Via Email: rule-comments@sec.gov

Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary
US Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, D.C. 20549-1090
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Re: File Number S7-07-13 - Dodd-Frank Act Pay Ratio Disclosure Mandate; Proposal for a Safe Harbor Disclosure Process

Dear Ms. Murphy,

My background is in strategy, human resources and global compensation and benefits and I have worked with a number of US and European multinational companies including RJR Nabisco, Cadbury Schweppes (now Kraft/Mondelez), Unilever and Barclays Bank. I submit these comments on behalf of Organizational Capital Partners, which have been developed in collaboration with a number of other concerned professionals involved in organizational strategy, financial markets and academics, both in the US as well as in Europe.

This letter further supports the comment letter provided by the Network for Sustainable Financial Markets of which I am also a member. http://www.sustainablefinancialmarkets.net

We suggest development of a safe harbor for determination of median employee compensation that would encourage implementation of pay ratio disclosures so as to be consistent with the intent of other Dodd-Frank Act provisions on executive compensation, risk management and corporate governance. We also note that this approach offers long-term company and investor advantages that would improve the rule's cost-benefit analysis.

Any proposal for legislation in the United States will also impact the world of business outside the US. These comments should therefore be seen as equally relevant to all public companies with international operations, including the US.
While our comments are broadly applicable to the proposal, we believe they are particularly relevant to the following issues:

- Questions 6, 7, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 - further guidance to registrants on determining which roles to include and how to calculate median compensation, pay ratios and additional narrative disclosures required for investors;
- Questions 32, 60 - alternative ways to meet the policy intent of the Dodd-Frank pay ratio;
- Questions 61, 62, 63, - additional benefits for board and investors that are not already discussed; and
- Questions 65, 66, 67, 69 - other impacts on boards, companies and capital market formation, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.¹

Using Pay Ratio Disclosure to Support Dodd-Frank Act Governance, Enterprise Risk Management and Executive Compensation Reform Priorities

The pay ratio disclosure provision of the Dodd-Frank Act was not enacted in a vacuum. It was part of a collection of legislative enactments relating to:

- Corporate governance (e.g., proxy access for long-term investors, disclosure of the board’s leadership structure, compensation committee independence, consideration of compensation consultant independence);
- Risk management (e.g., risk-related limits on financial institution incentive compensation, executive compensation claw-back policies to deter wrongdoing, disclosure of the relationship between compensation policies and risk management); and
- Performance measurement and executive compensation (e.g., shareholder say on pay votes, pay for performance disclosures, company policy on employee hedging of equity incentive compensation).

Accordingly, we believe that the pay ratio disclosure rule should be implemented with an eye toward achieving the Dodd-Frank Act’s broader strategic corporate governance and risk management goals, as well as provide additional compensation and organizational insights to stakeholders. If the pay ratio rule is effectively designed and implemented, we think it could become a catalyst for encouraging company improvement in strategic governance analytics and processes and for enhancing risk management, innovation and sustainable performance and capital market efficiency.

Our comments focus on taking advantage of the extensive knowledge base that already exists around organizational design, internal pay equity and the behavioral dynamics. We believe that input from these disciplines could benefit the policy debate surrounding pay ratio disclosure. We think the SEC should recognize and utilize the decades of research results that relate to management structure design, pay ratios and real world behavioral dynamics in structuring the SEC pay ratio rule so as to help achieve policy goals of the Dodd-Frank Act.

¹ Data privacy concerns are also addressed in the Appendix to this comment letter.
Advancing Sustainable Value Creation with a Safe Harbor Structured Around Research Findings on Organizational Design and Pay Equity

We agree that a "one size fits all" approach to pay ratio disclosure is not appropriate, given the variations in complexity, size, structure and operations of the companies that will be covered by the rule. However, we believe that the rule could be implemented so as to encourage adoption of practices aimed at providing boards, management and investors with the information needed and insights required to use the pay ratio disclosure process to improve strategic planning, innovation, risk management, corporate governance and efficient use of capital.

