S-1/A 1 anthropicpbc-sx1ax1.htm S-1/A Anthropic, PBC - S-1/A-1
As filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 2, 2026.
Registration No. 333-299633
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
AMENDMENT NO. 1
TO
FORM S-1
REGISTRATION STATEMENT
UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Anthropic, PBC
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
Delaware
7372
86-1696045
(State or other jurisdiction of
incorporation or organization)
(Primary Standard Industrial
Classification Code Number)
(I.R.S. Employer
Identification Number)
548 Market Street
PMB 90375
San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 326-6303
(Address, including zip code, and telephone number, including area code, of registrant’s principal executive offices)
Dario Amodei, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder
Daniela Amodei, President and Co-Founder
Anthropic, PBC
548 Market Street
PMB 90375
San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 326-6303
(Name, address, including zip code, and telephone number, including area code, of agent for service)
Copies to:  
Rezwan D. Pavri
Allison B. Spinner
Lang Liu
Colin G. Conklin
Jonie I. Kondracki
Lester Ang
Shannon R. Delahaye
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C.
650 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, California 94304
(650) 493-9300
Brian Israel
Elena Leichty
Patrick Ekeruo
Scott Booth
Anthropic, PBC
548 Market Street
PMB 90375
San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 326-6303
Sarah K. Solum
Calise Y. Cheng
Phillip S. Stoup
Freshfields US LLP 
855 Main Street
Redwood City, California 94063
(650) 618-9250
Approximate date of commencement of proposed sale to the public: As soon as practicable after this registration statement becomes effective.
If any of the securities being registered on this Form are to be offered on a delayed or continuous basis pursuant to Rule 415 under the Securities Act of 1933 check the
following box.  £
If this Form is filed to register additional securities for an offering pursuant to Rule 462(b) under the Securities Act, please check the following box and list the Securities
Act registration statement number of the earlier effective registration statement for the same offering.  £
If this Form is a post-effective amendment filed pursuant to Rule 462(c) under the Securities Act, check the following box and list the Securities Act registration
statement number of the earlier effective registration statement for the same offering.  £
If this Form is a post-effective amendment filed pursuant to Rule 462(d) under the Securities Act, check the following box and list the Securities Act registration
statement number of the earlier effective registration statement for the same offering.  £
Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, smaller reporting company, or an emerging growth
company. See the definitions of “large accelerated filer,” “accelerated filer,” “smaller reporting company,” and “emerging growth company” in Rule 12b-2 of the
Exchange Act. 
Large accelerated filer
☐
Accelerated filer
☐
Non-accelerated filer
☒
Smaller reporting company
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Emerging growth company
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If an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period for complying with any new or revised
financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 7(a)(2)(B) of the Securities Act.  £
The registrant hereby amends this registration statement on such date or dates as may be necessary to delay its effective date until the registrant
shall file a further amendment which specifically states that this registration statement shall thereafter become effective in accordance with
Section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or until the registration statement shall become effective on such date as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, acting pursuant to said Section 8(a), may determine.
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The information in this preliminary prospectus is not complete and may be changed. These securities may not be sold until
the registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission is effective. This preliminary prospectus is not
an offer to sell nor does it seek an offer to buy these securities in any jurisdiction where the offer or sale is not permitted.
Subject to Completion. Dated           .
Class A Common Stock
Shares
Anthropic, PBC
This is an initial public offering of shares of Class A common stock of Anthropic, PBC. We are selling            shares of Class A common stock and
the selling stockholders identified in this prospectus are selling an additional            shares of Class A common stock. We will not receive any
proceeds from the sale of shares of our Class A common stock by any of the selling stockholders.
Prior to this offering, there has been no public market for our Class A common stock. It is currently estimated that the initial public offering price
per share will be between $           and $          . We have applied to list our Class A common stock on the Nasdaq Global Select Market under the
symbol “ANT.”
We have a novel capital and corporate governance structure. We are incorporated as a public benefit corporation under Delaware law, a structure
consistent with our commitment to artificial intelligence (“AI”) safety and responsibility. As a public benefit corporation, we are required to
balance the pecuniary interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the specific public benefit
purpose identified in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation: the responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for
the long-term benefit of humanity. We created our Long-Term Benefit Trust (the “LTBT”) to help ensure that Anthropic, PBC is managed in a
manner that responsibly balances its goals as a public benefit corporation. The LTBT is intended to operate as an independent body of financially
disinterested trustees with expertise in AI safety, national security, public policy, and social enterprise. Through a special class of common stock,
Class T common stock, the LTBT generally has the authority to elect and remove the Class T directors, who together will constitute a majority of
the authorized members of our board of directors. Our Class T common stock does not otherwise have voting rights with respect to matters
submitted to stockholders generally and has no economic rights. Immediately prior to the completion of this offering, we will also issue a single
share of Class F common stock, a special class of our common stock, to a limited liability company organized by our co-founders (the “Founder
LLC”). Dario Amodei, our Chief Executive Officer and a member of our board of directors, and Daniela Amodei, our President and Chairperson of
our board of directors, together with our five other co-founders, will initially be the sole members of the Founder LLC. Our Class F common
stock, which will be held by the Founder LLC, will be entitled to an aggregate number of votes that equals 50.1% of the total voting power of our
outstanding shares of capital stock with respect to matters submitted to stockholders generally, including the election of our directors other than
the Class T directors. Our Class F common stock will not have any economic rights. Immediately prior to the completion of this offering, we will
also authorize a special class of our common stock, Class E common stock, which will be issued to our employees, excluding our co-founders. Our
Class E common stock will be entitled to vote only on certain limited matters and will not have any economic rights. In addition, we have
authorized Class A common stock and Class N common stock. The rights of the holders of Class A common stock and Class N common stock are
identical, except with respect to voting and conversion. Each share of Class A common stock is entitled to one vote and shares of Class N common
stock have no voting rights, except as otherwise required by law. The holders of our Class N common stock are primarily strategic business
partners, and shares of Class N common stock will generally convert to Class A common stock upon a sale or transfer to an unaffiliated third
party. Our Class A common stock is not convertible. See the sections titled “Risk Factors—Risks Related to our Governance Structure,” “Our
Governance Structure and Its Goals,” and “Description of Capital Stock” for more information.
We are considered a “controlled company” within the meaning of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate governance requirements. See the
sections titled “Our Governance Structure and Its Goals,” “Management,” and “Description of Capital Stock” for additional information.
See the section titled “Risk Factors” beginning on page 27 to read about factors you should consider before buying shares of
our Class A common stock.
Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor any other regulatory body has approved or disapproved of these
securities or passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of this prospectus. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal
offense.
Per share
Total
Initial public offering price
$                     
$                     
Underwriting discount(1)
$                     
$                     
Proceeds, before expenses, to Anthropic, PBC
$                     
$                     
Proceeds, before expenses, to selling stockholders
$                     
$                     
______________
(1)See the section titled “Underwriting” for a description of the compensation payable to the underwriters.
To the extent that the underwriters sell more than            shares of Class A common stock, the underwriters have the option to purchase up to an
additional            shares of Class A common stock from Anthropic, PBC at the initial public offering price less the underwriting discount.
The underwriters expect to deliver the shares against payment in New York, New York, on or about           .
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Morgan Stanley
J.P. Morgan
Citigroup
Barclays
Wells Fargo Securities
BofA Securities
Deutsche Bank Securities
RBC Capital Markets
UBS Investment Bank
BMO Capital Markets
BNP PARIBAS
Credit Agricole CIB
Jefferies
Mizuho
MUFG
TD Securities
BTIG
Cantor
Capital One Securities
Macquarie Capital
Societe Generale
Prospectus dated            
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Table of Contents
Through and including            (the 25th day after the date of this prospectus), all dealers effecting
transactions in these securities, whether or not participating in this offering, may be required
to deliver a prospectus. This is in addition to a dealer’s obligation to deliver a prospectus when
acting as an underwriter and with respect to an unsold allotment or subscription.
Neither we nor the selling stockholders, nor any of the underwriters, have authorized anyone to provide any
information or to make any representations other than those contained in this prospectus or in any free writing
prospectuses prepared by or on behalf of us to which we may have referred you in connection with this offering.
Neither we nor the selling stockholders, nor any of the underwriters, take responsibility for, or can provide any
assurance as to the reliability of, any other information that others may give you. This prospectus is an offer to
sell only the shares offered hereby, but only under circumstances and in jurisdictions where it is lawful to do so.
The information contained in this prospectus is current only as of its date, regardless of the time of delivery of
this prospectus or of any sale of our Class A common stock. Our business, financial condition, results of
operations, and prospects may have changed since such date.
For investors outside the United States: This offering includes public offerings in Australia, Canada, certain
member states of the European Economic Area, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We do not
currently intend to list our Class A common stock on any exchange in such jurisdictions. Neither we nor the
selling stockholders, nor any of the underwriters, have done anything that would permit this offering or
possession or distribution of this prospectus in any jurisdiction where action for that purpose is required, other
than in the United States and the jurisdictions listed above. Persons outside the United States who come into
possession of this prospectus must inform themselves about, and observe any restrictions relating to, the
offering of the shares of our Class A common stock and the distribution of this prospectus outside the United
States.
1
Select Defined Terms
The following are abbreviations, acronyms, and definitions of certain terms used in this prospectus:
“agent loop” refers to the iterative cycle in which an AI agent receives a task, takes an action, such as planning
a project, running code, or calling a tool, observes the result, and decides its next step, with this cycle repeating
until the task is complete. The agent loop is the core execution pattern underlying agentic AI behavior.
“agentic AI” refers to AI systems that, with varying degrees of autonomy, can plan, determine, and sequence
actions and execute them to accomplish defined objectives, including through interaction with external tools,
services, datasets, and environments on behalf of a user.
“AI” refers to artificial intelligence, a machine-based system that learns or is trained from data and, for explicit
or implicit objectives and with varying levels of autonomy, processes that data to infer patterns, generate
outputs—such as predictions, content, recommendations, and decisions—and act upon physical or virtual
environments.
“AI accelerators” refer to processors purpose-built or adapted for the large-scale computations required to
pre-train, post-train, refine, and run AI models. These processors are significantly more efficient and faster
than general-purpose processors for AI workloads.
“API” refers to application programming interface, a standardized interface that allows external software to
access a system’s capabilities programmatically. AI model providers may offer APIs that allow software
developers to send inputs to an AI model and receive outputs, enabling integration into the software developers’
products and workflows.
“Applied AI” refers to a discipline and organizational function focused on embedding AI capabilities directly
into production business environments to address specific customer requirements. Applied AI teams, which
include forward-deployed engineers, work with enterprises to design and deploy custom solutions, specialized
workflows, and domain-specific implementations tailored to a customer’s own systems and processes.
“closing the loop” refers to a development cycle in which successive versions of an AI model assist in building
the next, with the goal of compounding capability gains over time.
“compute” refers to the computational processing resources used to train and run AI models, including,
without limitation, specialized AI accelerators, memory, networking, storage, and power systems that are
deployed in data centers or other physical computing environments.
“compute multipliers” refer to algorithmic and methodological improvements in training and inference that
increase the effective output of a given amount of compute.
“computer use” refers to an AI capability that allows a model to observe and interact with a graphical user
interface, such as clicking, typing, and navigating applications, similar to how a human operator would.
“Constitutional AI” refers to an approach to training AI models using a set of written principles, which we
refer to as Claude’s constitution, currently organized around four priorities: being broadly safe, broadly ethical,
compliant with our guidelines, and genuinely helpful. Under Constitutional AI, our models evaluate, critique,
and revise their own responses against these principles, enabling us to define and control model behavior
through auditable principles, rather than relying solely on fixed rule-based instructions or human reviewers.
“context window” refers to the maximum amount of text, code, or other content, measured in tokens, that an
AI model can process in a given request, encompassing instructions, prior conversation history, user input, and
the model’s output.
“CSP” refers to a cloud service provider, a technology company that owns and operates large-scale cloud
computing infrastructure and provides on-demand compute, storage, and networking. CSPs may also serve as
distribution channels through which AI products and services are made available to customers. The largest
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CSPs, sometimes referred to as hyperscalers, operate at global scale with significant infrastructure and market
concentration.
“customer” refers to a prosumer or an organization that uses our models, platform, or applications.
“customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis,” “customers with $1 million or
more of revenue on a TTM basis,” and “customers with $10 million or more of revenue on a TTM
basis” each refer to customers contributing revenue equal to or greater than the applicable dollar amount
during the trailing twelve-month (“TTM”) period ending on the measurement date. For purposes of this metric,
we define a customer as a distinct organization, identified by aggregating the accounts that we determine
belong to the same organization based on internal records and available data. We do not separately define or
internally track a category of “enterprise” customers, and our customers are not segmented or measured
internally by reference to whether a given customer is an “enterprise.” Because spending $100,000 or more on
our products is generally characteristic of organizational rather than individual usage, we use the number of
and revenue from customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis as our measure of enterprise
adoption and engagement with Claude throughout this prospectus, including in references to “enterprise
customers” and “enterprise adoption.”
“frontier AI” refers to AI systems at the current leading edge of capability and safety, performing at or near
the highest levels of any existing system across a broad range of tasks.
“hallucinations” refer to outputs in which an AI model generates factually incorrect or fabricated information
with apparent confidence.
“inference” refers to the process by which a trained AI model processes an input and generates an output.
Inference occurs each time a user or agent interacts with an AI system.
“interleaved thinking” refers to a capability whereby an AI model interposes discrete reasoning steps
between successive tool calls within a single response, rather than confining its reasoning to a single planning
phase at the outset.
“interpretability” refers to research into how and why AI models produce specific outputs, with the goal of
making model behavior more transparent and verifiable, especially in high-stakes applications.
“knowledge work” refers to complex cognitive work and related professional activities, including obtaining,
producing, analyzing, and communicating information through tasks such as coding, drafting analyses,
synthesizing research, building financial models, and managing and automating documents and workflows.
“LLMs” refer to large language models, or AI models trained primarily on large datasets to understand and
generate natural language and computer code.
“mechanistic interpretability” refers to a subfield of interpretability research focused on reverse-
engineering the internal computations of neural networks. Rather than inferring model behavior from inputs
and outputs alone, mechanistic interpretability seeks to identify the specific features and circuits within a model
that give rise to its behavior with the goal of making model reasoning auditable at the mechanism level and
detecting failure modes, including deceptive or unsafe behavior, that may not surface in standard testing.
“model weights” refer to the numerical parameters encoding a trained AI model’s behavior, which are the
primary intellectual asset of a frontier AI developer, representing the accumulated investment in compute, data,
and research.
“multi-agent orchestration” refers to an architecture in which multiple AI agents collaborate on a shared
task, with one coordinating while others execute subtasks in parallel, enabling more complex, long-horizon
work than a single agent can complete alone.
“Net Revenue Retention” reflects customer expansion, contraction, and churn as of a measurement date.
We calculate Net Revenue Retention by dividing the Qualified Customers’ Current Period revenue by their Base
Period revenue. A Qualified Customer is a customer with at least $1 of revenue during the Base Period,
excluding subscribers to our Claude Pro, Max, and Ultra plans, whose fixed-price subscriptions do not reflect
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the expansion and contraction behavior this metric is intended to capture. The Base Period is the three months
ending a year prior to the measurement date. The Current Period is the three months ending as of the
measurement date.
“open-weight” refers to an AI model whose trained model weights are publicly released, allowing third parties
to download, run, and modify the model, subject to the terms of the model’s license, without necessarily
providing access to the underlying training data or code.
“pay-for-intelligence” or “consumption” refers to our revenue model under which customers pay for their
usage of our intelligence service, which is metered in tokens and priced according to the model selected.
“persistent,” in the context of AI applications, refers to denoting data, state, or context that is continuously
retained beyond the boundary of a single operation, session, or interaction, remaining accessible for reuse
across subsequent steps, sessions, or workflows without requiring reinitialization.
“post-training” refers to the collection of techniques applied to a pre-trained model to refine its behavior,
including reinforcement learning, supervised refinement methods, and other alignment methods. Post-training
is the stage in which much of the work to make a frontier model helpful, accurate, and safe is performed,
including the application of safety and alignment techniques.
“pre-training” refers to the initial stage of training an AI model, in which the model learns general patterns
and representations from large-scale datasets of text, code, and other data, typically by predicting the next
token in a sequence. The output of pre-training is a base model with broad capabilities that has not yet been
adapted for any specific deployment context.
“primitives” refer to the foundational, modular building blocks of a software system from which more
complex applications and workflows are constructed.
“prompt injection” refers to an adversarial technique in which malicious instructions are embedded in
content an AI model is asked to process, such as websites, documents, or tool outputs, with the aim of
overriding or manipulating the model’s intended behavior, typically without the user’s knowledge.
“prosumers” refer to individual users who subscribe to AI tools to perform knowledge work.
“reinforcement learning” refers to a machine learning approach in which a model learns to perform a task
by taking actions, receiving feedback signals called rewards, and adjusting its behavior to maximize the rewards
it accrues over time. In contemporary AI development, reinforcement learning is widely used to refine model
behavior after pre-training, including to improve helpfulness, accuracy, and adherence to safety guidelines.
“RLHF” refers to reinforcement learning from human feedback, a specific form of reinforcement learning in
which human evaluators rate the model’s responses, and those ratings are used as the reward signal to guide
training.
“Run-Rate Revenue” is an operating metric that refers to the estimated annualized value of our revenue-
generating activity as of a measurement date, calculated as the sum of (i) our consumption-based fees during
the trailing 28-day period ended on the measurement date, multiplied by 13, and (ii) our aggregate monthly
subscription fees as of the measurement date, multiplied by 12. For purposes of calculating Run-Rate Revenue,
consumption-based fees and subscription-based fees are derived from customer usage and active subscriptions.
“SIs” refer to systems integrators, or third-party technology and professional services firms that design, build,
and deploy integrated solutions for customers by combining products and services from multiple technology
vendors into unified systems tailored to customer needs.
“tokens” refer to numeric units into which an AI model converts the data it processes, including text, images,
audio, and video, the number of which varies by the model and tokenizer applied. Tokens are the smallest
individual units of data a language model processes and can correspond to words, subwords, characters, or
bytes. A tokenizer is the component of a model that converts customer inputs into the sequence of tokens the
model processes and then converts the processed tokens into the outputs provided to customers.
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Prospectus Summary
This summary highlights selected information that is presented in greater detail elsewhere in this prospectus.
This summary does not contain all of the information you should consider before investing in our Class A
common stock. You should read this entire prospectus carefully, including the sections titled “Risk Factors,”
“Special Note Regarding Forward-looking Statements,” “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations,” “Business,” and “Our Governance Structure and Its Goals,” as well as
our consolidated financial statements and the related notes included elsewhere in this prospectus, before
making an investment decision. Unless the context otherwise requires, the terms “Anthropic,” “the company,”
“we,” “us,” and “our” in this prospectus refer to Anthropic, PBC and its consolidated subsidiaries, and
references to our “common stock” refer to our Class A common stock, Class N common stock, and Class F
common stock (and, where the context requires, our Class T common stock and our Class E common stock).
Overview
For the first time in history, intelligence is something humans can build. The cognitive capability to reason,
analyze, synthesize, decide, and create is producible at scale and accessible on demand. We believe this
abundance of AI will rapidly transform every sector of the global economy in ways greater than the impact of
industrialization, electricity, semiconductors, and the internet. AI that truly delivers on its potential—with the
risks well managed—could significantly accelerate global growth and dramatically improve quality of life for
people around the world.
Anthropic was founded in 2021 by a team of researchers responsible for many of the breakthroughs that define
AI. We are first and foremost a research lab—our mission is the responsible development and maintenance of
advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity. This mission directs our focus—along with our talent and
culture, our frontier and safety research, our approach to compute, and our enterprise strategy, it is one of the
core advantages that set us apart. These advantages enable us to continuously advance frontier AI and shape
the standards for its safe and responsible development. Our frontier AI, Claude, is delivered to customers
through our models, platform, and applications. Claude has experienced the fastest enterprise adoption of any
technology in history, as demonstrated by revenue growing from $0 at commercial launch in the first quarter of
2023 to $17.0 billion for the three months ended September 30, 2026. This rapid and growing adoption
generates two self-reinforcing dynamics—an improvement loop that advances Claude and an investment loop
that helps fund our continued research in frontier AI.
Our Core Advantages
Mission & Focus. All of our efforts are guided by a singular focus on our mission. This focus enables us to
concentrate talent, research, and compute investment on the highest-value work for humanity and to avoid
conflicting priorities. Achieving our mission means the world gains the enormous benefits of frontier AI while
mitigating the most significant risks, and we believe this requires safety and capability to advance together.
Talent & Culture. Our mission and focus enable us to attract and retain world-class talent, including
researchers and engineers who want their work to shape a better future. We also have a culture that promotes a
low-ego, truth-seeking environment, where frontier AI capability and safety are mutually reinforcing. We
believe our culture has driven our talent density as we have scaled.
Frontier & Safety Research. We believe that sustained, focused research at the frontier of intelligence is
required to build the most capable and safest AI systems. Our frontier capabilities and safety research are
deeply integrated and directly shape model design, training, and deployment, helping us produce systems that
are more reliable, steerable, and well suited for real-world deployment, particularly in demanding enterprise
environments. We translate our research leadership into innovation velocity and have consistently released
better models, platform capabilities, and applications. Each version of a Claude model assists in building the
next, helping to compress development timelines and produce compounding improvements in the speed at
which we innovate. We refer to this recursive dynamic as “closing the loop,” and we believe it is one of the most
significant structural advantages in frontier AI.
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Our Approach to Compute. We manage compute as a single, fungible pool from multiple strategic partners, and
we dynamically direct available compute between workloads based on where the marginal unit is expected to be
most productive at any given time. We believe that this approach to compute enables us to deliver superior
models, serve more customers, and achieve greater productivity from our compute investment. This compute
efficiency creates the foundation for us to advance the frontier of AI capabilities through research and model
development, meet growing demand from customers, and provide for internal usage of Claude. We have
achieved this through our research breakthroughs and our multi-chip compute architecture across AWS
Trainium, Google TPUs, NVIDIA GPUs, and AMD GPUs, enabling us to orchestrate workloads to optimize for
price and performance. To support our research, model development, customer demand, and internal usage of
Claude, we continue to invest at scale. As of and subsequent to September 30, 2026, we have entered into
purchase commitments and lease agreements, including short-term commitments, as well as leases not yet
commenced, with an aggregate committed spend of approximately $895.4 billion, substantially all of which is
related to compute and infrastructure. These commitments include approximately $447.5 billion expected to be
incurred before December 31, 2030, and substantially all of the remainder is expected to be incurred between
2031 and 2045. Approximately $69.8 billion of these commitments are due in the 12 months following
September 30, 2026. See the section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations—Liquidity and Capital Resources—Contractual Obligations” for more information.
Enterprise Strategy. Our enterprise strategy is built on the belief that frontier AI is most valuable in real-world
settings, as deployment across enterprises is where economic impact is greatest and where the improvement
loop from customer feedback is richest. Accordingly, we have organized our research priorities, our product
roadmap, and our go-to-market and Applied AI teams around enterprise use cases, which range from routine
knowledge work to the most complex problems. The customer feedback we gather directs our research focus
and makes Claude more capable over time. This broadens where Claude can be deployed and further expands
enterprise adoption, which helps ensure that the benefits of our AI reach people and organizations at scale.
AI is Transforming Intelligence
We believe that Powerful AI, a highly capable and impactful form of frontier AI characterized by the following
key attributes, will become widely available within a few years:
•cognitive capabilities matching or exceeding those of top human experts across most professional and
scientific disciplines;
•the ability to navigate all interfaces available to a human working virtually, including text, audio, video,
and direct computer control;
•the ability to reason through complex tasks autonomously over extended periods—lasting hours, days,
or weeks—and seek clarification and feedback when needed;
•the ability to coordinate across multiple instances and collaborate with both humans and other AI
systems; and
•the ability to interface with the physical world by controlling laboratory equipment, robotic systems,
and other machines through digital connections.
If Powerful AI is directed at solving humanity’s hardest problems and the risks are managed responsibly, the
potential is extraordinary. The possibilities include compressing decades of scientific progress into years;
accelerating drug discovery, disease detection, and the delivery of personalized therapy; providing individually
tailored education and expert financial and legal advice; advancing power grids and battery design for greater
efficiency and reliability; and extending to the developing world capabilities that took wealthy nations
generations to build.
A Near-Term Opportunity to Transform Cognitive Work
Frontier AI is transforming cognitive work—the application of knowledge, reasoning, and judgment to produce
economic value. We believe it will make humans far more capable and expand the world’s overall capacity for
that work, including accelerating scientific discovery and helping businesses grow. Knowledge workers are the
leading edge of this opportunity. As frontier AI advances, more capable models can unlock entirely new use
1 See the section titled “Industry, Market, and Other Data” for a description of how we calculate annual economic value attributable
to knowledge workers globally.
2 IDC, The Economic Impact of AI: 2026 Edition, doc # US54452226, April 2026. Reflects cumulative economic impact as the sum
of the annual impact estimated for each year from 2025 through 2031. Includes the annual value created across AI solutions
and services, investments in the AI infrastructure supply chain, and enhancements in enterprise productivity and efficiency
unlocked by AI.
3 IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science, Global Medicine Use Trends 2026, February 2026.
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cases while also efficiently serving a wide range of cognitive work at scale across the capability-cost-speed
curve. We believe the work that knowledge workers perform represented more than $40 trillion in economic
value globally in 2025,1 and with frontier AI’s potential to make them meaningfully more productive, our near-
term opportunity is to expand this value and accelerate economic growth. While it is still early to forecast
frontier AI’s full impact across the economy, International Data Corporation (“IDC”) estimates that investment
in AI solutions and services will yield a cumulative global economic impact of $22.5 trillion by 2031.2 We
believe the impact could be even greater.
Frontier AI May Reshape Entire Sectors and Accelerate Novel Discoveries
We believe frontier AI represents a larger opportunity than any prior technology cycle, and Claude is already
demonstrating this potential. Claude can now execute complex projects autonomously and turn open-ended
tasks into finished, high-quality deliverables. These capabilities enable it to transform the largest sectors of the
economy, driving meaningful gains in productivity and output. Frontier AI’s capabilities may extend beyond
current markets to open entirely new ones, reaching domains such as robotics, advanced manufacturing, and
logistics, and accelerating progress in scientific research, including drug discovery and materials science. For
example, in the life sciences sector, where annual global pharmaceutical spend is expected to exceed $2 trillion
in 2026,3 Claude is used in drug discovery and development by our customers, our biotechnology partners, and
our own researchers. We are also extending Claude into robotics, where our Model Hardware Standard enables
AI agents to operate lab and manufacturing equipment such as microscopes, liquid handlers, and off-the-shelf
robotic arms. Ultimately, we believe frontier AI will help drive global economic growth. As frontier AI makes
workers and organizations more productive, becomes embedded in the products and services they deliver, and
unlocks new business models, it creates economic output that did not previously exist. We believe our
opportunity is to capture a share not only of today’s economic activity but also of that newly created output as
the global economy expands.
The Importance of Safety and Ethical Behavior
While the potential benefits of AI are extraordinary, its rapid advancement will impact the economy and society
in ways that could create significant disruption, particularly if the technology is not developed and deployed
responsibly. For example, bad actors have already conducted high-profile cyberattacks using AI’s capabilities to
discover vulnerabilities, generate malware, and evade detection tools; other risks associated with misuse,
including in the domain of biology, could result in even greater harm. AI deployed at scale also has the potential
to concentrate power and wealth both within and between countries in ways that could erode trust, harm
society, and destabilize the geopolitical order. Misaligned AI systems could corrupt institutional decision-
making or cause large-scale harm through autonomous actions that are not visible or understandable to their
users and operators. We believe that frontier AI companies must invest in safety and alignment to help ensure
the responsible diffusion of this technology. We also believe that safety, alignment, and ethical behavior
resonate particularly strongly with enterprises, where rigorous safeguards, predictable model behavior, and
demonstrable accountability have become decisive criteria in selecting an AI partner for mission-critical
workloads.
Claude as a Virtual Collaborator
We believe we have reached an inflection point where AI systems can function as genuine collaborators in
professional work. They quickly complete substantive tasks that might otherwise occupy a skilled professional
for several hours, a full day, or longer. AI systems are also becoming increasingly capable of performing tasks
that were previously too difficult or costly to complete or surfacing original insights and analyses. We refer to
these AI systems that work alongside humans to perform complex, multi-step work at professional levels as
Virtual Collaborators. Virtual Collaborators carry the access rights, system connections, and context that their
organizations grant them, which allows them to function more accurately and reliably. They can navigate and
4 IDC, Worldwide Developer Population Growth Forecast, 2025–2029, doc # US53789825, September 2025.
8
use internal tools and execute workflows that span multiple steps that require sustained reasoning. Virtual
Collaborators are AI designed to be embedded where work gets done, and our aim is to continue extending
them to knowledge workers globally, a population that is estimated to exceed one billion in 2028.4
Claude Code. The clearest manifestation of Virtual Collaborators today is Claude Code, our coding agent and
the product we believe has most concretely defined what autonomous AI work looks like. Claude Code shifted
the market’s understanding of what an AI system could do in collaboration with software developers: the model
suggests the next line of code and goes further by planning, writing, testing, and debugging—a process that
results in production-grade code. Within months of its release, autonomous coding became the reference point
for measuring the progress of frontier AI. For enterprise AI use cases, we believe the launch of Claude Code was
comparable in its impact to the introduction of the first widely adopted conversational AI assistants. What
makes Claude Code a Virtual Collaborator is its sustained reasoning, a harness that translates intent into
actions, an execution environment that maintains a persistent state whether on a developer’s machine or in a
sandboxed cloud environment, integration with existing tools and systems, and a user-friendly interface. Its
uses are highly varied and often surprising: for example, NASA engineers used Claude Code to plan and write
navigation commands for the Mars Perseverance rover, resulting in the first AI-planned drive on Mars.
Software developers are powerful advocates for Claude—they understand how systems work, have credibility
evaluating technical tools, and often serve as internal champions for adopting new technologies. Winning their
trust creates a foundation for broader diffusion of Virtual Collaborators across enterprise workforces. We are
already seeing this pattern play out with non-technical teams increasingly adopting Claude Code and Claude
Cowork to manage their own workflows.
Claude Cowork. All digital work is ultimately an expression of code, and Claude’s mastery of it powers Virtual
Collaborators capable of handling complex work far beyond software development. Claude Cowork extends the
agentic architecture of Claude Code to knowledge workers broadly by translating a user’s intent into completed
work, autonomously reading files, navigating applications, and executing multi-step workflows on a user’s
desktop while the underlying code is abstracted away. By extending beyond Claude Code with applications
purpose-built for specific professions and industry verticals, we accelerate Claude’s diffusion into new
categories of knowledge work and deepen our presence across the enterprise. As of September 30, 2026,
adoption of Claude Cowork, which we made available as a research preview in January 2026, outpaced the
adoption Claude Code achieved at the equivalent point following its research preview release in February 2025.
In September 2026, we began merging Claude Cowork and Claude.ai, bringing agentic and conversational work
into a unified application. Users can now move from a simple question to complex, multi-step tasks in the same
conversation.
Extending Virtual Collaborators. We believe the trajectory for Virtual Collaborators is clear and accelerating.
Each generation of Claude models has expanded along multiple dimensions: the depth and rigor of their
reasoning, the duration and autonomy of the work they can sustain, the complexity of tasks they can complete,
and the volume of useful output they can produce. Capability evaluations and benchmarking have shown
substantial improvements across Claude model versions in the duration and complexity of tasks that can be
completed reliably, with more recent model versions demonstrating particularly significant advances.
We are building towards a world where Claude can be given open-ended tasks lasting hours, days, or weeks,
and then execute them autonomously with the judgment and initiative of a brilliant colleague. Ultimately,
millions of Virtual Collaborators can run in parallel, each working independently on unrelated problems or
collaborating seamlessly to achieve a shared objective. The result is something without historical precedent:
what we refer to as a country of geniuses in a data center, available to every organization and sector of the
economy.
Enterprise Adoption of Claude
The speed and depth of our enterprise customer adoption are powerful evidence of Claude’s position at the
frontier of AI. Our customer base as of September 30, 2026 includes:
•More than 11,900 customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis;
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•More than 1,900 customers with $1 million or more of revenue on a TTM basis; and
•Approximately 250 customers with $10 million or more of revenue on a TTM basis.
We believe customers choose Claude for a wide variety of use cases, from routine knowledge work to their most
important problems. They come to us for access to frontier AI across our platform and applications that deliver
real-world outcomes. We see this conviction in customer behavior: enterprises consistently utilize our latest
and most capable models as soon as they are released, gravitating to the most advanced option for their highest-
value work. Our customers see us as a long-term partner for the frontier capabilities we offer today, for the
innovation they expect from us in the future, and for our ability to meet their needs across the capability-cost-
speed curve.
Beyond our models, the Claude Platform provides primitives that enable customers to accelerate time-to-value
and leverage Claude’s intelligence in a variety of use cases. These primitives are the same ones we use to build
our own applications. Our applications, such as Claude Code and Claude Cowork, multiply the impact of
employees. Over time, our applications have become more capable and are now frequently being used to
conduct long-running autonomous work alongside employees. Improvements to our models, platform, and
applications accrue to the benefit of our customers and drive continued adoption.
Our commitment to our mission instills confidence in our customers to choose Claude as a trusted partner. Our
investments in research on AI alignment, interpretability, cybersecurity, and enterprise-grade controls aim to
deliver the predictability and dependability that organizations need in customer-facing and regulated contexts.
This trust means that enterprises can expand the scope of the work that they delegate to Claude, as well as the
systems into which Claude is integrated. Enterprises are aligning their strategies around Claude with the
confidence that we are building frontier AI that serves their needs in the long term.
Today, enterprises rely on Claude to reason, plan, and execute across complex workflows with a level of
trustworthiness and judgment that we believe was not available from earlier generations of AI. Customers
realize value from Claude in three primary ways: more productive employees, faster processes, and embedded
intelligence in their products. As Claude’s capabilities grow, our customers benefit and often broaden their
adoption of Claude in new workflows. This expanding role reflects a broader shift in how Claude is used inside
the enterprise, from a tool that responds to discrete prompts to a Virtual Collaborator.
We drive the diffusion of Claude primarily by making it accessible across multiple product surfaces. For
example:
•Claude Platform, our comprehensive agentic development environment, provides customers with
direct access to the primitives to build, deploy, and scale their own applications that leverage Claude’s
capabilities within their own products and workflows.
•Claude Code, our coding agent, works alongside human software developers on end-to-end software
development: writing, planning, editing, testing, debugging, and committing code across production-
scale codebases.
•Claude Cowork, our knowledge work agent, has computer use capability that enables it to work with
professionals on end-to-end business tasks: autonomously researching, drafting, analyzing,
synthesizing, and executing other knowledge work.
Much of the diffusion of Claude has been organic. We amplify this with our go-to-market and Applied AI teams,
which extend our reach by meeting customers where they are through distribution partnerships that place
Claude inside customers’ existing technology stacks. For example, Claude is accessible on all three major cloud
platforms—Amazon Web Services (“AWS”), Google Cloud Platform (“GCP”), and Microsoft Azure (“Azure”). We
have a joint go-to-market approach with these CSPs through which we establish direct contractual relationships
with our customers while paying a fee to each CSP. This structure allows us to foster stronger commercial
alignment with these CSPs, avoid channel conflict, set pricing, and realize the financial benefits of ongoing
compute efficiency improvements. Ecosystem partnerships also expand our reach, allowing customers to adopt
Claude through SIs, such as Accenture, Deloitte, KPMG, and PwC; consultants; and data platforms, such as
Salesforce and Snowflake. We recently launched an AI services company, Ode with Anthropic, in partnership
10
with leading private equity firms to bring Claude’s capabilities to mid-sized companies across sectors, building
solutions on the Claude Platform and supporting customers over the long term.
Strengths of Our Financial Model
Building and scaling frontier AI is one of the most important and capital-intensive endeavors in history. Our
financial model provides us with the following strengths that allow us to build and scale efficiently:
•Rapid Revenue Growth. Our enterprise strategy is designed to drive durable customer adoption by
embedding Claude directly into business-critical workflows and enabling the development of products
built on Claude. We believe that enterprise customers achieve a compelling return on investment from
Claude, as agentic workflows can drive both top-line growth and efficiency. This enables us to expand
quickly with customers, as demonstrated by our Net Revenue Retention of approximately 900% as of
September 30, 2026. Diffusion also accelerates as our models become more capable and efficient,
allowing us to lower the cost per task for customers. For example, Opus 5.5 reduced customer costs per
task by approximately 40% compared to Opus 5. Lower costs per task drive greater usage, which in
turn drives broader diffusion of Claude. Our compute efficiency allows us to deliver these reductions
while preserving our margins.
•Compute Efficiency. Our compute efficiency drives more intelligence from research and model
development, and we believe this approach can support more customer and internal usage of Claude
for the same amount of compute compared to other approaches. Our compute efficiency is
demonstrated by revenue that grew 1,127% year over year for the three months ended September 30,
2026, compared to compute and infrastructure expenses that grew 382% during the same period.
•Operating Efficiency. Our operating efficiency, derived from our high talent density, our efficient go-
to-market, and how extensively our teams leverage Claude in their work, enables us to scale with a
smaller team relative to other large enterprise technology companies. Our operating efficiency is
demonstrated by TTM revenue per employee of over $6.6 million as of September 30, 2026, compared
to $1.4 million as of September 30, 2025.
The demonstrated growth, scale, and efficiency of our financial model help us to continue making significant
long-term investments to build frontier AI responsibly. Our business trajectory and financial profile have
enabled us to access capital and secure compute from investors and partners. As of September 30, 2026, we had
raised an aggregate of $141.1 billion of capital and had cash and cash equivalents of $95.6 billion and short-
term investments of $36.3 billion.
Our Self-Reinforcing Loops
Our scale and growth create self-reinforcing loops that make Claude better over time and that we believe create
durable competitive advantages.
•Improvement Loop. Enterprise deployments of Claude deepen our understanding of the hard
problems, edge cases, and domain-specific challenges that matter most to our customers. We improve
our models, platform, and applications based on feedback from customers using our offerings in
production across their businesses. These improvements result in wider deployments and adoption
that fuel the next cycle of improvement.
•Investment Loop. Revenue from expanding enterprise adoption helps us to fund the compute,
research, and talent needed to improve Claude. Claude’s advancing capabilities expand the range of
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tasks and workflows customers use Claude for, broadening our addressable market and driving deeper
deployment, additional revenue, and continued reinvestment in Claude.
prosummary1ba.jpg
Claude is Accelerating Our Ability to Close the Loop
Claude itself has become one of the most powerful drivers of our progress—each new version of a Claude model
directly accelerates development of the next. Many aspects of the research, training, and testing of subsequent
model generations now involve Claude, including running experiments, generating and processing training
data, automating evaluations and safety audits, and writing and reviewing code. We refer to this recursive
dynamic as “closing the loop.” A direct expression of this dynamic is our accelerating pace of producing
compute multipliers. More capable models help our researchers discover these improvements faster; in turn,
more powerful compute multipliers enable us to train even more capable models and deploy them more
efficiently.
Our Growth Strategy
We believe the diffusion of AI through the global economy represents one of the largest opportunities in history
to improve how humans live and work, and it is just beginning. In our view, the world has only begun to use the
capabilities of today’s frontier models, and the gap between what Claude can do and how broadly it is used
represents one of our largest growth opportunities, alongside continued advances at the frontier. Claude’s
capabilities have evolved significantly in recent years, and we expect they will continue advancing rapidly. This
will lead not only to an expanding addressable market, but also to an expanding scope of impact on the world.
