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Commitments, Contingencies, Guarantees, and Others
3 Months Ended
Mar. 31, 2017
Commitments and Contingencies Disclosure [Abstract]  
Commitments, Contingencies, Guarantees, and Others
NOTE 14—COMMITMENTS, CONTINGENCIES, GUARANTEES AND OTHERS
Commitments to Lend
Our unfunded lending commitments primarily consist of credit card lines, loan commitments to customers of both our Commercial Banking and Consumer Banking businesses, as well as standby and commercial letters of credit. These commitments, other than credit card lines, are legally binding conditional agreements that have fixed expirations or termination dates and specified interest rates and purposes. The contractual amount of these commitments represents the maximum possible credit risk to us should the counterparty draw upon the commitment. We generally manage the potential risk of unfunded lending commitments by limiting the total amount of arrangements, monitoring the size and maturity structure of these portfolios and applying the same credit standards for all of our credit activities.
For unused credit card lines, we have not experienced and do not anticipate that all of our customers will access their entire available line at any given point in time. Commitments to extend credit other than credit card lines generally require customers to maintain certain credit standards. Collateral requirements and loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios are the same as those for funded transactions and are established based on management’s credit assessment of the customer. These commitments may expire without being drawn upon; therefore, the total commitment amount does not necessarily represent future funding requirements.
We also issue letters of credit, such as financial standby, performance standby and commercial letters of credit, to meet the financing needs of our customers. Standby letters of credit are conditional commitments issued by us to guarantee the performance of a customer to a third party in a borrowing arrangement. Commercial letters of credit are short-term commitments issued primarily to facilitate trade finance activities for customers and are generally collateralized by the goods being shipped to the client. These collateral requirements are similar to those for funded transactions and are established based on management’s credit assessment of the customer. Management conducts regular reviews of all outstanding letters of credit and the results of these reviews are considered in assessing the adequacy of our allowance for loan and lease losses.
The following table presents contractual amount and carrying value of our unfunded lending commitments as of March 31, 2017 and December 31, 2016. The carrying value represents our reserve and deferred revenue on legally binding commitments.
Table 14.1: Unfunded Lending Commitments: Contractual Amount and Carrying Value
 
 
Contractual Amount
 
Carrying Value
(Dollars in millions)
 
March 31,
2017
 
December 31,
2016
 
March 31,
2017
 
December 31,
2016
Standby letter of credit and commercial letter of credit(1)
 
$
1,953

 
$
1,936

 
$
49

 
$
42

Credit card lines
 
320,446

 
312,864

 
N/A

 
N/A

Other loan commitments(2)
 