The Appendix attached to this comment letter contains a summary of related research from the United States, Canada and Britain. It supports the following principles that provide a foundation for turning the pay ratio disclosure process into a valuable mechanism for promoting sustainable value creation:

- Employees consistently appraise the optimal pay differential between value-adding management layers in the management structure as differing by a multiple of two to 2.5 times per level;
- Each value-adding management layer ("Work Level") is worth about two to 2.5 times more in total compensation than the level directly below it;
- The current median pay ratio difference between the principle executive officer ("PEO") and the other Named Executive Officers ("NEOs") directly reporting to that role at the largest 2000 issuers in the Russell 3000 for which data is available is less than 2.5;
- The total number of Work Levels between front line employees and the PEO can vary between companies and between subsidiaries or business lines in the same company;
- Evaluation of pay differentials and the degree of delegated authority between Work Levels can provide insights into a company's organizational and operational efficiency and innovation capacity, as well as the effectiveness of its risk management and PEO succession planning processes;
- The longest accountable performance period for which the PEO and other management Work Levels are held accountable, when compared to the company's business and risk horizon applicable to each Work Level, is an indication of whether total compensation is linked to risk-adjusted performance;
- In many companies where management of enterprise risk exposures are central to sustainable success, the pay ratio and Work Level difference between the PEO and chief risk officer ("CRO") can be a signal of how robust the enterprise risk management function is at the company.

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These findings have influenced the analyses used by governance and investment service providers. For example, GMI Ratings (formerly Governance Metrics International), Moody's Investor Services and Glass Lewis all have incorporated red flag measures of internal pay differential ratio between the PEO and direct reports to the PEO into their analytical processes (See Appendix). Recent research from the University of Delaware also supports the need for internal consistency of compensation throughout a company, up to and including the PEO.³

We suggest that the SEC use the pay ratio disclosure rule to expand usefulness of internal pay equity and measures beyond mere compliance reporting of relative CEO compensation ratios to capture measures of organizational efficiency, innovation, risk management, corporate governance and allocation of capital to creation of sustainable value.

**Benefits from a Safe Harbor that Encourages Accurate Measurement and Effective Management of Organizational Value and Enterprise Risks**

In today's knowledge-based economy, less than 25% of the valuation of the S&P 500 is comprised of tangible assets such as property, plant, equipment inventory and cash reflected in financial statements. The other 75% of the valuation is associated with intangible assets of a company, little of which is evident in financial statements prepared under GAAP. The intangible assets and market valuation of future company prospects are the real long-term value drivers for customers and shareholders. They include such intangibles as the optimal management structure design, work processes, information databases, patents, brand equity, enterprise risk management and the human capital that work within the structural capital and work systems of the enterprise.

A major advantage of identifying the median layer in the management structure and median compensation for the entire enterprise (in complying with the Dodd-Frank Act pay ratio disclosure mandate) could be development of valid and reliable information systems for reporting to the board and C-Suite on structural and human capital investments, costs and risks. Development of this data would also allow more accurate reporting to the board and investors of actual and complete enterprise long-term value drivers.

³ "Review of an executive's compensation should be done within the context of the organization as a whole. The executive is, after all, an employee of the corporation. His pay should be considered as an extension of the infrastructure that governs the rest of the company's wage structure. Internal consistency, or pay equity, throughout the organization, up to and including the CEO, should be a natural and reasonable objective. The board should not consider executive pay separately from the structures that govern compensation of other employees, rather its design should be structured upon the same foundations and precepts." Elson, Charles M. and Ferrere, Craig K., Executive Superstars, Peer Groups and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect and Solution (August 7, 2012), pages 129-130. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2125979.
The benefits of viewing pay ratio disclosure in this broader context could be enormous. The Human Resource Policy Association (which includes 350 of the largest companies in the United States) recently provided survey results to the SEC that show a surprising and concerning lack of available and reliable organizational data and related analytics. For example, the Association survey found that 84% of company respondents could not easily calculate worldwide enterprise cash compensation for all employees.4

Organizational Capital Partners cites first-hand knowledge of registrants, which are large global banks and consumer goods companies, which have discovered they do not have the following types of information for thousands of employee roles.5

“The location of the business unit where each role is included” – and by implication;

- The accountable manager for this role (thus they are orphaned roles in the information system and on organization charts); and
- The delegation of authority is from the manager to each reporting role, potentially putting the enterprise at material risk.

In addition, these registrants lack reliable information on:

- How many total enterprise layers they have (PEO to front line);
- Cost of management by layer; and
- Median employee total compensation costs by layer.

