EX-1.01
Exhibit 1.01
CONFLICT MINERALS REPORT
Summary of Apple’s Commitment
Apple is deeply committed to upholding human rights and using minerals in its products that do not directly or indirectly finance armed conflict
or benefit armed groups. Apple works to safeguard the well-being of people involved in its supply chain and to protect the place where these materials are found. As of December 31, 2017—for the third straight year—100 percent of
identified smelters and refiners* in Apple’s supply chain for all applicable products manufactured during calendar year 2017 participated in an independent third-party conflict minerals audit
(“Third Party Audit”) program for gold, columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, wolframite, tantalum, tin, and tungsten (collectively, “conflict minerals”). In 2017, Apple directed its suppliers to remove from its supply chain
10 smelters and refiners not willing to participate in, or complete, a Third Party Audit within given timelines.
Reaching and maintaining
100 percent participation is significant because Apple believes Third Party Audits are the foundation of a strong due diligence program. However, to help end abuses caused by conflict and to protect human rights, further measures beyond Third
Party Audits are needed. Apple believes human rights considerations are fundamental. Apple works hard to go beyond basic requirements in order to meet and exceed internationally accepted due diligence standards. The company also takes additional
steps to help protect people in its supply chain, with the ultimate goal of improving conditions on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) and adjoining countries.
Apple’s commitment goes beyond basic requirements in a number of ways. First, while Apple requires its suppliers to ensure that conflict minerals
smelters and refiners in its supply chain participate in Third Party Audit programs, it also maintains a strict Supplier Code of Conduct and Supplier Responsibility Standards that pertain to Apple’s partners at all levels. Second,
Apple now instructs its suppliers to engage with smelters and refiners in its supply chain to assess and identify a broader range of risks beyond conflict risk. Third, by supporting the expansion of a whistleblowing mechanism, Apple supports
initiatives that foster independent, local voices that can raise issues and report abuses at the mine-site level and throughout the supply chain, which Apple believes ultimately will help improve conditions for people living in the DRC and beyond.
Finally, Apple annually reviews reported supply chain incidents and public allegations of abuse, potentially linked to certain smelters and refiners in the supply chain, and uses that information to help improve conflict minerals traceability
schemes and Third Party Audit programs.
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250 in total as of December 31, 2017. |
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As the African Great Lakes Region faces ongoing challenges to achieve lasting change, Apple believes that
all stakeholders—governments, non-governmental organizations, industries, and local communities—should enhance their efforts to implement comprehensive due diligence programs and work together to
measure impact and
improve the situation on the ground.
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Introduction
Apple’s conflict minerals program includes due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals in its supply chain (see Annex I).
It has been designed to conform in all material respects to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Third Edition (2016), and the related supplements (“Due Diligence Guidance”) and its five-step framework.
OECD
Step 1: Strong Company Management Systems
Aligned with Step 1 of the Due Diligence Guidance, Apple has robust internal management systems
overseeing Apple’s human rights, conflict minerals, and responsible sourcing program. Apple’s responsible minerals sourcing policies and procedures are coordinated by the Supplier Responsibility (“SR”) team within Apple’s
World Wide Operations group. The SR team works across a number of Apple business teams and functions, including, but not limited to, Apple’s legal, finance, and procurement groups. The SR team also regularly consults with Apple’s senior
management to review progress and set ongoing strategy for its due diligence program.
Apple’s Supplier Code of Conduct and Supplier
Responsibility Standards outline Apple’s extensive requirements on the responsible sourcing of conflict minerals. In particular, the standards set out expectations for conflict minerals due diligence and related sourcing matters. These
documents are publicly available on Apple’s website. In this way, Apple implements its requirement that smelters and refiners in its supply chain comply with Apple’s strict standards, including that smelters and refiners are required to
participate in Third Party Audit programs. To ensure that Apple’s suppliers understand Apple’s conflict minerals sourcing policy, Apple directly communicates its policies and standards to suppliers with, in certain cases, accompanying
training.
Apple performs the due diligence measures summarized in Annex I to identify smelters and refiners in Apple’s conflict minerals
supply chain and to determine the chain of custody of conflict minerals included in Apple’s products.
Apple also maintains a grievance
mechanism through a dedicated conflict minerals email address. Through this email address, suppliers can report directly to Apple concerns or grievances in connection with conflict minerals mining, processing, and trading, which are then reviewed
with the participation of relevant Apple business teams.
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Apple believes its use of detailed policies, robust implementation systems, and direct engagement with its
supplier base has enabled it to achieve a 100 percent Third Party Audit participation rate of identified smelters and refiners in its supply chain since 2015.
Apple believes that Third Party Audits are the backbone of effective due diligence systems, but participation alone is not sufficient. To achieve
meaningful outcomes in the supply chain, more must be done beyond Third Party Audits to protect human rights on the ground and measure impacts.
Going Beyond: Working Together for Progress
Collective Action
Apple is working to make industry-wide progress,
beyond its own supply chain. As part of this commitment, in 2017, Apple maintained its participation in the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals; served on the Governance Committee of the Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals
Trade; participated in the Responsible Artisanal Gold Solutions Forum and supported its Artisanal- and Small-Scale Mining Toolkit; and chaired the Steering Committee of the Responsible Minerals Initiative (“RMI”), formerly known as the
Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative.
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As part of its commitment to industry-wide progress, Apple also benchmarked the scope and requirements of
dozens of third-party sustainability standards, including upstream protocols for mineral processors and mining companies. Apple analyzed which frameworks meet its responsible sourcing requirements and published this information in its Supplier
Responsibility Standards. By publicly listing acceptable upstream standards that meet Apple’s responsible sourcing expectations for 2017, Apple believes it has clearly communicated its policy and expectations to mining companies and smelters
and refiners further up the supply chain.
As a direct result of its benchmarking effort, Apple believes its standards directly contributed to
strengthening industry standards in the mining industry. The Mining Association of Canada announced the addition of child and forced labor requirements to its sustainability standard, Toward Sustainable Mining, based on Apple’s
work.
Empowering People
Apple has continued its efforts to
empower independent voices in the supply chain and at the mine-site level. In 2017, Apple continued supporting the whistleblowing mechanism of the International Tin Association’s (formerly known as ITRI Limited) International Tin Supply Chain
Initiative (“ITSCI”). Apple provided financial assistance for the expansion of its availability to five new provinces in the DRC. ITSCI assists companies in the responsible sourcing of conflict minerals from high-risk areas
and monitors the mine sites participating in ITSCI’s traceability and due diligence program. ITSCI’s whistleblowing mechanism allows people to place anonymous calls in local languages to voice concerns related to
mineral extraction, trade, handling, and the export of minerals so allegations of misconduct are surfaced and addressed.
Separately, Apple worked
with a Third Party Audit program to overhaul and enhance its grievance and complaints mechanism in an attempt to make it more immediately impactful. Apple also provided financial assistance to the Fund for Global Human Rights, a human rights
organization that supports local activists in the DRC working on a range of issues, including economic and social rights of mining communities, inclusive economic growth, judicial advocacy, and health, safety, and fair compensation for mining
communities.
OECD Step 2: Identification and Assessment of Risk in the Supply Chain
Consistent with Step 2 of the Due Diligence Guidance, Apple has worked on multiple levels in the supply chain to identify and assess risks. Apple
collects and processes data provided by suppliers through their completion of the industry-wide standard Conflict Minerals Reporting Template (“CMRT”) to map Apple’s supply chain to the smelter and refiner level. Apple has also made
available through Apple’s SupplierCare portal, in English, Mandarin, and certain other languages, online training and education for new and current suppliers in its supply chain. The training and education focuses primarily on Apple’s due
diligence expectations, practices, and requirements for conflict minerals reporting. In addition, to the extent that Apple determines a supplier has material gaps in management systems, in data management, or in smelter reporting, the supplier may
be offered tailored support by Apple to address the shortfalls.
