April 25, 2022

Via E-Mail
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street NE
Washington, D.C. 20549-1090

Re: Private Fund Advisers; Documentation of Registered Investment Adviser Compliance Reviews
File No. S7-03-22

Dear Ms. Countryman:

The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (the "DAF") is submitting this letter in support of the new private fund adviser rules proposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act"). In particular, as an investor in certain private funds, DAF supports the proposed rules because it believes that the rules, if adopted, would more effectively protect private fund investors and would help prevent certain abuses in the private fund industry. As described more fully below, the private funds DAF has invested in have been managed by advisers engaging in a variety of activities and preferential investor treatment that would be prohibited by the proposed rules. For these reasons, DAF commends the SEC's efforts to better protect private fund investors and supports the adoption of the proposed rules.

Our comments address two of the proposed new rules:

1. Proposed Rule 211(h)(2)-1 would prohibit all private fund advisers, including those that are not registered with the SEC, from engaging in certain sales practices, conflicts of interest, and compensation schemes that are contrary to the public interest and the protection of investors ("Prohibited Activities Rule"); and

2. Proposed Rule 211(h)(2)-3 would prohibit all private fund advisers from providing preferential treatment to certain investors in a private fund, unless the adviser discloses such treatment to other current and prospective investors ("Preferential Treatment Rule").

We appreciate your attention to our comments.

BACKGROUND

1. Charitable DAF Fund and Its Mission

DAF is a limited partnership organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands. Charitable DAF HoldCo, Ltd. is the only limited partner of DAF, and Charitable DAF GP, LLC (the "General Partner") is DAF's general partner. DAF invests in certain securities for the purpose of benefiting, directly and indirectly, its charitable supporting organizations. DAF's charitable supporting organizations

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are the indirect equity owners of DAF’s limited partner, Charitable DAF HoldCo, Ltd., and are also non-profit charitable entities exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. We have attached, as Exhibit A to this letter, an organizational chart reflecting DAF’s direct and indirect ownership structure.

Since its inception in 2012, DAF has had a significant impact in the communities where its charitable supporting organizations deploy their capital. DAF’s charitable supporting organizations donate tens of millions of dollars to a wide variety of charitable causes, including causes supporting education, military veterans and first responders, health and medical research, economic and community development initiatives, and youth and family programs. More specifically, since 2012, DAF’s charitable supporting organizations have committed over $42 million to nonprofit organizations, and have funded $32 million of total commitments, with the remaining commitments scheduled for future installments. These commitments include donations to more than 275 individual organizations, with average annual grant payments of approximately $3.7 million.

The donations from DAF’s charitable supporting organizations have supported organizations such as the Dallas Children’s Advocacy Center, which serves over 8,000 abused children annually. The donations have also supported The Family Place, which has provided for the safety of 11,000 victims of domestic violence. In addition, the donations have provided educational support for 600 low-income students in the Dallas area, as well as training and support for 4,000 military and law enforcement members.

2. DAF’s Claims Against Highland Capital Management

DAF has filed two complaints against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“HCM”), an SEC-registered investment adviser, with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (“District Court”). The two complaints (collectively, the "Complaints"), which detail various fiduciary violations HCM committed in its capacity as a private fund manager, are attached to this letter as Exhibit B and Exhibit C, respectively.

a. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.

As relevant to the proposed rulemaking, DAF, the General Partner, and HCM were parties to a non-discretionary advisory agreement dated as of January 1, 2017 (the "Agreement"). The Agreement has since been terminated, but was in effect through February 2021.

We have alleged in the Complaints that HCM recommended that DAF invest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), a limited company incorporated under the laws of the Island of Guernsey. DAF invested indirectly in HCLOF through DAF’s wholly owned entity, CLO Holdco, Ltd. ("Holdco"), a Cayman Islands limited company.

HCLOF’s investment adviser was Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. ("HHCFA"), a relying adviser and a wholly-owned subsidiary of HCM. Therefore, HCM and HHCFA can be viewed as operating a single

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2 HCM filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in October 2019, which is currently being heard in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas ("Bankruptcy Court").

3 Exhibit B, ¶ 12 (p. 5).

4 Id.
advisory business.\(^5\) HHCFA also employed HCM as a sub-adviser. Because HCLOF offered its units through U.S. jurisdictional means, it should be treated as a private fund.\(^6\)

We have alleged in the Complaints that HCM, acting on its own behalf and on behalf of HHCFA, withheld material non-public information that would have a material impact upon the value of the assets held by HCLOF.\(^7\) By withholding this non-public information, HCM was able to acquire, from another HCLOF shareholder, shares of HCLOF for itself at a price that failed to reflect the fair value of the assets held by HCLOF. Furthermore, this was all done when the Agreement remained in effect, which obligated HCM to act in DAF’s best interest as a fiduciary to DAF, and also while HCM was itself a shareholder of HCLOF. Consequently, HCM provided itself (a fellow shareholder in HCLOF) preferential information, and engaged in conduct that would have been prohibited by the Preferential Treatment Rule.

We note that the Agreement:

- limited liability of HCM, its members or any of their respective affiliates and their respective partners, members, officers, directors, employees, shareholders and agents (including parties acting as agents for the execution of transactions) (collectively, "Covered Persons") for any act of omission other than willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by a non-appealable judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction;

- required indemnification of Covered Persons for all conduct other than willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by a non-appealable judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; and

- failed to include a savings clause for claims arising under relevant federal or state securities laws.

We note that the Portfolio Management Agreement between HCLOF and HHCFA (the "PMA"):

- limited liability of HHCFA, its affiliates (including HCM), any officer, director, secretary, manager, employee or any direct or indirect partner, member, stockholder, agent or legal representative (e.g., executors, guardians and trustees) of the Portfolio Manager and its affiliates, including persons formerly serving in such capacities, any person who serves at the request of the Portfolio Manager or the Board of Directors of HCLOF, on behalf of HCLOF as an officer, director, secretary, manager, partner, member, employee, stockholder, agent or legal representative of any other person serving at the request of the Portfolio Manager or the Board of Directors of HCLOF on behalf of HCLOF (collectively, "Private Fund Covered Persons") for any act of omission other than bad faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by a non-appealable judgment of a court or governmental body of competent jurisdiction;

- required indemnification of Private Fund Covered Persons for all conduct other than bad faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by a non-appealable judgment of a court or governmental body of competent jurisdiction; and

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\(^6\) A Form D was filed on behalf of HCLOF with the SEC on November 20, 2017, in which HCLOF claimed reliance on Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"), available at [https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001723076/000172307617000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001723076/000172307617000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml).

\(^7\) Exhibit B, ¶¶ 36-37 (p. 8).
failed to include a savings clause for claims arising under relevant federal or state securities laws.

We also note that, according to HCLOF's Private Placement Memorandum, HCLOF's Articles of Association ("Articles"):

- limited liability of Private Fund Covered Persons for any act of omission other than bad faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by a non-appealable judgment of a court or governmental body of competent jurisdiction;

- required indemnification of Private Fund Covered Persons for all conduct other than bad faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by a non-appealable judgment of a court or governmental body of competent jurisdiction; and

- failed to include a savings clause for claims arising under relevant federal or state securities laws (although the offering memorandum notes that the provisions cannot act as a waiver of rights under applicable U.S. securities laws or other laws).

b. Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.

We also have alleged in the Complaints that DAF invested in Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P. ("MultiStrat"), another private fund advised by HCM.8 To our knowledge, no Form D is available with respect to MultiStrat. However, an application for an order filed by MultiStrat and various other applicants on March 18, 2016 ("Application") states that MultiStrat is a Delaware limited partnership that was formed on December 1, 2005 and commenced operations in December 2005.9 The Application states that MultiStrat may invest in, among other things, life settlement policies. The Application states that MultiStrat relies on Section 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act. Therefore, MultiStrat should also be treated as a private fund.

As it pertains to MultiStrat, we have alleged in the Complaints that: (i) MultiStrat raised funds from existing investors for the ostensible purpose of paying premiums on a viatical pool of life insurance policies (the "Life Contracts"), but failed to do so; and (ii) instead of paying the premiums on the Life Contracts, HCM caused MultiStrat to sell the Life Contracts to a third party at a price that was far below their fair value.10 At or around the time HCM was engaging in these alleged activities and causing MultiStrat to sell the Life Contracts, HCM was itself a large investor in MultiStrat, owning approximately 58.70% of MultiStrat.