From the perspective of long-horizon investors (such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and foundations), these deficiencies are very likely to be seen as material “managerial control risks and weaknesses” that should be known to the company’s chief risk officer and accurately reported to the board. If these material control weaknesses exist, we believe they should also be disclosed to investors along with a plan to remedy, in the same way that material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting are reported to audit committees and disclosed in periodic SEC filings. The Dodd-Frank pay ratio disclosure process could provide the vehicle for identifying and addressing these shortcomings.

We recognize that it might take a transitional period before most companies could develop robust information systems to solve for these material managerial control weaknesses.6 However, once developed and implemented by registrants, their C-Suites and boards will be able to use the process and analytics to more effectively manage these key organizational assets and minimize risks.

5 For many registrants across all sectors this is not an uncommon condition.
6 Up to a three-year transition period would appear to be reasonable.
In addition, in reviewing the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis for the rule, many have raised the large cost to prepare pay-ratio and other disclosures. We conclude that these would easily be outweighed overwhelmed by benefits from improved insights on organizational and management structure, cost of management, clarity of accountabilities and delegated decision authorities, human capital re-deployment opportunities, PEO succession planning, risk management and corporate governance. Improved data, analytics and reporting would also create a more informed proxy voting and “say on pay” voting process.

One of the major advantages of calculating the median role and median compensation for the entire global enterprise and the other more useful PEO pay ratios (see the Appendix for research) would be valid and reliable information systems for reporting on structural and human capital investments, costs and risks to the board and C-Suite, in addition to valid and more reliable disclosure to shareholders using actual and complete enterprise data, not sampling.7

Experts who have advised registrants on these issues have seen the benefits of improved information systems on organizational and management structure, cost of management, clarity of accountabilities and delegated decision authorities, human capital redeployment opportunities, PEO succession planning and strategic leadership assessment risks. For example, at one company with 25,000 employees, the resulting potential annual impact on organizational productivity was in the hundreds of millions of dollars. These benefits flow through to improve sustainability of return on invested capital, free cash flows, enterprise valuation and total shareholder return for long-horizon investors.

Comments on Structuring the Safe Harbor

We would be happy to assist the SEC in revising the required disclosure reporting standards to achieve the goals identified above. The minimum data needed by boards and management would include the following:

- Total Full Time Employees (“FTE”)
  - FTE by Enterprise, by Business Unit, by Geography (Country or Hemisphere), by Management Layer
  - This includes the FTE of leased or outsourced employees where there is a 1 year or greater contractual commitment for delivery of services to the employer
  - The FTE count will be as of year end
  - Together this will outline the TOTAL employment and workforce footprint of the enterprise worldwide and the sustainable employment value for societies the company generates

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7 The need for reliable systems and data highlights the importance of this information being "filed" with the SEC as accurate and reliable, rather than merely being publicly furnished as useful but unverified.
- Total Number of Management Layers PEO to Front Line & Cost of Management
  - Identify the total number of management layers segmented by business unit and corporate function
  - Within each management layer the TOTAL count of number of FTE employees and the TOTAL Cost of Management at each layer

- Total Compensation cost for each global employee would include:
  - Base Salary and separately Annual Bonus
  - Any applicable Longer Term Incentive compensation
  - Estimated Pension and Benefits (e.g., as a plug number, 8% of base salary)
  - Currency adjustment to USD at year end
- Median Role(s) / employees up the management structure
- The Total number of Managers (versus front line or individual contributors)
- The PEO's Longest Accountable Performance Period for which the PEO role is held accountable for, measured on and compensated
- Total Enterprise Compensation Cost (broken out from selling, general and administrative expenses)
- Pay Ratios and Internal Pay Equity
  - The median total compensation for EACH management layer up the management structure (layer to layer), including the median layer to PEO pay ratio required by the Dodd-Frank Act
  - The PEO pay ratio to the median of roles in layer 2 of the management structure
  - The PEO pay ratio to the median of roles in layer 3 of the management structure
  - If a financial or other risk-intensive institution, the PEO Pay ratio to the chief risk officer (“CRO”) role

Table 2 in the Appendix provides a sample analytics and reporting format for aggregating this information. Such organizational capital analytics would provide the C-Suite and the Board with organizational insights about structural and human capital investments and how they are currently deployed, as well as workforce and management structure design and options for possible redeployment that would increase economic profit and productivity.
Correspondingly, disclosures needed by investors to effectively evaluate management of organizational capital, corporate governance and risk management would include:

