

NO ACT

16
1-8-09



DIVISION OF
CORPORATION FINANCE

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-3010

March 6, 2009



09038708

Amy L. Goodman
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5306

Received SEC
MAR 06 2009
Washington, DC 20549

Act: 1934
Section: _____
Rule: 14a-8
Public
Availability: 3-6-09

Re: JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Incoming letter dated January 8, 2009

Dear Ms. Goodman:

This is in response to your letters dated January 8, 2009 and March 3, 2009 concerning the shareholder proposals submitted to JPMorgan Chase by Ray T. Chevedden and Kenneth Steiner. We also received a letter from Kenneth Steiner on February 10, 2009 and a letter on the proponents' behalf dated February 24, 2009. Our response is attached to the enclosed photocopy of your correspondence. By doing this, we avoid having to recite or summarize the facts set forth in the correspondence. Copies of all of the correspondence also will be provided to the proponents.

In connection with this matter, your attention is directed to the enclosure, which sets forth a brief discussion of the Division's informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals.

Sincerely,

Heather L. Maples
Senior Special Counsel

Enclosures

cc: John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

March 6, 2009

**Response of the Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance**

Re: JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Incoming letter dated January 8, 2009

The first proposal relates to special meetings. The second proposal relates to cumulative voting.

We are unable to concur in your view that JPMorgan Chase may exclude the first proposal under rule 14a-8(b). Accordingly, we do not believe that JPMorgan Chase may omit the first proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(b).

We are unable to concur in your view that JPMorgan Chase may exclude the second proposal under rule 14a-8(b). Accordingly, we do not believe that JPMorgan Chase may omit the second proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(b).

Sincerely,

Carmen Moncada-Terry
Attorney-Adviser

**DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE
INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS**

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by the Company in support of its intention to exclude the proposals from the Company's proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent's representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission, including argument as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure.

It is important to note that the staff's and Commission's no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action, does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the management omit the proposal from the company's proxy material.

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

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March 3, 2009

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Client No.
C 62344-00015

VIA E-MAIL

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Re: *JPMorgan Chase & Co.*
Withdrawal of No-Action Request Regarding the Shareholder Proposal of
John Chevedden (William Steiner);
Exchange Act of 1934—Rule 14a-8

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

On January 8, 2009, on behalf of our client, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (the "Company"), we submitted to the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Staff") a no-action request relating to the Company's ability to exclude from its proxy materials for its 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders a shareholder proposal entitled "Independent Lead Director" (the "Proposal") submitted by John Chevedden in the name of William Steiner pursuant to Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act of 1934 (the "No-Action Request"). The No-Action Request set forth the bases for our view that the Proposal (along with two other shareholder proposals submitted by John Chevedden in the name of Ray T. Chevedden and Kenneth Steiner, respectively) is excludable under Rule 14a-8(b).

Enclosed is a letter dated February 10, 2009 confirming the withdrawal of the Proposal. See Exhibit A. Accordingly, in reliance on this letter attached hereto as Exhibit A, we hereby withdraw the No-Action Request to the extent that it relates to the Proposal.

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
March 3, 2009
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Please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 955-8653, or Anthony J. Horan, the Company's Corporate Secretary, at (212) 270-7122 with any questions in this regard.

Sincerely,


Amy L. Goodman

Enclosure

cc: Anthony J. Horan, JPMorgan Chase & Co.
John Chevedden
William Steiner

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GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

EXHIBIT A

JOHN CHEVEDDEN

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

February 10, 2009


Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

**# 1 JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)
Rule 14a-8 Proposal by William Steiner
Independent Lead Director**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The above proposal is now withdrawn. The company did not request that this proposal be withdrawn prior to submitting its no action request.

Sincerely,


John Chevedden

cc:
William Steiner

Irma Caracciolo <caracciolo_irma@jpmorgan.com>

JOHN CHEVEDDEN

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

February 24, 2009

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

**# 1 JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) – Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher No Action Request
Rule 14a-8 Proposals by Ray T. Chevedden, William Steiner and Kenneth Steiner**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This responds to the January 8, 2009 no action request by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher sent a February 4, 2009 letter to the Staff on behalf of General Electric Company (GE) describing direct GE negotiations with three proponents recently purported to be straw-person proponents according to Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, which established the Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher straw-person argument used at JPMorgan Chase & Co. and elsewhere as corrupt.

The Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher February 4, 2009 letter in effect undercut its straw-person argument recently submitted on GE's behalf by describing GE's direct negotiation with the three so-called straw-persons as qualified proponents for a final agreement involving their respective rule 14a-8 proposals. At the same time Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher asked the Staff to determine that the three proponents were allegedly unqualified straw-persons and unable to negotiate on their own behalf.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher was thus in the potential position of obtaining Staff concurrence that the three proponents were unqualified straw-people while at the same time their client was actively recognizing the three proponents as qualified to negotiate directly with GE regarding their respective rule 14a-8 proposals and had in fact reached a final agreement regarding their shareholder proposals.

This duplicity is important because Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher is the mastermind of a number of additional no action requests claiming straw-person proponents including the JPMorgan Chase & Co. no action request.

Additionally the following precedents appear relevant to this no action request:

Wyeth (January 30, 2009)
Citigroup Inc. (February 5, 2009)
Alcoa Inc. (February 19, 2009)
The Boeing Company (February 18, 2009)
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (February 19, 2009)
Pfizer Inc. (February 19, 2009)

Sincerely,



John Chevedden

cc:

Ray T. Chevedden

William Steiner

Kenneth Steiner

Irma Caracciolo <caracciolo_irma@jpmorgan.com>

From: FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16.***

Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2009 8:19 PM

To: shareholderproposals

Cc: *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Subject: # 1 JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) – Rule 14a-8 Proposal by Kenneth Steiner

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

JPMorgan Chase has submitted a request for a no-action letter in their attempt to omit my proposal on cumulative voting from their proxy statement for the 2009 annual meeting. The submission from the law firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher is filled with multiple false statements, innuendo and inherent contradictions. For starters JPM has included several shareholder proposals from me in their proxy statements over the past ten years, most recently just two years ago. The transcript from that meeting exists on the internet and it is clear that I am being introduced and recognized by the Chairman Mr. Harrison and CEO James Dimon. Now JPM seeks to omit my proposal by claiming that I am not the real proponent but am a "nominal proponent" and an "alter ego" of John Chevedden. What changed in the last two years? Their behavior is schizophrenic. Either they think I am a proponent or not. They seem unable to have any consistency and their statement that I am under someone else's control is laughable and I tell you clearly that it is false. The Gibson law firms' argument is entirely ridiculous when you read the transcript of that annual meeting when I introduce my proposal and make a supporting statement on it's behalf. Who was controlling me then? Some invisible ventriloquist? I have submitted over 100 stockholder proposals over the last 15 years and have attended dozens of annual meetings and won numerous votes as your records would indicate. I am the person who submitted this proposal. I find it insulting after being a well-recognized shareholder activist for many years to be called someone else's alter ego. It is a blatantly and provably false statement. Just look at the history of corporate governance over the last 15 years and you will see all of my accomplishments, including winning majority votes at many companies on issues such as the staggered board, poison pill, etc. My guess is that JPM having suffered a 50% drop in their stock price and taken a multi-billion dollar bailout from the taxpayers is trying to avoid the embarrassment of any losing votes at their annual meeting and are using any means necessary to try to avoid shareholder participation. Shame on them and shame on Gibson Dunn for creating fantasies and wacky conspiracy theories. Maybe they truly believe their own propaganda which would be even sadder. Is TARP money being used for this bogus purpose? JPM knows I am a long time shareholder and a regular participant in their annual meetings. All shareholders and Americans should be happy and thankful that there are people willing to work to improve corporate democracy and accountability in an entirely legitimate and meaningful way. This is what most shareholder proponents including myself are trying to do and I have always treated the companies and their officers with respect. It is disconcerting to see they lack the honorability to do likewise in this particular case. Based on the just-released Wyeth decision which considered the same principles for no-action requests I would ask the SEC to render a similar decision in this case as well. I urge you to reject the JPM no-action request and that of any other company making the same sorts of fantastical arguments. There is no substantive evidence to their pleas and in my opinion no common sense to them either.