MultiStrat's Fourth Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement ("LPA"):

- limits liability of MultiStrat's General Partner, HCM, any of their Affiliates, each direct or indirect member, manager, partner, director, officer, shareholder and employee of any of the foregoing and, with the approval of the General Partner, any agent of any of the foregoing (including their respective executors, heirs, assigns, successors or other legal representatives) (each a "MultiStrat LPA Indemnified Person") for any loss or damage occasioned by any acts or omissions in the performance of services under the LPA Agreement or MultiStrat’s Investment Management Agreement with HCM, or otherwise in connection with MultiStrat, its investments or operations, unless such loss or damage has

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8 See Exhibit C, ¶¶ 11-12 (p. 3).

9 Amendment No. 4 to the Application for an Order Pursuant to Section 17(d) and Section 57(i) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rule 17d-1 Under the Act to Permit Certain Joint Transactions Otherwise Prohibited by Section 17(d) and Section 57(a)(4) of the Act and Rule 17d-1 Under the Act, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1167365/000119312516509986/d116277d40appa.htm (File No. 812-14430).

10 See Exhibit C, ¶¶ 17, 20 (p. 3).
occurred by reason of the willful misconduct, fraud or gross negligence of that MultiStrat LPA Indemnified Person or as otherwise required by law; and

- requires indemnification of MultiStrat LPA Indemnified Persons for all conduct other than bad faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence as determined by:
  - a non-appealable judgment of a court or governmental body of competent jurisdiction; or
  - a nolo contendre plea.

We note that the Third Amended and Restated Investment Management Agreement by and among Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, Ltd. (“Offshore Feeder”), MultiStrat and HCM (the “IMA”):

- limits HCM’s liability to MultiStrat, the Offshore Feeder, or any of their partners or shareholders for any losses, damages, expenses or claims occasioned by any act or omission of HCM in connection with the performance of its services hereunder, other than as a result of HCM’s willful misconduct, fraud or gross negligence, or as otherwise prescribed by applicable law;

- requires indemnification of HCM each member, shareholder, partner, manager or director of, or any person who controls, HCM, each of the respective affiliates of the foregoing and each of the respective executors, heirs, assigns, successors or other legal representatives of the foregoing for all conduct other than fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence; and

- failed to include a savings clause for claims arising under relevant federal or state securities laws.

We also note that the MultiStrat Private Placement Memorandum includes a cursory discussion of side letters. It notes that the General Partner may enter into side letters with respect to management fees, performance allocations, transparency and withdrawals. It notes that side letters are typically provided to HCM’s principals and employees, as well as their family members or affiliates.

The Offshore Feeder Private Placement Memorandum includes a more fulsome discussion of side letters. In addition to the details provided to U.S. investors, it mentions that other investors are not required to be informed of the terms of any side letters, or of their existence. It also mentions that other investors are not required to be offered the same terms or rights offered to an investor pursuant to a side letter.

**COMMENTS**

As described more fully in the Complaints, DAF has seen firsthand the fiduciary violations committed by HCM, both as an investor in HCLOF and Multistrat, and as a client of HCM. Based upon DAF’s experiences with what it views as HCM’s repeated egregious breaches of its fiduciary duties to DAF, we urge the SEC to adopt the Prohibited Activities Rule and the Preferential Treatment Rule in the form proposed.

More specifically, DAF believes that, had the Prohibited Activities Rule and the Preferential Treatment Rule been in effect, HCM:

- would not have been able to insulate its conduct from liability;
- could not have selectively disclosed solely to itself, in its capacity as an investor in HCLOF, the material non-public information about the value of certain of HCLOF’s underlying assets; and
• could not have caused Multistrat to sell the Life Contracts to a third party at a price that was far below their fair value.

We also urge the SEC to utilize its statutory authority under Section 1109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to participate in bankruptcy cases involving investment advisers in instances where an investment adviser may seek to utilize the bankruptcy process to protect itself from liability involving breaches of its federal fiduciary duty, or otherwise insulate itself from challenges to the type of conduct that the proposed rules are trying to prohibit.

1. HCLOF

We respectfully submit that, if the Prohibited Activities Rule been in place, it may well have discouraged HCM from acquiring HCLOF shares at a price that was materially less than the shares’ fair value, especially while HCM possessed material non-public information regarding the value of certain assets in HCLOF’s portfolio. In particular, we note that the SEC stated that the Prohibited Activities Rule, among other things, would prohibit an adviser to a private fund from seeking to limit its liability for breaches of its required standard of conduct. The SEC rightly noted that activities in contravention of an adviser’s required standard of conduct “harm investors by placing the adviser’s interests above those of its private fund clients (and investors in such clients).” The SEC further observed that limiting an adviser’s liability for breaching its required standard of conduct diminishes its incentive to comply with that standard. Indeed, this is an observation that DAF has witnessed firsthand, given HCM’s multiple fiduciary breaches alleged in the Complaints.

We agree with the SEC and we believe that this is precisely what occurred with HCM and HHCF. As noted above, the Agreement, the PMA and the Articles all purported to limit HCM and HHCF’s liability and require indemnification for any act or omission other than willful misconduct or gross negligence (or bad faith, in the case of the PMA and the Articles). These liability limitations effectively incented HCM, in its capacity as sub-advisor, and HHCF, to breach their fiduciary obligations to their clients (including DAF) and to the private funds they managed. With the security of these broad liability limitations, HCM was encouraged to engage in certain transactions and preferential investor treatment that would have been prohibited by the proposed rules.

Moreover, we respectfully submit that, had the Preferential Treatment Rule been in place, it likewise may well have discouraged HCM from acquiring HCLOF shares at a price that was materially less than the shares’ fair value, especially while HCM was in the possession of material non-public information regarding the value of certain assets in HCLOF’s portfolio. In particular, we note that the SEC indicated that the Preferential Treatment Rule, among other things, would prohibit an adviser and its related persons from selectively disclosing a private fund’s portfolio

11 The rule would “prohibit an adviser to a private fund, directly or indirectly, from seeking reimbursement, indemnification, exculpation, or limitation of its liability by the private fund or its investors for a breach of fiduciary duty, willful misfeasance, bad faith, negligence, or recklessness in providing services to the private fund.” Proposing Release, supra note 1, 87 Fed. Reg. at 16925.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 See EXAMS National Examination Program Risk Alert: Observations from Examinations of Private Fund Advisers 5 (Jan. 27, 2022) (“EXAMS Private Funds Risk Alert 2022”), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/private-fund-risk-alert-pt-2.pdf (“EXAMS staff observed private fund advisers that included potentially misleading hedge clauses in documents that purported to waive or limit the Advisers Act fiduciary duty except for certain exceptions, such as a non-appealable judicial finding of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or fraud. Such clauses could be inconsistent with Sections 206 and 215(a) of the Advisers Act.”).
holdings information if doing so could negatively affect other private fund investors.\textsuperscript{15} The SEC noted that this selective disclosure can lead to profits or loss avoidance among those who obtained the disclosed information at the expense of investors who failed to obtain the disclosed information.\textsuperscript{16}

Here, too, we agree with the SEC and we believe that this is precisely what occurred with HCM. We note that HCM was an existing shareholder in HCLOF when it purchased HCLOF shares based on material non-public information, and thus (i) engaged in self-dealing in violation of its fiduciary duty, and (ii) offered preferential treatment to itself (as an HCLOF shareholder) at the expense of all other HCLOF shareholders.

2. MultiStrat

We respectfully submit that, if the Prohibited Activities Rule had been in place, it may well have discouraged HCM from selling the Life Contracts at a price less than their fair value of the settlement pool.

As noted above, the LPA and the IMA purported to limit HCM’s liability and require indemnification for any act or omission other than willful misconduct, fraud or gross negligence. As a practical matter, we would argue that the liability limitations effectively incented HCM to breach its fiduciary obligations to MultiStrat and to make a cost-benefit calculation that the time, expense, and uncertainty of litigation exceeded the amount and likelihood of any recovery by MultiStrat.

Further, DAF understands that HCM (as a shareholder in MultiStrat) may have loaned funds to MultiStrat for premium payment purposes, where such funds were eventually repaid in full to HCM. This is in contrast to additional funds that were contributed by DAF to MultiStrat for premium payment purposes, where DAF only received additional shares in MultiStrat in exchange for the contributed funds. DAF understands that the additional equity it received was reduced in value due to MultiStrat’s ongoing litigation liabilities (the full scope of which was not known to DAF), and ultimately rendered less valuable than the additional funds DAF contributed to MultiStrat. DAF believes the differential treatment of investors – in this case, loan repayment terms offered to HCM versus additional (and less valuable) equity offered to DAF – amounts to a violation of the Preferential Treatment Rule.

3. Bankruptcy Code

As noted above, HCM filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in October 2019. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas is considering HCM’s bankruptcy filing. Our experience has been that the bankruptcy court is not a venue that is particularly well-suited for us to vindicate our federal securities law claims.

