May 19, 2020

Via electronic submission: rules-comments@sec.gov

Anne Sheehan  
Chairman  
Investor Advisory Committee

Elisse Walter  
Vice Chairman  
Investor Advisory Committee

Securities and Exchange Commission  
100 F Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20549-1090

Re: Investor Advisory Committee Meeting on May 21, 2020 (File No. 265-28)

Dear All:

Better Markets\(^1\) appreciates the opportunity to submit the enclosed Fact Sheet on Credit Rating Agencies. We welcome the Investor Advisory Committee’s decision to convene a panel on Credit Rating Agencies. We submit the recently published Fact Sheet to better inform your discussion on these timely and important issues. We would appreciate if you could disseminate the Fact Sheet among other members of the IAC.

Should you need to discuss further, please reach out to Stephen Hall, Legal Director and Securities Specialist at [email protected] or [email protected] or Lev Bagramian, Senior Securities Policy Advisor at [email protected] or [email protected].

Sincerely,

Lev Bagramian

Senior Securities Policy Advisor

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\(^1\) Better Markets is a non-profit, non-partisan, and independent organization founded in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to promote the public interest in the financial markets, support the financial reform of Wall Street, and make our financial system work for all Americans again. Better Markets works with allies—including many in finance—to promote pro-market, pro-business, and pro-growth policies that help build a stronger, safer financial system that protects and promotes Americans’ jobs, savings, retirements, and more.
Credit Rating Agency Conflicts of Interest Again Fueling A Financial Crisis

Today’s Market Turmoil Supplies Fresh Proof That We Can No Longer Afford the Status Quo – The SEC Must Act

Introduction

A dangerous conflict of interest lies embedded in the “issuer-pays” business model that most credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) prefer: The companies that issue bonds and need credit ratings to attract investors are the same ones that pick and pay the CRAs to come up with the ratings. Because it’s a repeat business, if the issuers that hire the CRAs don’t think the ratings are high enough, then they simply shop around for a replacement, turning to one of the other leading CRAs—firms that will be more than happy to win the business and produce ratings aligned with what the issuer wants. This “ratings shopping” inevitably results in ratings inflation, and when this pattern becomes widespread, it means that reams of investments that are far riskier than they appear work their way into the financial system. That sets the stage for systemic risk and financial crisis. This is exactly what happened in 2008—and it’s happening again.

It’s an accepted fact that grossly inflated credit ratings assigned to thousands of mortgage-backed securities in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis helped bring our economy to its knees, costing over $20 trillion in lost GDP and untold suffering. As one leading report on the crisis explained, inaccurate AAA credit ratings and the inevitable and sudden downgrades thereafter “perhaps more than any other single event” triggered the crisis. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, Majority and Minority Staff Report, United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at 6 (Apr. 13, 2011).

The Dodd-Frank Act (Sections 939 et seq.) required reforms in the credit rating industry, not only to increase transparency and oversight, but also to root out the driving force behind bloated ratings: the powerful conflicts of interest inherent in the “issuer-pays” compensation model. Those incentives virtually guarantee that the CRAs will inflate their ratings to attract business from issuers and underwriters, earn lucrative fees, and maintain the flow of future deals.

Over the last 10 years, the SEC has implemented a number of the Dodd-Frank Act mandates on CRAs, but none of them individually or together has been strong enough to eliminate or even put much of a dent in the conflicts of interest that dominate the “issuer pays” model and lead to dangerously inflated ratings. In fact, the SEC has left out the single most important fix set forth in the law: creating an independent assignment system for ratings on “structured” debt securities (i.e. asset-backed securities) so the CRAs won’t have an incentive to yield to their clients, distort their ratings, and retain a steady flow of repeat business. See Dodd-Frank Act, Section 939F.

As the coronavirus pandemic sweeps over the country, potentially triggering another financial crisis, we see ominous signs that the SEC’s failure to follow through on the Dodd-Frank reforms is contributing once again to financial market instability and chaos. As detailed below, fresh concerns about inflated credit ratings emerged last Fall from the Hill and in the press. Those voices turned out to be prescient, as credit rating downgrades—especially for highly leveraged companies and the securitizations built on their debt (the “CLOs”)—have exploded in the past few weeks amidst the
financial market turmoil triggered by the pandemic. See, e.g., Lisa Lee, *Battered CLO Investors Are About to Get a Look at Their Losses*, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2020). Many believe that fundamentally, nothing has changed. Patrick Temple-West, *Ratings Agencies Brace for Backlash After Rash of Downgrades*, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020). Therefore, when the current crisis subsides, the SEC must solve the perennial problem of corrupted and conflicted credit ratings once and for all, as Congress required.

