Subject: Comment on File Number S7-2026-39: Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform (Release Nos. 33-11455; 34-106873; Item 402 of Regulation S-K)
From: Takahiro Morita
Affiliation:

Nov. 14, 2026

TITLE: Objective Materiality, Cross-Border Governance Arbitrage, and Equity Award Lifecycle Integrity: An Empirical Law-and-Economics Analysis of Proposed Amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K (File No. S7-2026-39; Release Nos. 33-11455; 34-106873) 
TO: Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090 
RE: Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform (File No. S7-2026-39; Release Nos. 33-11455; 34-106873; Item 402 of Regulation S-K)
FROM: Takahiro Morita, Qualified Shareholder & Independent Capital Market Forensics Researcher (Empirical Case Study Subject: SOMPO Holdings, Inc. / OTC: SMPNY / TSE: 8630) 
DATE: November 14, 2026 
RELATED PUBLIC COMMISSION DOCKETS: - U.S. SEC Public Comment Docket, File No. DSP-3 (Draft Strategic Plan) - U.S. SEC Public Comment Docket, File No. 4-927 (Release No. 34-106402)ABSTRACT
This comment letter evaluates the Securities and Exchange Commission's November 13, 2026 proposing release amending Item 402 of Regulation S-K (Release Nos. 33-11455; 34-106873) within the doctrinal and economic framework articulated in the accompanying Statements of Chairman Paul S. Atkins and Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, alongside the Commission's statutory mandates under Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, this study responds to Chief Economist and Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) Director Joshua White's November 9 and November 11, 2026 calls for empirical evidence regarding "missing important context" and the economic incidence of governance failures, while integrating Division of Enforcement Director David Woodcock's enforcement principles regarding repeated internal control breakdowns, qualitative materiality under Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB 99), and misleading claims concerning artificial intelligence and emerging technologies ("AI Washing") as applied to Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) accessing U.S. institutional debt and insurance markets.
Drawing upon verified statutory filings, public shareholding disclosures, and governance records of a major Japanese insurance holding company-SOMPO Holdings, Inc. (TSE Prime: 8630; U.S. OTC ADR: SMPNY)-this analysis demonstrates that maintaining an uncalibrated blanket exemption for FPIs under Item 402(a)(1), when home-country gatekeeper remedies are exhausted, invites severe cross-border governance arbitrage across four interconnected dimensions:
1. Absence of Personal Equity Alignment Amid Corporate Share Repurchases: Eight tracked board and audit fiduciaries-including the Principal Executive Officer (PEO) and Principal Financial Officer (PFO) targeted by amended Item 402-hold a combined 72,876 shares, representing a negligible 0.00780% of total issued equity, with virtually zero open-market, out-of-pocket share acquisitions beyond mechanical fractional accumulations through an executive shareholding association (and with the incumbent Group CFO omitted entirely from statutory shareholding tables for roughly six years from 2020 to 2026 due to holding a non-statutory "executive officer" title). Insulating themselves from personal downside risk through cash-settled stock-price-linked compensation ("phantom stock"), management deployed substantial corporate treasury funds under a ¥69.0 billion share repurchase authorization-at acquisition prices exceeding the board's implied reference price by over 60%-without cancelling a single repurchased share, thereby inflating the valuation of their granted equity-linked awards while accumulating unretired treasury stock.
2. Bifurcated Incentive Design, Policyholder Cost-Shifting, and Concealed Control Breakdowns: Operating under post-sanction regulatory probation following major industry-wide claims scandals, management increased variable bonus ratios for managerial ranks while deliberately excluding front-line claims servicing units from governance modernization. Within those excluded units, personnel bypassed enterprise ERP controls to generate fabricated, double-counted repair estimates and coerced a compliant policyholder who had declined insurance usage into a mandatory three-grade policy demotion (inflicting a certain net financial loss of approximately ¥110,000) to serve as a nominal plaintiff in retaliatory litigation ("justice laundering") against a whistleblowing shareholder-orchestrated via a divide-and-conquer legal segmentation strategy involving an outside counsel concurrently serving on the local bar disciplinary committee, forcing through contradictory arguments in defiance of judicial estoppel under the personal name of the core operating subsidiary's Representative Director and President, and permanently fixing those self-incriminating filings in public Japanese court records-while suffering recurring cybersecurity breaches (over 125,000 leaked policyholder records within 29 days), multi-year agency fraud (approximately 340 cases), and an unexplained 3.5-hour daytime core portal outage on October 19, 2026 behind the scenes of the Autumn SEC-FSA Financial Regulatory Dialogue in Tokyo between SEC Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda and FSA Vice Minister for International Affairs Toshiyuki Miyoshi (SEC Press Release 2026-107), which in itself demonstrates a severe deficiency in IT General Controls (ITGC) and raises irreconcilable doubts regarding record integrity and potential alteration.