We note that Section 1109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the SEC with statutory authority to participate in bankruptcy cases. However, the SEC has generally limited its activity to large public company Chapter 11 cases.\textsuperscript{17} The SEC stated that its role focuses on four main areas, including “to participate on legal issues that may affect the rights of public investors, such as where a debtor may seek to improperly shield officers and directors from lawsuits for securities fraud.” We would argue that the use of the bankruptcy process to protect an investment adviser from liability to a private fund or its investors for a breach of fiduciary duty similarly affects the rights of investors. Consequently, we would urge the SEC to complement the goals it articulated.

\textsuperscript{15} See Proposing Release, supra note 1, 87 Fed. Reg. at 16929.

\textsuperscript{16} Id.

\textsuperscript{17} Data: Public Company Bankruptcy Cases Opened and Monitored, available at https://www.sec.gov/open/datasets-bankruptcy.html.
in proposing the Prohibited Activities Rule by participating in bankruptcy cases involving private
fund advisers in instances where the rights of private fund investors may be adversely affected.

CONCLUSION

DAF reiterates its support of, and appreciates the opportunity to comment on, the proposed rules. 
Please do not hesitate to contact Mark Patrick) with any questions 
or to discuss this comment letter.

Respectfully submitted,

Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.

By: Charitable DAF GP, LLC,
    its general partner

By:  

Mark Patrick
Managing Member

cc:   Hon. Gary Gensler, SEC Chair
     Hon. Allison Herren Lee, SEC Commissioner
     Hon. Hester M. Peirce, SEC Commissioner
     Hon. Caroline A. Crenshaw, SEC Commissioner
     William A. Birdthistle, SEC Director, Division of Investment Management
     Christine Schleppegrell, SEC Senior Counsel, Division of Investment Management
     Richard Best, SEC Acting Director, Division of Examinations
     Marshall Gandy, SEC National Associate Director of the Investment Adviser/Investment
     Company Examination Program, Division of Examinations
EXHIBIT A

Charitable DAF/CLO HoldCo
Structure Chart

- The Dallas Foundation (Community Foundation)
- Greater Kansas City Community Foundation (Community Foundation)
- Santa Barbara Foundation (Community Foundation)
- The Community Foundation of North Texas (CFN)
  (Community Foundation)

- Highland Dallas Foundation, Inc. (Sponsor and Supporting Organization)
- Highland Kansas City Foundation, Inc. (Sponsor and Supporting Organization)
- Highland Santa Barbara Foundation, Inc. (Sponsor and Supporting Organization)

- Mark Patrick (Managing Member)

- Charitable DAF GP, LLC (Delaware)
- Charitable DAF HoldCo, Ltd. (Cayman Islands) (Corporate Blocker)

- Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (Cayman Islands) (Hedge Fund)

- CLO HoldCo, Ltd. (Cayman Islands) (Corporate Blocker)
Exhibit B
EXHIBIT B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P.
and CLO HOLDCO, LTD.,
directly and derivatively,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
L.P., HIGHLAND HCF ADVISOR, LTD.,
and HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING, LTD.,
nominally,

Defendants.

Cause No. __________________________

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

I.

INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of the acts and omissions of Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM"), which is the general manager of Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. ("HCFA"), both of which are registered investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act"),¹ and nominal Defendant Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF") (HCM and HCFA each a "Defendant," or together, "Defendants"). The acts and omissions which have recently come to light reveal breaches of fiduciary duty, a pattern of violations of the Advisers Act’s anti-fraud provisions, and concealed breaches of the HCLOF Company Agreement, among others, which have caused and/or likely will cause Plaintiffs damages.

¹ https://adviserinfo.sec.gov/firm/summary/110126
At all relevant times, HCM was headed by CEO and potential party James P. Seery (“Seery”). Seery negotiated a settlement with the several Harbourvest\(^2\) entities who owned 49.98% of HCLOF. The deal had HCM (or its designee) purchasing the Harbourvest membership interests in HCLOF for $22.5 million. Recent revelations, however, show that the sale was predicated upon a sales price that was vastly below the Net Asset Value (“NAV”) of those interests. Upon information and belief, the NAV of HCLOF’s assets had risen precipitously, but was not disclosed to Harbourvest nor to Plaintiffs.

Under the Advisers Act, Defendants have a non-waivable duty of loyalty and candor, which includes its duty not to inside trade with its own investors, \(i.e.,\) not to trade with an investor to which HCM and Seery had access to superior non-public information. Upon information and belief, HCM’s internal compliance policies required by the Advisers Act would not generally have allowed a trade of this nature to go forward—meaning, the trade either was approved in spite of compliance rules preventing it, or the compliance protocols themselves were disabled or amended to a level that leaves Defendants HCM and HCLOF exposed to liability. Thus, Defendants have created an unacceptable perpetuation of exposure to liability.

Additionally, Defendants are liable for a pattern of conduct that gives rise to liability for their conduct of the enterprise consisting of HCM in relation to HCFA and HCLOF, through a pattern of concealment, misrepresentation, and violations of the securities rules. In the alternative, HCFA and HCM, are guilty of self-dealing, violations of the Advisers Act, and tortious interference by (a) not disclosing that Harbourvest had agreed to sell at a price well below the current NAV, and (b) diverting the Harbourvest opportunity to themselves.

\(^2\)“Harbourvest” refers to the collective of Harbourvest Dover Street IX Investment, L.P., Harbourvest 2017 Global AIF, L.P., Harbourvest 2017 Global Fund, L.P., HV International VIII Secondary, L.P., and Harbourvest Skew Base AIF, L.P. Each was a member of Defendant Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.
For these reasons, judgment should be issued in Plaintiffs’ favor.

II.

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd. is a limited company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands.

2. Plaintiff Charitable DAF Fund, L.P., (“DAF”) is a limited partnership formed under the laws of the Cayman Islands.

3. Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P. is a limited partnership with its principal place of business at 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, Texas 75201. It may be served at its principal place of business or through its principal officer, James P. Seery, Jr., or through the Texas Secretary of State, or through any other means authorized by federal or state law.

4. Defendant Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. is a limited company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands. Its principal place of business is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, Texas 75201. It is a registered investment adviser (“RIA”) subject to the laws and regulations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Adviser’s Act”). It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Highland Capital Management, L.P.

5. Nominal Defendant Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. is a limited company incorporated under the laws of the Island of Guernsey. Its registered office is at First Floor, Dorey Court, Admiral Park, St. Peter Port, Guernsey GY1 6HJ, Channel Islands. Its principal place of business is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, Texas 75201.

6. Potential party James P. Seery, Jr. (“Seery”) is an officer and/or director and/or control person of Defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland CLO Funding, Ltd., and Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., and is a citizen of and domiciled in Floral Park, New York.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as one or more rights and/or causes of action arise under the laws of the United States. This Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over all other claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

8. Personal jurisdiction is proper over the Defendants because they reside and/or have continual contacts with the state of Texas, having regularly submitted to jurisdiction here. Jurisdiction is also proper under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d).

9. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because one or more Defendants reside in this district and/or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated in this district. Venue in this district is further provided under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d).

IV. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

HCLOF IS FORMED

10. Plaintiff DAF is a charitable fund that helps several causes throughout the country, including providing funding for humanitarian issues (such as veteran’s welfare associations and women’s shelters), public works (such as museums, parks and zoos), and education (such as specialty schools in underserved communities). Its mission is critical.

11. Since 2012, DAF was advised by its registered investment adviser, Highland Capital Management, L.P., and its various subsidiaries, about where to invest. This relationship was governed by an Investment advisory Agreement.
12. At one point in 2017, HCM advised DAF to acquire 143,454,001 shares of HCLOF, with HCFA (a subsidiary of HCM) serving as the portfolio manager. DAF did so via a holding entity, Plaintiff CLO Holdco, Ltd.

13. On November 15, 2017, through a Subscription and Transfer Agreement, the DAF entered into an agreement with others to sell and transfer shares in HCLOF, wherein the DAF retained 49.02% in CLO Holdco.

14. Pursuant to that agreement, Harbourvest acquired the following interests in the following entities:

- Harbourvest Dover Street IX Investment, L.P., acquired 35.49%;
- Harbourvest 2017 Global AIF, L.P., acquired 2.42%;
- Harbourvest 2017 Global Fund, L.P., acquired 4.85%;
- HV International VIII Secondary, L.P., acquired 6.5%; and
- Harbourvest Skew Base AIF, L.P., acquired 0.72%;

for a total of 49.98% (altogether, the “Harbourvest interests”).