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Further, Apple engaged a third party to conduct a number of
in-person audits of suppliers to verify the accuracy of reported CMRT data and to test that corrective actions have been taken with respect to audit findings. In general, based on audits conducted in 2016 and
2017, Apple believes that suppliers have shown improvements in their due diligence practices.
Going Beyond: Expanding Risk Assessment
Apple has sought to enhance its due diligence program, in part, by seeking out information beyond that obtained through Third Party Audit participation.
In 2016, Apple first began to comprehensively request identified conflict minerals smelters and refiners in Apple’s supply chain to complete Apple’s Risk Readiness Assessment (“RRA”) survey. The RRA helps assess risk readiness
beyond just those associated with conflict and incorporates additional social, environmental, and human rights categories. In particular, the RRA includes assessment categories related to how smelters and refiners treat artisanal and small-scale
mining formalization.1 The RRA also assesses how smelters and refiners address certain community health and safety issues. In 2017, Apple demanded that its suppliers engage with smelters and
refiners in its supply chain to complete the RRA and, as a result, 80 percent of identified smelters and refiners provided responses. The chart below illustrates the breakdown of responses Apple received by conflict mineral category, which
demonstrates the highest response rate from tin smelters and the lowest response rate from gold refiners.
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Formalization in this context means the formal establishment and recognition, through policies and commitments by
relevant stakeholders, of an artisanal and small-scale mining sector. |
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Based on its belief in the overall usefulness of the RRA, and with the support of various non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), Apple took steps in 2017 to make the tool available more broadly to stakeholders. Apple provided the RRA to the Responsible Business Alliance (“RBA”),
formerly known as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, so that other supply chain actors can collectively benefit from its use. RBA has reported to Apple that, as of December 31, 2017, 60 downstream companies and 151 upstream smelters
and refiners have utilized the RRA.
OECD Step 3: Strategy to Respond to Identified Risks
In alignment with Step 3 of the Due Diligence Guidance, Apple has designed and implemented systems in its due diligence program to respond to identified
risks, either at the Apple level or, in certain instances, by working with or through third-party stakeholders. Apple closely monitors completion of Third Party Audits and re-audits by the smelters and
refiners in its supply chain. In the instances where there are delays on the part of the smelters and refiners in implementing corrective action plans developed by Third Party Audits, Apple leverages its downstream position to conduct applicable
smelter or refiner outreach. It also reiterates in such instances to relevant smelters and refiners the importance of timely completion and closure of the corrective action plans with respect to such audits. Apple also actively engages and partners
with the key Third Party Audit programs—in particular, RMI; the London Bullion Market Association (“LBMA”); the Responsible Jewellery Council (“RJC”); and ITSCI, the traceability program—to address identified risks. In
2017, Apple worked with RMI, LBMA, and RJC in connection with certain smelter, refiner, or mine-level allegations to seek verification of the allegations, to the extent reasonably possible, and advance appropriate corrective action, where necessary.
Apple also took steps in 2017 to strengthen industry due diligence systems. The RMI, LBMA, and RJC each went through scheduled revisions of their
auditing standards during 2017 and Apple engaged with each body through the process. Apple used the opportunity to advocate for enhancements to the due diligence requirements and data collection processes related to smelters and refiners and their
associated supply chains. In addition, Apple continued to engage gold industry stakeholders in 2017, including banking and jewelry industry groups, to encourage stronger leadership on responsible sourcing by major gold users.
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Going Beyond: Strengthening Reporting Systems
Review of ITSCI Incidents
Apple believes that transparency and
public reporting promote a better understanding of the success and challenges of industry-wide due diligence efforts and enable more systemic engagement by other stakeholders in the supply chain, such as NGOs. As a result of advocacy by Apple, in
2017, ITSCI published a summary of incidents, from 2011–2016, of abuse potentially associated with mine sites in the DRC supplying certain tin, tantalum, and tungsten smelters. Such publication included incident categorization, resolution
rates, and outcomes. In 2017, Apple continued its work with ITSCI and monitored over 1,240 incidents generated through the ITSCI reporting system relating to incidents of abuse potentially associated with mine sites in the DRC and adjoining
countries.
Closing Out Reported 2016 Incidents
In 2016, Apple
reviewed over 1,300 incidents and allegations reported by ITSCI, local NGOs, and others, relating to incidents potentially associated with mine sites supplying smelters and refiners in the international supply chain, including in the electronics
industry supply chain. As reported in Apple’s Conflict Minerals Report for 2016, 15 of these incidents (13 reported through ITSCI and two raised with the LBMA), potentially linked to smelters and refiners reported in Apple’s supply chain,
had occurred in which individuals, identified as members or potential members of organizations within the meaning of “armed groups,” as defined in Item 1.01(d)(2) of Form SD (“armed groups”). In particular, the police in the DRC,
the DRC national army, and the Mai Mai group, an armed group in the DRC, were alleged to be involved.
In 2017, Apple received assurances from ITSCI
that the 13 incidents reported by ITSCI had been closed, in accordance with ITSCI criteria, after ITSCI’s follow-up. Of the 13, seven incidents were resolved through corrective actions, including
sanctions of alleged perpetrators, redress by local authorities, and security and due diligence improvements near mine sites. Four incidents were closed due to lack of sufficient evidence, and the remaining two ITSCI incidents were closed due to
insufficient engagement from local authorities. With respect to the two allegations raised with the LBMA, which related to an LBMA-audited gold refiner, the LBMA followed up with the refiner directly and subsequently verified the refiner’s
response during the refiner’s scheduled LBMA “Responsible Gold Guidance” audit. That audit determined that the facts on which the original allegations were made could not be substantiated. Apple was unable to determine whether
specific minerals were included in Apple’s products in any of the 15 incidents—13 incidents reported by ITSCI and the two incidents raised with the LBMA.
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Analysis of 2017 ITSCI Incidents
In 2017, Apple monitored over 1,240 ITSCI incidents to identify those potentially linked to smelters reported in Apple’s supply chain, where
individuals identified as members or potential members of armed groups were alleged to be involved. Apple identified seven potential incidents involving the police in the DRC, the DRC national army, and the DRC national intelligence agency in
connection with a variety of alleged illicit activities. Based on information received to date, these alleged illicit activities ranged from bribery, illegal arrests, and illegal taxation at mining sites and checkpoints or road barriers, to
corruption and other criminal activity, potentially for personal gain. Apple has not, to date, been able to determine whether the reported incidents were connected to specific conflict minerals included in Apple’s products. The challenges with
tracking specific mineral quantities through the supply chain continue to prevent the traceability of any specific mineral shipment through the entire manufacturing process.
To date, of the seven identified incidents potentially involving armed groups, three have been closed and four remain open, as they occurred near the
end of 2017, and investigations and corrective actions are still in process. In two of the closed incidents, the alleged perpetrators have been removed and checkpoints where illegal taxation was purportedly taking place were confirmed to be no
longer in use or removed. In addition, in one of these incidents the alleged perpetrator has been sanctioned or received some level of official redress by the local authorities. The remaining third incident was closed due to insufficient and
conflicting evidence.
Working with ITSCI, Apple’s 2016 Conflict Minerals Report included for the first time an analysis of outcomes of all
ITSCI incidents monitored and closed in 2016. The analysis provided a snapshot of the corrective actions taken to address relevant incidents. Apple believes this brought further transparency to ITSCI’s operations and a deeper understanding of
remediation and mitigation measures.