Most Sincerely,
Kenneth Steiner

3/6/2009

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

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January 8, 2009

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Client No.
C 62344-00015

VIA E-MAIL

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Re: *JPMorgan Chase & Co.*
Shareholder Proposals of John Chevedden
Exchange Act of 1934—Rule 14a-8

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter is to inform you that our client, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (the "Company"), intends to omit from its proxy statement and form of proxy for its 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (collectively, the "2009 Proxy Materials") three shareholder proposals (collectively, the "Proposals") and statements in support thereof submitted by John Chevedden (the "Proponent"). The Proposals described below were transmitted to the Company under the name of the following nominal proponents:

- a proposal titled "Special Shareowner Meetings" purportedly submitted in the name of Ray T. Chevedden (the "Special Meeting Proposal");
- a proposal titled "Cumulative Voting" purportedly submitted in the name of Kenneth Steiner (the "Cumulative Voting Proposal"); and
- a proposal titled "Independent Lead Director" purportedly submitted in the name of William Steiner (the "Independent Lead Director Proposal").

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), we have:

LOS ANGELES NEW YORK WASHINGTON, D.C. SAN FRANCISCO PALO ALTO LONDON
PARIS MUNICH BRUSSELS DUBAI SINGAPORE ORANGE COUNTY CENTURY CITY DALLAS DENVER

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Office of Chief Counsel
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- filed this letter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") no later than eighty (80) calendar days before the Company intends to file its definitive 2009 Proxy Materials with the Commission; and
- concurrently sent copies of this correspondence to the Proponent and his nominal proponents.

Rule 14a-8(k) and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) ("SLB 14D") provide that shareholder proponents are required to send companies a copy of any correspondence that the proponents elect to submit to the Commission or the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Staff"). Accordingly, we are taking this opportunity to inform the Proponent that if the Proponent elects to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the Staff with respect to the Proposals, a copy of that correspondence concurrently should be furnished to the undersigned pursuant to Rule 14a-8(k) and SLB 14D.

BASES FOR EXCLUSION

We hereby respectfully request that the Staff concur in our view that the Proposals may properly be excluded from the 2009 Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(b) because Messrs. Ray Chevedden, Kenneth Steiner and William Steiner (collectively, the "Nominal Proponents") are nominal proponents for Mr. Chevedden, whom the Company believes is not a shareholder of the Company.

We also believe that the Proposals are excludable for reasons addressed in separate no-action requests. Copies of the Proposals and the Proponent's cover letters submitting each Proposal are attached hereto as Exhibit A, and copies of other correspondence with the Proponent regarding the Proposals are attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Company has not received any correspondence relating to the Proposals directly from the Nominal Proponents.

ANALYSIS

The Proposals May Be Excluded under Rule 14a-8(b) Because Mr. Chevedden, and Not the Nominal Proponents, Submitted the Proposals.

The Proposals may be excluded from the 2009 Proxy Materials because the facts and circumstances demonstrate that Mr. Chevedden is, in fact, the proponent of the Proposals and the Nominal Proponents serve as his alter egos. Thus, the Proposals may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(b), which states, "[i]n order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting." Mr. Chevedden has never demonstrated that he personally owns any of the Company's shares and thus is seeking to interject his proposals into the Company's 2009 Proxy Materials without personally having any stake or investment in the Company, contrary to the objectives and intent of the ownership

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requirements of Rule 14a-8.

The history of Rule 14a-8 indicates that the Commission was well aware of the potential for abuse of the Rule, and the Commission has indicated on several occasions that it would not tolerate such conduct. Consistent with the history of the Rule, the Staff has on many occasions concurred that proposals could be excluded when facts and circumstances indicate that a single proponent was acting through nominal proponents. Mr. Chevedden is well known in the shareholder proposal community. Although he apparently personally owns stock in a few corporations, through a group of nominal proponents he submitted more than 125 shareholder proposals to more than 85 corporations in 2008 alone.¹ In thus circumventing the ownership requirement in Rule 14a-8(b), Mr. Chevedden has a singular distinction; we are unaware of any other proponent who operates in such a manner, or on so widespread a basis, in disregarding the Commission's shareholder proposal rules. Thus, as discussed below, in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Proposals and Mr. Chevedden's methods and to address Mr. Chevedden's persistent and continuing abuse of Rule 14a-8, we request that the Staff concur in our view that the Company may exclude the Proposals submitted by Mr. Chevedden on behalf of the Nominal Proponents pursuant to Rule 14a-8(b).

A. Abuse of the Commission's Shareholder Proposal Rules

The Commission amended Rule 14a-8 in 1983 to require that proponents using the Rule have a minimum investment in, and satisfy a minimum holding period with respect to, the company's shares in order to avoid abuse of the shareholder proposal rule and ensure that proponents have a stake "in the common interests of the issuer's security holders generally." Exchange Act Release No. 4385 (November 5, 1948). The Commission explicitly acknowledged the potential for abuse in the shareholder proposal process:

A majority of the commentators specifically addressing this issue supported the concept of a minimum investment and/or holding period as a condition to eligibility under Rule 14a-8. Many of these commentators expressed the view that abuse of a security holder proposal rule could be curtailed by requiring shareholders who put the company and other shareholders to the expense of including a proposal in a proxy statement to have some measured stake or investment in the corporation. The Commission believes that there is merit to

¹ Based on data provided by RiskMetrics Group as of December 6, 2008. Moreover, Mr. Chevedden and certain shareholders under whose names he frequently submits proposals (the Proponent, the Rossi Family, the Steiner family and the Gilbert family) accounted for at least 533 out of the 3,476 shareholder proposals submitted between 1997 and 2006. See Michael Vihs and Robin Braun, *Shareholder Activism in the United States—Developments over 1997-2006—What are the Determinants of Voting Outcomes*, August 15, 2008.

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those views and is adopting the eligibility requirement as proposed. Exchange Act Release No. 20091 (August 16, 1983).

The Commission's concerns about abuse of Rule 14a-8 also are evident in its statements regarding Rule 14a-8(c), which provides that "each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting." When the Commission first adopted a limit on the number of proposals that a shareholder would be permitted to submit under Rule 14a-8 more than 30 years ago, it stated that it was acting in response to the concern that some "proponents . . . [exceed] the bounds of reasonableness . . . by submitting excessive numbers of proposals." Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (November 22, 1976). It further stated that "[s]uch practices are inappropriate under Rule 14a-8 not only because they constitute an unreasonable exercise of the right to submit proposals at the expense of other shareholders but also because they tend to obscure other material matters in the proxy statements of issuers, thereby reducing the effectiveness of such documents . . ." *Id.* Thus, the Commission adopted a two proposal limitation (subsequently amended to a one proposal limitation) but warned of the "possibility that some proponents may attempt to evade the [Rule's] limitations through various maneuvers . . ." *Id.* The Commission went on to warn that "such tactics" could result in the granting of no-action requests permitting exclusion of the multiple proposals.

These requirements also recognize and are intended to reduce the costs to companies and to the Staff of Rule 14a-8 proposals. Subsequently, in adopting the one proposal limitation, it stated, "The Commission believes that this change is one way to reduce issuer costs and to improve the readability of proxy statements without substantially limiting the ability of proponents to bring important issues to the shareholder body at large." Exchange Act Release No. 20091 (August 16, 1983). While the Company does not seek to exclude the Proposals under Rule 14a-8(c), we believe that these concerns about abuse of the shareholder proposal rule are present here as well.

