Subject: Comment Letter in Support of Proposed FINRA Accredited Investor Examination Pathway File No. 4-931
From: Reginald Hart
Affiliation:

Oct. 28, 2026

Dear Secretary Countryman: 
I am a real estate investor and a business owner. Over the course of my professional career, I have developed substantive expertise in private-market underwriting, including the analysis of Debt Service Coverage Ratio financing, evaluation of private placements through structured due diligence, and financial modeling across a range of asset classes. I am not a licensed securities professional, nor do I write on behalf of any firm, trade association, or advocacy organization. I write solely as an individual practitioner who works daily with the analytical frameworks that private-market investing demands. I submit this letter in strong and unqualified support of the Commission's proposal to designate the successful passage of a FINRA-developed accredited investor examination as a qualifying pathway for accredited investor status under Rule 501(a) of Regulation D. I believe this proposal represents one of the most meaningful and long-overdue reforms to investor access policy that the Commission has considered in a generation, and I urge its adoption. 
The existing accredited investor thresholds—a net worth exceeding one million dollars, exclusive of a primary residence, or an annual income of two hundred thousand dollars for individuals, or three hundred thousand dollars jointly—were designed as a proxy for financial sophistication. In practice, however, they function as nothing more than a proxy for wealth. The two qualities are not synonymous, and the Commission has long recognized as much. A high-income physician or attorney with no background in financial analysis, no understanding of capital structure, and no experience evaluating the risks of illiquid securities qualifies automatically under the current standard. Meanwhile, a financially literate investor with demonstrated analytical competency—one who can read a private placement memorandum, model cash flows, and assess leverage risk—is categorically excluded if his income or net worth does not clear the prescribed threshold. This outcome is not incidental to the design of the rule; it is the direct product of it. According to the SEC's own Office of the Advocate for Small Business Capital Formation, approximately four hundred billion dollars was raised in Regulation D offerings, excluding pooled investment funds, between July 1, 2024 and June 30, 2025. That is a market of enormous consequence—one from which capable, informed, and otherwise sophisticated investors are structurally barred on the basis of financial characteristics that have no necessary relationship to investment competency. This is not a policy nuance. It is a market access and equity issue that warrants the Commission's most serious attention. 
The foundational premise of the accredited investor framework is that certain investors are capable of fending for themselves in private markets—that they possess the sophistication necessary to evaluate complex securities without the full protections of a registered offering. A standardized examination modeled on existing FINRA frameworks, such as the Series 7, Series 82, or Series 65, directly tests the knowledge that is most relevant to that determination: an understanding of securities law, the ability to interpret risk factors and offering documents, familiarity with liquidity constraints and lock-up periods, and comprehension of capital structure and its implications for investor returns and protections. Wealth thresholds, by contrast, test only one thing: the capacity to absorb losses. They say nothing whatsoever about whether an investor can assess risk, price an offering appropriately, identify conflicts of interest, or recognize when a disclosure is materially deficient. Speaking from my own experience underwriting real estate debt transactions, I can state with confidence that the competencies that actually protect an investor are substantive ones: understanding leverage, modeling debt coverage under stress scenarios, interrogating exit assumptions, and evaluating market risk. A passing score on a rigorous, purpose-built examination demonstrates precisely those capabilities. The wealth-based standard demonstrates none of them. Investor protection is best served when investors can actually evaluate what they are purchasing—not merely when they can afford to lose it. The Commission's proposal, by centering competency rather than capital, advances the genuine protective rationale that has always underpinned the accredited investor framework. 
The benefits of a competency-based pathway extend beyond individual investors. Expanding the accredited investor pool through rigorous examination will deepen private capital markets, increase competition among issuers for investor capital, and create market conditions that tend to improve offering terms, disclosure quality, and issuer accountability. The investors currently excluded from Regulation D offerings are not unsophisticated actors unfamiliar with private markets. They include small business owners, entrepreneurs, experienced real estate professionals, financial planners, and a broad range of economically productive practitioners who have deep, domain-specific expertise in the asset classes they seek to access. Their exclusion does not make private markets safer; it makes those markets less competitive and less dynamic. When qualified, competent investors are able to participate in these markets, capital flows more efficiently to productive uses, job creation is supported, and the economic base of smaller markets is strengthened. The Commission has articulated a broader goal of responsible retailization of private markets. A competency-based examination pathway is not merely consistent with that goal—it is among the most direct and defensible mechanisms available to advance it. 
I write with particular emphasis on this point: the proposed examination must be offered free of charge to all applicants. This is not a peripheral design consideration. It is central to the integrity of the proposal. If a fee is imposed on individuals seeking to qualify through the examination pathway, the Commission will have done nothing more than replace one financial barrier with another—substituting a direct monetary hurdle for the indirect one that the wealth threshold already imposes. The meritocratic promise of the proposal would be rendered largely symbolic. FINRA already administers a broad range of investor education resources and regulatory programs, and the examination envisioned here aligns directly with FINRA's public-interest mission. The Commission should explore funding the examination through existing FINRA regulatory revenue streams or through a dedicated SEC administrative allocation, consistent with the public-interest rationale that underlies the proposal itself. A no-cost examination would also signal something important: that the Commission is genuinely committed to meritocratic market access, not merely the appearance of reform. It would ensure that the pathway is equally available across income levels, geographic regions, and demographic groups. In so doing, it would meaningfully advance the Commission's stated equity and inclusion objectives, which cannot be achieved if the gateway to participation carries a price of admission. 
While the Commission and FINRA are best positioned to determine the precise content and structure of the examination, I respectfully offer several design recommendations based on my experience as a practicing private-market investor. First, the examination should be rigorous and purpose-built for private-market investing, rather than a repurposed broker-dealer licensing examination. The relevant competencies differ in important respects from those tested by existing FINRA qualification exams, and the examination should reflect that specificity. I recommend that the examination content address, at a minimum, the following subject areas: the mechanics of Regulation D offerings and the distinctions between Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c); analysis of private placement memoranda and the identification of material risk factors; interpretation of financial statements and basic financial modeling; liquidity and lock-up risk and its implications for portfolio management; conflicts of interest common to private-market structures; and the legal protections and limitations applicable to investors in exempt offerings. Second, I recommend that the Commission adopt a continuing education or periodic re-examination requirement, with a renewal cycle of three to five years, consistent with the standards applicable to other FINRA-administered credentials. Private-market practices, regulatory frameworks, and financial products evolve, and ongoing competency requirements would ensure that the examination pathway reflects durable, current knowledge rather than a one-time demonstration of qualification. Third, and perhaps most importantly, I urge the Commission to consult with practicing individual investors—not only broker-dealers, institutional participants, and industry trade groups—in the examination development process. The perspective of investors who actively participate in private markets without institutional resources or intermediaries is essential to ensuring that the examination tests the competencies that are genuinely predictive of informed, self-protective investment decision-making. 
The accredited investor definition has long served as the gatekeeping mechanism for participation in private capital markets. For decades, that mechanism has operated on the assumption that wealth is an adequate substitute for sophistication—an assumption that is empirically unsupported and practically unjust. The Commission's proposal to establish a FINRA examination pathway directly challenges that assumption, and it does so on principled, defensible grounds. I write in strong support of the proposal and urge the Commission to move expeditiously to finalize the rule. The case for reform is well-documented, the policy rationale is sound, and the practical tools necessary for implementation are well within the Commission's reach. Further delay serves only those who benefit from restricted market access, not the investing public whose interests the Commission exists to protect. I am grateful for the opportunity to submit these comments and to contribute to the perspective of a private-market practitioner to the Commission's deliberative process.