The breakdown of outcomes of monitored and closed ITSCI incidents for 2017 was similar to 2016 incidents. In 2017, of all
monitored and closed incidents:
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43% were addressed through due diligence improvements. This category broadly covers a range of potential improvements,
from administrative corrections to changes in company sourcing practices. Apple believes that such steps demonstrate the continuous improvement occurring along the supply chain. |
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18% were addressed through improvements in governance and security, which included arrests and prosecution of
perpetrators as well as other actions taken by local authorities, such as steps to reduce corruption. |
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15% were closed as unresolved incidents due to ineffective implementation of corrective actions or a lack of agreement
between involved stakeholders. |
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10% were closed as unsubstantiated incidents due to lack of sufficient evidence to support the particular allegation.
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7% were addressed through awareness raising, including formal training and stakeholder dialogue in the communities.
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5% were addressed through human rights or health and safety risk mitigation, including repayment to miners or families
for damages. |
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2% were closed following the applicable mines, companies, or minerals being suspended or seized, which Apple believes
demonstrates the extent to which responsible sourcing requirements impact businesses. |
Public Allegations
In addition
to monitoring the 2017 incidents reported by ITSCI, Apple reviewed other public allegations potentially linked to smelters. By reviewing allegations, Apple aims to bridge the reported findings from civil society and other independent voices with
industry due diligence mechanisms so that verified abuses on the ground can be addressed and remedied.
Apple believes that addressing incidents and
allegations potentially affecting only Apple’s supply chain will not lead to progress on the ground. Accordingly, Apple has taken steps to mobilize a broader group of stakeholders to be informed of and take action on other public allegations.
In 2016, Apple developed a process to more systematically identify, categorize, and follow up on relevant allegations. In 2017, Apple worked with key stakeholders to develop a multi-stakeholder grievance platform to foster greater transparency and
consistency in how public allegations are identified, reported, and addressed and to drive toward addressing potential abuses on the ground. Apple also worked directly with the RMI, LBMA, and RJC to innovate an OECD-based process for investigating
and resolving public allegations. In addition, Apple worked with the United Nations International Organization for Migration to develop a set of public guidelines for industry actors on how to address confirmed allegations in the upstream supply
chain.
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Though collective measures do not substitute for a company’s own supply chain due diligence, Apple
believes these processes will ultimately strengthen Third Party Audit programs and traceability programs that Apple and others in the industry rely on to responsibly source conflict minerals. Apple continues to advocate for Third Party Audit
programs to review and address public allegations with the overall goal of improving the reporting, auditing, and traceability aspects of their programs.
OECD
Step 4: Independent Third Party Audit of Supply Chain Due Diligence
Apple believes Third Party Audits remain the foundation of robust due
diligence systems. In particular, Apple believes that Third Party Audits play a significant role in providing assurances that smelters and refiners have appropriate due diligence systems in place and help ensure that operations and sourcing
practices do not support conflict in the DRC and adjoining countries. To date, through advocacy and influence, Apple has driven a steady increase in smelters and refiners participating in Third Party Audits. In 2015, Apple first reached its goal of
a 100 percent rate of participation in Third Party Audit programs by identified smelters and refiners in its supply chain, and again achieved a 100 percent rate of participation in 2016 and 2017.
Apple believes that continued pressure on the smelters and refiners removed from Apple’s supply chain in previous years for not
participating in a Third Party Audit has led to some smelters and refiners undergoing audits in 2017. As a result, two have received approval to re-enter Apple’s supply chain following
their completion of a Third Party Audit in 2017.
If smelters or refiners are unable or unwilling to meet Apple’s high standards, Apple will
take necessary actions to cause the termination of the applicable business relationships with such smelters or refiners. In 2017, Apple directed its suppliers to remove from Apple’s supply chain 10 smelters and refiners not willing to
participate in, or complete, a Third Party Audit within given timelines.
Going Beyond: Considering Impact
Third Party Audits are currently not designed to capture or assess the extent to which conditions for people living in the affected countries are
improving. As part of its commitment to safeguard the well-being of people involved in its supply chain, Apple took steps in 2017 to integrate human rights impact measurements into its due diligence program. Apple sought out available data to
evaluate the impact of certification and traceability programs on human rights of people living near mine sites.
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In particular, Apple worked with International Peace Information Service (“IPIS”),
an independent research institute, to integrate the IPIS data into Apple’s efforts to begin measuring the impact of Third Party Audits and traceability schemes on human rights improvements of people living
near mine sites. Data was collected from tin, tantalum, and tungsten mine sites both officially recognized by the DRC government, which includes mine sites participating in the ITSCI traceability program (“validated mine
sites”), and not officially recognized by the DRC government (“non-validated mine sites”). As a result of reviewing the data, Apple observed lower interference by actors allegedly
perpetuating human rights violations at validated mine sites versus non-validated mine sites. However, more data is needed to track progress on human rights impacts on the ground, which Apple will continue to
integrate into its due diligence efforts.
OECD Step 5: Report on Supply Chain Due Diligence
In alignment with Step 5 of the Due Diligence Guidance, Apple reports annually on its due diligence requirements through, among other means, its annual
Conflict Minerals Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Apple also publishes on its website various other public reports that include information about Apple’s due diligence practices beyond conflict minerals.
Going Beyond: Promoting Transparency
Apple is committed to
transparency. Apple’s Supplier Code of Conduct and Supplier Responsibility Standards are published and updated annually to reflect emerging risks and stricter requirements than those required in previous years for suppliers and the smelters and
refiners from which they source. In addition to publishing all identified conflict minerals smelters and refiners, Apple also publishes on its website an annual list of identified smelters and refiners of cobalt. Apple also makes audit and RRA
completion statuses publicly available. Apple further requires suppliers to ensure that applicable smelters and refiners post relevant information and verification or audit status on their websites and, where applicable, be listed on a recognized
third-party website. Suppliers are also required to inform Apple immediately of certain high risks associated with conflict minerals, as outlined in Apple’s Supplier Responsibility Standards, through a dedicated Apple email address.
Apple annually publishes on its website the list of its 200 largest suppliers, including component providers and others. In 2017, this represented
at least 98 percent of procurement expenditures for materials, manufacturing, and assembly of Apple products worldwide.
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Conclusion: Risk Mitigation and Future Due Diligence Measures
Apple will continue to responsibly source conflict minerals throughout its supply chain and press for continuous improvements in industry-wide due
diligence approaches and human rights–focused practices to make a positive impact on the lives of people living in the DRC and adjoining countries. Going forward, Apple intends to continue to push beyond the status quo by:
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Continuing to collaborate with relevant stakeholders to improve on how incidents and allegations are tracked and
addressed on a transparent, industry-wide basis. |
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Working with industry and NGOs to measure impacts of due diligence programs on conditions in the affected countries.
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Collaborating with industry groups and NGOs to continue improving traceability of conflict minerals beyond smelters and
refiners to the mine level. |
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Increasing use of the RRA by continuing to press for the completion of an RRA by smelters and refiners with the
understanding that failure to do so may be a basis for removal. |
Determination
Based on the information provided by Apple’s suppliers and its own due diligence efforts through December 31, 2017 (see Annex I), Apple
believes the facilities that may have been used to process conflict minerals in Apple’s products include the smelters and refiners listed in Annex II. Through the smelter and refiner identification and validation process, Apple has identified a
total of 309 smelters and refiners as potential sources of conflict minerals that, initially, were believed to have been in its supply chain at some point during 2017. Of the 309 smelters and refiners:
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250 smelters and refiners were determined to be in Apple’s conflict minerals supply chain as of December 31,
2017; |
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8 smelters and refiners were subsequently found to be inoperative during 2017; and |
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51 smelters and refiners were removed and no longer reported in Apple’s supply chain as of December 31, 2017.