15. On or about October 16, 2019, Highland Capital Management filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which was later transferred to the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, in the case styled In Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P., Debtor, Cause No. 19-34054, (the “HCM Bankruptcy” and the Court is the “Bankruptcy Court”).

The Harbourvest Settlement with Highland Capital Management in Bankruptcy

16. On April 8, 2020, Harbourvest submitted its proofs of claim in the HCM bankruptcy proceeding. Annexed to its proofs of claims was an explanation of the Proof of Claim and the basis therefor setting out various pre-petition allegations of wrongdoing by HCM. See, e.g., Case No. 19-bk-34054, Doc. 1631-5.
17. The debtor, HCM, made an omnibus response to the proofs of claims, stating they were duplicative of each other, overstated, late, and otherwise meritless.


19. Harbourvest represented that it had invested in HCLOF, purchasing 49.98% of HCLOF’s outstanding shares.

20. Plaintiff CLO Holdco was and is also a 49.02% holder of HCLOF’s member interests.


22. The Harbourvest Claims centered on allegations that when Harbourvest was intending to invest in a pool of Collateralized Loan Obligations, or CLOs, that were then-managed by Acis Capital Management (“Acis”), a subsidiary of HCM, HCM failed to disclose key facts about ongoing litigation with a former employee, Josh Terry.

23. Harbourvest contended that HCM never sufficiently disclosed the underlying facts about the litigation with Terry, and HCM’s then-intended strategy to fight Terry caused HCLOF to incur around $15 million in legal fees and costs. It contended that had it known the nature of the lawsuit and how it would eventually turn out, Harbourvest never would have invested in HCLOF. See Cause No. 19-bk-34054, Doc. 1057.

24. HCLOF’s portfolio manager is HCFA. HCM is the parent of HCFA and is managed by its General Partner, Strand Management, who employs Seery and acts on behalf of HCM.
25. Before acceding to the Harbourvest interests, HCM was a 0.6% holder of HCLOF interests.

26. While even assuming Harbourvest’s underlying claims were valid as far as the lost $15 million went, the true damage of the legal fees to Harbourvest would have been 49.98% of the HCLOF losses (i.e., less than $7.5 million). Harbourvest claimed that it had lost over $100 million in the HCLOF transaction due to fraud, which, after trebling under the racketeering statute, it claimed it was entitled to over $300 million in damages.

27. In truth, as of September 2020, Harbourvest had indeed lost some $52 million due to the alleged diminishing value of the HCLOF assets (largely due to the underperformance of the Acis entities)—and the values were starting to recover.

28. HCM denied the allegations in the Bankruptcy Court. Other than the claim for waste of corporate assets of $15 million, HCM at all times viewed the Harbourvest legal claims as being worth near zero and having no merit.

29. On December 23, 2020, HCM moved the Court to approve a settlement between itself and Harbourvest. No discovery had taken place between the parties, and Plaintiff did not have any notice of the settlement terms or other factors prior to the motion’s filing (or even during its pendency) in order to investigate its rights.

30. HCM set the hearing right after the Christmas and New Year’s holidays, almost ensuring that no party would have the time to scrutinize the underpinnings of the deal.

31. On January 14, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court held an evidentiary hearing and approved the settlement in a bench ruling, overruling the objections to the settlement.

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3 Acis was being managed by Joshua Terry. JP Morgan had listed the four ACIS entities under his management as the four worst performers of the 1200 CLOs it evaluated.
32. An integral part of the settlement was allowing $45 million in unsecured claims that, at the time of the agreement, were expected to net Harbourvest around 70 cents on the dollar. In other words, Harbourvest was expected to recover around $31,500,000 from the allowed claims.

33. As part of the consideration for the $45 million in allowed claims, Harbourvest agreed to transfer all of its interests in HCLOF to HCM or its designee.

34. HCM and Seery rationalized the settlement value by allocating $22.5 million of the net value of the $45 million in unsecured claims as consideration to purchase Harbourvest’s interests in HCLOF, meaning, if 70% of the unsecured claims—i.e., $31.5 million—was realized, because $22.5 million of that would be allocated to the purchase price of the Harbourvest interests in HCLOF, the true “settlement” for Harbourvest’s legal claims was closer to $9 million.

35. Plaintiffs here are taking no position at this time about the propriety of settling the Harbourvest legal claims for $9 million. That is for another day.

36. At the core of this lawsuit is the fact that HCM purchased the Harbourvest interests in HCLOF for $22.5 million knowing that they were worth far more than that.

37. It has recently come to light that, upon information and belief, the Harbourvest interests, as of December 31, 2020, were worth in excess of $41,750,000, and they have continued to go up in value.

38. On November 30, 2020, which was less than a month prior to the filing of the Motion to Approve the Settlement, the net asset value of those interests was over $34.5 million. Plaintiffs were never made aware of that.

39. The change is due to how the net asset value, or NAV, was calculated. The means and methods for calculating the “net asset value” of the assets of HCLOF are subject to and
governed by the regulations passed by the SEC pursuant to the Adviser’s Act, and by HCM’s internal policies and procedures.

40. Typically, the value of the securities reflected by a market price quote.

41. However, the underlying securities in HCLOF are not liquid and had not been traded in a long while.

42. There not having been any contemporaneous market quotations that could be used in good faith to set the marks\(^4\) meant that other prescribed methods of assessing the value of the interests, such as the NAV, would have been the proper substitutes.

43. Seery testified that the fair market value of the Harbourvest HCLOF interests was $22.5 million. Even allowing some leeway there, it was off the mark by a mile.

44. Given the artifice described herein, Seery and the entity Defendants had to know that the representation of the fair market value was false. But it does not appear that they disclosed it to Harbourvest to whom they owed fiduciary duties as the RIA in charge of HCLOF, and they certainly did not disclose the truth to the Plaintiff.

45. It is either the case that (i) Defendants conducted the proper analysis to obtain a current value of the assets but decided to use a far lower valuation in order to whitewash the settlement or enrich the bankruptcy estate; or (ii) Defendants never conducted the proper current valuation, and therefore baselessly represented what the current value of the assets was, despite knowingly having no reasonable basis for making such a claim.

46. For years HCM had such internal procedures and compliance protocols. HCM was not allowed by its own compliance officers to trade with an investor where HCM had superior knowledge about the value of the assets, for example. While Plaintiff has no reason to believe that

\(^4\) The term “mark” is shorthand for an estimated or calculated value for a non-publicly traded instrument.
those procedures were scrapped in recent months, it can only assume that they were either overridden improperly or circumvented wholesale.

47. Upon finalizing the Harbourvest Settlement Agreement and making representations to the Bankruptcy Court to the Plaintiffs about the value of the Harbourvest Interests, Seery and HCM had a duty to use current values and not rely on old valuations of the assets or the HCLOF interests.

48. Given Defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge that they were purchasing Harbourvest’s Interests in HCLOF for a less than 50% of what those interests were worth—Defendants owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty not to purchase them for themselves.

49. Defendants should have either had HCLOF repurchase the interests with cash, or offer those interests to Plaintiff and the other members pro rata, before HCM agreed to purchase them all lock, stock and barrel, for no up-front cash.

50. Indeed, had Plaintiff been offered those interests, it would have happily purchased them and therefore would have infused over $20 million in cash into the estate for the purpose of executing the Harbourvest Settlement.

51. That Defendants (and to perhaps a lesser extent, the Unsecured Creditors Committee (the “UCC”)) agreed to pay $22.5 million for the HCLOF assets, where they had previously not consented to any such expenditure by the estate on behalf of HCLOF, strongly indicates their awareness that they were purchasing assets for far below market value.

52. The above is the most reasonable and plausible explanation for why Defendants and the UCC forwent raising as much as $22.5 million in cash now in favor of hanging on to the HCLOF assets.
53. Indeed, in January 2021 Seery threatened Ethen Powell that “[Judge Jernigan] is laughing at you” and “we are coming after you” in response to the latter’s attempt to exercise his right as beneficial holder of the CLO, and pointing out a conflict of interest in Seery’s plan to liquidate the funds.

54. HCM’s threat, made by Seery, is tantamount to not only a declaration that he intends to liquidate the funds regardless of whether the investors want to do so, and whether it is in their best interests, but also that HCM intends to leverage what it views as the Bankruptcy Court’s sympathy to evade accountability.

V.

CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Breaches of Fiduciary Duty

55. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate the foregoing factual averments as if fully set forth herein and further alleges the following:

56. HCM is a registered investment advisor and acts on behalf of HCFA. Both are fiduciaries to Plaintiffs.

57. The Advisers Act establishes an unwaivable federal fiduciary duty for investment advisers.\(^5\)

\(^5\) See e.g, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); Transamerica Mortg. Advisors (tama) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (“§ 206 establishes ‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment advisers.”); Santa Fe Indus, v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471, n.11 (1977) (in discussing SEC v. Capital Gains, stating that the Supreme Court’s reference to fraud in the “equitable” sense of the term was “ premised on its recognition that Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers”). See also Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060 (July 28, 2010) (“Under the Advisers Act, an adviser is a fiduciary whose duty is to serve the best interests of its clients, which includes an obligation not to subrogate clients’ interests to its own”) (citing Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106 (Jan. 31, 2003)).
58. HCM and the DAF entered into an Amended and Restated Investment Advisory Agreement, executed between them on July 1, 2014 (the “RIA Agreement”). It renews annually and continued until the end of January 2021.

59. In addition to being the RIA to the DAF, HCM was appointed the DAF’s attorney-in-fact for certain actions, such as “to purchase or otherwise trade in Financial Instruments that have been approved by the General Partner.” RIA Agreement ¶ 4.

60. The RIA Agreement further commits HCM to value financial assets “in accordance with the then current valuation policy of the Investment Advisor [HCM], a copy of which will provided to the General Partner upon request.” RIA Agreement ¶ 5.

61. While HCM contracted for the recognition that it would be acting on behalf of others and could be in conflict with advice given the DAF, (RIA Agreement ¶ 12), nowhere did it purport to waive the fiduciary duties owed to the DAF not to trade as a principal in a manner that harmed the DAF.

62. HCFA owed a fiduciary duty to Holdco as an investor in HCLOF and to which HCFA was the portfolio manager. HCM owed a fiduciary duty to the DAF (and to Holdco as its subsidiary) pursuant to a written Advisory Agreement HCM and the DAF had where HCM agreed to provide sound investment advice and management functions.

63. As a registered investment adviser, HCM’s fiduciary duty is broad and applies to the entire advisor-client relationship.

64. The core of the fiduciary duty is to act in the best interest of their investors—the advisor must put the ends of the client before its own ends or the ends of a third party.
65. This is manifested in a duty of loyalty and a duty of utmost care. It also means that the RIA has to follow the terms of the company agreements and the regulations that apply to the investment vehicle.

66. The fiduciary duty that HCM and Seery owed to Plaintiff is predicated on trust and confidence. Section 204A of the Advisers Act requires investment advisors (whether SEC-registered or not) to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the RIA from trading on material, non-public information. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7. That means that Plaintiff should be able to take Defendants at their word and not have to second guess or dig behind representations made by them.

67. The simple thesis of this claim is that Defendants HCFA and HCM breached their fiduciary duties by (i) insider trading with Harbourvest and concealing the rising NAV of the underlying assets—i.e., trading with Harbourvest on superior, non-public information that was neither revealed to Harbourvest nor to Plaintiff; (ii) concealing the value of the Harbourvest Interests; and (iii) diverting the investment opportunity in the Harbourvest entities to HCM (or its designee) without offering it to or making it available to Plaintiff or the DAF.

68. HCM, as part of its contractual advisory function with Plaintiffs, had expressly recommended the HCLOF investment to the DAF. Thus, diverting the opportunity for returns on its investment was an additional breach of fiduciary duty.

69. This violated a multitude of regulations under 27 C.F.R. part 275, in addition to Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-1. 17 CFR 240.10b5-1 (“Rule 10b5-1”) explains that one who trades while possessing non-public information is liable for insider trading, and they do not necessarily have to have used the specific inside information.

70. It also violated HCM’s own internal policies and procedures.
71. Also, the regulations impose obligations on Defendants to calculate a current valuation when communicating with an investor, such as what may or may not be taken into account, and what cannot pass muster as a current valuation. Upon information and belief, these regulations were not followed by the Defendants.

72. HCM’s internal policies and procedures, which it promised to abide by both in the RIA Agreement and in its Form ADV SEC filing, provided for the means of properly calculating the value of the assets.

73. HCM either did not follow these policies, changed them to be out of compliance both with the Adviser Act regulations and its Form ADV representations, and/or simply misrepresented or concealed their results.

74. In so doing, because the fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff is a broad one, and because Defendants’ malfeasance directly implicates its relationship with Plaintiff, Defendants have breached the Advisers Act’s fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff as part of their fiduciary relationship.6

75. At no time between agreeing with Harbourvest to the purchase of its interests and the court approval did Defendants disclose to either Harbourvest or to Plaintiff (and the Bankruptcy Court for that matter) that the purchase was at below 50% the current net asset value as well, and when they failed to offer Plaintiff (and the other members of HCLOF) their right to purchase the interests pro rata at such advantageous valuations. Plaintiff’s lost opportunity to

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6 See Advisers Act Release No. 4197 (Sept. 17, 2015) (Commission Opinion) (“[O]nce an investment Advisory relationship is formed, the Advisers Act does not permit an adviser to exploit that fiduciary relationship by defrauding his client in any investment transaction connected to the Advisory relationship.”); see also SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612-CIV, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73026, at 90 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2008) (“Unlike the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Section 206 of the Advisers Act does not require that the activity be ‘in the offer or sale of any’ security or ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’”).
purchase has harmed Plaintiff. Plaintiff had been led to believe by the Defendants that the value of what was being purchased in the Harbourvest settlement by HCM (or its designee) was at fair market value. This representation, repeated again in the Bankruptcy Court during the Harbourvest confirmation, implicitly suggested that a proper current valuation had been performed.

76. Defendant’s principal, Seery, testified in January 2021 that the then-current fair market value of Harbourvest’s 49.98% interest in HCLOF was worth around $22.5 million. But by then, it was worth almost double that amount and has continued to appreciate. Seery knew or should have known that fact because the value of some of the HCLOF assets had increased, and he had a duty to know the current value. His lack of actual knowledge, while potentially not overtly fraudulent, would nonetheless amount to a breach of fiduciary duty for acting without proper diligence and information that was plainly available.

77. Furthermore, HCLOF holds equity in MGM Studios and debt in CCS Medical via various CLO positions. But Seery, in his role as CEO of HCM, was made aware during an advisors meeting in December 2020 that Highland would have to restrict its trading in MGM because of its insider status due to activities that were likely to apply upward pressure on MGM’s share price.

78. Furthermore, Seery controlled the Board of CCS Medical. And in or around October 2020, Seery was advocating an equatization that would have increased the value of the CCS securities by 25%, which was not reflected in the HCM report of the NAV of HCLOF’s holdings.

79. Seery’s knowledge is imputed to HCM.

80. Moreover, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to commit corporate waste, which is effectively what disposing of the HCLOF assets would constitute in a rising market, where there
is no demand for disposition by the investors (save for HCM, whose proper 0.6% interest could easily be sold to the DAF at fair value).

81. As holder of 0.6% of the HCLOF interests, and now assignee of the 49.98% Harbourvest Interests), HCM has essentially committed self-dealing by threatening to liquidate HCLOF now that it may be compelled to do so under its proposed liquidation plan, which perhaps inures to the short term goals of HCM but to the pecuniary detriment of the other holders of HCLOF whose upside will be prematurely truncated.

82. Seery and HCM should not be allowed to benefit from the breach of their fiduciary duties because doing so would also cause Plaintiffs irreparable harm. The means and methods of disposal would likely render the full scope of damages to the DAF not susceptible to specific calculation—particularly as they would relate to calculating the lost opportunity cost. Seery and HCM likely do not have the assets to pay a judgment to Plaintiffs that would be rendered, simply taking the lost appreciation of the HCLOF assets.

83. Defendants are thus liable for diverting a corporate opportunity or asset that would or should have been offered to Plaintiff and the other investors. Because federal law makes the duties invoked herein unwaivable, it is preposterous that HCM, as a 0.6% holder of HCLOF, deemed itself entitled to the all of the value and optionality of the below-market Harbourvest purchase.

84. Defendants cannot rely on any contractual provision that purports to waive this violation. Nothing in any agreement purports to permit, authorize or otherwise sanitize Defendants’ self-dealing. All such provisions are void.

85. In the fourth quarter of 2020, Seery and HCM notified staff that they would be terminated on December 31, 2020. That termination was postponed to February 28, 2021.
Purchasing the Harbourvest assets without staffing necessary to be a functioning Registered Investment Advisor was a strategic reversal from prior filings that outlined canceling the CLO management contracts and allowing investors to replace Highland as manager.

86. Seery’s compensation agreement with the UCC incentivizes him to expedite recoveries and to prevent transparency regarding the Harbourvest settlement.