28,350

 
28,402

 
95

 
98

Total unfunded lending commitments
 
$
350,749

 
$
343,202

 
$
144

 
$
140

__________
(1) 
These financial guarantees have expiration dates ranging from 2017 to 2025 as of March 31, 2017.
(2) 
Includes $667 million and $699 million of advised lines of credit as of March 31, 2017 and December 31, 2016, respectively.
Loss Sharing Agreements and Other Obligations
Within our Commercial Banking business, we originate multifamily commercial real estate loans with the intent to sell them to the GSEs. We enter into loss sharing agreements with the GSEs upon the sale of the loans. At inception, we record a liability representing the fair value of our obligation which is subsequently amortized as we are released from risk of payment under the loss sharing agreement. If payment under the loss sharing agreement becomes probable and estimable, an additional liability may be recorded on the consolidated balance sheets and a non-interest expense may be recognized in the consolidated statements of income. The amount of liability recognized on our consolidated balance sheets for our loss sharing agreements was $49 million and $48 million as of March 31, 2017 and December 31, 2016, respectively.
In certain securitizations in connection with the discontinued manufactured housing operations of GreenPoint Credit, LLC, the third party servicer has an obligation to exercise mandatory clean-up calls. In the event the third party servicer does not fulfill its obligation to exercise these clean-up calls, the obligation reverts to us. The amount of loan receivables and other assets subject to these clean-up calls is approximately $420 million. Based on our current projections, we expect these securitizations to reach their individual clean-up call thresholds beginning in 2017 and continuing through 2019. According to current information and estimates, we also expect the fair value of the loan receivables and other assets to be less than the contractual amount required to exercise the clean-up calls. We monitor the underlying assets for trends in delinquencies and related losses and review the third party servicer’s financial strength. As of March 31, 2017, we recorded a liability of $40 million associated with these clean-up call obligations. Our best estimate is that any reasonably possible future losses associated with these clean-up call obligations in excess of the liability recorded are not significant to the Company’s financial position.
U.K. Payment Protection Insurance
In the U.K., we previously sold payment protection insurance (“PPI”) and other ancillary cross sell products. In response to an elevated level of customer complaints across the industry, heightened media coverage and pressure from consumer advocacy groups, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), formerly the Financial Services Authority, investigated and raised concerns about the way the industry has handled complaints related to the sale of these insurance policies. For the past several years, the U.K.’s Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) has been adjudicating customer complaints relating to PPI, escalated to it by consumers who disagree with the rejection of their complaint by firms, leading to customer remediation payments by us and others within the industry. On October 2, 2015, the FCA issued a Statement on PPI (“FCA Proposal”) announcing it has decided to consult on the introduction of a time bar for PPI complaints and on new rules and guidance about how banks should handle unfair relationship PPI complaints covered by s.140A of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 (“Consumer Credit Act”). Following feedback on the FCA Proposal, the FCA issued a further Consultation Paper on August 2, 2016, suggesting some amendments to its proposed rules on how banks should handle unfair relationship PPI complaints and indicating an expectation that the complaint deadline will fall by the end of June 2019. This timetable was based on making a decision about whether to proceed, and making rules and guidance, by the end of December 2016. On December 9, 2016, the FCA issued a statement delaying any further announcement until the first quarter of 2017. On March 2, 2017, the FCA further issued a statement that sets out final rules and guidance on the PPI complaints deadline, which has been set as August 29, 2019. The statement also provides clarity on how to handle PPI complaints under s.140A of the Consumer Credit Act, including guidance on how redress for such complaints should be calculated.