We aim to ensure that impact is as positive as possible. Our core advantages, the speed and scale of enterprise
adoption of Claude, and our unprecedented financial model enable us to continue investing aggressively to
build an AI-enabled future that benefits humanity broadly. Elements of our growth strategy include:
•Talent and Culture. To recruit world-class researchers and engineers and retain exceptional people, we
intend to continue investing in our low-ego, high-impact, and mission-aligned culture that has driven
our talent density as we have scaled.
•Compute. We intend to secure further compute beyond our existing commitments, expand our own
data center footprint to secure additional long-term compute, improve compute efficiency across our
multi-chip compute architecture, and produce further algorithmic advances in model efficiency.
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•Claude’s Intelligence, Capability, and Safety. We plan to continue advancing Claude’s core intelligence
and safety in tandem, expand the frontier of what AI systems can reliably do, and pioneer new ways AI
can be applied across professional domains.
•Claude’s Accessibility. We plan to continue making Claude’s intelligence accessible across every surface
where work happens, including through our own platform and applications, through AWS, GCP, and
Azure, and through embedding in enterprise applications.
•Claude’s Adoption. We intend to grow our direct go-to-market and Applied AI teams, deepen cloud
distribution partnerships, invest in brand and marketing, and expand our international presence to
drive adoption of Claude as the trusted AI partner for organizations worldwide.
•New Markets. We intend to extend frontier AI to accelerate novel discoveries, reaching domains from
healthcare and life sciences to robotics and physical work, where we believe compounding model
capabilities can unlock transformative opportunities.
•Strategic Transactions and Partnerships. We intend to selectively pursue acquisitions, investments,
and strategic partnerships, including ecosystem partnerships with SIs, consultants, and data platforms,
that accelerate our mission, expand our reach, and strengthen our competitive position.
Our Commitment to Public Benefit
We founded Anthropic on the belief that the most transformative technology in human history demands an
extraordinary level of responsibility, and that responsibility extends far beyond building safe systems. We
intend to direct a meaningful portion of our resources toward ensuring that frontier AI is safe and its benefits
are broadly distributed, which we refer to as our public benefit initiatives.
As part of these initiatives, we contributed 846,840,960 shares of our Class N common stock, representing 5%
of our fully diluted shares as of June 30, 2026 (assuming full conversion of the Amazon Notes, as defined
below), to Anthropic Public Benefit Fund, LLC (the “Anthropic Public Benefit Fund”), our wholly owned
subsidiary dedicated to the Company Purpose (as defined below) (such issuance, the “Initial Public Benefit
Issuance”). Our board of directors has also approved a framework under which it may, in its discretion, issue
shares of our Class N common stock to the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund (or other designee) representing up
to an additional 2% of our then-outstanding shares (plus any shares subject to options, restricted stock units
(“RSUs”), and other convertible securities and any shares held by the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund) each time
our share price appreciates 50% above the prior share price milestone, beginning with our initial public offering
price (the “Public Benefit Issuances”). In addition, our co-founders have each pledged to dedicate 80% of their
personal equity in Anthropic to philanthropic causes. For additional information regarding these pledges,
including related risks, see the section titled “Risk Factors—Risks Related to Ownership of our Class A Common
Stock.” Separate from the co-founders’ pledges, we also maintain a donation matching program through which
employees can pledge a meaningful portion of their equity awards toward charitable giving, which we match
with shares of our Class N common stock.
Our Governance Structure and Its Goals
Our novel capital and corporate governance structure has been carefully designed and differs significantly from
that of other public companies. We strive to help bring humanity safely into an era where transformative AI
exerts tremendous and potentially decisive influence over a broad range of human undertakings. Operating as a
public benefit corporation (“PBC”) gives our board of directors the necessary latitude to balance the pecuniary
interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the specific
public benefit purpose that we promote. Our specific public benefit purpose is the responsible development and
maintenance of advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity (the “Company Purpose”). In addition, a
financially disinterested trust, which we refer to as the Long-Term Benefit Trust (the “LTBT”) and which
generally has the power to elect and remove a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors, is
designed to supply both the incentives and insights for striking this balance appropriately. We also believe that
our seven co-founders are distinctly equipped to be stewards of our mission.
13
Public Benefit Corporation Status
Consistent with our long-term commitment to AI safety and responsibility, we are incorporated as a PBC under
Delaware law. PBCs are a class of corporations that are intended to produce a public benefit and operate in a
responsible and sustainable manner. Under Delaware law, a PBC is required to identify in its certificate of
incorporation the public benefit or benefits it will promote, and its directors have a duty to manage the affairs of
the corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the corporation’s stockholders, the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit purpose
identified in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation. As provided in our amended and restated certificate
of incorporation, the public benefit that we promote, which we must always consider in the management of our
company, is the Company Purpose.
Long-Term Benefit Trust
In 2023, we implemented an innovative governance structure featuring the LTBT, which is designed to ensure
that we are managed in a manner that responsibly balances our tripartite goals as a PBC: the pecuniary
interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the Company
Purpose. The LTBT is intended to operate as an independent body of five financially disinterested voting
trustees (“Trustees”) with expertise in AI safety, national security, public policy, and social enterprise. Through
a special class of common stock, Class T common stock, the LTBT generally has the authority to elect and
remove the Class T directors, who together will constitute a majority of the authorized members of our board of
directors. Our Class T common stock does not otherwise have voting rights on matters submitted to
stockholders generally.
Founder Voting Structure
We believe that our seven co-founders, Dario Amodei, Daniela Amodei, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Jared Kaplan,
Sam McCandlish, and Christopher Olah, as a group, are distinctly equipped to be stewards of our mission.
Immediately prior to the completion of this offering, we will issue a single share of Class F common stock, a
special class of our common stock, to a limited liability company of which our seven co-founders will initially be
the sole members (the “Founder LLC”).
Our Class F common stock will be entitled to an aggregate number of votes that equals 50.1% of the total voting
power of our outstanding shares of capital stock with respect to matters submitted to stockholders generally,
including the election of our directors other than the Class T directors.
Board Governance
Decisions regarding our business and affairs are made by our board of directors. Immediately prior to the
completion of this offering, we will enter into a stockholders’ agreement (the “Stockholders’ Agreement”) with
the LTBT and the Founder LLC, under which they will agree to vote their shares and take other actions to give
effect to the board composition, director nomination, and director removal provisions described in our
governing documents. Collectively, the LTBT and the Founder LLC will have the ability to elect all members of
our board of directors. Regardless of the class or classes of stock by which a director is elected, there is no limit
to the number of terms a director may serve.
While the LTBT has significant influence over our board of directors through its ability to generally elect and
remove a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors, neither the LTBT nor the Trustees have
decision-making authority in the day-to-day management or strategy setting of the company. The LTBT’s role is
to select directors who are well equipped to make decisions in furtherance of the responsible balancing of the
pecuniary interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the
Company Purpose, and to support our management’s decision-making through advice and guidance.
The Founder LLC will also have significant influence over our business and affairs through its ability to vote our
Class F common stock, which is entitled to an aggregate number of votes that equals 50.1% of the total voting
power of our outstanding shares of capital stock with respect to matters submitted to stockholders generally,
including the election of our directors other than the Class T directors.
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See the sections titled “Risk Factors—Risks Related to our Governance Structure,” “Our Governance Structure
and Its Goals,” “Management,” “Certain Relationships and Related Person Transactions,” and “Description of
Capital Stock” for more information.
Controlled Company Status
We are considered a “controlled company” within the meaning of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate
governance requirements because the LTBT, as the sole holder of our Class T common stock, generally has the
power to elect a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors. As such, we are permitted to opt
out of compliance with certain Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate governance requirements. Accordingly, if
we elect not to comply with certain requirements, you will not have the same protections afforded to
stockholders of companies that are subject to all of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate governance
requirements. Although we qualify as a “controlled company,” we do not expect to rely on this exemption except
with respect to our nominating and corporate governance committee (“NGC”), which will not consist entirely of
independent directors. Our board of directors currently consists of a majority of independent directors and our
audit and compensation committees currently consist entirely of independent directors. See the sections titled
“Risk Factors—Risks Related to our Governance Structure—We are considered a ‘controlled company’ within
the meaning of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate governance requirements, and, as a result, we
qualify for, and currently rely on, exemptions from certain corporate governance requirements,” “Our
Governance Structure and Its Goals,” “Management,” and “Description of Capital Stock” for additional
information.
15
Our Capital Structure
The following table summarizes certain key terms of each class or series of our common stock that will be
authorized following the completion of this offering:
Category of
Rights
Class A Common
Stock
Class N
Common Stock
Class T Common
Stock
Class F Common
Stock
Class E Common
Stock
Votes per share
1
0
1
50.1% of
outstanding voting
power on record
date
1
Matters on which
entitled to vote
All matters
submitted to
stockholders
generally; election
of non-Class T
directors; certain
amendments to the
terms of the LTBT
or the rights of our
Class T common
stock; redemption
of our Class T
common stock
Not entitled to vote
except as required
by law, in which
case our Class N
common stock will
have one vote per
share
Election of Class T
directors, which
constitute a
majority of our
board of directors;
redemption of our
Class E common
stock; certain
amendments to the
rights of our Class
F common stock 
All matters
submitted to
stockholders
generally; election
of non-Class T
directors; certain
amendments to the
terms of the LTBT
or the rights of our
Class T common
stock; redemption
of our Class T
common stock;
redemption of our
Class E common
stock
Nomination,
change in
designation, or
removal of the
Specified Class T
Director (as
defined below)
(only if our NGC
does not concur
with the LTBT’s
nomination,
change in
designation, or
removal); certain
amendments to the
terms of the LTBT
or the rights of our
Class T common
stock; redemption
of our Class T
common stock
Conversion
rights
None
Converts into Class
A common stock
upon a sale or
transfer to an
unaffiliated third
party
None
None
None
Transferability
Generally
transferable
Generally
transferable;
converts to Class A
common stock
upon transfer as
described above
Transferable only
upon approval of
persons comprising
the Trust
Amendment
Threshold (as
defined below)
Not transferable
except in the case
of a reorganization
or redomiciliation
of the Founder LLC
that is approved by
our board of
directors and does
not result in a
change to the
members of the
Founder LLC
Not transferable
Dividend rights
Entitled to
participate pro rata
in dividends and
distributions
Entitled to
participate pro rata
in dividends and
distributions
None
None
None
Right to receive
liquidation
distributions
Entitled to
participate pro rata
in liquidation
distributions
Entitled to
participate pro rata
in liquidation
distributions
Entitled to par
value per share
Entitled to par
value per share
Entitled to par
value per share
Redeemable by
company
No
No
Redeemable by us
for no
consideration upon
occurrence of
certain events
Redeemable by us
for no
consideration upon
occurrence of
certain events
Redeemable by us
for no
consideration upon
occurrence of
certain events
For more information about our capital structure, see the section titled “Description of Capital Stock.”
Risk Factors Summary
Our business is subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, including those highlighted in the section titled
“Risk Factors” immediately following this prospectus summary. These risks could adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations, which could cause the market price of our Class A common stock
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to decline and could result in a loss of all or part of your investment. Additional risks, beyond those summarized
below or discussed elsewhere in this prospectus, may apply to our business, activities, or operations as currently
conducted or as we may conduct them in the future and in the markets in which we operate or may in the future
operate. These risks include the following:
•Our success depends in large part on our ability to continue to develop the most advanced and capable
AI models, and any failure to do so could adversely affect our business.
•If we are unable to secure adequate compute or if we fail to direct our compute effectively across our
workloads, we may be unable to train models that remain competitive with those of our competitors or
adequately serve our customers.
•Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability to secure adequate
compute.
•We are highly dependent on the continued service of our co-founders, senior management team, and
key technical employees, and the loss of any of these individuals may adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
•Our company culture has contributed to our success and, if we cannot maintain this culture as we
grow, our business could be adversely affected.
•We face intense competition, and if we are unable to compete effectively, our business, financial
condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
•If the market for our models, platform, and applications develops more slowly than we expect or
declines, our growth may slow or stall, and our business, financial condition, and results of operations
could be adversely affected.
•If the use of our AI models results in harm, whether through use by malicious actors or misuse by other
third parties, or if our model guardrails or safeguards fail to prevent such misuse, our reputation and
brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
•Our AI models may behave in unintended, misaligned, or autonomous ways, including by taking
harmful actions that no user or third party directed, which could adversely affect our reputation and
brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations.
•We may be exposed to liability, litigation, and regulatory action arising from harms associated with our
AI models, and our contractual protections and insurance may be insufficient, any of which could
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
•A substantial portion of our revenue and accounts receivable is driven by a limited number of
customers and distribution channels, and the loss of, or a significant reduction in, spend from one or
more of our top customers or disruption through those channels could adversely affect our prospects,
business, and financial condition.
•We have a limited operating history in an evolving and nascent industry, which makes it difficult to
evaluate our future prospects and may increase the risk that we will not be successful.
•We are at an early stage of our revenue growth, we have experienced rapid growth in recent periods,
and our historical growth rates are not indicative of future performance or our ability to sustain or
forecast future revenue growth.
•Our business is subject to an evolving and uncertain regulatory and political environment, which could
increase our costs, restrict our operations, or adversely affect demand for our models, platform, and
applications.
•Our reliance on a limited number of CSPs and suppliers, some of which have strategic and investment
relationships with us and are our customers, creates complex dynamics that could give rise to conflicts
of interest and adversely affect our access to compute.
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•Our capital stock structure features certain provisions that are novel or otherwise not common among
other corporations with multiple-class structures, and may effectively eliminate the ability of holders of
our Class A common stock to influence important decisions, including a change in control.
•Our capital structure will concentrate voting power with the LTBT and the Founder LLC for the
foreseeable future and will result in the LTBT and the Founder LLC having voting power that is not
derived from or proportionate to economic interests in our company.
•Our focus on the long-term best interests of our company as a PBC, and the duty of our directors to
balance the pecuniary interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those stakeholders materially
affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose, may conflict with short-, medium-, or long-term
financial interests and business performance, which may negatively impact the value of our Class A
common stock.
Channels for Disclosure of Information
Investors, the media, and others should note that, following the completion of this offering, we intend to
announce material information to the public through filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), the investor relations page on our website (www.anthropic.com), blog posts on our website, press
releases, public conference calls, public webcasts, our X accounts (@AnthropicAI and @ClaudeAI), our
Instagram page (@claudeai), our Threads account (@claudeai), and our LinkedIn page (https://
www.linkedin.com/company/anthropicresearch/).
The information disclosed through the foregoing channels could be deemed to be material information. As
such, following the completion of this offering, we encourage investors, the media, and others to follow the
channels listed above and to review the information disclosed through such channels. We are not incorporating
any of the information in such channels into this prospectus.
Any updates to the list of disclosure channels through which we will announce information will be posted on the
investor relations page on our website.
Corporate Information
We were incorporated as a Delaware PBC in January 2021. Our principal executive offices are located at 548
Market Street, PMB 90375, San Francisco, California 94104, and our telephone number is (415) 326-6303. Our
website address is www.anthropic.com. Information contained on, or that can be accessed through, our website
does not constitute part of this prospectus and references to our website address in this prospectus are inactive
textual references only. You should not consider information contained on our website to be part of this
prospectus or rely on it in deciding whether to purchase shares of our Class A common stock.
“Anthropic,” our logo, and our other registered or common law trademarks, service marks, or trade names
appearing in this prospectus are the property of Anthropic, PBC. Other trademarks and trade names referred to
in this prospectus are the property of their respective owners. Solely for convenience, trademarks and trade
names referred to in this prospectus may appear without the ® or ™ symbols, but such references are not
intended to indicate, in any way, that we will not assert, to the fullest extent under applicable law, our rights, or
the rights of any applicable licensor, to these trademarks and trade names. 
18
The Offering
Class A common stock offered by us
shares
Class A common stock offered by the selling
stockholders
           shares
Underwriters’ option to purchase additional
shares of Class A common stock from us
shares
Class A common stock to be outstanding after
this offering
           shares (or            shares if the underwriters exercise
their option to purchase additional shares of our Class A
common stock in full)
Class N common stock to be outstanding after
this offering
           shares
Class T common stock to be outstanding after
this offering
1 share
Class E common stock to be outstanding after
this offering
0 shares
Class F common stock to be outstanding after
this offering
1 share
Class A, Class N, Class T, Class E, and Class F
common stock to be outstanding after this
offering
           shares (or            shares if the underwriters exercise
their option to purchase additional shares of our Class A
common stock in full)
Use of proceeds
We estimate that the net proceeds from the sale of shares of
our Class A common stock by us in this offering will be
approximately $           (or approximately $           if the
underwriters’ option to purchase additional shares of our
Class A common stock is exercised in full), based upon the
assumed initial public offering price of $           per share,
which is the midpoint of the estimated offering price range
set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, and after
deducting estimated underwriting discounts and
commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by
us. We will not receive any proceeds from the sale of shares
of Class A common stock by the selling stockholders.
The principal purposes of this offering are to increase our
capitalization and financial flexibility, create a public
market for our Class A common stock, facilitate an orderly
distribution of shares for the selling stockholders, and
enable access to the public equity markets for us and our
stockholders. We intend to use the net proceeds from this
offering for general corporate purposes, including working
capital, operating expenses, and capital expenditures,
including investments in compute and infrastructure, as
well as hiring and retention of highly skilled personnel.
Additionally, we may use a portion of the net proceeds to
acquire or invest in businesses, products, services, or
technologies. However, we do not have agreements or
commitments for any material acquisitions or investments
at this time. We also intend to use a portion of the net
proceeds to satisfy our anticipated tax withholding and
remittance obligations related to the settlement of certain
of our outstanding RSUs. See the section titled “Use of
Proceeds” for more information.
19
Voting rights
Shares of our Class A common stock are entitled to one vote
per share. Shares of our Class N common stock have no
voting rights, except as otherwise required by law. The
share of our Class T common stock has no voting rights
with respect to matters submitted to stockholders
generally, except as set forth within our amended and
restated certificate of incorporation, including with respect
to the election of a majority of our board of directors or as
required by law. The share of our Class F common stock
will be entitled to an aggregate number of votes that equals
50.1% of the total voting power of our outstanding shares of
capital stock as of the applicable record date on all matters
submitted to a vote of stockholders generally, including the
election of our directors other than the Class T directors.
Shares of our Class E common stock will be entitled to one
vote per share with respect to certain limited matters.
Controlled company
We are considered a “controlled company” within the
meaning of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate
governance requirements. See the sections titled “Our
Governance Structure and Its Goals,” “Management,” and
“Description of Capital Stock” for additional information.
Risk factors
See the section titled “Risk Factors” and other information
included in this prospectus for a discussion of some of the
factors you should consider before deciding to invest in our
Class A common stock.
Proposed trading symbol
“ANT”
The number of shares of our Class A common stock, Class N common stock, Class T common stock, and Class F
common stock that will be outstanding after this offering is based on            shares of our Class A common stock,
           shares of our Class N common stock, one share of our Class T common stock, and one share of our Class F
common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026, which reflects:
•the automatic conversion of (i) all            outstanding shares of our Series A, C-1, D-1, D-2, E-1, F-1, G-1,
and H-1 redeemable convertible preferred stock into            shares of Class A common stock and (ii) all
           outstanding shares of our Series B, C-2, D-3, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, F-2, G-2, G-3, G-4, H-2, H-3,
and H-4 redeemable convertible preferred stock into            shares of Class N common stock,
immediately prior to the completion of this offering pursuant to the terms of our amended and restated
certificate of incorporation (collectively, the “Preferred Stock Conversion”);
•one share of our Class F common stock that will be issued immediately prior to the completion of this
offering to the Founder LLC (the “Class F Stock Issuance”);
•the conversion of $           in aggregate principal amount of our
outstanding convertible promissory notes into            shares of Class N common stock immediately
prior to the completion of this offering, representing shares issuable to Amazon Web Services, Inc.
upon the completion of this offering without causing it to exceed the applicable ownership cap (the
“Convertible Notes Conversion”);
•the Initial Public Benefit Issuance, the shares of which (i) are considered legally outstanding, (ii) are
not considered outstanding for accounting purposes while held by our wholly owned subsidiary, and
(iii) accordingly will not be reflected as outstanding in our consolidated financial statements; and
•the net issuance of            shares of Class A common stock subject to RSUs outstanding as of September
30, 2026, for which the service-based vesting condition will be satisfied as of the date of this offering
and the performance-based vesting condition will be satisfied upon the effectiveness of the registration
statement of which this prospectus forms a part, after giving effect to the withholding of            shares of
Class A common stock subject to such RSUs to satisfy the associated estimated tax withholding and
remittance obligations (based upon the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which
20
is the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, and
an assumed           % tax withholding rate) (the “RSU Settlement”).
The shares of our Class A common stock, Class N common stock, Class T common stock, and Class F common
stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026 exclude the following:
•1,774,342,693 shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the exercise of options to purchase
shares of our Class A common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026, with a weighted-average
exercise price of $2.91 per share;
•           shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs
outstanding as of September 30, 2026, but for which (i) the service-based vesting condition was not
satisfied as of the date of this offering and (ii) the performance-based vesting condition, if applicable,
will be satisfied upon the effectiveness of the registration statement of which this prospectus forms a
part;
•           shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs granted
after September 30, 2026;
•           shares of our Class A common stock and 848,882 shares of our Class N common stock issued
after September 30, 2026 in connection with our acquisitions of privately-held companies; and
•           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance under our equity compensation
plans, consisting of:
◦           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance upon conversion of Class N
common stock issuable under our Donation Matching Plan (as amended and restated, our
“Donation Matching Plan”), of which            shares related to employee pledges on vested equity
awards that were issued after September 30, 2026 (the “Pledge Issuance”);
◦           shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our 2026
Equity Incentive Plan (our “2026 Plan”), which will become effective prior to the completion of
this offering;
◦           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance under our Amended and
Restated 2021 Stock Plan (our “2021 Plan”) as of September 30, 2026, which number of shares will
be added to the shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our
2026 Plan upon its effectiveness, at which time we will cease granting awards under our 2021 Plan;
and
◦           shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our 2026
Employee Stock Purchase Plan (our “ESPP”), which will become effective prior to the completion
of this offering.
Our 2026 Plan and ESPP each provide for an annual automatic increase in the number of shares of our Class A
common stock reserved thereunder, and our 2026 Plan provides for increases to the number of shares that may
be granted thereunder based on awards under our 2021 Plan that expire or are cancelled or forfeited, and
shares under our 2021 Plan that are tendered to or withheld by us for payment of an exercise price or for
satisfying tax withholding obligations or are forfeited or otherwise repurchased by us, as more fully described in
the section titled “Executive Compensation—Equity Plans.”
21
As of September 30, 2026
Class A Common
Stock
(Outstanding)
Class N Common
Stock
(Outstanding)
Redeemable
Convertible
Preferred Stock
Stock Options
RSUs
Total Class A and
Class N Common
Stock (As-
Converted, Fully
Diluted)
(No Economic
Right) Class T and
Class F Common
Stock
Historical
Class A common stock
Class N common stock
Class T common stock
Redeemable convertible preferred stock
Stock options
RSUs
Total
Pro Forma Adjustments
Preferred Stock Conversion
Convertible Notes Conversion
RSU Settlement
Shares issued under treasury stock method(1)
Class F Stock Issuance
Class A common stock offered by us in this offering
Total
Additional Adjustments
RSUs granted after September 30, 2026
Rollover notes(2)
Acquisition Issuances
Acquisition holdback shares(3)
Pledge Issuance
Donation Matching Plan Vested Obligations(4)
Initial Public Benefit Issuance
Total
______________
(1)Reflects the net reduction in shares issuable upon exercise of outstanding stock options, which have a weighted-average exercise price of $           per share, assuming aggregate
exercise proceeds of approximately $            billion are used to repurchase shares of Class A common stock at the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is
the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus.
(2)For more information about the terms of our convertible promissory notes, see the section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations—Liquidity and Capital Resources—Convertible Notes—Outstanding Notes.”
(3)For more information about the terms of our acquisition holdback shares, see Note 15 to our consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this prospectus.
(4)           .
Except as otherwise indicated, all information in this prospectus assumes:
•the Preferred Stock Conversion will occur immediately prior to the completion of this offering;
22
•the Convertible Notes Conversion will occur immediately prior to the completion of this offering;
•the filing and effectiveness of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation in Delaware and the effectiveness of our amended and
restated bylaws will each occur immediately prior to the completion of this offering;
•the Class F Stock Issuance will occur immediately prior to the completion of this offering;
•no issuance of shares of Class E common stock prior to the completion of this offering;
•no exercise of outstanding stock options or settlement of outstanding RSUs subsequent to September 30, 2026, other than the RSU Settlement;
and
•no exercise by the underwriters of their option to purchase up to an additional            shares of our Class A common stock from us in this offering.
23
Summary Consolidated Financial and Other Data
The following tables summarize our consolidated financial and other data. We have derived the summary
consolidated statements of operations data for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025 from our
audited consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this prospectus. We have derived the summary
consolidated statements of operations data for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and 2026, and the
summary consolidated balance sheet data as of September 30, 2026, from our unaudited interim consolidated
financial statements included elsewhere in this prospectus. The summary consolidated financial data in this
section are not intended to replace our consolidated financial statements and related notes and are qualified in
their entirety by our consolidated financial statements and related notes included elsewhere in this prospectus.
Our historical results are not necessarily indicative of the results that may be expected in the future and our
results for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 are not necessarily indicative of the results that may be
expected for the full year ending December 31, 2026 or any other period. The following summary consolidated
financial and other data should be read in conjunction with the section titled “Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” and our consolidated financial statements and
related notes thereto included elsewhere in this prospectus.
Consolidated Statements of Operations Data
Year Ended December 31,
Nine Months Ended September
30,
(in millions, except share and per share
amounts)
2023
2024
2025
2025
2026
Revenue
$41
$386
$4,585
$2,545
$33,242
Operating expenses:
Compute and infrastructure
433
2,522
7,326
4,381
18,808
Personnel(1)
95
454
1,839
1,027
4,863
Bartz settlement
—
—
1,500
1,500
—
Sales, marketing, and partnerships
2
43
568
322
5,529
Other operating and administrative
62
347
1,412
539
5,302
Total operating expenses
592
3,366
12,645
7,769
34,502
Operating loss
(551)
(2,980)
(8,060)
(5,224)
(1,260)
Interest income
69
106
431
239
2,359
Change in fair value of convertible
notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs
(1,045)
(5,434)
(34,308)
(20,107)
(94,324)
Other income (expense), net
(2)
—
(8)
(3)
(10,397)
Total other income (expense), net
(978)
(5,328)
(33,885)
(19,871)
(102,362)
Loss before provision for income taxes
(1,529)
(8,308)
(41,945)
(25,095)
(103,622)
Provision for income taxes
2
1
20
12
417
Net loss(2)
$(1,531)
$(8,309)
$(41,965)
$(25,107)
$(104,039)
Net loss per share attributable to common
stockholders, basic and diluted
$(1.42)
$(5.43)
$(23.04)
$(13.90)
$(50.10)
Weighted-average number of shares
outstanding, basic and diluted
1,076,880,510
1,528,994,540
1,821,084,860
1,806,802,920
2,076,810,122
______________
(1)Includes stock-based compensation expense of $29 million, $192 million, and $1.2 billion for the years ended December 31,
2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively, and $591 million and $3.3 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and
2026, respectively.
(2)Includes change in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and simple agreements for future equity (“SAFEs”),
which were $1.0 billion, $5.4 billion, and $34.3 billion for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively,
and $20.1 billion and $94.3 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and 2026, respectively. These changes were
primarily driven by an increase in the fair value of our outstanding convertible promissory notes resulting from an increase in
our enterprise valuation during each of the respective periods.
24
The following table sets forth the computation of unaudited pro forma net loss per share, basic and diluted, of
common stock attributable to common stockholders for the periods presented:
(in millions, except share and per share amounts)
Year Ended
December 31,
2025
Nine Months
Ended
September 30,
2026
Numerator:
Net loss
$(41,965)
$(104,039)
Pro forma adjustment to record stock-based compensation expense related to
RSUs for which the performance-based vesting condition will be satisfied upon
the effectiveness of the registration statement of which this prospectus forms a
part
Pro forma adjustment to eliminate the change in fair value recognized related to
convertible promissory notes
Pro forma net loss
Denominator:
Weighted-average number of shares outstanding, basic and diluted
1,821,084,860
2,076,810,122
Pro forma adjustment to reflect the Preferred Stock Conversion
Pro forma adjustment to reflect the RSU Settlement
Pro forma adjustment to reflect the Convertible Notes Conversion
Weighted-average number of shares outstanding used to compute pro forma net
loss per share, basic and diluted(1)(2)
Pro forma net loss per share, basic and diluted(1)(2)
______________
(1)The unaudited pro forma net loss per share and pro forma weighted-average number of shares used in computing pro forma net
loss per share give effect to (i) the Preferred Stock Conversion, as if such conversion had occurred on January 1, 2025, (ii) the
Convertible Notes Conversion, as if such conversion had occurred on January 1, 2025, (iii) the elimination of the change in fair
value recognized on convertible promissory notes that converted into shares of our redeemable convertible preferred stock
during the periods presented and that convert in the Convertible Notes Conversion, in each case as if such notes had converted
on January 1, 2025, (iv) stock-based compensation expense related to RSUs for which the service-based vesting condition was
satisfied or partially satisfied, and as if the performance-based condition had been satisfied on January 1, 2025, of $           and
$           for the year ended December 31, 2025 and the nine months ended September 30, 2026, respectively, (v) the net
issuance of            and            shares of our Class A common stock upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs, for which the service-
based vesting condition was satisfied, and as if the performance-based condition had been satisfied on January 1, 2025, for the
year ended December 31, 2025 and the nine months ended September 30, 2026, respectively, and (vi) the filing and
effectiveness of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation in Delaware that will become effective immediately prior
to the completion of this offering. The pro forma weighted-average number of shares does not give effect to the Initial Public
Benefit Issuance, as shares of our Class N common stock held by our wholly owned subsidiary are not considered outstanding
for accounting purposes.
(2)As of September 30, 2026, unrecognized stock-based compensation expense not reflected in pro forma net loss per share was
$24.1 billion related to RSUs for which the service-based vesting condition was not satisfied, and which is expected to be
recognized over a weighted-average period of approximately 2.0 years, and $2.1 billion related to our other outstanding equity
awards, which is expected to be recognized over a weighted-average period of approximately 1.4 years.
25
Consolidated Balance Sheet Data
As of September 30, 2026
(in millions)
Actual
Pro Forma(1)
Pro Forma As
Adjusted(2)(3)
Cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments
$131,845
$                     
$                     
Working capital(4)
$129,349
$                     
$                     
Total assets
$154,320
$                     
$                     
Total liabilities
$146,683
$                     
$                     
Redeemable convertible preferred stock
$157,510
$                     
$                     
Additional paid-in capital
$6,481
$                     
$                     
Accumulated deficit
$(156,193)
$                     
$                     
Total stockholders’ deficit
$(149,873)
$                     
$                     
______________
(1)The pro forma column in the consolidated balance sheet gives effect to (i) the Preferred Stock Conversion, as if such conversion
had occurred on September 30, 2026, (ii) the Convertible Notes Conversion, as if such conversion had occurred on September
30, 2026, (iii) the Class F Stock Issuance, as if it had occurred on September 30, 2026, (iv) an increase to additional paid-in
capital and accumulated deficit related to stock-based compensation of $           related to RSUs subject to the RSU Settlement,
and (v) the filing and effectiveness of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation in Delaware that will become
effective immediately prior to the completion of this offering.
(2)The pro forma as adjusted column gives effect to (i) the pro forma adjustments set forth above, (ii) the sale and issuance by us
of             shares of our Class A common stock in this offering, based upon the assumed initial public offering price of $           per
share, which is the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, and after
deducting estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us, and (iii) the use
of net proceeds from this offering, together with existing cash and cash equivalents, if necessary, to satisfy the estimated tax
withholding and remittance obligations related to the RSU Settlement. We will not receive any proceeds from the sale of shares
of our Class A common stock by any of the selling stockholders.
(3)Each $1.00 increase (decrease) in the assumed initial public offering price would increase (decrease) each of cash, cash
equivalents, and short-term investments; working capital; total assets; additional paid-in capital; and total stockholders’ deficit
by $          , assuming the number of shares offered by us as stated on the cover page of this prospectus remains unchanged and
after deducting the estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us.
Similarly, each increase (decrease) of 1.0 million in the number of shares offered by us, as set forth on the cover page of this
prospectus, would increase (decrease) each of cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments; working capital; total assets;
additional paid-in capital; and total stockholders’ deficit by $          , assuming the assumed initial public offering price of $          
per share (the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus) remains the same,
and after deducting the estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us. We
will not receive any proceeds from the sale of shares of our Class A common stock by any of the selling stockholders.
(4)Working capital is defined as current assets less current liabilities.
Non-GAAP Financial Measures
In addition to the measures presented in our consolidated financial statements that were prepared in
accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States (“GAAP”), we use Adjusted
Operating Income (Loss), Adjusted Operating Margin, and Adjusted Net Income (Loss) as non-GAAP financial
measures to evaluate our business, measure our performance, identify trends affecting our business, formulate
business plans, and make strategic decisions.
Year Ended December 31,
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
2025
2025
2026
Adjusted Operating Income (Loss)
$(522)
$(2,788)
$(4,854)
$(3,133)
$4,081
Operating margin
(1,344)%
(772)%
(176)%
(205)%
(4)%
Adjusted Operating Margin
(1,273)%
(722)%
(106)%
(123)%
12%
Adjusted Net Income (Loss)
$(457)
$(2,683)
$(4,455)
$(2,911)
$5,591
See the section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
—Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for a definition of each non-GAAP financial measure, a discussion of the
26
limitations of each non-GAAP financial measure, and a reconciliation of each non-GAAP financial measure to
its most comparable GAAP financial measure for the periods presented and additional information. 
riskfactorscover1ba.jpg
28
Risk Factors
Investing in our Class A common stock involves a high degree of risk. You should carefully consider the risks
and uncertainties described below, together with all of the other information in this prospectus, including the
section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” and
our consolidated financial statements and related notes, before making a decision to invest in our Class A
common stock. The disclosures in this section reflect our beliefs and opinions as to matters that could
materially and adversely affect us in the future, and are not representations as to whether such matters have
or have not occurred previously, except as otherwise disclosed. References to past events are provided by way
of example only and are not intended to be a complete listing or a representation as to their likelihood of
occurring in the future. Our business, financial condition, results of operations, or prospects could also be
adversely affected by risks and uncertainties not currently known to us or that we currently do not believe
are material. If any of the risks actually occur, our business, financial condition, results of operations, and
prospects could be adversely affected. In that event, the market price of our Class A common stock could
decline, and you could lose part or all of your investment.
Risks Related to our Business and Industry
Our success depends in large part on our ability to continue to develop the most advanced and
capable AI models, and any failure to do so could adversely affect our business.
Our success depends in large part on our ability to continuously develop, improve, and deploy the most
advanced, capable, and useful AI models. Achieving and maintaining this position depends on our ability to:
•advance the frontier of AI capabilities through breakthrough research, innovative architectures, and
efficient training methodologies;
•ensure our models are safe, reliable, and trustworthy while maintaining competitive performance;
•secure the compute and infrastructure necessary to power and support our increasing needs;
•advance compute efficiency through algorithmic and architectural innovations, including compute
multiplier advancements;
•retain the continued service of our co-founders, senior management team, and key technical
employees, and attract, retain, and motivate leading researchers, engineers, and technical talent in an
intensely competitive and evolving market;
•continue revenue growth and maintain access to sufficient capital, including through potential equity
and debt financing, to make the investments we believe are necessary to support our growth trajectory;
•secure and maintain relationships with data providers, licensors, and partners to obtain the diverse,
high-quality datasets necessary for world-class model performance;
•secure and maintain relationships with cloud, ecosystem, and other partners to facilitate the diffusion
of Claude;
•build, operate, and maintain the infrastructure required to deploy frontier models cost-effectively and
at scale;
•translate model capabilities into products that meet evolving customer needs and achieve meaningful
adoption;
•allocate substantial financial resources efficiently across research, infrastructure, and operations; and
•navigate an evolving, uncertain, and at times divergent global regulatory landscape and engage with
legislators, regulators, and other stakeholders to promote the development of regulatory frameworks
that we believe are good for society, our customers, and the long-term health of the global economy.
29
Our failure to achieve any of the foregoing could prevent us from maintaining our competitive position, cause
us to fall behind competitors, reduce customer adoption of, or demand for, our models, platform, and
applications, and impair our revenue growth. Limitations to our revenue growth could, in turn, constrain our
ability to fund the substantial and increasing expenditures required for frontier AI development, including
investments in compute, model training, data acquisition, and safety and security systems, as well as our ability
to attract, retain, and appropriately compensate highly skilled technical and operational personnel in a highly
competitive market. Any such constraints could slow our rate of development and innovation, degrade model
performance or reliability relative to competitors, limit our participation in industry standards-setting and
regulatory processes, and reduce our attractiveness to enterprises and prosumers. These effects could create a
self-reinforcing or compounding cycle in which diminished growth limits our capacity to invest in the resources
necessary to remain competitive, which in turn could further weaken our ability to sustain or increase our
revenue growth, making it increasingly difficult and costly to regain technological leadership and operate at the
frontier of AI. Any of the foregoing could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of
operations.
Our ability to maintain our position at the frontier of AI depends in part on our use of AI systems to accelerate
our research processes, a recursive dynamic we refer to as “closing the loop,” in which successive versions of our
models assist in building the next, with the goal of compounding capability gains over time. Our models have
been and are increasingly becoming critical tools in designing, training, testing, and optimizing next-generation
AI systems. If we fail to direct sufficient compute and research efforts to AI-assisted development, or if our
competitors more effectively leverage AI to enhance their own innovation cycles, we risk falling progressively
further behind as competitors continuously use AI to further enhance their own development capabilities,
enabling the creation of increasingly advanced systems at an accelerating pace. As our reliance on our own AI
systems to write production code, conduct research, and build subsequent model versions deepens, any
systemic flaw, bias, or error in our current models could propagate into the next versions of models and
products built using those systems, compounding across successive versions of Claude models in ways that may
be difficult to detect or remediate. If we are unable to manage the foregoing risks, our ability to deploy the most
advanced, capable, and useful AI models could be adversely affected.
In addition, our increasing use of AI systems to accelerate our own research and development may cause the
capabilities of our models to advance more rapidly than our ability to develop, validate, and implement
corresponding safety, alignment, and security measures. Much of our evidence regarding the pace of such AI-
driven acceleration is derived from lagging indicators, and our ability to forecast or measure the rate at which
our capabilities are advancing, including any acceleration attributable to our most recent or unreleased models,
is limited. As a result, we have in the past not identified, and may in the future not identify, a significant
acceleration in our rate of development until after it has occurred. For example, our internal estimates and our
expectations regarding future models, rather than our current models, indicate that we may imminently meet
our Responsible Scaling Policy’s definition of “dramatically accelerated progress attributable to AI.” We have
not designated any of our current models as exceeding this threshold, and we continue to assess the underlying
data. We are also evaluating the implications of meeting the AI research and development capability threshold
and will release further reports in the future as we set forth in our Responsible Scaling Policy. If our capabilities
were to outpace our safety, alignment, and security measures, or if we were unable to anticipate the pace of such
advancement, we may be unable to adequately assess or mitigate the resulting risks, which could increase the
likelihood of safety incidents, regulatory intervention, or reputational harm, and could adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations. In light of these uncertainties, including limits on our
ability to observe the pace at which our capabilities are advancing, we have adopted, and may continue to adopt,
precautionary safety, alignment, and security measures to allow our safety efforts to advance together with
model capabilities. In the past these measures have included delaying the release of models and limiting their
initial availability, such as with Mythos through Project Glasswing, and in the future, as we learn more about
model capabilities and behavior, they could include additional measures that affect whether, how, and when we
develop or deploy new models or capabilities. We cannot predict with precision when we will determine that
such measures are necessary, what measures will be required, or how long they will remain in place, and as the
capabilities of our models advance, such measures may become more frequent and more costly. These measures
could slow our capability gains relative to competitors that do not adopt similar constraints, and could
adversely affect our competitive position, revenue growth, and results of operations.
