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Commitments and Contingencies
12 Months Ended
Dec. 31, 2012
Commitments and Contingencies
Commitments and Contingencies
California Rent Control Litigation
As part of the Company’s effort to realize the value of its Properties that are subject to rent control, the Company has initiated lawsuits against certain localities in California. The Company’s goal is to achieve a level of regulatory fairness in California’s rent control jurisdictions, and in particular those jurisdictions that prohibit increasing rents to market upon turnover. Such regulations allow tenants to sell their homes for a price that includes a premium above the intrinsic value of the homes. The premium represents the value of the future discounted rent-controlled rents, which is fully capitalized into the prices of the homes sold. In the Company’s view, such regulations result in a transfer to the tenants of the value of the Company’s land, which would otherwise be reflected in market rents. The Company has discovered through the litigation process that certain municipalities considered condemning the Company’s Properties at values well below the value of the underlying land. In the Company’s view, a failure to articulate market rents for sites governed by restrictive rent control would put the Company at risk for condemnation or eminent domain proceedings based on artificially reduced rents. Such a physical taking, should it occur, could represent substantial lost value to stockholders. The Company is cognizant of the need for affordable housing in the jurisdictions, but asserts that restrictive rent regulation does not promote this purpose because tenants pay to their sellers as part of the purchase price of the home all the future rent savings that are expected to result from the rent control regulations, eliminating any supposed improvement in the affordability of housing. In a more well-balanced regulatory environment, the Company would receive market rents that would eliminate the price premium for homes, which would trade at or near their intrinsic value. Such efforts include the following matters:
City of San Rafael
The Company sued the City of San Rafael on October 13, 2000 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging its rent control ordinance (the “Ordinance”) on constitutional grounds. The Company believes the litigation was settled by the City’s agreement to amend the ordinance to permit adjustments to market rent upon turnover. The City subsequently rejected the settlement agreement. The Court refused to enforce the settlement agreement, and submitted to a jury the claim that it had been breached. In October 2002, a jury found no breach of the settlement agreement.
The Company’s constitutional claims against the City were tried in a bench trial during April 2007. On April 17, 2009, the Court issued its Order for Entry of Judgment in the Company’s favor (the “April 2009 Order”). On June 10, 2009, the Court ordered the City to pay the Company net fees and costs of approximately $2.1 million. On June 30, 2009, as anticipated by the April 2009 Order, the Court entered final judgment that gradually phased out the City’s site rent regulation scheme that the Court found unconstitutional. Pursuant to the final judgment, existing residents of the Company’s Property in San Rafael will be able to continue to pay site rent as if the Ordinance were to remain in effect for a period of 10 years, enforcement of the Ordinance was immediately enjoined with respect to new residents of the Property, and the Ordinance will expire entirely ten years from the June 30, 2009 date of judgment.
The City and the residents’ association (which intervened in the case) appealed, and the Company cross-appealed. The briefing has been completed, oral argument was held on February 13, 2013, and a decision from the Court of Appeals remains pending.
City of Santee
In June 2003, the Company won a judgment against the City of Santee in California Superior Court (Case No. 777094). The effect of the judgment was to invalidate, on state law grounds, two rent control ordinances the City of Santee had enforced against the Company and other property owners. However, the Court allowed the City to continue to enforce a rent control ordinance that predated the two invalid ordinances (the “prior ordinance”). As a result of the judgment the Company was entitled to collect a one-time rent increase based upon the difference in annual adjustments between the invalid ordinance(s) and the prior ordinance and to adjust its base rents to reflect what the Company could have charged had the prior ordinance been continually in effect. The City of Santee appealed the judgment. The City and the Homeowners’ Association of Meadowbrook Estates (“tenant association”) also each sued the Company in separate actions in the California Superior Court (Case Nos. GIE 020887 and GIE 020524) alleging that the rent adjustments pursuant to the judgment violated the prior ordinance, sought to rescind the rent adjustments, and sought refunds of amounts paid, and penalties and damages in these separate actions. As a result of further proceedings and a series of appeals and remands, the Company was required to and did release the additional rents to the tenant association’s counsel for disbursement to the tenants, and the Company has ceased collecting the disputed rent amounts.