- Total Full Time Employees (FTE), including leased employees
- Total number of Management Layers PEO to Front Line & Median Role(s)
- Total number of Managers (versus front line or individual contributors)
- The PEO's Longest Accountable Performance Period for which the PEO role is held accountable for, measured on and compensated
- Total Enterprise Compensation Cost (broken out from selling, general and administrative expenses)
- The Pay Ratios and Internal Pay Equity
- The median total compensation for EACH management layer up the management structure (layer to layer), including the median layer to PEO pay ratio required by the Dodd-Frank Act
- The PEO pay ratio to the median of roles in layer 2 of the management structure
- The PEO pay ratio to the median of roles in layer 3 of the management structure
- If a financial or other risk-intensive institution, the PEO Pay ratio to the CRO role

These disclosures should ideally be provided in a table format that allows for easy XBRL tagging (see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XBRL_International](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XBRL_International)) and thus for inclusion in financial and other databases, to facilitate analysis by investors, credit ratings agencies, proxy advisors and other investment service providers. Five-year trend lines are needed to capture time frame data that materially impact company performance and valuation and are central to any company's capacity to create sustainable value. Table 1 in the Appendix is a sample-reporting format for investors.

In evaluating the information required by investors, it is important to stress that the PEO pay ratios to the median of both management layers 2 and 3 are needed. Because the number of senior executives in layer 2 is often minimal, it could be relatively easy for some companies to increase total compensation of that level to present an artificial view of management design, compensation and enterprise internal pay equity. Inclusion of layer 3 (direct report roles once removed from the PEO) will provide a more accurate picture, capture more of the most likely sources for senior management succession and mitigate opportunities to manipulate the data.

**Attention to Development of Coordinated Disclosure Process**

If the SEC is not now able to implement a disclosure regimen that applies the suggested broader management structure design and related organizational and strategic leadership risk, we believe the issues raised in this comment letter deserve continued attention. In that event, we recommend that the SEC seek out advice from experts in management structure and accountability design, including related internal pay equity design, and start an initiative with participation of its Investor Advisory Committee and Issuer Advisory Committee to explore development of an approach to corporate disclosures that will encourage improved management of organizational design, enterprise risk management, corporate governance and efficient use of structural, human, natural and financial capital.
We believe that reporting to the C-Suite and boards, combined with transparent disclosures to investors, along the lines described above, will materially contribute to higher performance of investee companies, more sustainable returns for investors and more efficient capital markets overall.

If any of us can be of assistance in finalizing how the pay ratio rule is implemented or providing more information, feel free to contact us.

Respectfully submitted,

Karel Leeflang
Partner, Organizational Capital Partners

cc:

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissioners:
- Hon Mary Jo White, Chairman
- Hon Kara Stein, Commissioner
- Hon Luis Aguilar, Commissioner
- Hon Daniel Gallagher, Commissioner Hon Michael Piwowar, Commissioner

United States Senate Banking Committee:
- The Honorable Tim Johnson, Chairman
- The Honorable Mike Crapo, Ranking Minority Member

United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services
- The Honorable Jeb Hensarling, Chairman
- The Honorable Maxine Waters, Ranking Minority Member
Appendices:

- Table 1 - Proposed Table Layout for Organizational Capital & Pay Ratio Disclosures For Investors

- Research Background on Management Structure and PEO Pay Ratio(s) Reporting and Governance / Risk Insights for Boards and Disclosures for Long Horizon Investors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yr 0</th>
<th>Yr 1</th>
<th>Yr 2</th>
<th>Yr 3</th>
<th>Yr 4</th>
<th>4 yr Absolute Growth (Change)</th>
<th>4 yr % Growth (Change)</th>
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<td>Total Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)</td>
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<td>Total # Layers (PEO to Front Line)</td>
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<td>Longest Accountable Performance Period for PEO</td>
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<td>Total Enterprise Compensation</td>
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<td>PEO Total Pay Ratio to Median Total Pay 2nd Management Layer</td>
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<td>PEO Total Pay Ratio to Median Total Pay 3rd Management Layer</td>
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<td>PEO Total Pay Ratio to Median of Enterprise (Dodd Frank)</td>
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</table>
Research Background on Management Structure and PEO Pay Ratio(s) Reporting and Governance / Risk Insights for Boards and Disclosures for Long Horizon Investors

Pay Ratio and Optimal Management Structure Design Research

Starting with work that Elliott Jaques and the Brunel Institute for Organization and Social Studies (BIOSS) initiated, more than a dozen research studies investigated the relationship between differential pay, position in the management structure and corporate hierarchy, the time-span of decision discretion of a particular role and the nature of role complexity.