The potential for abuse that the Commission was concerned about, as reflected in the Commission releases quoted above, has in fact been realized by Mr. Chevedden's pattern over recent years of annually submitting multiple shareholder proposals to the Company, ostensibly as the representative for the Nominal Proponents or, at times, other Company shareholders. However, as discussed below, Mr. Chevedden is the architect and author of the Proposals and has no "stake or investment" in the Company. Moreover, the facts and circumstances regarding the Proposals indicate that Mr. Chevedden, and not the Nominal Proponents, is the proponent of the Proposals.

B. Staff and Other Legal Precedent Support that the Proposals are the Proponent's, Not the Nominal Proponents'

The Staff previously has concurred that shareholder proposals were submitted by Mr. Chevedden rather than nominal proponents where the facts and circumstances suggested that Mr. Chevedden controlled the shareholder proposal process and that the Nominal Proponents

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

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only acted as alter egos. For example, in *TRW Inc.* (avail. Jan. 24, 2001), the Staff concurred in the exclusion under Rule 14a-8(b) of a shareholder proposal submitted by a nominal proponent on behalf of Mr. Chevedden, where Mr. Chevedden did not personally own any of the company's stock. There, according to the Staff, the facts demonstrated that (1) the nominal proponent "became acquainted with Mr. Chevedden, and subsequently sponsored the proposal, after responding to Mr. Chevedden's inquiry on the internet for TRW shareholders willing to sponsor a shareholder resolution," (2) the nominal proponent "indicated that Mr. Chevedden drafted the proposal," and (3) the nominal proponent "indicated that he is acting to support Mr. Chevedden and the efforts of Mr. Chevedden." The Staff concurred with exclusion under Rule 14a-8(b), stating that Mr. Chevedden was "not eligible to submit a proposal" to the company. Similarly, in *PG&E Corp.* (avail. Mar. 1, 2002), the Staff concurred with the exclusion of a shareholder proposal submitted by Mr. Chevedden and co-sponsored by several nominal proponents, where Mr. Chevedden did not personally satisfy the stock ownership requirements. In that case, the nominal proponents stated that they did not know each other, one proponent indicated that Mr. Chevedden submitted the proposal without contacting him and the other said that Mr. Chevedden was "handling the matter." In addition, the font of the proposals and the fax number from which the proposals were submitted was the same as other proposals submitted by Mr. Chevedden for consideration at the same shareholders' meeting. The Staff concurred with exclusion under Rule 14a-8(b), stating that Mr. Chevedden was "not eligible to submit a proposal" to the company.

Many of the facts that the Staff examined in *TRW* and *PG&E* regarding Mr. Chevedden's control over the nominal proponents are similar to the facts the Staff examined where it responded to requests to exclude shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(c) (the one proposal limit) and concluded that the facts and circumstances showed that nominal proponents were "acting on behalf of, under the control of, or as the alter ego of" the shareholder proponent. *BankAmerica Corp.* (avail. Feb. 8, 1996); *see also Weyerhaeuser Co.* (avail. Dec. 20, 1995); *First Union Real Estate (Winthrop)* (avail. Dec. 20, 1995); *Stone & Webster Inc.* (avail. Mar. 3, 1995); *Banc One Corp.* (avail. Feb. 2, 1993). In this regard, the Staff (echoing the Commission's statement) has on several occasions noted, "the one proposal limitation applies in those instances where a person (or entity) attempts to avoid the one proposal limitation through maneuvers, such as having persons they control submit a proposal." *See American Power Conversion Corp.* (avail. Mar. 27, 1996); *Consolidated Freightways, Inc. (Recon.)* (avail. Feb. 23, 1994). Thus, in *First Union Real Estate (Winthrop)*, the Staff concurred with the exclusion of three proposals, stating that "the nominal proponents are acting on behalf of, under the control of, or alter ego of a collective group headed by [the trustee]."

Moreover, the Staff on numerous instances has concurred that the one proposal limitation under Rule 14a-8(c) applies when multiple proposals were submitted under the name of nominal proponents serving as the alter egos or under the control of a single proponent and the actual

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proponent explicitly indicated that it controlled the nominal proponents' proposals.² Likewise, the Staff repeatedly has permitted the exclusion of shareholder proposals in cases where a shareholder who is unfamiliar with Rule 14a-8's one proposal limit has submitted multiple proposals and, upon being informed of the one proposal rule, has had family members, friends or other associates submit the same or similar proposals.³

However, even in the absence of an explicit acknowledgment that shareholders are serving as nominal proponents, Staff precedent indicates that a company may use circumstantial evidence to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that nominal proponents are the alter egos of a single proponent. For example:

- In *Albertson's* (avail. Mar. 11, 1994), the Staff concurred with the exclusion under the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(c) of two of three shareholder proposals submitted by three individuals associated with the Albertson's Shareholder's Committee ("ASC"). All three proponents previously had represented themselves to Albertson's as ASC co-chairs and were active in a labor union representing Albertson's employees. The labor union had declared publicly its intention to use the shareholder proposal process as a pressure point in labor negotiations. Moreover, the three proposals included identical cover letters and two contained similar supporting statements. The Staff concurred with the exclusion of the two proposals in which the proponents identified themselves as affiliated with ASC; the third proposal contained no such reference and was not excludable.

² See *Banc One Corp.* (avail. Feb. 2, 1993) (proposals submitted by a proponent and two nominal proponents but the proponent stated in a letter to the company that he had recruited and "arranged for other qualified shareholders to serve as proponents of three shareholder proposals which we intend to lay before the 1993 Annual Meeting"); *Occidental Petroleum* (avail. Mar. 22, 1983) (permitting exclusion under the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(c) where the proponent admitted to the company's counsel that he had written all of the proposals and solicited nominal proponents).

³ See, e.g., *General Electric Co.* (avail. Jan. 10, 2008) (concurring with the omission of two proposals initially submitted by one proponent and, following notice of the one proposal rule, resubmitted by the proponent's two daughters, where (on behalf of the two shareholders) the initial proponent handled all of the correspondence with the company and the Staff regarding the proposals, and the initial and resubmitted proposals and supporting statements were identical in substance and format); *Staten Island Bancorp, Inc.* (avail. Feb. 27, 2002) (concurring in the exclusion under Rule 14a-8(c) of five shareholder proposals, all of which were initially submitted by one proponent, and when notified of the one proposal rule, the proponent, a daughter, close friends and neighbors resubmitted similar and in some cases identical proposals).

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

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- In *BankAmerica* (avail. Feb. 8, 1996), the Staff concurred with exclusion of multiple proposals under the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(c) after finding that the individuals who submitted the shareholder proposals were acting on behalf of, under the control of, or as the alter egos of Aviad Visoly. Specifically, Mr. Visoly was the president of a corporation that submitted one proposal and the custodian of shares held by another. Moreover, a group of which Mr. Visoly was president endorsed the proposals, the proposals were formatted in a similar manner, and the proponents acted together in connection with a proposal submitted the prior year.
- In *TPI Enterprises, Inc.* (avail. July 15, 1987) the Staff concurred with the exclusion of multiple shareholder proposals under the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(c) where (1) a law firm delivered all of the proposals on the same day, (2) the individual coordinating the proposals communicated directly with the company regarding the proposals, (3) the content of the documents accompanying the proposals were identical, including the same typographical error in two proposals, (4) the subject matter of the proposals were similar to subjects at issue in a lawsuit previously brought by the coordinating shareholder, and (5) the coordinating shareholder and the nominal proponents were linked through business and family relationships.
- In *Peregrine Pharmaceuticals Inc.* (avail. July 28, 2006), the Staff concurred that the company could exclude two proposals received from a father and son, where the father served as custodian of the son's shares and the multiple proposals were all dated the same, e-mailed on the same date, contained identical addresses, were formatted the same, and were accompanied by identical transmittal letters.
- In *Occidental Petroleum* (avail. Mar. 22, 1983), the Staff concurred with exclusion under the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(c) of six proposals that had been presented at the prior year's annual meeting where, following the annual meeting, the proponent admitted to the Company's assistant general counsel that he had written all of the proposals and solicited nominal proponents.
- In *First Union Real Estate (Winthrop)* (avail. Dec. 20, 1995), the Staff concurred with the exclusion under the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(c) of three proposals submitted by one individual on behalf of a group of trusts where the trustee, after being informed of the one proposal rule, resubmitted the proposals, allocating one to each trust, but the trustee signed each cover letter submitting the proposals in his capacity as fiduciary. The Staff concurred that under the facts, "the nominal proponents are acting on behalf of, under the control of, or alter ego of a collective group headed by [the trustee]."