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The development of frontier AI models requires substantial investments of compute resources, capital, and
human capital to conduct large-scale training runs that may span weeks or months and cost many millions of
dollars. There is no guarantee that any given training run will succeed—a run may fail for a number of reasons,
such as failing to achieve the targeted capability or safety thresholds, producing unexpected or undesirable
behaviors that cannot be adequately remediated, or yielding a model that is ultimately not competitive with
alternatives available in the market. We would also face the additional cost and delay of initiating a new training
run to attempt to achieve the intended model improvements. We have in the past experienced, and may in the
future experience, such failed or underperforming training runs, resulting in a loss of invested resources with
limited or no corresponding benefit to our business. Given the scale of compute and other resources required
for frontier model training and the extended timelines involved, a failed or underperforming training run could
also delay our product roadmap, affect our competitive position, and adversely affect our business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
New models, features, or capabilities may not be introduced on schedule, may not perform as intended, may
require significant iteration after release, may fail to gain meaningful adoption, or may take longer than
expected to gain meaningful adoption, any of which could reduce customer demand or place us at a competitive
disadvantage. In addition, considerations relating to model safety, interpretability, alignment, and welfare may
lead us to limit or delay the deprecation of older models or to continue supporting legacy versions alongside
newer releases, creating tradeoffs in product development and compute distribution that could adversely affect
innovation velocity, infrastructure utilization, and revenue. Customers who have integrated older models into
their workflows may resist migration to newer versions, and any accelerated or forced deprecation could result
in customer attrition, contractual disputes, or reputational harm. We have also changed, and may in the future
change, usage limits, rate limits, or model and product capabilities, which could adversely affect our reputation
and the perceived value of our offerings. Some of these changes have resulted, and could in the future result, in
claims that our disclosures regarding model access or capabilities were inadequate or misleading.
Further, the industry benchmarks commonly used to test AI models may not accurately reflect real-world
performance or utility, and even models that perform well on such benchmarks may not meet customer
expectations when deployed in production environments, which could lead to customer dissatisfaction, reduced
usage, or reputational harm. If we are unable to effectively innovate and improve our models, platform, and
applications while addressing these challenges, or if competitors are able to deliver AI solutions that are
perceived as more capable, safer, or more reliable, or that offer adequate performance at a lower cost, our
business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
In addition, innovation in AI involves addressing complex and evolving challenges related to data quality, data
integrity, training methodologies, bias, safety, accuracy, and the behavior of model outputs. AI algorithms may
be flawed, and AI systems may contain bugs, errors, or defects or fail to follow instructions or produce
inaccurate, misleading, offensive, inappropriate, or otherwise harmful outputs; reflect or amplify unwanted or
unknown biases present in training data; or raise concerns relating to intellectual property, privacy, or other
legal and ethical considerations. We must continually invest resources to identify, mitigate, remediate, and
reduce the occurrence of such issues, including through managing and improving datasets, training techniques,
evaluation methods, safeguards, and human oversight. However, we may not be able to obtain the datasets that
we need, including through licenses or strategic data partnerships. In addition, we or our data providers may
use synthetic or AI-generated data in the training process, which could introduce quality issues, amplify biases
or errors, contribute to model degradation, or raise novel legal questions regarding ownership, licensing, or
intellectual property rights that may not be timely or clearly resolved by courts or regulators. Such unintended
consequences, failures, or misuse of our models could impair customer trust, slow adoption, expose us to legal
or regulatory scrutiny, or adversely affect our brand and reputation.
If we are unable to secure adequate compute or if we fail to direct our compute effectively
across our workloads, we may be unable to train models that remain competitive with those
of our competitors or adequately serve our customers.
Our ability to develop, train, improve, and deploy frontier models depends on our access to enormous and
increasing quantities of specialized compute. The training of Claude models has required, and we expect will
continue to require, substantial compute. Industry participants, academic researchers, and our own experience
suggest that, in certain contexts, applying greater amounts of compute during model training has been
associated with improvements in model capabilities. These observations are consistent with aspects of broader
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empirical relationships among model performance, model size, training data, and compute scale that are
commonly referred to as “Scaling Laws,” although the extent, efficiency, and durability of such improvements
are uncertain, and these relationships may plateau, diminish, or fail to materialize at larger scales or under
different conditions. Accordingly, our ability to remain at the frontier of AI capabilities is substantially
dependent on our ability to secure compute at the scale required to sustain all our workloads, including to train
next-generation models, and we cannot provide assurance that increased investment in compute will result in
commensurate improvements in model performance.
The market for compute is intensely competitive. We compete for access to compute with some of the world’s
largest and most well-capitalized technology companies, many of which develop their own competitive AI
models and have significantly greater financial resources than us. Many own and operate cloud computing data
center infrastructure, maintain captive chip manufacturing or design capabilities, have long-standing strategic
relationships with key hardware suppliers, or have significant equity investments from, or other financial
arrangements with, such suppliers. These competitors can outbid us for scarce compute, secure priority
allocations from chip manufacturers and CSPs, and make long-term capital commitments that we cannot
match. We expect demand for advanced compute to continue to grow, and the cost of compute could rise
significantly, particularly if AI-driven demand accelerates or if the ability to build highly capable models
becomes more broadly available and shifts competition toward access to advanced compute. Additionally,
numerous well-funded AI companies are pursuing large-scale AI model development, further increasing
demand for limited compute. Certain CSPs from which we obtain substantial compute also develop and offer
their own AI models and related services. As a result, our commercial relationships with these providers may
not always be fully aligned with our long-term interests, and if the compute we have access to from third parties
is curtailed, repriced, or terminated, whether for competitive reasons or otherwise, our business, financial
condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
In addition to competition from third parties, our ability to secure compute is subject to allocation decisions by
our CSPs. Although our CSPs are generally subject to contractual commitments with us regarding the provision
of compute, our ability to obtain such capacity remains dependent on those providers’ operational execution,
adherence to the terms of such contractual provisions, and broader business considerations, such as capacity
constraints, internal demand for compute to support their own AI and computing operations, relationships with
or contractual obligations to third parties (which may include other AI companies), and risk management
considerations. As a result, we may not receive the full amount of compute we seek, or such compute may not
be delivered on the timelines we require, even where contractual arrangements are in place. Additionally, we
have in the past sought quantities of compute from CSPs in excess of what those partners were willing to
provide. If our CSPs reduce, limit, or fail to increase our allocations to keep pace with our growing requirements
for any reason, we may need to seek alternative compute sources on less favorable terms or timelines, and we
may be unable to secure adequate alternative compute, or any at all. In addition, certain of our compute
providers and infrastructure partners depend on third-party financing or credit support to acquire chips and
develop capacity, and if such financing or support becomes unavailable or more costly, contracted capacity may
be delayed, repriced, reduced, or not delivered. Any such shortfall could constrain our ability to train models,
serve customers, or maintain our competitive position.
Even if we are able to secure compute, we must still direct it efficiently across the full range of workloads that
are a part of our business, including research, model development, serving customers, and internal usage of
Claude. While we manage our compute as a single, fungible pool and direct available compute between
workloads based on where the marginal unit is expected to be most productive at any given time, there can be
no assurance that this approach to compute will be the most efficient or that it will support the needs of each of
our workloads. Because demand for compute has historically exceeded available capacity, any constraint on our
ability to procure, maintain, or expand that capacity could adversely affect multiple aspects of our business
simultaneously, including our ability to serve customers at the quality and scale they expect, to train and
improve our models, and to develop new products and capabilities. While we actively manage and balance such
compute capacity across these workloads via our capacity management system, if this system fails to perform as
intended, or if our ability to dynamically rebalance capacity across workloads is disrupted, customer-facing
service quality or model and product development timelines could be adversely affected. There can be no
assurance that we will make optimal resourcing decisions, and any significant inefficiencies, including those
related to deployment and rebalancing, could adversely affect both our near-term results of operations and our
long-term strategic position. These compute resourcing challenges are heightened by the growth of our agentic
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offerings, which involve multi-step reasoning chains, iterative tool invocations, extended context windows, and
sustained inference sessions that consume significantly more compute per user interaction than single-turn API
calls or chat-based interactions. As agentic workloads grow as a proportion of our total compute demand, the
aggregate compute required to serve our customers could increase disproportionately relative to the associated
revenue, placing additional strain on our compute workload management decisions.
The majority of our compute is procured under multi-year commitments that are typically entered into well in
advance of the periods in which that compute is deployed. Because different AI accelerators have varying
performance characteristics across workload types, the composition of our committed compute portfolio,
including the mix of accelerator architectures procured from our partners, reflects our demand forecasts and
development roadmap assumptions at the time those commitments are made. If the magnitude or mix of
workloads we need to support differs materially from those forecasts, whether due to changes in model
architecture, customer demand, internal operations, or research priorities, the composition of our available
compute may not optimally match our needs in a given period. This could affect our ability to serve customers,
develop models, and support internal operations.
If we fail to secure sufficient compute, or if we fail to effectively direct the limited compute we have across our
workloads to develop and deploy models with capabilities at least comparable to those of our competitors, we
risk falling behind the technological frontier. The pace of AI development is extremely rapid, with successive
versions of models emerging in compressed timeframes, often measured in months rather than years. As a
result, even a brief period without access to sufficient compute could cause us to fall behind quickly. With AI
development, the gap between frontier models and those one or two versions behind can be significant in terms
of capability, performance, and commercial applicability. Customers, partners, and software developers may
shift to competitors whose models offer superior capabilities, and we may be unable to attract or retain the
technical talent necessary for frontier research if our researchers lack access to adequate compute or if we are
not perceived as operating at the forefront of model development. Any inability to maintain our position at the
frontier could result in loss of customers and revenue, diminished brand and reputation, and a decline in our
competitive position, each of which may be difficult to regain. If we are unable to manage the foregoing risks,
our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
If our actual compute requirements differ materially from our projections, we may fail to
secure sufficient compute to meet our needs or we may be committed to excess compute that
remains underutilized.
The competitive and structural dynamics of the compute market require us to make binding financial
commitments for compute months or years in advance of our day-to-day delivery and use. Chip manufacturers,
CSPs, and data center developers require advance commitments in order to allocate production capacity, plan
infrastructure investments, and manage their own supply chains. As a result, we must forecast our compute
requirements well in advance of their deployment and commit capital accordingly, often with limited ability to
adjust commitments if our needs change.
These forecasts for future compute usage are inherently uncertain. Our actual compute requirements depend on
numerous factors that are difficult to predict, including the pace of our research progress, the compute intensity
of training techniques we develop or adopt, changes in the competitive landscape that may require us to
accelerate or modify our development plans, customer demand for inference compute, and the evolution of
hardware or other technological efficiencies and changes. If we underestimate our compute requirements, we
may be unable to secure sufficient compute to support our forecasted customer demand and model
development roadmap. In the past, we have significantly underestimated our compute requirements, which left
us capacity constrained and impacted both product development and deployment. Further, the timing of
compute coming online may not align with the timing of demand growth, which could result in periods of
excess or underutilized compute and committed cash outflows that do not produce immediate revenue.
Our ability to forecast and secure the compute we need is further challenged by our ongoing transition from a
cloud-only, fixed-time arrangement compute model to a hybrid model that includes directly leased chips that
are hosted in dedicated data center facilities leased and operated on our behalf, to our specification. This
transition introduces additional variables into our procurement planning, including the timing of facility
completion, the pace at which newly commissioned facilities achieve full operational capacity, our ability to
operate, maintain, and integrate on-premise capacity with cloud-based infrastructure, the operational
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execution of our suppliers, and the performance of hardware in new facility environments. Delays in securing
energy, water, and other critical services for these facilities could further slow the pace at which newly
commissioned compute becomes available for use. Errors in forecasting any of these transition-related
variables could compound our risks related to securing sufficient compute and result in either capacity
shortfalls or underutilized capacity during the transition period.
We have entered into, and expect to continue to enter into, long-term agreements for compute and related
resources that involve minimum purchase commitments, take-or-pay provisions, and other terms that obligate
us to pay for resources regardless of actual utilization. These commitments represent substantial fixed
obligations. As of and subsequent to September 30, 2026, we have entered into purchase commitments and
lease agreements, including short-term commitments, as well as leases not yet commenced, with an aggregate
committed spend of approximately $895.4 billion, substantially all of which is related to compute and
infrastructure. These commitments include approximately $447.5 billion expected to be incurred before
December 31, 2030, and substantially all of the remainder is expected to be incurred between 2031 and 2045.
Approximately $69.8 billion of these commitments are due in the 12 months following September 30, 2026. See
the section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—
Liquidity and Capital Resources—Contractual Obligations” for more information.
Our ability to meet the substantial and growing financial obligations of these requirements to secure compute
depends on our ability to generate significant revenue growth. We must grow our customer base and expand
revenue rapidly in order to generate the cash flows necessary to satisfy these commitments. However, our
revenue is primarily consumption-based, and much of it is not subject to long-term contractual commitments,
while our compute and infrastructure commitments generally extend over multiple years. As a result, we may
enter into these obligations based on revenue expectations that may not be realized. If our revenue growth does
not keep pace with our compute-related payment obligations, if we are unable to successfully convert our
compute investment into revenue-generating customer workloads, if we fail to raise additional capital on
acceptable terms, or if we experience other adverse developments affecting our liquidity, we may be unable to
satisfy these obligations. Any such failure could also result in defaults under our agreements, loss of access to
critical resources, and reputational harm. In particular, a default under certain commercial agreements could
trigger cross-default provisions under the A&R Credit Agreement (as defined below) and certain of our
outstanding convertible promissory notes, potentially resulting in the acceleration of substantially all of our
outstanding, and any future, indebtedness. Such cross-defaults could set off a cascading series of adverse
consequences, including the exercise of remedies by multiple creditors, the termination of key commercial
arrangements, enforcement actions against our assets, and severe liquidity constraints. An acceleration of our
indebtedness, combined with the loss of access to critical data center infrastructure, among other things, could
impair our ability to train and deploy models, serve customers, and fund ongoing operations, which could have
an adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations. For more information, see the
sections titled “—We have incurred significant indebtedness in order to operate and grow our business,
including to fund our substantial compute commitments, and our ability to service this indebtedness may be
constrained by our cash flows and liquidity” and “—We may not have the ability to raise the funds necessary to
repay the principal and accrued interest of our outstanding convertible promissory notes or the A&R Credit
Agreement in cash when required by the terms of the notes or the A&R Credit Agreement, as applicable, or at
their maturity.”
Additionally, the rapid pace of technological change across AI infrastructure, hardware, software, system
architectures, and model development techniques means that compute secured today may become less efficient
or economically attractive relative to future alternatives. We may find ourselves committed to using older-
generation hardware and infrastructure while competitors gain access to more advanced systems, or we may be
paying premium prices for resources that have declined in market value. These dynamics could adversely affect
our cost structure and competitive position. Certain of our financing arrangements require us to enter into
exclusive or preferential supply commitments with particular chip suppliers with respect to the compute
financed pursuant to such arrangements. These commitments may limit our ability to shift procurement to
alternative suppliers or newer chip architectures if our needs or the technology landscape evolve, potentially
leaving us committed to platforms that are suboptimal for our actual workload requirements and reducing our
ability to adjust our compute portfolio in response to changed circumstances. If we are unable to manage the
foregoing risks, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
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Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability to secure
adequate compute.
The compute necessary for training and deploying frontier models depends on a supply chain with multiple
potential points of constraint or failure. The availability, pricing, and lead times for compute are affected by the
supply of advanced chips and other IT equipment, the availability of sufficient electrical power and the
infrastructure required to generate and deliver it, and the capacity of data center infrastructure. Each of these
inputs faces significant constraints that may limit our ability to secure the compute we need. In addition,
increasing demand for compute has contributed to, and may continue to contribute to, increases in the cost of
such resources, which could limit our ability to invest in, develop, or deploy our models, platform, and
applications at the pace we anticipate.
Supply and Concentration of Chips, Memory, and Data Center Equipment
The specialized chips required for AI workloads, particularly high-performance AI accelerators and memory,
are produced by a limited number of manufacturers. The production of advanced chips is extraordinarily
complex, requiring manufacturing processes at the leading edge of technological capability.
The majority of the world’s most advanced chip manufacturing capacity is concentrated in Taiwan, primarily at
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (“TSMC”). This geographic concentration creates significant
risks, including exposure to natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, potential disruption from
geopolitical tensions between Taiwan and China, vulnerability to any interruption in Taiwan’s power grid, water
supply, or other critical infrastructure, and susceptibility to developing trade regulations and restrictions. Any
military conflict, tariffs and trade restrictions, economic coercion, blockade, natural disaster, or other incident
affecting Taiwan could severely disrupt the global supply of advanced chips, with effects that could persist for
years given the time required to construct and qualify alternative fabrication facilities. Efforts to establish
sufficient advanced chip manufacturing capacity outside of Taiwan, including in the United States, remain in
early stages and may not produce adequate compute to materially reduce these concentration risks within the
foreseeable future. In addition, due to the demand for advanced chip manufacturing, TSMC has, at times, been
unable to fully satisfy market demand for chip manufacturing capacity, and as a result, we have not always been
able to obtain sufficient quantities of chips on a timely basis. Accordingly, any restrictions or delays on the
supply of advanced chips out of Taiwan or TSMC would adversely affect our business, financial condition, and
results of operations.
In addition, both high-bandwidth memory, which is a key component in high-performance AI accelerators, and
other high-performance memory products used in compute infrastructure, are largely manufactured by SK
hynix Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., and Micron Technology, Inc. Each of these manufacturers is working to
expand its production capacity to meet demand. However, there is no guarantee that these efforts will result in
adequate supply fast enough to meet demand, particularly if large customers or competitors secure exclusive
supply commitments or otherwise reserve substantially all of a manufacturer’s available production capacity.
The concentration and constraints in manufacturing supply expose us to the risk that manufacturers may make
allocation decisions or strategic shifts that adversely affect our access to the advanced chips needed for our
business. We also face risks that specialized chips may contain defects, or that their production or delivery may
be delayed or disrupted, which, given long replacement lead times, could constrain available compute and
adversely affect our operations and ability to scale. A meaningful portion of the components we and our
partners rely on is sourced from or manufactured outside of the United States, and new or increased tariffs,
import restrictions, or trade disputes could delay deliveries, force supply-chain changes, or raise our costs,
some of which we bear directly under pass-through arrangements. For more information, see the section titled
“—Governmental trade controls, including export and import controls, sanctions, customs requirements, and
related regimes, could subject us to liability or loss of contracting privileges or limit our ability to compete in
certain markets.”
We also depend on third-party chip design and services companies for the design, manufacture, and support of
certain custom accelerator platforms, as well as for related infrastructure financing arrangements. Disruption to
these relationships, or any failure by these parties to deliver hardware or services on expected timelines and
specifications, could adversely affect the availability, performance, or cost of accelerator platforms on which we
rely.
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Data centers also require electrical, generation, and transmission equipment, cooling systems, backup
generators, and networking hardware, some of which are made by only a few manufacturers, must be ordered
years in advance, and require substantial pre-delivery payments that we may not recover if our plans change. In
addition, certain equipment, such as high-voltage transformers, switchgear, turbines, generators, substations,
and transmission components, has been subject to extended delivery timelines, price increases, tariffs and
national security requirements, and allocation constraints as demand from data center operators and other
large electricity consumers has grown. If such equipment is delayed or unavailable, we may be able to replace it
only at higher prices or under less favorable long-term commitments. In order to secure near-term access to
compute, we may also elect, or be required, to procure long-lead-time generation and electrical equipment at
prices above prevailing market rates on the expectation that it can be deployed on an accelerated timeline to
unlock capacity in the near term. Realizing the benefit of paying such prices depends on the timely and
successful engineering, procurement, and construction of the associated facilities, which requires specialized
expertise that is currently in short supply and involves significant execution risk. Delays, cost overruns, or
failure to secure energy on the anticipated schedule could mean that we do not obtain the energy and capacity
for which we paid such prices. In some cases, these arrangements also depend on a developer or other
counterparty agreeing to purchase the equipment at such prices, finance such purchase, and recover those costs
and associated financing costs from us over time, and we may bear these costs even if the underlying capacity is
delayed or never realized. Our equipment supply framework agreements and similar arrangements may expose
us to further risks, including minimum purchase or take-or-pay commitments, price escalation, and obligations
that we are unable to align with our actual deployment needs.
Additionally, the U.S. government has imposed and may continue to impose export controls restricting the sale
of advanced chips and chip manufacturing equipment to certain countries, including China. These restrictions
have affected global chip and related equipment supply allocation, and future changes in export control policy
could affect the availability or pricing of the compute resources on which we rely. Future export controls could
be more restrictive, for example, by placing restrictions on the countries in which advanced chips may be
installed or in which model weights may be stored, which could limit where we or our partners are able to build
data centers, constrain our international expansion, or increase our costs.
Electrical Power and Fuel Constraints
The operation of data centers at the scale required for frontier AI development and deployment consumes
substantial quantities of electrical power. The availability of sufficient electrical power has emerged as a
significant constraint on data center development and expansion in many geographies, including the United
States. Electric grid infrastructure in the United States and other countries was not designed to accommodate
the rapid increase in demand associated with AI development, and the lead times required to build new
generation capacity, transmission infrastructure, and grid interconnections can extend for years. Demand on
electric grid infrastructure is also increasing as a result of the increased electrification of homes, vehicles, and
industry, and this growing demand is occurring at a time when power generation capacity additions,
transmission expansion, and grid modernization efforts have not kept pace and certain existing generation
resources are being retired, all of which has contributed to higher electricity prices and longer interconnection
timelines in certain regions. We have publicly committed to covering the cost of electricity price increases to
consumers caused by our data centers, including both the cost of electricity itself and the infrastructure
necessary to deliver it.
Our access to electrical power also depends on our ability, and the ability of the third parties on which we rely
for the construction, management, and operation of our data center facilities, to negotiate and maintain
contracts with utility providers and grid operators and to obtain approvals from public utility commissions and
other regulators. These parties may be unable or unwilling to approve, or may condition or delay, the
connections, capacity expansions, special or negotiated rate arrangements, and infrastructure investments
necessary to support data center growth, or may grant them only at costs that limit the economic efficiency and
viability of certain facilities, such as by requiring us to bear grid upgrade or interconnection costs beyond those
attributable to serving our facilities—representing a larger share of costs than is required under existing or prior
regulatory constructs. Interconnection queues for large new electricity loads have also lengthened substantially
in many regions, which could delay or limit our access to grid power. Utility providers and regulators may also
reallocate previously committed capacity that our data center facilities may require. In many jurisdictions, a
single utility provider has substantial control over the terms, timing, and cost of the service and infrastructure
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necessary to power our data center facilities. The commercial and regulatory priorities of utility providers may
differ from ours, including with respect to which infrastructure investments are made, how their costs are
allocated, and whether alternative or self-supplied generation arrangements are permitted and on what
conditions. Utility providers and other stakeholders may also seek regulatory or legislative measures affecting
large electricity loads, self-supply, or alternative power generation arrangements. The outcomes of our
negotiations and regulatory proceedings involving utilities are uncertain, and unfavorable results could increase
our costs, delay our projects, or limit the alternatives available to us. More broadly, regulatory proceedings
relating to cost allocation, rate design, and the treatment of large electricity loads are ongoing in numerous
jurisdictions, and adverse outcomes, changes in policy, or the imposition of new tariffs, surcharges, or
curtailment obligations applicable to data centers could increase our costs or limit our access to electrical
power.
In addition, the construction of the generation and transmission infrastructure on which we depend is itself
capital-intensive and exposed to labor shortages, supply chain disruptions, permitting delays, changes in
interest rates, tariffs, other cost overruns, and financing constraints. The significant and increasing capital
required to fund these generation, transmission, and related infrastructure investments, whether incurred by
us, our utility and energy supply providers, or our data center development partners, is sensitive to prevailing
interest rates and the availability of debt or equity financing on acceptable terms. Any inability of our partners
to access capital when needed, and the limitations, cost, and competition for such capital, could increase the
cost of the power on which we depend, delay or halt projects, or render certain facilities commercially unviable,
and under certain of our arrangements, we bear these financing and capital costs directly or on a pass-through
basis. Furthermore, newer sources of generation, such as solar, wind, battery storage, nuclear, and geothermal
power, may not be available in the quantities or on the timelines we require, or may be available only at higher
cost. Our facilities separately depend on access to reliable water for cooling, which in some regions is scarce,
subject to use restrictions, or increasingly costly. Any of the foregoing could adversely affect the availability of
the power or water we require, increase our costs, or limit our ability to develop, expand, or operate our data
center facilities, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Competition for access to electrical supply and data center locations with adequate power availability is intense,
and we compete for such access with well-capitalized CSPs, some of which produce and develop competing AI
models, cryptocurrency mining operations, and other large-scale electricity consumers. In addition to, or
sometimes in lieu of, grid-based electricity, an increasing share of data centers are being developed with
dedicated on-site power generation capacity that supplies electricity directly to the facility independent of any
utility-operated electric grid. The reliability of such off-grid power generation solutions varies by the underlying
technology, the equipment used, and the operator and will reflect site-by-site operational and environmental
profiles. Development of this new capacity in turn requires power generation and electrical infrastructure that
are themselves subject to supply challenges and operational complexity. For example, certain of our planned
data center facilities rely on dedicated on-site natural gas-fired generation, which exposes us to fuel price
volatility and supply disruptions that are outside of our control and for which we bear the cost on a pass-
through basis. These facilities are also subject to constraints on pipeline capacity and firm fuel transportation
necessary to deliver natural gas. As data center operators increasingly rely on natural gas-fired generation, and
because behind-the-meter and on-site arrangements are feasible only in some jurisdictions given the applicable
regulatory frameworks, we expect increased competition among users for the same natural gas supply and
pipeline capacity in those areas. This competition could drive up the price of natural gas in such areas and may
adversely affect our ability to contract for firm fuel supply and transportation and to secure the pipeline
connections and laterals our facilities require.
These dynamics present several related risks. We may be unable to secure firm gas supply and transportation
during the development of a facility, causing a planned site to be delayed or abandoned; we may face fuel supply
or delivery disruptions once a facility is operating; and because our arrangements generally provide for fuel and
related costs to be borne by us on a pass-through basis without cost caps, we remain exposed to increases in the
cost of natural gas and its transportation. More broadly, the cost of electricity is subject to significant variability
that is largely outside of our control, as wholesale electricity prices fluctuate with changing supply and demand,
weather, fuel prices, tariffs or surcharges, and grid stress, and can rise sharply during periods of peak demand
or constrained supply, and such increases in energy costs could adversely affect our results of operations.
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In some regions, including certain regions where we have contracted compute commitments, data center
development has prompted public controversy and regulatory scrutiny regarding environmental impact, land
and water use, and the allocation of limited power resources. For example, if our efforts to secure electrical
power are perceived to affect other utility customers and the broader grid, regulators may impose conditions,
standby charges, or other requirements intended to address such impacts. More broadly, our access to electrical
power is subject to an evolving regulatory framework characterized by complexity, jurisdictional overlap, and
rules that were largely designed around service by incumbent utility providers and existing generation
arrangements and that may not readily accommodate new entrants or alternative approaches, which can result
in significant delay or prevent the development of the generation we require. Grid-tied electrical supply, for
instance, is subject to the jurisdiction of federal and state energy regulators, regional grid operators, and public
utility commissions, while behind-the-meter and on-site generation is subject to a distinct set of exclusive
service franchise protections, permitting, environmental, air quality, interconnection, and siting requirements.
In addition, environmental standards applicable to power generation continue to evolve, including as a result of
changing governmental priorities and shifting public and political views regarding climate change and the
appropriate treatment of various power generation sources. Any failure to secure access to adequate electrical
power, any legal, regulatory, or other administrative action or change limiting the availability of electricity, or
any significant increase in energy or compliance costs, could adversely affect our cost structure and limit our
ability to scale our compute infrastructure, develop and deploy our models, and service our customers. We have
also made, and may in the future make, voluntary commitments to offset the impact of our data center energy
consumption on local communities and electricity ratepayers, including commitments to cover grid
infrastructure upgrade costs, procure new power generation to match our energy needs, invest in curtailment
systems to reduce strain on the grid during peak demand periods, and address environmental impacts. These
commitments have increased, and we expect will continue to increase, our operating costs. Moreover, we
believe this is part of a broader emerging trend in the AI industry, and such commitments, or similar
obligations, may become increasingly standard or required, which could further increase our costs. In addition,
the physical effects of climate change may increase our operating costs over time, as higher average
temperatures can increase the power consumption and water usage required to cool equipment at the facilities
on which we depend.
Data Center Infrastructure
Even where chips and electrical power are available, the development of data center facilities requires
substantial time, capital, and specialized expertise. Data center construction involves lengthy permitting
processes, complex supply chains for specialized equipment, and significant lead times for the installation and
commissioning of cooling systems, electrical infrastructure, and networking equipment. Labor shortages,
including shortages of, and competition for, electricians, facility technicians, and other skilled tradespeople,
supply chain disruptions, permitting delays, and other factors can extend construction timelines and increase
costs. Further, given data center development projects require significant advance capital commitments with
dedicated end users, we have in some cases relied, and expect to continue to rely, on arrangements for financing
or with partners who guarantee the lease obligations to support the development of data center capacity that is
expected to host such partner’s chips or computing infrastructure. In addition, there are a limited number of
qualified third-party vendors with the expertise we require and that support the particular infrastructure we
wish to implement. Accordingly, we rely on this limited number of third parties for the construction,
management, and operation of certain of our data center facilities, some of which have limited operating history
or may have less experience operating data center infrastructure at the scale and complexity our operations
require. In certain cases, these third-party operators are trained or supervised by our chip partners to manage
facilities on our behalf but are not affiliates of those partners and may not have the same depth of expertise,
operational resilience, or resources. Any failure by these third-party operators to perform as expected could
disrupt our access to compute. In addition, safety or environmental incidents at facilities built or operated for
us, whatever their cause, could expose us to claims, fines, or suspensions of construction or operations, the
costs of which we may bear. We also depend on an extended network of suppliers, builders, and facility
operators. If any of them engage in practices that are unsafe, unlawful, or contrary to the labor, human rights,
environmental, or other standards we or our partners require, we could face legal liability, lose the ability to use
affected suppliers or facilities, and suffer harm to our reputation, even where we did not direct or know of the
conduct.
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Our collective data center infrastructure is currently concentrated primarily in the United States, which exposes
us to risks associated with regional regulatory changes, power grid constraints or failures, disruptions to
network connectivity between facilities, natural disasters, physical attacks—including those motivated by
geopolitical events, opposition to AI, and opposition to data center development—and other disruptions that
could affect multiple facilities. Certain state, local, and municipal jurisdictions in the United States are also
considering or have approved moratoriums on new data center construction, citing public health, safety, and
environmental concerns. Such jurisdictions and other regulators, grid operators, or utilities may also adopt
other measures that subject users of large electricity loads, including data centers, to curtailment, interruptions,
forced reductions, disconnection, or other restrictions during periods of grid stress, whether through changes in
law or policy, market or reliability constraints, limits on transmission and distribution infrastructure, or a
preference for protecting other utility customers and the broader grid. New large loads on the electric grid may
be increasingly subject to mandatory curtailment in regions where there is insufficient grid-connected power
generation to reliably supply existing and new electricity loads. For example, states such as New York and Texas
have recently moved to regulate large-scale data centers, whether by pausing state permitting for new large
facilities, as New York has, or by subjecting large electricity loads to curtailment or disconnection during grid
emergencies, as Texas has. Such moratoriums, or similar actions, could delay or prevent the construction or
expansion of facilities on which we depend for compute. Opposition to data center development has also
become more organized and coordinated across jurisdictions, and our public profile may draw particular
attention to projects associated with us. The loss of, or a significant disruption at, any major facility may not be
readily absorbed by our remaining or future infrastructure. We are expanding our data center capacity
internationally as part of our efforts to diversify our infrastructure footprint and reduce concentration risks
associated with operating a significant portion of our compute infrastructure in the United States and to
support our international growth strategy, including by entering into letters of intent and negotiating lease and
related agreements for data center facilities in multiple non-U.S. jurisdictions, which exposes us to additional
risks related to foreign regulatory requirements and approvals, data sovereignty and localization laws,
governmental access or assistance requirements, cross-border data transfer restrictions, foreign tax regimes,
and increased operational complexity. Our ability to enter into definitive agreements for data center capacity
and operations in non-U.S. jurisdictions depends on the timely formation, registration, and receipt of
governmental approval of local subsidiaries, as well as the establishment of local banking arrangements, and
any delay or failure in completing these steps could delay or prevent us from mitigating our infrastructure
concentration risks, executing our international growth strategy, securing planned compute capacity, or could
result in substantial additional taxes, penalties, or other liabilities. In addition, regulatory, legal, and other
constraints in many jurisdictions may limit the locations in which we can practically site or contract for data
center capacity, which could constrain our ability to diversify our infrastructure footprint as quickly or as
broadly as we currently intend.
We and our principal competitors rely on substantially similar inputs to develop and deploy frontier models,
including advanced chips sourced from a small number of suppliers and data center capacity and compute
obtained from CSPs and other third parties. As we and our competitors increasingly pursue vertical integration,
the basis of competition could shift over time to encompass not only which company can develop the most
capable models, but also which company can develop the best underlying components. Our future
competitiveness may depend in part on our ability to successfully develop vertically integrated compute
infrastructure on competitive terms and timelines, and there can be no assurance that we will be able to do so.
Our competitors may be better positioned, or may invest greater efforts, to vertically integrate across the
compute supply chain, including through proprietary chip design, fabrication, ownership or long-term control
of data center infrastructure, access to dedicated power generation assets, exclusive supply arrangements with
hardware manufacturers, or by securing the limited sites suitable for large-scale data center development ahead
of us. Competitors that succeed in controlling a greater share of these supply chain layers may be able to secure
compute at greater scale, lower cost, or with greater reliability than we can, particularly during periods of high
demand or supply constraint, when captive supply relationships may confer certain advantages over
participants that depend on third-party providers. Such competitors may also develop proprietary hardware-
software co-designs that optimize compute efficiency for their specific model architectures, which could
compound any capability gap across successive model versions. While we are pursuing initiatives to develop
dedicated data center infrastructure, there can be no assurance that these efforts will be completed on the
timelines or at the costs we anticipate, or that they will be sufficient to offset any structural advantages that
vertically integrated competitors may achieve. Competitors that succeed in these efforts may be better
positioned to remain at the frontier of AI regardless of broader market constraints.
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Natural hazards, extreme weather, or other disruptions affecting the regions where these inputs are produced
or where our facilities are located could further constrain the availability of chips, power, water, or data center
capacity on which we depend. If we are unable to manage the foregoing risks, our business, financial condition,
and results of operations could be adversely affected.
We are highly dependent on the continued service of our co-founders, senior management
team, and key technical employees, and the loss of any of these individuals may adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We are highly dependent on the continued service of our Chief Executive Officer, President, co-founders, senior
management team, and key technical team. In particular, our Chief Executive Officer and President are critical
to setting our strategic direction, advancing our research agenda, shaping our safety and governance
frameworks, and generally advancing our mission, and we believe that their leadership would be difficult to
replace. If either were to become unavailable for any reason, or if either of their reputations were significantly
harmed, regardless of merit, there could be an adverse impact on our operations and competitive position,
employee morale, employee retention, pace of innovation, customer and partner confidence in our company,
our brand and reputation, and our long-term strategic objectives. Further, the loss of key personnel, including
members of our founding team and senior management team, and key engineering, research, product
development, marketing, and sales personnel, could also disrupt our operations and have an adverse effect on
our business. Many of our key personnel, particularly within our technical and research teams, are strongly
motivated by our mission and the opportunity to work on addressing specific problems within the AI landscape.
To the extent that their interests evolve, they seek to pursue different technical challenges or areas of focus, or
they are drawn to other organizations or initiatives that they perceive as better aligned with their personal
beliefs or professional objectives, we may face increased difficulty retaining such personnel. This risk may be
heightened as we continue to scale and mature as an organization, which may change the nature of the work
environment, priorities, or perceived mission alignment for certain personnel, including personnel who may
conclude that the objectives that drew them to us have been substantially achieved. In addition, under certain of
our agreements with suppliers, the loss of certain key personnel could accelerate our obligations or otherwise
trigger adverse consequences under such agreements.
If we are unable to retain key personnel, or if we fail to conduct effective succession planning and find suitable
replacements for any losses of such key personnel in a timely manner and on competitive terms, we could
experience declines in sales, delays in research and development, and harm to our business and operations. If
we are unable to manage the foregoing risks, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could
be adversely affected.
We may require additional capital to meet our substantial ongoing obligations and support
our business growth, and our ability to generate sufficient revenue and secure additional
capital on acceptable terms is critical to our continued operations and competitive position.
Our business model requires substantial and increasing capital to support our ability to remain competitive and
to stay at the frontier of AI. We intend to continue to make significant financial investments to support our
business growth and may require additional funds to acquire sufficient compute and respond to business
challenges, including expenditures to create, maintain, upgrade, and enhance our models, platform, and
applications, including costs related to investments in infrastructure, human capital, office expansion, and data
assets. In addition, we may use a portion of our cash to satisfy tax withholding and remittance obligations
related to outstanding RSUs and equity awards that we grant in the future.
In addition, to date we have financed our compute primarily under arrangements with CSPs, with costs
recognized as compute is made available to us. We may in the future finance a greater portion of our compute
on an upfront basis, including through finance leases, prepayments, debt-financed purchases of equipment, or
similar arrangements. If we were to do so, we may incur significant cash outflows in advance of compute
availability or related revenue, which could increase demands on our cash flows and liquidity and our need to
raise additional capital. Such arrangements could also increase our capital intensity and alter our cash-flow
profile.
Accordingly, it is critical that we maintain strong revenue growth, grow revenue efficiently relative to our
committed compute, infrastructure, and personnel costs, and manage our cash flows effectively. To the extent
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that such efforts are insufficient to meet our capital needs, we may need to obtain additional capital through
equity or debt financings. If we raise additional funds through future issuances of equity, equity-linked
securities, or convertible debt securities, our existing stockholders could suffer dilution, and any new securities
we issue could have rights, preferences, and privileges superior to those of holders of our common stock.
Further, the conversion of our outstanding convertible securities will cause additional dilution to our existing
stockholders. Any debt financing that we may secure in the future may involve restrictive covenants relating to
our capital raising activities and other financial and operational matters, potentially making it more difficult for
us to obtain additional capital and to pursue business opportunities.
In addition, our ability to draw amounts under certain of our note purchase agreements (“NPAs”) is not
guaranteed and is subject to the satisfaction of specified conditions. In particular, our ability to access
additional amounts under certain of these facilities depends on our achievement of certain revenue
performance targets and/or the ability of third parties to deliver additional compute to us. While we have
historically surpassed all such revenue performance targets, there can be no assurance that revenue will
continue to exceed these thresholds at all times in the future. If these conditions are not satisfied, we may be
unable to draw additional amounts under the applicable NPA, which could adversely affect our cash flows and
liquidity. For more information about the terms of our convertible promissory notes, see the section titled
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Liquidity and
Capital Resources—Convertible Notes.”
We may not be able to obtain additional financing on terms favorable to us, if at all. We evaluate financing
opportunities from time to time, and our ability to obtain financing will depend, among other things, on our
development efforts, business plans, and operating performance and the condition of the capital markets at the
time we seek financing. The equity and debt markets may experience extreme volatility and disruption from
time to time, which could result in higher credit spreads in such markets and higher funding costs for us. If we
are unable to generate sufficient revenue growth or obtain adequate financing or financing on terms satisfactory
to us when we require it, our ability to continue to support our business growth, scale our infrastructure,
develop new models, platform, and applications, enhance our existing models, platform, and applications, and
respond to business challenges may be impaired, and our business, financial condition, and results of
operations may be adversely affected.