**Credit Ratings Have Proven to Be Valuable But Also Destructive Financial Tools**

Credit ratings have existed for more than a century, becoming an extremely important fixture in our capital markets. They are heavily relied upon by investors and issuers, and they even became embedded in our securities laws and regulations as shorthand standards of creditworthiness used by regulators. When credit ratings are honest and accurate, they help promote investor confidence, capital formation, and market liquidity in corporate, municipal, and sovereign debt offerings.

However, credit ratings have also contributed to some of our most spectacular financial disasters, the financial crisis of 2008 foremost among them. Virtually every post-mortem of the 2008 crash puts grossly inflated or fraudulent credit ratings on complex mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) squarely in the chain of causation. As a direct result of the Triple-A ratings cavalierly applied by the handful of leading CRAs, everyone from pension and mutual funds to individual investors bought huge swaths of extraordinarily complex and ultimately worthless structured debt instruments stuffed with poorly underwritten, doomed-to-default mortgage loans. And they did so because the rating agencies said they carried virtually no risk at all.

But as the housing market collapsed, those RMBS failed in droves and the rating agencies were forced to issue sudden and dramatic ratings downgrades. In turn, the derivatives markets keyed to those investments sank, the credit markets froze, and banks and financial firms fell into a spiral of failures and near-failures prevented only by massive taxpayer bailouts. As economist and Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has famously said, “The banks could not have done what they did without the complicity of the ratings agencies.” Elliot Blair Smith, *Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge*, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2008). (For a more entertaining presentation of the failures of the CRAs, see the literally blind CRAs in the movie “The Big Short,” based on Michael Lewis’s excellent book of the same title.)

Sadly, that wasn’t even the first high-profile failure linked to credit ratings. The spectacular collapse of Enron in 2001, preceded by strong ratings until the eve of its bankruptcy, generated fresh concerns about the role of credit ratings and the need for oversight. The same sobering lesson was driven home again during the 2010 Eurozone crisis, which was inflamed when CRAs issued sudden downgrades of Greek sovereign debt after consistently rating it A+ for years. And the fact that only one of the three major rating agencies downgraded long-term U.S. debt in 2011 speaks volumes about the fundamentally arbitrary, unreliable, and at times even politically driven nature of credit ratings.

**Efforts to Regulate the Credit Rating Agencies Have Been Slow, Incremental, and Incomplete**

Establishing an effective regulatory regime for credit rating agencies has proven to be a long, slow, and challenging process, one that has not kept pace with the power of credit ratings to profoundly affect our markets. Consider how much was done and yet how little was really accomplished:

- The Commission incorporated credit ratings in its rules for the first time in 1975, as one factor to be used in calculating net capital requirements for broker-dealers. As the capital markets grew in volume and complexity, reliance on credit ratings in the markets and in the regulations increased, yet these important “gatekeepers” remained essentially *unregulated for decades*.
- In 1994, the SEC issued a concept release to explore the merits of establishing formal procedures for designating CRAs as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (or “NRSROs”) and monitoring their activities, but a resulting 1997 rule proposal was *abandoned*. 
Following the Enron disaster, Congress amended the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to require the SEC to study ways to improve transparency in the ratings field and ways to address conflicts of interest in the operation of credit rating agencies. The result was a report to Congress on the role of credit rating agencies in the securities markets. Congress finally undertook systematic oversight of CRAs in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. The statute created the first general framework for regulating CRAs, but it was essentially a light-touch approach, focused on registration of NRSROs with the SEC, a duty simply to manage conflicts of interest arising from compensation arrangements, and appointment of a compliance officer.

After the financial crash of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act required a more robust set of reforms.

- It built on the regulatory requirements that were implemented in the 2006 law, adding new provisions on corporate governance, disclosure of methodologies and performance, training standards, and conflicts of interest, including measures to prevent marketing or sales considerations from influencing ratings. And it created the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings to conduct annual examinations of the NRSROs and oversee the CRA marketplace.
- It sought to reduce reliance upon credit ratings by requiring the SEC and other federal agencies to remove any references to credit ratings in regulations and to substitute appropriate standards of creditworthiness in their place.
- And in Section 939F, it required the SEC to study the feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private utility would assign NRSROs to determine the initial credit ratings for structured finance products. That provision also imposed an unequivocal mandate: It required the SEC either to establish such an assignment system (which would prevent the issuer or underwriter of the structured finance product from selecting the NRSRO) or to pursue an alternative system if the SEC found one that would better serve the public interest and the protection of investors.