In determining our best estimate of incurred losses for future remediation payments, management considers numerous factors, including (i) the number of customer complaints we expect in the future; (ii) our expectation of upholding those complaints; (iii) the expected number of complaints customers escalate to the FOS; (iv) our expectation of the FOS upholding such escalated complaints; (v) the number of complaints that fall under the s.140A of the Consumer Credit Act; and (vi) the estimated remediation payout to customers. We monitor these factors each quarter and adjust our reserves to reflect the latest data.
Management’s best estimate of incurred losses related to U.K. PPI totaled $324 million and $238 million as of March 31, 2017 and December 31, 2016, respectively. For the three months ended March 31, 2017, we added $99 million to our reserve in response to the above FCA statement made on March 2, 2017. Other movements to the reserve were a combination of utilization of the reserve through customer refund payments and foreign exchange movements. Our best estimate of reasonably possible future losses beyond our reserve as of March 31, 2017 is approximately $200 million. The decrease in this estimate from the prior quarter is due to the publication of the FCA rules on March 2, 2017 which resulted in a number of factors previously considered reasonably possible becoming probable and therefore shifting into our reserve estimate.
Mortgage Representation and Warranty Liabilities
We acquired three subsidiaries that originated residential mortgage loans and sold these loans to various purchasers, including purchasers who created securitization trusts. These subsidiaries are Capital One Home Loans, LLC, which was acquired in February 2005; GreenPoint, which was acquired in December 2006 as part of the North Fork acquisition; and Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. (“CCB”), which was acquired in February 2009 and subsequently merged into CONA (collectively, the “subsidiaries”).
In connection with their sales of mortgage loans, the subsidiaries entered into agreements containing varying representations and warranties about, among other things, the ownership of the loan, the validity of the lien securing the loan, the loan’s compliance with any applicable loan criteria established by the purchaser, including underwriting guidelines and the existence of mortgage insurance, and the loan’s compliance with applicable federal, state and local laws. The representations and warranties do not address the credit performance of the mortgage loans, but mortgage loan performance often influences whether a claim for breach of representation and warranty will be asserted and has an effect on the amount of any loss in the event of a breach of a representation or warranty.
Each of these subsidiaries may be required to repurchase mortgage loans in the event of certain breaches of these representations and warranties. In the event of a repurchase, the subsidiary is typically required to pay the unpaid principal balance of the loan together with interest and certain expenses (including, in certain cases, legal costs incurred by the purchaser and/or others). The subsidiary then recovers the loan or, if the loan has been foreclosed, the underlying collateral. The subsidiary is exposed to any losses on the repurchased loans, taking into account any recoveries on the collateral. In some instances, rather than repurchase the loans, a subsidiary may agree to make cash payments to make a purchaser whole on losses or to settle repurchase claims, possibly including claims for attorneys’ fees and interest. In addition, our subsidiaries may be required to indemnify certain purchasers and others against losses they incur as a result of certain breaches of representations and warranties.
These subsidiaries, in total, originated and sold to non-affiliates approximately $111 billion original principal balance of mortgage loans between 2005 and 2008, which are the years (or “vintages”) with respect to which our subsidiaries have received the vast majority of the repurchase-related requests and other related claims.
The following table presents the original principal balance of mortgage loan originations for the three general categories of purchasers of mortgage loans and the estimated unpaid principal balance as of March 31, 2017 and December 31, 2016.
Table 14.2: Unpaid Principal Balance of Mortgage Loans Originated and Sold to Third Parties Based on Category of Purchaser
 