87. What is more, Seery had previously testified that the management contracts for the funds—HCLOF included—were unprofitable, and that he intended to transfer them. But he later rejected offers to purchase those management contracts for fair value and instead decided to continue to manage the funds—which is what apparently gave rise to the Harbourvest Settlement, among others. He simultaneously rejected an offer for the Harbourvest assets of $24 million, stating that they were worth much more than that.

88. Because of Defendants’ malfeasance, Plaintiffs have lost over $25 million in damages—a number that continues to rise—and the Defendants should not be able to obtain a windfall.

89. For the same reason, Defendants’ malfeasance has also exposed HCLOF to a massive liability from Harbourvest since the assignment of those interests is now one that is likely unenforceable under the Advisers Act, Section 47(b), if there was unequal information.

90. HCM and HCFA are liable as principals for breach of fiduciary duty, as are the principals and compliance staff of each entity.

91. Plaintiffs seek disgorgement, damages, exemplary damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. To the extent the Court determines that this claim had to have been brought derivatively on behalf of HCLOF, then Plaintiffs represent that any pre-suit demand would have been futile since asking HCM to bring suit against its principal, Seery, would have been futile.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of HCLOF Company Agreement
(By Holdco against HCLOF, HCM and HCFA)

92. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate the foregoing factual averments as if fully set forth herein and further alleges the following:

93. On November 15, 2017, the members of HCLOF, along with HCLOF and HCFA, executed the Members Agreement Relating to the Company (the “Company Agreement”).

94. The Company Agreement governs the rights and duties of the members of HCLOF.

95. Section 6.2 of HCLOF Company Agreement provides that when a member “other than … CLO Holdco [Plaintiff] or a Highland Affiliate,” intends to sell its interest in HCLOF to a third party (i.e., not to an affiliate of the selling member), then the other members have the first right of refusal to purchase those interests pro rata for the same price that the member has agreed to sell.

96. Here, despite the fact that Harbourvest agreed to sell its interests in HCLOF for $22.5 million when they were worth more than double that, Defendants did not offer Plaintiff the chance to buy its pro rata share of those interests at the same agreed price of $22.5 million (adjusted pro rata).

97. The transfer and sale of the interests to HCM were accomplished as part of the Harbourvest Settlement which was approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

98. Plaintiff was not informed of the fact that Harbourvest had offered its shares to Defendant HCM for $22.5 million—which was under 50% of their true value.

99. Plaintiff was not offered the right to purchase its pro rata share of the Harbourvest interests prior to the agreement being struck or prior to court approval being sought.
100. Had Plaintiff been allowed to do so, it would have obtained the interests with a net equity value over their purchase price worth in excess of $20 million.

101. No discovery or opportunity to investigate was afforded Plaintiff prior to lodging an objection in the Bankruptcy Court.

102. Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance or, alternatively, disgorgement, constructive trust, damages, attorneys’ fees and costs.

**Third Cause Of Action**

**Negligence**

(By the DAF and CLO Holdco against HCM and HCFA)

103. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate the foregoing factual averments as if fully set forth herein, and further alleges the following:

104. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing causes of action and note that all the foregoing violations were breaches of the common law duty of care imposed by law on each of Seery, HCFA and HCM.

105. Each of these Defendants should have known that their actions were violations of the Advisers Act, HCM’s internal policies and procedures, the Company Agreement, or all three.

106. Seery and HCM owed duties of care to Plaintiffs to follow HCM’s internal policies and procedures regarding both the propriety and means of trading with a customer [Harbourvest], the propriety and means of trading as a principal in an account but in a manner adverse to another customer [the DAF and Holdco], and the proper means of valuing the CLOs and other assets held by HCLOF.

107. It would be foreseeable that failing to disclose the current value of the assets in the HCLOF would impact Plaintiffs negatively in a variety of ways.
108. It would be reasonably foreseeable that failing to correctly and accurately calculate the current net asset value of the market value of the interests would cause Plaintiffs to value the Harbourvest Interests differently.

109. It would be reasonably foreseeable that referring to old and antiquated market quotations and/or valuations of the HCLOF assets or interests would result in a mis-valuation of HCLOF and, therefore, a mis-valuation of the Harbourvest Interests.

110. Likewise, it would have been foreseeable that Plaintiff’s failure to give Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase the Harbourvest shares at a $22.5 million valuation would cause Plaintiff damages. Defendants knew that the value of those assets was rising. They further knew or should have known that whereas those assets were sold to HCM for an allowance of claims to be funded in the future, selling them to Plaintiff would have provided the estate with cash funds.

111. Defendants’ negligence foreseeably and directly caused Plaintiff harm.

112. Plaintiff is thus entitled to damages.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(CLO Holdco and DAF against HCM)

113. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate the foregoing factual averments as if fully set forth herein, and further alleges the following:


115. HCLOF constitutes an enterprise under the RICO Act. Additionally, or in the alternative, HCM, HCLA, and HCLOF constituted an association-in-fact enterprise. The purpose of the association-in-fact was the perpetuation of Seery’s position at HCM and using the
Harbourvest settlement as a vehicle to enrich persons other than the HCLOF investors, including
Holdco and the DAF, and the perpetuation of HCM’s holdings in collateralized loan obligations
owned by HCLOF, while attempting to deny Plaintiffs the benefit of its rights of ownership.

116. The association-in-fact was bound by informal and formal connections for years
prior to the illicit purpose, and then changed when HCM joined it in order to achieve the
association’s illicit purpose. For example, HCM is the parent and control person over HCFA,
which is the portfolio manager of HCLOF pursuant to a contractual agreement—both are
registered investment advisors and provide advisory and management services to HCLOF.

117. Defendants injured Plaintiffs through their continuous course of conduct of the
HCM-HCLA-HCLOF association-in-fact enterprise. HCM’s actions (performed through Seery
and others) constitute violations of the federal wire fraud, mail fraud, fraud in connection with a
case under Title 11, and/or securities fraud laws, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) and (D).

118. HCM operated in such a way as to violate insider trading rules and regulations when
it traded with Harbourvest while it had material, non-public information that it had not supplied to
Harbourvest or to Plaintiffs.

119. In or about November 2020, HCM and Harbourvest entered into discussions about
settling the Harbourvest Claims. Seery’s conduct of HCLOF and HCLA on behalf of HCM through
the interstate mails and/or wires caused HCM to agree to the purchase of Harbourvest’s interests
in HCLOF.

120. On or about each of September 30, 2020, through December 31, 2020, Seery,
through his conduct of the enterprise, utilized the interstate wires and/or mails to obtain or arrive
at valuations of the HCLOF interests. Seery’s conduct of the enterprise caused them to cease
sending the valuation reports to Plaintiffs, which eventually allowed Plaintiffs to be misled into believing that Seery had properly valued the interests.

121. On or about September 30, 2020, Seery transmitted or caused to be transmitted through the interstate wires information to HCLOF investors from HCM (via HCFA), including Harbourvest, regarding the value of HCLOF interests and underlying assets.

122. Additionally, Seery operated HCM in such a way that he concealed the true value of the HCLOF interests by utilizing the interstate wires and mails to transmit communications to the court in the form of written representations on or about December 23, 2020, and then further transmitted verbal representations of the current market value (the vastly understated one) on January 14, 2021, during live testimony.

123. However, Harbourvest was denied the full picture and the true value of the underlying portfolio. At the end of October and November of 2020, HCM had updated the net asset values of the HCLOF portfolio. According to sources at HCM at the time, the HCLOF assets were worth north of $72,969,492 as of November 30, 2020. Harbourvest’s share of that would have been $36,484,746.

124. The HCLOF net asset value had reached $86,440,024 as of December 31, 2021, which means that by the time Seery was testifying in the Bankruptcy Court on January 14, 2021, the fair market value of the Harbourvest Assets was $22.5 million, when it was actually closer to $43,202,724. Seery, speaking on behalf of HCM, knew of the distinction in value.

125. On January 14, 2021, Seery also testified that he (implying HCM, HCLA and HCLOF) had valued the Harbourvest Assets at their current valuation and at fair market value. This was not true because the valuation that was used and testified to was ancient. The ostensible purpose of this concealment was to induce Plaintiff and other interest holdings to take no action.
126. In supporting HCM’s motion to the Bankruptcy Court to approve the Harbourvest Settlement, Seery omitted the fact that HCM was purchasing the interests at a massive discount, which would violate the letter and spirit of the Adviser’s Act.

127. Seery was informed in late December 2020 at an in-person meeting in Dallas to which Seery had to fly that HCLOF and HCM had to suspend trading in MGM Studios’ securities because Seery had learned from James Dondero, who was on the Board of MGM, of a potential purchase of the company. The news of the MGM purchase should have caused Seery to revalue the HCLOF investment in MGM.