3. Gatekeeper Capture, Exhaustion of Home-Country Remedies, and Offshore Asset Ring-Fencing: Despite formal corporate governance disclosures touting dual internal audit reporting lines and clawback policies, and despite written investor relations confirmation on February 17, 2026 that regulatory notifications were escalated to the Board of Directors prior to closing a $3.5 billion U.S. insurer acquisition and issuing $1.3 billion in U.S. Rule 144A debt, domestic oversight failed due to acute regulatory capture. Specifically, the Audit Committee Chair (a former financial regulator who acknowledged in formal proceedings receiving shareholder corrective evidence three times) issued unqualified approvals without remediation; outside defense counsel served concurrently on the local bar disciplinary committee reviewing related complaints; and the external PCAOB-registered auditor closed its global whistleblower intake channel without explanation-followed immediately by a massive offshore capital transfer to a Bermuda reinsurance subsidiary days after receiving a statutory shareholder derivative demand.
4. Ultra Vires Home-Country Exoneration Instruments: To shield leadership from personal restitution and mandatory clawbacks under Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 and Exchange Act Rule 10D-1, the Principal Executive Officer and Audit Committee leadership jointly executed a bilateral mutual exoneration notice purporting to absolve both management and the external PCAOB-registered auditor.
To prevent Item 402(a)(1) from generating unintended regulatory arbitrage under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 553), this letter proposes two narrowly tailored, low-cost refinements for the adopting release.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: OBJECTIVE MATERIALITY, DERA'S "ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION," AND THE "MINIMUM EFFECTIVE DOSE" OF REGULATION
In his November 13, 2026 Statement accompanying Release Nos. 33-11455 and 34-106873, Chairman Paul S. Atkins positioned the comprehensive reform of Item 402 of Regulation S-K as the second of three foundational pillars transforming the public company disclosure regime. Building on the May 2026 filer-status simplifications (Release No. 34-105515), this proposal establishes a direct bridge to the upcoming third pillar reforming the business, risk, and governance provisions of Regulation S-K.
Invoking TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445, 449 (1976), Chairman Atkins underscored that disclosure mandates must remain anchored in objective materiality-capturing facts that significantly alter the "total mix" of information for a reasonable investor-rather than catering to specialized preferences likened at the July 2025 Roundtable to stocking "rum raisin and maple walnut" ice cream flavors for a single customer. In parallel, Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda observed that two decades of piecemeal rulemaking since the 2006 Executive Compensation Release (Release No. 33-8732A) have caused Item 402 to grow "by accretion rather than design," missing the forest for the trees, and recalled former Chairman Christopher Cox's warning regarding the "Museum of Unintended Consequences."
Streamlining tabular disclosures into three coherent instruments-the Earned Compensation Table, the Granted Compensation Table, and the Status of Equity Awards Table-while focusing primary reporting on the Principal Executive Officer (PEO) and Principal Financial Officer (PFO) exemplifies Chairman Atkins' philosophy of prescribing the "minimum effective dose of regulation."
At the same time, under Exchange Act Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2), the Commission must rigorously evaluate how its rules affect efficiency, competition, and capital formation. As Chief Economist and DERA Director Joshua White emphasized in his November 9, 2026 Roundtable address ("Machine-Understandable Data in the Age of Super Intelligence") and his November 11, 2026 remarks ("The Economics of Attention"), modern market analysis relies on machine-understandable context, yet faces acute risks when machine-readable formal disclosures are "missing important context" or when board attention is diverted away from productive risk oversight toward self-preservation. Director White specifically invited commenters to supply empirical data identifying what governance failures cost, what drives those costs, and who ultimately bears them.