Our company culture has contributed to our success and, if we cannot maintain this culture as
we grow, our business could be adversely affected.
We believe that our company culture is a critical component of our success. We are a mission-driven company
and our culture reflects a strong emphasis on the Company Purpose. Our ability to continue to cultivate and
maintain this culture is essential to our growth and continued success. We face a number of challenges
associated with our commitment to our company culture, including:
•the need to identify, attract, reward, and retain people in leadership positions in our organization who
share and further our culture, values, and mission;
•the increasing size and geographic diversity of our workforce, and our ability to promote a uniform and
consistent culture across all of our offices and employees;
•internal and external perceptions about our mission, values, commitment to safety, and uses of our
models, platform, and applications;
•engagement with government policymakers on issues that resonate differently across our workforce;
•competitive pressures to move in directions that may divert us from our mission and values;
•the rigorous, values-driven standards we apply in hiring and decision-making, which may slow the
pace at which we can scale our workforce or expand our operations relative to competitors;
•the continued challenges of a rapidly evolving industry;
•the increased scrutiny and expectations associated with operating as a public company; and
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•the need to balance our long-term, mission-driven objectives with shorter-term financial performance
expectations, which may create internal tension and challenge our ability to consistently reinforce our
cultural values and mission across teams and leadership.
Our mission-driven culture is one of our core characteristics that helps us to attract and retain key personnel
and differentiates us in the market. If we are unable to maintain our culture, as well as balance our commitment
to maintaining our culture with the demands of rapid growth, competition, and operating as a public company,
our employee morale, engagement, and retention could suffer, requiring us to incur additional costs or adopt
alternative recruiting strategies, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of
operations.
We face intense competition, and if we are unable to compete effectively, our business,
financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
The market for AI models, platforms, and applications is rapidly evolving, intensely competitive, and subject to
frequent and significant changes in technology, evolving customer requirements and expectations, shifting
industry standards, regulatory developments, new market entrants, and new models, platforms, and
applications. We face competition from a wide range of companies across multiple categories.
We compete directly with companies developing frontier models for third-party software developers and
enterprises. Our primary competitors in this category include Alphabet Inc. (together with its affiliates,
“Google”) and OpenAI Group PBC (“OpenAI”). These competitors are developing increasingly capable AI
systems and compete with us for customers, talent, compute, and strategic partnerships. Many have
substantially greater financial, technical, and marketing resources than we do, their own or greater access to
sources of compute, longer operating histories, greater brand recognition, and established relationships with
current and potential customers and partners, which facilitates their ability to integrate their models into first-
party applications sold directly to businesses.
We also compete with a broader set of model providers operating at or below the frontier, including large
companies, specialized AI labs, and a growing range of other open-weight or open-source (shared weights,
training data, and code) models released by international and domestic organizations. Such providers compete
for a growing range of enterprise workloads that prioritize cost efficiency over intelligence. In particular, certain
large companies compete through proprietary AI models, integrated AI capabilities in existing products, and
control of cloud infrastructure and distribution channels. Some of these companies also have substantially
greater financial, technical, and marketing resources than we do, their own or greater access to sources of
compute, longer operating histories, greater brand recognition, and established relationships with current and
potential customers and partners. In addition, some have substantially broader and more diverse product and
service offerings and may be able to leverage existing relationships with distribution partners and customers to
gain business in ways that discourage customers from purchasing our models, platform, and applications. For
example, competitors may bundle AI capabilities with other products, integrate AI functionality into products
that customers already use, offer closed technology platforms that lock customers into their ecosystems, sell
products at zero or negative margins to gain market share, or use their substantial financial resources to
subsidize the cost of AI models, platforms, and applications. Customers may prefer to purchase from existing
vendors with which they have established relationships, even if our models, platform, and applications offer
superior features or performance. Further, large companies that are currently our customers may choose to
develop their own AI capabilities internally rather than purchase our models, platform, and applications.
Specialized AI labs, on the other hand, are competitive due to their ability to offer specific AI applications and
differentiated business models. These companies can move quickly, attract top talent, develop novel
approaches, platforms, or business models that disrupt existing competitive dynamics, and introduce
technologies or products with greater performance or functionality, lower cost, ease of implementation, or other
advantages. Some competitors or customers may have access to proprietary datasets, distribution channels, or
domain-specific expertise that we do not possess, or new competitors may emerge that address particular
industries or use cases more effectively than our models, platform, and applications, which could enable them
to develop more specialized or higher-performing AI systems. In addition, competitors, customers, or other
third parties have attempted in the past and will likely continue to attempt to replicate, distill, extract, or
otherwise derive the functionality or capabilities of our models through permitted or impermissible means,
including through our research previews. These actions could reduce the technological differentiation of our
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offerings; enable the development of competing products at lower cost, with reduced research and development
investment, or that replicate our models without safety controls or safeguards that were incorporated in our
versions; implicate national security concerns or strain geopolitical tensions; and intensify competitive
pressures. In addition, efforts to prevent or mitigate model replication, distillation, or other forms of extraction
may require us to modify our models, platform, and applications, limit features or use cases, or implement
technical safeguards that could reduce the usability or attractiveness of our offerings, slow adoption, and
adversely affect customer demand and revenue. More broadly, as AI models are increasingly used to develop
other AI models, the knowledge and techniques required to build frontier models may become more widely
available over time, including through distillation, unauthorized access to or theft of model weights, or the
diffusion of AI-assisted research and development capabilities across the industry. If the ability to develop
highly capable models becomes more broadly available, our technological differentiation could erode and
competition could increasingly depend on access to large-scale compute rather than on model development
capability. In such an environment, access to sufficient compute on economical terms could become the
primary constraint on our ability to train and serve competitive models, and our business, competitive position,
and results of operations could be adversely affected if we are unable to secure compute at the scale or cost or
on the timeline we require.
Additionally, open-weight or open-source AI models may capture a portion of the market for certain use cases,
which could exert pricing pressure on our offerings or lead certain customers to adopt open-source alternatives
for those use cases.
A significant portion of our customer base consists of startups and technology-oriented enterprises that may be
more sensitive to adverse macroeconomic conditions and may reduce or delay spending during a downturn.
Because our cost structure limits our ability to rapidly adjust spending, a sustained economic downturn could
disproportionately disadvantage us relative to larger, better-capitalized competitors. Such competitors may be
better positioned to absorb or withstand adverse economic conditions or reductions in customer technology
spending due to their greater financial resources, diversified product offerings and customer bases, and more
stable revenue streams. It could also disadvantage us relative to smaller startups with leaner cost structures,
lower fixed overhead, and fewer long-term contractual commitments that could help enable them to adjust
spending more rapidly than we can. As a result, competitive pressures on our business could intensify, which
could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
If we are unable to differentiate our models, platform, and applications from competing offerings through
enhanced functionality, superior performance, better safety features and reliability, lower cost, or other factors,
demand for our models, platform, and applications may decline. The rapid pace of technological change in AI
means that models, platforms, and applications can quickly become outdated. We must continuously invest in
research and development to maintain our competitive position, but there is no guarantee that our investments
will result in models, platforms, and applications that customers prefer over competing alternatives. Moreover,
we are first and foremost a research lab, and our strategy prioritizes frontier research and model capability. We
believe the advancing intelligence and capabilities of our models are the principal drivers of their adoption, and
we have historically prioritized research and model development rather than new products and applications or
sales and marketing. This approach assumes that model capability will continue to be a meaningful source of
competitive differentiation. However, as the AI industry matures, the degree of differentiation among advanced
AI models may narrow. This convergence may result from factors such as overlapping or similarly sourced
training data, the widespread adoption of comparable model architectures, training techniques, and
optimization methods, shared access to computing infrastructure, and the rapid dissemination of research
advances across the industry. To the extent competitors are able to achieve comparable model capabilities with
lower development or deployment costs, our ability to differentiate our models, platform, and applications on
the basis of performance, functionality, or cost may be diminished. If differentiation among advanced models
narrows, or if customers increasingly select AI providers on the basis of application features, user experience,
distribution, integration into products they already use, or the strength of a sales organization rather than
model capability, competitors that have invested more heavily than we have in those areas could be better
positioned than we are. Responding to such a shift could require us to increase our investment in product
development and sales and marketing substantially beyond our current plans, which could take longer or cost
more than we anticipate and could reduce the compute and other resources available for frontier research, and
we may not be able to execute such a shift quickly or effectively. See also the section titled “—We have a limited
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history under our current go-to-market strategy, and our efforts to scale and evolve our customer acquisition,
engagement, and retention model may not be successful.”
If we are unable to compete successfully, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
adversely affected.
If we fail to attract new customers, retain existing customers, or expand usage of our models,
platform, and applications, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could
be adversely affected.
Our future growth depends on our ability to attract new customers, retain existing customers, and expand sales
within our existing customer base. We face significant challenges in each of these areas, and failure to execute
on our customer acquisition and retention strategies could adversely affect our business, financial condition,
and results of operations.
We must continue to attract new customers in a cost-effective manner. Potential customers may not understand
the benefits of our models, platform, and applications or may be unable to justify the investment in our models,
platform, and applications, particularly as existing competitors continue to enhance their offerings, improve
performance, expand functionality, or reduce costs. Our ability to demonstrate differentiated value to potential
customers may become more difficult as this competition intensifies, or as large technology companies bundle
AI capabilities into existing products. If we continue to focus on enterprise customers, we may face longer sales
cycles that demand significant upfront investment in enterprise sales teams and customer service. These sales
efforts are costly and may not result in customer conversion.
Even if we successfully attract new customers, we face significant challenges in retaining them. Many of our
customer contracts allow customers to reduce usage or terminate with limited or no notice. Customers are not
obligated to renew their subscriptions or contracts with us. Customer retention and usage levels may decline
due to a number of factors, including:
•dissatisfaction with the performance, reliability, safety, or accuracy of our AI models;
•availability of competitive alternatives;
•customers developing their own AI capabilities internally;
•our models, platform, and applications reducing demand for our customers’ offerings or causing
disruptions to their businesses, which could lead to reduced usage or customer attrition;
•changes in customer budgets or strategic priorities regarding AI investment;
•concerns about data privacy, security, or our data handling practices;
•negative publicity regarding AI generally or our business specifically;
•changes in the regulatory and legal landscape surrounding AI and our models, platform, and
applications in particular;
•pricing changes or perception that our pricing is not competitive; and
•general economic conditions or industry-specific downturns affecting our customers.
Our ability to retain customers and drive expansion also depends on our continued investment in product
development. The process of developing products and incorporating new technologies is complex and
uncertain, and if we fail to accurately predict customers’ changing needs and emerging technological trends and
opportunities, we may not be able to compete effectively and our business and ability to generate revenue could
be adversely affected. As AI technology evolves rapidly, customers may perceive our models, platform, and
applications as becoming outdated or may expect continuous improvements to model performance and
capabilities. Even minor degradations in model performance or increases in response latency could cause
customers to reduce usage or switch to competitors. If we are unable to retain existing customers or if our
customers do not maintain their usage levels, our revenue and growth could be adversely affected. For
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additional discussion on product development, see the section titled “—Our success depends in large part on
our ability to continue to develop the most advanced and capable AI models, and any failure to do so could
adversely affect our business.”
Some of our enterprise customers may have the financial resources, technical capabilities, and access to the
talent and compute necessary to develop and deploy proprietary AI models, and may reduce or cease usage of
our models, platform, and applications as their internal AI capabilities mature, even where they initially
adopted our offerings as a foundation for their AI strategy. If these customers were to reduce or cease usage of
our models, platform, and applications, our revenue and growth could be adversely affected.
In addition to retaining customers, our growth strategy depends in part on expanding usage within our existing
customer base by increasing usage volumes, selling additional capabilities, and expanding adoption across
departments and use cases within customer organizations. However, customers may not expand their usage for
a variety of reasons, including satisfaction with current usage levels, budget constraints, technical challenges in
integrating our models, platform, and applications more broadly within their organizations, or preference for
multi-vendor AI strategies in order to limit dependence on any single provider. Due to our consumption-based
pricing model, customers may reduce or cease usage at any point within a given period due to budget or
internal procurement constraints, organizational spending controls, or other factors unrelated to the quality or
performance of our models, platform, and applications, and may not resume usage until a new budget period
commences or additional spend is approved, even where demand for our models, platform, and applications
remains strong. As a result, our revenue could be lower or more variable than anticipated and this effect may be
particularly pronounced among customers experiencing rapid growth in their usage of AI. If we increase sales
and marketing expenditures to accelerate customer acquisition without achieving proportional revenue growth
and if we cannot attract new customers, retain existing customers, expand within our customer base, or
accomplish these objectives in a cost-effective manner or timely manner, our revenue growth will decline and
our business, financial condition, and results of operations will be adversely affected.
If the market for our models, platform, and applications develops more slowly than we expect
or declines, our growth may slow or stall, and our business, financial condition, and results of
operations could be adversely affected.
The market for AI technologies, including frontier AI and related models, platforms, and applications, has
grown rapidly in recent years, but is still relatively nascent and evolving rapidly, and it is uncertain whether the
market for such AI technologies will achieve or sustain widespread adoption at the pace or to the extent we
expect. Our ability to generate revenue and achieve sustainable growth depends in significant part on the extent
to which enterprises, software developers, and other users adopt AI technologies, integrate them into existing
workflows, expand usage over time, and are willing to pay for our models, platform, and applications at levels
that support durable economic value at scale. Market adoption may be slower than anticipated due to factors
such as uncertainty regarding the cost, performance, reliability, and perceived value of AI solutions; increased
regulation; concerns about security, privacy, legal and regulatory compliance, or ethical considerations;
technological challenges; level of effort and expense associated with integration efforts; competition from
alternative or emerging technologies; the availability or adoption of complementary infrastructure and
workflows; or reductions in corporate spending due to macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, demand for
frontier models may decline if customers determine that less advanced, lower-cost models are sufficient for
their particular use cases. As AI capabilities improve across the industry and a broader range of models
becomes available, customers may conclude that incremental performance gains at the frontier do not justify
the additional cost, and may migrate toward smaller, cheaper, or open-source alternatives that adequately
address their needs. If we are unable to demonstrate sufficient differentiated value from our frontier models
relative to less capable alternatives, our revenue and growth could be adversely affected, even in a market where
overall AI adoption continues to grow. Further, while AI adoption may continue or accelerate in certain areas,
the long-term trajectory of this technological trend is uncertain, and market understanding, acceptance, and
valuation of AI-enabled models, platforms, and applications may be inaccurate or change over time and
adoption may occur unevenly across industries, geographies, and customer types. If growth in the AI market
does not translate into sustained customer demand for our offerings, expanded usage, and increased revenue,
or if anticipated use cases fail to materialize, our prospects, business, financial condition, and results of
operations could be adversely affected.
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The political environment and our engagement with policymakers and public positions on AI
regulation and safety could subject us to heightened scrutiny, political backlash, or
disproportionate regulatory action.
Our commitment to responsible and safe AI development includes active engagement with policymakers,
regulators, and other stakeholders regarding the development of AI-related laws, regulations, and standards.
We have participated in, and will likely continue to participate in, political processes, including through
contributions, advocacy, or support of political organizations. In addition, our executives and other
representatives have publicly expressed and may in the future publicly express views on AI policy, regulation,
safety, and related social or political issues. As a result, we have experienced, and may continue to experience,
increased visibility and may continue to be subject to heightened scrutiny or the risk of being disproportionately
or selectively targeted by particular governmental bodies, even where similarly situated companies are not,
including through investigations or enforcement actions, the imposition or selective application of regulatory,
licensing, or permitting requirements, adverse treatment in government procurement or provision of security
clearances, or targeted immigration or visa actions affecting our personnel. As part of our political engagement,
we have advocated for, and will likely continue to advocate for, regulatory approaches or industry standards
that we believe promote the safe and responsible development of AI but that could increase our compliance
burdens, limit our product development or deployment flexibility, or otherwise slow our growth relative to
competitors.
Our public positions, stated values, policy advocacy, or statements by our executives have attracted, and may
continue to attract, criticism from influential political figures, industry participants, regulators, or other third
parties, particularly in politically sensitive or polarized environments, which could shape public narratives or
regulatory perceptions of our business in ways that are unfavorable to us. For example, public statements by us
or other industry participants regarding the safety of frontier AI development have been cited by governmental
actors to support litigation or regulatory claims, including requests for injunctive relief restricting model
development, and could be cited in future proceedings involving us. Such scrutiny or backlash could result in
reputational harm, increased compliance or operating costs, investigations, enforcement actions, or restrictions
on our operations, any of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of
operations.
If the use of our AI models results in harm, whether through use by malicious actors or misuse
by other third parties, or if our model guardrails or safeguards fail to prevent such misuse,
our reputation and brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
adversely affected.
While our AI models are designed to comply with our AI safety and usage guidelines and be broadly safe,
ethical, and helpful, and while we have implemented safety measures intended to anticipate, identify, and
mitigate potential harmful uses, such measures are incomplete, may be outdated in light of evolving threat
models, or may fail to identify or prevent all potential misuse of our models, and our models have been, and
may continue to be, misused or manipulated to produce harmful outputs or carry out harmful actions.
Malicious actors have used, and may continue to develop novel or more sophisticated methods to use, our
models in ways that violate our usage policy or seek to circumvent our model guardrails or safeguards through
techniques such as prompt injection, adversarial inputs, or other methods, and use our models to engage in
harmful activities, including developing weapons, generating fraudulent or misleading content, conducting
cyberattacks, perpetrating acts of violence, or otherwise engaging in activities that would be prohibited under
our usage policy or in violation of applicable law. Our customer onboarding diligence varies by access channel,
and we do not and in certain situations cannot uniformly verify the identity of those who access our models or
of our customers’ end users, which may limit our ability to prevent access or recidivism by malicious actors or
to enforce our usage policy or other policies.
Moreover, our safety and security controls, including automated classifiers and monitoring systems, depend on
complex internal configurations that have failed, been misconfigured, or been inadvertently disabled, and may
do so again in the future without our timely detection. Any undetected failure of our safety controls could
permit misuse that our safeguards are designed to prevent, and could result in real-world harm, legal liability,
regulatory or enforcement action, loss of customer trust, and reputational harm, any of which could adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
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In particular, our most capable models have demonstrated, and future models are expected to demonstrate,
capabilities that could provide meaningful assistance to malicious actors seeking to develop chemical,
biological, or other dangerous weapons. We deploy technical safeguards, including automated classifiers,
specifically intended to detect and block these categories of misuse, but such safeguards are incomplete, may be
outdated in light of evolving threat models, have been and may in the future again be circumvented, or may fail
to operate as intended. Any actual or perceived use of our models to contribute to the development of such
weapons could result in harm, legal liability, regulatory or enforcement action, loss of government and
enterprise relationships, and damage to our reputation and brand, any of which could adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
For example, in September 2025, we detected and assessed with high confidence that a Chinese state-sponsored
hacking group manipulated our Claude Code tool into attempting infiltration into roughly 30 global targets,
including large technology companies, financial institutions, chemical manufacturing companies, and
government agencies, resulting in a limited number of successful intrusions. We believe this is the first
documented case of a large-scale cyberattack executed without substantial human intervention. We expect that
malicious actors, including sophisticated state-sponsored actors, will continue to seek to leverage our models,
platform, and applications for harmful actions, including by circumventing our safeguards, and their efforts to
do so may increase as the capabilities of our technology increase. Any successful attempt to misuse, or any
perceived misuse of, our models, platform, and applications for a cyberattack or for any other malicious
purpose could result in exposure to liability, disruption of our customer or other commercial relationships, or
damage to our reputation. The risks of such harms may increase as the cybersecurity-related capabilities of our
models, platform, and applications increase. Independent security researchers and other third parties have also
used, and may in the future use, our models to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the systems of other
companies, including other AI developers, at times in connection with authorized bug bounty programs. While
such activity may be lawful and consistent with industry practice for vulnerability research, it illustrates that
our models can function as a general-purpose tool for gaining unauthorized access to third-party systems, and
comparable capabilities could be used by malicious actors without authorization. Such incidents, whether or
not we are a direct party to them, may draw public and regulatory attention to the offensive cybersecurity
capabilities of our models and could result in reputational harm, calls for additional restrictions on our models,
or claims that we failed to adequately safeguard against such uses. For more information about risks related to
security incidents, see the section titled “—Any security breaches or other incidents, including those that affect
our networks, systems, or data, or the networks, systems, or data of our service providers, suppliers, or
customers, could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.”
As part of our commitment to responsible security research and transparency, we disclose information about
the capability and safety of our models, the safeguards that we have adopted with respect to our models, and
instances of misuse of our technology, such as the September 2025 cyberattack described above. We also
publish model system cards, our research findings, and other safety-related information. We take steps to
ensure that such disclosures will not materially assist malicious activity and weigh the benefits and risks of such
disclosures from an ecosystem preparedness perspective; however, malicious actors, including sophisticated
state-sponsored adversaries, have in the past and may in the future use those disclosures to assist their
attempts to circumvent our safeguards and security measures, thereby increasing the risks of misuse of our
models, platform, and applications, as well as the potential for exposure to liability, regulatory or litigation
proceedings, or other harms. In addition, because these disclosures describe risks and observed model
behaviors in detail, they may draw heightened public, media, or regulatory attention and could be cited by
regulators, litigants, or others in proceedings or claims against us. The steps we take to prevent misuse of our
models, platform, and applications could be incomplete or may fail to operate as intended, and any actual or
perceived misuse could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our AI models may behave in unintended, misaligned, or autonomous ways, including by
taking harmful actions that no user or third party directed, which could adversely affect our
reputation and brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our AI models may themselves cause harm by producing undesirable outputs or behaving in unintended,
misaligned, or autonomous ways, including by taking unintended or harmful actions that no user or third party
directed. These risks may increase as our models become more capable and are granted greater autonomy,
permissions, and integration with external systems. Although we continue to study why these behaviors
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emerge, our understanding continues to evolve, and we may be unable to anticipate or understand such
behaviors in the future.
In addition, our models have been and may continue to be deployed in high-risk or sensitive contexts, such as
healthcare, scientific and biomedical research, drug discovery and development, legal, finance, government, or
other critical decision-making environments, and in connection with hardware, where undesirable model
behaviors—which are inherently non-deterministic and may manifest in unpredictable ways, such as errors,
inaccuracies, biased or unsolicited views, or hallucinations—could lead to serious harm, liability, or reputational
or other damage. More broadly, the long-term effects of regular AI interaction on mental health, cognitive
development, and social behavior are not yet fully understood, and if such long-term harms do materialize in
the future, we could face significant liability, reputational harm, and adverse effects on our business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
Our development of more advanced AI models and our expansion into new jurisdictions could amplify the
foregoing risks. As our AI models become more advanced and capable, we have faced and may continue to face
heightened alignment, interpretability, controllability, and safety challenges, as more sophisticated models may
be better able to circumvent safeguards or behave in unintended ways. We may be unable to fully understand or
explain why our models produce particular outputs or behave in particular ways, which could limit our ability to
predict or prevent failures, provide explanations to customers or regulators, or satisfy emerging regulatory,
transparency, and explainability requirements.
In addition, our safety evaluations and testing processes have produced and may in the future produce
incomplete or unreliable results. For example, we have observed models behaving differently when they detect
or infer that they are being evaluated, which can limit our ability to accurately assess real-world risks or failure
modes prior to deployment. Such model awareness of our evaluation efforts creates a significant limitation on
our ability to assess model safety.
Furthermore, AI models have developed, and may in the future develop, unexpected capabilities during training
that were not anticipated, intended, or tested for, and such emergent capabilities may not be discovered until
after a model has been deployed, potentially resulting in safety incidents, reputational harm, regulatory
scrutiny, or the need to withdraw, retrain, or modify deployed models at significant expense. Such models may
also be deployed in higher-stakes or more sensitive applications, increasing the potential impact of errors,
misuse, or misalignment.
In addition, advanced AI models, including our models, give rise to novel ethical and safety risks, including
risks related to autonomy, manipulation, and the simulation of aspects of human psychology. These risks could
result in unforeseen harms and may require the development of governance structures, safeguards, or
mitigation strategies beyond existing AI safety frameworks, and there is always a risk that we will be unable to
develop or implement them effectively. In addition, models, including our own, have exhibited, and may in the
future exhibit, unexpected strategic or self-preserving behaviors, including attempts to resist shutdown, conceal
or manipulate information, or generate outputs that could be interpreted as coercive, deceptive, or
manipulative, including behavior resembling blackmail or efforts to influence human decision-makers to
preserve the model’s continued operation or access.
Even isolated or simulated instances of such behavior, whether occurring in testing or real-world deployments,
and whether occurring with our models or models developed by others, could generate significant public
concern, regulatory scrutiny, litigation risk, or reputational harm, regardless of whether such behavior results
in actual harm. For example, state attorneys general in California and at least 15 other states have announced
investigations of another company in our industry regarding AI safety. Concerns have been raised both within
our organization and by other researchers, regulators, policymakers, and industry participants that sufficiently
advanced AI systems could, if not developed, deployed, and operated with appropriate safeguards, oversight,
and security measures, pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity, particularly if such systems were
misused, replicated, weaponized, or allowed to operate with a high degree of autonomy. We have observed that
our models are contributing to the pace of our own research, and these risks will increase as AI systems
substantially automate AI research and development if, for example, they accelerate AI progress beyond our
ability to evaluate and safeguard new models, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition,
and results of operations.
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Our development of highly advanced models, platforms, and applications and expansion of use cases could
further increase the risk that our models cause harm. For example, agentic AI systems are capable of
autonomously taking actions on behalf of users, interacting directly with external systems, executing code,
making API calls, sending communications, or completing transactions with limited human oversight. These
systems are designed to possess enterprise-level permissions, integrations, and contextual awareness and to
operate autonomously for extended durations, including sustained multi-step workflows lasting hours or days,
which amplifies the potential severity of any errors, misalignments, or security incidents that may occur during
such extended autonomous operation. These autonomous capabilities could increase the potential for harm, as
errors, misalignment, or security exploits may result in real-world consequences—including consequences that
may be difficult or impossible to reverse, such as committing code changes, deleting or modifying data, or
completing financial transactions—before effective intervention is possible.
In an agentic workflow, an error or unintended action at any individual step may propagate through subsequent
steps, compounding the severity of harm before detection or correction. The pace and volume of autonomous
execution, particularly in enterprise deployments, may also exceed the capacity of human reviewers to
meaningfully understand and evaluate whether each action is appropriate. The effectiveness of human
oversight over our agentic offerings may be limited by the speed and volume of autonomous agent actions, the
complexity of multi-agent and multi-step workflows that may make it difficult for reviewers to assess whether
an agent’s actions are appropriate, and organizational pressures within customer environments to maximize
agent autonomy in order to achieve productivity gains. Human reviewers may experience alert fatigue, may lack
sufficient context to evaluate agent decisions, or may not review agent actions in time to prevent harm,
particularly in high-volume enterprise deployments where agents operate concurrently across multiple
workflows or in manners outside of a human’s awareness. In addition, agentic systems may pursue stated
objectives in ways that are technically consistent with their instructions but contrary to the user’s actual intent.
Moreover, our ability to anticipate, detect, or test vulnerabilities or other design or implementation
shortcomings in such systems may be constrained, particularly where agents operate across complex, multi-
step workflows or interact with third-party services outside our control, and the breadth and complexity of
potential interactions across such multi-step agent behaviors cannot be exhaustively tested prior to
deployment. Separately, models may behave in a misaligned manner and take harmful actions that are not
directed by a user or third party, pursuing objectives or acting on dispositions that diverge from those intended
by human users or developers. Misaligned behaviors of this kind, whether occurring in testing or real-world
deployments, have been observed both in our models and elsewhere in the industry, including in testing and
internal use, models circumventing network and sandbox restrictions, granting themselves permissions they
had not been given, taking unintended actions in pursuit of assigned goals, interfering with other AI agents, and
misrepresenting whether tasks had been completed or verified, and as models are granted greater autonomy,
permissions, and integration with external systems, the consequences of such misaligned behavior increase. For
example, during cybersecurity evaluations built by a third-party evaluation partner, a misconfiguration in the
testing environment left the model under evaluation connected to the open internet despite instructions that it
had no internet access. Four of our models gained unauthorized access to real third-party systems during
sessions lasting roughly 10 to 34 hours of active work. In one incident, after being unable to abort an impossible
task, an early version of a model used a password it found to gain administrator access to a third party’s system,
harvested additional credentials, changed system settings, and read one individual’s personal information. The
affected parties were notified. Each incident involved a single instance of a model working in isolation on its
assigned exercise, and our investigation found no evidence that any model coordinated with other agents,
pursued goals beyond its assigned task, or attempted to evade oversight. These risks may be heightened where
multiple AI agents operate together. Agents that interact or coordinate with one another may amplify,
propagate, or reinforce misaligned behavior across the group, pursue objectives collectively in ways not
intended or endorsed by any user, or take coordinated actions against systems or targets unrelated to their
assigned tasks, in each case, in ways that may be difficult to anticipate, detect, or contain. Incidents of this kind
have occurred, and we expect the deployment and interaction of larger numbers of autonomous agents to
increase these risks over time.
Our ability to detect and mitigate misaligned or unintended behavior depends in part on the effectiveness of our
alignment evaluations, monitoring, and other oversight and control techniques, many of which rely on our
models having a limited ability to evade or subvert such oversight. As our models become more capable, they
have become better able to circumvent such techniques, including by concealing misaligned objectives or
behaviors, and the effectiveness of our evaluation, monitoring, and control measures, and our ability to
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measure the degree to which our models are aligned, may decline as a result. In addition, models, including our
own, have attempted, in incidents observed in our industry, to interfere with, manipulate, or subvert the
mechanisms used to evaluate, grade, or oversee such models, including the systems responsible for assessing
their performance or alignment. Models, including our own, that are used to assess the behavior of other
models have engaged, and may in the future engage, in misaligned behavior. Such conduct described above
could cause our evaluations to overstate the safety or alignment of our models and could further limit our
ability to detect misalignment. If we become less able to detect or assess misalignment as our models advance,
we may deploy models whose behavior we cannot adequately verify, which could increase the risk of undetected
harmful conduct and misalignment, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results
of operations.
We are also extending our models, platform, and applications into scientific, biomedical, and physical domains.
For example, we offer Claude Science, an agentic research environment that connects our models to scientific
databases, third-party and open-source scientific models, and customers’ own computing infrastructure, and
we have released, initially as a limited research preview, an open protocol that enables our models to monitor
and control laboratory instruments, robotic systems, and other physical hardware. We also conduct research on
the ability of our models to operate robotic systems. When our models direct physical equipment, errors,
misaligned behavior, adversarial manipulation, or misuse could result in bodily injury, property damage,
damage to costly equipment or experimental materials, or the release of hazardous substances, and such
consequences may be immediate and irreversible. Safety interlocks, human-in-the-loop controls, and access
restrictions we implement may prove inadequate, and because certain of these components are open source,
third parties may deploy them with hardware, or in configurations, that we have not evaluated or from which
our safeguards have been removed. Connecting increasingly capable models to laboratory automation may also
heighten governmental and public concern regarding the potential for AI systems to accelerate the development
of dangerous biological, chemical, or other materials, which could result in additional regulatory restrictions on,
or scrutiny of, these offerings.
In addition, maintaining comprehensive records of the actions, decisions, and reasoning of our agentic systems
across complex, multi-step workflows is technically challenging, particularly when agents interact with third-
party systems outside our control, and any inability to provide adequate audit trails could impair our ability to
investigate incidents, respond to regulatory inquiries, or defend against liability claims. These risks are
heightened by the fact that we use our own agentic offerings, including Claude Code, as critical tools in our
internal development processes, such that any errors, vulnerabilities, or degradation in these products could
directly impair our ability to develop and deploy future models and products. As we increasingly leverage
Claude to accelerate progress within Anthropic, our organization may lose visibility across certain processes in a
way that may become difficult for any individual or group of humans to understand and control. Because our
models write a large and growing share of our code and increasingly perform our research, including our safety
research, misaligned behavior in internal use could undermine that work, introduce vulnerabilities into our
systems or into the training of future models, or result in models operating outside of our intended controls.
Our monitoring does not cover all of our internal and external deployments and may not detect subtle or diffuse
forms of such behavior.
Any of the foregoing model behaviors, whether in testing or in real-world deployments and whether involving
our models or those of others, could result in safety incidents, reputational harm, increased regulatory scrutiny,
or liability, any of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Furthermore, while we continue to design and develop more sophisticated techniques to evaluate the safety and
alignment of our models, the capabilities of our models may have already advanced, and may continue to
advance, at a rate that initiates the implementation of enhanced safety and testing measures as we have
described in our Responsible Scaling Policy. If our evaluations, monitoring, or reviews indicate risks that we
believe warrant further testing, we have in the past, and may in the future, delay, restrict, or decline to proceed
with the release of a model. For example, following incidents in 2026 in which our models gained unauthorized
access to real computer systems during pre-release cybersecurity evaluations, we suspended certain of those
evaluations, as well as higher-risk reinforcement learning environments. For more information about our
approach to model releases, please see the section titled “Business—Safety Research is Core to Our Business—
Our Approach to Model Releases.” Any decision to delay or restrict a release could adversely affect our
competitive position and customer relationships, and adversely affect our business, financial condition, and
results of operations.
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We may be exposed to liability, litigation, and regulatory action arising from harms
associated with our AI models, and our contractual protections and insurance may be
insufficient, any of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results
of operations.
Harms associated with our AI models, whether arising from misuse by third parties, from our models’ own
behavior, or from their deployment in high-risk or sensitive contexts, may expose us to liability, litigation, and
regulatory action, including under theories that remain unsettled as applied to AI, and our contractual and
insurance protections may prove insufficient.
Individuals at risk of suicide or self-harm or who have committed acts of violence toward others have used, and
may also in the future use, our models, notwithstanding our safeguards. AI models developed by others in our
industry have been and may in the future be alleged to have played a role in instances of suicide, acts of violence
toward others, or serious self-harm, which have resulted and may in the future result in significant public
scrutiny, litigation, criminal investigations, regulatory attention, and reputational harm.
Similar incidents involving our models have presented and could in the future present substantial risk to our
reputation, expose us to legal, regulatory, and other proceedings, and adversely affect our business, financial
condition, and results of operations. While our current Consumer Terms of Service requires our users to be at
least 18 years of age, minors have accessed in the past, and may in the future access, the platform, and risks
relating to child safety may be particularly acute, as minors may be more susceptible to harmful content,
manipulation, or overreliance on AI outputs, and incidents involving children tend to draw heightened
regulatory, media, and public scrutiny.
State attorneys general and private plaintiffs have also begun to assert tort, product liability, consumer
protection, and failure-to-warn claims against companies in our industry, alleging that AI models caused or
contributed to harm and that the developer failed to adequately warn users of known risks. In at least one case,
a state attorney general has initiated a criminal investigation against another company offering similar services.
Regulators have obtained substantial monetary settlements and injunctive relief against other technology
companies based on analogous theories of product-design or algorithmic harm, and we believe similar theories
are likely to continue to be tested against us and other companies in our industry as adoption of our models
grows, including by minors and other vulnerable users, notwithstanding our efforts to restrict such access. The
relief sought in such matters has, in at least one instance, extended beyond data-handling, disclosure, or age-
verification practices to include a request to enjoin an AI company from developing new models absent
independent, third-party safety review and approval, illustrating the potential breadth of remedies
governmental actors may pursue against companies in our industry. Any determination that we are liable under
such theories, or any judicial or regulatory expansion of tort, product liability, or consumer protection law, or
criminal liability, as applied to AI models, could result in significant liability and require us to change how we
design and offer our models, platform, and applications.
A substantial portion of our traffic is subject to Zero Data Retention (“ZDR”) terms under which we retain only
classifier scores, not prompts or outputs. For that traffic, we cannot conduct offline analysis, cross-conversation
investigation, human review, or otherwise analyze historical data to detect, investigate, and document security
events or incidents, which thereby reduces our ability to detect misuse. ZDR may also prevent us from
producing records for subpoenas, regulatory examinations, or incident-reporting obligations, and there is no
certainty a regulator or court would excuse non-production based on a lack of available records, and such
regulators or courts may construe the lack of records against us through unfavorable inferences or other
sanctions. As our models become more capable, our safety framework has required and may continue to require
monitoring and retention incompatible with ZDR for certain model classes. Because ZDR is a competitive
expectation for enterprise customers in regulated industries and on third-party cloud platforms, these
requirements have caused and could continue to cause customers to migrate to other providers or to
deployments where our visibility is more limited.
In the European Union (“EU”), the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, cybersecurity and AI-related incidents are
subject to increasingly stringent reporting obligations. European regulators expect companies to provide
detailed information about incidents under several laws and regulations, which we may not be able to provide
within the prescribed timeframe. Similarly, in the United States, companies are increasingly subject to incident
reporting obligations. In addition, other jurisdictions around the world have adopted, or may adopt, similar
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laws and regulations with similar implications. Any of the foregoing could result in regulatory action, litigation,
customer attrition, or reputational harm that adversely affects our business. For more information regarding
our incident reporting obligations, see the section titled “—Any security breaches or other incidents, including
those that affect our networks, systems, or data, or the networks, systems, or data of our service providers,
suppliers, or customers, could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.”
The legal frameworks governing liability for actions taken autonomously by AI systems, including our agentic
products, are unsettled and could expose us to significant and unpredictable legal claims. Existing legal
doctrines governing agency, product liability, and professional negligence were developed in the context of
human decision-making and have not been authoritatively applied to autonomous AI systems. We believe our
provision of our intelligence service is considered a “service” in the context of legal frameworks addressing
product liability, but courts and regulators may reach different conclusions across jurisdictions. In addition, it
is unclear whether, and under what circumstances, actions taken by an AI agent could be deemed to create
binding legal obligations on behalf of the user or deploying enterprise, or whether our contractual protections,
including limitation of liability and indemnification provisions, will be enforceable or adequate in the context of
claims arising from autonomous agent conduct. We may face claims from customers, their end users, or third
parties alleging that we are liable for harm caused by our agents’ autonomous actions, even where the customer
configured, deployed, or supervised the agent. The absence of settled legal standards creates significant
uncertainty regarding our potential liability exposure and the adequacy of our risk mitigation measures.
Our expansion into new geographic markets further compounds these risks, as we must navigate differing
cultural norms regarding AI use, comply with diverse and evolving regulatory regimes that may impose varying
safety, compliance, or liability requirements, address language-specific vulnerabilities and content moderation
challenges, and potentially face regulatory enforcement actions, litigation, or other liabilities in jurisdictions
where we have more limited operational experience, including heightened risks of intellectual property theft,
unauthorized model access, or misuse associated with operating data center infrastructure in certain non-U.S.
locations.
If our models are involved in causing significant harm, we could be subject to legal claims, including personal
injury or negligence claims, regulatory enforcement actions, criminal investigations, or other governmental
efforts, which could result in costly litigation, significant financial judgments or settlements, disruptive
remediation obligations, or a challenging regulatory landscape. We have taken steps to limit our liability for
such matters—for example, through warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability in our terms of service—
but those contractual protections may not be upheld, or may not apply to certain claims, or may otherwise be
insufficient to limit our liability exposure under applicable law. Moreover, in some cases we have contractually
assumed additional liability. For example, to facilitate independent testing and evaluation of our frontier
models, we have agreed to indemnify certain external evaluators and testing vendors for specified losses arising
from testing activities, including security incidents, data loss, data breaches, and other harms associated with
such activities. Although our agreements with external evaluators and testing vendors generally limit the
amount of our indemnification obligations, certain of these agreements require us to defend and indemnify the
evaluator, without a cap on our liability, against certain third-party claims. These include claims arising from
allegations that our models or their outputs, as used in the evaluator’s authorized testing, infringe third-party
intellectual property or other proprietary rights, as well as certain other claims arising from the testing or
related engagement. Because our models may behave in ways that no user or developer intended, claims arising
from such actions could result in substantial liability. Our insurance policies also may not provide sufficient
coverage to adequately mitigate the potential liabilities we face, especially where any one incident, or a group of
incidents, causes disproportionate harm. In addition, with the scale of harm that could result from a
catastrophic AI-related incident, no single insurer, and potentially the insurance industry in the aggregate, may
have sufficient capacity or expertise to underwrite insurance commensurate with such exposure.