These studies involved over 1,000 participants – from PEO to manager levels in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. – concluding that the “Felt Fair Pay” ratio and differential compensation between the real work in organizations consistently differed by a multiple of two. Also see the follow up research studies in the USA undertaken by Roy Richardson and Edna Homa.

The research identified that each value-adding management layer - called a “Work Level” - should be worth two times more in **Total Compensation** than the level directly below it (Manager to Direct Report role relationship in the management structure) if the manager role is designed properly and truly performing differential and value adding work. When analyzing the entire management structure the **median** Pay differential at each management layer is the proper analysis method and not the **average**, which would be distorted by outlier pay data and outlier pay ratios in the management structure.

**The Felt Fair Pay research findings were based on Total Compensation and not Total Cash Compensation.**

Recently, MVC Management Corporation undertook an extension of this management structure and “Felt Fair Pay” research at the request of Board clients and analyzed the PEO to Median NEO pay ratios for the USA. They analyzed the 2035 largest USA issuers in the Russell 3000 for which 3-year Named Executive Officer (NEO) Pay data was available (2003 – 2005).

Removing the outlier data, the results of the updated research identified that PEO Pay Ratio some 25 years since the last major study had been conducted confirmed the Fair Pay ratio for America’s top managers at 2.45 (CEO to other NEO’s). Over the last 60 years the Manager to Direct Report pay ratio has been consistently identified as seen as equitable and fair in the 2 to 2.5 times broad range as a guiding organizational principle and corporate governance check.


When the PEO total pay ratio in relationship to Layer 2 (direct reports) and Layer 3 (direct reports once removed from the PEO role) becomes too large the research has identified the following material risks for investors:

- Named executive officers and or Layer 3 roles may lack appropriate delegated decision authority creating organizational risks due to an overly dominant PEO
- Layer 2 and Layer 3 may not have appropriate accountability and or authority for creating the Future Value and innovation of the Enterprise when as of March 2013 the Future Value was approximately 50% of the Valuation of the S&P 500
- PEO succession planning risks as evidence that too large a PEO pay ratio identifies (> 3X to layer 2 and > 6X to layer 3) both structural and talent gap material risks for PEO continuity
- Materials weaknesses in Board processes, Director Independence and execution of Fiduciary Accountability and possible credit risk for bondholders.

Defining What to Measure and How for the Median Employee Compensation

The research on Internal Pay Equity, “Felt Fair Pay” and Internal Pay ratios identifies that the “Felt Fair” compensation identified by the managers and direct reports as equitable pay differentials was based on Total Compensation and NOT base salary only.

For consistent global application across countries and in meeting the intended application for good Corporate Governance, insightful pay ratios and Dodd Frank compliance, Total Compensation for each employee and the median employee compensation by layer should be calculated and include the following pay elements:

- Base Salary
- Annual Bonus
- Any applicable Longer Term Incentive Compensation
- Estimated Pension and Benefits (use an estimated 8% of base salary)
- Currency adjustment to USD at year end

The estimated 8% of base salary as a pension & benefit cost is based on a review of the Mercer global pension and benefit global database and calculation of the Median pension and benefit cost for the world.

Identifying the median role (employee) and median compensation in the management structure is easily done by:

1) Doing a database query to count the number of management layers from the PEO to the Front Line employees (deepest depth structure in the management reporting structure)
2) Counting the median layer (mid-point between Layer 2 and the deepest front line employee) and not including the Principle Executive Officer (PEO) in that count
3) Running a query on the median pay for each layer in the management structure
4) Calculating the Median Enterprise compensation by taking the Median TOTAL compensation of each role managerial layer
5) See Table 2 for an example USA registrant
PEO Pay Ratio, Management Structure, PEO Succession Risk & Corporate Governance

Subsequent to the recent 2007 research by MVC Management and the previous research, Moody's (the bond rating service) confirmed the validity of material capital markets risk and they outlined their policy in assessing the PEO pay differential at > 3X to the other Named Executive Officers as a Red Flag for PEO succession and corporate governance risk and for input into corporate credit rating risk down grade. Moody's outlines this further in a number of their credit rating special comment white papers (2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008).

