Nov. 16, 2026
To: The Honorable Paul S. Atkins Chairman U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549 Email: chairmanoffice@sec.gov Dear Chairman Atkins: I am writing to urge you and the Securities and Exchange Commission to withdraw or substantially revise the proposed Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform, announced November 13, 2026, under File No. S7-2026-39, Release Nos. 33-11455, 34-106873, and IC-36385. Although the Commission describes this proposal as a modernization intended to make executive compensation disclosures more principles-based, materiality-driven, and less burdensome for publicly traded companies, several of its provisions risk substantially reducing the information available to shareholders about executive compensation, corporate governance, management accountability, and the relationship between executive rewards and corporate performance. The concerns identified by Better Markets in its November 13 statement deserve serious consideration. Investors are the owners of publicly traded companies. They have a legitimate interest in knowing how much senior executives receive, what forms their compensation takes, how compensation relates to company performance, and whether corporate resources are being used to provide substantial personal benefits to senior management. This information is not merely interesting or incidental. It helps shareholders evaluate management effectiveness, exercise informed voting rights, assess corporate governance, and determine whether compensation arrangements serve the long-term interests of the company and its owners. The SEC's responsibility is not to protect corporate executives from scrutiny or to make compensation arrangements less visible. Its disclosure framework must enable investors to make informed investment and voting decisions. I recognize that the existing Item 402 framework has become complicated and that unnecessary duplication can make disclosures difficult to understand. However, the proper response is to improve the accessibility, consistency, and usefulness of disclosure—not to eliminate information that allows investors to hold corporate leadership accountable. 1. The SEC's investor-protection responsibilities require meaningful disclosure The Securities and Exchange Commission was established to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. These objectives must be considered together. Reducing regulatory burdens can be legitimate, but it cannot become an overriding objective that diminishes the information shareholders need to evaluate the companies in which they invest. Executive compensation represents a substantial corporate expenditure. It may include salaries, bonuses, stock awards, options, deferred compensation, retirement benefits, personal benefits, security arrangements, and other financial advantages. These arrangements can have significant consequences for corporate finances, management incentives, risk-taking, and the alignment of executive interests with those of shareholders. Shareholders should not be required to accept corporate assertions that executive compensation is reasonable without access to sufficient information to evaluate those assertions independently. The Commission should therefore apply its materiality standard from the perspective of a reasonable investor, considering the collective significance of executive compensation information rather than presuming that information is immaterial simply because a company prefers not to report it. 2. Reducing named executive officer disclosure to two individuals One of the most concerning provisions would generally narrow named executive officer disclosure to the principal executive officer and principal financial officer. Under the existing framework, disclosure generally encompasses the principal executive officer, principal financial officer, and additional highly compensated executive officers, subject to the applicable rules. The proposal would substantially reduce the number of executives whose compensation must routinely be disclosed. This creates an important accountability gap. The chief executive officer and chief financial officer are unquestionably important, but they are not the only executives whose decisions can materially affect corporate performance, financial reporting, risk management, investment strategy, and shareholder value. Other senior executives may exercise substantial authority over: Corporate operations and business strategy. Financial management and capital allocation. Risk management and regulatory compliance. Major acquisitions and divestitures. Technology and information security. Employment practices and workforce restructuring. Corporate governance and internal controls. Their compensation arrangements may provide important information about corporate priorities, internal incentive structures, and the distribution of executive rewards. Removing routine disclosure concerning these individuals would make it more difficult for shareholders to identify compensation practices that deserve scrutiny. I urge the Commission to retain disclosure covering the additional highly compensated executive officers required under the existing framework. If the Commission believes the current reporting structure is unnecessarily complicated, it should simplify the presentation without eliminating the underlying information. At a minimum, any revised framework should preserve standardized disclosure for executives whose compensation exceeds an objective, appropriately calibrated threshold, together with clear identification of their positions and responsibilities. 3. Raising the perquisite disclosure threshold from $10,000 to $150,000 The proposed increase in the aggregate perquisite reporting threshold from $10,000 to $150,000 is another significant concern. The proposal also introduces a de minimis tracking exclusion and revises the interpretive guidance governing what constitutes a perquisite. The Commission argues that the existing threshold has not been updated since 2006 and imposes unnecessary tracking burdens. However, raising the threshold fifteenfold creates a substantial reduction in routine disclosure. Executive benefits may include personal use of corporate aircraft, residential arrangements, club memberships, personal transportation, security arrangements, and other benefits that are not necessarily reflected in conventional salary or bonus figures. Such benefits can represent meaningful compensation even when they are not paid directly in cash. Their disclosure allows shareholders to understand the full economic value of executive compensation and determine whether the company's compensation committee is exercising appropriate oversight. The concern becomes greater when a higher threshold is combined with greater corporate discretion over whether a benefit qualifies as a perquisite. The Commission should not create a system in which companies have both increased discretion to classify executive benefits and a substantially higher threshold before disclosure becomes mandatory. I urge the SEC to retain the existing $10,000 aggregate threshold or, if an adjustment is considered necessary, adopt a substantially lower and objectively justified alternative. The Commission should also preserve clear interpretive examples and require disclosure of material executive benefits even where a registrant's classification of a benefit is disputed. The reporting framework should include safeguards against dividing, reclassifying, or structuring benefits to avoid disclosure. 