Furthermore, regulatory deference to home-country governance for Foreign Private Issuers under Item 402(a)(1) rests on an implicit premise of international comity-namely, that home-country audit committees, external auditors, and legal gatekeepers function independently. When an FPI raises billions of dollars from U.S. Qualified Institutional Buyers via Rule 144A debt offerings and acquires U.S.-regulated insurance subsidiaries while home-country gatekeepers are neutralized by regulatory capture, preserving an unconditional FPI exemption conceals precisely the "missing important context" that alters the "total mix" of information for every reasonable investor.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: EQUITY AWARD LIFECYCLE DISTORTION AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION MISALIGNMENT
Chairman Atkins emphasized that amended Item 402 is designed "to elicit information that clearly informs investors of when compensation is first granted and then ultimately earned, through tabular disclosure focused on the most common elements of compensation-salary, bonus, and equity." Publicly filed shareholding and corporate repurchase disclosures of SOMPO Holdings, Inc. (TSE: 8630; OTC: SMPNY)-an FPI that completed a $3.5 billion acquisition of a U.S.-regulated insurer (Aspen Insurance Holdings) in February 2026 and issued $1.3 billion in U.S. Rule 144A senior unsecured notes due 2037 (governed by New York law) in April 2026-illustrate why lifecycle tracking of granted versus earned equity is highly material to U.S. market participants.
1. Quantitative Absence of Personal Capital Commitment and Six-Year Disclosure Gap via Non-Statutory Officer Titles
A longitudinal audit of statutory shareholding disclosures from 2025 onward (including Annual Securities Reports, General Meeting of Shareholders Convocation Notices, and timely disclosures regarding executive appointments dated February 13 and May 20, 2026) establishes that eight tracked current and former executive directors, audit committee members, and outside directors-including both the PEO (Group CEO) and PFO (Group CFO) targeted by amended Item 402-hold negligible personal equity stakes and committed virtually zero personal capital to open-market purchases beyond minor periodic fractional accumulations through an executive shareholding plan:
Audit Committee Member (Internal Director I): 18,900 shares held (0.00202% of total issued shares; reflecting solely stock-plan/trust accumulation without open-market purchases).
Group Chief Financial Officer, Director, and Representative Executive Officer Deputy President (PFO): 16,700 shares held (0.00179%; reflecting only +400 shares via periodic plan accumulation from 16,300 shares at year-end 2025).
Group Chief Executive Officer, Director, and Representative Executive Officer President (PEO): 13,400 shares held (0.00143%; reflecting only +500 shares year-over-year).
Group Chief Human Resources Officer, Director, and Representative Executive Officer Deputy President: 10,750 shares held (0.00115%; -50 shares year-over-year).
Audit Committee Member (Internal Director II): 6,526 shares held (0.00070%; +200 shares via periodic plan accumulation).
Former Independent Outside Director I: 4,400 shares held (0.00047%; +100 shares year-over-year).
Former Independent Outside Director II: 1,500 shares held (0.00016%; +100 shares year-over-year).
Independent Outside Director and Audit Committee Member III: 700 shares held (0.00007%; +100 shares year-over-year).
(Note: Even including the 17,300 shares held by the former Group CFO who retired in June 2026, the combined holdings of all nine fiduciaries total just 90,176 shares, or 0.00965% of issued equity, while another outside director holds zero shares.)
Collectively, these eight fiduciaries hold 72,876 shares-representing a mere 0.00780% of total issued shares. Compounding this lack of personal equity ownership, the issuer's performance-linked equity compensation is structured as cash-settled stock-price-linked compensation ("phantom stock"), enabling management to capture upside appreciation in cash without bearing personal downside equity risk. Moreover, although the incumbent Group CFO (PFO) held core group leadership roles across overseas strategy, corporate planning, and subsidiary deputy presidency, he was completely omitted from Japanese statutory shareholding tables for roughly six years (April 2020 through March 2026) because his holding-company title was a non-statutory "executive officer" (shikko-yakuin) rather than a Companies Act statutory officer. This exemplifies how reliance on home-country formal classifications generates "missing important context."