The tenant association continued to seek damages, penalties and fees in their separate action based on the same claims the City made on the tenants’ behalf in the City’s case. The Company moved for judgment on the pleadings in the tenant association’s case on the ground that the tenant association’s case was moot in light of the result in the City’s case. On November 6, 2008, the Court granted the Company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. The tenant association appealed. In Note 18—Commitments and Contingencies (continued)
June 2010, the Court of Appeal remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, on December 12, 2011, the Court granted the Company’s motion for summary judgment and denied the tenant association’s motion for summary judgment. On January 9, 2012, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Company, specifying that the tenant association shall recover nothing. On January 26, 2012, the Court set March 30, 2012 as the date for hearing the Company’s motion for attorneys’ fees and the tenant associations’ motion to reduce the Company’s claim for costs. On March 26, 2012, the tenant association filed a notice of appeal. On August 16, 2012, the Company and the tenant association entered a settlement agreement pursuant to which the tenant association dismissed its appeal in exchange for the Company’s agreement to dismiss its claims for attorneys’ fees and other costs. Because the matter was a class action by the tenant’s association, on January 18, 2013 the Court held a fairness hearing to consider final approval of the settlement, and approved the settlement.
In addition, the Company sued the City of Santee in United States District for the Southern District of California alleging all three of the ordinances are unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On October 13, 2010, the District Court: (1) dismissed the Company’s claims without prejudice on the ground that they were not ripe because the Company had not filed and received from the City a final decision on a rent increase petition, and (2) found that those claims are not foreclosed by any of the state court rulings. On November 10, 2010, the Company filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s ruling dismissing the Company’s claims. On April 20, 2011, the appeal was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties.
In order to ripen its claims, the Company filed a rent increase petition with the City. At a hearing held on October 6, 2011, the City’s Manufactured Home Fair Practices Commission voted to deny that petition, and subsequently entered written findings denying it. The Company appealed that determination to the Santee City Council, which on January 25, 2012 voted to deny the appeal. In view of that adverse final decision on its rent increase petition, on January 31, 2012 the Company filed a new complaint in United States District for the Southern District of California alleging that the City’s ordinance effectuates a regulatory and private taking of the Company’s property and is unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On April 2, 2012, the City filed a motion to dismiss the new complaint. On December 21, 2012, the Court entered an order in which it: (a) denied the City’s motion to dismiss the Company’s private taking and substantive due process claims; (b) granted the City’s motion to dismiss the Company’s procedural due process claim as not cognizable because of the availability of a state remedy of a writ of mandamus; and (c) granted the City’s motion to dismiss the Company’s regulatory taking claim as being not ripe.
In addition, the Company also filed in the California Superior Court on February 1, 2012 a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, and on September 28, 2012 a motion for writ of administrative mandamus, seeking orders correcting and vacating the decisions of the City and its Manufactured Home Fair Practices Commission, and directing that the Company’s rent increase petition be granted. The Company’s motion for writ of administrative mandamus is currently scheduled for hearing on April 5, 2013.
Colony Park
On December 1, 2006, a group of tenants at the Company’s Colony Park Property in Ceres, California filed a complaint in the California Superior Court for Stanislaus County alleging that the Company had failed to properly maintain the Property and had improperly reduced the services provided to the tenants, among other allegations. The Company answered the complaint by denying all material allegations and filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief and damages. The case proceeded in Superior Court because the Company’s motion to compel arbitration was denied and the denial was upheld on appeal. Trial of the case began on July 27, 2010. After just over three months of trial in which the plaintiffs asked the jury to award a total of approximately $6.8 million in damages, the jury rendered verdicts awarding a total of less than $44,000 to six out of the 72 plaintiffs, and awarding nothing to the other 66 plaintiffs. The plaintiff's who were awarded nothing filed a motion for a new trial or alternatively for judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, which the Court denied on February 14, 2011. All but 3 of the 66 plaintiffs to whom the jury awarded nothing have appealed. The briefing on that appeal has been completed, but a date for oral argument remains to be set by the California Court of Appeal.
By orders entered on December 14, 2011, the Superior Court awarded the Company approximately $2.0 million in attorneys’ fees and other costs jointly and severally against the plaintiffs to whom the jury awarded nothing, and awarded no attorneys’ fees or costs to either side with respect to the six plaintiffs to whom the jury awarded less than $44,000. Plaintiffs have filed an appeal from the approximately $2.0 million award to the Company of attorneys’ fees and other costs.
Note 18—Commitments and Contingencies (continued)
California Hawaiian
On April 30, 2009, a group of tenants at the Company’s California Hawaiian Property in San Jose, California filed a complaint in the California Superior Court for Santa Clara County alleging that the Company has failed to properly maintain the Property and has improperly reduced the services provided to the tenants, among other allegations. The Company moved to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings, to dismiss the case, and to strike portions of the complaint. By order dated October 8, 2009, the Court granted the Company’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the court proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration. The plaintiffs filed with the California Court of Appeal a petition for a writ seeking to overturn the trial court’s arbitration and stay orders. On May 10, 2011, the Court of Appeal granted the petition and ordered the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to restore the matter to its litigation calendar for further proceedings. On May 24, 2011, the Company filed a petition for rehearing requesting the Court of Appeal to reconsider its May 10, 2011 decision. On June 8, 2011, the Court of Appeal denied the petition for rehearing. On June 16, 2011, the Company filed with the California Supreme Court a petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision. On August 17, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Discovery in the case is proceeding. The Company believes that the allegations in the complaint are without merit, and intends to vigorously defend the litigation.