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Of the 51 removed smelters and refiners:
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35 were removed from Apple’s supply chain in 2016 and initially, erroneously or unintentionally reported
again in 2017 by suppliers due to reasons such as changes in a supplier’s supply chain or product line; and changes in a supplier’s declaration of scope in the supplier’s CMRT. Apple took action to ensure that the 35
smelters and refiners did not re-enter or remain in Apple’s supply chain. |
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16 were newly removed in 2017 at Apple’s request or by suppliers on their own initiative. |
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Of these 16 newly removed smelters and refiners:
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10 had been previously participating but subsequently stopped participating in a Third Party Audit program or were
not willing to participate in, or complete, a Third Party Audit within given timelines; and |
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6 were removed by suppliers on their own initiative. |
Apple’s reasonable country of origin inquiry is based on Third Party Audit information and, to the extent that country of origin information has
not been audited, additional information collected by others. To the extent reasonably possible, Apple has documented the country of origin of identified smelters and refiners based on information received through the RMI’s Third Party Audit
program—formerly known as the Conflict-Free Smelter Program, now known as the Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (“RMAP”)—the LBMA, a survey of smelters, and/or third-party reviews of publicly available information. However,
some country of origin information has not been audited by a third party because, among other reasons, applicable smelters and refiners have gone out of operation before completing a Third Party Audit; smelters and refiners have not gone through a
Third Party Audit; or the particular Third Party Audit program either did not provide, or has not yet required reporting of, country of origin information from all smelters and refiners. Therefore, Apple does not have sufficient information to
conclusively determine the countries of origin of the conflict minerals in all of its products; however, based on the information provided by Apple’s suppliers, smelters and refiners, as well as from the RMI, the LBMA, and other sources, Apple
believes that the conflict minerals contained in its products originate from the countries listed in Annex III, as well as from recycled and scrap sources.
Of all 250 of the smelters and refiners of conflict minerals determined to be in Apple’s supply chain as of December 31,
2017, Apple found no reasonable basis for concluding that any such smelter or refiner sourced conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups.
Of the 41 smelters and refiners known to be sourcing from the DRC or an adjoining country, 40 participated or continued to
participate in a Third Party Audit in 2017 involving the review of the traceability of the smelter’s or refiner’s conflict minerals, in addition to a validation of its due diligence systems and country of origin
information. The remaining smelter, although it participated in a Third Party Audit in 2016, was removed during 2017 by suppliers on their own initiative from Apple’s supply chain. Apple was
informed that the smelter had a change in circumstances and it subsequently determined not to continue to participate in the Third Party Audit program. The foregoing does not include smelters and refiners indirectly sourcing from
the DRC or adjoining countries by acquiring conflict minerals from these 41 smelters and refiners.
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About This Report
The report has been prepared pursuant to Rule 13p-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, for
the reporting period from January 1 to December 31, 2017.
This report relates to the process undertaken for Apple products that were
manufactured, or contracted to be manufactured, during 2017 and that contain conflict minerals.
These products are Apple’s iPhone®, iPad®, Mac®, iPod®,
Apple TV®, Apple Watch®, AirPods®, HomePod™, Beats® products, displays, and Apple accessories. Third-party products that Apple retails but that it does not manufacture or contract
to manufacture are outside of the scope of this report. The smelters and refiners identified in this report include smelters and refiners producing service or spare parts contract manufactured in 2017 for use in connection with the subsequent
service of previously sold products, including products serviced in subsequent years using those parts. This report does not include smelters of tantalum, tin, and tungsten and refiners of gold where such conflict minerals are included in end-of-life service parts for products that Apple no longer manufactures or contracts to manufacture.
This report’s use of the terms “smelters” and “refiners” refers to the facilities (i.e., a smelter or refiner) processing
primary conflict minerals to retail purity. Apple suppliers have in some cases reported smelters and refiners that Apple believes are not operational or may have been misidentified as smelters and refiners. As a result, Apple continues to conduct
independent research on smelters and refiners and to work with suppliers throughout its supply chain to revalidate, improve, and refine their reported information, taking into account supply chain fluctuations and other changes in status or scope
and relationships over time. “Identified” smelters and refiners are those that (i) have been reported in supplier surveys, (ii) Apple believes are currently operational, were operational at some point during the applicable year
or, while inoperative, were capable of re-engagement with minimal delay or effort, and (iii) otherwise meet the definition of a smelter or refiner, provided that Apple may determine to treat a third party
as an identified smelter or refiner notwithstanding a reclassification of such third party or a change in its status. As part of its reasonable country of origin inquiry, Apple concluded that several processing facilities are using only recycled
material. Facilities that process only secondary materials (i.e., scrap or recycled material) are excluded from the scope of this report, except where the entity has undergone a Third Party Audit and is otherwise identified in Annex II.
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Participating smelters and refiners are those that have agreed to participate in, or have been found
compliant with, the RMAP or cross-recognized independent third-party conflict minerals audit programs confirming their conflict minerals sourcing practices. Such programs may also include audits of traceability requirements, conformity with Due
Diligence Guidance, management systems, and/or risk assessments. Cross-recognized independent third-party conflict minerals audit programs include the LBMA’s Responsible Gold Program and the RJC’s Chain-of-Custody Certification. Throughout this report, the audits by these programs are included in references to “Third Party Audit” programs.
This report includes forward-looking statements, within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which involve risks and
uncertainties. Forward-looking statements provide current expectations of future events based on certain assumptions and include any statement that does not directly relate to any historical or current fact. Forward-looking statements can also be
identified by words such as “expects,” “plans,” “intends,” “will,” “may,” and similar terms. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance. Apple assumes no obligation to revise
or update any forward-looking statements for any reason, except as required by law. Subsequent events may affect Apple’s future determinations under Rule 13p-1.
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 16
ANNEX I: Due Diligence Guidance
Apple designed its due diligence measures to conform in all material respects to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. Apple seeks to meet and exceed
internationally accepted due diligence measures on the traceability of conflict minerals in its supply chain.
2017 Due Diligence Measures
Performed:
| |
1. |
Apple directly communicated to suppliers in its supply chain Apple’s policy for the supply chain of conflict
minerals originating from the DRC and adjoining countries. |
| |
2. |
Apple continued to conduct outreach to smelters and refiners not yet participating in a Third Party Audit program, and
participating smelters and refiners appearing to delay the completion of their Third Party Audits, to request their timely participation and completion of an audit in order to meet this requirement. As a result of this process, Apple identified 10
smelters and refiners that did not meet this requirement and directed its suppliers to remove these smelters and refiners from their supply chain. |
| |
3. |
Apple compared information provided by the RMI against other recognized Third Party Audit programs as part of its due
diligence process. |
| |
4. |
Apple engaged with suppliers throughout its supply chain to identify and assess conflict minerals–related risks,
including taking the following specific actions: |
| |
a) |
Requiring its suppliers utilizing conflict minerals to submit a CMRT in order for Apple to maintain the mapping of its
supply chain to the smelter and refiner level. |
| |
b) |
Requesting its conflict minerals smelters and refiners to complete and deliver an RRA survey in order to report not only
on conflict minerals–related risk but also on a broader set of risks. |
| |
c) |
Engaging a third party to perform audits on certain suppliers to verify the accuracy of their conflict
minerals–related reporting and to identify any material gaps in associated management systems. |
| |
5. |
Apple encouraged improved monitoring and transparent tracking of incidents and allegations to determine whether reported
smelters and refiners, identified as potentially sourcing conflict minerals from the DRC or adjoining countries, may be associated with armed groups. |
| |
a) |
Apple reviewed publicly available information such as investigative reports from NGOs and international organizations
that have conducted investigations on individuals and companies associated with armed groups. |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 17
| |
b) |
Apple continued its financial and non-financial support for the development of
an incident review process with ITSCI in 2017. Apple monitored and analyzed ITSCI reports of incidents occurring in 2017 to identify which reports related to potential armed group interference in applicable mineral supply chains; whether these
incidents had been followed up and addressed; and whether the incidents could be linked to smelters in Apple’s tin, tantalum, or tungsten supply chains. |
| |
c) |
Apple followed up on identified allegations from NGO reports in the gold supply chain to determine what, if any,
corrective actions had occurred. |
| |
d) |
Apple worked with key stakeholders to develop a multi-stakeholder grievance platform to foster greater transparency and
consistency in how public allegations are identified, reported, and addressed and to drive toward addressing potential abuses on the ground. |
| |
6. |
Through primarily advocacy and influence: |
| |
a) |
Apple caused an increase in the number of smelters and refiners participating in a Third Party Audit program.