The Staff's application of the "control" standard is well founded in principles of agency. As set forth in the Restatement of Agency:

The relation of agency is created as the result of conduct by two parties manifesting that one of them is willing for the other to act for him subject to his

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
January 8, 2009
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control, and that the other consents so to act. The principal must in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for him, and the agent must act or agree to act on the principal's behalf and subject to his control. Agency is a legal concept which depends upon the existence of required factual elements: the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent's acceptance of the undertaking and the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958).

In sum, the Staff (consistent with other legal standards) has concurred that the "nominal proponent" and "alter ego" standards are satisfied where the facts and circumstances indicate that a single proponent is effectively the driving force behind the relevant shareholder proposals or that the proponents are acting as a group. As discussed below, the Nominal Proponents have granted to Mr. Chevedden complete control over the shareholder proposal process, and the Nominal Proponents' conduct indicates that they act as his agents by agreeing to let their shares serve as the basis for him to submit the Proposals. Likewise, Mr. Chevedden so dominates all aspects of the Nominal Proponents' submissions of the Proposals that the Staff should concur that Mr. Chevedden, and not the Nominal Proponents, is the proponent of the Proposals.

C. The Facts and Circumstances Indicate that Mr. Chevedden, Not the Nominal Proponents, Is the Proponent of the Proposals

The facts and circumstances surrounding the Proposals, the Nominal Proponents and Mr. Chevedden demonstrate that Mr. Chevedden employs the same tactics to attempt to evade Rule 14a-8's requirements that have been present in other precedent where proposals have been excluded under Rule 14a-8(b) and Rule 14a-8(c). In fact, numerous facts indicate that Mr. Chevedden performed (and continues to perform) all or substantially all of the work submitting and supporting the Proposals, and thus so dominates and controls the process that it is clear the Nominal Proponents serve as his alter egos.

- Some of the strongest indications of Mr. Chevedden's status as the Proponent arise from his role in the submission of the Proposals. Each of the Proposals was in fact "submitted" by Mr. Chevedden: each of the Proposals was faxed from the same telephone number, which corresponds to Mr. Chevedden's contact number provided in the text of each cover letter, and e-mailed from Mr. Chevedden's personal e-mail address. The Company's proxy statement states that shareholder proposals are to be sent to the Secretary of the Company, and the Nominal Proponents have not communicated with the Secretary at all with regard to the Proposals other than through Mr. Chevedden.⁴

⁴ This process contrasts with and is clearly distinguishable from the more typical situation (frequently seen with labor unions and religious organizations that are shareholders) where a proponent directly submits a proposal to the company on its own letterhead and arranges for

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- Significantly, each of the cover letters is generic and refers only to “this Rule 14a-8 proposal.” See Exhibit A. Thus, there is no evidence that the Nominal Proponents are even aware of the subject matter of the Proposals that Mr. Chevedden has submitted under their names.
- But for the dates and the Nominal Proponents’ names and addresses, each of the cover letters signed by the Nominal Proponents is virtually identical.⁵ See Exhibit A. Each of the cover letters to the Company states, “This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company,” but, as noted above, does not identify the subject matter of the proposal. Each letter also states, “This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting.” Those cover letters add, “[p]lease direct all future communications to John Chevedden,” and they provide Mr. Chevedden’s phone number and e-mail address.
- The Proposals abound with other similarities: each bears the same proposal number followed by the proposal (“3 – [Title of Proposal]”) with each in the same format (centered and bolded); each contains a section entitled “Statement of [Nominal Proponent’s Name],” also in the same format (centered and bolded); each “Statement of [Nominal Proponent’s Name]” section concludes with the exact same language, “Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal”; and all of the Proposals conclude with the proposal name followed by the phrase “Yes on 3” followed by an underscore, all in the exact same format (centered and bolded). Significantly, each Proposal includes the same “Notes” section, which furnishes instructions for publication of the proposal, quotes Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B, and cites the *Sun Microsystems, Inc.* no-action letter dated July 21, 2005. See Exhibit A.
- Following his submission of the Proposals, Mr. Chevedden has handled all aspects of navigating the Proposals through the shareholder proposal process. Each of the cover letters indicates that Mr. Chevedden controls all aspects of the process, expressly appointing Mr. Chevedden as the Nominal Proponent’s “designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal . . . before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting” and directing that “all future communication” be directed to Mr. Chevedden. Further demonstrating his control over the process, Mr. Chevedden handles all aspects of responding to requests for proof of the Nominal Proponents’

providing proof of ownership, but appoints another person to act on its behalf in coordinating any discussions with respect to the subject matter of the proposal.

⁵ The only other difference is that, in two cases, the contact information for Mr. Chevedden consists only of his facsimile number and e-mail address and not also his street address.

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stock ownership and submitting the requested documentation to the Company. *See Exhibit B.*

The foregoing facts are similar to many of the facts that existed in the precedent cited above. As with *TPI Enterprises*, the same person has delivered all of the Proposals to the Company, and that individual has been the only person to communicate directly with the Company regarding the Proposals, the content of the documents accompanying the Proposals is identical, and (as discussed below) the subject matters of the Proposals are similar to subjects that the Proponent is advocating at other companies through the same and other nominal proponents. As with *Peregrine Pharmaceuticals* and *General Electric*, Mr. Chevedden is handling all correspondence and all work in connection with submitting the Proposals.

Given that Mr. Chevedden is familiar enough with Rule 14a-8 to comply with its requirements, it is not surprising that the facts here vary to some degree from the precedent cited above. However, many of the facts that are present here go beyond those cited in existing precedent to more clearly demonstrate the extent to which Mr. Chevedden controls the Proposals and thus demonstrates that he is the true proponent of the Proposals. For example:

- Mr. Chevedden, not the Nominal Proponents, traditionally handles all of the correspondence with the Staff regarding proposals submitted by nominal proponents to the Company. During the 2005 through 2008 proxy seasons, Mr. Chevedden coordinated the submission of at least 14 shareholder proposals to the Company. On at least one occasion, he failed to copy the nominal proponent, further evidence that he, not the Nominal Proponents, controls the proposal process. *See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co.* (avail. April 1, 2005).
- Mr. Chevedden appears to treat the nominal proponents as interchangeable.
 - The Company received the Cumulative Voting Proposal from Mr. Chevedden during the 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 proxy seasons with the Rossi Family serving as the nominal proponent in 2006 and 2007 and Mr. Kenneth Steiner serving as the nominal proponent last year and this year.
- Additionally, identical or substantially similar versions of the Proposals have been or are being submitted to other companies by other nominal proponents, in each case with Mr. Chevedden being the common denominator among the proposals:
 - Notably, during the 2004 through 2008 proxy seasons, at least 37 other cumulative voting proposals that were identical or substantially similar in language and format to the Cumulative Voting Proposal were submitted to at least 22 other companies either by Mr. Chevedden in his own name or in the name of an individual who named Mr. Chevedden as their proxy.