GMI Ratings and its predecessor companies (Governance Metrics International and The Corporate Library), as the leading Governance Risk Rating firm in the world adopted the same policy and now reports and RED FLAGS all PEO to Median NEO pay ratios greater than 3 times.

Applying the research and “Felt Fair Pay” principles, if the PEO to median of total pay differential to all 2nd layer role relationships is greater than 3X then this “Red Flags” a material risk related to corporate governance, delegation of authority, PEO succession and long-term enterprise continuity - all clearly material risks for investors. This PEO pay differential indicator correlates highly with an overly dominant PEO, possibility of failure to delegate authority, lack of PEO succession candidates in the 2nd layer, and weak corporate governance by the Board of Directors.

It is easy to overpay the 2nd layer of management and have a large PEO pay differential with the 3rd layer of management (the PEO role being the 1st layer of management down from the Board). It is the 3rd layer where the work, accountability and decision authority may be more operationally focused depending on the complexity of the enterprise and how many layers of management the firm has.

A further and more insightful check of PEO pay ratios is required for investors (equity and debt). If the PEO to median total pay differential to all 3rd layer role relationships is greater than 6.00 X then this further validates structural problems and PEO succession and future value risks. This wide Pay Differential gap indicates a failure to provide effective delegation of authority in the management structure.

As well, it is the 3rd layer of Management from which many next generation of PEO succession candidates usually are selected depending on the ages of the second layer incumbent talent pool.

The Board should be provided with an enterprise analysis of management structure and Pay ratios once a year that is similar to Table 2. This includes identifying any Red Flags for corporate governance reporting and investor disclosure.

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8 Key findings on optimal management structure design, internal pay equity and "Felt Fair Pay" are archived at these sites: http://globalro.org; http://stores.homestead.com/CasonHallPublishersStore; http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2391950?uid=3739448&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3737720&uid=4&sid=21102888420493.
This is why reporting and disclosing the total number of layers, total number of managers, total FTE in the enterprise is also important for Boards and Long Horizon Investors in understanding the shape of the management structure and workforce productivity for shareholders. These context-setting organizational insights also assist effective comparison between PEO Pay Ratios within the same company and across companies.

[See Table 3 with examples of PEO Pay ratios and how they vary due to changing management structure and organizational complexity.]

If the issuer is a financial institution, disclosure of the PEO to Chief Risk Officer (CRO) total pay ratio can provide great insight and has been confirmed to us by a number of former Bank PEOs. Their view is, if the Pay differential between the PEO to CRO roles is greater than 3X, then this indicates the structure and authority of corporate risk function and caliber of executive leading such a critical function for shareholders is inadequate. To further this disclosure the PEO pay differential to the median of all role relationships in the 2nd layer of the corporate risk function would also be advocated by us for the benefit of investors.

Banks today disclose all their Enterprise Compensation through a compensation & benefits line item in their financial statement along with a total-stock based compensation disclosure line item. Added together these create the banks’ total investment in structural and human capital, which we call Organizational Capital. With such a disclosure an investor can then calculate the banks’ Return on Organizational Capital (ROOC) calculated as NOPAT / Total Bank Compensation.

This represents the shareholders’ performance and return on what has been invested in the structural and human capital of the enterprise. This can then be compared across peer banks to see the relative performance of structural and human capital productivity. A bank that overpays its PEO and top 200 – 300 + officers will have a lower Return On Organizational Capital compared to a bank that pays closer the median of the rest of banking industry. This disclosure is available for all banks today in the USA.

All listed companies, like banks, should be required to provide breakout disclosures on Total Enterprise Compensation costs as separate from SG&A costs and have this disclosed in either in their financial statements or in the proxy statement. This would allow for insightful investor analysis of organizational capital productivity and or under investment. It may have a secondary effect of moderating any rise in total enterprise compensation costs shareholders.
Table 2:
Sample Organizational Capital, Management Structure Pay Ratio Reporting For Boards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mgmt Structure &amp; Layering</th>
<th>Median Total Rewards by Layer</th>
<th>CEO to Median Lyr 2 Pay Ratio (Red Flag 3X)</th>
<th>CEO to Median Lyr 3 Pay Ratio (Red Flag 6X)</th>
<th>CEO to Median Enterprise (Dodd-Frank)</th>
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<td>CEO-1(Sum Comp Table Pay)</td>
<td>$9,801,101</td>
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<td>FL Mgr &amp; Indv Contr</td>
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<td>Enterprise Median to Lyr 11</td>
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<td>Median Lyr 2 to Lyr 11</td>
<td>$139,275</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CEO Pay Ratio to Median Balance of Mgmt structure per SEC filing rule $9.8M divided $139,275 70.37
CEO Pay Ratio to Median Front Line Employee 362.83