|
| |
b) |
Apple continued its support of a whistleblowing mechanism, which allowed for the expansion of the availability of the
whistleblowing mechanism to five new provinces in the DRC. |
| |
c) |
Apple took steps to make its RRA available more broadly to stakeholders, one result of which was that it was reported
that, as of December 31, 2017, 60 downstream companies and 151 upstream smelters and refiners have utilized the RRA. |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 18
ANNEX II: Smelter and Refiner Lists+
List 1: Smelters and refiners reported in Apple’s supply chain as of December 31, 2017.
Smelters and refiners that completed a Third Party Audit will be approved for Apple’s supply chain; otherwise, such smelters and refiners will be
removed from Apple’s supply chain.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# |
|
Conflict
Mineral |
|
Facility Name of Smelter or Refiner |
|
Country
Location of Smelter or Refiner |
| |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Gold |
|
Advanced Chemical Co.* |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
2 |
|
Gold |
|
Aida Chemical Industries Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
3 |
|
Gold |
|
Al Etihad Gold LLC |
|
United Arab Emirates |
| |
|
|
|
|
4 |
|
Gold |
|
Allgemeine Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt AG* |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
5 |
|
Gold |
|
Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex |
|
Uzbekistan |
| |
|
|
|
|
6 |
|
Gold |
|
AngloGold Ashanti Córrego do Sítio Mineraçäo |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
7 |
|
Gold |
|
Argor-Heraeus S.A. |
|
Switzerland |
| |
|
|
|
|
8 |
|
Gold |
|
Asahi Pretec Corp.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
9 |
|
Gold |
|
Asahi Refining Canada Ltd. |
|
Canada |
| |
|
|
|
|
10 |
|
Gold |
|
Asahi Refining USA Inc. |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
11 |
|
Gold |
|
Asaka Riken Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
12 |
|
Gold |
|
AU Traders and Refiners |
|
South Africa |
| |
|
|
|
|
13 |
|
Gold |
|
Aurubis AG |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
14 |
|
Gold |
|
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines)*** |
|
Philippines |
| |
|
|
|
|
15 |
|
Gold |
|
Boliden AB |
|
Sweden |
| |
|
|
|
|
16 |
|
Gold |
|
C. Hafner GmbH + Co. KG* |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
17 |
|
Gold |
|
CCR Refinery – Glencore Canada Corp. |
|
Canada |
| |
|
|
|
|
18 |
|
Gold |
|
Chimet S.p.A. |
|
Italy |
| |
|
|
|
|
19 |
|
Gold |
|
Daejin Indus Co., Ltd.* |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
20 |
|
Gold |
|
Daye Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
21 |
|
Gold |
|
DODUCO Contacts and Refining GmbH* |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
22 |
|
Gold |
|
Dowa |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
23 |
|
Gold |
|
DSC (Do Sung Corp.) |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
24 |
|
Gold |
|
Eco-System Recycling Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
25 |
|
Gold |
|
Emirates Gold DMCC |
|
United Arab Emirates |
| |
|
|
|
|
26 |
|
Gold |
|
Geib Refining Corp.* |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
27 |
|
Gold |
|
Gold Refinery of Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
28 |
|
Gold |
|
Great Wall Precious Metals Co., Ltd. of CBPM |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
29 |
|
Gold |
|
HeeSung Metal Ltd.* |
|
Republic of Korea |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 19
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
30 |
|
Gold |
|
Heimerle + Meule GmbH* |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
31 |
|
Gold |
|
Heraeus Metals Hong Kong Ltd. |
|
Hong Kong |
| |
|
|
|
|
32 |
|
Gold |
|
Heraeus Precious Metals GmbH & Co. KG |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
33 |
|
Gold |
|
Inner Mongolia Qiankun Gold and Silver Refinery Share Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
34 |
|
Gold |
|
Ishifuku Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
35 |
|
Gold |
|
Istanbul Gold Refinery |
|
Turkey |
| |
|
|
|
|
36 |
|
Gold |
|
Italpreziosi |
|
Italy |
| |
|
|
|
|
37 |
|
Gold |
|
Japan Mint* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
38 |
|
Gold |
|
Jiangxi Copper Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
39 |
|
Gold |
|
JSC Ekaterinburg Non-Ferrous Metal Processing Plant |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
40 |
|
Gold |
|
JSC UralElectromed |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
41 |
|
Gold |
|
JX Nippon Mining & Metals
Co., Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
42 |
|
Gold |
|
Kazzinc |
|
Kazakhstan |
| |
|
|
|
|
43 |
|
Gold |
|
Kennecott Utah Copper LLC |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
44 |
|
Gold |
|
Kojima Chemicals Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
45 |
|
Gold |
|
Korea Zinc Co., Ltd. |
|
Republic of
Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
46 |
|
Gold |
|
Kyrgyzaltyn JSC |
|
Kyrgyzstan |
| |
|
|
|
|
47 |
|
Gold |
|
LS-NIKKO Copper Inc. |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
48 |
|
Gold |
|
Materion |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
49 |
|
Gold |
|
Matsuda Sangyo Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
50 |
|
Gold |
|
Metalor Technologies (Hong Kong)
Ltd. |
|
Hong
Kong |
| |
|
|
|
|
51 |
|
Gold |
|
Metalor Technologies (Singapore)
Pte., Ltd. |
|
Singapore |
| |
|
|
|
|
52 |
|
Gold |
|
Metalor Technologies (Suzhou)
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
53 |
|
Gold |
|
Metalor Technologies S.A. |
|
Switzerland |
| |
|
|
|
|
54 |
|
Gold |
|
Metalor USA Refining Corp. |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
55 |
|
Gold |
|
Metalúrgica Met-Mex Peñoles S.A. de C.V. |
|
Mexico |
| |
|
|
|
|
56 |
|
Gold |
|
Mitsubishi Materials Corp. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
57 |
|
Gold |
|
Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co.,
Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
58 |
|
Gold |
|
MMTC-PAMP India Pvt., Ltd. |
|
India |
| |
|
|
|
|
59 |
|
Gold |
|
Moscow Special Alloys Processing
Plant |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
60 |
|
Gold |
|
Nadir Metal Rafineri San. Ve Tic
A.Ş. |
|
Turkey |
| |
|
|
|
|
61 |
|
Gold |
|
Navoi Mining and Metallurgical
Combinat |
|
Uzbekistan |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
62 |
|
Gold |
|
Nihon Material Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
63 |
|
Gold |
|
Ögussa Österreichische
Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt GmbH* |
|
Austria |
| |
|
|
|
|
64 |
|
Gold |
|
Ohura Precious Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
65 |
|
Gold |
|
OJSC The Gulidov Krasnoyarsk Non-Ferrous Metals Plant (OJSC Krastsvetmet) |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
66 |
|
Gold |
|
OJSC Novosibirsk Refinery |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
67 |
|
Gold |
|
PAMP S.A. |
|
Switzerland |
| |
|
|
|
|
68 |
|
Gold |
|
Prioksky Plant of Non-Ferrous Metals |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
69 |
|
Gold |
|
PT Aneka Tambang (Persero)
Tbk |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
70 |
|
Gold |
|
PX Précinox S.A. |
|
Switzerland |
| |
|
|
|
|
71 |
|
Gold |
|
Rand Refinery (Pty) Ltd. |
|
South
Africa |
| |
|
|
|
|
72 |
|
Gold |
|
Republic Metals Corp. |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
73 |
|
Gold |
|
Royal Canadian Mint |
|
Canada |
| |
|
|
|
|
74 |
|
Gold |
|
SAAMP |
|
France |
| |
|
|
|
|
75 |
|
Gold |
|
Samduck Precious Metals* |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
76 |
|
Gold |
|
SAXONIA Edelmetalle GmbH* |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
77 |
|
Gold |
|
Schone Edelmetaal B.V.* |
|
Netherlands |
| |
|
|
|
|
78 |
|
Gold |
|
SEMPSA Joyería
Platería S.A. |
|
Spain |
| |
|
|
|
|
79 |
|
Gold |
|
Shandong Zhaojin Gold &
Silver Refinery Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
80 |
|
Gold |
|
Sichuan Tianze Precious Metals Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
81 |
|
Gold |
|
Singway Technology Co.,
Ltd.* |
|
Taiwan |
| |
|
|
|
|
82 |
|
Gold |
|
SOE Shyolkovsky Factory of Secondary
Precious Metals |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
83 |
|
Gold |
|
Solar Applied Materials Technology
Corp.* |
|
Taiwan |
| |
|
|
|
|
84 |
|
Gold |
|
Sumitomo Metal Mining Co.,
Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