2. Divergence Between Corporate Share Repurchases, Zero Share Cancellation, and Executive Equity Valuation
Despite bearing negligible personal equity risk, management obtained board authorization in May 2026 for a ¥69.0 billion (17.0 million share) corporate share repurchase program predicated on an implied reference price of ¥4,058.8 per share. Statutory monthly repurchase filings (EDINET) reveal two structural governance concerns:
(a) High-Valuation Treasury Deployment and Unfulfilled Share Commitments: Through October 31, 2026, the issuer expended approximately ¥61.88 billion (nearly 90% of its monetary authorization) to acquire approximately 9.27 million shares at a cumulative average price exceeding ¥6,678 per share-more than 64% above the board's implied reference price-providing exit liquidity for departing institutional investors while leaving over 45% of the share-count commitment unfulfilled.
(b) Zero Share Cancellation: Statutory disclosures confirm that zero shares were retired during the reporting period, expanding uncancelled treasury stock to approximately 49.67 million shares (5.32% of total issued shares). Rather than cancelling shares to permanently enhance per-share value, corporate liquidity was deployed to accumulate treasury stock-which serves as the funding pool for future executive equity awards-while substantially inflating the market valuation of executives' existing granted shares and cash-settled phantom stock awards upon vesting. Under the proposed Granted Compensation Table and Status of Equity Awards Table, reasonable investors could readily evaluate this divergence between personal capital commitment and corporate treasury support.
III. "GOOD FAITH" DISCRETION, QUALITATIVE MATERIALITY (SAB 99), AND THE NEXUS TO PILLAR THREE GOVERNANCE REFORMS
Release Nos. 33-11455 and 34-106873 condition registrant flexibility in Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) and perquisite determinations on judgments being "reasonable and made in good faith." Chairman Atkins further noted that Commission staff is advancing toward Pillar Three of the Regulation S-K transformation: reforming "business, risk, and governance requirements" (complementing PCAOB Quality Control Standard QC 1000 and FASB monitoring of semi-annual reporting and data infrastructure disclosures).
Indeed, in an administrative opinion issued on the very same day as the proposing release-In the Matter of Eric Christopher Cannon, Exchange Act Release No. 106896 (Nov. 13, 2026)-Chairman Atkins and Commissioner Uyeda reaffirmed under the Steadman public-interest framework that regulatory leniency is warranted only where the record demonstrates an absence of scienter, genuine recognition of wrongful conduct, and sincere assurances against future violations, whereas bare denials without specific factual support cannot establish good faith. Applying that exact doctrinal standard to Item 402 confirms that principles-based "good faith" discretion must be conditioned on verifiable internal-control integrity rather than presumed for FPIs whose leadership actively neutralizes oversight.
Concurrently, Division of Enforcement Director David Woodcock, appearing alongside Chairman Atkins on the Commission's official broadcast Material Matters on October 16, 2026, emphasized that the Commission prioritizes pursuing "real investor harm," "real intentional misconduct," unaddressed and recurring internal control failures ("controls that are just really out of whack"), and issuers exploiting artificial intelligence or emerging-technology narratives to mislead investors. Under Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB 99), misstatements or control overrides involving intentional misconduct, regulatory evasion, or systemic failure cannot be excused on the basis of nominal quantitative thresholds. Empirical evidence from the subject issuer illustrates how perverse incentive structures directly generate these pathologies:
1. Bifurcated Incentive Design, Recidivism, and Policyholder Cost-Shifting: Operating under post-sanction regulatory probation following major industry-wide claims scandals, management increased performance-linked bonus ratios for managerial ranks in April 2025 while-as the Human Resources Department (secretariat to the Nomination and Compensation Committees) admitted in a November 10, 2026 governance interview-intentionally excluding front-line insurance claims servicing divisions from job-based career autonomy reforms. Within those excluded claims operations, personnel bypassed enterprise ERP controls to generate fabricated, double-counted repair estimates and coerced a compliant policyholder who had expressly declined insurance usage into a mandatory three-grade policy demotion (inflicting a net financial loss of approximately ¥110,000 through increased premiums) so that the insurer could deploy the policyholder as a nominal plaintiff in self-protective retaliatory litigation.