Global SBU's 10
Total FTE 29,000
North America 15000
Europe 6000
South America 2000
AsiaPac 6000

Total Mgmt Layers (CEO to Front line) 11
PEO Longest Accountable Performance Period 5 yrs
Total Enterprise Compensation Costs - Yr End $1,350,583,338
Total 5 Named Officer Compensation Cost - Yr End - SCT $27,353,875

CEO to Median Enterprise (Dodd-Frank)
Table 3:

How Median PEO Pay Ratios change by different Organization Structures and Management Layering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Mgmt Struct</th>
<th>PEO 1</th>
<th>PEO 2</th>
<th>PEO 3</th>
<th>PEO 4</th>
<th>PEO 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Work Levels</td>
<td>$1,367,187.50</td>
<td>$546,875.00</td>
<td>$218,750.00</td>
<td>$87,500.00</td>
<td>$35,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Work Levels</td>
<td>$8,544,921.88</td>
<td>$3,417,968.75</td>
<td>$1,367,187.50</td>
<td>$546,875.00</td>
<td>$218,750.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidence of Excessive PEO Pay Ratio, Poor Performance and Enterprise Risk for Shareholders

In the recently released research commissioned by the New York Times related to Pay and Performance, and PEO Pay ratios the research further validated the performance risk for investors and efficient capital markets.

Eighteen Fortune 300 companies delivered a 5 year combined economic loss of $134 billion over 5 years. All 18 companies had an ROIC less than WACC over 5 years and destroyed intrinsic shareholder value. The 90 named officers of these 18 companies were granted $ 3.1 billion in 5 year realizable compensation.

The hidden headline is the PEO to Median Other Named Executive Officer pay ratio for the 18 companies was on average 3.2 X, greater than the Moody's and GMI Red Flag of 3 X, and a number of these Value Destroying companies had significant PEO to median NEO pay ratio in the 3.5 to 4.9 range further validating the investor risk when there is an excessive PEO pay differential.

**Dodd-Frank PEO Pay Ratio to Median Role / Employee of Enterprise – Potential Misleading Disclosures**

The Dodd-Frank PEO Pay Ratio to the Median of the enterprise compensation calculation does have a material risk of providing misleading disclosures to Long Horizon Investors and creditors. This is mentioned in the National Investor Relations Institute recent comment letter to the SEC. We agree.

If a company has 5 Layers of Management, a median compensation for layer 5 at $ 35,000 and uses a “Felt Fair Pay” and internal pay equity differential of 2.5 X per layer then the PEO Pay Ratio under Dodd-Frank disclosure rule for this company is 8.93. See Table 3.

A company that is much more complex and global would have 7 or more layers and following the same management structure and pay ratio principles and calculations would result in a PEO Pay Ratio of 22.32 times.

Thus the shape of the management structure, complexity of the company, number of business units, number of layers, and number of FTE, and location of the FTE around the world will all impact the validity, reliability and interpretation of the PEO to Median Enterprise disclosure and its application for strategic corporate governance and proxy voting by investors.

The reality is Investors and the media will compare the Dodd Frank PEO Pay ratio between peers, within sectors, and across sectors. To minimize possible misleading disclosures a number of organizational shape and complexity related disclosures must be part of the narrative in describing the PEO / Median of Enterprise disclosure.
The most critical additional disclosures to provide effective interpretive and comparative insights of the PEO to Median Pay employee ratio (Dodd-Frank) and would also need to be disclosed, include:

- Total Enterprise FTE (globally), including leased employees
- Total Number of Management Layers (deepest structure PEO to Front Line Employee)
- Total Number of Managers
- Longest Accountable Performance Period for the PEO
- Total Enterprise Compensation Costs
- The PEO pay ratio to the median of roles in layer 2 of the management structure
- The PEO pay ratio to the median of roles in layer 3 of the management structure

**Data Privacy and Pay Ratios**

Data privacy rules will have to be observed. For example, the European Union has a Safe Harbor agreement with the US, so data transfer can be done legally and should retain the same rights as is held in Europe.