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- The Company received a Special Meeting Proposal this year and in 2008. In addition, between 2007 and this year, at least 86 other special meeting proposals that were identical or substantially similar in language and format to the Special Meeting Proposal were submitted to at least 64 other companies either by Mr. Chevedden in his own name or in the name of individuals who named Mr. Chevedden as their proxy. Moreover, as further evidence of the generic nature of Mr. Chevedden's proposals, the Special Meeting Proposal that he submitted to the Company this year is titled "Special Shareowner Meetings" despite the fact that the Company's proxy materials use the term "shareholder" rather than "shareowner."
- During the 2008 proxy season, the Company received an Independent Lead Director Proposal from Mr. Chevedden with Mr. William Steiner serving as the nominal proponent. Notably, at least six other companies also received proposals from Mr. Chevedden and the nominal proponents for whom he typically serves as proxy that were identical or substantially similar in language and format to the Independent Lead Director Proposal.
- Mr. Chevedden commonly takes credit for proposals submitted by his nominal proponents. For example, in early 2006, Mr. Chevedden "said he chose forest-products producer Weyerhaeuser [to receive a shareholder proposal on supermajority voting] because of its failure to act on years of majority votes to declassify its board."⁶ According to data from RiskMetrics Group, in 2006, Weyerhaeuser did not receive a shareholder proposal from Mr. Chevedden but did receive a proposal on supermajority voting from Nick Rossi who appointed Mr. Chevedden as his proxy. Substantially similar shareholder proposals were submitted to other companies that same year by Mr. Chevedden (five proposals) and numerous other individuals who typically appoint Mr. Chevedden as their proxy (Ray Chevedden, three proposals; members of the Rossi family, 14 proposals; and William Steiner, five proposals).
- Mr. Chevedden is widely recognized in the press as being the principal behind the multiple proposals he submits through nominal proponents. See Julie Johnsson, *Discontent in air on execs' pay at Boeing*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 1, 2007, at 4 ("'Obviously, we have very high CEO pay here,' said John Chevedden, a shareholder activist who introduced the two pay measures. He vowed to press the measures again next year.") (*emphasis added*); Craig D. Rose, *Sempre reformers get their point across*, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, May 5, 2004, at C1 ("The measures were presented by John Chevedden, a long-time corporate governance activist from Redondo Beach.") (*emphasis added*); Richard Gibson, *Maytag CEO puts himself on line in proxy issues battle*, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE,

⁶ Subodh Mishra, *2006 U.S. proxy season preview*, GOVERNANCE WEEKLY, February 17, 2006.

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April 4, 2002, at C2 (“Last year, three measures the company opposed won approval from a majority of holders in proxy voting The dissident proposals were submitted by a shareholder identified as John Chevedden, the owner of 207 shares of Maytag.”) (*emphasis added*).

While Mr. Chevedden’s complete control of the process has the effect of avoiding any possibility of the Nominal Proponents expressly acknowledging that they serve as Mr. Chevedden’s alter egos (as occurs in some of the precedent cited above), it more powerfully demonstrates that they have ceded absolute control over the Proposals to him. Thus, the facts and circumstances described above clearly indicate that the Nominal Proponents are alter egos for Mr. Chevedden and that he is the controlling force behind the Proposals.

D. *For these Reasons, the Staff Should Determine that Mr. Chevedden Is the Proponent of the Proposals and Concur with their Exclusion Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(b)*

The facts and circumstances surrounding the Proposals, the Nominal Proponents and Mr. Chevedden make clear that Mr. Chevedden is attempting to circumvent the ownership requirements in Rule 14a-8(b). Specifically, Mr. Chevedden’s performance of substantially all of the work submitting and supporting the Proposals, the language and formatting similarities among the Proposals, and the fungible nature of shareholder proposals for which he is appointed proxy are compelling evidence that Mr. Chevedden is in control of the shareholder proposal process and the Nominal Proponents serve as his “alter egos.”

The need to examine specific facts and circumstances in applying the alter ego and control test under Rule 14a-8(b) is especially important, as applying a narrow interpretation that effectively limits the application of the rules to only a few scenarios would provide shareholders interested in evading Rule 14a-8’s limitations with a roadmap on how to do so and would not further the Commission’s intent to address abusive situations.⁷ Although some of the circumstances that were present in precedent cited above are not present here, the cumulative evidence of the Proponent’s activities with respect to the Proposals and with respect to proposals submitted to the Company, and to many other companies in the past, present a compelling case for application of Rule 14a-8(b). Thus, based on the language set forth by the Commission in Exchange Act Release No. 12999, specifically that “such tactics” and “maneuvers” could result in the granting of no-action relief concerning the omission of the proposals at issue, and on the no-action letter precedent cited above, and in order to prevent the Commission’s shareholder

⁷ Thus, the operation of Rule 14a-8(b) and Rule 14a-8(c) does not chill the ability of shareholders generally to seek assistance with the shareholder proposal process, appoint representatives to engage in discussions with companies regarding their proposals and co-sponsor proposals with other shareholders, as each of these situations are clearly distinguishable from the facts present here.

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proposal rule from being circumvented or rendered a nullity, we believe that all of the Proposals are excludable in reliance on Rule 14a-8(b).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we respectfully request that the Staff concur that it will take no action if the Company excludes the Proposals from its 2009 Proxy Materials. We would be happy to provide you with any additional information and answer any questions that you may have regarding this subject.

If we can be of any further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 955-8653 or Anthony J. Horan, the Company's Corporate Secretary at (212) 270-7122.

Sincerely,



Amy L. Goodman

ALG/pah
Enclosures

cc: Anthony J. Horan, JPMorgan Chase & Co.
John Chevedden
Ray T. Chevedden
Kenneth Steiner
William Steiner

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

EXHIBIT A



*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** To Anthony Horan <ANTHONY.HORAN@chase.com>

11/04/2008 09:55 PM

cc Irma Caracciolo <caracciolo_irma@jpmorgan.com>

bcc

Subject Rule 14a-8 Proposal (JPM) SPM

This document contains a file attachment with a file size of 224.0 KB.

Please see the attachment.

Sincerely,
John Chevedden


CCE0007.pdf

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NOV 04 2008

Ray T. Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NOV 04 2008

Mr. James Dimon
Chairman
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)
Corporate Secretary
270 Park Ave
New York NY 10017

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Dimon,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications to John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

to facilitate prompt and verifiable communications.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,

Ray T. Chevedden 10-19-08
Ray T. Chevedden Date

Ray T. Chevedden and Veronica G. Chevedden Family Trust 050490
Shareholder

cc: Anthony J. Horan <ANTHONY.HORAN@chase.com>
Corporate Secretary
PH: 212-270-7122
FX: 212-270-4240
FX: 212-270-1648

[JPM: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, November 4, 2008]

3.- Special Shareowner Meetings

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our by laws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such by law and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Statement of Ray T. Chevedden

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer.

This proposal topic won impressive support at the following companies (based on 2008 yes and no votes):

Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration. Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting.

The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, have taken special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

Special Shareowner Meetings -
Yes on 3

Notes:
Ray T. Chevedden, *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** submitted this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.



FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** To Irma Caracciolo <caracciolo_irma@jpmorgan.com>

11/04/2008 10:05 PM

cc

bcc

Subject Rule 14a-8 Proposal (JPM) CUV

This document contains a file attachment with a file size of 275.8 KB.

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NOV 04 2008

Please see the attachment.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden


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[JPM: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 30, 2008]

3 – Cumulative Voting

RESOLVED: Cumulative Voting. Shareholders recommend that our Board take the steps necessary to adopt cumulative voting. Cumulative voting means that each shareholder may cast as many votes as equal to number of shares held, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. A shareholder may cast all such cumulated votes for a single candidate or split votes between multiple candidates. Under cumulative voting shareholders can withhold votes from certain poor-performing nominees in order to cast multiple votes for others.

Statement of Kenneth Steiner

Cumulative voting won 54%-support at Aetna and greater than 51%-support at Alaska Air in 2005 and in 2008. It also received greater than 53%-support at General Motors (GM) in 2006 and in 2008. The Council of Institutional Investors www.cii.org recommended adoption of this proposal topic. CalPERS also recommend a yes-vote for proposals on this topic.