4. Preserving meaningful pay-versus-performance disclosure The proposed amendments would simplify pay-versus-performance reporting by reducing required performance measures and replacing the existing Compensation Actually Paid calculation with total compensation earned under the proposed Earned Compensation Table. The SEC argues that the current calculation is complicated and imposes substantial compliance burdens. There is a legitimate case for making compensation calculations easier to understand. However, simplification should not eliminate the information necessary to assess whether executive compensation corresponds to corporate performance. Investors need to understand whether executive rewards are justified by the company's actual results and whether compensation arrangements encourage sustainable performance rather than short-term financial manipulation or excessive risk-taking. A compensation figure alone does not establish whether an executive has created shareholder value. Investors need standardized information connecting compensation to financial performance, stockholder returns, and the performance measures used by compensation committees. The Commission should retain sufficient standardized performance information to permit comparisons between companies and across reporting years. Any revised calculation should be accompanied by clear explanations of its methodology, limitations, and relationship to the actual economic value received by executives. The Commission should also preserve historical comparability so that investors can evaluate changes in compensation and performance over time. 5. Preserving the CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio The proposed restriction of the median-employee calculation to U.S. full-time employees is particularly concerning. Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act directed the SEC to require disclosure of the annual total compensation of the median employee, the annual total compensation of the chief executive officer, and the ratio between those amounts. The existing framework encompasses a broader employee population, including full-time, part-time, seasonal, and temporary workers, subject to applicable exclusions and accommodations. The proposed revision would substantially narrow the population used to determine the median employee. It would exclude foreign employees and part-time, seasonal, and temporary workers from the required population. This would change what the resulting ratio represents. For companies with significant international operations, outsourced production arrangements, substantial part-time workforces, or seasonal employment patterns, a U.S. full-time-only calculation may provide an incomplete picture of the relationship between executive compensation and the company's workforce. The exclusion of lower-paid employment categories could also make the resulting ratio appear more favorable without any actual improvement in the economic relationship between executive and worker compensation. This is not simply a technical reporting issue. The pay ratio provides shareholders with information about workforce structure, compensation practices, and the distribution of economic benefits within the company. The Commission should retain the broader workforce population or require a supplementary disclosure that preserves the ability to evaluate compensation across the company's entire workforce. The statutory language referring to the median compensation of all employees also warrants a careful legal examination before adopting a narrower interpretation. The SEC should explain in its final rule how any proposed limitation satisfies the text and purpose of Section 953(b). 6. Maintaining meaningful Compensation Discussion and Analysis The proposal would make the Compensation Discussion and Analysis requirement more principles-based, require registrants to address three specified topics, and eliminate the existing list of 15 example topics. Reducing boilerplate language and repetitive disclosures is a reasonable objective. Nevertheless, excessive flexibility can produce inconsistent reporting and make it more difficult for investors to compare companies. The Compensation Discussion and Analysis should provide shareholders with an understandable explanation of: The objectives of executive compensation policies. The relationship between compensation and corporate strategy. The performance criteria used to determine executive rewards. The role of the board and compensation committee. The relationship between actual performance and compensation outcomes. The risks associated with the company's incentive structures. The treatment of long-term shareholder interests. A principles-based approach should not become an invitation to omit important information. The Commission should retain clear minimum disclosure expectations and require companies to explain material compensation decisions in a manner that is specific to their circumstances. The elimination of standardized guidance should not make it easier for companies to substitute generalized statements for meaningful explanations. 