The second way to access the data is under contracts that use sets of model clauses drafted by the European Commission. Please see:

http://export.gov/safeharbor/


Removing any personal identifiers (name, phone number, badge number, email address, company personnel number) from any databases to be accessed or data exports could also address many of these privacy concerns.

The focus is on the management structure, roles, compensation, pay ratios and NOT the people.

**Glossary of Terms**

The following is a list of terms related to effectively defining Accountability, Authority, Felt Fair Compensation and Pay Ratios in management structures that are employment hierarchies.

**Accountability**
A relationship where one role (manager) is held to account to another role for its actions and decisions in the managerial structure or other body authorized to approve and or which has a fiduciary duty to others

**Authority**
Legitimate decision right or action vested by delegation with power vested to invest resources and capital (structural, human, intellectual, financial) to create value for customers and shareholders

**Level of**
Level of complexity is determined by the number of factors, their inter-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Complexity</strong></th>
<th>relationships and rate of change in those factors to be taken into account in making a decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision</strong></td>
<td>The making of a choice with a commitment to a future goal and the investment of capital (structural, human, intellectual, financial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delegation</strong></td>
<td>The act of assigning an accountability for a performance outcome and the related resources to direct reports and other roles to exercise judgment and discretion for investing those resources to create value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Felt Fair Pay</strong></td>
<td>A level of total compensation payment that is seen by the role holder, manager and manager once removed (MoR) as equitable payment based on the differential work of the role (accountability and authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Front Line Role</strong></td>
<td>A role that is accountable for direct outcome work assigned by the manager and is at the front line of delivery of value to customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Time Equivalent</strong></td>
<td>Full-time equivalent (FTE) is a unit that indicates the workload of an employed role in a way that makes workloads comparable across various contexts. FTE is often used to measure a role's involvement in a project, or to track cost reductions in an organization. An FTE of 1.0 means that the role is equivalent to a full-time worker, while an FTE of 0.5 signals that the worker is only half time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the U.S. federal government, FTE is defined by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as the number of total hours worked divided by the maximum number of compensable hours in a full-time schedule as defined by law.

For example, if the normal schedule for a quarter is defined as 411.25 hours (\(35 \text{ hours per week} \times (52 \text{ weeks per year} - 5 \text{ weeks regulatory vacation}) \div 4\)), then someone working 100 hours during that quarter represents \(100/411.25 = 0.24\) FTE.

Two employees working in total 400 hours during that same quarterly period represent 0.97 FTE.

| **Layer** | A reporting role relationship (manager to direct report) in an accountable management structure |
| **Longest Accountable Performance Period** | The targeted completion time for the longest accountable activity or strategic program / initiative into the future for which the role is held to account for performance, has delegated authority and decision discretion to invest resources, create value and a return on the invested capital |
| **Manager** | A role held to account for the direct output of their role and the delegated accountability and outcome of direct report roles, direct report roles once removed including the minimum managerial decision authorities of hire, removal from role, assignment of type work, goal setting, appraisal of performance, and rewards |
| **Principle Executive** | The first full time accountable role in a managerial hierarchy of a |
Officer (PEO) corporation which is being held to account for specific strategic and operations goals established by the board of directors and has been delegated authority by the board to exercise good business judgment in the investment of capital

PEO Pay Ratio The pay ratio between the PEO total compensation and total compensation of other roles in the management structure

Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) The Return on Invested Capital is calculated as Net Operating Profit after Tax divided by Total Invested Capital (including intangible capital adjustments)

Role A role is a position in a management structure where the manager has set clearly defined metrics, targets, by when including its level of expected innovation, longest expected accountable performance period, and delegated resources (operating or investment capital) and delegated decision authority to exercise judgment to meet established goals set by the manager

Strategic Risk Horizon Furthest into the future that a role is required to conceptualize the future(s), innovate, set milestones and invest risk capital for investors to reach a future state and a Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)

Total Compensation The total amount of compensation adding together the elements of compensation including base salary, bonus, long term incentive, benefits and pension

Work The exercise of judgment and discretion in making decisions in carrying out goal directed activities (what, by when, with what quality standards and what resources) as assigned by the manager

Work Level A unique and clearly differentiated level of work complexity, level of innovation and targeted completion time for value creation that is differentiated in the management structure; there may be 2 or more layers in a single Work Level