Hurricane Claim Litigation
On June 22, 2007, the Company filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Case No. 07CH16548), against its insurance carriers, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Essex Insurance Company (“Essex”), Lexington Insurance Company and Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company (“Westchester”), regarding a coverage dispute arising from losses suffered by the Company as a result of hurricanes that occurred in Florida in 2004 and 2005. The Company also brought claims against Aon Risk Services, Inc. of Illinois (“Aon”), the Company’s former insurance broker, regarding the procurement of appropriate insurance coverage for the Company. The Company is seeking declaratory relief establishing the coverage obligations of its carriers, as well as a judgment for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair settlement practices and, as to Aon, for failure to provide ordinary care in the selling and procuring of insurance. The claims involved in this action are approximately $11.0 million.
In response to motions to dismiss, the trial court dismissed: (1) the requests for declaratory relief as being duplicative of the claims for breach of contract and (2) certain of the breach of contract claims as being not ripe until the limits of underlying insurance policies have been exhausted. On or about January 28, 2008, the Company filed its Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which the insurers answered. In response to the court’s dismissal of the SAC’s claims against Aon, the Company ultimately filed, on February 2, 2009, a new Count VIII against Aon alleging a claim for breach of contract, which Aon answered. In January 2010, the parties engaged in a settlement mediation, which did not result in a settlement. In June 2010, the Company filed motions for partial summary judgment against the insurance companies seeking a finding that our hurricane debris cleanup costs are within the extra expense coverage of our excess insurance policies. On December 13, 2010, the Court granted the motion. Discovery is proceeding with respect to various remaining issues, including the amounts of the debris cleanup costs the Company is entitled to collect pursuant to the Court’s order granting the Company partial summary judgment.
On August 6, 2012, the Company was served with motions by Essex and Westchester seeking leave to amend their pleadings, which the Court subsequently allowed, to add affirmative defenses seeking to bar recovery on the alleged ground that the claim the Company submitted for hurricane-related losses allegedly intentionally concealed and misrepresented that a portion of that claim was not hurricane-related, and to add a counterclaim seeking on the same alleged ground reimbursement of approximately $2.4 million Essex previously paid. The Company believes that the affirmative defenses and counterclaim are without merit, and intends to vigorously contest them. The parties have filed motions for partial summary judgment with respect to certain of the claims that remain in the case, which are pending. The case has been set for trial on August 19, 2013.
The Company has entered settlements of its claims with certain of the insurers and also received additional payments from certain of the insurers since filing the lawsuit, collectively totaling approximately $7.4 million.
Membership Class Action
On July 29, 2011, the Company was served with a class action lawsuit in California state court filed by two named plaintiffs, who are husband and wife. Among other allegations, the suit alleges that the plaintiffs purchased a membership in the Company’s Thousand Trails network of campgrounds and paid annual dues; that they were unable to make a reservation to utilize one of the campgrounds because, they were told, their membership did not permit them to utilize that particular campground; that the Company failed to comply with the written disclosure requirements of various states’ membership camping statutes; that the Company misrepresented that it provides a money-back guaranty; and that the Company misrepresented that the campgrounds or portions of the campgrounds would be limited to use by members.
Note 18—Commitments and Contingencies (continued)
Allegedly on behalf of “between 100,000 and 200,000” putative class members, the suit asserts claims for alleged violation of: (1) the California Civil Code §§ 1812.300, et seq.; (2) the Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 32-2198, et seq.; (3) Chapter 222 of the Texas Property Code; (4) Florida Code §§ 509.001, et seq.; (5) Chapter 119B of the Nevada Administrative Code; (6) Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., (7) Business & Professions Code §§ 17500; (8) Fraud - Intentional Misrepresentation and False Promise; (9) Fraud - Omission; (10) Negligent Misrespresentation; and (11) Unjust Enrichment. The complaint seeks, among other relief, rescission of the membership agreements and refund of the member dues of plaintiffs and all others who purchased a membership from or paid membership dues to the Company since July 21, 2007; general and special compensatory damages; reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses of suit; punitive and exemplary damages; a permanent injunction against the complained of conduct; and pre-judgment interest.
On August 19, 2011, the Company filed an answer generally denying the allegations of the complaint, and asserting affirmative defenses. On August 23, 2011, the Company removed the case from the California state court to the federal district court in San Jose. On July 23, 2012, the Company filed a motion to deny class certification. On July 24, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their class action complaint to add four additional named plaintiffs. On August 28, 2012, the Court held a hearing on the Company's motion to deny class certification and on the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. The Court took the motions under submission and has not yet ruled on them. Separately, on September 14, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, on which the Court held a hearing on November 6, 2012 and which remains pending.