85 |
|
Gold |
|
SungEel HiMetal Co., Ltd.* |
|
Republic of
Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
86 |
|
Gold |
|
T.C.A. S.p.A.* |
|
Italy |
| |
|
|
|
|
87 |
|
Gold |
|
Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K.K. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
88 |
|
Gold |
|
The Refinery of Shandong Gold Mining
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
89 |
|
Gold |
|
Tokuriki Honten Co., Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
90 |
|
Gold |
|
Torecom* |
|
Republic of
Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
91 |
|
Gold |
|
Umicore Brasil Ltda. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
92 |
|
Gold |
|
Umicore Precious Metals
Thailand* |
|
Thailand |
| |
|
|
|
|
93 |
|
Gold |
|
Umicore S.A. Business Unit Precious
Metals Refining |
|
Belgium |
| |
|
|
|
|
94 |
|
Gold |
|
United Precious Metal Refining
Inc.* |
|
United
States |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
95 |
|
Gold |
|
Valcambi S.A. |
|
Switzerland |
| |
|
|
|
|
96 |
|
Gold |
|
Western Australian Mint trading as
The Perth Mint |
|
Australia |
| |
|
|
|
|
97 |
|
Gold |
|
Wieland Edelmetalle GmbH* |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
98 |
|
Gold |
|
Yamakin Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
99 |
|
Gold |
|
Yokohama Metal Co., Ltd.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
100 |
|
Gold |
|
Zhongyuan Gold Smelter of Zhongjin
Gold Corp. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
101 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Changsha South Tantalum Niobium Co.,
Ltd.* |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
102 |
|
Tantalum |
|
D Block Metals LLC* |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
103 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Exotech Inc.* |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
104 |
|
Tantalum |
|
F&X Electro-Materials
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
105 |
|
Tantalum |
|
FIR Metals & Resource
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
106 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Global Advanced Metals Aizu |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
107 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Global Advanced Metals
Boyertown |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
108 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Guangdong Rising Rare Metals-EO Materials Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
109 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Guangdong Zhiyuan New Material Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
110 |
|
Tantalum |
|
H.C. Starck Co., Ltd. |
|
Thailand |
| |
|
|
|
|
111 |
|
Tantalum |
|
H.C. Starck Hermsdorf GmbH |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
112 |
|
Tantalum |
|
H.C. Starck Inc. |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
113 |
|
Tantalum |
|
H.C. Starck Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
114 |
|
Tantalum |
|
H.C. Starck Smelting GmbH &
Co. KG |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
115 |
|
Tantalum |
|
H.C. Starck Tantalum and Niobium
GmbH |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
116 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Hengyang King Xing Lifeng New
Materials Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
117 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Jiangxi Dinghai Tantalum &
Niobium Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
118 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Jiangxi Tuohong New Raw
Material |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
119 |
|
Tantalum |
|
JiuJiang JinXin Nonferrous Metals
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
120 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Jiujiang Tanbre Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
121 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Jiujiang Zhongao Tantalum &
Niobium Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
122 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Kemet Blue Metals |
|
Mexico |
| |
|
|
|
|
123 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Kemet Blue Powder |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
124 |
|
Tantalum |
|
King-Tan Tantalum Industry Ltd.** |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
125 |
|
Tantalum |
|
LSM Brasil S.A. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
126 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Metallurgical Products India Pvt.,
Ltd. |
|
India |
| |
|
|
|
|
127 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Mineração Taboca
S.A. |
|
Brazil |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 22
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
128 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co.,
Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
129 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Ningxia Orient Tantalum Industry
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
130 |
|
Tantalum |
|
NPM Silmet A.S. |
|
Estonia |
| |
|
|
|
|
131 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Power Resources Ltd. |
|
Macedonia |
| |
|
|
|
|
132 |
|
Tantalum |
|
QuantumClean* |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
133 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Resind Indústria e
Comércio Ltda.* |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
134 |
|
Tantalum |
|
RFH Tantalum Smeltery Co.,
Ltd./Yanling Jincheng Tantalum & Niobium Co., Ltd.* |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
135 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Solikamsk Magnesium Works
OAO |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
136 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Taki Chemical Co., Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
137 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Telex Metals |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
138 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Ulba Metallurgical Plant
JSC |
|
Kazakhstan |
| |
|
|
|
|
139 |
|
Tantalum |
|
XinXing Haorong Electronic Material
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
140 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Yichun Jin Yang Rare Metal Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
141 |
|
Tin |
|
Alpha* |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
142 |
|
Tin |
|
Chenzhou Yunxiang Mining and
Metallurgy Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
143 |
|
Tin |
|
China Tin Group Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
144 |
|
Tin |
|
CV Ayi Jaya |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
145 |
|
Tin |
|
CV Dua Sekawan |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
146 |
|
Tin |
|
CV Gita Pesona |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
147 |
|
Tin |
|
CV Tiga Sekawan |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
148 |
|
Tin |
|
CV United Smelting |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
149 |
|
Tin |
|
CV Venus Inti Perkasa |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
150 |
|
Tin |
|
Dowa |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
151 |
|
Tin |
|
EM Vinto*** |
|
Bolivia |
| |
|
|
|
|
152 |
|
Tin |
|
Fenix Metals* |
|
Poland |
| |
|
|
|
|
153 |
|
Tin |
|
Gejiu Fengming Metallurgy Chemical
Plant |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
154 |
|
Tin |
|
Gejiu Jinye Mineral Co. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
155 |
|
Tin |
|
Gejiu Kai Meng Industry and Trade
LLC |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
156 |
|
Tin |
|
Gejiu
Non-Ferrous Metal Processing Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
157 |
|
Tin |
|
Gejiu Yunxin Nonferrous Electrolysis
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
158 |
|
Tin |
|
Guangdong Hanhe Non-Ferrous Metal Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
159 |
|
Tin |
|
Guanyang Guida Nonferrous Metal
Smelting Plant |
|
China |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 23
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
160 |
|
Tin |
|
Huichang Jinshunda Tin Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
161 |
|
Tin |
|
Jiangxi Ketai Advanced Material Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
162 |
|
Tin |
|
Magnu’s Minerais Metais e Ligas
Ltda. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
163 |
|
Tin |
|
Malaysia Smelting Corp.