7. Preserving disclosure concerning compensation-related risks and equity awards The proposal also contemplates eliminating certain disclosure requirements concerning risk-management-related compensation policies and practices and equity awards granted close in time to the release of material nonpublic information. These are important governance issues. Compensation arrangements can influence executive decisions and create incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking, inappropriate short-term behavior, or the manipulation of corporate performance measures. The timing of equity awards in relation to the release of material nonpublic information can also raise important questions about corporate governance and the administration of compensation programs. Investors should retain access to information that allows them to evaluate these practices. The Commission should not eliminate disclosures merely because the information is difficult to collect or because some companies believe that investors rarely ask questions about it. The absence of frequent shareholder questions does not establish that information lacks material significance. The Commission should preserve appropriate disclosure of material compensation-related risks and equity-award timing practices, while allowing proportionate reporting methods that avoid unnecessary duplication. 8. The economic and governance consequences of reduced transparency Better Markets identifies an important economic context for this proposal. Its November 13 statement cites research indicating that CEO compensation has increased substantially relative to worker compensation. It reports that, at the 100 lowest-paying companies in the S&P 500, CEO compensation averaged $17.5 million in 2025, compared with median worker compensation of $36,571. The organization also cites an analysis reporting that inflation-adjusted CEO pay increased 54 percent between 2019 and 2025, while global worker pay declined 12 percent. These figures should be independently evaluated and placed in their proper methodological context. Nevertheless, they illustrate why shareholders and the public have a legitimate interest in understanding executive compensation. The issue is not whether the SEC should determine what executives deserve to earn. The issue is whether shareholders should retain the information necessary to make that determination for themselves. Transparent compensation reporting helps investors assess whether executive rewards reflect corporate performance, whether compensation committees are exercising appropriate oversight, and whether incentive arrangements are consistent with long-term shareholder interests. Reducing transparency can weaken those accountability mechanisms. It can also diminish confidence in corporate governance and increase the difficulty of comparing compensation arrangements across publicly traded companies. 9. The need for a more balanced and evidence-based rulemaking process The Commission states that its proposal follows a review of the existing framework, a July 2025 roundtable, and consideration of more than 80 comment letters. The proposal acknowledges that investors and corporate registrants do not necessarily share the same views about the value of existing disclosure requirements. Indeed, the Commission's own discussion recognizes that investor representatives generally expressed greater support for the existing framework than registrants and their advisers, although investors also identified opportunities for improvement. This difference in perspective deserves careful attention. Companies naturally have an interest in reducing the costs associated with regulatory reporting. Investors, however, have an interest in retaining information that enables them to evaluate corporate management and protect their investments. The SEC must balance those interests according to its statutory responsibilities. It should not assume that reducing the volume of disclosed information automatically improves disclosure quality. Nor should the Commission equate a lack of shareholder inquiries about a particular disclosure with a lack of investor value. The SEC should undertake a more comprehensive evaluation of the likely information losses associated with the proposal, including the cumulative effects of narrowing executive coverage, increasing perquisite thresholds, simplifying performance comparisons, and restricting workforce populations. The economic analysis should account for the potential costs imposed on investors through reduced transparency, diminished comparability, weaker governance oversight, and increased reliance on alternative information sources. 10. Concrete implementation and accountability checklist I urge you, as SEC Chairman, to direct the Commission and relevant staff to undertake the following actions before adopting any final amendments. A. Protect the scope of executive compensation disclosure Retain routine disclosure of compensation for the principal executive officer, principal financial officer, and additional highly compensated executive officers under an objective and consistent reporting framework. Avoid limiting routine disclosure to only two executives where other senior officers exercise substantial corporate authority or receive significant compensation. Preserve sufficient information to identify executive responsibilities and evaluate the distribution of compensation among senior management. B. Protect perquisite transparency Retain the existing $10,000 aggregate perquisite disclosure threshold or adopt a substantially lower alternative supported by a transparent investor-focused analysis. Preserve clear interpretive guidance concerning personal benefits, corporate aircraft, residential arrangements, personal transportation, security benefits, and other executive perquisites. Require meaningful disclosure where companies provide substantial personal benefits, even if they characterize those benefits differently for accounting or administrative purposes. Establish safeguards against artificial fragmentation or reclassification of benefits to avoid disclosure. C. Preserve compensation-performance accountability Retain standardized pay-versus-performance information that allows investors to compare executive compensation with company performance. Preserve clear explanations of compensation calculations, performance measures, and material changes in methodology. Maintain historical comparability so that investors can evaluate trends in executive compensation and corporate performance. Require disclosure sufficient to assess whether incentive arrangements promote long-term corporate performance or create material risk-taking concerns. D. Protect workforce compensation information Retain the broader employee population in the median-worker compensation calculation, consistent with the statutory mandate of Dodd-Frank Section 953(b). If the Commission adopts a narrower calculation, require supplementary disclosure that identifies the limitations of the measure and preserves meaningful workforce-wide comparisons. Require clear explanations of exclusions, employee-population methodology, and material changes affecting the reported