Cascade
On December 10, 2008, the King County Hospital District No. 4 (the “Hospital District” or “District”) filed suit against the Company in the Superior Court of King County, Washington, seeking a declaratory judgment that the District had properly rescinded an agreement to acquire, in lieu of a formal condemnation proceeding, the Company’s Thousand Trails - Cascade Property (“Cascade”) located 20 miles east of Seattle, Washington. Under that agreement, the Company had agreed to accept from the Hospital District $12.5 million for Cascade with an earnest money deposit of approximately $0.4 million. Immediately before commencement of the trial, the parties entered into a settlement, pursuant to which: (a) the Hospital District would acquire Cascade and compensate the Company in the amount of $7.05 million (the “Compensation Amount”) in 2015 or sooner; (b) the unpaid balance of the Compensation Amount would be increased at a rate of 5% (or 6% under certain circumstances) per year until closing; (c) the Hospital District would make interim non-refundable payments to the Company of 50% of each payment it received on its $30.0 million promissory note from the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe (the “Tribe Note”); and (d) if the Hospital District breached its obligations under the settlement, including without limitation if the Hospital District compromised the Tribe Note without the Company's written consent or failed to pay the Company 50% of any amounts received under the Tribe Note, the Company would be entitled to have a judgment automatically entered against the Hospital District for $12.15 million less interim payments the Hospital District had made.
On August 27, 2012, the Hospital District provided written notice under the settlement of its readiness to close on the acquisition of Cascade. The Company learned that the Hospital District negotiated and received a discounted, early payoff of the Tribe Note without obtaining the Company’s written consent, and failed to pay to the Company 50% of that payoff. Accordingly, pursuant to the terms of the settlement, the Company sent to the Hospital District on August 31, 2012 written notice that the Hospital District had breached the settlement both (1) by modifying the Tribe's Note without having first obtained the Company’s written consent; and (2) by failing to pay to the Company 50% of all sums received by the District from the Tribe Note. The Company’s written notice asserted that the Company was therefore entitled to file the Automatic Judgment, and invited resolution of the dispute. On December 7, 2012, the parties closed on the sale of the Property from the Company to the Hospital District, from which the net proceeds to the Company were approximately $7.6 million, finally resolving the matter.
Utah Utility Charges Class Action
On October 9, 2012, the Company was served with a class action lawsuit in Utah state court filed by the “Utah Manufactured Homeowner's Action Group, Inc.” against numerous owners and operators of numerous Utah manufactured home communities, two of which are owned by the Company. Among other allegations, the suit alleged that the defendants unlawfully impose service charges or fees on residents that are greater than the defendants’ actual costs of providing the utility services, and that when residents question or object defendants threatened to evict or otherwise punish and intimidate the residents. The suit asserted claims that the foregoing alleged conduct violated Utah Code 57-16-4(ii)(c) and resulted in unjust enrichment to the defendants. The suit demanded a jury trial and sought, among other relief, damages in an amount to be determined but not less than $1.0 million; costs and fees; punitive and/or exemplary damages, as appropriate; and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On December 19, 2012, the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal dismissing the Company from the class action lawsuit.
Note 18—Commitments and Contingencies (continued)
Litigation Relating to Potential Acquisition of Certain RV Resorts
On November 9, 2012, the Company entered a letter of intent with Morgan RV Resorts (“Morgan”), which granted the Company a right of exclusive dealing (“Exclusivity Right”) and a right of first refusal (“ROFR”) with respect to the purchase of 15 of Morgan's RV resorts. On December 13, 2012, Sun Communities, Inc. announced in an SEC filing that certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Sun”) had entered into a contract with Morgan to purchase 11 of those same properties, as a result of which the Company subsequently exercised its ROFR. In a suit initiated by Sun on December 26, 2012 against the Company and Morgan in the Oakland County (Michigan) Circuit Court, the parties are litigating the issue of who has the right to the properties. On February 12, 2013, Sun announced in an SEC filing that it had closed its purchase from Morgan on ten of the 11 properties at issue.
Other
The Company is involved in various other legal and regulatory proceedings arising in the ordinary course of business. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, notices, consent decrees, information requests, and additional permit requirements and other similar enforcement actions by governmental agencies relating to the Company’s water and wastewater treatment plants and other waste treatment facilities. Additionally, in the ordinary course of business, the Company’s operations are subject to audit by various taxing authorities. Management believes that all proceedings herein described or referred to, taken together, are not expected to have a material adverse impact on the Company. In addition, to the extent any such proceedings or audits relate to newly acquired Properties, the Company considers any potential indemnification obligations of sellers in favor of the Company.