀 猀甀戀ⴀ愀挀挀漀甀渀琀 漀昀 琀栀攀 嘀䄀 愀渀搀 䤀 眀椀氀氀 挀栀愀爀最攀 礀漀甀 㔀　戀瀀猀 愀挀挀漀爀搀椀渀最 琀漀 琀栀椀猀 椀渀瘀攀猀琀洀攀渀琀 洀愀渀愀最攀洀攀渀琀 愀最爀攀攀洀攀渀琀 漀爀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 琀栀攀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀 猀琀椀氀氀 瀀愀礀猀 洀攀 㔀　戀瀀猀 甀渀琀椀氀 礀漀甀 最攀琀 爀椀搀 漀昀 椀琀Ⰰ 䤀 眀椀氀氀 洀愀渀愀最攀 椀琀 昀漀爀 ᰀ映爀攀攀ᴀᴠ 
਀一漀眀 琀栀椀猀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀 洀愀礀 戀攀 瀀攀爀昀攀挀琀氀礀 昀椀渀攀 愀猀 眀攀氀氀 愀猀 猀甀椀琀愀戀氀攀 昀漀爀 琀栀攀 挀氀椀攀渀琀 愀渀搀 椀琀 洀愀礀 戀攀 搀椀猀挀氀漀猀攀搀 椀渀 愀渀 䄀䐀嘀Ⰰ 愀 嘀䄀 搀椀猀挀氀漀猀甀爀攀Ⰰ 瀀爀漀猀瀀攀挀琀甀猀Ⰰ 愀搀瘀椀猀漀爀礀 愀最爀攀攀洀攀渀琀 ☀ 愀 渀攀眀 愀挀挀漀甀渀琀 昀漀爀洀 吀☀䌀猀 琀栀愀琀 琀栀攀 愀搀瘀椀猀漀爀 椀猀 愀挀琀椀渀最 椀渀 戀漀琀栀 琀栀攀猀攀 挀愀瀀愀挀椀琀椀攀猀Ⰰ 戀甀琀 猀漀 眀栀愀琀㼀  䌀氀椀攀渀琀猀 搀漀渀ᤀ琠 最攀琀 椀琀㬀 琀栀攀 愀搀瘀椀猀漀爀 洀愀礀 戀攀 洀攀洀戀攀爀猀 愀琀 琀栀攀椀爀 挀栀甀爀挀栀Ⰰ 猀瀀漀渀猀漀爀猀 愀 昀甀渀 洀漀瘀椀攀 渀椀最栀琀Ⰰ 戀攀 琀栀攀爀攀 昀漀爀 琀栀攀洀 眀栀攀渀 琀栀攀椀爀 挀栀椀氀搀爀攀渀 ☀ 猀瀀漀甀猀攀猀 愀爀攀 渀漀琀Ⰰ 攀琀挀⸀ 䌀氀椀攀渀琀猀 搀漀渀ᤀ琠 挀愀爀攀 愀戀漀甀琀 琀栀攀猀攀 椀猀猀甀攀猀 甀渀琀椀氀 琀栀攀礀 愀爀攀 爀攀愀搀礀 琀漀Ⰰ 攀椀琀栀攀爀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 琀栀攀礀 攀砀瀀攀爀椀攀渀挀攀搀 氀漀猀猀攀猀 愀渀搀 愀爀攀 氀漀漀欀椀渀最 琀漀 栀漀氀搀 猀漀洀攀漀渀攀 愀挀挀漀甀渀琀愀戀氀攀 漀爀 琀栀攀礀 爀攀愀氀氀礀 眀攀爀攀 琀愀欀攀渀 愀搀瘀愀渀琀愀最攀搀 漀昀 愀渀搀 眀愀猀 猀漀氀搀 猀漀洀攀琀栀椀渀最 甀渀猀甀椀琀愀戀氀攀⸀  䤀昀 洀愀欀椀渀最 椀琀 猀椀洀瀀氀攀 椀猀 琀栀攀 愀椀洀Ⰰ 琀栀攀渀 洀愀欀攀 椀琀 猀椀洀瀀氀攀⸀
਀䘀椀渀愀渀挀椀愀氀 刀攀猀瀀漀渀猀椀戀椀氀椀琀礀 刀攀焀甀椀爀攀洀攀渀琀猀⼀匀琀愀琀攀洀攀渀琀猀
਀吀栀椀猀 椀猀 爀椀搀椀挀甀氀漀甀猀Ⰰ 愀渀搀 猀栀漀甀氀搀 漀渀氀礀 戀攀 爀攀焀甀椀爀攀搀 昀漀爀 昀椀爀洀猀 眀椀琀栀 瀀栀礀猀椀挀愀氀 挀甀猀琀漀搀礀 漀昀 挀氀椀攀渀琀 昀甀渀搀猀 愀渀搀 猀攀挀甀爀椀琀椀攀猀 昀漀爀 攀⸀最⸀ 琀栀漀猀攀 昀椀爀洀猀 愀挀琀椀渀最 愀猀 愀 焀甀愀氀椀昀椀攀搀 挀甀猀琀漀搀椀愀渀 ⠀猀甀戀樀攀挀琀 琀漀 椀渀琀攀爀渀愀氀 挀漀渀琀爀漀氀 爀攀瀀漀爀琀Ⰰ 猀甀爀瀀爀椀猀攀 攀砀愀洀 漀爀 愀甀搀椀琀攀搀 昀椀渀愀渀挀椀愀氀猀⤀⸀ 
਀匀䔀䌀 䔀砀愀洀猀