2. Escalation Notice, Divide-and-Conquer Retaliatory Litigation ("Justice Laundering"), and Judicial Record Fixation: After a shareholder documented these irregularities and reported them to financial authorities, the issuer's Investor Relations Department acknowledged in writing on February 17, 2026 that the matter had been escalated to the Board of Directors (foreclosing any management defense of ignorance). Nevertheless, management proceeded to close the $3.5 billion U.S. insurer acquisition and issue $1.3 billion in U.S. Rule 144A notes without disclosing the control breakdown, while weaponizing retaliatory litigation against the whistleblowing shareholder (implicating Exchange Act Rule 21F-17). Specifically, after an initial four-attorney defense team stripped their names from pleadings upon being confronted with digital metadata contradictions, management deployed an outside counsel concurrently serving on the local bar disciplinary committee to orchestrate a divide-and-conquer legal segmentation strategy-forcing through contradictory legal positions in defiance of judicial estoppel under the personal name of the core operating subsidiary's Representative Director and President, thereby permanently fixing this executive-led "justice laundering" as an official public record in the Japanese courts.
3. Gatekeeper Capture, Compliance Window-Dressing, and ITGC System Outage Anomalies: In direct inversion of DERA Director White's productive-efficiency framework, acute regulatory capture diverted board and gatekeeper attention toward self-preservation. While formally touting dual internal audit reporting lines to the CEO and Audit Committee in corporate governance reports, the Audit Committee Chair (a former financial regulator who admitted in disciplinary defense filings receiving shareholder corrective evidence three times) continued issuing unqualified approvals without remediation out of deference to major M&A transactions; outside defense counsel served concurrently on the local bar disciplinary committee reviewing related complaints; and the external PCAOB-registered auditor closed its global whistleblower intake channel without explanation. Furthermore, while suffering two supply-chain data breaches within 29 days exposing over 125,000 policyholder records (October and November 2026) and multi-year agency claims irregularities (approximately 340 cases), management marketed commercial cyber-risk diagnostics, promoted artificial intelligence initiatives, and co-hosted a cybersecurity seminar with prefectural police to project external compliance-conduct squarely implicating Enforcement Director Woodcock's warning against misleading technology and governance claims. Notably, on October 19, 2026-behind the scenes of the Autumn SEC–FSA Financial Regulatory Dialogue in Tokyo where SEC Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda and FSA Vice Minister for International Affairs Toshiyuki Miyoshi were conferring on cross-border investor protection and supervisory cooperation (SEC Press Release 2026-107)-the core operating subsidiary's customer portal suffered an unexplained 3.5-hour daytime outage during peak hours. Beyond projecting operational fragility, a sudden daytime core system collapse of this magnitude objectively evidences a severe deficiency in IT General Controls (ITGC) under SOX Section 404 and PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2201, leaving irreconcilable doubts regarding audit-trail preservation and potential alteration of electronic records under federal securities laws.
4. Offshore Asset Ring-Fencing and Structural Subordination of U.S. Bondholders: Days after receiving a formal shareholder derivative demand in late July 2026, management announced and executed a substantial capital transfer to a Bermuda reinsurance subsidiary-exhibiting classic badges of fraudulent conveyance and asset ring-fencing. Under Section 8 of the Indenture governing the issuer's $1.3 billion U.S. Rule 144A senior unsecured notes due 2037, bondholders' claims are structurally subordinated to all liabilities and regulatory obligations of the core operating insurance subsidiary. Answering DERA Director White's question regarding who ultimately bears the economic incidence of governance failures, unreserved contingent liabilities (IAS 37) and regulatory sanctions arising from misaligned incentive structures are shifted directly onto U.S. institutional bondholders and retail policyholders.