 
Estimated Unpaid Principal Balance
 
Original Principal Balance
(Dollars in billions)
 
March 31,
2017
 
December 31,
2016
 
2005-2008
GSEs
 
$
2

 
$
2

 
$
11

Insured Securitizations
 
3

 
3

 
20

Uninsured Securitizations and Other
 
11

 
12

 
80

Total
 
$
16

 
$
17

 
$
111


Of the $20 billion in original principal balance of mortgage loans sold directly by our subsidiaries to private-label purchasers who placed the loans into securitizations supported by bond insurance (“Insured Securitizations”), approximately 48% of the original principal balance was covered by bond insurance. Further, approximately $16 billion original principal balance was placed in securitizations as to which the monoline bond insurers have made repurchase-related requests or loan file requests to one of our subsidiaries (“Active Insured Securitizations”) and the remaining approximately $4 billion original principal balance was placed in securitizations as to which the monoline bond insurers have not made repurchase-related requests or loan file requests to one of our subsidiaries (“Inactive Insured Securitizations”). Insured Securitizations often allow the monoline bond insurer to act independently of the investors. Bond insurers typically have indemnity agreements directly with both the mortgage originators and the securitizers, and they often have super-majority rights within the trust documentation that allow them to direct trustees to pursue mortgage repurchase-related requests without coordination with other investors.
Because we do not service most of the loans our subsidiaries sold to others, we do not have complete information about the current ownership of a portion of the $80 billion in original principal balance of mortgage loans not sold directly to GSEs or placed in Insured Securitizations. We have determined based on information obtained from third-party databases that about $48 billion original principal balance of these mortgage loans was placed in private-label publicly issued securitizations not supported by bond insurance (“Uninsured Securitizations”). An additional approximately $22 billion original principal balance of mortgage loans were initially sold to private investors as whole loans. Various known and unknown investors purchased the remaining $10 billion original principal balance of mortgage loans.
With respect to the $111 billion in original principal balance of mortgage loans originated and sold to others between 2005 and 2008, we estimate that approximately $16 billion in unpaid principal balance remains outstanding as of March 31, 2017, of which approximately $3 billion in unpaid principal balance is at least 90 days delinquent. Approximately $23 billion in losses have been realized by third parties. Because we do not service most of the loans we sold to others, we do not have complete information about the underlying credit performance levels for some of these mortgage loans. These amounts reflect our best estimates, including extrapolations of underlying credit performance where necessary. These estimates are dependent on the availability of performance data.
The subsidiaries had open repurchase-related requests with regard to approximately $653 million original principal balance of mortgage loans as of March 31, 2017, a decrease of $716 million from $1.4 billion as of December 31, 2016.
The substantial majority of remaining repurchase requests are related to ongoing litigation. The repurchase-related requests reflect the original principal balance amounts of the mortgage loans at issue and do not correspond to the losses our subsidiary would incur upon the repurchase of these loans.
Total repurchase-related requests include all timely requests ever received by our subsidiaries where the requesting party has not formally rescinded the repurchase-related requests or our subsidiary has not agreed to either repurchase the loan at issue or make the requesting party whole with respect to its losses. We have received relatively few repurchase-related requests subsequent to the New York’s highest court ruling in 2015 that the statute of limitations for repurchase claims begins when the relevant representations and warranties were made, as opposed to some later date during the life of the loan. Additionally, we have received relatively few repurchase-related demands for vintages after 2007, mostly because GreenPoint ceased originating mortgages in August 2007.
We established reserves for the $11 billion original principal balance of GSE loans, based on open claims and historic repurchase rates. We have entered into and completed repurchase or settlement agreements with respect to the majority of our repurchase exposure to the GSEs.
Our reserves could also be impacted by any claims which may be brought by governmental agencies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), the False Claims Act or other federal or state statutes. For example, GreenPoint and Capital One have received requests for information and/or subpoenas from various governmental regulators and law enforcement authorities, including members of the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (“RMBS”) Working Group, relating to the origination of loans for sale to the GSEs and to RMBS participants. We are cooperating with these regulators and other authorities in responding to such requests.
For the $16 billion original principal balance in Active Insured Securitizations, our reserving approach is based upon the expected resolution of litigation directed by the monoline bond insurers. Accordingly, our representation and warranty reserves related to Active Insured Securitizations are litigation reserves. In establishing these litigation reserves, we consider the current and future monoline insurer losses inherent within the securitization and apply legal judgment to the developing factual and legal record to estimate the liability for each securitization. We consider as factors within the analysis our own past monoline settlements in addition to publicly available industry monoline settlements. Our reserves with respect to the U.S. Bank Litigation, referenced below, are related to Active Insured Securitizations. Further, to the extent we have litigation reserves with respect to indemnification risks from certain representation and warranty lawsuits brought by monoline bond insurers against third-party securitizations sponsors, where one of our subsidiaries provided some or all of the mortgage collateral within the securitization but is not a defendant in the litigation, such reserves are also contained within this category.
For the $4 billion original principal balance of mortgage loans in Inactive Insured Securitizations and the $48 billion original principal balance of mortgage loans in Uninsured Securitizations, we establish reserves based on an assessment of probable and estimable legal liability, if any, utilizing both our own experience and publicly available industry settlement information to estimate lifetime liability. In contrast with the bond insurers in the Insured Securitizations, investors in Uninsured Securitizations often face a number of legal and logistical hurdles before they can force a securitization trustee to pursue mortgage repurchases, including the need to coordinate with a certain percentage of investors holding the securities and to indemnify the trustee for any litigation it undertakes. Accordingly, we only reserve for such exposures when a trustee or investor with standing brings claims and it is probable we have incurred a loss. Some Uninsured Securitization investors are currently suing investment banks and securitization sponsors under federal and/or state securities laws. Although we face some indirect indemnity risks from these litigations, we generally have not established reserves with respect to these indemnity risks because we do not consider them to be both probable and reasonably estimable liabilities. In addition, to the extent we have litigation reserves with respect to indemnification risks from certain representation and warranty lawsuits brought by parties who purchased loans from our subsidiaries and subsequently re-sold the loans into securitizations, such reserves are also contained within this category.
For the $22 billion original principal balance of mortgage loans sold to private investors as whole loans, we establish reserves based on open claims and historical repurchase rates.
The aggregate reserve for all three subsidiaries totaled $516 million as of March 31, 2017 compared to $630 million as of December 31, 2016. The decrease was primarily due to favorable legal developments. The table below summarizes changes in our representation and warranty reserve for the three months ended March 31, 2017 and 2016.
Table 14.3: Changes in Representation and Warranty Reserve(1)
 