While the SEC issued a variety of rules pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, it never fulfilled its obligation to establish the assignment system—the one measure that would have finally helped eliminate the lure of revenue that issuers use to procure inflated ratings from the CRAs.

**Fresh Calls for Reform Arose Before the Coronavirus Crisis, But the Current Market Turmoil Appears to Be Validating Yet Again the Need for More Decisive Regulatory Action**

Not long after the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, many advocates, including Better Markets, urged the SEC to follow through on its mandate to institute the assignment system. Recently, a new round of calls for reform has emerged. Since last fall, media reports, members of Congress, and market experts have expressed increasing concern about the persistent problem of inflated ratings, the dominant issuer-pays model of compensation, and the potential for another round of disastrous financial failures linked to inflated credit ratings.

- On the Hill, Sen. Elizabeth Warren was among the first to sound the alarm about inflated bond ratings as a growing, contemporary problem. In a Sept. 26, 2019, letter to SEC Chair Jay Clayton, she explained “there are strong indications that rating agencies are continuing to prop up risky financial products” as the leading CRAs fight for market share. Sen. Warren also pointed to the enduring conflicts of interest in the market arising from the issuer-pays model, the rapid growth in particular of collateralized loan obligations (risky securitizations comprised of loans to already highly indebted companies), and the SEC’s failure to address these issues and to implement the Dodd-Frank ratings assignment system or a better alternative. The Senator issued a series of questions asking the Chair to explain his agency’s inaction. Four other Senators issued a letter to Chair Clayton on February 3, 2020, also questioning the SEC’s failure to implement the Dodd-Frank assignment system.
- An August 7, 2019, Wall Street Journal article reported that many investors remain skeptical of ratings, especially those assigned to structured or securitized debt offerings, viewing them as inflated in ways reminiscent of the 2008 crisis. The article also shared the findings of an analysis indicating that all firms—established and newcomers alike—still boost ratings in a constant struggle to preserve or enlarge their market share among issuers. Cezary Podkul & Gunjan Banerji, Inflated Bond Ratings Helped Spur the Financial Crisis. They’re Back, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2019). The article thus suggested that increased competition among issuer-pays CRAs by itself will not solve the
problem until the underlying conflicts of interest are addressed. An October 29, 2019, Wall Street Journal article also highlighted the enduring problem of conflicts of interest, explaining that the promise of “unsolicited ratings” favored by the SEC as a check on paid ratings remains unfulfilled: CRAs aren’t interested in devoting resources to the effort because they don’t get paid to do it. See Cezary Podkul, SEC Fix for Conflicts of Interest at Credit-Ratings Firms Has Failed, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2019).

• Market watchers are also concerned. In an opinion piece in The Hill on Jan. 20, 2020, Kurt Schacht with the CFA Institute expressed grave concern that the old familiar pattern of CRAs slapping inflated ratings on complex structured debt offerings was playing out again in the booming economy and low interest rate environment that prevailed until early this year. See Kurt Schacht, Ratings Agency Redux, THE HILL (Jan. 21, 2020). He suggested that regulators would be well-advised to “check the NRSROs math.” Others see evidence that ratings continue to be inflated and that the issuer-pays model—and the conflicts of interest that go with it—remain resilient. As one report noted, regulators “merely tinkered” with oversight of the ratings industry following the 2008 crisis. Credit Rating Agencies Are Back Under the Spotlight, Finance and Economics, THE ECONOMIST (May 7, 2020). A recent SEC enforcement action illustrates the problem: Marketing incentives continue to contaminate the ratings process, but occasional enforcement actions will have little effect, especially if the SEC targets only the smaller NRSROs. Caitlin Reilly, Morningstar Pays $3.5M to Settle SEC Conflict of Interest Charges, CQ ROLL CALL (May 15, 2020); Jaclyn Jaeger, Morningstar to Pay $3.5M for Conflicts of Interest Violations, COMPLIANCE WEEK (May 19, 2020). Even some in the industry, such as Egan-Jones, are pressing for fundamental change to address conflicts of interest in the prevailing issuer-pays model. See Letter from Sean Egan, Chief Executive Officer, Egan-Jones Ratings Co., to the Securities and Exchange Commission Fixed Income Market Structure Advisory Committee (Jan. 31, 2020) (urging greater reliance on investor-paid ratings).