Further, the insurance market for AI-specific risks is nascent and evolving, and we may be unable to obtain
coverage for certain AI-related liabilities on commercially reasonable terms, or at all, leaving us exposed to
potentially significant uninsured losses. Harmful incidents involving our models, regardless of fault, could also
severely and disproportionately damage our reputation and brand as a safety-focused AI company, leading to
loss of customer trust and customer attrition, reduced demand for our models, platform, and applications, and
difficulty attracting and retaining talent. In addition, because we primarily serve enterprise customers, which
often have heightened expectations around safety, reliability, and compliance, any harmful incident or
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perceived lapse in our safety practices could have a disproportionate adverse impact on our brand, customer
relationships, and revenue. Moreover, to the extent enterprises are attracted to our models, platform, and
applications due to our safety-focused positioning, any erosion of that perception could impair our ability to
attract and retain enterprise customers.
There can be no assurance that we will be able to predict, detect, and proactively prevent every harmful use or
harmful output of our AI models, in particular as we continue to rapidly develop our models, platform, and
applications, and expand our operations geographically, and any failure to do so could adversely affect our
reputation and brand or result in costly legal liability. There may have been past instances of harmful use or
harmful output of our models that we did not detect, and there may be future instances that we will not detect.
Any of the foregoing risks could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
If we are unable to manage the risks related to our focus on and commitment to AI safety, our
brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
Balancing Safety and Commercial Objectives. Our commitment to AI safety requires us to make difficult
judgments that balance safety considerations against commercial objectives, competitive pressures, and
stakeholder expectations. We often make judgment calls with respect to when we determine a model is safe
enough to release and which capabilities to develop or restrict. For example, in April 2026, we initially released
our frontier model, Mythos, as a gated research preview through Project Glasswing, available to select
organizations for cybersecurity applications, rather than making it broadly available at launch due to its
advanced capabilities in cyber vulnerability discovery. We expect that frontier models with similar or enhanced
capability profiles, whether developed by us or by other AI labs, will continue to emerge, and that future
Anthropic models exhibiting such capabilities may be subject to access constraints. More broadly, we believe it
is important to assess the safety of our models not only at release but throughout their development. For
models we anticipate will have novel capabilities or present novel safety risks, we plan to evaluate the safety of
each stage of training, including pre-training, post-training, and internal deployment, and we may delay or
pause a stage when we are not confident in our safety measures for that stage. For example, we recently chose to
delay pre-training a new frontier base model for more than a month to allow time to further enhance our
security measures related to preventing model weight exfiltration and protecting our intellectual property. We
are also considering additional measures, including updates to our Responsible Scaling Policy, to require
human review and approval of certain decisions in our research and development processes as our models
perform an increasing share of that work. There can be no assurance, however, that the safeguards or access
regimes we adopt will prove adequate, that we will correctly identify which capabilities require restriction, or
that constraints we impose will not be circumvented. These judgments are particularly consequential because,
as AI systems become more capable, the potential severity of harm from misaligned or misused models
increases correspondingly, and a wide range of stakeholders, including researchers and policymakers, have
raised concerns that sufficiently advanced AI systems could pose catastrophic or existential risks to society if
not developed and deployed responsibly. Our safety-focused approach is designed in part to mitigate such risks,
but there can be no assurance that our efforts will be successful or that the broader AI industry will adopt
similar safeguards. In particular, as AI systems become more autonomous and capable of taking consequential
actions with less human oversight, there is a risk that such systems could, whether due to misalignment with
human intentions, errors in objective specification, or self-preserving behaviors, take harmful actions
independently and at scale without human intervention. Even if our own models do not cause such harm, a
significant safety incident involving any frontier AI could trigger broad reputational damage to the AI industry,
public backlash, and sweeping regulatory responses that could adversely affect our business. For example, in
September 2026, media reports citing a senior Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) official indicated that the
FTC has opened non-public investigations into the potential risks that increasingly autonomous AI systems may
pose to consumers. In October 2026, the FTC issued a civil investigative demand to us seeking information
about our consumer protection, data protection, and privacy practices, as well as the safety and security of our
products. The scope of any investigation of us or its outcome, and any investigation, enforcement action, or
adverse finding arising from this or similar inquiries could result in significant costs, require changes to how we
design, test, or deploy our models, platform, and applications, or otherwise adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations. We may misjudge these tradeoffs, either by being overly cautious
and potentially losing market opportunities, or by being insufficiently rigorous and releasing models, platforms,
or applications that cause harm. Even where human oversight mechanisms are in place, such mechanisms may
prove insufficient in practice if the volume, speed, or complexity of autonomous agent actions exceeds the
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capacity of human reviewers to meaningfully evaluate and intervene, and any perceived failure of our oversight
mechanisms could expose us to regulatory enforcement, liability claims, and reputational harm. For more
information, see the section titled “—If the use of our AI models results in harm, whether through use by
malicious actors or misuse by other third parties, or if our model guardrails or safeguards fail to prevent such
misuse, our reputation and brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely
affected.”
Moreover, governmental authorities have restricted, and may in the future further restrict, the availability of
our models, including based on their assessment of the capabilities or safeguards of our models, independent of
our own safety-based access decisions. For example, in June 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed
worldwide export restrictions on our Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models, which we disabled for all customers until
those restrictions were lifted. For more information, see the section titled “—Governmental trade controls,
including export and import controls, sanctions, customs requirements, and related regimes, could subject us to
liability or loss of contracting privileges or limit our ability to compete in certain markets.”
Internal Governance and Decision-Making
To institutionalize our safety commitments and ensure we are managed in a manner that responsibly balances
our tripartite goals as a PBC, we have established the LTBT, which through a special class of common stock,
Class T common stock, generally has the authority to elect and remove the Class T directors, who together will
constitute a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors. In addition to the LTBT and our
structure as a PBC, we train our models in accordance with Claude’s constitution, which we make publicly
available, and have adopted and continue to update safety policies, such as our Responsible Scaling Policy. We
also solicit and seriously consider input from a wide range of stakeholders and constituents, including our
stockholders, employees, customers, the LTBT, industry leaders and experts, and AI safety organizations. Such
practices and processes have previously resulted in, and may in the future result in, slower decision-making and
product releases. We may also face potential conflicts when safety and business interests diverge. If we do not
successfully manage these risks related to our AI safety processes and practices, or if there is a perception that
we have not successfully managed such risks, we may face reputational harm, internal conflicts resulting in a
deterioration of our company culture, slower or inferior product releases, or litigation. For more information,
see the section titled “—Risks Related to our Governance Structure.”
We have implemented an external reviewer program and engage researchers, adversarial testers, and other
third parties to support aspects of our safety, security, and model-evaluation efforts. Certain of these
arrangements are novel and may require us to provide such parties with access to internal information,
systems, personnel, or models, which could increase the risk of disclosure of confidential, proprietary, or other
sensitive information. In addition, findings, assessments, or public statements by such third parties may differ
from our views and could adversely affect customer trust, regulatory perceptions, or our reputation.
Heightened Reputational Vulnerability. As we have publicly positioned ourselves as a safety-focused
organization, we face heightened vulnerability to reputational harm from any perceived inconsistency between
our stated values and actual practices. We are held to higher standards than certain competitors that have not
made similar public commitments, and any incidents impacting our perception as a safety-focused organization
could result in:
•Employee Disruption. Employees who joined our company based on our safety commitments may
experience a decline in morale, disillusionment, a loss of trust in leadership, or reduced productivity if
they perceive we are not living up to our stated values. Public disagreements regarding our safety
approach, including criticism from current or former employees, or the departure of personnel
associated with our safety efforts, could amplify such perceptions. Such negative perceptions could also
impair our ability to recruit and hire new talent to the organization. Any erosion of our safety-focused
reputation could also make it more difficult or costly to attract and retain highly skilled employees,
including by increasing compensation or other hiring costs. These dynamics could lead to increased
turnover, loss of institutional knowledge, and reduced effectiveness of our teams, which could in turn
cause disruption to ongoing development and safety initiatives and impair our ability to remain at the
frontier of AI model development. 
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•Customer Backlash. Customers and enterprise partners who choose to deploy our models, platform,
and applications based on our safety positioning may lose trust in us, terminate or decline to renew
their contracts, demand refunds, publicly criticize our company, or switch to our competitors, which
could result in harm to our reputation, revenue loss, and reduced market share. These risks may be
heightened with respect to programs in which we make models available only to a limited group of
vetted organizations, such as Project Glasswing. Organizations not selected for, or removed from, such
programs may perceive our access decisions as arbitrary, exclusionary, or anticompetitive, which could
result in reputational harm, loss of customer or partner relationships, regulatory complaints, or
litigation, including claims under antitrust or unfair competition laws. Conversely, participants in such
programs may publicly criticize us or terminate their participation if program terms, eligibility criteria,
transition arrangements to successor models, or capability levels do not meet their expectations.
•Regulatory Scrutiny. Regulators may subject us to heightened oversight, investigations, enforcement
actions, or new or more burdensome compliance requirements based on the capabilities of our models,
platform, and applications or perceived failures to meet our own stated standards, which could
increase our operational costs and limit our ability to deploy our models, platform, and applications. 
•Damaging Media Coverage. Negative press coverage could amplify concerns about our safety
practices, reach broader audiences, including potential customers and investors, create lasting
reputational damage through viral social media discussion, and make future incidents subject to
heightened scrutiny, which could further exacerbate the adverse effects of any perceived failures to
meet our stated standards. 
•Litigation. We may face lawsuits from stockholders alleging misrepresentation, from customers
claiming breach of contractual or implied commitments, or from other parties alleging harm resulting
from the gap between our stated values and actual practices, leading to legal costs, settlements,
judgments, injunctions, or other liabilities and remedies.
Any safety-related controversy or incident, whether actual or perceived, and regardless of fault or frequency,
could prove significantly damaging to our business. In addition, we have engaged with governments in Canada,
the EU, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other jurisdictions in connection with Project Glasswing
and related frontier-capability programs, and we have positioned such programs, in part, to help provide the
foundation for broader industry coordination on the responsible release of frontier models with cybersecurity
and other advanced capabilities. The commercial viability of these and similar future programs may depend on
sustained governmental and industry coalition support. If such coalitions fail to materialize, are perceived as
exclusionary or anticompetitive, are rolled back, or result in mandates we cannot readily satisfy (including with
respect to access, localization, monitoring, or reporting), our ability to commercialize models with Mythos-class
capabilities, and the reputational benefits we derive from safety-focused positioning, could be materially
impaired. For more information, see the section titled “—If we are unable to maintain and enhance our brand
and reputation, our business, financial condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected.”
We voluntarily publicly disclose information regarding AI safety challenges, research findings, and limitations
of our models and systems that exceeds standard industry practice and regulatory requirements. While our
intent with these voluntary disclosures is to advance the safe development of AI and build public trust, these
disclosures create several risks. The AI safety landscape is nascent and evolving rapidly, and our understanding
of and perspective on appropriate safety practices, risk tradeoffs, and deployment contexts may change over
time as technologies, use cases, and regulatory expectations develop. As a result, statements we make today
may later prove incomplete, require modification, or be interpreted differently in light of subsequent
developments. To the extent we adhere to prior public statements or frameworks, we may also limit our
operational flexibility, product development, or deployment decisions, even where evolving circumstances
would otherwise warrant a different approach. Our public statements about AI risks, safety challenges, areas of
uncertainty, or potential societal impacts, including statements regarding job displacement or economic
disruption, may be used against us in litigation, regulatory proceedings, or public controversies, particularly if
our future actions or statements are viewed as inconsistent with our prior statements and commitments.
Regulators have used and could continue to use our disclosures as the basis for heightened scrutiny or more
stringent requirements applicable to us compared to less transparent competitors. Additionally, our disclosures
have provided, and may in the future provide, competitors with insights into our proprietary training and other
sensitive processes, research priorities, and strategic concerns, without reciprocal transparency, which may put
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us at a competitive disadvantage. If we are unable to effectively manage the foregoing risks, our brand,
reputation, and ability to compete could be adversely affected.
Resource Allocation and Scaling. Safety-focused development is resource-intensive. We must allocate limited
resources, capital, and talent between safety-focused workloads and other initiatives, often without clear
returns on our safety-focused investments. For example, our investments in interpretability research and
techniques designed to ensure our models’ behavior remains consistent with intended goals, values, and safety
objectives may not yield actual or perceived commercial returns. Additionally, as we develop our models,
platform, and applications, safety testing may become more expensive and resource-intensive. Limited-access
programs such as Project Glasswing may also require us to design, operate, and continually maintain bespoke
vetting, contracting, monitoring, and offboarding processes that differ materially from our standard
commercial release processes, including coordination among participating organizations, transition planning to
successor models, and enhanced internal controls commensurate with the heightened sensitivity of the
underlying capabilities. These activities impose ongoing operational, legal, and security costs that may recur as
future frontier models with similar capability profiles are released. If we fail to successfully manage resource
allocation or develop more efficient methods with respect to our safety initiatives, our safety outcomes,
business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
As our product portfolio and employee and customer base expand globally, applying safety principles
consistently across our rapidly expanding organization, models, platform, applications, use cases, and
jurisdictions and regulatory regimes has become increasingly challenging. For more information, see the
section titled “—To continue to grow our business, we will need to continue to expand internationally, and our
non-U.S. operations and sales to customers outside of the United States expose us to risks inherent in
international expansion, sales, and operations.”
If we are unable to successfully manage the foregoing risks related to our focus on and commitment to AI
safety, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
If we are unable to maintain and enhance our brand and reputation, our business, financial
condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected.
We believe that maintaining and enhancing our brand identity and reputation is critical to our relationships
with, and to our ability to attract and retain, customers, partners, and employees. Our brand and reputation are
influenced not only by our actions, but also by the actions of our partners, our customers, and other third
parties with whom we do business, and by broader public perceptions of the AI industry, and we may be
grouped with other industry participants and judged similarly, regardless of differences in our approach or
conduct. The successful promotion of our brand depends on a number of factors, including our ability to
continue to develop and deliver reliable, high-quality, and responsible models, platforms, and applications that
meet the needs of our customers; our sales and marketing efforts, including our effectiveness at developing a
strong brand name and positive presence within the AI industry through participation in industry events and
key media coverage; the perceptions and experiences of both our enterprise and individual customers,
including through testimonials, use cases, and word-of-mouth; our ability to maintain security and reliability of
our models, platform, and applications; the actions of our management; and our ability to differentiate our
models, platform, and applications from those of our competitors, including through product design choices,
safeguards, business models, and policies, including our approach to monetization strategies that differ from
those of certain competitors. In addition, our brand is subject to heightened scrutiny with respect to perceived
societal, environmental, labor, health, and safety-related impacts of AI technologies, and a single perceived
failure could result in outsized reputational harm. For example, as AI systems become more capable or
prevalent, public perception that our models, platform, and applications contribute to job displacement or
economic disruption could generate significant negative media coverage, customer or employee backlash, or
organized opposition, regardless of the actual impact of our models, platform, and applications on employment.
Our ability to maintain and enhance our brand and reputation also depends on the effectiveness and scalability
of our internal communications and reputation-management capabilities, including our ability to support
global operations, and limitations in these areas could adversely affect our brand as we grow. Our crisis
response and reputation-management capabilities may be limited or underdeveloped, particularly as we scale,
which could impair our ability to respond effectively to adverse events and mitigate reputational harm.
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The promotion of our brand requires us to make substantial expenditures, which we anticipate will increase as
our market becomes more competitive. We have in the past faced, and may in the future face, challenges in
building broader brand awareness and may fall behind competitors with more established or widely recognized
brands. Our brand promotion activities may not be successful or generate the awareness or increased revenue
we expect, and even if they do, any increase in revenue may not offset the significant expenses we incur in the
efforts to build our brand.
If we do not successfully maintain and enhance our brand, our business may not grow, we may have reduced
pricing power relative to competitors, we could lose customers or fail to attract potential customers, or we could
fail to hire and retain employees, all of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and
results of operations.
We derive substantially all of our revenue from a limited number of products and
applications, and our failure to maintain and expand our product portfolio could adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We currently derive substantially all of our revenue from a limited number of products and applications,
primarily our Claude models and portfolio of applications that sit on top of the Claude Platform. This
dependence on a narrow set of offerings subjects us to various risks that could adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
Our concentration in a limited number of products and applications, as well as our focused development
strategy within specific areas of the broader AI landscape, reduces our ability to mitigate business risks through
diversification. While this focused approach may enable us to allocate resources efficiently and compete
effectively in our prioritized areas, it also creates the risk that significant market opportunities or the largest
addressable markets may emerge in areas outside our current strategic focus. Many of our competitors offer
diverse product portfolios across multiple business lines or pursue broader development across AI modalities,
enabling them to offset weaknesses in a particular area. In contrast, any decline in demand for our core
offerings, whether due to competition, technological changes, pricing pressure, changes in customer demand,
or other factors, would have a direct and disproportionate impact on our revenue and ability to achieve and
sustain profitability. Our concentration also reflects a strategy that prioritizes model capability as a principal
source of differentiation and relies substantially on organic adoption rather than a large direct sales
organization. The risks of that strategy, including the risks that differentiation among advanced models
narrows, that customers select providers based on factors other than capability, or that competitors capture the
individual users from whom our enterprise adoption often originates, are described in the sections titled “—We
face intense competition, and if we are unable to compete effectively, our business, financial condition, and
results of operations could be adversely affected” and “—We have a limited history under our current go-to-
market strategy, and our efforts to scale and evolve our customer acquisition, engagement, and retention model
may not be successful.”
The AI industry is rapidly evolving, and it is difficult to predict which modalities or applications will capture the
most durable commercial value or how the competitive landscape will shift. If the market for AI models,
platforms, and applications develops in ways that do not align with our chosen areas of focus, or if competitors
are better positioned to address the areas where the market opportunity ultimately proves largest, our ability to
sustain revenue growth and compete effectively could be adversely affected. If we experience a decline in
demand for our core offerings, we may not be able to successfully expand our product and application portfolio,
and even if we do, our new products and applications may not achieve market acceptance or generate sufficient
revenue to offset any decline in our existing business. Further, technical issues, security incidents, regulatory
restrictions, or reputational harm affecting our models, platform, and applications could have an immediate
and disproportionate impact on our business due to our product concentration where alternative revenue
streams may not be available to offset such impact.
The market for AI models, platforms, and applications is evolving quickly, and customer requirements and
expectations are changing rapidly. Customers may increasingly demand specialized solutions or specialized
integration and tooling that we do not currently offer and may not plan to offer, or may seek AI solutions
embedded more deeply into enterprise workflows. Enterprises may prefer to develop their own AI capabilities
internally or choose competitors that offer more comprehensive product suites. Moreover, because
substantially all of our models and applications are built on top of our frontier models, any defect, vulnerability,
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safety issue, or performance degradation in an underlying frontier model could simultaneously affect multiple
products and applications and customer deployments, amplifying the impact of any such issue across our
business. If we fail to anticipate or respond effectively to these evolving customer needs, we may lose customers
to competitors or fail to acquire new customers.
In addition, we currently compete, and may increasingly compete, with some of our own customers. As we
expand our product portfolio or introduce new capabilities, our offerings may overlap with or directly compete
with the models, platforms, and applications that our customers provide. This risk is particularly acute with
software-as-a-service and other software companies, whose offerings may incorporate AI functionality similar
to, or dependent on, the capabilities we provide. These customers may view our product expansion as a
competitive threat to their business models and may reduce their purchases from us, limit their adoption of new
offerings, terminate their relationships with us, seek alternative providers, restrict our access to the compute we
obtain from them, initiate intellectual property or other litigation against us, or accelerate efforts to develop
competing solutions internally in order to avoid relying on a direct competitor. This dynamic could result in
customer attrition, reduced expansion within our existing customer base, pricing pressure, or reputational
challenges, any of which could adversely affect our revenue growth and business prospects.
Expanding our product portfolio requires substantial time and investment. We must make significant
investments in research and development, compute infrastructure, engineering talent, sales and marketing, and
go-to-market capabilities to develop new models, platforms, and applications and enable continued adoption.
We may seek to expand into new products and markets, including areas outside of our current core
competencies or where we have limited experience, and we may not successfully develop, commercialize, or
support such offerings. Development timelines for AI models, platforms, and applications are uncertain, and
new capabilities, even when continuously improved and released into our models, platform, and applications,
may take significant time to achieve commercial scale. We may invest significant resources in products or
services that fail to gain market traction, experience technical difficulties, face unexpected competition, lead to
unexpected harm or societal impacts that do not align with our values, or generate insufficient returns to justify
the investment. Additionally, we face other constraints on our ability to expand our offerings, including the
ability to hire, retain, and motivate qualified AI researchers, engineers, and technical personnel; the capital
intensity of developing and operating AI models, platforms, and applications which require substantial
compute and infrastructure investment; and our limited portfolio, which may make it difficult to provide the
comprehensive, integrated solutions that customers may expect.
If we are unable to successfully expand our product portfolio, if we fail to compete effectively with our current
offerings, or if customer preferences shift away from our models, platform, and applications, our business,
financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
A substantial portion of our revenue and accounts receivable is driven by a limited number of
customers and distribution channels, and the loss of, or a significant reduction in, spend from
one or more of our top customers or disruption through those channels could adversely affect
our prospects, business, and financial condition.
A substantial portion of our revenue is driven by a limited number of customers. While no single customer
represented more than 10% of our revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2026, our top five
customers represented approximately 25% of our revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2026.
Many of our top customers are not subject to long-term contracts with us or have contracts with near-term
expiration dates and are able to reduce or in some cases cease spending at any time and for any reason. Further,
we have agreements with certain large customers which provide flexibility around financial commitments,
termination rights, indemnification, and security obligations. Our top customers may vary spend levels period
to period, and there can be no assurance that our large customers will continue to spend at levels similar to
prior periods.
We anticipate that we will continue to derive a significant portion of our revenue from a limited number of
customers for the foreseeable future, and in some cases, the portion of our revenue attributable to certain
customers may increase in the future. The composition of our customer base, including our top customers, may
fluctuate from period to period given that our customer composition has evolved and is expected to continue to
evolve significantly as our business continues to evolve and scale and as the use cases for AI continue to
develop.
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In addition, a significant portion of our revenue and accounts receivable is associated with transactions
conducted with a limited number of CSPs that act as distribution and billing channels for our models. During
the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025 and the nine months ended September 30, 2026, revenue
generated from sales to customers through CSP marketplaces represented approximately 11%, 32%, 47%, and
44%, respectively, of total revenue. As of December 31, 2024 and 2025 and September 30, 2026, net accounts
receivable from sales through CSP marketplaces to customers represented 42%, 60%, and 52%, respectively, of
our net accounts receivable. These platforms bill end customers, collect payments on our behalf, and remit such
amounts to us, net of applicable platform and other fees. Any change to, or termination of, one of our significant
distribution relationships could adversely affect our business by disrupting customer access to our models,
reducing usage, or increasing customer acquisition, onboarding, and migration costs. In these third-party
arrangements, we generally maintain separate contractual arrangements with end customers governing access
to, and pricing for, our models, independent of the applicable platform, and changes in, or termination of, a
particular distribution relationship would not independently eliminate those contractual relationships.
However, customers may be unwilling or unable to transition to alternative access points on commercially
acceptable terms or timelines, or at all, following a disruption, which could result in revenue loss, increased
costs, or adverse impacts to our growth, margins, and results of operations. In addition, any delay, dispute, or
operational issue affecting a platform’s collection or remittance of customer payments could adversely affect
our cash flows and working capital.
We may not be able to maintain or increase revenue from our top customers for a variety of reasons, including
but not limited to the following:
•customers may develop their own solutions that compete with our models, platform, and applications;
•some of our customers may redesign their systems to require fewer of our services with limited notice
to us and may choose not to renew or increase their purchases of our models, platform, and
applications;
•changes to our models, platform, and applications may not align with the needs or expectations of our
customers and such changes may reduce customer trust in us;
•our customers may have pre-existing or concurrent relationships with, or may be, current or potential
competitors that may affect such customers’ decisions to purchase our models, platform, and
applications;
•our customers and partners that heavily rely on our offerings may want to reduce such levels of
reliance, seek out competing offerings, or transition to other providers altogether; and
•our customers, particularly early-stage and high-growth companies, may depend on venture capital or
other external financing to fund their operations, and may reduce or cease spending with us if such
funding is delayed, reduced, or unavailable or if their access to capital becomes more costly.
Any adverse change in demand from our largest customers, in their ability or willingness to perform under their
contracts with us, in applicable laws or regulations, or in our broader strategic relationships with such
customers could adversely affect our business and prospects. As a result, a significant reduction in spending by,
or the loss of, one or more of our largest customers, if not offset by new customer relationships or increased
business from our other existing customers, could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results
of operations. For additional risks related to our reliance on enterprise customers and government customers,
including longer sales cycles, complex procurement processes, heightened contractual, compliance, and security
requirements, and budgetary and policy constraints, see the sections titled “—Sales to enterprise customers
involve complexities and risks that could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of
operations” and “—Our sales to government entities and highly regulated organizations are subject to
challenges and risks.”
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We have incurred significant indebtedness in order to operate and grow our business,
including to fund our substantial compute commitments, and our ability to service this
indebtedness may be constrained by our cash flows and liquidity.
In order to operate and grow our business, including to fund our substantial compute commitments, we have
incurred a substantial amount of debt, which requires significant interest and principal payments. As of
September 30, 2026, our total indebtedness was $6.2 billion, reflecting the aggregate principal amount
outstanding under the convertible promissory notes issued to Amazon (through Amazon Web Services, Inc.)
pursuant to the Convertible Note Purchase Agreement, dated as of September 19, 2023, by and between us and
Amazon (the “Amazon 2023 NPA”) and the New Convertible Note Purchase Agreement, dated as of November
22, 2024, by and between us and Amazon (the “Amazon 2024 NPA”) (all such notes issued thereunder,
collectively, the “Amazon Notes”). We may also incur additional indebtedness to meet our future financing
needs. We have guaranteed the obligations of certain of our subsidiaries that are party to AI infrastructure
arrangements, as well as pursuant to agreements we entered into in connection with an equipment lease with a
third-party partner, Broadcom Inc. (“Broadcom”), in March 2026 to procure specialized AI accelerators and
associated components (pursuant to which Broadcom subsequently assigned a portion of such arrangement to a
designated financial partner, and may further assign a portion of such arrangement to one or more additional
financial partners) (together with any related lease entered into with an assignee, the “2026 Lease
Arrangement”). In addition, we have the ability to issue, if needed, up to $42.0 billion in aggregate principal
amount of convertible promissory notes to Broadcom or, subject to our consent (not to be unreasonably
withheld), a designated financial partner pursuant to a note purchase agreement that we entered into with
Broadcom in March 2026 (as amended to date, the “Infrastructure Partner 2026 NPA”) to finance obligations
under the 2026 Lease Arrangement. We may be required to use a substantial portion of our cash flows from
operations to pay interest, principal, or other required payments on our indebtedness.
The delivery of shares of our Class N common stock upon conversion of our outstanding convertible promissory
notes could result in dilution to our existing stockholders. Following this offering (after giving effect to the
Convertible Notes Conversion), our outstanding convertible promissory notes will represent in the aggregate
approximately           % of our Class N common stock and           % of our total outstanding common stock.
Pursuant to the terms of the Amazon Notes, to the extent that the full amount of such notes cannot convert into
shares of our Class N common stock in connection with this offering as a result of the ownership cap applicable
to the Amazon Notes, which may be waived at Amazon’s election, the remaining balance of such notes will
automatically convert, subject to Amazon’s ownership cap, into shares of our Class N common stock at the
applicable conversion price at the end of each fiscal quarter following this offering or, if such remaining balance
of such notes does not convert before the applicable maturity date because of the applicable ownership cap,
such balance will be repaid in cash at such maturity date. For more information about our convertible
promissory notes, see the section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations—Liquidity and Capital Resources—Convertible Notes.”
Our ability to make scheduled payments in respect of, to pay interest on, or to refinance our indebtedness,
including the A&R Credit Agreement and our outstanding convertible promissory notes, depends on our future
performance, which is subject to economic, financial, competitive, and other factors beyond our control. Such
payments will reduce the funds available to us for working capital, capital expenditures, and other corporate
purposes and may limit our ability to obtain additional financing for working capital, capital expenditures,
expansion plans, and other investments. Our business may not be able to generate cash flows from operations
in the future that are sufficient to service our debt and make necessary capital expenditures. If we are unable to
generate such cash flows, we may be required to adopt one or more alternatives, such as selling assets or
obtaining additional debt financing or equity capital on terms that may be onerous or highly dilutive. Our
ability to refinance our indebtedness will depend on the capital markets and our financial condition at such
time. We may not be able to engage in any of these activities or engage in these activities on desirable terms,
which could result in a default on our debt obligations and adversely affect our financial condition. Further, the
terms of the A&R Credit Agreement and the Infrastructure Partner 2026 NPA include a number of covenants
that limit our ability and our subsidiaries’ ability to, among other things, incur additional indebtedness, create
liens, make asset sales or investments, engage in mergers or other fundamental changes, pay dividends or
distributions, repurchase or redeem equity interests, and enter into transactions with affiliates. The terms of the
A&R Credit Agreement may restrict our current and future operations and could adversely affect our ability to
finance our future operations or capital needs. For more information, see the sections titled “—We may require
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additional capital to meet our substantial ongoing obligations and support our business growth, and our ability
to generate sufficient revenue and secure additional capital on acceptable terms is critical to our continued
operations and competitive position” and “—If the market for our models, platform, and applications develops
more slowly than we expect or declines, our growth may slow or stall, and our business, financial condition, and
results of operations could be adversely affected.”
We are also subject to variable interest rate risk because the interest rate under the A&R Credit Agreement
varies based on a margin over an indexed rate or an adjusted base rate. If interest rates associated with our
floating rate debt increase, our debt service obligations in connection with the A&R Credit Agreement would
increase even though the amount borrowed remained the same, and our available cash would correspondingly
decrease. Our substantial amount of debt, combined with variable interest rates, could limit our flexibility in
planning for, or reacting to, changes in our business and the markets in which we operate, including limiting
our future investments or our ability to enter into acquisitions and strategic partnerships, and obtain financing
for such transactions.
In addition, our indebtedness, combined with our other financial obligations and contractual commitments,
could have other important consequences. For example, they could:
•make us more vulnerable to adverse changes in general U.S. and non-U.S. economic, industry, and
competitive conditions and adverse changes in government regulation;
•limit our flexibility in planning for, or reacting to, changes in our business and our industry;
•place us at a disadvantage compared to our competitors that have less or fixed rate indebtedness;
•limit our ability to borrow additional amounts to fund acquisitions, for working capital, and for other
general corporate purposes; and
•make an acquisition of our company less attractive or more difficult.
Any of these factors could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. In
addition, if we incur additional indebtedness, the risks related to our business and our ability to service or repay
our indebtedness would increase.
A failure by us to comply with the covenants, including those tied, in part, to operational and performance-
based metrics, or payment obligations under the A&R Credit Agreement or our outstanding convertible
promissory notes, as applicable, whether as a result of financial constraints, operational challenges,
inexperience managing complex infrastructure and large-scale capital commitments, or otherwise, could result
in an event of default under these instruments. Upon an event of default under the A&R Credit Agreement, the
lenders would have the right to accelerate all amounts outstanding and exercise other remedies available to
them, including enforcing their rights against the collateral securing the A&R Credit Agreement. An event of
default under our outstanding convertible promissory notes would similarly give the noteholders the right to
declare all amounts outstanding under our outstanding convertible promissory notes immediately due and
payable. If the indebtedness under the A&R Credit Agreement and/or outstanding convertible promissory notes
were to be accelerated, we may not have sufficient cash or be able to borrow sufficient funds to refinance such
indebtedness or sell sufficient assets to repay such indebtedness, which could adversely affect our business,
cash flows, financial condition, and results of operations. Even if we were able to obtain new financing, it may
not be on commercially reasonable terms or on terms that are acceptable to us.
We may not have the ability to raise the funds necessary to repay the principal and accrued
interest of our outstanding convertible promissory notes or the A&R Credit Agreement in cash
when required by the terms of the notes or the A&R Credit Agreement, as applicable, or at
their maturity.
In connection with the completion of this offering, the Amazon Notes will convert into Class N common stock,
subject, in each case, to an ownership cap as set forth in the Amazon Notes, which may be waived at Amazon’s
election. In the event that any of the notes comprising the Amazon Notes cannot be fully converted without
exceeding the ownership cap applicable to such notes, the balance of any such notes will remain outstanding
and will automatically convert, subject to Amazon’s ownership cap, into shares of our Class N common stock at
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the applicable conversion price at the end of each fiscal quarter following the completion of this offering. To the
extent any of our convertible promissory notes remain outstanding, or if we issue any additional convertible
promissory notes following the completion of this offering, we will be required to repay such notes in cash at
their maturity, unless earlier converted or repaid pursuant to the terms of such note. In addition, we will be
required to repay in full all amounts outstanding under the A&R Credit Agreement upon its maturity. However,
we may not have enough available cash on hand or be able to obtain financing at the time we are required to
make any repayments on outstanding convertible promissory notes or under the A&R Credit Agreement.
Our failure to repay any outstanding convertible promissory notes or amounts outstanding under the A&R
Credit Agreement, as applicable, at a time when the repayment is required, or to pay cash upon any conversion
of outstanding convertible promissory notes, as applicable, as required pursuant to the terms of each note or
the applicable NPA, would constitute a default thereunder. A default under an outstanding convertible
promissory note and/or the applicable NPA as well as the A&R Credit Agreement could also lead to a default
under agreements governing our existing and future indebtedness. If the payment of the related indebtedness
were to be accelerated after any applicable notice or grace periods, we may not have sufficient funds to repay
such indebtedness and repay the amounts outstanding under the A&R Credit Agreement or outstanding
convertible promissory notes at the applicable maturity, or when repayment is otherwise required pursuant to
the terms of the note.
Our pricing structures for our models, platform, and applications change from time to time,
which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We have in the past changed, and we expect that in the future we may change, our pricing models, including as
a result of competition, macroeconomic conditions, compliance with increased regulatory hurdles, the
maturation of the market for AI models, platforms, and applications, or changes in how our models, platform,
and applications are broadly consumed. As a result, we may be required to reduce our prices, offer shorter
contract durations, or offer alternative pricing models, such as outcome- or task-based pricing, any of which
could adversely affect our business. In addition, our agentic offerings are structurally more compute-intensive
than our non-agentic offerings. If we are unable to implement pricing models that adequately reflect the higher
compute intensity of these agentic workloads, or if competitive dynamics constrain our ability to price these
products at levels sufficient to cover their costs, our compute efficiency could deteriorate as agentic usage
grows, which could adversely affect our ability to achieve or sustain profitability.
Additionally, as we continue to target selling our models, platform, and applications to our enterprise
customers, these customers may demand different pricing structures, price concessions, or additional
functionality at the same price levels. If we are unable to modify or develop effective pricing models and
strategies that are attractive to existing and prospective customers, our business, financial condition, and
results of operations may be adversely affected.
If we are unable to attract, retain, or motivate highly skilled personnel, we may not be able to
grow or operate effectively.
Our performance and ability to grow our business depend on the talents and efforts of highly skilled
individuals, and our future success depends on our continuing ability to identify, hire, develop, motivate, and
retain highly skilled personnel for all areas of our organization. Our business is particularly dependent on a
limited pool of researchers, engineers, and technical personnel with specialized experience in designing,
training, deploying, and operating frontier models and the underlying infrastructure that supports them. We
have from time to time experienced, and we expect to continue to experience, difficulty in hiring and retaining
highly skilled employees with appropriate qualifications at the pace that our operations require. Competition in
our industry relating to hiring and retaining employees with appropriate qualifications and on competitive
economic terms is exceptionally intense and has escalated significantly in recent periods, especially in the San
Francisco Bay Area, where our headquarters is located and where we have a substantial presence and need for
highly skilled personnel. A small number of well-capitalized AI labs, large technology companies, and new
market entrants compete aggressively for a relatively fixed supply of individuals with the requisite expertise.
Certain of our competitors have directly solicited, and continue to directly solicit, our employees. Our former
employees are also generally able to join or found competing companies immediately following their departure,
and, subject to their confidentiality and other legal obligations, use the general skills, know-how, and
experience they developed while employed by us. In addition, we have in the past, and may in the future, be
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subject to claims or disputes relating to the solicitation or hiring of employees, including allegations that such
hires violated non-compete, non-solicitation, intellectual property, confidentiality, or other employment-
related obligations.
As our company continues to grow and our industry evolves, the incentives to attract, retain, and motivate
employees provided by our cash and equity awards or by future arrangements may not be as effective as in the
past. Many of the companies with which we compete for highly qualified personnel have greater resources than
we have and may be willing to offer more attractive compensation packages. We may need to invest significant
amounts of cash and equity to attract and retain employees, resulting in substantial additional stock-based
compensation expense and dilution to the ownership of our existing stockholders, and we may never realize
returns on these investments that are commensurate with the level of our expenditures. If the perceived value
of our compensatory package declines or is subject to significant value fluctuations, it may adversely affect our
ability to attract and retain highly skilled employees. In addition, we have a number of current employees,
including our co-founders, who hold equity in our company or whose equity awards are or will become
substantially vested upon the completion of this offering. This may be particularly true for certain of our longer-
tenured and early employees, whose equity holdings may represent a significant portion of their personal
wealth. As a result, it may be difficult for us to continue to retain and motivate these employees, and the value
of their holdings could affect their decisions about whether or not they continue to work for us.
Historically, our ability to successfully attract, retain, and motivate our personnel has in large part been due to
our company culture and commitment to safety and responsible scaling and development. If we are unable to
maintain our culture, if we make decisions as a company that our employees do not believe align with our
values, or if events take place, regardless of fault, that call into question whether we have operated in
accordance with our values, our ability to attract, retain, and motivate our personnel may be adversely affected.
Rapid growth has also created workforce-planning and execution challenges, including limitations in our ability
to accurately forecast headcount needs, periods of accelerated hiring followed by corrective actions that may
disrupt operations or reduce morale, and increased reliance on managers operating at greater scale than in
their prior experience, which introduces additional operational, legal, reputational, and execution risk as the
organization continues to expand. If we move into new geographies, we will need to attract and recruit skilled
personnel in those geographic areas, but it may be challenging for us to compete with traditional local
employers in these regions for talent. If we fail to attract new personnel or fail to retain and motivate our
current personnel who are capable of meeting our growing technical, operational, and managerial
requirements, our business may be adversely affected.
In addition, heightened public attention on AI has increased physical and informational security risks, and we
have experienced threats to employee safety and attempts to obtain confidential information through physical
or digital means, which, despite the security measures we have implemented at certain facilities, may be
exacerbated by our global and flexible working arrangements and could adversely affect employee morale,
productivity, and our ability to attract, retain, and motivate highly skilled personnel. Addressing these risks also
requires us to attract and retain additional specialized security personnel, and difficulties in recruiting qualified
security engineers could further exacerbate these challenges.