 
Three Months Ended March 31,
(Dollars in millions)
 
2017
 
2016
Representation and warranty reserve, beginning of period
 
$
630

 
$
610

Provision (benefit) for mortgage representation and warranty losses:
 
 
 
 
Recorded in continuing operations
 
(25
)
 
(1
)
Recorded in discontinued operations
 
(67
)
 
3

Total provision (benefit) for mortgage representation and warranty losses
 
(92
)
 
2

Net realized recoveries (losses)
 
(22
)
 
1

Representation and warranty reserve, end of period
 
$
516

 
$
613

__________
(1) 
Reported on our consolidated balance sheets as a component of other liabilities.
As part of our business planning processes, we have considered various outcomes relating to the future representation and warranty liabilities of our subsidiaries that are possible but do not rise to the level of being both probable and reasonably estimable outcomes justifying an incremental accrual under applicable accounting standards. Our current best estimate of reasonably possible future losses from representation and warranty claims beyond our reserves as of March 31, 2017 is approximately $1.4 billion, a decrease from our $1.5 billion estimate at December 31, 2016. The estimate as of March 31, 2017 covers all reasonably possible losses relating to representation and warranty claim activity, including those relating to the cases more specifically described below in Mortgage Repurchase Litigation.
In estimating reasonably possible future losses in excess of our current reserves, for Active Insured Securitizations, we assume loss rates on the high end of those observed in monoline settlements or court rulings. For our remaining GSE exposures, Uninsured Securitizations and whole loan exposures, our reasonably possible risk estimates assume lifetime loss rates and claims rates at the highest levels of our past experience and also consider the limited instances of observed settlements. We do not however, based on industry precedent, assume claim rates or loss rates for these risk categories will be as high as those assumed for the Active Insured Securitizations. Should the number of claims or the loss rates on these claims increase significantly, our estimate of reasonably possible risk would increase materially. We also assume that repurchase-related requests will be resolved at discounts reflecting the nature of the claims, the vintage of the underlying loans and evolving legal precedents.
Notwithstanding our ongoing attempts to estimate a reasonably possible amount of future losses beyond our current accrual levels based on current information, it is possible that actual future losses will exceed both the current accrual level and our current estimate of the amount of reasonably possible losses. Our reserve and reasonably possible loss estimates involve considerable judgment and reflect that there is still significant uncertainty regarding numerous factors that may impact the ultimate loss levels, including, but not limited to: litigation outcomes; court rulings; governmental enforcement decisions; future repurchase and indemnification claim levels; securitization trustees pursuing mortgage repurchase litigation unilaterally or in coordination with investors; investors successfully pursuing repurchase litigation independently and without the involvement of the trustee as a party; ultimate repurchase and indemnification rates; future mortgage loan performance levels; actual recoveries on the collateral; and macroeconomic conditions (including unemployment levels and housing prices). In light of the significant uncertainty as to the ultimate liability our subsidiaries may incur from these matters, an adverse outcome in one or more of these matters could be material to our results of operations or cash flows for any particular reporting period.
Litigation
In accordance with the current accounting standards for loss contingencies, we establish reserves for litigation related matters that arise from the ordinary course of our business activities when it is probable that a loss associated with a claim or proceeding has been incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. None of the amounts we currently have recorded individually or in the aggregate are considered to be material to our financial condition. Litigation claims and proceedings of all types are subject to many uncertain factors that generally cannot be predicted with assurance. Below we provide a description of potentially material legal proceedings and claims.
For some of the matters disclosed below, we are able to determine estimates of potential future outcomes that are not probable and reasonably estimable outcomes justifying either the establishment of a reserve or an incremental reserve build, but which are reasonably possible outcomes. For other disclosed matters, such an estimate is not possible at this time. For those matters below where an estimate is possible (excluding the reasonably possible future losses relating to the Mortgage Repurchase Litigation described below, which are included within the estimate of reasonably possible representation and warranty losses discussed above), management currently estimates the reasonably possible future losses beyond our reserves as of March 31, 2017 is approximately $200 million. Notwithstanding our attempt to estimate a reasonably possible range of loss beyond our current accrual levels for some litigation matters based on current information, it is possible that actual future losses will exceed both the current accrual level and the range of reasonably possible losses disclosed here. Given the inherent uncertainties involved in these matters, especially those involving governmental agencies, and the very large or indeterminate damages sought in some of these matters, there is significant uncertainty as to the ultimate liability we may incur from these litigation matters and an adverse outcome in one or more of these matters could be material to our results of operations or cash flows for any particular reporting period.
Interchange Litigation