Cumulative voting allows a significant group of shareholders to elect a director of its choice – safeguarding minority shareholder interests and bringing independent perspectives to Board decisions. Cumulative voting also encourages management to maximize shareholder value by making it easier for a would-be acquirer to gain board representation. It is not necessarily intended that a would-be acquirer materialize, however that very possibility represents a powerful incentive for improved management of our company.

The merits of this Cumulative Voting proposal should also be considered in the context of the need for improvements in our company's corporate governance and in individual director performance. For instance in 2008 the following governance and performance issues were identified:

- The Corporate Library (TCL), www.thecorporatelibrary.com, an independent investment research firm rated our company:
 - “High Concern” in executive pay – \$27 million for James Dimon.
 - “D” in Overall Board Effectiveness.
 - “High Governance Risk Assessment”
- We did not have an Independent Chairman or even a Lead Director – Independent oversight concern.
- Eight directors were designated as “Accelerated Vesting” directors by The Corporate Library due to their involvement in speeding up stock option vesting in order to avoid recognizing the related cost:
 - Stephen Burke
 - James Crown
 - James Dimon
 - Ellen Futter
 - William Gray
 - Laban Jackson
 - David Novak
 - Lee Raymond
- We had 4 directors with 15 to 21 years tenure each – Independence concerns:
 - James Crown
 - William Gray
 - Laban Jackson
 - Lee Raymond
- Six of our directors served on boards rated “D” by The Corporate Library:
 - David Cote
 - Honeywell (HON)

James Crown	General Dynamics (GD)
William Gray	Pfizer (PFE)
Cradall Close Bowles	Deere (DE)
David Novak	Yum! Brands (YUM)
William Weldon	Johnson & Johnson (JNJ)

- Of the 11 seats on our key audit, executive pay and nomination committees:
 - Seven seats were held by "Accelerated Vesting" directors.
 - Four seats were held by directors with more than 15-years tenure.
 - Six seats were held by directors serving on D-rated boards.

The above concerns shows there is need for improvement. Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

Cumulative Voting
Yes on 3

Notes:

Kenneth Steiner, *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** sponsored this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.



FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

To Anthony Horan <ANTHONY.HORAN@chase.com>

cc Irma Caracciolo <caracciolo_irma@jpmorgan.com>

bcc

11/04/2008 10:04 PM

Subject Rule 14a-3 Proposal (JPM) LD

This document contains a file attachment with a file size of 221.2 KB.

Please see the attachment.

Sincerely,
John Chevedden



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NOV 04 2008

William Steiner

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

RECEIVED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NOV 04 2008

Mr. James Dimon
Chairman
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)
Corporate Secretary
270 Park Ave
New York NY 10017

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Dimon,


This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications to John Chevedden.

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

to facilitate prompt communications and in order that it will be verifiable that communications have been sent.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,


William Steiner

10/1/08
Date

cc: Anthony J. Horan <ANTHONY.HORAN@chase.com>
Corporate Secretary
PH: 212-270-7122
FX: 212-270-4240
FX: 212-270-1648

[JPM: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, November 4, 2008]

3 – Independent Lead Director

Resolved, Shareholders request that our Board take the steps necessary to adopt a bylaw to require that our company have an independent lead director whenever possible with clearly delineated duties, elected by and from the independent board members, to be expected to serve for more than one continuous year, unless our company at that time has an independent board chairman. The standard of independence would be the standard set by the Council of Institutional Investors which is simply an independent director is a person whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation.

The clearly delineated duties at a minimum would include:

- Presiding at all meetings of the board at which the chairman is not present, including executive sessions of the independent directors.
- Serving as liaison between the chairman and the independent directors.
- Approving information sent to the board.
- Approving meeting agendas for the board.
- Approving meeting schedules to assure that there is sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items.
- Having the authority to call meetings of the independent directors.
- Being available for consultation and direct communication, if requested by major shareholders.

Statement of William Steiner

A key purpose of the Independent Lead Director is to protect shareholders' interests by providing independent oversight of management, including our CEO. An Independent Lead Director with clearly delineated duties can promote greater management accountability to shareholders and lead to a more objective evaluation of our CEO.

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal and establish a Lead Director position in our bylaws to protect shareholders' interests when we do not have an independent Chairman:

**Independent Lead Director –
Yes on 3**

Notes:

William Steiner, *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** sponsored this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

EXHIBIT B

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.

Anthony J. Horan
Corporate Secretary
Office of the Secretary

November 5, 2008

VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Re: Shareholder Proposal - John Chevedden/Ray Chevedden

Dear Mr. Chevedden:

I am writing on behalf of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), which received on November 4, 2008, from Mr. Ray T. Chevedden, on behalf of the Ray T. Chevedden and Veronica G. Chevedden Family Trust 050490, a shareholder proposal entitled "Special Shareowner Meetings" for consideration at our 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (Proposal). Mr. Chevedden has appointed you as his proxy to act on his behalf in this and all matters related to this proposal and its submission at our annual meeting.

Mr. Chevedden's Proposal contains certain procedural deficiencies, as set forth below, which Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require us to bring to your attention.

Rule 14a-8(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, provides that each shareholder proponent must submit sufficient proof that he has continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of a company's shares entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year as of the date the shareholder proposal was submitted. The Company's stock records do not indicate that Mr. Chevedden is the record owner of sufficient shares to satisfy this requirement and we did not receive proof from him that he has satisfied Rule 14a-8's ownership requirements as of the date that the proposal was submitted to JPM.

To remedy this defect, you must submit sufficient proof of Mr. Chevedden's ownership of JPM shares. As explained in Rule 14a-8(b), sufficient proof may be in the form of:

- a written statement from the "record" holder of his shares (usually a broker or a bank) verifying that, as of the date the proposal was submitted, he continuously held the requisite number of JPM shares for at least one year; or
- if he has filed a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 or Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting his ownership of JPM shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins, a copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in the ownership level and a written statement that he continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period.

270 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017-2070
Telephone 212 270 7122 Facsimile 212 270 4240 anthony.horan@chase.com

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

The rules of the SEC require that your response to this letter be postmarked or transmitted electronically no later than 14 calendar days from the date you receive this letter. Please address any response to me at 270 Park Avenue, 38th Floor, New York NY 10017. Alternatively, you may transmit any response by facsimile to me at 212-270-4240. For your reference, please find enclosed a copy of SEC Rule 14a-8.

If you have any questions with respect to the foregoing, please contact me.

Sincerely,



cc: R. Chevedden

Enclosure: Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Shareholder proposals

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

(a) Question 1: What is a proposal?

A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).

(b) Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible?

(1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1% of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting.

(2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:

(i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or

(ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D (§240.13d-101), Schedule 13G (§240.13d-102), Form 3 (§249.103 of this chapter), Form 4 (§249.104 of this chapter) and/or Form 5 (§249.105 of this chapter), or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:

(A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;

(B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and

(C) Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.

(c) Question 3: How many proposals may I submit?

Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.

(d) Question 4: How long can my proposal be?

The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.

(e) Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal?

(1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (§249.308a of this chapter), or in shareholder reports of investment companies under §270.30d-1 of this chapter of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.

(2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(3) If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(f) Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section?

(1) The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification. A company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under §240.14a-8 and provide you with a copy under Question 10 below, §240.14a-8(j).

(2) If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.

(g) Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be excluded?

Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.

(h) Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders' meeting to present the proposal?

(1) Either you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a

qualified representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative, follow the proper state-law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.

(2) If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.

(3) If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years.

(i) **Question 9:** If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal?

(1) **Improper under state law:** If the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization;

Note to paragraph(i)(1): Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

(2) **Violation of law:** If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

Note to paragraph(i)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law would result in a violation of any state or federal law.

(3) **Violation of proxy rules:** If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including §240.14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;

(4) **Personal grievance; special interest:** If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;

(5) **Relevance:** If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business;

(6) **Absence of power/authority:** If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal;

(7) **Management functions:** If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations;

(8) **Relates to election:** If the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election;

(9) **Conflicts with company's proposal:** If the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting;

Note to paragraph(i)(9): A company's submission to the Commission under this section should specify the points of conflict with the company's proposal.