IV. PRESERVING CONGRESSIONAL MANDATES: DODD-FRANK SECTION 954 CLAWBACKS AND ULTRA VIRES BILATERAL EXONERATION
Chairman Atkins reaffirmed that with respect to Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 clawbacks, the proposed amendments "remain faithful to the congressional mandate" while keeping "[t]he underlying mechanics of a registrant's clawback process... unchanged."
Safeguarding the self-executing mechanics of Exchange Act Rule 10D-1 and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 is essential. Executives who elevate variable bonus ratios while presiding over material ICFR weaknesses face both mandatory clawbacks and intentional-act exclusions under Directors & Officers (D&O) liability insurance policies. Although the subject issuer's corporate governance disclosures formally advertise clawback mechanisms to satisfy global listing and debt-market expectations, on August 31, 2026, the Principal Executive Officer, the Audit Committee Chair, and the Audit & Supervisory Committee Chair jointly executed a bilateral "Notice of Refusal" purporting to mutually dismiss statutory liability demands against each other on the exact same instrument-while the CEO simultaneously purported to absolve the external PCAOB-registered auditor from liability.
Under Japanese corporate law (Companies Act Articles 424 and 426), a representative executive officer lacks statutory authority to release supervisory directors or external auditors from fiduciary liability. Under U.S. Exchange Act Section 29(a), any stipulation waiving compliance with federal securities statutes or rules is void ab initio. Explicit regulatory clarification is warranted to prevent FPIs from invoking such ultra vires home-country instruments under Rule 10D-1's "impracticability" exceptions.
V. CONCRETE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: PRESCRIBING THE "MINIMUM EFFECTIVE DOSE"
To fulfill the Commission's statutory obligations under Exchange Act Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) and align Release Nos. 33-11455 and 34-106873 with TSC Industries materiality, DERA Director White's contextual disclosure principles, and Pillar Three governance reforms, the Commission should incorporate two narrowly tailored provisions into the adopting release:
1. Targeted Calibration of the Item 402(a)(1) FPI Exemption for U.S.-Debt-Issuing and U.S.-Regulated Financial FPIs: Without imposing narrative bloat, require any Foreign Private Issuer that has issued Rule 144A debt securities in the United States or owns U.S.-regulated insurance or financial subsidiaries to disclose the streamlined Granted Compensation Table and Status of Equity Awards Table solely for the Principal Executive Officer (PEO) and Principal Financial Officer (PFO)-irrespective of whether those officers hold statutory or non-statutory titles under home-country corporate law-accompanied by a concise tabular reconciliation of: (i) open-market share purchases versus equity-based or cash-settled phantom stock grants; and (ii) concurrent issuer share repurchases and treasury-share cancellations executed during the award measurement period.
2. Codifying the Invalidity of Bilateral Exoneration Instruments Under Rule 10D-1 and Exchange Act Section 29(a): Explicitly clarify in the adopting release and accompanying interpretive guidance that internal corporate resolutions, bilateral mutual exoneration notices between executive officers and audit committee members, or home-country non-prosecution notices are void under Exchange Act Section 29(a) for purposes of federal securities compliance, do not constitute valid grounds for "impracticability" under Exchange Act Rule 10D-1(b)(1)(iv), and cannot shield erroneously awarded incentive compensation from mandatory recovery following an accounting restatement or material ICFR weakness.
VI. CONCLUSION
By anchoring Item 402 in objective TSC Industries materiality and streamlined lifecycle reporting, Release Nos. 33-11455 and 34-106873 establish a rigorous foundation for the Commission's Regulation S-K modernization. Prescribing the "minimum effective dose" of lifecycle transparency for U.S.-market-accessing FPIs-including functional PEO and PFO coverage regardless of domestic title nomenclature-and fortifying Dodd-Frank Section 954 clawbacks against ultra vires bilateral exoneration schemes will eliminate the "missing important context" identified by DERA and protect the integrity of the "total mix" of information across global capital markets.
Respectfully submitted, Takahiro Morita Qualified Shareholder & Independent Capital Market Forensics Researcher (Empirical Case Study Subject: SOMPO Holdings, Inc. / OTC: SMPNY / TSE: 8630)