• Recent reports also indicate that inflated credit ratings are in fact stoking what may become another full-blown financial crisis. Ratings downgrades are coming in huge waves, at breakneck speed, and across multiple sectors, from corporate and municipal bonds to sovereign debt. See Olivia Raimonde, S&P, Moody’s Cut Credit Grades at Fastest Pace in a Decade, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2020). But the carnage appears to be greatest among the ratings for already highly leveraged companies, whose debt has been bundled into the securitizations known as “collateralized loan obligations” or CLOs. Those companies are being downgraded dramatically and in droves, in turn causing downgrades to the CLOs themselves. Lisa Lee, Battered CLO Investors Are About to Get a Look at Their Losses, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2020); Joe Rennison, Rating Agencies Put 1,000 CLO Slices on Review for Downgrade, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 13, 2020).

• The damage is magnified on several levels. As a result of the ratings downgrades, CLO managers face the prospect of having to offload those bonds as their ratings sink below acceptable levels, thus liquidating losses and further depressing the value of that debt. Investors in the CLOs face the prospect of lost interest and ultimately principal. All of this is unfolding on a grand scale because the $700 billion CLO market has grown so dramatically since the 2008 crisis. And Congress may have sown the seeds for more instability down the road, since the $2.3 trillion rescue package (The CARES Act) signed into law on March 27, 2020, is heavily laced with references to credit ratings as criteria for allocating billions of dollars in loan relief—even though the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 939, 939A) required the removal of all references to credit ratings in financial laws and regulations. See Twitter Feed of Professor Frank Portnoy, UC Berkeley Law, https://twitter.com/FrankPartnoy. Worse, the term sheets for some of the new emergency credit facilities insist on ratings from one of the three dominant NRSROs as a condition of participation. This requirement excludes many small to mid-size companies from those relief programs, since the big three often don’t cover those companies. It also unfairly disadvantages the smaller NRSROs, and it even threatens to inject more risk into the financial system given the infamously poor track record of the dominant CRAs. See Letter from Rep. Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, House Financial Services Committee, to the Hon. Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Apr. 16, 2020).

• The large CRAs helped create and sustain this modern mania in the CLO market. As one report explained, “[l]ax underwriting standards, rosy profit predictions and rock-bottom interest rates all fueled the irrational exuberance in a market that’s come crashing down as a worldwide health crisis brings the global economy to a standstill.” Brandon Kochkodin, Riskier CLOs Get Big Boost From S&P in “New Ratings Shopping,” BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2020).
But it is precisely the job of the CRAs to see through bad underwriting, rosy predictions, and temporary economic conditions to arrive at objective and accurate credit ratings. This they failed to do, as in 2008. Worse, it now appears that at least one major CRA (S&P Global) may have deliberately employed a methodology designed to inflate CLO ratings and attract the bulk of the ratings business in that sector. *Id.*

And where is the SEC in the face of these pressing challenges? As of February 24, 2020, the head of the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings, Jessica Kane, acknowledged that the effort to promote non-hired ratings as a safeguard against paid, issuer-influenced ratings was under fire as ineffective. And she further reported that “conflicts of interest management” was among the leading problem areas in the examination reports spanning 2011 to 2019. Yet she offered little promise of action on the Dodd-Frank assignment model, listing instead a series of enhanced disclosure requirements as the primary remedies under consideration at the agency.

It is long past time for the SEC to comply with Congress’s mandate and implement a ratings assignment system that will finally and effectively address the threats posed by conflicts of interest in credit ratings for structured products, and ultimately other investments as well. While the growing calls for change provide some reason for optimism, it may be that today’s extraordinary financial, economic, and market turmoil will help supply final proof that we can no longer afford the status quo.

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**Better Markets** is a public interest 501(c)(3) non-profit based in Washington, DC that advocates for greater transparency, accountability, and oversight in the domestic and global capital and commodity markets, to protect the American Dream of homes, jobs, savings, education, a secure retirement, and a rising standard of living.

Better Markets fights for the economic security, opportunity and prosperity of the American people by working to enact financial reform, to prevent another financial crash and the diversion of trillions of taxpayer dollars to bailing out the financial system.

By being a counterweight to Wall Street’s biggest financial firms through the policymaking and rulemaking process, Better Markets is supporting pragmatic rules and a strong banking and financial system that enables stability, growth and broad-based prosperity. Better Markets also fights to refocus finance on the real economy, empower the buyside and protect investors and consumers.