In 2005, a number of entities, each purporting to represent a class of retail merchants, filed antitrust lawsuits against MasterCard and Visa and several member banks, including our subsidiaries and us, alleging among other things, that the defendants conspired to fix the level of interchange fees. The complaints seek injunctive relief and civil monetary damages, which could be trebled. Separately, a number of large merchants have asserted similar claims against Visa and MasterCard only (together with the lawsuits described above, “Interchange Lawsuits”). In October 2005, the class and merchant Interchange Lawsuits were consolidated before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York for certain purposes, including discovery. In July 2012, the parties executed and filed with the court a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to resolve the litigation on certain terms set forth in a settlement agreement attached to the Memorandum. The class settlement provides for, among other things, (i) payments by defendants to the class and individual plaintiffs totaling approximately $6.6 billion; (ii) a distribution to the class merchants of an amount equal to 10 basis points of certain interchange transactions for a period of eight months; and (iii) modifications to certain Visa and MasterCard rules regarding point of sale practices. In December 2013, the district court granted final approval of the proposed class settlement, which was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2014. On June 30, 2016, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s certification of the class, reversed approval of the proposed class settlement, and remanded the litigation to the district court for further proceedings, ruling that some of the merchants that were part of the proposed class settlement were not adequately represented. Because the Second Circuit ruling remands the litigation to the district court for further proceedings, the ultimate outcome in this matter is uncertain. Several merchant plaintiffs also opted out of the class settlement before it was overturned, and some of those plaintiffs have sued MasterCard, Visa and various member banks, including Capital One. The opt-out cases are consolidated before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York for certain purposes, including discovery. Visa and MasterCard have settled a number of individual opt-out cases, requiring non-material payments from all banks, including Capital One. Separate settlement and judgment sharing agreements between Capital One, MasterCard and Visa allocate the liabilities of any judgment or settlement arising from the Interchange Lawsuits and associated opt-out cases. Visa created a litigation escrow account following its IPO of stock in 2008, which funds any settlements for its member banks, and any settlements related to MasterCard allocated losses are reflected in Capital One’s reserves.
Mortgage Repurchase Litigation
In February 2009, GreenPoint was named as a defendant in a lawsuit commenced in the New York County Supreme Court, by U.S. Bank, N. A., Syncora Guarantee Inc. and CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. (“U.S. Bank Litigation”). Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that GreenPoint breached certain representations and warranties in two contracts pursuant to which GreenPoint sold approximately 30,000 mortgage loans having an aggregate original principal balance of approximately $1.8 billion to a purchaser that ultimately transferred most of these mortgage loans to a securitization trust. Some of the securities issued by the trust were insured by Syncora and CIFG. Plaintiffs seek unspecified damages and an order compelling GreenPoint to repurchase the entire portfolio of 30,000 mortgage loans based on alleged breaches of representations and warranties relating to a limited sampling of loans in the portfolio, or, alternatively, the repurchase of specific mortgage loans to which the alleged breaches of representations and warranties relate. In March 2010, the court granted GreenPoint’s motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs Syncora and CIFG but denied the motion with respect to U.S. Bank. GreenPoint subsequently answered the complaint with respect to U.S. Bank, denying the allegations, and filed a counterclaim against U.S. Bank alleging breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In February 2012, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint and dismissed Syncora and CIFG from the case. Syncora and CIFG appealed their dismissal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department (“First Department”), which affirmed the dismissal in April 2013. The New York Court of Appeals denied Syncora’s and CIFG’s motion for leave to appeal the First Department’s decision in February 2014. Therefore, the case is now proceeding with U.S. Bank as the sole plaintiff.
In May, June and July 2012, FHFA (acting as conservator for Freddie Mac) filed three summonses with notice in the New York state court against GreenPoint, on behalf of the trustees for three RMBS trusts backed by loans originated by GreenPoint with an aggregate original principal balance of $3.4 billion. In January 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated complaint in the name of the three trusts, acting by the respective trustees, alleging breaches of contractual representations and warranties regarding compliance with GreenPoint underwriting guidelines relating to certain loans (“FHFA Litigation”). Plaintiffs seek specific performance of the repurchase obligations with respect to the loans for which they have provided notice of alleged breaches as well as all other allegedly breaching loans, rescissory damages, indemnification, costs and interest. On March 29, 2017, the trial court granted GreenPoint’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff’s claims as untimely.
As noted above in the section entitled Mortgage Representation and Warranty Liabilities, the Company’s subsidiaries establish reserves with respect to representation and warranty litigation matters, where appropriate, within the Company’s overall representation and warranty reserves.
Anti-Money Laundering
Capital One is being investigated by the New York District Attorney’s Office (“NYDA”), the Department of Justice and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) of the U.S. Department of Treasury with respect to certain former check casher clients of the Commercial Banking business and Capital One’s anti-money laundering (“AML”) program. Capital One is cooperating with all agencies involved in the investigation.