(10) *Substantially implemented*: If the company has already substantially implemented the proposal;

(11) *Duplication*: If the proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting;

(12) *Resubmissions*: If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the company's proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years, a company may exclude it from its proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last time it was included if the proposal received:

(i) Less than 3% of the vote if proposed once within the preceding 5 calendar years;

(ii) Less than 6% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed twice previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; or

(iii) Less than 10% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed three times or more previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; and

(13) *Specific amount of dividends*: If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.

(j) *Question 10: What procedures must the company follow if it intends to exclude my proposal?*

(1) If the company intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials, it must file its reasons with the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy with the Commission. The company must simultaneously provide you with a copy of its submission. The Commission staff may permit the company to make its submission later than 80 days before the company files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy, if the company demonstrates good cause for missing the deadline.

(2) The company must file six paper copies of the following:

(i) The proposal;

(ii) An explanation of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should, if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule; and

(iii) A supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law.

(k) *Question 11: May I submit my own statement to the Commission responding to the company's arguments?*

Yes, you may submit a response, but it is not required. You should try to submit any response to us, with a copy to the company, as soon as possible after the company makes its submission. This way, the Commission staff will have time to consider fully your submission before it issues its response. You should submit six paper copies of your response.

(l) *Question 12: If the company includes my shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, what information about me must it include along with the proposal itself?*

(1) The company's proxy statement must include your name and address, as well as the number of the company's voting securities that you hold. However, instead of providing that information, the company may instead include a statement that it will provide the information to shareholders promptly upon receiving an oral or written request.

(2) The company is not responsible for the contents of your proposal or supporting statement.

(m) **Question 13:** What can I do if the company includes in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should not vote in favor of my proposal, and I disagree with some of its statements?

(1) The company may elect to include in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against your proposal. The company is allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view, just as you may express your own point of view in your proposal's supporting statement.

(2) However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, §240.14a-6, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.

(3) We require the company to send you a copy of its statements opposing your proposal before it sends its proxy materials, so that you may bring to our attention any materially false or misleading statements, under the following timeframes:

(i) If our no-action response requires that you make revisions to your proposal or supporting statement as a condition to requiring the company to include it in its proxy materials, then the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 5 calendar days after the company receives a copy of your revised proposal; or

(ii) In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before it files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under §240.14a-6.



FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** To "Anthony J. Horan" <anthony.horan@chase.com>

11/17/2008 01:30 PM

cc

bcc

Subject Rule 14a-8 Broker Letter (JPM) SPM

History:

This message has been forwarded.


Mr. Horan,
Attached is the broker letter requested. Please advise within one business day whether there is any further rule 14a-8 requirement.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden


CCE00007.pdf

The rules of the SEC require that your response to this letter be postmarked or transmitted electronically no later than 14 calendar days from the date you receive this letter. Please address any response to me at 270 Park Avenue, 38th Floor, New York NY 10017. Alternatively, you may transmit any response by facsimile to me at 212-270-4240. For your reference, please find enclosed a copy of SEC Rule 14a-8.

If you have any questions with respect to the foregoing, please contact me.

Sincerely,



cc: K.Steiner

Enclosure: Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934



November 17, 2008

Ray T. Chevedden

*** Fidelity & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

To Whom It May Concern,

I am responding to Mr. Chevedden's request to confirm his position in Nisource, Inc. ("NI") and JP Morgan Chase Co. ("JPM").

I can confirm that the Ray T. Chevedden and Veronica G. Chevedden Family Trust dated 05/04/90, Ray Chevedden Trustee has continuously held no less than 200,000 shares of NI and 100 shares of JPM since July 1, 2006.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please call the Premium Service Department assistance line at 1-800-544-4442.

Sincerely,

Kevin Goff
Senior Premium Service Specialist

Our file: W019790-13NOV08

Post-It® Fax Note	7871	Date	11/17/08	# of Pages	1
To	Anthony Horan	From	John Chevedden		
Co./Dept.		Co.			
Phone #	***	PMSMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***			
Fax #	212-270-4240	Pror. #			

Fidelity Premium Services
Fidelity Preferred Services
Fidelity Preferred Retirement Services
Fidelity Distributors Corporation
General Distributors Agent for Fidelity Mutual Funds
Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC, Member NYSE, SIPC

49 North 400 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Phone: 800.544.4442

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.

Anthony J. Horan
Corporate Secretary
Office of the Secretary

November 5, 2008

VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Re: Shareholder Proposal – John Chevedden/Kenneth Steiner

Dear Mr. Chevedden:

I am writing on behalf of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), which received on October 30, 2008, from Mr. Kenneth Steiner, a shareholder proposal entitled "Cumulative Voting" for consideration at our 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (Proposal). Mr. Steiner has appointed you as his proxy to act on his behalf in this and all matters related to this proposal and its submission at our annual meeting.

Mr. Steiner's Proposal contains certain procedural deficiencies, as set forth below, which Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require us to bring to your attention.

Rule 14a-8(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, provides that each shareholder proponent must submit sufficient proof that he has continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of a company's shares entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year as of the date the shareholder proposal was submitted. The Company's stock records do not indicate that Mr. Steiner is the record owner of sufficient shares to satisfy this requirement and we did not receive proof from him that he has satisfied Rule 14a-8's ownership requirements as of the date that the proposal was submitted to JPM.

To remedy this defect, you must submit sufficient proof of Mr. Steiner's ownership of JPM shares. As explained in Rule 14a-8(b), sufficient proof may be in the form of:

- a written statement from the "record" holder of his shares (usually a broker or a bank) verifying that, as of the date the proposal was submitted, he continuously held the requisite number of JPM shares for at least one year; or
- if he has filed a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 or Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting his ownership of JPM shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins, a copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in the ownership level and a written statement that he continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period.

270 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017-2070
Telephone 212 270 7122 Facsimile 212 270 4240 anthony.horan@chase.com

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Kenneth Steiner

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

RECEIVED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NOV 04 2008

Mr. James Dimon
Chairman
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)
Corporate Secretary
270 Park Ave
New York NY 10017


Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Dimon,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications to John Chevedden.

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
to facilitate prompt communications and in order that it will be verifiable that communications have been sent.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Steiner

10-9-08
Date

cc: Anthony J. Horan <ANTHONY.HORAN@chase.com>
Corporate Secretary
PH: 212-270-7122
FX: 212-270-4240
FX: 212-270-1648

Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Shareholder proposals

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

(a) Question 1: What is a proposal?

A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).

(b) Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible?

(1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting.

(2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:

(i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or

(ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D (§240.13d-101), Schedule 13G (§240.13d-102), Form 3 (§249.103 of this chapter), Form 4 (§249.104 of this chapter) and/or Form 5 (§249.165 of this chapter), or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:

(A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;

(B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and

(C) Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.

(c) Question 3: How many proposals may I submit?

Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.

(d) Question 4: How long can my proposal be?

The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.

(e) Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal?

(1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (Section 300a of this chapter), or in shareholder reports of investment companies under §270.30d-1 of this chapter of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.

(2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(3) If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(f) Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section?

(1) The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification. A company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under §240.14a-8 and provide you with a copy under Question 10 below, §240.14a-8(j).

(2) If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.

(g) Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be excluded?

Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.

(h) Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders' meeting to present the proposal?

(1) Either you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a

qualified representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative, follow the proper state law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.

(2) If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.

(3) If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years.

(i) **Question 9: If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal?**

(1) **Improper under state law:** If the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization;

Note to paragraph(i)(1): Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

(2) **Violation of law:** If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

Note to paragraph(i)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law would result in a violation of any state or federal law.