(MSC) |
|
Malaysia |
| |
|
|
|
|
164 |
|
Tin |
|
Melt Metais e Ligas S.A. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
165 |
|
Tin |
|
Metallic Resources Inc.* |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
166 |
|
Tin |
|
Metallo Belgium N.V.* |
|
Belgium |
| |
|
|
|
|
167 |
|
Tin |
|
Metallo Spain S.L.U.* |
|
Spain |
| |
|
|
|
|
168 |
|
Tin |
|
Mineração Taboca
S.A. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
169 |
|
Tin |
|
Minsur |
|
Peru |
| |
|
|
|
|
170 |
|
Tin |
|
Mitsubishi Materials Corp.* |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
171 |
|
Tin |
|
O.M. Manufacturing (Thailand) Co.,
Ltd.* |
|
Thailand |
| |
|
|
|
|
172 |
|
Tin |
|
O.M. Manufacturing Philippines
Inc.* |
|
Philippines |
| |
|
|
|
|
173 |
|
Tin |
|
Operaciones Metalurgical
S.A. |
|
Bolivia |
| |
|
|
|
|
174 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Aries Kencana Sejahtera |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
175 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Artha Cipta Langgeng |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
176 |
|
Tin |
|
PT ATD Makmur Mandiri Jaya |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
177 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Babel Inti Perkasa |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
178 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Bangka Prima Tin |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
179 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Bangka Tin Industry |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
180 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Belitung Industri
Sejahtera |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
181 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Bukit Timah |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
182 |
|
Tin |
|
PT DS Jaya Abadi |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
183 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Eunindo Usaha Mandiri |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
184 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Inti Stania Prima |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
185 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Karimun Mining |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
186 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Kijang Jaya Mandiri |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
187 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Lautan Harmonis
Sejahtera |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
188 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Menara Cipta Mulia |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
189 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Mitra Stania Prima |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
190 |
|
Tin |
|
PT O.M. Indonesia ** |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
191 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Panca Mega Persada |
|
Indonesia |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 24
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
192 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Premium Tin Indonesia |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
193 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Prima Timah Utama |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
194 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Refined Bangka Tin |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
195 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Sariwiguna Binasentosa |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
196 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Stanindo Inti Perkasa |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
197 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Sukses Inti Makmur |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
198 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Sumber Jaya Indah |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
199 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Timah (Persero) Tbk
Kundur |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
200 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Timah (Persero) Tbk
Mentok |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
201 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Tinindo Inter Nusa |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
202 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Tommy Utama |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
203 |
|
Tin |
|
Resind Indústria e
Comércio Ltda.* |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
204 |
|
Tin |
|
Rui Da Hung |
|
Taiwan |
| |
|
|
|
|
205 |
|
Tin |
|
Soft Metais Ltda. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
206 |
|
Tin |
|
Thaisarco |
|
Thailand |
| |
|
|
|
|
207 |
|
Tin |
|
White Solder Metalurgia e
Mineração Ltda. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
208 |
|
Tin |
|
Yunnan Chengfeng Non-ferrous Metals Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
209 |
|
Tin |
|
Yunnan Tin Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
210 |
|
Tungsten |
|
A.L.M.T. Tungsten Corp. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
211 |
|
Tungsten |
|
ACL Metais Eireli |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
212 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Asia Tungsten Products Vietnam
Ltd. |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
213 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Chenzhou Diamond Tungsten Products
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
214 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Chongyi Zhangyuan Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
215 |
|
Tungsten |
|
FuJian JinXin Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
216 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Ganzhou Huaxing Tungsten Products
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
217 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Ganzhou Jiangwu Ferrotungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
218 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Ganzhou Seadragon W & Mo
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
219 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Global Tungsten & Powders
Corp. |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
220 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Guangdong Xianglu Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
221 |
|
Tungsten |
|
H.C. Starck Smelting GmbH &
Co. KG |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
222 |
|
Tungsten |
|
H.C. Starck Tungsten GmbH |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
223 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Hunan Chenzhou Mining Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
224 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Hunan Chuangda Vanadium Tungsten
Co., Ltd. Wuji |
|
China |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 25
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
225 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Hunan Chunchang Nonferrous Metals
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
226 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Hydrometallurg JSC |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
227 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Japan New Metals Co., Ltd. |
|
Japan |
| |
|
|
|
|
228 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangwu H.C. Starck Tungsten
Products Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
229 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Gan Bei Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
230 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Tonggu Non-ferrous Metallurgical & Chemical Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
231 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Xinsheng Tungsten Industry
Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
232 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Xiushui Xianggan Nonferrous
Metals Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
233 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Yaosheng Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
234 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Kennametal Fallon |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
235 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Kennametal Huntsville |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
236 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Malipo Haiyu Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
237 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Moliren Ltd. |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
238 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Niagara Refining LLC |
|
United
States |
| |
|
|
|
|
239 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Nui Phao H.C. Starck Tungsten
Chemicals Manufacturing LLC |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
240 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Philippine Chuangxin Industrial Co.,
Inc. |
|
Philippines |
| |
|
|
|
|
241 |
|
Tungsten |
|
South-East Nonferrous Metal Co.,
Ltd. of Hengyang City |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
242 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Tejing (Vietnam) Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
243 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Unecha Refractory Metals
Plant |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
244 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Vietnam Youngsun Tungsten Industry
Co., Ltd. |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
245 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Wolfram Bergbau und Hütten
AG |
|
Austria |
| |
|
|
|
|
246 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Woltech Korea Co., Ltd. |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
247 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Xiamen Tungsten (H.C.) Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
248 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Xiamen Tungsten Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
249 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Xinfeng Huarui Tungsten &
Molybdenum New Material Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
250 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Xinhai Rendan Shaoguan Tungsten Co.,
Ltd. |
|
China |
| + |
Certain terms used in this Annex are defined in the report. |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 26
List 2: Smelters and refiners identified in Apple’s supply chain during 2017, but subsequently
determined to be inoperative or removed prior to December 31, 2017.