128. In or around October 2020, Seery (who controls the Board of CSS Medical) was pursuing “equatization” of CSS Medical’s debt, which would have increased the value of certain securities by 25%. In several communications through the U.S. interstate wires and/or mails, and with Plaintiffs, and the several communications with Harbourvest during the negotiations of the settlement, Seery failed to disclose these changes which were responsible in part for the ever-growing value of the HCLOF CLO portfolio.

129. Seery was at all relevant times operating as an agent of HCM.

130. This series of related violations of the wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud laws, in connection with the HCM bankruptcy, constitute a continuing pattern and practice of racketeering for the purpose of winning a windfall for HCM and himself—a nearly $30,000,000 payday under the confirmation agreement.

131. The federal RICO statute makes it actionable for one’s conduct of an enterprise to include “fraud in connection with a [bankruptcy case]”. The Advisers’ Act antifraud provisions require full transparency and accountability to an advisers’ investors and clients and does not require a showing of reliance or materiality. The wire fraud provision likewise is violated when,
as here, the interstate wires are used as part of a “scheme or artifice … for obtaining money or property by means of false … pretenses, [or] representations[.]”

132. Accordingly, because Defendants’ conduct violated the wire fraud and mail fraud laws, and the Advisers’ Act antifraud provisions, and their acts and omissions were in connection with the HCM Bankruptcy proceedings under Title 11, they are sufficient to bring such conduct within the purview of the RICO civil action provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

133. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to damages, treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, in addition to all other injunctive or equitable relief to which they are justly entitled.

**FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

*Tortious Interference*  
(CLO Holdco against HCM)

134. Plaintiff respectfully incorporates the foregoing factual averments as if fully set forth herein and further alleges the following:

135. At all relevant times, HCM owned a 0.6% interest in HCLOF.

136. At all relevant times, Seery and HCM knew that Plaintiff had specific rights in HCLOF under the Company Agreement, § 6.2.

137. Section 6.2 of HCLOF Company agreement provides that when a member “other than … CLO Holdco [Plaintiff] or a Highland Affiliate,” intends to sell its interest in HCLOF to a third party (i.e., not an affiliate of the member), then the other members have the first right of refusal to purchase those interests pro rata for the same price that the member has agreed to sell.

138. HCM, through Seery, tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual rights with HCLOF by, among other things, diverting the Harbourvest Interests in HCLOF to HCM without giving HCLOF or Plaintiff the option to purchase those assets at the same favorable price that HCM obtained them.
139. HCM and Seery tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual rights with HCLOF by, among other things, misrepresenting the fair market value as $22.5 million and concealing the current value of those interests.

140. But for HCM and Seery’s tortious interference, Plaintiff would have been able to acquire the Harbourvest Interests at a highly favorable price. HCM and Seery’s knowledge of the rights and intentional interference with these rights has caused damage to Plaintiff CLO Holdco.

141. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to damages from HCM and Seery, as well as exemplary damages.

VI.

JURY DEMAND

142. Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all claims so triable.

VII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

143. Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s respectfully pray that the Court enter judgment in its favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally, for:

a. Actual damages;
b. Disgorgement;
c. Treble damages;
d. Exemplary and punitive damages;
e. Attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by common law, statute or contract;
f. A constructive trust to avoid dissipation of assets;
g. All such other relief to which Plaintiff is justly entitled.
Dated: April 12, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

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Exhibit C
EXHIBIT C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

THE CHARITABLE DAF FUND, L.P., §

Plaintiff,

v. §

Causes No. ______________________

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, §
L.P., §

Defendant. §

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

This matter concerns self-dealing and seeks redress for violation of state and federal law, including, but not limited to, violations of the Advisers Act of 1940, and other state causes of action.

I.

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("Plaintiff" or "DAF") is a limited partnership formed under the laws of the Cayman Islands.

2. Defendant Highland Capital Management L.P. ("Highland" or "HCMLP") is a Delaware limited partnership, whose principal place of business is in Dallas, Texas, at 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, Texas 75201.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. Subject matter jurisdiction is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 because the suit arises out of post-petition acts or omissions of the debtor and certain of its principals.
4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Highland Capital Management, L.P. because it has continuously done business in this state, and the causes of action arise from the acts or omissions committed in this state.

5. Venue is proper in this Court because a substantial number of the acts or omissions giving rise to this lawsuit and the causes of action asserted herein occurred in Dallas County.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6. HCMLP is a registered investment advisor ("RIA") subject to the regulations of the Securities Exchange Commission.

7. HCMLP is both the advisor of and investor in Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P. ("Multistrat"), a Delaware limited partnership. Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund GP, L.P., itself a Delaware limited partnership, is the general partner of Multistrat, and HCMLP is the sole member of the general partner of Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund GP, L.P.

8. HCMLP’s advisory capacity is governed, or at all relevant times was governed, by the Third Amended and Restated Investment Management Agreement, effective November 1, 2013 (the "IMA").

9. The purpose of Multistrat as a vehicle was stated as such: “The Fund's investment objective is to seek attractive risk-adjusted returns, consistent with the preservation of capital and prudent investment management.”

10. The Confidential Private Placement Memorandum for Multistrat disclosed that “[t]he Investment Manager is registered as an investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the ‘Advisers Act’).
Each prospective investor will be required to make a representation to indicate that it is a ‘qualified client’ as defined in the Advisers Act.”

11. Because of these agreements and roles as the General Partner and RIA, Highland owed contractual and fiduciary duties to Plaintiff as an investor in Multistrat.

12. James Seery, the principal, CEO, and CRO of HCMLP, in its capacity as a debtor, admitted under oath that HCMLP owes fiduciary duties to the investors of the funds HCMLP manages—which would include Multistrat—and therefore, has admitted under oath that HCMLP and its governed persons owe fiduciary duties to the investors in Multistrat, which include Plaintiff, The Charitable DAF Fund, and Highland Capital Management Services, Inc., among others.

13. As an investment vehicle advised at all times and controlled at all times by HCMLP, Multistrat purchased and owned a pool of viaticals—investments in life insurance policies keyed to the lives of other persons. When a person passes away, the life insurance money is paid to the owner of the policy—in this case, Multistrat.

14. The notional value of the viatical pool was approximately $145 million.

15. In or around August 2020, HCMLP sold the entire viatical pool for approximately $35,000,000—less than one quarter of the insured value.

16. The policies insured people aged 90 on average, suggesting that the policies were highly likely to pay off in the ensuing few years given the age and life expectancies of the insureds, as well as considering the actuarial impact of the COVID pandemic.

17. In the spring of 2020, Multistrat raised funds specifically for the purpose of paying the premiums on the viatical pool—amounts raised, borrowing availability, and liquid securities provided enough cash to pay the premiums. But HCMLP did not pursue this path as promised.
Instead, it sold the assets. To this day, it is unclear why the policies were sold, and why, just prior to a planned mediation.

18. Furthermore, the process of selling was severely flawed. For example, the health assessments used to determine the likelihood and timeline for the payout were two years old. HCMLP did not cause new, up-to-date health assessments to be performed, and instead was content to rely on stale information or worse, no information at all.

19. Furthermore, HCMLP made no effort to adjust the projected life expectancies due to the increasing age of the insureds during a process that stretched over seven months, nor for the potential impact of COVID on people over the age of 90, which would have impacted the price.

20. Equally troubling is that Multistrat obtained the funds to pay the premiums from another investor—yet, it apparently did not use the funds for that purpose.

21. HCMLP apparently used the proceeds of the sale to pay itself, notwithstanding the fact that there were redeemed interests waiting to be paid—interests to whom HCMLP also owed fiduciary duties.

22. In short, HCMLP caused Multistrat to sell the viatical pool at a substantially discounted amount to curry favor with the brokers and buyers in the marketplace for no apparent benefit to Multistrat’s investors or the debtor’s estate.

III.

CAUSES OF ACTION

First Cause of Action
Breach of the Advisers Act

23. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

24. Highland’s actions violate the Advisers Act.

25. As an RIA, HCMLP is subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
26. The IMA imposes and incorporates the duties and obligations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

27. Under this federal law, an investment adviser is a fiduciary.¹ This includes a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty to refrain from engaging in transactions in which it is not a disinterested person.

28. The duty of loyalty imposed by the Advisers Act of 1940 is not specifically defined in the Advisers Act or in Commission rules but reflects a Congressional recognition “of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship” as well as a Congressional intent to “eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.”

29. To meet its duty of loyalty, an adviser must make full and fair disclosure to its clients of all material facts relating to the advisory relationship, including disclosing transactions in which the advisor has an interest, and to disclose all pertinent facts of a transaction that could affect the client or the client’s interest.² In order for disclosure to be full and fair, it should be sufficiently specific so that a client is able to understand the material fact or conflict of interest and make an informed decision whether to provide consent.