In addition, Capital One is subject to an open consent order with the OCC dated July 10, 2015 concerning regulatory deficiencies in our AML program.
Intellectual Ventures Corp., et al.
In June 2013, Intellectual Ventures I, LLC and Intellectual Ventures II, LLC (collectively “IV”) sued Capital One Financial Corp., Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. and Capital One, N.A. (collectively “Capital One”) for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In the Complaint, IV alleged infringement of patents related to various business processes across the Capital One enterprise. IV simultaneously filed patent infringement actions against numerous other financial institutions on the same and other patents in several other federal courts. Capital One filed an answer and counterclaim alleging antitrust violations. In December 2013, the court dismissed Capital One’s counterclaim and decided the parties’ arguments on claim construction. IV agreed to dismiss two patents in suit, and following claim construction, asked for a stipulation of non-infringement for one patent with an opportunity to appeal the court’s decision regarding claim construction. In April 2014, the court granted Capital One’s motion for summary judgment and found that the two remaining patents were either unpatentable or indefinite. In May 2014, IV appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all three remaining patents in July 2015.
In January 2014, IV filed a second suit against Capital One for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. In the complaint, IV again alleges infringement of patents related to various business practices across the Capital One enterprise. In March 2015, the court granted Capital One’s motion for leave to add a counterclaim for antitrust violations. IV voluntarily dismissed one of the patents against Capital One and in September 2015, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Capital One on the remaining four patents and dismissed IV’s claims. IV appealed the dismissal of three of its claims to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s dismissal in March 2017. The only claims remaining in the trial court are Capital One’s counterclaims for antitrust violations by IV. The parties are engaged in discovery related to the counterclaims.
Other Pending and Threatened Litigation
In addition, we are commonly subject to various pending and threatened legal actions relating to the conduct of our normal business activities. In the opinion of management, the ultimate aggregate liability, if any, arising out of all such other pending or threatened legal actions will not be material to our consolidated financial position or our results of operations.