Some smelters and refiners that are no longer reported in Apple’s
supply chain may currently be participating in a Third Party Audit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# |
|
Conflict
Mineral |
|
Facility Name of Smelter or Refiner |
|
Country
Location of Smelter or Refiner |
| |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
Gold |
|
Abington Reldan Metals LLC |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
2 |
|
Gold |
|
Atasay Kuyumculuk Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. |
|
Turkey |
| |
|
|
|
|
3 |
|
Gold |
|
Bangalore Refinery |
|
India |
| |
|
|
|
|
4 |
|
Gold |
|
Caridad |
|
Mexico |
| |
|
|
|
|
5 |
|
Gold |
|
Cendres + Métaux S.A.** |
|
Switzerland |
| |
|
|
|
|
6 |
|
Gold |
|
Degussa Sonne / Mond Goldhandel GmbH |
|
Germany |
| |
|
|
|
|
7 |
|
Gold |
|
Elemetal Refining LLC |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
8 |
|
Gold |
|
GCC Gujrat Gold Centre Pvt., Ltd. |
|
India |
| |
|
|
|
|
9 |
|
Gold |
|
Guangdong Jinding Gold Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
10 |
|
Gold |
|
Guoda Safina High-Tech Environmental Refinery Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
11 |
|
Gold |
|
Hangzhou Fuchunjiang Smelting Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
12 |
|
Gold |
|
Hunan Chenzhou Mining Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
13 |
|
Gold |
|
HwaSeong CJ CO., LTD. |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
14 |
|
Gold |
|
Kazakhmys Smelting LLC |
|
Kazakhstan |
| |
|
|
|
|
15 |
|
Gold |
|
KGHM Polska Miedź Spółka Akcyjna |
|
Poland |
| |
|
|
|
|
16 |
|
Gold |
|
Kyshtym Copper-Electrolytic Plant ZAO |
|
Russia |
| |
|
|
|
|
17 |
|
Gold |
|
L’azurde Company For Jewelry |
|
Saudi Arabia |
| |
|
|
|
|
18 |
|
Gold |
|
L’Orfebre S.A. |
|
Andorra |
| |
|
|
|
|
19 |
|
Gold |
|
Lingbao Gold Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
20 |
|
Gold |
|
Lingbao Jinyuan Tonghui Refinery Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
21 |
|
Gold |
|
Luoyang Zijin Yinhui Gold Refinery Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
22 |
|
Gold |
|
Modeltech Sdn Bhd |
|
Malaysia |
| |
|
|
|
|
23 |
|
Gold |
|
Morris and Watson |
|
New Zealand |
| |
|
|
|
|
24 |
|
Gold |
|
Morris and Watson Gold Coast |
|
Australia |
| |
|
|
|
|
25 |
|
Gold |
|
Penglai Penggang Gold Industry Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
26 |
|
Gold |
|
Refinery of Seemine Gold Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
27 |
|
Gold |
|
Remondis Argentia B.V. |
|
Netherlands |
| |
|
|
|
|
28 |
|
Gold |
|
Sabin Metal Corp. |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
29 |
|
Gold |
|
Safimet S.p.A |
|
Italy |
| |
|
|
|
|
30 |
|
Gold |
|
SAFINA A.S. |
|
Czech Republic |
| |
|
|
|
|
31 |
|
Gold |
|
Sai Refinery |
|
India |
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 27
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
32 |
|
Gold |
|
Samwon Metals Corp. |
|
Republic of Korea |
| |
|
|
|
|
33 |
|
Gold |
|
Shandong Tiancheng Biological Gold Industrial Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
34 |
|
Gold |
|
Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
35 |
|
Gold |
|
TOO Tau-Ken-Altyn |
|
Kazakhstan |
| |
|
|
|
|
36 |
|
Gold |
|
Yunnan Copper Industry Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
37 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Duoluoshan |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
38 |
|
Tantalum |
|
Hi-Temp Specialty Metals Inc. |
|
United States |
| |
|
|
|
|
39 |
|
Tin |
|
An Vinh Joint Stock Mineral Processing Co. |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
40 |
|
Tin |
|
CNMC (Guangxi) PGMA Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
41 |
|
Tin |
|
Cooperativa Metalurgica de Rondônia Ltda. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
42 |
|
Tin |
|
Electro-Mechanical Facility of the Cao Bang Minerals & Metallurgy Joint Stock Co.** |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
43 |
|
Tin |
|
Estanho de Rondônia S.A. |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
44 |
|
Tin |
|
Gejiu Zili Mining And Metallurgy Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
45 |
|
Tin |
|
HuiChang Hill Tin Industry Co., Ltd. ** |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
46 |
|
Tin |
|
Jiangxi New Nanshan Technology Ltd.** |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
47 |
|
Tin |
|
Modeltech Sdn Bhd |
|
Malaysia |
| |
|
|
|
|
48 |
|
Tin |
|
Nghe Tinh Non-Ferrous Metals Joint Stock Co. |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
49 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Cipta Persada Mulia |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
50 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Tirus Putra Mandiri |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
51 |
|
Tin |
|
PT Wahana Perkit Jaya |
|
Indonesia |
| |
|
|
|
|
52 |
|
Tin |
|
Super Ligas |
|
Brazil |
| |
|
|
|
|
53 |
|
Tin |
|
Tuyen Quang Non-Ferrous Metals Joint Stock Co. |
|
Vietnam |
| |
|
|
|
|
54 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Dayu Jincheng Tungsten Industry Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
55 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Dayu Weiliang Tungsten Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
56 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Ganzhou Haichuang Tungsten Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
57 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Ganzhou Yatai Tungsten Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
58 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Dayu Longxintai Tungsten Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
| |
|
|
|
|
59 |
|
Tungsten |
|
Jiangxi Minmetals Gao’an Non-ferrous Metals Co., Ltd. |
|
China |
* The smelter/refiner is believed to process conflict minerals solely from recycled or scrap sources. It is listed
alongside smelters and refiners in this Annex to highlight its efforts to complete a Third Party Audit. Other smelters and refiners determined to be processing conflict minerals solely from recycled or scrap sources reported to be in Apple’s
supply chain, which have not undergone a Third Party Audit or which are not seeking to participate in a Third Party Audit, are not listed.
** The
smelter/refiner has changed its compliance or operational status since December 31, 2017.
*** The smelter/refiner is in the process of being
removed.
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 28
Note: VQB Mineral and Trading Group JSC and Zhouzhou Cemented Carbide Group, Co., Ltd., which in prior
periods were classified as smelters, were re-categorized in calendar year 2017 and, accordingly, are not included herein.
Note: Smelter and refiner facility names originate from information provided by the LBMA and/or the RMAP.
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 29
ANNEX III: Countries of Origin of Conflict Minerals
|
| Argentina |
| Armenia |
| Australia |
| Austria |
| Azerbaijan |
| Benin |
| Bolivia |
| Bosnia Herzegovina |
| Botswana |
| Brazil |
| Bulgaria |
| Burkina Faso |
| Burundi* |
| Cambodia |
| Canada |
| Chile |
| China |
| Colombia |
| Côte D’Ivoire |
| Czech Republic |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo* |
| Denmark |
| Dominican Republic |
| Ecuador |
| Egypt |
| Eritrea |
| Ethiopia |
| Fiji |
| Finland |
| France |
| French Guiana |
| Gabon |
| Georgia |
| Germany |
| Ghana |
| Greece |
| Guatemala |
| Guinea |
|
| Guyana |
| Honduras |
| India |
| Indonesia |
| Ireland |
| Japan |
| Kazakhstan |
| Kenya |
| Kyrgyzstan |
| Laos |
| Liberia |
| Madagascar |
| Malaysia |
| Mali |
| Mauritania |
| Mexico |
| Mongolia |
| Morocco |
| Mozambique |
| Myanmar |
| Namibia |
| New Caledonia |
| New Zealand |
| Nicaragua |
| Niger |
| Nigeria |
| Norway |
| Panama |
| Papua New Guinea |
| Peru |
| Philippines |
| Poland |
| Portugal |
| Republic of Korea |
| Romania |
| Russia |
| Rwanda* |
| Saudi Arabia |
|
| Senegal |
| Serbia |
| Sierra Leone |
| Slovakia |
| Solomon Islands |
| South Africa |
| Spain |
| Suriname |
| Sweden |
| Switzerland |
| Taiwan |
| Tajikistan |
| Tanzania* |
| Thailand |
| Togo |
| Turkey |
| Uganda* |
| United Kingdom |
| United States |
| Uruguay |
| Uzbekistan |
| Venezuela |
| Vietnam |
| Zambia* |
| Zimbabwe |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
|
* The DRC or adjoining countries
Apple Inc. | 2017 Conflict Minerals
Report | 30