² SEC v. Capital Gains, supra, at 200 (“Failure to disclose material facts must be deemed fraud or deceit within its intended meaning.”). Investment Advisers Act Release 3060, supra, footnote 15 (“as a fiduciary, an adviser has an ongoing obligation to inform its clients of any material information that could affect the advisory relationship”); see also General Instruction 3 to Part 2 of Form ADV (“Under federal and state law, you are a fiduciary and must make full disclosure to your clients of all material facts relating to the advisory relationship.”).
30. This fiduciary duty also requires an adviser “to adopt the principal’s goals, objectives, or ends.” This means the adviser must, at all times, serve the best interest of its client and not subordinate its client’s interest to its own. In other words, the investment adviser cannot place its own interests ahead of the interests of its client and must at all times act for the interests of its investors.3

31. Here, the goals of Multistrat included “to seek attractive risk adjusted returns, consistent with the preservation of capital and prudent investment management.”

32. The duty of care includes, among other things: (i) the duty to provide advice that is in the best interest of the client, (ii) the duty to seek best execution of a client’s transactions where the adviser has the responsibility to select broker-dealers to execute client trades, and (iii) the duty to provide advice and monitoring over the course of the relationship.

33. These fiduciary duties are **unwaivable**, and any agreement made in derogation of the obligations under the Advisers Act is **void**.

34. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks to declare the sale of the viaticals void because they were accomplished in violation of the Advisers Act.

35. Plaintiff further seeks to declare the agreement(s) between Highland and Multistrat void because they were continued in violation of the Advisers Act.

**Second Cause of Action**

**Breach of Fiduciary Duty**

36. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

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3 Investment Advisers Act Release 3060 (adopting amendments to Form ADV and stating that “[u]nder the Advisers Act, an adviser is a fiduciary whose duty is to serve the best interests of its clients, which includes an obligation not to subrogate clients’ interests to its own,” citing Investment Advisers Act Release 2106, supra footnote 15). *SEC v. Tambone*, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act at all times in the best interest of the fund...”); *Sec. & Exch. Commission v. Moran*, 944 F. Supp. 286, 297 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (“Investment advisers are entrusted with the responsibility and duty to act in the best interest of their clients.”).
37. As an RIA, HCMLP is subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

38. The IMA imposes and incorporates the duties and obligations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

39. Under this federal law, an investment adviser is a fiduciary.\textsuperscript{4} This includes a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty to refrain from engaging in transactions in which it is not a disinterested person.

40. The duty of loyalty imposed by the Advisers Act of 1940 is not specifically defined in the Advisers Act or in Commission rules, but reflects a Congressional recognition “of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship” as well as a Congressional intent to “eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.”

41. To meet its duty of loyalty, an adviser must make full and fair disclosure to its clients of all material facts relating to the advisory relationship, including disclosing transactions in which the advisor has an interest, and to disclose all pertinent facts of a transaction that could affect the client or the client’s interest.\textsuperscript{5} In order for disclosure to be full and fair, it should be


\textsuperscript{5} SEC v. Capital Gains, supra, at 200 (“Failure to disclose material facts must be deemed fraud or deceit within its intended meaning.”). Investment Advisers Act Release 3060, supra, footnote 15 (“as a fiduciary, an adviser has an ongoing obligation to inform its clients of any material information that could affect the advisory relationship”); see also General Instruction 3 to Part 2 of Form ADV (“Under federal and state law, you are a fiduciary and must make full disclosure to your clients of all material facts relating to the advisory relationship.”).
sufficiently specific so that a client is able to understand the material fact or conflict of interest and make an informed decision whether to provide consent.

42. This fiduciary duty also requires an adviser “to adopt the principal’s goals, objectives, or ends.” This means the adviser must, at all times, serve the best interest of its client and not subordinate its client’s interest to its own. In other words, the investment adviser cannot place its own interests ahead of the interests of its client and must at all times act for the interests of its investors.\(^6\)

43. Here, the goals of Multistrat included “to seek attractive risk adjusted returns, consistent with the preservation of capital and prudent investment management.”

44. The duty of care includes, among other things: (i) the duty to provide advice that is in the best interest of the client, (ii) the duty to seek best execution of a client’s transactions where the adviser has the responsibility to select broker-dealers to execute client trades, and (iii) the duty to provide advice and monitoring over the course of the relationship.

45. These fiduciary duties are **unwaivable**, and any agreement made in derogation of the obligations under the Advisers Act is **void**.

46. HCMLP’s CEO testified under oath that he and HCMLP were aware of these duties and had to comply with them.

47. Section 204 of the Advisers Act requires HCMLP to carry written policies and procedures that must be followed in order to adhere to its federal obligations.

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\(^6\) Investment Advisers Act Release 3060 (adopting amendments to Form ADV and stating that “[u]nder the Advisers Act, an adviser is a fiduciary whose duty is to serve the best interests of its clients, which includes an obligation not to subrogate clients’ interests to its own,” citing Investment Advisers Act Release 2106, supra footnote 15). **SEC v. Tambone**, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act at all times in the best interest of the fund...”); **SEC v. Moran**, 944 F. Supp. 286, 297 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (“Investment advisers are entrusted with the responsibility and duty to act in the best interest of their clients.”).
48. Section 206 of the Advisers Act prohibits transactions by an adviser that were accomplished via a “deceit” on a client or prospective client, e.g., by concealing the role and interest the adviser has in the transaction, or via engaging in a course of conduct that has a tendency to mislead a client or which is manipulative.

49. These breaches include, but are not limited to (1) selling the viatical pool at a distressed price when it was not in distress and there was no need for Multistrat to sell; (2) concealing the information about the transaction from the Plaintiff; (3) failing to advise the Plaintiff of the opportunity to purchase the viatical pool—especially when it knew the Plaintiff had an interest in the pool and had the means of purchasing it for more cash than $35 million; (4) concealing the purpose behind the sale of the viatical pool and the conflicts of interest that inhere in the transaction; (5) causing the viatical pool to be sold in a manner that violated the rights of the Plaintiff as an investor in Multistrat (e.g., by failing to conduct an auction, obtaining competitive bids and taking the pool to market); and (6) utilizing the sale proceeds for its own ends—namely, to enrich itself.

50. The Advisers Act declares any contract that was made in violation of its provisions or regulations, or any contract that has been performed in violation of the Advisors Act, void.

51. The Advisers Act created a private right of action to void unlawful agreements and acts and to seek such equitable relief as accompanies such claims.

52. Texas law allows a fiduciary plaintiff to seek damages for breaches of fiduciary duty and to seek disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains obtained by a fiduciary.

53. Plaintiff has been damaged due to the breaches of fiduciary duty outlined herein, and it is entitled to recover damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.
54. To the extent this claim must be brought as a derivative action, it is plain that the demand requirement under Delaware law could not be met because serving a demand on Highland or to sue Highland would have been futile.

Third Cause of Action
Breach of Contract

55. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

56. The IMA imposes a duty of prudent investment management for the benefit of the investors in Multistrat and incorporate the duties and obligations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

57. The violations set forth above constitute a breach of each or both of these agreements.

58. These breaches include, but are not limited to (1) selling the viatical pool at a distressed price when it was not in distress and there was no need for Multistrat to sell; (2) concealing the information about the transaction from the Plaintiff; (3) failing to advise the Plaintiff of the opportunity to purchase the viatical pool—especially when it knew the Plaintiff had an interest in the pool and had the means of purchasing it for more cash than $35 million; (4) concealing the purpose behind the sale of the viatical pool and the conflicts of interest that inhere in the transaction; (5) causing the viatical pool to be sold in a manner that violated the rights of the Plaintiff as an investor in Multistrat (e.g., by failing to conduct an auction, obtaining competitive bids, and taking the pool to market); and (6) utilizing the sale proceeds for its own ends—namely, to enrich itself.

59. Plaintiff has been damaged by the breaches of contract outlined herein.

60. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and attorneys’ fees.
JURY DEMAND AND PRAYER

61. Plaintiff demands trial by jury.

62. Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment and an order:
   • Disgorging all ill-gotten gains in an amount to be determined at trial;
   • Voiding the sale and other relevant agreements herein with HCMLP pursuant to the Advisers Act;
   • Awarding damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
   • Awarding punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
   • Awarding attorneys’ fees and costs in an amount to be determined at trial;
   • Awarding all interim and final relief to which Plaintiff is legally or equitably entitled under the facts and circumstances raised herein.

Dated: July 22, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

/is/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

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