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RELATED PARTIES
12 Months Ended
Dec. 31, 2012
RELATED PARTIES [Abstract]  
RELATED PARTIES
NOTE 14 – RELATED PARTIES
 
David A. Taft, a director, is the president of IBS Capital LLC ("IBS"), a Massachusetts limited liability company, whose principal business is investing in securities. IBS is the general partner of the IBS Turnaround Fund (QP), which is a Massachusetts limited partnership, IBS Turnaround Fund (LP), which is a Massachusetts limited partnership and the IBS Opportunity Fund, Ltd. Set forth below are purchases of Common Stock from the Company by the funds since January 1, 2011:

Date of Purchase
 
The IBS Turnaround Fund (QP) (A Limited Partnership)
  
The IBS Turnaround Fund (LP) (A Limited Partnership)
  
The IBS Opportunity Fund, Ltd.
  
Price Per Share
 
              
March 28, 2011
  1,385,000   459,000   656,000  $0.80 
June 27, 2011
  706,000   205,000   338,750  $1.60 


The above sales of shares of common stock were used to fund the Company's operations. The stock sold on March 28, 2011 was priced at the closing price of the Company's common stock on March 25, 2011. The stock sold on June 27, 2011 was priced at a slight premium to the closing price of the Company's common stock on June 24, 2011.

The Company is a related party to Material Advisors ("MA"), an entity with which the Company has a management agreement for executive services. See Note 15 for further details.

Forbearance Agreement

The Company and certain of its former officers were defendants in a class action In Re Atlas Mining Company Securities Litigation (the "Class Action"), whose settlement has been approved by the court. As an accommodation to facilitate the settlement of the Class Action, the following persons (the "Forbearing Shareholders") entered into a Forbearance Agreement whereby they agreed not to submit claims for damages relating to shares that they own or control and that would otherwise be eligible to participate in the settlement: David Taft; The IBS Turnaround (QP) Fund (A Limited Partnership), the IBS Turnaround Fund (A Limited Partnership), The IBS Opportunity Fund (BVI), Ltd. (the prior three hereafter collectively "IBS"); Andre Zeitoun (the Company's CEO), Chris Carney (the Company's Interim CFO), and Eric Basroon (an employee of Material Advisors LLC). The Forbearance Agreement provided that:

Prior to the time that the Forbearing Shareholders entered into the Forbearance Agreement, certain members of the Board of Directors, without taking formal action as a Board, acknowledged that the Forbearing Shareholders were accommodating the Company in a manner not required and should be compensated "as if" they had submitted claims as class members in the Settlement and this acknowledgement was communicated to the Forbearing Shareholders.

The Board subsequently appointed a committee of disinterested directors to determine whether compensation should be paid, the amount of any such compensation, and whether to pay compensation in cash or Common Stock. The committee consists of John Levy, Morris Weiss, and Evan Stone.

On March 29, 2010, the committee adopted resolutions designed to treat the Forbearing Shareholders as if they had participated in the settlement.

To achieve this goal, damages of each Forbearing Shareholder were computed using the formula for determining damages in the Class Action. Damages per share are the lesser of $0.84 or the difference between the purchase price and $0.80. The damages for each Forbearing Shareholders are approximately as follows: Taft - $0; IBS - $3,564,657; Zeitoun - $479,411; Carney - $231,735; and Basroon - $89,250. The aggregate damages for all of the Forbearing Shareholders are approximately $4,365,053.

The amount payable as compensation to the Forbearing Shareholders in the aggregate will be an amount equal to the Net Settlement Fund in the Class Action (approximately $800,000) multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is the aggregate damages of the Forbearing Shareholders and the denominator is the sum of (i) the aggregate damages of the Forbearing Shareholders and (ii) the dollar amount of claims actually submitted by shareholders against the Net Settlement Fund in the Class Action (this amount is different form the total damages of all shareholders other than the Forbearing Shareholders).

The deadline for submitting claims in the Class Action was May 6, 2010. The plaintiff's counsel is currently evaluating all claims. The amount payable to the Forbearing Shareholders varies depending on the dollar amount of claims actually submitted in the Class Action, the higher the dollar amount of claims submitted in the Class Action, the lower the amount payable to the Forbearing Shareholders. By way of example, if no claims at all were submitted by shareholders in the Class Action, the amount payable to all of the Forbearing Shareholders would be $800,000; if $3,000,000 in claims are submitted in the Class Action, the amount payable to the Forbearing Shareholders would be $474,136.

The committee of disinterested directors has determined that compensation to the Forbearing Shareholders will be paid in Common Stock of the Company. The shares will be valued at the market price of the Company's Common Stock as of the closing price on the first date on which the distribution agent in the Class Action sends or delivers distributions from the Net Settlement Fund to shareholders who have submitted claims.

If the Forbearing Shareholders had not entered into the Forbearance Agreement, they believe that the Company may not have been able to settle the Class Action on the favorable terms that it did. The damages suffered by the Forbearing Shareholders, based on an estimate of total damages provided by counsel to the plaintiffs in the Class Action, represented a majority of the total damages of the class. The plaintiff's counsel required a representation by the Company that any damages paid by the Company to the Forbearing Shareholders not exceed amounts granted to the class. The Forbearing Agreement had the effect of making the entire Net Settlement Fund available to other shareholders. The Forbearing Shareholders believe that if they did not enter into the Forbearance Agreement, plaintiffs would have insisted on a significantly higher settlement amount and this in all likelihood would have forced the Company to raise additional capital by selling stock at, what they believed to be, unfavorable terms at the time.

On November 22, 2010, the Company issued to Messrs. Taft, Zeitoun, Carney and Basroon, 349,286 shares, 46,975 shares, 22,707 shares and 8,745 shares, respectively as determined by the terms of the Forbearance Agreement in full settlement.