pay ratio. E. Preserve meaningful corporate governance disclosure Retain minimum substantive requirements for Compensation Discussion and Analysis, including executive compensation objectives, performance criteria, material decisions, and governance oversight. Preserve appropriate disclosure of material compensation-related risk-management practices. Preserve appropriate disclosure concerning equity awards granted close in time to the release of material nonpublic information. Ensure that any simplification of tables or reporting formats does not eliminate material information or undermine comparisons across registrants. F. Strengthen the rulemaking record Publish a comprehensive comparison identifying the information required under the existing Item 402 framework and the information that would no longer be required under the proposed amendments. Quantify the likely information losses for investors, including the effects on compensation visibility, perquisite reporting, pay-versus-performance comparisons, and workforce compensation ratios. Evaluate the cumulative effects of the proposed changes rather than examining each disclosure reduction in isolation. Consider investor comments, including submissions from individual shareholders, institutional investors, pension funds, labor organizations, retirement savers, and investor-protection organizations. Explain how the final rule satisfies the relevant statutory mandates, particularly Dodd-Frank Sections 953(a), 953(b), and 951, as applicable. G. Establish implementation and public accountability Publish a substantive response to significant investor concerns raised during the public-comment period. Identify which investor-protection recommendations are accepted, modified, or rejected and provide reasoned explanations for the Commission's decisions. Establish measurable criteria for evaluating whether the revised disclosures actually improve clarity without reducing access to material information. Conduct a post-implementation assessment within two years of the effective compliance date, examining investor access to compensation information, disclosure comparability, reporting costs, and the usefulness of the revised framework. Publish the results of that assessment and identify any additional amendments necessary to correct unintended losses of investor information. These actions would provide a practical means of reducing unnecessary regulatory complexity without weakening shareholder oversight. 11. The Commission's responsibility to shareholders and retirement savers The consequences of reduced executive compensation disclosure extend beyond professional investment managers. Millions of Americans own shares directly or indirectly through retirement accounts, pension funds, mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and other investment vehicles. These individuals depend on reliable public information to evaluate the companies in which their savings are invested. They generally cannot negotiate directly with corporate executives or obtain private access to internal compensation committee deliberations. Public disclosure is therefore an essential mechanism through which ordinary shareholders can exercise informed ownership rights. The SEC should not diminish that mechanism without compelling evidence that the information being eliminated is genuinely unnecessary for reasonable investors. Corporate executives and compensation committees should remain accountable to the shareholders whose capital supports their businesses. The availability of meaningful compensation information helps ensure that corporate management is not insulated from scrutiny simply because its compensation arrangements are complex. A transparent market requires more than the disclosure companies consider convenient. It requires disclosure that enables investors to make independent judgments. 12. Closing request: Preserve transparency while modernizing disclosure Chairman Atkins, I recognize the importance of reviewing longstanding regulations and eliminating unnecessary complexity. A well-designed disclosure system should be understandable, efficient, consistent, and focused on information that matters to investors. However, those objectives cannot be achieved by reducing the information shareholders need to evaluate executive compensation and corporate governance. The SEC should not make it easier for public companies to conceal material elements of executive compensation behind higher reporting thresholds, narrower executive populations, discretionary classifications, or less comparable performance measures. I urge you to withdraw the current proposal and undertake a revised rulemaking that retains meaningful executive compensation transparency while addressing genuine duplication, excessive complexity, and unnecessary compliance costs. At a minimum, the Commission should preserve disclosure concerning additional highly compensated executives, maintain meaningful reporting of executive perquisites, protect standardized pay-versus-performance information, retain a representative workforce compensation measure, and preserve material compensation-related governance disclosures. The final rule should be supported by a comprehensive assessment of its effects on investors, accompanied by a transparent explanation of how the Commission has addressed significant objections and satisfied its statutory responsibilities. The SEC's commitment to materiality should mean providing investors with the information necessary to understand the economic realities of the companies they own—not allowing those companies to determine unilaterally which aspects of executive compensation shareholders are permitted to see. Investors should be able to evaluate executive compensation for themselves. They should not be shielded from information merely because that information may invite scrutiny of corporate leadership or compensation practices. The Commission has an opportunity to modernize Item 402 in a way that improves clarity, reduces unnecessary reporting burdens, and strengthens rather than weakens investor confidence. I urge you to use this rulemaking process to achieve that objective through substantive revisions, meaningful public participation, and verifiable investor-protection safeguards. The ultimate measure of success should be a disclosure framework that is easier to understand, less duplicative, and fully capable of informing shareholders about executive compensation, corporate performance, and management accountability. Protecting investors must remain the Commission's guiding responsibility. Respectfully, Robert E. Rutkowski