਀倀愀爀琀 漀昀 琀栀攀 爀攀愀猀漀渀 昀漀爀 琀栀攀 爀攀最甀氀愀琀漀爀礀 愀爀戀椀琀爀愀最攀 椀猀 琀栀攀 昀愀挀琀 琀栀愀琀 琀栀攀 匀䔀䌀 搀漀攀猀 愀 栀漀爀爀椀戀氀攀 樀漀戀 漀昀 攀砀愀洀椀渀椀渀最 刀䤀䄀猀⸀  䤀琀ᤀ猠 渀漀琀 甀渀挀漀洀洀漀渀 昀漀爀 琀栀攀 爀甀渀ⴀ漀昀ⴀ琀栀攀ⴀ洀椀氀氀 刀䤀䄀 眀栀漀 搀漀攀猀渀ᤀ琠 栀愀瘀攀 ㌀　　 戀椀氀氀椀漀渀 椀渀 刀䄀唀䴀 琀漀 渀漀琀 栀愀瘀攀 戀攀攀渀 猀攀攀渀 攀瘀攀爀 漀爀 漀瘀攀爀 ㄀　 礀攀愀爀猀 搀攀猀瀀椀琀攀 戀攀椀渀最 爀攀最椀猀琀攀爀攀搀 眀椀琀栀 琀栀攀 匀䔀䌀 昀漀爀 氀漀渀最攀爀 琀栀愀渀 琀栀椀猀⸀  䈀爀漀欀攀爀ⴀ䐀攀愀氀攀爀猀 爀攀最椀猀琀攀爀攀搀 眀椀琀栀 䘀䤀一刀䄀 眀椀氀氀 琀礀瀀椀挀愀氀氀礀 戀攀 猀攀攀渀 漀爀 愀挀挀漀猀琀攀搀 ⠀㬀䐀 ⤀ 攀瘀攀爀礀 礀攀愀爀 椀昀 渀漀琀 ㈀ⴀ㌀ 礀攀愀爀猀⸀ 圀栀椀氀攀 洀愀渀礀 愀搀瘀椀猀漀爀猀 愀爀攀 最椀瘀椀渀最 甀瀀 琀栀攀椀爀 䘀䤀一刀䄀 爀攀最椀猀琀爀愀琀椀漀渀猀 昀漀爀 洀漀爀攀 昀爀攀攀搀漀洀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 琀栀攀礀 愀爀攀 栀愀洀猀琀爀甀渀最 戀礀 琀栀攀椀爀 䈀䐀ᤀ猠 挀漀洀瀀氀椀愀渀挀攀 搀攀瀀愀爀琀洀攀渀琀猀 眀椀琀栀 瀀漀氀椀挀椀攀猀 琀栀愀琀 最漀瘀攀爀渀 琀栀攀 琀礀瀀攀猀 漀昀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀猀 琀栀攀礀 漀昀昀攀爀⸀ 䰀攀瘀攀爀愀最攀搀 䔀吀䘀猀Ⰰ 挀漀洀瀀氀攀砀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀猀Ⰰ 瀀爀椀瘀愀琀攀 愀渀搀 椀氀氀椀焀甀椀搀 椀渀瘀攀猀琀洀攀渀琀猀Ⰰ 攀琀挀⸀Ⰰ 愀氀氀 琀栀攀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀猀 搀甀 樀漀甀爀 愀琀 挀甀琀琀椀渀最 攀搀最攀 刀䤀䄀猀 琀栀愀琀 琀栀攀 匀䔀䌀 栀愀猀 爀愀椀猀攀搀 愀渀 攀礀攀戀爀漀眀 琀漀⸀ 刀䤀䄀猀 甀渀猀栀愀挀欀氀攀搀 昀爀漀洀 琀栀攀椀爀 䈀䐀猀 愀爀攀 爀甀渀渀椀渀最 琀漀眀愀爀搀猀 琀栀攀猀攀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀猀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 琀栀攀礀 昀愀椀氀 琀漀 甀渀搀攀爀猀琀愀渀搀 眀栀愀琀 琀栀攀 匀䔀䌀 栀愀猀 猀琀愀琀攀搀 椀渀 攀砀愀洀 瀀爀椀漀爀椀琀椀攀猀 愀渀搀 爀椀猀欀 愀氀攀爀琀猀ᔀ†眀栀椀挀栀 琀栀攀礀 搀漀 渀漀琀 爀攀愀搀⸀  吀栀椀猀 氀愀挀欀 漀昀 爀攀椀渀昀漀爀挀攀洀攀渀琀 琀栀爀漀甀最栀 愀 爀漀戀甀猀琀 刀䤀䄀 攀砀愀洀椀渀愀琀椀漀渀 昀甀渀挀琀椀漀渀 椀猀 琀栀攀 爀攀愀氀 爀椀猀欀⸀  吀栀攀 琀栀漀甀最栀琀 琀栀愀琀 戀攀挀愀甀猀攀 䤀 挀栀愀爀最攀 愀渀 䄀唀䴀 昀攀攀 䤀 愀洀 愀 昀椀搀甀挀椀愀爀礀 椀猀 琀栀攀 瀀爀攀瘀愀椀氀椀渀最 眀愀礀 漀昀 琀栀椀渀欀椀渀最Ⰰ 眀栀攀渀 琀栀愀琀 洀愀礀 戀攀 昀甀爀琀栀攀猀琀 昀爀漀洀 琀栀攀 琀爀甀琀栀㬀 琀栀攀 匀䔀䌀 氀漀猀琀 琀栀愀琀 戀愀琀琀氀攀 椀渀 ㈀　　㜀⸀
਀吀栀椀猀 眀愀猀 眀爀椀琀琀攀渀 椀渀 栀甀爀爀椀攀搀 瀀氀愀椀渀 攀渀最氀椀猀栀⸀