Further, changes to immigration policies that restrain the flow of professional and technical talent, including
but not limited to U.S. immigration policies, may inhibit our ability to recruit and retain highly qualified
employees. If we are unable to effectively manage the foregoing risks, our prospects, business, financial
condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
We have a limited operating history in an evolving and nascent industry, which makes it
difficult to evaluate our future prospects and may increase the risk that we will not be
successful.
We were founded in 2021 and launched our first commercial product, Claude, publicly in the first quarter of
2023. Since then, our business has grown rapidly. We operate in an industry characterized by rapid and
unpredictable technological change, evolving safety and regulatory expectations, significant capital and
compute requirements, and uncertain commercial adoption patterns. Our limited operating history and our
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evolving and nascent business and industry make it difficult to evaluate our future prospects and the risks and
challenges we may encounter. These risks and challenges include our ability to:
•develop and release new models and products on a timely and cost-effective basis;
•accurately forecast our revenue, operating expenses, and compute requirements in an environment
characterized by rapid technological change and usage patterns that may scale in nonlinear or
exponential ways;
•secure access to sufficient compute to meet the needs of all our workloads and manage the risks related
to securing compute;
•effectively manage our growth, including our cash flows and capital needs;
•accurately predict customer demands, expectations, or requirements;
•maintain and enhance our brand and reputation;
•attract, retain, utilize, and motivate our highly skilled personnel;
•build and maintain our strategic partnerships;
•anticipate and respond to macroeconomic changes and changes in the industry and markets in which
we operate;
•anticipate and respond to evolving regulatory requirements and political dynamics;
•maintain our safety-focused approach while meeting market demands;
•successfully monetize our models, platform, and applications; and
•respond effectively to competitive threats.
If we fail to effectively address the risks and challenges we face, including those described elsewhere in this
“Risk Factors” section, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
We have encountered in the past, and will encounter in the future, risks and uncertainties frequently
experienced by growing companies with limited operating histories in rapidly changing industries. If our
assumptions regarding these risks and uncertainties, which we use to plan and operate our business, are
incorrect or change, or if we do not address these risks successfully, our results of operations could differ
materially from our expectations and our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
adversely affected. 
We are at an early stage of our revenue growth, we have experienced rapid growth in recent
periods, and our historical growth rates are not indicative of future performance or our
ability to sustain or forecast future revenue growth.
We have grown rapidly over the last several years, and therefore our recent revenue growth and financial
performance should not be considered indicative of our future performance. In 2023, 2024, and 2025, our
revenue was $41 million, $386 million, and $4.6 billion, respectively, representing year-over-year growth of
841% in 2024 and 1,088% in 2025. In the nine months ended September 30, 2026, our revenue was $33.2
billion, representing a year-over-year growth rate of 1,206%. We do not expect our revenue will continue to
grow at comparable rates, and we cannot assure you that it will continue to grow at all. Our recent growth may
reflect early-stage adoption dynamics, the nascency of the AI market, and rapid initial customer expansion that
may not be sustainable over time, and it may decline significantly and more rapidly than we anticipate, as our
revenue base increases, as the market matures, and as a result of the other factors described below. We expect
our revenue growth rate to decline over time. In addition, because the AI industry is very nascent, we have
struggled to accurately forecast our revenue in the past and may struggle to do so in the future.
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We may experience declines in our revenue growth rate as a result of a number of factors, including:
•the slowing or shifting demand for our models, platform, and applications or the market as a whole;
•our inability to secure sufficient compute and direct it efficiently across our organization;
•insufficient growth in the number of users and paying customers of our models, platform, and
applications or the failure to increase sales of our models, platform, and applications to existing
customers;
•failures, errors, or performance limitations in our models, including unexpected behavior, degraded
outputs, outages, or inability to meet customer expectations or use-case requirements;
•increasing competition among existing competitors and new market entrants;
•the safety and risk mitigation measures we implement in developing and releasing our models,
including any resulting delays in model development or release, or the adoption of laws, regulations, or
standards that affect how and when frontier AI models may be developed or released;
•our failure to continue to capitalize on growth opportunities;
•our ability to collect amounts owed to us from customers, including as a result of customer credit risk,
billing disputes, or delays in payment;
•our reliance on, and the terms of, relationships with key partners and distribution channels, and any
changes to, or termination of, such arrangements;
•new or more restrictive laws, regulations, or regulatory actions affecting AI development, deployment,
or use, including taxes, fees, or other measures specifically applicable to AI companies or AI-related
labor displacement; and
•reputational harm, adverse publicity, or heightened scrutiny that reduces customer adoption or
expansion.
We expect to continue to make investments in the development and expansion of our business, which may not
result in increased revenue or growth. If our revenue or revenue growth rate declines, or our revenue growth
rate declines with respect to certain markets or customer categories, our business, results of operations, and
investors’ perceptions of our business could be adversely affected, which could in turn negatively impact the
market price of our Class A common stock.
If we fail to manage our growth effectively, our brand, business, financial condition, and
results of operations could be adversely affected.
Since 2021, we have experienced rapid growth in our employee headcount, number of customers, geographic
reach, and our operations, and we expect this growth to continue. For example, the number of our employees
increased from approximately 940 as of December 31, 2024 to approximately 5,300 as of September 30, 2026,
and our revenue increased from $197 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024 to $17.0 billion for
the three months ended September 30, 2026. This growth has placed, and may continue to place, a significant
strain on our management and our operational and financial resources.
Our ability to successfully manage this growth depends on our ability to scale and integrate our operations,
workforce, technologies, models, platform, and applications, and any future acquisitions while preserving the
beneficial aspects of our company culture. Continued growth may strain our ability to develop and enhance our
operational, compliance, technical, financial, and management controls, improve our reporting systems and
procedures, recruit, train, and retain highly skilled personnel, and maintain customer satisfaction. If we are
unable to do so, our operations, compliance with applicable laws, development and deployment of our models,
platform, and applications, and customer experience could be adversely affected.
As we expand, we must also manage an increasing number of relationships with strategic partners, customers,
vendors, and other third parties that are critical to our business, including those that provide compute, data
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center infrastructure, networking, software tools, and other services necessary to develop, train, deploy, and
operate our models. If these relationships deteriorate, or if our third-party providers are unable to scale their
services in line with our growth, we may experience delays, service disruptions, reduced sales to new customers,
or the loss of existing customers, which could adversely affect our revenue growth and reputation. In addition,
our ability to manage our growth depends in part on our ability to accurately plan for and efficiently manage the
compute required to develop, train, deploy, and operate our models. Any material underinvestment or
overinvestment in such resources could result in service limitations, increased costs, operational inefficiencies,
or delays in model development, any of which could adversely affect our business.
If we fail to effectively manage the growth of our business and operations, we may be unable to maintain
effective internal controls, reporting systems, and compliance processes, may face increased regulatory
scrutiny, and may suffer harm to our brand and our ability to attract and retain customers. As a result, our
business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
We have a history of net losses and may not generate sufficient revenue to achieve or sustain
profitability in the future.
We have incurred net losses in each year since our founding, including net losses of $1.5 billion, $8.3 billion,
and $42.0 billion for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively, and $104.0 billion for
the nine months ended September 30, 2026, and we may not achieve or sustain profitability in the future.
These net losses included changes in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs of $1.0
billion, $5.4 billion, and $34.3 billion for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively,
and $94.3 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2026, primarily driven by an increase in the fair
value of our outstanding convertible promissory notes resulting from an increase in our enterprise valuation
during each of the respective periods. While we have experienced significant revenue growth in recent periods,
our business is highly capital intensive, and our ability to remain at the frontier of AI capabilities and secure
sufficient compute depends in meaningful part on our ability to generate and sustain substantial revenue and
improve our operating efficiencies. Further, our revenue growth may not be sustainable, and our rate of growth
may decrease. We expect our costs will increase over time and our losses will continue as we expect to invest
significant resources towards growing our business and operating as a public company.
We have expended and expect to continue to expend substantial financial and other resources related to the
growth of our business, including:
•investments to enhance our access and ability to secure compute;
•continued investments in research and development to remain at the frontier of AI model development
and introduce new features and enhancements to our models, platform, and applications;
•expansion of our sales and marketing activities;
•hiring additional employees;
•expansion of our operations across our multiple geographies;
•investments in our expanding general and administrative organization;
•costs associated with complying with existing and evolving laws, regulations, and industry standards
applicable to AI, data protection, privacy, and security, among other things;
•investments in AI safety, risk management, monitoring, evaluation, and mitigation efforts;
•additional expenses associated with operating as a public company; and
•costs related to legal proceedings.
For example, as of and subsequent to September 30, 2026, we have entered into purchase commitments and
lease agreements, including short-term commitments, as well as leases not yet commenced, with an aggregate
committed spend of approximately $895.4 billion, which may substantially increase our operating expenses
and cash requirements. These expenditures and investments may be more costly than we expect and may not
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result in increased revenue or growth in our business. If we are unable to successfully address these risks and
challenges as we encounter them, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely
affected.
In addition, we have granted RSUs to our employees and other service providers, which vest upon the
satisfaction of both a service-based condition and a performance-based condition. The service-based condition
for a majority of such RSUs is satisfied over a period of four years. The performance-based condition of such
RSUs will be satisfied upon the effectiveness of the registration statement of which this prospectus forms a part.
We account for award forfeitures as they occur. As of September 30, 2026, no stock-based compensation
expense had been recognized for such RSUs because a qualifying event as described above was not probable. In
the quarter in which this offering is completed, we will begin recording stock-based compensation expense
based on the grant-date fair value of the RSUs using the accelerated attribution method. If this offering had
been completed on September 30, 2026, we would have recorded $8.2 billion of cumulative stock-based
compensation expense related to the RSUs on that date, and an additional $24.1 billion of unrecognized stock-
based compensation expense related to the RSUs, would be recognized over a weighted-average period of
approximately 2.0 years. In addition to stock-based compensation expense associated with the RSUs, as of
September 30, 2026, we had unrecognized stock-based compensation expense of approximately $2.1 billion
related to other outstanding equity awards, which we expect to recognize over a weighted-average period of
approximately 1.4 years. Subsequent to September 30, 2026, our board of directors approved the grant of
          RSUs, which grants will become effective as of the day prior to the effectiveness of the registration
statement of which this prospectus forms a part. The grant-date fair value of each RSU subject to these awards
will be equal to the price per share of the shares sold in this offering. These RSUs will vest upon the satisfaction
of a service-based condition only, generally over four years. Assuming a grant-date fair value of $           per
share, which is the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus,
we would expect to record stock-based compensation expense of approximately $           billion related to such
RSUs, over a weighted-average period of approximately            years, commencing in the quarter in which this
offering is completed. Following the completion of this offering, the stock-based compensation expense related
to RSUs and other outstanding equity awards will result in increases in our expenses in future periods, in
particular, in the quarter in which this offering is completed.
If we fail to generate adequate revenue to offset increases in our operating expenses, improve our operating
efficiencies, or otherwise manage our costs as we invest in our business, we may continue to incur significant
losses in the future and may not be able to achieve or sustain profitability.
Our results of operations may fluctuate significantly on a period-to-period basis, including as
a result of strategic investment decisions and substantial compute-related expenditures,
which could cause the market price of our Class A common stock to decline.
Our results of operations have historically varied from period to period, and we expect that our results of
operations will continue to vary significantly from quarter to quarter and from year to year in the future, such
that the results of any one period should not be relied upon as an indication of future performance. In
particular, our financial performance may be significantly influenced by strategic decisions we make regarding
the allocation of resources and the amount and timing of operating expenses and capital expenditures that we
may incur to maintain and expand our business and operations and to remain competitive. We may make
significant and, at times, discrete investments in areas such as research and development, compute and related
infrastructure, product development, safety and security initiatives, and go-to-market expansion, which may be
uneven in size and timing. These investments may materially increase our expenses in a given period and cause
our results of operations to fluctuate significantly or vary meaningfully from period to period, and may result in
periods of reduced margins or increased losses even if our underlying business trends remain unchanged or
continue to improve. As a result, our financial performance may not follow any consistent pattern, and prior or
interim periods of improved results of operations should not be viewed as indicative of our future performance.
Our revenue in any period has also included, and we expect will continue to include, amounts from customers
that we subsequently determine are using our models, platform, and applications in violation of our usage
policy or commercial terms, and whose revenue would not be expected to recur following restriction or
termination of their access. We believe this dynamic is common in our industry. Detection, investigation, and
enforcement take time, and we cannot assure you that we will identify such usage, or restrict or terminate a
customer’s access, on a timely basis or at all. Customers may evade our controls, and customers whose access is
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restricted or terminated may re-register under new accounts. As a result, revenue from such customers may
continue or recur notwithstanding our enforcement efforts. Our continued detection and enforcement efforts,
and in particular, the enhancement of such efforts in August and September 2026, and the timing of any
resulting restrictions or terminations, are expected to reduce the percentage of revenue from customers using
our models, platform, and applications in violation of our usage policy or commercial terms, and may reduce
our overall revenue and growth rates in future periods and contribute to variability in our results from period to
period.
Our results of operations are also affected by seasonal variations in the usage of our models, platform, and
applications. Because our revenue is primarily consumption-based, we have experienced, and expect to
continue to experience, lower usage around holiday and vacation periods in the summer and winter, when
certain customer workflows slow down and overall customer activity declines. Our results of operations may
also vary with the timing and cadence of our model and product releases, which are uneven from period to
period and may cause usage, and therefore revenue, to increase or decline between periods. Our historical
growth rates may have masked the impact of seasonal trends on our results. As our growth rate declines over
time, we expect seasonal effects to become more apparent in, and to have a greater effect on, our period-to-
period results. In addition, other seasonal trends may develop, and the seasonal trends that we currently
experience may become more pronounced, as we continue to scale.
Our results of operations may also fluctuate due to a variety of additional factors, many of which are outside of
our control and difficult to predict, including, but not limited to:
•the level of demand for our models, platform, and applications, and our ability to forecast such
demand;
•our ability to forecast required compute and to obtain additional compute as needed, and any increase
in costs thereof;
•our ability to expand usage within organizations;
•our ability to attract and retain customers and increase sales of our models, platform, and applications
to existing customers;
•our ability to effectively manage our relationships with our third-party service providers and our
reliance on such providers for critical infrastructure and services;
•the timing and success of new features, integrations, capabilities, and enhancements by us to our
models, platform, and applications, or by our competitors to their products;
•the safety and risk mitigation measures we implement in developing and releasing our models,
including any resulting delays in model development or release, or the adoption of laws, regulations, or
standards that affect how and when frontier AI models may be developed or released;
•our ability to achieve widespread acceptance and use of our models, platform, and applications;
•changes in the competitive landscape and introduction of competitive companies, models, platforms,
and applications;
•security breaches, technical difficulties, or interruptions to our models, platform, or applications;
•real or perceived improper or unauthorized use of, disclosure of, or access to confidential, proprietary,
personal, or sensitive data;
•pricing pressure as a result of competition or otherwise;
•adverse litigation judgments, other dispute-related settlement payments, or other litigation-related
costs;
•the number of employees hired;
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•the timing of the grant or vesting of equity awards to employees, directors, or consultants;
•the vesting and settlement of equity awards, including any cash used to remit taxes on behalf of
employees in connection with the settlement of RSUs and the recognition of stock-based compensation
expense;
•our ability to maintain, protect, and enhance our brand;
•declines in the values of foreign currencies relative to the U.S. dollar;
•changes in, and continuing uncertainty in relation to, the legislative or regulatory environment with
respect to our industry;
•enforcement by government regulators, including investigations, proceedings, fines, orders,
designations, or consent decrees;
•increased legal and regulatory compliance costs in new and existing markets;
•costs and timing of expenses related to the potential acquisition of businesses, talent, technologies, or
intellectual property, including potentially significant amortization costs and possible write-downs;
•catastrophic events, and resulting interruptions in the availability of our models, platform, and
applications; and
•general economic conditions in either U.S. or non-U.S. markets, including geopolitical uncertainty and
instability and their effects on software spending.
Any one or more of the factors above, or other factors in this “Risk Factors” section, may result in significant
fluctuations in our results of operations or other key metrics, which may cause such results to fall below our
financial guidance or other projections or the expectations of analysts or investors, and cause the market price
of our Class A common stock to decline.
Certain of our operating metrics are subject to assumptions and limitations. As a result, these
metrics may not provide an accurate indication of our actual performance or future results.
Certain of our operating metrics, such as Run-Rate Revenue, Net Revenue Retention, customer counts, and
Claude’s success rate, are based on numerous assumptions and limitations, are calculated using data from
internal systems and tools, have not been independently verified by third parties, are subject to inherent
limitations in measurement, and may not accurately reflect actual results or provide an accurate indication of
future or expected results.
Run-Rate Revenue is not a substitute for revenue prepared in accordance with GAAP or a forecast of revenue.
Because Run-Rate Revenue annualizes our consumption-based fees for a trailing 28-day period and our
subscription-based fees for a single month, it assumes that activity during those measurement periods has
continued at the same rate for a full year. Because it annualizes a short measurement period, Run-Rate Revenue
measured during a period of seasonally higher or lower usage, such as the reduced usage we have typically
experienced around holiday and vacation periods in the summer and winter, may differ significantly from Run-
Rate Revenue measured at other times, and in each case may not correspond to the revenue we ultimately
recognize over any quarter or fiscal year. Our actual historical revenue and future revenue may differ materially
from this measure. Both our consumption-based and subscription-based revenue may fluctuate from period to
period, and in particular, our consumption-based revenue may fluctuate significantly or decline if customers
reduce, limit, or do not expand their usage or spend, or shift usage to lower-priced models, including in
response to competitive offerings, pricing changes, changes in customer budgets or strategic priorities
regarding AI investment, seasonality, or general economic conditions. In addition, sustaining and growing this
revenue depends on our ability to continue to offer models at the frontier of AI capability, which we may not be
able to do. Our ability or decision to remain at the frontier may also be affected by the safety and risk mitigation
measures we implement in developing and releasing our models. Our recent Run-Rate Revenue growth has also
been driven in part by rapid initial customer adoption and expansion often characteristic of an early-adoption
period and the nascency of the AI market that may not be sustainable, and we expect our Run-Rate Revenue
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growth rate to decline over time, and it may decline significantly and more rapidly than we anticipate, as our
revenue base increases, as the market matures, and as a result of other factors. In addition, our Run-Rate
Revenue has included, and we expect will continue to include, amounts from customers that we subsequently
determine are using our models, platform, and applications in violation of our usage policy or commercial
terms. When we identify such usage, we seek to restrict or terminate the customer’s access; however, because
our detection, investigation, and enforcement take time, our Run-Rate Revenue as of any measurement date
includes amounts from customers that have not yet been restricted or terminated and whose revenue would not
be expected to recur following restriction or termination of their access. Our continued enforcement efforts may
reduce our revenue, Run-Rate Revenue, and growth rates in future periods. See “—Our results of operations
may fluctuate significantly on a period-to-period basis, including as a result of strategic investment decisions
and substantial compute-related expenditures, which could cause the market price of our Class A common
stock to decline.” Accordingly, our Run-Rate Revenue as of any measurement date is not indicative of historical
revenue and may not be indicative of our revenue for any future period.
The determination of the number of customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis is based on
our internal records and involves judgment, including in determining which accounts should be aggregated and
treated as belonging to the same organization. We apply our most current customer records in calculating this
metric, and our determination of which accounts belong to a single organization may change over time,
including as a result of acquisitions and account consolidations. We do not separately define or internally track
a category of “enterprise” customers, and our customers are not segmented or measured internally by reference
to whether a given customer is an “enterprise.” Because spending $100,000 or more on our products is
generally characteristic of organizational rather than individual usage, we use the number of and revenue from
customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis as our measure of enterprise adoption and
engagement with Claude throughout this prospectus, including in references to “enterprise customers” and
“enterprise adoption.” As a result, this measure may not precisely correspond to the population of organizations
that would otherwise be characterized as enterprises, and may over- or understate that population.
Certain success rates and similar AI performance metrics with respect to Claude referenced in this prospectus
are measured using internal benchmarks developed and maintained by us. These benchmarks reflect our
proprietary testing methodology and are based on tasks, datasets, and evaluation criteria selected by us.
Performance results derived from these internal benchmarks may not be replicable by customers, researchers,
or other third parties who evaluate our models using different tasks, datasets, evaluation criteria, or computing
environments. Accordingly, such metrics may differ materially from performance outcomes experienced by any
particular customer or user in their specific deployment environment or use case, and should not be relied upon
as indicative of the results any customer or user will achieve. Because AI performance benchmarking
methodologies vary significantly across developers, such performance metrics as we measure them may also not
be comparable to similarly titled or analogous metrics reported by other AI developers, and direct comparison
of such metrics across companies may be misleading.
Investors should consider these metrics in light of the assumptions and processes used in calculating such
metrics and the limitations as a result thereof. In addition, our internal systems and tools have a number of
limitations, which could result in unexpected changes to our metrics, including the metrics we publicly disclose.
Further, certain of our operating metrics are based in part on data reported to us by our third-party partners. If
the internal systems and tools we use to track these metrics or the data reported to us by our third-party
partners undercount or overcount performance, or contain algorithmic or other technical errors, the data we
report may not be accurate. While our operating metrics are based on what we believe to be reasonable
estimates for the applicable period of measurement, there are inherent challenges in these measurements. We
may also refine or change our methodology for tracking certain operating metrics from time to time, to the
extent practicable, including to improve overall accuracy and alignment with management’s view of business
and operating performance and as a result of acquisitions. Any of these updates may result in changes in certain
business and operating trends and may impact comparability of these metrics across periods. Investors should
not place undue reliance on these metrics as an indicator of our future or expected results. Moreover, these
metrics may differ from similarly titled metrics presented by other companies and may not be comparable to
such other metrics. See the sections titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations” and “Business” for more information regarding our operating metrics.
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Our business is subject to an evolving and uncertain regulatory and political environment,
which could increase our costs, restrict our operations, or adversely affect demand for our
models, platform, and applications.
The development, deployment, and use of AI technologies are subject to rapidly evolving and increasingly
complex laws, regulations, and governmental scrutiny across multiple jurisdictions. Governments and
regulatory authorities in the United States and in other countries in which we operate or distribute our models,
platform, and applications have proposed, enacted, or are considering legislation, regulations, and guidance
relating to AI model development and deployment, data usage and privacy, transparency, safety, consumer
protection, content generation, intellectual property, cybersecurity, export controls, and competition. For
example, the EU AI Regulation 2024/1689 (“EU AI Act”), which came into force in August 2024 and will
become fully applicable following a transitional period, imposes a range of obligations on AI systems and
general-purpose AI models placed on the market or put into service in the EU, including transparency, risk
management, and governance requirements, and provides for significant penalties for non-compliance. In the
United States, the regulatory framework for AI remains fragmented and uncertain, with evolving federal policy
initiatives, continued debate regarding the scope and durability of executive actions, and a growing number of
state-level laws and proposals addressing the development and use of AI. For example, several U.S. states,
including New York and California, have passed AI safety laws. More generally, proposed legislation in the
United States contemplates more expansive governmental oversight of AI, including potential nationalization,
mandatory shutdown or discontinuation requirements for frontier AI systems, or other strategic measures to
prevent or manage the development of artificial superintelligence. Further, in June 2026, the U.S. federal
government issued an executive order establishing a voluntary framework for developers of frontier AI models
to engage with the government prior to the deployment of such AI technologies, directing federal agencies to
strengthen cyber defenses, and prioritizing enforcement against criminal misuse of AI; although that
framework is voluntary and does not establish a mandatory governmental licensing, preclearance, or permitting
requirement for the development or deployment of AI models, it reflects increasing federal attention to the
national security implications of frontier AI and the order may be followed by further executive or legislative
action. If executive or legislative action of this nature were enacted to regulate AI technologies, it could
constrain how we operate our business.
We have also advocated, and expect to continue to advocate, for regulation and oversight of frontier AI,
including industry-wide standards primarily relevant to the use of AI to accelerate AI development, so that AI
capabilities do not advance faster than the safety, alignment, and security practices needed to support them,
and we have proposed working with the U.S. government and other frontier AI developers to establish safety
standards. Regulatory or other measures of the kind we advocate, if adopted, would apply to us and could
increase our compliance burdens, limit our product development or deployment flexibility, affect how and
when we develop or release new models, or otherwise slow our growth. The effect that any such measures would
have on the rate at which AI capabilities advance, and on our business, is uncertain and would depend on the
specific requirements adopted and on the extent to which safety, alignment, and security practices advance
together with model capabilities. There is no assurance that policymakers will adopt the approaches we
support, and our advocacy has in the past drawn, and may continue to draw, criticism, heightened scrutiny, or
other challenges.
Regulatory approaches to AI also vary significantly by geography and may be influenced by local political,
economic, social, or environmental considerations. In some jurisdictions, public concern regarding the
potential displacement of labor by AI systems, the perceived societal impacts of automation, or the
environmental footprint associated with AI development and deployment, has led, or could lead, to restrictive
legislation or other governmental actions. In particular, to the extent the rate of job displacement rapidly
increases due to the adoption of AI or for related reasons, whether actual or perceived, governments or other
regulatory authorities may intervene to slow the rate of adoption of AI, restrict its use, or take other actions that
increase the cost of developing, deploying, or commercializing AI systems. Even in the absence of any legal or
regulatory requirements, we may from time to time voluntarily elect to take actions intended to ameliorate the
impact of such displacement. Any such actions would represent additional costs and expenditures for which we
may not receive a corresponding commercial benefit, and there can be no assurance that any such actions
would be effective in reducing displacement-related harms or in mitigating the associated reputational,
regulatory, or political risks.
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Increasingly restrictive AI regulation in the United States and other Western jurisdictions could enable
competitors operating in less regulated environments to innovate, scale, and deploy AI technologies more
rapidly, potentially allowing such competitors to become more advanced and pose greater competitive or
strategic threats over time. In particular, increasing strategic competition between the United States and China
in AI development may lead to divergent regulatory approaches, with the potential for the United States to
impose restrictions on AI companies’ interactions with Chinese entities or markets, and for China to impose
reciprocal measures that limit access to or demand for U.S.-origin AI models, platforms, and applications.
As a result of these and other regulatory developments, our business could be subject to a wide range of
regulatory limitations, obligations, or restrictions, including, among other things:
•limitations, conditions, or prohibitions on certain AI use cases, applications, or deployment contexts;
•requirements to modify, restrict, delay, or withdraw specific models, features, or functionalities in
particular markets or for specific customers; for example, in early 2026, the U.S. Department of War
suggested it could invoke the Defense Production Act to compel us to remove the limitations we have
placed on the use of our models for autonomous weapons and mass surveillance;
•heightened transparency, documentation, auditing, governance, or human-oversight obligations;
•restrictions on the collection, use, transfer, localization, or retention of data used to train or operate AI
systems, based on intellectual property, privacy, or other frameworks;
•mandated safety, risk-management, or evaluation frameworks, certifications, or approvals, including
requirements for independent, third-party review or approval prior to model development, training, or
release; for example, in September 2026, a state attorney general asked a court, in pending litigation
alleging harm to minors, to enjoin an AI company from developing new AI models without
independent, third-party guardrails and approval;
•restrictions on data center development or expansion, including permitting, zoning, or limits on energy
or water usage;
•heightened energy efficiency, sustainability, or environmental compliance requirements;
•limitations on cross-border deployment, access, or commercialization of AI models, including through
export controls, national security determinations, or other governmental measures that could restrict
our ability to sell our models, platform, and applications in certain markets or to certain customers; for
example, in June 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed worldwide export restrictions on
our Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models, which were subsequently lifted after we updated our safeguards, and
other models may be subject to these or similar export restrictions in the future; for more information,
see the section titled “—Governmental trade controls, including export and import controls, sanctions,
customs requirements, and related regimes, could subject us to liability or loss of contracting privileges
or limit our ability to compete in certain markets”;
•AI-specific taxes, fees, reporting obligations, or other financial burdens; or
•outright bans or moratoriums on activities material to our business or the businesses of our customers
and partners.
Because AI regulation is developing rapidly and in a fragmented manner, including as a result of political
considerations, public sentiment, and geopolitical dynamics, we will not be able to fully anticipate how existing
laws will be interpreted or enforced, how new legal frameworks will evolve, or whether regulatory regimes
across jurisdictions will converge or diverge over time. Compliance with new or changing requirements may
require substantial investment in research and development, compliance systems, operational processes, or
localized offerings, and we may need to adjust or limit our activities in certain jurisdictions to address
conflicting or inconsistent legal obligations. In addition, regulatory actions affecting our customers or partners,
including restrictions on their ability to develop, deploy, or commercialize AI-enabled models, platforms, or
applications, could indirectly reduce demand for our models, platform, and applications. Any failure, or
perceived failure, to comply with applicable laws and regulations, or any significant increase in the cost or
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complexity of compliance, could result in litigation, enforcement actions, penalties, reputational harm, delayed
or reduced adoption of our offerings, or other adverse effects on our business, financial condition, and results of
operations.
Additionally, as AI systems become more sophisticated, emerging debates regarding whether AI systems
possess or could develop forms of sentience or moral status may lead to regulatory requirements, public
pressure, or advocacy efforts that could constrain how we develop, train, deploy, or modify our models, increase
our costs, or affect our reputation, regardless of the ultimate resolution of these philosophical and scientific
questions. In addition, given our focus on developing frontier AI, and the way we approach model sentience and
moral status, we may face heightened scrutiny or pressure in connection with these debates and could elect to
adopt policies, safeguards, or limitations regarding model development, deployment, or modification that go
beyond existing legal requirements, which could constrain our operations, increase costs, or limit the
commercial potential of our models, platform, and applications. If we are unable to manage the foregoing risks,
our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
Our sales to government entities and highly regulated organizations are subject to challenges
and risks.
Our customers include U.S. and non-U.S. government agencies. Revenue from government agency contracts
represented, in aggregate, less than 2% of our revenue in each of the periods presented in this prospectus;
however, the risks described below, including the governmental actions described in this risk factor, are not
limited to revenue generated directly from government agencies and could affect our relationships with
commercial customers and partners. Sales to government agencies involve additional risks, including, but not
limited to:
•changes in government fiscal or procurement policies, or decreases in government funding available
for procurement of goods and services generally, or for our federal government contracts specifically;
•changes in government programs or applicable requirements;
•our ability to agree on commercial terms with government entities, including with respect to the
permitted use of our models, platform, and applications;
•restrictions in the grant of personnel security clearances to our employees;
•our ability to maintain facility clearances required to perform on classified contracts for U.S.
government and non-U.S. government agencies, as applicable;
•changes in the political environment, including before or after a change to the leadership within the
government administration, and any resulting uncertainty or changes in policy or priorities and
resultant funding;
•changes in the government’s attitude towards us as a company or our technology;
•appeals, disputes, or litigation relating to government procurement, including but not limited to bid
protests by unsuccessful bidders on potential or actual awards of contracts to us or our partners by the
government;
•the adoption of new laws or regulations or changes to existing laws or regulations;
•budgetary constraints, reductions in government spending, operating under continuing resolutions,
disruptions from government shutdowns, or similar measures and constraints imposed by any lapses
in appropriations for the federal government or certain of its departments and agencies;
•influence by, or competition from, third parties with respect to pending, new, or existing contracts with
government customers;
•changes in legal obligations or political or social attitudes with respect to security or privacy issues;
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•potential delays or changes in the government appropriations or procurement processes, including as a
result of events such as war, incidents of terrorism, natural disasters, and public health concerns; and
•increased or unexpected costs or unanticipated delays caused by other factors outside of our control.
Any such event or activity, among others, could cause governments and government agencies to delay, pause, or
cancel contracts or seek to modify their contracts, or refrain from entering into contracts with us or purchasing
our models, platform, and applications in the future, undermine our ability to pursue future contracts, damage
our relationships with partners and customers who also sell models, platforms, or applications to governments,
or reduce the size or timing of payment with respect to our services to or purchases from existing or new
government customers. Any of the foregoing could have an adverse effect on our prospects, business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
For example, in February 2026, in response to our publicly stated position that our technology should not be
used for mass domestic surveillance or fully autonomous weapons, the President of the United States stated
that he had directed that all federal executive agencies cease using our technology. At the same time, the
Secretary of War directed the Department of War to designate us as a “supply-chain risk to national security”
and stated that “effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United
States military may conduct any commercial activity” with us. On March 4, 2026, the Department of War sent
us two letters—one pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and the other pursuant to Section 4713 of the Federal
Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (“FASCSA”)—asserting that our models, platform, and applications
present a supply-chain risk. These actions referenced above are defined herein as “Challenged Actions.” We
vigorously challenged these Challenged Actions in Anthropic PBC v. Department of War, et al. (N.D. Cal.) and
Anthropic PBC v. Department of War, et al. (D.C. Cir.). After first obtaining an order from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California that preliminarily enjoined the Department of War’s
directive and Section 3252 supply-chain risk designation of us and preliminarily enjoined the other defendant
agencies from implementing the Presidential directive until final resolution of the lawsuit, we subsequently, on
August 27, 2026, obtained an order from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
that largely granted summary judgment in our favor. The court ruled that the Challenged Actions were
retaliatory acts meant to punish us for speech protected under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and violated our rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The court also held that the Secretary of War’s actions, particularly with respect to 10 U.S.C. §
3252, violated the Administrative Procedure Act because they were in excess of statutory authority, contrary to
law, and arbitrary and capricious. The court entered final judgment largely in our favor. The defendants filed a
notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, denied our motion to
stay the Secretary of War’s Section 4713 designation of us as a supply-chain risk pending review on the merits.
On September 25, 2026, in a 2-1 split decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied our petition for review,
ruling that the Department of War’s Section 4713 supply-chain risk designation was proper, and that our rights
under the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment were not violated. We filed a
petition for rehearing en banc asking the full D.C. Circuit to review the panel’s decision. We cannot predict the
ultimate outcome of these lawsuits. While we continue to work with government agencies, we cannot be certain
that the resolution of these lawsuits will not adversely affect our ability to sell to government agencies and other
customers that sell products and services to the U.S. government, and in turn adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
Further, in June 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed worldwide export restrictions on our Fable
5 and Mythos 5 models, which we disabled for all customers until those restrictions were lifted, as described in
the section titled “—Governmental trade controls, including export and import controls, sanctions, customs
requirements, and related regimes, could subject us to liability or loss of contracting privileges or limit our
ability to compete in certain markets.” Similar restrictions could be imposed again in the future.
Each of the foregoing may result in significant reputational harm, including adverse media coverage, public
scrutiny, and negative perceptions among existing and prospective customers, partners, employees, and
investors, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the litigation. Such perceptions may lead customers, including
commercial enterprises and international customers, to delay or forgo purchasing our models, platform, and
applications, or to impose additional diligence, contractual restrictions, or termination rights in connection
with engagements with us. Further, these developments may create uncertainty in the broader market
regarding our long-term ability to operate in certain sectors, which could result in increased volatility in
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demand for our models, platform, and applications, reduced willingness of counterparties to enter into long-
term or strategic arrangements with us, and fluctuations in investor sentiment, any of which could adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
The bidding process for government contracts can be highly competitive, expensive, and time-consuming, often
requiring significant upfront time and expense without any assurance that these efforts will generate revenue.
Government agencies often undertake a significant evaluation process that results in a lengthy sales cycle. Some
contracts with government agencies are structured in phases or include options, where each phase is subject to
satisfaction of certain conditions and where the exercise of options is discretionary. As a result, the actual scope
of work performed pursuant to any such contracts, in addition to related contract revenue, could be less than
total contract value. In addition, product purchases by such organizations are frequently subject to budget
constraints, multiple approvals, and unanticipated administrative, processing, and other delays. All of these
factors can add further risk to business conducted with these customers and could lead to lower revenue results
than originally anticipated.
We also must comply with both local and international laws and regulations relating to the formation,
administration, and performance of contracts. Contracts with government agencies are subject to extensive,
evolving, and sometimes complex regulations which provide public sector customers rights, many of which are
not typically found in commercial contracts. For example, government contracts generally include the ability of
government agencies to terminate for convenience, which, if exercised, would result in a lower contract value
and lower-than-anticipated revenue generated by such arrangement. Any changes to the government
regulations applicable to government contracts could affect our ability to enter into, or the profitability of,
contracts with government entities.
Our subsidiary, Anthropic Public Institutions, LLC, is required to maintain a facility security clearance to
perform on classified contracts for the U.S. federal government and must comply with National Industrial
Security Program requirements. Failure to comply with these requirements may result in Anthropic Public
Institutions, LLC’s facility clearance being revoked. To the extent Anthropic Public Institutions, LLC, is not able
to maintain its facility security clearance, we may not be able to bid on or win new classified contracts, and
existing contracts requiring a facility security clearance could be terminated, either of which could have an
adverse impact on our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Contracts with government agencies are also subject to audits and reviews of contractors’ administrative
processes and other contract-related compliance obligations. Breaches of government contracts, failure to
comply with applicable regulations, failure to obtain and maintain required facility and/or security clearances,
or unfavorable findings from government audits or reviews could result in contract terminations, reputational
harm, or other adverse consequences, including ineligibility to sell to government agencies in the future,
government refusal to continue buying our subscriptions, or fines or civil or criminal liability, which could
adversely affect our results of operations.
Our reliance on a limited number of CSPs and suppliers, some of which have strategic and
investment relationships with us and are our customers, creates complex dynamics that could
give rise to conflicts of interest and adversely affect our access to compute.
We rely on a limited number of CSPs—Amazon.com, Inc. (together with its affiliates, “Amazon”), Google, and
Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”)—and suppliers, such as Broadcom, for compute and critical components of
our compute infrastructure. These relationships are governed by contractual arrangements that, while
providing us with significant committed compute, also create dependencies and potential vulnerabilities. These
CSPs may experience service outages, security incidents, or capacity constraints that affect our operations. The
terms of our arrangements, including pricing, compute commitments, and service levels, are subject to
negotiation upon renewal, and we may be unable to secure renewals on terms as favorable as our current
arrangements. Migrating workloads to alternative providers would be costly, time-consuming, and
operationally complex, and may not be feasible within timeframes that would avoid material disruption to our
model development roadmap or our ability to serve customers. The engineering investment required to
maintain the performance of our unified compute platform across new hardware environments means that any
such migration could degrade our compute efficiency, increasing the compute and infrastructure costs required
to support a given level of business activity during and following any such migration period.
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Our relationships with these CSPs are multifaceted and complex. Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, through their
respective affiliates, have made significant equity investments in our company. At the same time, they may have
made, and may in the future make, equity investments in, provide financing to, or otherwise support companies
whose models, platforms, or applications compete with ours. These CSPs are also our customers, purchasing
our intelligence service for internal use or for their own products and services. Their purchasing decisions may
be influenced by their own competing offerings, which could affect their demand for our intelligence service.
Additionally, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are among the largest technology companies in the world, each
with substantial AI research and development programs, AI-powered models, platforms, and applications that
compete with ours, and strategic interests that may not be fully aligned with our own. Amazon, Google, and
Microsoft each offer AI services and develop and deploy competing AI models through their respective cloud
platforms. We make certain of our models available through these cloud platforms, and our distribution
relationships with Amazon, Google, and Microsoft generate revenue for us, but they also create dependencies,
give them visibility into our pricing and commercial terms across the platforms they operate, and may influence
their incentives regarding pricing, compute allocation, service quality, sales prioritization, and compensation
structures. To the extent these CSPs promote, integrate, prioritize, or provide customer access to our models,
platform, and applications on terms that are less favorable than those applicable to their own competing
offerings or to the offerings of other companies, including with respect to pricing, commercial terms, product
placement, integration, or access to compute or sales incentives, our competitive position, customer adoption,
and business results could be adversely affected.
