Subject: Comment on Release No. 34‑106383 - Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a‑8
From: James McRitchie
Affiliation:

Sep. 16, 2026

Dear Secretary Countryman,
Please find below my comment on the Commission's proposed rescission of Rule 14a‑8 and amendments to Rule 14a‑4 (Release No. 34‑106383).

Comment Letter Opposing the Rescission of Rule 14a‑8 and Amendments to Rule 14a‑4 James McRitchie, Shareholder Advocate and Publisher, CorpGov.net Elk Grove, California September 16, 2026
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Commission's proposal to rescind Rule 14a‑8 and amend Rule 14a‑4. I write as a long‑term, diversified investor who has filed and supported shareholder proposals for more than 25 years. My experience spans thousands of proxy statements, hundreds of engagements, and decades of observing how the federal proxy system either empowers or silences the owners of public companies.
After reviewing the proposal, I strongly oppose the rescission of Rule 14a‑8 and the related amendments to Rule 14a‑4. The Commission's statutory‑authority argument is historically inconsistent, doctrinally selective, and practically harmful to investors. The proposal would eliminate the only mechanism that allows ordinary shareholders to place items on the corporate agenda without running a prohibitively expensive proxy contest.
I. The Commission's Statutory‑Authority Argument Misreads Section 14(a) The proposal asserts that Rule 14a‑8 exceeds the Commission's authority because Section 14(a) regulates proxy solicitation, not shareholder voting rights. Yet for more than 80 years, the Commission has recognized that federal proxy regulation must facilitate the exercise of state‑law rights. Rule 14a‑8 does not create voting rights; it ensures that shareholders can use the proxy machinery to exercise rights state law already provides. Courts have repeatedly upheld broad SEC authority under Section 14(a) when rules are "necessary or appropriate...for the protection of investors." The proposal's narrow reading of Section 14(a) is not supported by the Commission's own history or by judicial precedent.
II. Rescission Would Render State‑Law Rights Meaningless for Ordinary Investors State law provides no mechanism for dispersed shareholders to place items on the agenda without federal proxy rules. Without Rule 14a‑8, only shareholders able to finance a proxy contest could place proposals before fellow owners. Retail shareholders would lose any practical ability to raise emerging risks or governance concerns. Companies could adopt bylaws that eliminate or severely restrict shareholder proposals altogether.
III. The Proposal Underestimates Reliance Interests Built Over Eight Decades Investors, issuers, proxy advisors, and fiduciaries have built governance practices around Rule 14a‑8. Eliminating the rule would create fragmentation and uncertainty across jurisdictions. The release acknowledges reliance interests but dismisses them as insufficient to justify retaining the rule. That conclusion is inconsistent with administrative‑law principles requiring agencies to consider reliance when reversing longstanding policy.
IV. The Proposal's Federalism Argument Is Selective and Incomplete The release argues that Rule 14a‑8 has "evolved into a Federal common law" that displaces state corporate governance. This characterization is overstated. Rule 14a‑8's exclusions are procedural filters, not substantive determinations of shareholder rights. The Commission's own amendments over the decades have repeatedly reaffirmed that state law governs what is a "proper subject for action."
V. Amendments to Rule 14a‑4 Would Expand Management's Discretionary Voting Power The proposal would broaden circumstances under which companies may vote uninstructed shares on matters not included in the proxy materials. Although the amendments would allow shareholders to opt out of discretionary authority, many shareholders do not understand how discretionary authority works. The practical effect would be to increase management's ability to vote shares without explicit shareholder direction-especially concerning in a world without Rule 14a‑8.
VI. The Proposal Conflicts with Global Governance Norms Shareholder‑proposal rights are standard in major markets, including the EU, UK, and Canada. Rescinding Rule 14a‑8 would make the United States an outlier and weaken confidence in U.S. corporate governance standards.
VII. Conclusion Rule 14a‑8 is not an overreach; it is the foundation of meaningful shareholder participation in corporate governance. Rescinding it would silence the very investors the Commission is charged with protecting. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a‑4 would further tilt the proxy system toward management at the expense of shareholders.
I respectfully urge the Commission to withdraw the proposal and instead consider targeted improvements that preserve and strengthen shareholder rights.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely, 


James McRitchie 
Shareholder Advocate 
CorpGov.net 
http://www.corpgov.net 
9295 Yorkship Court 
Elk Grove, CA 95758