(3) **Violation of proxy rules:** If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including §240.14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;

(4) **Personal grievance; special interest:** If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;

(5) **Relevance:** If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business;

(6) **Absence of power/authority:** If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal;

(7) **Management functions:** If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations;

(8) **Relates to election:** If the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election;

(9) **Conflicts with company's proposal:** If the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting;

Note to paragraph(i)(9): A company's submission to the Commission under this section should specify the points of conflict with the company's proposal.

(10) *Substantially implemented*: If the company has already substantially implemented the proposal;

(11) *Duplication*: If the proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting;

(12) *Resubmissions*: If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the company's proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years, a company may exclude it from its proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last time it was included if the proposal received:

(i) Less than 3% of the vote if proposed once within the preceding 5 calendar years;

(ii) Less than 6% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed twice previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; or

(iii) Less than 10% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed three times or more previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; and

(13) *Specific amount of dividends*: If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.

(j) *Question 10: What procedures must the company follow if it intends to exclude my proposal?*

(1) If the company intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials, it must file its reasons with the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy with the Commission. The company must simultaneously provide you with a copy of its submission. The Commission staff may permit the company to make its submission later than 80 days before the company files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy, if the company demonstrates good cause for missing the deadline.

(2) The company must file six paper copies of the following:

(i) The proposal;

(ii) An explanation of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should, if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule; and

(iii) A supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law.

(k) *Question 11: May I submit my own statement to the Commission responding to the company's arguments?*

Yes, you may submit a response, but it is not required. You should try to submit any response to us, with a copy to the company, as soon as possible after the company makes its submission. This way, the Commission staff will have time to consider fully your submission before it issues its response. You should submit six paper copies of your response.

(l) *Question 12: If the company includes my shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, what information about me must it include along with the proposal itself?*

(1) The company's proxy statement must include your name and address, as well as the number of the company's voting securities that you hold. However, instead of providing that information, the company may instead include a statement that it will provide the information to shareholders promptly upon receiving an oral or written request.

(2) The company is not responsible for the contents of your proposal or supporting statement.

(m) Question 13: What can I do if the company includes in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should not vote in favor of my proposal, and I disagree with some of its statements?

(1) The company may elect to include in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against your proposal. The company is allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view, just as you may express your own point of view in your proposal's supporting statement.

(2) However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, §240.14a-9, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.

(3) We require the company to send you a copy of its statements opposing your proposal before it sends its proxy materials, so that you may bring to our attention any materially false or misleading statements, under the following timeframes:

(i) If our no-action response requires that you make revisions to your proposal or supporting statement as a condition to requiring the company to include it in its proxy materials, then the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 5 calendar days after the company receives a copy of your revised proposal; or

(ii) In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before its files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under §240.14a-6.

Office of the Secretary
Anthony Horan/JPMCHASE
11/11/2008 12:08 PM

To Irma R. Caracciolo/jpmchase@jpmchase, Carin S
Reddish/jpmchase@jpmchase

cc

bcc

Subject olmsted Fw: Rule 14a-8 Broker Letter (JPM) CUV

 Anthony J. Horan, Corporate Secretary | JPMorgan Chase, 270 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10017 | W: 212
270-7122 | Cell: 917-881-2602 | Fax: 212-270-4240
— Forwarded by Anthony Horan/JPMCHASE on 11/11/2008 12:08 PM —



FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

11/11/2008 11:30 AM

To "Anthony J. Horan" <ANTHONY.HORAN@chase.com>

cc

Subject Rule 14a-8 Broker Letter (JPM) CUV

Mr. Horan,
Attached is the broker letter requested. Please advise within one business
day whether there is any further rule 14a-8 requirement.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden



CCE00002.pdf



Date: 10 Nov 2008

To whom it may concern:

As introducing broker for the account of Kenneth Steiner,
 account number _____, held with National Financial Services Corp.
 as custodian, DJE Discount Brokers hereby certifies that as of the date of this certification
Kenneth Steiner is and has been the beneficial owner of 1050
 shares of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; having held at least two thousand dollars
 worth of the above mentioned security since the following date: 1/21/98, also having
 held at least two thousand dollars worth of the above mentioned security from at least one
 year prior to the date the proposal was submitted to the company.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Mark Filiberto'.

Mark Filiberto,
 President
 DJE Discount Brokers

Post-it® Fax Note	7671	Date	<u>11-11-08</u>	# of pages	
To	<u>Anthony Harco</u>	From	<u>Jason Chevillard</u>		
Co./Dept.		Co.			
Phone #		*** PSMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***			
Fax #	<u>212-270-4240</u>	Fax #			

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.

Anthony J. Horan
Corporate Secretary
Office of the Secretary

November 5, 2008

VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Re: Shareholder Proposal – John Chevedden/William Steiner

Dear Mr. Chevedden:

I am writing on behalf of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), which received on November 4, 2008, from Mr. William Steiner, a shareholder proposal entitled "Independent Lead Director" for consideration at our 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (Proposal). Mr. Steiner has appointed you as his proxy to act on his behalf in this and all matters related to this proposal and its submission at our annual meeting.

Mr. Steiner's Proposal contains certain procedural deficiencies, as set forth below, which Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require us to bring to your attention.

Rule 14a-8(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, provides that each shareholder proponent must submit sufficient proof that he has continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of a company's shares entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year as of the date the shareholder proposal was submitted. The Company's stock records do not indicate that Mr. Steiner is the record owner of sufficient shares to satisfy this requirement and we did not receive proof from him that he has satisfied Rule 14a-8's ownership requirements as of the date that the proposal was submitted to JPM.


To remedy this defect, you must submit sufficient proof of Mr. Steiner's ownership of JPM shares. As explained in Rule 14a-8(b), sufficient proof may be in the form of:

- a written statement from the "record" holder of his shares (usually a broker or a bank) verifying that, as of the date the proposal was submitted, he continuously held the requisite number of JPM shares for at least one year; or
- if he has filed a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 or Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting his ownership of JPM shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins, a copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in the ownership level and a written statement that he continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period.

The rules of the SEC require that your response to this letter be postmarked or transmitted electronically no later than 14 calendar days from the date you receive this letter. Please address any response to me at 270 Park Avenue, 38th Floor, New York NY 10017. Alternatively, you may transmit any response by facsimile to me at 212-270-4240. For your reference, please find enclosed a copy of SEC Rule 14a-8.

If you have any questions with respect to the foregoing, please contact me.

Sincerely,



cc: W. Steiner

Enclosure: Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Shareholder proposals

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

(a) Question 1: What is a proposal?

A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).

(b) Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible?

(1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting.

(2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:

(i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or

(ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D (§240.13d-101), Schedule 13G (§240.13d-102), Form 3 (§249.103 of this chapter), Form 4 (§249.104 of this chapter) and/or Form 5 (§249.105 of this chapter), or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:

(A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;

(B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and

(C) Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.

(c) Question 3: How many proposals may I submit?

Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.

(d) Question 4: How long can my proposal be?

The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.

(e) Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal?

(1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (§249.308a of this chapter), or in shareholder reports of investment companies under §270.308-1 of this chapter of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.

(2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(3) If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(f) Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section?

(1) The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification. A company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under §240.14a-8 and provide you with a copy under Question 10 below, §240.14a-8(j).

(2) If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.

(g) Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be excluded?

Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.

(h) Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders' meeting to present the proposal?

(1) Either you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a

qualified representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative, follow the proper state law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.

(2) If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.

(3) If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years.

(i) **Question 9: If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal?**

(1) **Improper under state law:** If the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization;

Note to paragraph(1)(1): Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

(2) **Violation of law:** If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

Note to paragraph(1)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law would result in a violation of any state or federal law.

(3) **Violation of proxy rules:** If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including §240.14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;

(4) **Personal grievance; special interest:** If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;

(5) **Relevance:** If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business;

(6) **Absence of power/authority:** If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal;

(7) **Management functions:** If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations;

(8) **Relates to election:** If the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election;

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(2) However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, §240.14a-9, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.

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(ii) In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before its files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under §240.14a-6.