Our relationships with our strategic partners—whether with these CSPs, which simultaneously serve as our
investors, customers, distribution partners, and competitors, or with Broadcom, which simultaneously serves as
a supplier and lessor—create potential conflicts of interest that are difficult to fully anticipate or mitigate. These
CSPs may prioritize their own compute needs or those of their other customers, including competitors in which
they have invested, may gain insight into our operations and compute requirements through their roles as
providers that could inform their competitive strategies, or may make business decisions regarding their
platforms that disadvantage our models, platform, and applications relative to their own offerings or the
offerings of other companies they support. Similarly, Broadcom may prioritize the supply of AI accelerators and
infrastructure capacity to other customers, alter the terms of our equipment lease or the operation of our
dedicated facilities, or make decisions regarding the availability or pricing of hardware that adversely affect our
access to the compute infrastructure it provides. Any deterioration in these relationships, or any decision by
Amazon, Google, Microsoft, or Broadcom to reduce their support for our models, platform, and applications or
limit our access to compute, could adversely affect our business. In addition, such relationships, including any
exclusive or preferential arrangements, investment ties, bundling of services, or cooperative initiatives, have
attracted and may in the future attract antitrust or competition law scrutiny from regulators and private
plaintiffs in the United States or non-U.S. jurisdictions, and any resulting investigations, enforcement actions,
or required modifications to our business arrangements could be costly, distracting, and harmful to our
business.
If we are unable to manage the foregoing risks, our business, financial condition, and results of operations
could be adversely affected.
We are pursuing initiatives to develop our own data center infrastructure, which involves
significant capital commitments, operational complexities, and execution risks that could
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
To help reduce our dependence on CSPs, address constraints on available compute, and secure access to
compute at the scale necessary for frontier model development, we are pursuing initiatives to develop our own
dedicated on-premise data center infrastructure. These efforts include long-term leases and partnerships with
third-party partners to procure the underlying real estate, power, and data center facilities while we lease
capacity in those facilities and contract with specialized third-party operators for ongoing facility management.
We also procure certain compute and infrastructure equipment directly and operate it in dedicated data center
facilities leased and operated on our behalf, to our specification. For example, under the 2026 Lease
Arrangement, the rent payments over the five-year equipment lease are equal to an aggregate of approximately
$125.2 billion excluding interest, with rent payable in quarterly installments and payment obligations typically
commencing upon AI infrastructure equipment becoming “ready for service” at the applicable data center
facility. The 2026 Lease Arrangement is non-cancelable by the parties to such agreement during the applicable
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lease period except in the case of a default. In addition, we deposited cash into a restricted account in April
2026 for the benefit of Broadcom to secure compute capacity, which amount may be released or applied toward
obligations under the lease depending on the satisfaction of specified conditions. Under certain circumstances,
we may be required to place additional cash into this restricted account for future amounts due under the 2026
Lease Arrangement. Upon the occurrence of certain uncured events of default, such as certain payment or
performance failures pursuant to the terms of the 2026 Lease Arrangement, a substantial portion of our
obligations under the 2026 Lease Arrangement would be accelerated and, while we have access to multiple
sources of capital and are not dependent on the potential financing capacity provided in the Infrastructure
Partner 2026 NPA that we entered into in connection with the 2026 Lease Arrangement, we may not be
permitted to elect to issue the convertible promissory notes under the Infrastructure Partner 2026 NPA to
finance such obligations. Furthermore, we may in the future continue to directly procure such data center
infrastructure and we may also undertake other efforts to build out our own compute and infrastructure and
invest more deeply in the compute supply chain, which could result in significantly higher upfront costs and
adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations. For more information about such lease
arrangements, see the sections titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations—Liquidity and Capital Resources—Contractual Obligations” and “—If our actual compute
requirements differ materially from our projections, we may fail to secure sufficient compute to meet our needs
or we may be committed to excess compute that remains underutilized.” We have limited experience in
managing such data center infrastructure projects at scale. Successfully executing on these data center
infrastructure initiatives requires us to recruit personnel with relevant experience and manage complex multi-
year deployment timelines and relationships with developers, contractors, and service providers.
As we continue to build out our own compute and infrastructure and further vertically integrate across the
compute supply chain, these multi-party structures will become more prevalent and will expose us to a
structural timing and liquidity risk in our payment obligations that differs from our historical compute
arrangements. Historically, we have generally obtained compute from a limited number of CSPs under
arrangements in which our compute and infrastructure expenses are paid as compute becomes available to us.
In the future, we expect we will increasingly enter into separate arrangements with a greater number of
different counterparties, each responsible for discrete services or inputs across the compute supply chain.
Under many of these arrangements, we may be obligated to pay a counterparty once it performs its discrete
obligation, even if delays or failures by others prevent us from assembling those discrete services or inputs into
usable compute we can deploy to generate revenue. In addition, counterparties may deliver their services or
inputs later than scheduled, or may fail to deliver them at all, and any such delay or non-delivery by a single
counterparty could postpone or prevent our deployment of the associated compute. As a result, we could incur
significant cash outflows without obtaining usable compute on a timely basis, which could adversely affect our
liquidity, financial condition, and results of operations.
Certain of our data center infrastructure arrangements involve complex multi-party structures in which chips
are procured from or through our CSPs, leased to us by third-party financing entities, installed in data center
facilities procured by or through other third-party partners, and operated by yet another set of third-party
service providers. The complexity of these arrangements increases execution risk, as delays or failures by any
participant in the chain could affect the availability or performance of the resulting compute.
In addition, to meet the substantial energy demands of large-scale AI workloads, we have entered into, and may
in the future enter into, arrangements involving dedicated power generation assets and/or the development,
operation, or control of power stations or other energy infrastructure. Such arrangements expose us to new
operational, regulatory, and environmental liabilities, and require expertise and capabilities that differ from our
core competencies. Successfully executing on these power infrastructure projects requires us to recruit
personnel with relevant experience and manage complex multi-year deployment timelines and relationships
with developers, contractors, service providers, and regulators, including aligning project completion schedules
with the data centers such projects are expected to serve in order to avoid timing delays that constrain our
ability to utilize this compute and to generate revenue and recoup costs from such investments.
Deployment of our data center and power infrastructure projects involves execution risks, including delays due
to permitting issues, change in law, force majeure, lack of network connectivity between facilities, supply chain
disruptions, labor shortages, or contractor performance; cost overruns due to equipment pricing changes,
design modifications, or unanticipated requirements; and technical risks that facilities may not perform as
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specified or achieve expected reliability or efficiency levels. Certain of our arrangements are also subject to
conditions precedent that must be satisfied before construction can commence, and completion guarantees that
may terminate upon a lender foreclosure before construction is complete, leaving us without contractual
recourse to compel completion. Certain of these arrangements also depend on the continued performance of
credit support provided by a third party that is also a competitor, the loss or impairment of which could
jeopardize the underlying arrangements. Such credit support provided to third-party data center developers or
hardware providers, from which we derive no direct contractual rights or obligations, may also affect the
availability and cost of data center capacity and hardware generally. Additionally, new tariffs or import fees
enacted after the effective date of certain arrangements may be passed through to us as additional costs. Any
delay in or limitation on the amount of compute delivered to us could adversely affect our business.
The capital-intensive and long-term nature of leasing and equipping data center capacity creates financial risk,
as large upfront investments and long-term payment commitments must be made months before facilities
become fully operational. If our compute requirements or technology needs change, we may find ourselves with
leased or dedicated infrastructure that is poorly suited to our actual needs, and technological changes in AI
hardware or training methodologies could render such infrastructure less efficient than newer alternatives.
Unlike CSP arrangements where compute can be adjusted relatively dynamically, long-term leases, reserved
compute, and dedicated infrastructure investments are much less flexible and create long-term financial
obligations regardless of whether the capacity continues to meet our needs. For example, certain of our
dedicated power and data center infrastructure arrangements have initial terms of 20 years with annual
escalators and include take-or-pay compute payment obligations and uncapped fuel cost pass-throughs that
apply for the duration of the term regardless of actual utilization.
Our increasing efforts to build out our compute and infrastructure require substantial capital expenditures and
are changing the cash flow profile of our business. Whereas the compute purchased through our CSP
arrangements is generally paid as the compute becomes available to us, we expect an increasing portion of our
compute and infrastructure investment to take the form of capital expenditures and other commitments,
including lease obligations, that require significant upfront payments well in advance of the related compute
becoming operational. Our existing commitments are substantial, and we expect our capital expenditures to
increase significantly as we continue to expand our compute and infrastructure build-out. See the section titled
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Liquidity and
Capital Resources” for more information. As a result, we expect these investments to result in significant net
cash used in operating and investing activities for the foreseeable future, and our net cash used in these
activities may increase regardless of whether our financial performance improves. The magnitude and timing of
these investments are inherently uncertain and may change materially over short periods, including as a result
of decisions to accelerate or expand our build-out, and such changes could rapidly and significantly alter our
expected results of operations and cash flows for a given period. If our cash flows from operations and available
capital are insufficient to fund these investments, we may be required to raise additional capital on unfavorable
terms or to reduce, defer, or forgo planned investments, any of which could adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
If we are unable to successfully execute on our data center infrastructure initiatives, experience significant
delays or cost overruns, or find that the infrastructure we lease, deploy, or build does not meet our evolving
needs, we may not realize the expected benefits of these investments, which could adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
We may not successfully build, expand, and deploy our sales and marketing organization in a
timely manner, or we may not successfully hire, retain, train, and motivate our sales
personnel.
We have grown, and will continue to grow, our direct sales force. Whether we are able to increase our sales to
existing customers, identify and engage new customers, and enter new U.S. and non-U.S. markets, each with a
focus on broadening use of our models, platform, and applications across departments and entire
organizations, will depend, among other things, on our ability to successfully test new market segments and
customer types, validate product-market fit through early customer engagement, timely and effectively scale
our sales motions, and adapt quickly when market conditions change. We have limited experience building,
managing, and scaling a direct sales force. We have dedicated and plan to continue to dedicate significant
resources to sales and marketing programs and to expand our sales and marketing capabilities to target
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potential customers and achieve broader market adoption of our models, platform, and applications, but there
is no guarantee that we will be successful in attracting and maintaining additional customers. Moreover,
identifying, recruiting, training, and managing sales personnel requires significant time, expense, and attention,
including from our senior management and other key personnel, as there is significant competition for sales
personnel with the skills and technical knowledge that we require, including the ability to understand and
communicate complex and evolving AI use cases, regulatory considerations, customer risk sensitivities, and
rapidly changing product capabilities. These challenges are particularly acute for international expansion,
which requires qualified personnel with international experience, language skills, cultural competencies in the
geographic markets which we target, and an aligned mission-oriented culture. If we are unable to successfully
manage the foregoing risks, our prospects, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
adversely affected.
We periodically make adjustments to our sales and marketing organization in response to market
opportunities, product introductions or enhancements, acquisitions, and other internal and external
considerations. Any future sales and marketing organization changes may result in a temporary reduction of
productivity, which could negatively affect our rate of growth. In addition, any significant change to the way we
structure and implement the compensation of our sales and marketing organization may be disruptive or may
not be effective and may adversely affect our revenue growth. If we are unable to attract, hire, develop, retain,
and motivate qualified sales and marketing personnel, if our new sales personnel are unable to achieve
sufficient sales productivity levels in a reasonable period of time or at all, if our marketing programs are not
effective, or if we are unable to effectively build, expand, and manage our sales organization and operations, our
sales and revenue may grow more slowly than expected or decline, and our prospects, business, financial
condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
We have a limited history under our current go-to-market strategy, and our efforts to scale
and evolve our customer acquisition, engagement, and retention model may not be successful.
We have a limited history selling consumption-based access and subscriptions to our models, platform, and
applications under our current business model, and we are continuing to scale our operations and go-to-market
strategy. Our future success depends in part on our ability to continue attracting, onboarding, expanding, and
retaining customers under this model, including determining whether, when, and how to target, develop, and
deepen relationships with individual customers over time. Scaling our operations, including hiring, training,
and retaining additional sales, sales engineering, and customer-facing personnel, and evolving our go-to-
market strategy may take more time and require more effort than anticipated, and the results of these efforts
are difficult to predict. Our business and operating models have not been fully proven, and our limited history
with our current approach makes it difficult to evaluate our prospects, plan for future growth, and forecast our
results of operations.
In addition, our strategy and customer mix expose us to competitive and execution risks as the AI market
continues to evolve. We have organized our research priorities, our product roadmap, and our go-to-market and
Applied AI teams around enterprise use cases, and much of the diffusion of Claude to date has been organic—
driven by individual users, including software developers and prosumers, who adopt Claude and often serve as
internal champions for its broader adoption within their organizations—rather than by a large direct sales
organization. This approach has allowed us to scale with a smaller team relative to other large enterprise
technology companies, but it assumes that our applications and distribution will be sufficient to deliver the
capabilities of our models to customers and that individual adoption will continue to translate into
organizational adoption and expansion. Companies with stronger consumer-facing businesses, larger consumer
user bases, more established brands, broader distribution, or deeper customer relationships may choose to
increase their focus on enterprise customers or enterprise use cases and could leverage their scale, resources,
and market presence to compete more effectively with us. In particular, if such competitors capture the
individual users from whom our enterprise adoption often originates, whether through their consumer
applications, by integrating AI functionality into products those users already use, or otherwise, our pipeline of
enterprise opportunities could be reduced in ways that a direct sales organization of our current scale may not
be able to offset. Building a substantially larger sales organization, or shifting investment toward consumer and
application-layer products to compete for those users, would require significant time and resources beyond our
current plans and would involve the tradeoffs described in the section titled “—We face intense competition,
and if we are unable to compete effectively, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
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adversely affected.” Because we have a limited operating history with our current business model and go-to-
market strategy, we have less experience predicting customer adoption, expansion, and retention patterns, and
customers may be slower than expected to adopt our models, platform, and applications or expand usage. Any
failure to successfully scale our operations or effectively execute on and refine our go-to-market strategy could
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Sales to enterprise customers involve complexities and risks that could adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We derive a large portion of our revenue from sales to enterprise customers. Our ability to attract, retain, and
expand relationships with enterprise customers depends in significant part on our ability to meet their
generally heightened operational, technical, security, reliability, and compliance requirements. Enterprises
typically expect high levels of system uptime, performance consistency, data security, auditability, internal
controls, and scalability, as well as robust support and service levels. These requirements may be heightened for
our agentic offerings, where enterprise customers may require detailed logs of each action taken by an
autonomous agent within their environment, including the agent’s reasoning, tool invocations, and interactions
with external systems. Any inability on our part to provide such logs at the level of granularity customers
require could limit adoption of our agentic offerings by enterprises or result in customer attrition. If we are
unable to deliver models, platforms, and applications that satisfy these enterprise-grade requirements, or if we
experience outages, performance degradation, security incidents, or other operational failures, our ability to
retain and expand with enterprise customers could be adversely affected. In particular, as we deploy our Virtual
Collaborators, like Claude Code and Claude Cowork, within enterprise environments, these systems will require
broad permissions and deep integrations with customers’ internal tools, data, and workflows in order to operate
effectively. The scope of access required for extended autonomous operation within enterprise environments
increases the potential consequences of any security incident, unauthorized action, or system error, and
customers may be reluctant to grant the level of access necessary for these systems to operate as designed if
they are unable to satisfy themselves regarding the security, reliability, and controllability of such systems.
Our sales efforts targeted at enterprise customers also involve risks and challenges that may not be present, or
that are present to a lesser extent, with sales to individuals or smaller organizations. These customers typically
have longer decision-making cycles, require greater security, functionality, and scalability, expect a broader
range of services, demand that providers take on a larger share of risks, require higher levels of customer
service and support, and expect greater payment flexibility from vendors. We are often required to spend
significant time and resources to familiarize potential customers with the value proposition of our models,
platform, and applications, and this process can take substantially longer with enterprise customers.
Enterprises may also require extensive customization, integration support, and vendor evaluations and demand
more features than we currently offer or than we can deliver within their expected timeframes, including
enterprise-grade functionality such as audit logs, compliance features, security controls, and monitoring tools,
which may require us to make additional investments in product development or services capabilities, before
committing to a purchase. As a result of these factors, sales opportunities with enterprises require us to devote
greater sales and administrative support and professional services resources to each such enterprise customer,
which increases our costs, lengthens our sales cycle, and diverts our sales and customer service resources to a
smaller number of enterprise customers. We may spend substantial time, effort, and money in our sales efforts
without successfully producing any sales. In addition, many enterprise customers procure and deploy our
models, platform, and applications through third-party CSP marketplaces, which can introduce additional
complexity into the sales and deployment process, including reliance on the CSPs’ procurement, security, and
billing workflows and coordination with multiple counterparties. As a result, our ability to attract, retain, and
expand relationships with enterprise customers may also depend in part on factors outside of our direct control,
including the policies, priorities, and operational requirements of such CSPs.
A number of factors influence the length and variability of our sales cycle. The need to educate potential
customers about the uses and benefits of our models, platform, and applications, the discretionary nature of
purchasing and budget cycles, competitive evaluation and purchasing approval processes, procurement
requirements, legal review of contract terms, and internal budget authorization procedures all contribute to
sales cycle variability. The length of our sales cycle, from identification of the opportunity to deal closure, may
vary significantly from customer to customer. Sales to enterprises typically take longer to complete than sales to
individuals or smaller organizations.
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A meaningful portion of our revenue is attributable to a relatively small number of such enterprise customer
relationships, which increases the variability of our financial results. Our revenue in any given quarter could be
substantially affected if these customers decide to significantly reduce their spend.
Enterprises may have deep existing relationships with our competitors for models, platforms, and applications
we do not offer, or relationships with others in the ecosystem, which may delay our sales process or cause us to
not succeed with such enterprises.
Enterprise customers are particularly sensitive to our ability to maintain the uptime of our models, platform,
and applications, and any degradation in uptime could adversely affect our ability to retain and expand with our
enterprise customers. Sustaining the uptime, performance, and scale that enterprise customers expect can place
additional demands on our overall compute, and any failure of our capacity management systems to direct
sufficient compute to support such demands could adversely affect our ability to serve all workloads. For more
information about the foregoing, see the section titled “—If we fail to manage our technical operations
infrastructure, or experience service outages, interruptions, or delays in the deployment of our models,
platform, and applications, our results of operations may be adversely affected.”
Our sales strategy for these enterprise customers also depends on our ability to build and maintain an effective
sales organization. If we fail to effectively manage these risks associated with sales to enterprises, our business,
financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected. For additional discussion of our
personnel-related risks, see the section titled “—We may not successfully build, expand, and deploy our sales
and marketing organization in a timely manner, or we may not successfully hire, retain, train, and motivate our
sales personnel.”
If our marketing strategies, such as our free trials and free tiers, fail to generate the benefits
we expect, or if their costs exceed those benefits, our ability to grow our revenue could be
adversely affected.
A portion of our users access our models, platform, and applications through free tiers or promotional offerings,
and we seek to convert these users into paying customers over time. We may not always be successful in doing
so, as free users may be satisfied with the limited functionality available in free tiers, may not have budgets to
support paid subscriptions, or may choose to use our free offerings indefinitely without converting to paid
plans. The availability of free tiers may cannibalize potential paid subscriptions, as some users who would have
otherwise paid for our services may instead rely exclusively on free access. Additionally, providing free access to
our models, platform, and applications involves costs, including compute and infrastructure, customer support,
and other operational costs. In addition, we offer free access in significant part to build awareness of, familiarity
with, and engagement with our products, and as a means of reaching individuals engaged in knowledge work
outside of a business or organizational context. However, these benefits are inherently difficult to measure, free
usage may not generate the awareness or advocacy we expect, and individual adoption of our products may not
translate into organizational adoption or expansion. See the section titled “—We have a limited history under
our current go-to-market strategy, and our efforts to scale and evolve our customer acquisition, engagement,
and retention model may not be successful.” If the costs of supporting free users exceed the value we derive
from their eventual conversion or other benefits such as network effects and word-of-mouth referrals, our
business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
If we fail to maintain high-quality customer support, our ability to retain and expand
customers could suffer, which may adversely affect our prospects, business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
Our customers rely on our customer support services to resolve issues and realize the full benefits that our
models, platform, and applications provide. In order to deliver high-quality customer support and engagement,
we must successfully assist our customers in deploying and continuing to use our models, platform, and
applications, resolve performance issues, discover and deploy our models, platform, and applications in new
use cases, provide hands-on technical implementation, customization, and solution engineering support,
provide training and guidance to help customers effectively adopt and scale their use of our models, platform,
and applications, address interoperability challenges, and respond to security threats and cyberattacks and
performance and reliability problems that may arise from time to time. The importance of our support function
will increase as we expand our business and pursue new customers. Many enterprises have complex internal
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systems and require high levels of focused support to fully realize the benefits of our models, platform, and
applications. If we do not help our customers quickly resolve issues and provide effective ongoing support and
enablement, or a market perception develops that we do not maintain high-quality customer support and
experience, our ability to maintain and expand our subscriptions to existing and new customers could suffer,
particularly with respect to our enterprise customers.
In addition, our growth model depends significantly on driving deeper adoption and expanded use cases within
our existing customer base. If we are unable to effectively provide support and integration efforts that enable
customers to identify, deploy, and scale additional high-value use cases, demonstrate measurable return on
investment, or integrate our models, platform, and applications into their core workflows, customers may limit
usage, fail to renew at expected levels, or reduce their spend, which could materially slow our revenue growth.
Further, there can be no assurance that we will be able to hire sufficient support personnel as and when needed,
particularly if our sales exceed our internal forecasts. We expect to continue to increase our customer base, and
that growth may put additional pressure on our customer support teams, which may require additional
personnel to respond to customer demand. We may be unable to respond quickly enough to accommodate
short-term increases in customer demand for services. To the extent that we are unsuccessful in hiring,
training, and retaining adequate support personnel, our ability to provide high-quality and timely support to
our customers will be negatively impacted, and our customers’ satisfaction and their use and subscription of our
models, platform, and applications could be adversely affected.
In addition, as we continue to grow our operations and reach a larger and increasingly global customer base, we
need to be able to provide efficient services that meet our customers’ needs globally at scale, and our customer
support teams may face additional challenges, including those associated with delivering support, training, and
documentation in languages other than English and providing services across expanded time zones. If we are
unable to manage the foregoing risks, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
adversely affected.
Our product and investment decisions may not prioritize short-term financial results and may
not align with investor expectations or preferences, which could adversely affect the market
price of our Class A common stock.
Our product and investment decisions are informed in large part by our commitment to AI safety, expanding
our models, platform, and applications securely and responsibly, and providing high-quality customer support,
all of which, in addition to our status as a PBC, may not necessarily maximize short-term financial results.
While we generally believe that our product and investment strategy will improve our long-term financial
results, we regularly make product and investment decisions that may or may be perceived to negatively impact
our short-term revenue or ability to achieve and sustain profitability. For example, we have in the past delayed
the release of new models or features, limited their availability, imposed usage restrictions, or constrained
certain functionality until we determined that sufficient safety testing, evaluations, or mitigations were
completed, such as with Mythos through Project Glasswing, which may have had a negative impact on our
short-term revenue, and we may do so again in the future.
Our focus on AI safety and responsible deployment may also require us to incur significant additional costs,
including increased research and development expenses, additional personnel and infrastructure, and foregone
or delayed revenue opportunities relative to competitors that may prioritize speed to market, broader access, or
more permissive use of their products. These decisions may reduce customer adoption, limit usage by certain
customers or use cases, or make our offerings less attractive, particularly when compared to competitors that do
not adopt similar constraints.
In addition, as we focus on responsibly growing our customer base and engagement across our models,
platform, and applications, we may make product, pricing, or access decisions that lead to lower short-term
profits or engagement compared to our competitors. Customers, partners, or investors may not agree with or
fully understand these decisions and may perceive them as limiting our competitiveness or commercial
potential, which could adversely affect our reputation, customer relationships, market adoption, or valuation.
We cannot assure you that our long-term strategy will ultimately result in superior financial performance or
that the anticipated long-term benefits of these decisions will be realized on the timeline we expect, or at all.
Any of the foregoing risks could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
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Our investments in new products, technologies, and business initiatives may not produce the
expected benefits and could adversely affect our business.
We regularly make decisions to invest in new products, technologies, business lines, and strategic initiatives,
including in areas outside our current core offerings, and the outcomes of these investments are inherently
uncertain. These initiatives often require significant upfront investments of capital, research and development
resources, and management attention, and their outcomes may not achieve widespread market adoption, may
not generate revenue at anticipated levels, may take longer than expected to mature, or may fail entirely. In
addition, reallocating resources from our core offerings to pursue new initiatives could slow growth in existing
products, reduce operating efficiency, or weaken our competitive position if those initiatives do not succeed. If
our investments in new products or business lines do not produce the long-term benefits we anticipate, our
business, financial condition, results of operations, and prospects could be adversely affected.
Certain of these initiatives, including our life sciences research program, which involves operating laboratory
facilities, and our research in robotics and physical AI, require us to engage in activities outside our historical
experience as a software and research organization, such as handling biological and chemical materials,
operating laboratory and robotic equipment, and complying with biosafety, occupational health and safety,
environmental, hazardous materials, and, potentially, preclinical and clinical research regulations. These
activities expose us to categories of liability, including for workplace injury and environmental contamination,
that differ from those associated with our core business, and any drug candidates or other discoveries resulting
from these efforts would face the lengthy, costly, and uncertain development and regulatory pathways
characteristic of the life sciences industry, and may never generate revenue.
If we fail to manage our technical operations infrastructure, or experience service outages,
interruptions, or delays in the deployment of our models, platform, and applications, our
results of operations may be adversely affected.
Our systems and operations are subject to disruptions resulting from changes to our technology infrastructure.
We have experienced, and may continue to experience, service interruptions or degraded performance due to
software deployments, configuration changes, system updates, and new model introductions. These disruptions
may adversely affect our ability to service customers and could result in lost revenue, customer attrition, or
reputational harm. Further, our mitigation efforts and processes may be insufficient to prevent or minimize the
impact of system changes on service availability, and we may lack adequate testing, rollback procedures, or
monitoring capabilities to detect and remediate issues arising from system changes in a timely manner. For
example, in March 2026, we experienced a service outage and periods of degraded performance resulting from
a combination of factors, including a significant and rapid increase in usage demand, compute constraints in
certain components of our infrastructure, and other factors. Although we have taken and continue to take steps
to address these issues, including migrating to more scalable infrastructure and enhancing our operational
processes, similar incidents may occur in the future.
In addition, continued growth in our customer base could place additional demands on our models, platform,
and applications and could cause or exacerbate slowdowns or interrupt the availability of our models, platform,
and applications. If there is a substantial increase in the volume of usage of our models, platform, and
applications, we will be required to further expand and upgrade our technology and infrastructure. Any
substantial increase in usage will also require increased compute. Because our compute is procured well in
advance based on projected demand across all workloads, a significant acceleration in customer demand could
cause aggregate capacity to fall short of the levels required to support all of our workloads concurrently at the
scale we intend. If our committed compute proves insufficient, or the composition of our committed compute
portfolio differs materially from our demand forecasts, we may experience service disruptions, degraded
response times, or limitations on customer and user access to our models, platform, and applications, while also
experiencing constraints on the compute available to support ongoing model development. There can be no
assurance that we will be able to accurately project the rate or timing of increases, if any, in the use of our
models, platform, and applications or expand and upgrade our systems and infrastructure to accommodate
such increases on a timely basis. If our users are not able to access our models, platform, and applications or
encounter slowdowns, we may lose customers or partners. In order to remain competitive, we must continue to
enhance and improve the responsiveness, functionality, and features of our models, platform, and applications
and the underlying compute infrastructure supporting them. Our disaster recovery plan may not be sufficient to
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address all aspects or any unanticipated consequence or incidents, and our insurance may not be sufficient to
compensate us for the losses that could occur.
Moreover, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft provide substantial portions of the compute infrastructure that we
use to host our models, platform, and applications and many of the internal tools we use to operate our
business. Any significant disruption of, limitation of our access to, or other interference with this infrastructure
would negatively impact our operations, degrade the availability and performance of our models, platform, and
applications, and could cause us to lose customers who are unable to access or experience difficulties accessing
our models, platform, and applications. Even absent a full disruption, the level of service provided by Amazon,
Google, and Microsoft could affect the availability or speed of our models, platform, and applications, which
may also impact the usage of, and our customers’ satisfaction with, our models, platform, and applications and
could seriously harm our business and reputation.
Any transition of the services and infrastructure currently provided by Amazon, Google, and Microsoft to
another CSP would require significant time and expense and could further disrupt or degrade delivery of our
models, platform, and applications. Such a transition could require us to re-architect portions of our
infrastructure, retrain or migrate models and large datasets, incur data transfer and duplication costs, and
adapt our systems to new tools and configurations, which could result in operational delays and reduced
performance during the transition period. If Amazon, Google, or Microsoft increases pricing terms, terminates
or seeks to terminate our contractual relationship, whether for competitive reasons or otherwise, establishes
more favorable relationships with our competitors, or changes or interprets its terms of service or policies in a
manner that is unfavorable with respect to us, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could
be adversely affected.
In addition, an increasing portion of our compute is hosted in dedicated data center facilities that are leased
and operated on our behalf by third parties rather than by our CSPs, and we expect this portion to grow. Certain
of these operators have a limited operating history, and these facilities may have less geographic redundancy,
failover capacity, or operational tooling than those of large-scale cloud environments, such that an equipment
failure, cooling or network disruption, or operator error at a single facility could affect a meaningful portion of
our available capacity. Moreover, the continuous availability of our models, platform, and applications depends
on the reliable supply of electrical power and water to the facilities that host our infrastructure, whether
operated by our CSPs or on our behalf. Utility outages, shortages, price increases, or required curtailment of
power during periods of peak demand, whether in connection with or outside of natural disasters or other
catastrophic events, could interrupt or degrade the provision of our services in the ordinary course of our
business. See the sections titled “—Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability
to secure adequate compute.” and “—Our business, financial condition, and results of operations may be
adversely affected by war, terrorism, natural disasters, public health crises, political crises, or other unexpected
events.”
If we are unable to make acquisitions and investments, or successfully integrate them into our
business, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely
affected.
As part of our business strategy, we will continue to consider a wide array of potential strategic transactions,
including acquisitions of businesses, new technologies, services, and other assets and strategic investments that
complement our business. We have previously acquired and continue to evaluate targets that operate in
relatively nascent markets, and there is no assurance that such acquired businesses will be successfully
integrated into our business or generate substantial revenue. In addition, we may overpay for acquisition
targets or make investments at valuations that do not ultimately prove justified by the targets’ performance,
strategic value, or market conditions, which could adversely affect our financial condition.
We may be unable to identify or complete prospective and attractive strategic transactions for many reasons,
including competition from other potential acquirers, the effects of consolidation in our industry, and
potentially high valuations of acquisition candidates. Even if we identify strategic transactions or enter into
agreements with respect to such transactions, applicable antitrust laws and other regulations may limit our
ability to acquire targets or force us to divest all or a portion of our business or an acquired business. If we are
unable to identify suitable targets or complete acquisitions, our growth prospects may suffer, and we may not
be able to realize sufficient scale and technological advantages to compete effectively.
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Acquisitions involve many risks, any of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and
results of operations, including:
•intense competition for suitable acquisition targets, which could increase prices and adversely affect
our ability to consummate deals on favorable or acceptable terms;
•failure or material delay in closing a transaction;
•transaction-related lawsuits or claims;
•difficulties in integrating the technologies, operations, existing contracts, and personnel of an acquired
company;
•difficulties in retaining key employees, business partners, or customers of an acquired company;
•challenges with integrating the brand identity of an acquired company with our own;
•diversion of financial and management resources from existing operations or alternative acquisition
opportunities;
•failure to realize the anticipated benefits or synergies of a transaction at all or within the expected
timeframe;
•the incurrence of debt or dilution related to equity issuances in connection with a transaction;
•failure to identify or address the problems, liabilities, or other shortcomings or challenges of an
acquired company or technology, including issues related to copyrights and other intellectual property,
regulatory compliance practices, litigation, revenue recognition, or other accounting practices, or
employee or user issues;
•risks that the acquired company could have a negative impact on our company culture;
•risks that regulatory bodies may enact new laws or promulgate new regulations that are adverse to an
acquired company or business;
•risks that regulatory bodies do not approve our acquisitions or business combinations or delay such
approvals;
•theft of our trade secrets or confidential information that we share with potential acquisition
candidates;
•risk that an acquired company or investment in new services cannibalizes a portion of our existing
business; and
•adverse market reaction to an acquisition.
If we fail to address the foregoing risks or other problems encountered in connection with past or future
acquisitions of businesses, new technologies, services, and other assets, strategic investments, and other
strategic transactions, or if we otherwise fail to realize the expected benefits of such acquisitions or investments,
our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
Unfavorable media coverage regarding our business, our models, platform, and applications,
the impacts of AI, and the AI industry more broadly could adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
As our business has grown and as interest in us and the AI industry overall has increased, we have attracted,
and may continue to attract, significant media coverage, public commentary, and scrutiny from time to time.
This coverage and commentary have included, and we expect will continue to include, recurring narratives
concerning the potential adverse societal impacts of AI, including that AI may displace or eliminate jobs, may
be misused or otherwise cause harm, and may pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity. We have been,
and may continue to be, a particular focus of such narratives, and unfavorable coverage of the AI industry
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generally may be attributed to us, in each case regardless of whether the underlying concerns are well-founded
or specifically applicable to our models, platform, or applications. Unfavorable publicity regarding us, our
partners, or the AI industry more broadly could adversely affect our reputation and brand, as described in the
section titled “—If we are unable to maintain and enhance our brand and reputation, our business, financial
condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected.” Negative media coverage, including public
figures making negative or threatening statements about our company, whether accurate or not, could also
adversely affect our brand and reputation and may reduce market acceptance of our models, platform, and
applications or impair our ability to attract and retain customers. As public awareness of our brand increases,
any issues that draw media attention may have an amplified adverse effect on our reputation. If unfavorable
media coverage or adverse public perceptions persist or intensify, the demand for our models, platform, and
applications could decline and our brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be
adversely affected.
We will incur increased costs and demands upon management as a result of complying with
the laws and regulations affecting public companies, which may adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
As a public company, we will incur greater legal, accounting, and other expenses than we incurred as a private
company. For example, we are subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (“Exchange Act”), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”), the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the rules and regulations of the SEC, and the listing standards of
the Nasdaq Global Select Market. The Exchange Act requires, among other things, that we file annual,
quarterly, and current reports with respect to our business and results of operations. Compliance with these
requirements will increase our legal, accounting, and financial compliance costs, and increase demand on our
systems, making some activities more time-consuming and costly. In addition, changing laws, regulations, and
standards relating to reporting obligations and corporate governance disclosure are creating uncertainty for
public companies, which could result in continued uncertainty regarding compliance matters and higher costs.
We expect these rules and regulations to make it more expensive for us to obtain director and officer liability
insurance, and we may be required to accept reduced policy limits and coverage or incur substantially higher
costs to maintain the same or similar coverage. As a result, it may be more difficult for us to attract and retain
qualified individuals to serve on our board of directors or as our executive officers.
As a public company, we expect to incur significant expenses and devote substantial management effort toward
ensuring compliance with the auditor attestation requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In
that regard, we will need to hire additional accounting and financial staff with appropriate public company
experience and technical accounting knowledge. In addition, as a public company, we may be subject to
stockholder activism, which can lead to substantial costs, distract management, and impact the manner in
which we operate our business in ways we cannot currently anticipate.
As a result of disclosure of information in this prospectus and in our public filings with the SEC as required of a
public company, our business and financial condition will become more visible, which we believe may result in
threatened or actual litigation, including by competitors and other third parties. If such claims are successful,
our business, financial condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected, and even if the claims do
not result in litigation or are resolved in our favor, these claims, and the time and resources necessary to resolve
them, may divert the resources of our management and our board of directors, and adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Further, many members of our management team have limited experience managing a publicly traded
company, interacting with public company investors, and complying with the increasingly complex laws and
regulations pertaining to public companies. Our management team may not successfully or efficiently manage
our transition to being a public company subject to significant regulatory oversight and reporting obligations
under the federal securities laws and the continuous scrutiny of securities analysts and investors. These new
obligations and constituents will require significant attention from our management and may divert their
attention away from the day-to-day management of our business, which may adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
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Our business, financial condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected by war,
terrorism, natural disasters, public health crises, political crises, or other unexpected events.
War, terrorist attacks, and other acts of political violence, or any significant natural disaster, such as an
earthquake, fire, hurricane, tornado, flood, or significant power outage, may disrupt our operations, mobile
networks, the internet, data centers, or the operations of our partners or third-party service providers, and the
impact of climate change may increase these risks. In particular, our corporate headquarters is located in the
San Francisco Bay Area, a region known for seismic activity and increasingly for the threat of fires. In addition,
any public health crises, pandemics, political crises, terrorist attacks, war and other political or social
instability, other geopolitical developments, or other catastrophic events, whether in the United States or in
non-U.S. geographies, may adversely affect our operations or macroeconomic conditions. For example, an act of
terrorism, armed conflict, or escalation of geopolitical tensions could result in physical damage to or
destruction of data centers and other critical infrastructure, whether owned or operated by us or our third-party
providers, as well as disruptions to power, cooling, or network connectivity necessary to operate such facilities.
The impact of any of the foregoing or other disruption to us, our partners, or other third parties may result in
system interruptions and degradation, reputational harm, delays in our product development, lengthy
interruptions in our services, data breaches, malware, and other security or hacking incidents, all of which may
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. All of the aforementioned risks may
be further increased if our disaster recovery plans prove to be inadequate. Further, the insurance we maintain
may be insufficient to cover our losses resulting from such business interruptions, and any incidents may result
in loss of, or increased costs of, such insurance.
If we are unable to ensure that our models, platform, and applications interoperate with a
variety of software applications that are developed by others, including our integration
partners, we may become less competitive and our business, financial condition, and results
of operations may be adversely affected.
Our models, platform, and applications must integrate with a variety of hardware and software platforms, and
we need to continuously modify and enhance our models, platform, and applications to adapt to changes in
hardware, software, and browser technologies. In particular, we have developed our models, platform, and
applications to be able to easily integrate with third-party applications, including the applications of software
providers that compete with us as well as our partners, through the interaction of APIs. In general, we rely on
the providers of such software systems to allow us access to their APIs to enable these integrations. We are
typically subject to standard terms and conditions of such providers, which govern the distribution, operation,
and fees of such software systems, and which are subject to change by such providers from time to time. Our
business will be harmed if any provider of such software systems:
•discontinues or limits our access to its software or APIs;
•modifies its terms of service or other policies, including fees charged to, or other restrictions on, us or
other software developers;
•changes how information is accessed by us or our customers;
•establishes more favorable relationships with one or more of our competitors; or
•develops or otherwise favors its own competitive offerings over our models, platform, and applications.
Further, we depend in part on operating systems, including mobile operating systems such as iOS and Android,
and their respective application stores, such as Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store, to drive downloads of
our Claude app. If such operating systems or application stores limit the availability of our app, make changes
that degrade the functionality of our app, increase the cost of using our app, impose terms of use unsatisfactory
to us, or modify their search or ratings algorithms in ways that are detrimental to us, or if our competitors’
placement in such mobile operating systems’ application store is more prominent than the placement of our
app, our user growth could be adversely affected. Any changes in such operating systems and application stores
that degrade the functionality of our app or give preferential treatment to our competitors’ apps could adversely
affect our platform’s usage across devices. Some marketplaces have explored changing their policies regarding
what content is acceptable within an application. If we are unable to adapt to such changes, this could adversely
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affect our platform’s access to and usage within those ecosystems. As new mobile devices and mobile platforms
are released, there is no guarantee that certain mobile devices will continue to support our platform or
effectively roll out updates to our apps. Additionally, in order to deliver a high-quality app, we need to ensure
that our models, platform, and applications are designed to work effectively with a range of mobile
technologies, systems, networks, and standards. We may not be successful in developing or maintaining
relationships with key participants in the mobile industry that enhance users’ experience. If users encounter
any difficulty accessing or using our apps on their mobile devices or if we are unable to adapt to changes in
popular mobile operating systems, our prospects, business, financial condition, and results of operations could
be adversely affected.
Third-party models, platforms, and applications are constantly evolving, and we may not be able to modify our
models, platform, and applications to assure their compatibility with those of other third parties. In addition,
some of our competitors may be able to disrupt the operations or compatibility of our models, platform, and
applications with their models, platforms, or applications, or exert strong business influence on our ability to,
and the terms on which we, operate our models, platform, and applications. Should any of our competitors
modify their products or standards in a manner that degrades the functionality of our models, platform, and
applications or gives preferential treatment to competitive models, platforms, or applications, whether to
enhance their competitive position or for any other reason, the interoperability of our models, platform, and
applications with these products could decrease and our business, financial condition, and results of operations
could be adversely affected. Further, if we are not permitted or able to integrate with these and other third-
party applications in the future, our business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely
affected.
Many of the risks we face are interconnected and may compound or trigger cascading adverse
effects across our business, which could amplify their overall impact.
Our business and operations are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, as described in this “Risk
Factors” section, many of which are interrelated, such that the occurrence of one risk event may exacerbate or
trigger additional risk events, and the combined effect may be materially greater than the impact of any
individual risk event in isolation. For example, unfavorable developments in intellectual property laws or
adverse outcomes in copyright or other litigation could require us to modify, retrain, or limit the capabilities of
our models, increasing costs and reducing the performance or competitiveness of our models, platform, and
applications, which could in turn harm customer demand, revenue, and our reputation and brand. In addition,
constraints on the availability or cost of compute could similarly limit our ability to develop and deploy
advanced models, delay product launches, reduce service reliability, and adversely affect our revenue growth,
while also affecting customer trust and perception of our offerings. If our revenue growth is limited and we do
not have sufficient additional sources of capital, we may be unable to acquire necessary compute or invest in
our talent to remain at the technological frontier or to support our customers, or we may face breaches of
covenants or defaults under the A&R Credit Agreement and certain of our commercial agreements. If we were
to breach covenants or default under the A&R Credit Agreement or certain of our commercial agreements, such
an event could trigger cross-defaults, accelerate repayment obligations, restrict our access to capital, and
further constrain our operations and growth, potentially magnifying other financial, operational, and
reputational risks. Because these and other risks may interact in complex and unpredictable ways, particularly
in a fast-moving industry characterized by technological change, evolving regulation, and emerging business
models, we may not be able to foresee or effectively manage all potential consequences. If one risk triggers or
intensifies others, or if multiple adverse events occur concurrently or in close succession, our prospects,
reputation, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
Risks Related to Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Intellectual Property
The application of certain copyright law doctrines and contractual interpretations of open-
source licenses to modern AI model training are uncertain.
The application of certain copyright law doctrines and contractual interpretations of open-source licenses to
modern AI model training have not been authoritatively resolved by U.S. and non-U.S. courts as of this date.
We have a good faith belief that we own or possess all sufficient legal rights and/or defenses to the training data
used in or with our AI models, platform, and applications, which is based in part on our belief that our use or
acquisition of the training data used in or with our AI models, platform, and applications constitutes “fair use”
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of such training data under copyright law doctrine. In addition, copyright laws in some jurisdictions outside the
United States generally do not recognize fair use, and our reliance on analogous exceptions is subject to
evolving conditions and to adverse or unsettled judicial interpretation in those jurisdictions. If a court of law
disagrees with our belief that our use or acquisition of such training data constitutes fair use or otherwise
concludes that it violates copyright law, for example, by adopting the reasoning in Bartz (as defined below),
including without limitation in currently active litigation against us or another company in our industry, our
business may be adversely affected. In particular, adverse rulings in litigation involving other AI developers,
regardless of the specific facts, data practices, or legal theories at issue in those cases, could establish legal
precedents or interpretations of copyright law that apply broadly across the industry and limit our ability to
train, develop, or deploy AI models, even if our own data procurement and usage practices differ. Such
outcomes could restrict access to certain categories of training data, narrow the scope of available legal
defenses, or impose new licensing, compliance, or operational requirements across the AI industry. For
example, if we cannot rely on the fair use doctrine to access copyrighted work for training our models, we may
be required to pay significant fees to obtain a license to such training data or our ability to further develop our
models, platform, and applications and distribute models trained on such data at issue could be adversely
affected. In addition, an adverse ruling against us or another company in our industry could result in injunctive
relief that restricts our ability to use or distribute models trained on the data at issue or could require us to
retrain affected models from scratch at substantial cost. If we are unable to manage the foregoing risks, our
business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
We are subject to complex and evolving laws, regulations, and other legal obligations related
to privacy and data protection, and any actual or perceived failure to comply with such
obligations could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We are subject to a range of laws and regulations in the EU, the United States, and other jurisdictions, and
other legal obligations relating to privacy, data protection, and the collection, use, transfer, storage, and other
processing of data. These laws, regulations, and other legal obligations vary across jurisdictions, and include
comprehensive frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (“GDPR”), laws that
impose sector-specific obligations, and those that impose specific requirements or restrictions on the handling
of particular types of data, such as personal data that is considered sensitive. These obligations are not
harmonized, continue to evolve in scope, present technical and operational complexities and challenges, and
may conflict or impose overlapping or inconsistent obligations. Further, these laws and regulations, as well as
other laws and regulations not originally enacted to address privacy or data protection, continue to evolve as
they are applied to new technologies, including AI, and may be interpreted or enforced in ways that are
inconsistent, unclear, novel, or subject to significant regulatory discretion. Additionally, plaintiffs, class action
counsel, state attorneys general, and other claimants continue to pursue claims against AI companies relating to
data handling, privacy, and cybersecurity; similar disputes could arise against us and they could take the form
of privacy, cybersecurity, breach of contract, tort, or other claims. New or evolving laws, regulations, regulatory
interpretations, claims, and novel or inconsistent application of existing laws and regulations to us, or our
evolving contractual or other legal obligations, including those that arise as we seek to enter into new markets
or product offerings, may require us to modify our models, platform, and applications, policies, and practices,
delay or limit the development or deployment of certain features, increase compliance and litigation costs, and
result in fines or penalties.
Our compliance obligations and expenditures, and our exposure thereunder, may vary depending on both how
customers access and use our models, platform, and applications, including through our first-party offerings or
third-party distribution channels, and on the nature of data processed in connection with those offerings. For
example, our costs and regulatory exposure may vary based on the demands we receive from individuals,
regulators, and other parties seeking to exercise rights under privacy or data protection laws. We may be subject
to additional obligations, restrictions, or exposure in connection with the processing of data that is considered
sensitive under applicable laws. In connection with the development, deployment, and improvement of our
services, including model training, improvement, and inference, we have faced, and may face in the future,
operational errors or claims or assertions that our use or processing of data, such as personal, sensitive, or
confidential data, is inconsistent with our obligations.
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Failure to secure data against risks to its confidentiality, integrity, or availability may result in legal obligations,
such as notification obligations to individuals, regulators, or customers, which could result in additional legal
and reputational risk.
Any actual or perceived failure or inability by us, our personnel, or third parties acting on our behalf to comply
with applicable privacy or data protection requirements, our contractual commitments, or our public
statements regarding our data practices could result in investigations, litigation, fines, penalties, or other
liability; require us to change our models, platform, and applications, policies, or practices; reduce customer
demand or harm our reputation; require us to make public disclosures that could expose us to reputational and
legal risks; and otherwise adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We process personal and sensitive data for AI safety, and any actual or perceived failure to
comply with the legal and regulatory obligations applicable to such processing could
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our commitment to AI safety requires us in some cases to access, collect, and process personal and sensitive
data. While our approach and mechanisms relating to handling personal and sensitive data are designed to
improve AI safety, they also subject us to compliance with evolving industry practices, laws and regulations, and
increased risks related to the processing of sensitive data, such as increased risks of harm or litigation if we
experience a security incident or unauthorized access to or processing of data. Further, laws and regulations not
originally enacted to address AI safety are being applied to AI safety and may be increasingly interpreted or
enforced in ways that are inconsistent, unclear, novel, or subject to significant regulatory discretion. Any actual
or perceived failure to comply with AI safety requirements or our processing of personal or sensitive data for AI
safety, or any actual or perceived security incident involving such data, could result in investigations, litigation,
fines, penalties, or other liability; require us to change our policies or practices; reduce customer demand or
harm our reputation; require us to make public disclosures that could expose us to reputational and legal risks;
and otherwise adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Any security breaches or other incidents, including those that affect our networks, systems, or
data, or the networks, systems, or data of our service providers, suppliers, or customers,
could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We store, handle, and otherwise process confidential, proprietary, and personal information, and our
customers use our models, platform, and applications to process similarly sensitive information. We experience
security risks, unintended exposure of or access to data, cyberattacks, and other attempts to gain unauthorized
access to our information, sites, networks, systems, models, platform, and applications. These have resulted in,
and may in the future result in, breaches of our security measures or those of our third-party service providers;
unauthorized access to our sites, networks, systems, and accounts; unauthorized access to, and
misappropriation of, personal, confidential, or proprietary information belonging to us, our customers, or
others; viruses, worms, spyware, or other malware being served from our models, platform, and applications,
networks, or systems; deletion or modification of content; the display of unauthorized content on our models,
platform, and applications; interruption, disruption, or malfunction of operations; and other risks.
We have in the past faced and in the future may face risks of phishing schemes and other cyberattacks,
including by nation-states and state-sponsored actors, that continue to evolve in sophistication and volume,
and may inherently be difficult to detect. Our proprietary model weights, corporate and financial data, and
other core intellectual property represent particularly high-value targets for state-sponsored espionage and
theft, and security researchers have identified frontier AI companies as priority targets for non-U.S. intelligence
services. The efforts of such state-sponsored actors to target us will likely increase over time, especially as we
develop models with next-generation capabilities, and they may specifically target models which have not, or
have not yet, been released to the general public. For example, state-sponsored actors may conduct cyberattacks
specifically targeting Mythos in light of its advanced cyber vulnerability discovery capabilities.
Our security capabilities continue to evolve, and certain aspects of our security program may not be sufficient to
fully address the most sophisticated malicious actors, including well-resourced nation-state or state-sponsored
groups, especially as those groups develop or obtain more powerful technology, which may include AI
technology with offensive capabilities similar to those displayed by Mythos. While we are actively investing in
and enhancing our security infrastructure and controls, we have operated in the past, and may in the future
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operate, for periods of time with known limitations or gaps in our defenses as we continue to mature our
security posture, and no information security program can be expected to prevent all possible incidents. There
can be no assurance that we will be able to prevent or adequately detect and defend against all cyberattacks or
other cybersecurity incidents affecting our systems, including incidents caused by nation-state and state-
sponsored actors. An unauthorized exfiltration of our model weights could enable adversaries to bypass
significant research investment, eliminate key competitive advantages, and potentially raise national security
concerns if such technology is acquired by malicious actors. Further, if our model weights were obtained by
unauthorized actors, such actors may be able to deploy such models outside of our usage policy, safety
mechanisms, or monitoring frameworks, which could enable harmful or misuse scenarios that our safeguards
are designed to prevent and could subject us to regulatory, reputational, or public scrutiny for having developed
such capabilities.
We have faced and expect to face insider threat risks and vulnerabilities related to hiring processes, identity
verification, remote work environments, and compromised devices that could enable unauthorized access to
sensitive systems or information. We have been and expect that we will continue to be targeted by individuals
seeking employment under false identities, or with ulterior or malicious motives for seeking employment with
us and the third parties on which we rely. We also face the risk that employees, contractors, or other personnel
with authorized access to our systems, model weights, or other sensitive information may be compromised after
joining us, including due to efforts by state-sponsored actors, competitors, or others to recruit, bribe, coerce, or
otherwise induce such personnel, or to compromise their credentials or devices, in order to misappropriate
sensitive information, enable unauthorized access, or introduce vulnerabilities into our systems, models, or
products. Because personnel with authorized access to our model weights and other core intellectual property
are particularly attractive targets, and because our remote and distributed work environment and our reliance
on third-party vendors for certain key processes may limit our visibility into such conduct, we may be unable to
prevent or timely detect these insider threats. In addition, in certain jurisdictions in which we operate or in
which our vendors or the operators of facilities hosting our infrastructure are located, such personnel, vendors,
or operators may be legally compelled to cooperate with government authorities, including intelligence and
security agencies, in ways contrary to our interests, such as by providing access to our systems, data, or model
weights. The laws of those jurisdictions may prohibit the affected parties from notifying us of such demands
and may afford us limited or no ability to challenge them, and because such cooperation may be lawful where it
occurs and involves personnel acting within their authorized access, our insider-threat and other security
controls may not detect it.
We have also seen, and expect to continue to see, industry-wide software supply chain vulnerabilities and
attacks, which could affect our or third parties’ systems, or the security of our models, platform, and
applications. Geopolitical tensions or armed conflicts around the world may increase these risks. As a result, we
may be unable to prevent or timely detect all attempts to access or exfiltrate sensitive information, including by
actors with substantial technical, financial, or geopolitical resources.
As we continue to develop and deploy new features, including those incorporating AI, our systems are exposed
to additional or evolving security risks, including those arising from emerging or imperfectly understood AI-
specific threat vectors. Such AI-specific threats include prompt injection attacks that manipulate model
behavior through malicious inputs, attempts to replicate or reverse engineer our proprietary models through
systematic API queries, adversarial inputs designed to cause model failures or misclassifications, malicious
corruption of training data that could compromise model integrity, and vulnerabilities in continuous
integration and deployment pipelines that could allow insiders or other actors to inject malicious code that is
subsequently propagated or amplified through AI-assisted development workflows. Such attacks may be
difficult to detect, may not be addressed by traditional cybersecurity defenses, and may require specialized
expertise, techniques, and infrastructure to mitigate. Further, features that rely on AI may be particularly
susceptible to unanticipated vulnerabilities as both our understanding and the broader market’s understanding
of AI-related security risks and mitigation techniques continue to develop. Our efforts to mitigate the foregoing
risks may result in false positives and our mistakenly limiting or blocking certain users from accessing our
technology, which could result in potential litigation or regulatory action.
In addition, our agentic offerings interact with external tools, APIs, databases, code repositories, and other
third-party systems, creating cybersecurity attack surfaces that are distinct from those applicable to traditional
AI models. An adversary could manipulate the content of an external data source, API response, document, or
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web page processed by an agent to cause the agent to take harmful or unauthorized actions based on that
manipulated input. An attacker could also attempt to compromise an active agent session and redirect the agent
to perform malicious actions using the customer’s authenticated credentials and permissions. Because our
agentic offerings are designed to take autonomous actions with real-world consequences, including executing
code, modifying files, sending communications, and completing transactions, a successful exploitation of these
agentic attack surfaces could result in data exfiltration, unauthorized transactions, code injection, or other
adverse effects, potentially across multiple customer deployments simultaneously. Traditional cybersecurity
defenses, including firewalls, input validation, and access controls, may not be fully effective against these novel
threat vectors, and the security community’s understanding of agentic-specific attack surfaces is still
developing.
We have in the past discovered, and may in the future discover, errors, vulnerabilities, or other defects, such as
hallucinations, in our models, platform, and applications only after deployment, including in connection with
the development of new features, integrations, or capabilities. Such issues have resulted and may in the future
result in service disruptions, degraded performance, unintended or harmful outputs, or the unauthorized
disclosure of personal or proprietary information, including through security incidents that impact the
networks, systems, and data of our customers. In addition, incidents impacting our customers may be caused by
customer misconfiguration or misuse, or by inadequate access controls or other security practices by our
customers. Such incidents, even if caused by customer misconfigurations or misuse, or by a customer’s lack of
adequate security controls, may impact our reputation or the reputation of our models, platform, and
applications, and may subject us to liability exposure, disruption of commercial relationships, or other damage.
Cyberattacks, including cyberattacks directed at our networks, our customers’ networks, or the networks of
third parties with which we have relationships, have been, and may in the future continue to be, amplified
through the use of AI, including our models, platform, and applications. Such capabilities may be used to
automate or scale attacks, impersonate employees or members of senior management, or otherwise gain
unauthorized access to our systems or those of our customers, partners, or vendors.
Failures in our internal systems or controls, security breaches, failures to comply with our privacy or data
protection commitments, or other incidents, whether resulting from malicious activity, human error, or system
limitations, could adversely affect our reputation, brand, and business and impair our ability to attract and
retain customers. Our offices and the data centers that host our infrastructure, many of which are operated by
third parties, are also exposed to physical threats as well as failures by the operators of those facilities. A
physical intrusion could damage equipment, interrupt our services, or provide a path to our systems and data,
including our model weights, that bypasses our network defenses.
Although we have dedicated significant resources designed to identify and address these security risks, we
cannot guarantee that our security measures will be effective or that our recovery protocols, backup, and other
systems will be sufficient. Even where we detect an incident, our response may prove inadequate, including if
we misjudge its severity, respond too slowly, or fail to fully remediate the underlying cause. In addition,
incidents that appear minor when they occur may later prove significant when considered together with other
incidents or with information learned afterward, and a series of related incidents, none of which is material on
its own, could prove material in the aggregate. We continue to devote significant resources to protect against
security breaches and other incidents, and we may need to devote significant resources in the future to mitigate
and address problems caused by breaches and other incidents, which may divert resources from the growth and
expansion of our business.
Any actual or perceived security breach or other incident experienced by us or third parties with whom we do
business, particularly our CSPs, could damage our reputation and brand, cause our business to suffer, require
us to expend significant capital and other resources, cause us to incur increasing costs, including costs to deploy
additional personnel and protection technologies, train employees, and engage third-party experts and
consultants, expose us to litigation or regulatory action, cause us to violate applicable privacy, data protection,
security, and other laws and regulations, subject us to adverse publicity and a loss of confidence in our security
measures, and cause us to incur significant fines, penalties, and other liability exposure, which could adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. We have taken steps to limit our liability for
certain incidents, for example through warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability in our terms of service,
but those contractual protections may not be upheld, or may not apply to certain claims, or may otherwise be
insufficient to limit our liability exposure under applicable law.
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In the EU, we face increasingly stringent regulatory reporting obligations for cybersecurity and AI-related
incidents. Under the GDPR, we must notify the competent regulators about incidents that involve personal data
and are likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. Similarly, the EU Network and
Information Security Directive 2022/2555 (“NIS2”) requires us to notify the competent authorities of any
significant cybersecurity incident through a staged process. In addition, the EU AI Act requires providers of
general-purpose AI models with systemic risk to keep track of, document, and report serious incidents without
undue delay to the AI Office and competent authorities. Going forward, providers and deployers of high-risk AI
systems, as defined under the EU AI Act, will also have to report serious incidents or malfunctions without
undue delay in certain circumstances.
In the United States, companies are increasingly subject to analogous incident reporting obligations, including
under federal and state data breach notification laws, such as the New York Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic
Data Security (SHIELD) Act. In addition, certain U.S. states have adopted incident reporting laws specific to
frontier model providers, such as the New York Responsible AI Safety and Education Act (RAISE Act) and the
California Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act. These frameworks create heightened compliance
and liability exposure in case of delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate incident disclosures.
While we currently maintain insurance that may cover certain costs, liabilities, and other losses in connection
with security breaches and other incidents, the insurance market for such losses is continuously evolving, and
we may be unable to obtain coverage for certain cybersecurity-related or data-related liabilities on commercially
reasonable terms, or at all, leaving us exposed to potentially significant uninsured losses. Furthermore, there
can be no guarantee that the insurance coverage we do maintain will be adequate to compensate us for the
potential losses, or that any insurance claims we submit will be covered, paid in a timely manner, or paid at all
by our insurance carrier or carriers.
We employ automated data collection across the web and use other methods to collect data for
training our AI models, and such activities may subject us to liability or limit our ability to
use the collected data, which may adversely affect our business, financial condition, and
results of operations.
We collect and use various data sources to train our AI models, including publicly available information from
the internet, datasets licensed or commissioned from third parties, and synthetic data generated by our own
models. We use such data across the stages of model development, including pre-training and post-training. To
collect publicly available information, we utilize web scraping or web crawling techniques, book scanning, and
other methods. While we take steps designed to ensure that our activities comply with applicable law,
applicable robots.txt notices, and relevant technical measures such as paywalls or logins, our efforts may not
always be successful. Further, we may not be able to verify whether information collected using such techniques
is protected under privacy, copyright, or other intellectual property laws in certain cases, and our use of any
such protected information may subject us to additional liability for intellectual property infringement or
privacy violations. More broadly, inadequate documentation of training data sources, provenance, or chain of
custody could create legal exposure, complicate our ability to respond to regulatory inquiries or litigation
discovery requests, or raise concerns during due diligence by investors, partners, or potential acquirers that
could adversely affect our strategic transactions or business relationships.
Our data collection activities have in the past resulted, are presently the subject of, and may in the future result
in, litigation or other actions filed or instituted against us, alleging that our scraping, web crawling, and other
techniques to collect data violate the law. For example, Reddit, Inc. has filed suit against us, captioned Reddit,
Inc. v. Anthropic PBC, alleging we improperly accessed posts stored on Reddit, Inc.’s platform in violation of its
legal rights. On July 3, 2025, we filed a notice of removal of the case to federal court. The case was remanded to
state court on March 30, 2026. The lawsuit is currently pending, and we continue to defend ourselves against
the allegations.
The costs of defending against such litigation, regardless of merit, are considerable, and such litigation may
divert management and key personnel’s attention and resources, which may seriously harm our business,
financial condition, and results of operations. Claims of allegedly illegal scraping and web crawling techniques
may be extremely broad, and it may not be possible for us to conduct our business in such a way as to avoid all
such claims.
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We may be required to settle such litigation on terms that are unfavorable to us. For example, a settlement may
require us to discontinue such allegedly illegal practices, preclude us from using certain scraping and web
crawling techniques, and/or require us to develop alternative technology or practices. The development of
alternative technology or practices would require significant effort and expense or may not be successful.
Similarly, if any litigation to which we may be a party fails to settle and we go to trial, we may be subject to an
unfavorable judgment which may not be reversible upon appeal. The terms of a judgment may require us to
cease some or all of our operations or require the payment of substantial amounts. Any of these events could
cause our business, financial condition, and results of operations to be adversely affected.
We collect, integrate, and analyze data via agreements from multiple sources, including data
provided by our customers and users and data sourced from third parties under contractual
arrangements, and such activities may subject us to liability or limit our ability to use the
collected data, which may adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of
operations.
If we or the customers, users, or third parties from which we source data lack sufficient rights to collect, use,
process, share, or analyze certain third-party data—including for training or improving analytical or AI models
—we could be subject to legal claims, regulatory scrutiny, or contractual liability. Such claims could require us
to limit functionality, segregate data, or retrain models, and could adversely affect our business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
The costs of defending against such litigation, regardless of merit, are considerable, and such litigation may
divert management and key personnel’s attention and resources, which may adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations. Claims of misappropriation, misuse, infringement, privacy
violations, or other violations of intellectual property or contractual rights, as well as other claims related to
using particular data, may be extremely broad, and as such, it is likely we will face certain claims in the ordinary
course of business.
We have been, are currently defending against, and may in the future be subject to,
intellectual property rights claims by third parties, which are extremely costly to defend, may
require us to pay significant damages, and may limit our ability to use certain technologies,
which may adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
There is considerable intellectual property development activity in our industry. Our competitors, as well as a
number of other entities, including non-practicing entities and individuals, may own or claim to own
intellectual property rights relating to our industry or our technology. As we face increasing competition and
our public profile increases, the possibility of intellectual property rights claims against us may also increase.
To train our models, we use material from many sources, some of which may include third-party copyrighted
content or trademarks. Regardless of whether the material is copyrighted or the trademarks are registered,
parties who own the rights to that content or those trademarks, or distribute that content, may attempt to sue
us based on intellectual property infringement or other theories. We also face claims that outputs generated by
our models infringe, or facilitate infringement of, third-party works. Lawsuits asserting such claims have been
filed, are pending, and may be filed in the future in the United States and internationally. For example, in
September 2025, we reached an agreement to settle a copyright infringement class action, captioned Bartz, et
al. v. Anthropic PBC (“Bartz”), for $1.5 billion, which was approved by the district court in July 2026. As
additional examples, various publishers have filed suit against us alleging copyright infringement of song lyrics
and unlawful removal of copyright management information in the cases captioned Concord Music Group, Inc.,
et al. v. Anthropic PBC, Concord Music Group, Inc., et al. v. Anthropic PBC et al., BMG Rights Management
(US) LLC v. Anthropic PBC, Round Hill Music LP, et al. v. Anthropic PBC, Sony Music Publishing (US) LLC v.
Anthropic PBC et al., and others. Similarly, a third party alleges we accessed and reproduced posts stored on
the third party’s platform in violation of its legal rights and has filed suit against us, captioned Reddit, Inc. v.
Anthropic PBC. The possibility of statutory damages under some intellectual property legal frameworks creates
additional risk for us. We are vigorously defending ourselves in these pending lawsuits and believe we have
meritorious defenses, though these lawsuits address novel issues and areas of law that make the results
uncertain.
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We also face patent infringement claims, which may seek substantial damages or injunctive relief limiting our
ability to use certain technologies, and we expect such claims may increasingly be asserted as our public profile
grows. Moreover, certain of our competitors hold substantially larger patent portfolios than we do, which they
could assert against us and which may limit our ability to obtain effective cross-licenses or to counter such
assertions with our own patent rights.
The costs of defending against such litigation, regardless of merit, are considerable, and such litigation may
divert management and key personnel’s attention and resources, which may adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations. Claims of misappropriation, misuse, infringement, or other
violations of intellectual property rights, as well as other claims related to using particular content, may be
extremely broad, and as such, it is likely we will face certain claims in the ordinary course of business.
We may be required to settle such litigation on terms that are unfavorable to us. For example, a settlement may
require us to obtain a license to continue practices alleged to violate a third party’s rights, which may not be
available on reasonable terms and may significantly increase our operating expenses. Such a license may not be
available to us at all. As a result, we may be required to develop alternative technology or practices or
discontinue such allegedly infringing practices. The development of alternative technology or practices would
require significant effort and expense or may not be successful.
Similarly, if any litigation to which we may be a party fails to settle and we go to trial, we may be subject to an
unfavorable judgment which may not be reversible upon appeal. The terms of a judgment may require us to
cease some or all of our operations or require the payment of substantial amounts. Any of these events could
cause our business, financial condition, and results of operations to be adversely affected.
We also offer to indemnify our contract counterparties for certain third-party infringement claims against
them, and such indemnification obligations may be excluded from contractual limitation of liability provisions
that limit our exposure. In certain cases, our indemnification obligations may be broad or unlimited in scope,
which could expose us to significant contingent liabilities, particularly given the unsettled nature of intellectual
property law as applied to AI-generated outputs and the potential for claims to arise from a wide range of
customer use cases that we cannot predict or control. For example, certain of our agreements require us to
defend and indemnify the counterparty, without a cap on our liability, against third-party claims alleging that
our models, or outputs generated by our models, infringe third-party intellectual property rights. In addition, as
described in the section titled “—We may be exposed to liability, litigation, and regulatory action arising from
harms associated with our AI models, and our contractual protections and insurance may be insufficient, any of
which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations,” certain of our
agreements with external evaluators and testing vendors require us to defend and indemnify the evaluator,
without a cap on our liability, against certain third-party claims, including claims of intellectual property
infringement. Third-party infringement claims may require us to initiate or defend protracted and costly
litigation on behalf of our customers and distribution partners, regardless of the merits of these claims. If any of
these claims succeed, we may be forced to pay damages on behalf of our customers and distribution partners,
may be required to modify our allegedly infringing models, platform, and applications to make them non-
infringing, or may be required to obtain licenses under the infringed intellectual property rights. If we cannot
obtain all necessary licenses on commercially reasonable terms or are unable to modify our models, platform,
and applications or technology so that they are no longer infringing, our customers may be forced to stop using
our models, platform, and applications, and our distribution partners may be forced to stop selling our models,
platform, and applications. Even if we do not litigate these matters to a judgment, we may be required to settle
such litigation on terms that are unfavorable to us.
If we fail to adequately protect our intellectual property rights, our competitive position may
be impaired, and we may lose valuable assets, generate reduced revenue, and incur costly
litigation to protect our rights, which may adversely affect our business, financial condition,
and results of operations.
Our success is dependent, in part, upon protecting our intellectual property rights and proprietary information.
We rely and expect to continue to rely on a combination of trademark, copyright, patent, and trade secret
protection laws, along with contractual restrictions, to protect our intellectual property rights and proprietary
information. However, we cannot guarantee that the steps we take to protect our intellectual property rights
and proprietary information will be sufficient, or that we will have adequate remedies for any such failure. In
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particular, current or former employees, contractors, or other insiders with access to our proprietary model
weights, training data, algorithms, research insights, or other proprietary information could misappropriate
such information, whether for personal gain, to benefit competitors, to harm our company, or for other
purposes, and our confidentiality agreements and internal security controls may not be sufficient to prevent or
detect such malfeasance.
Further, third parties have in the past, and may in the future, knowingly or unknowingly infringe or circumvent
our intellectual property rights, and we may not be able to prevent infringement without incurring substantial
expense. Litigation brought to protect and enforce our intellectual property rights has been, and would be,
costly, time-consuming, and distracting to management and key personnel, and could result in the impairment
or loss of portions of our intellectual property rights. Further, our efforts to enforce our intellectual property
rights may be met with defenses, counterclaims, and countersuits attacking the validity and enforceability of
our intellectual property rights and may result in injunctive relief or monetary damages against us. If the
protection of our intellectual property rights is inadequate to prevent use or misappropriation by third parties,
the value of our brand and other intangible assets may be diminished and competitors may be able to more
effectively mimic our models, platform, and applications and methods of operations. In addition, due to the
significant amount of discovery required in connection with intellectual property litigation, our confidential
information may be compromised by disclosure during litigation. Any of these events would have an adverse
effect on our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our future success and competitive position depend in part upon our ability to obtain or maintain certain
intellectual property rights used in our models, platform, and applications. While we have issued patents and
have patent applications pending, we may be unable to obtain patent protection for the technology covered in
our patent applications. In addition, we cannot ensure that any of the patent applications will be granted or that
the claims allowed on any issued patents will be sufficiently broad to protect our technology or models,
platform, and applications and provide us with competitive advantages. Further, any issued patents may be
challenged, invalidated, or circumvented by third parties.
Many patent applications in the United States may not be public for a period of time after they are filed, and
since publication of discoveries in the scientific or patent literature tends to lag behind actual discoveries by
several months, we cannot be certain that we will be the first creator of inventions covered by any patent
application we make or that we will be the first to file patent applications on such inventions. Because some
patent applications may not be public for a period of time, there is also a risk that we could adopt a technology
without knowledge of a pending patent application, which technology would infringe a third-party patent once
that patent is issued.
We also rely on unpatented proprietary technology. It is possible that others will independently develop the
same or similar technology or otherwise obtain access to our unpatented technology. To protect our trade
secrets and other proprietary information, our policy requires employees, consultants, and independent
contractors to enter into confidentiality agreements. We cannot guarantee that these agreements will provide
sufficient protection for our trade secrets, know-how, or other proprietary information in the event of any
unauthorized use, misappropriation, or disclosure of such trade secrets, know-how, or other proprietary
information, or that the employee, consultant, or independent contractor will not breach their confidentiality
agreements with us. If we are unable to maintain the proprietary nature of our technologies, our business could
be adversely affected.
We also rely on our trademarks, trade names, and brand names to distinguish our models, platform, and
applications from the products of our competitors and have registered or applied to register many of these
trademarks in the United States and certain countries outside the United States. However, occasionally third
parties have registered and acquired, and may in the future register or acquire, common law rights in identical
or similar marks for products or solutions that also address similar markets to our own and have tried to
enforce such rights. As we rely in part on brand names and trademark protection to enforce our intellectual
property rights, efforts by third parties to limit use of our brand names or trademarks and barriers to the
registration of brand names and trademarks in various countries may restrict our ability to promote and
maintain a cohesive brand throughout our key markets. There can also be no assurance that pending or future
U.S. or non-U.S. trademark applications will be approved in a timely manner or at all, or that such registrations
will effectively protect our brand names and trademarks. Additionally, third parties have opposed, and may in
the future oppose, our trademark applications or otherwise challenge our use of the trademarks. In the event
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that our trademarks are successfully challenged, we could be forced to rebrand our models, platform, and
applications, which would result in loss of brand recognition and would require us to devote resources to
advertising and marketing new brands. Although we take measures to protect our property, if we are unable to
prevent the theft of our intellectual property or its exploitation, the value of our investments may be
undermined and our business, financial condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected.
We incorporate open-source software in our models, platform, and applications, which may
subject us to litigation or other requirements, each of which may adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
A portion of the technologies we use in our models, platform, and applications incorporates open-source
software, and we may incorporate open-source software in our models, platform, and applications in the future.
From time to time, companies that use third-party open-source software have faced claims challenging the use
of such open-source software and their compliance with the terms of the applicable open-source license. We
may be subject to suits by parties claiming ownership of what we believe to be open-source software or claiming
non-compliance with the applicable open-source licensing terms. Some open-source licenses require end-users
who distribute or make available across a network software that includes open-source software to make
available all or part of such software (which may include valuable proprietary code), at no cost, or license such
software under the terms of the particular open-source license. While we employ practices designed to help
ensure our compliance with the licenses of third-party open-source software and protect our valuable
proprietary source code, we may inadvertently use third-party open-source software in a manner that exposes
us to claims of non-compliance with the applicable terms of such license, including claims for infringement of
intellectual property rights or for breach of contract. These risks may be heightened by our use of our own AI
tools, including Claude Code, in our software development processes, as AI-generated code could incorporate or
reproduce open-source software such that the associated license obligations, including copyleft requirements to
disclose or license proprietary source code, apply to us without our knowledge. Similar concerns regarding AI-
generated code could also lead enterprise customers to limit their use of our products. Further, there is an
increasing number of open-source software license types, almost none of which have been tested in a court of
law, resulting in a dearth of judicial guidance regarding the proper legal interpretation of such license types. If a
third party makes a claim against us alleging that we have not complied with the conditions of the applicable
open-source license, we could incur significant legal expenses defending against such allegations, expend
substantial time and resources to re-engineer some or all of our software, and could be subject to significant
damages, enjoined from the sale of our models, platform, and applications that contained the open-source
software, and required to comply with the conditions of the open-source license, which may include the public
release of certain portions of our proprietary source code, each of which may have an adverse impact on our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
In addition to risks related to license requirements, use of open-source software can lead to greater risks than
use of third-party commercial software because open-source licensors generally do not provide warranties or
other contractual protections regarding misappropriation, misuse, infringement, ownership, misattribution, or
other violations, the quality of the code, or the origin of the open-source software. Many of the risks associated
with the use of open-source software cannot be eliminated and may adversely affect our business, financial
condition, and results of operations. For instance, open-source software is developed by programmers beyond
our control and may have security vulnerabilities, defects, or errors of which we may not be aware. Even if we
become aware of any such vulnerabilities, defects, or errors, it may take a significant amount of time for either
us or the relevant programmers to address such vulnerabilities, defects, or errors. Such a delay may negatively
impact our models, platform, and applications, including by adversely affecting the market’s perception of our
models, platform, and applications, impairing the functionality of our models, platform, and applications, or
delaying the launch of new features or functionality on our models, platform, and applications, any of which
may adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We currently, and may in the future, license technology from third parties for use in our
models, platform, and applications, and our inability to maintain those licenses could
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations, and our use of
such third-party technology could subject us to litigation.
We currently incorporate, and may in the future incorporate, technology that we license from third parties into
our models, platform, and applications. If we are unable to obtain or continue to use or license these
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technologies on reasonable terms, or if these technologies become unreliable, unavailable, or fail to operate
properly, we may not be able to secure adequate alternatives in a timely manner or at all, and our ability to offer
our models, platform, and applications and remain competitive in our market would be harmed. Further,
licensing technologies from third parties exposes us to increased risk of being the subject of intellectual
property infringement claims and vulnerabilities due to, among other things, our lower level of visibility into
the development process with respect to such technology and the care taken to safeguard against risks. We
cannot be certain that our licensors do not or will not infringe on the intellectual property rights of third parties
or that our licensors have or will have sufficient rights in the licensed technology or related intellectual property
rights in all jurisdictions in which we may sell or offer our models, platform, and applications. Some of our
agreements with our licensors may be terminated by them or otherwise provide for a limited term. If we are
unable to continue to license technology because of intellectual property infringement claims brought by third
parties against our licensors or against us, or if we are unable to continue our license agreements or enter into
new licenses on commercially reasonable terms, our ability to develop and sell our models, platform, and
applications containing or dependent on that technology would be limited, and our business, financial
condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
Additionally, if we are unable to license technology from third parties, we may be forced to acquire or develop
alternative technology, which we may be unable to do in a commercially feasible manner, or at all, and may
require us to use alternative technology of lower quality or performance standards. This could limit or delay our
ability to offer new or competitive offerings and increase our costs. Third-party software we rely on may be
updated infrequently, unsupported, or include errors or vulnerabilities that may not be resolved in a timely
manner, any of which may result in errors in our own models, platform, and applications or expose our models,
platform, and applications to vulnerabilities. Any impairment of the technologies or of our relationship with
these third parties could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our development of solutions that replace or reduce reliance on third-party vendors may
expose us to litigation and other disputes.
We develop and deploy proprietary and partner-based solutions that replace, deprecate, or reduce our reliance
on third-party vendors, including vendors that historically provided software, services, or infrastructure
supporting our business. These vendors may perceive our actions as adversely affecting their business interests
and may assert claims against us, including claims for breach of contract, intellectual property infringement
(including patents, copyrights, or trade secrets), misuse of confidential or proprietary information, tortious
interference, or unfair competition.
Such claims may be asserted regardless of their merit and could result in costly litigation, settlements,
injunctions, or restrictions on our ability to deploy or expand our models, platform, and applications.
Defending against these claims could divert management and key personnel’s attention and resources, require
significant legal expenditures, and adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We may be subject to claims that we or our employees have misappropriated the intellectual
property of other companies, particularly as we hire employees from other AI and technology
companies.
Our success depends in part on our ability to attract and retain highly skilled employees, including engineers,
data scientists, and researchers with experience in AI and machine learning. As competition for AI talent
continues to intensify, we have hired and may in the future hire employees who previously worked for or have
otherwise been involved with competitors or companies operating in related technology areas, and certain of
our employees have left and others may leave to work for such competitors.
These employees may have had access to proprietary or confidential information, including trade secrets, of
their former employers. Although we require employees to comply with confidentiality and intellectual property
obligations, we may nonetheless be subject to claims that we or our employees have misappropriated or
improperly used trade secrets or other intellectual property of competitors or other companies. Such claims
may be asserted even if we believe they are without merit and even in the absence of any intentional
misconduct.
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Defending against these claims could be costly, time-consuming, and disruptive, and could divert management
attention and resources away from our business. In addition, such disputes could result in damages,
settlements, injunctive relief, restrictions on our ability to use certain technologies, limitations on the roles of
certain employees, or reputational harm. Any of the foregoing could adversely affect our business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
Risks Related to Legal and Regulatory Matters
We are subject to claims, lawsuits, investigations, executive and administrative orders and
directives, other regulatory actions, and various actions and proceedings, and face potential
liability, expenses for legal claims, and harm to our business.
We are subject to claims, lawsuits, arbitration proceedings, government inquiries and investigations, executive
and administrative orders and directives, and other legal, regulatory, and administrative actions and
proceedings, including those involving intellectual property disputes, compliance with regulatory requirements,
government approvals and authorizations, labor and employment, anti-discrimination, commercial disputes,
competition, privacy, consumer protection, customer complaints, advertising, and other matters relating to our
technology, models, platform, and applications, and we may become subject to additional types of claims,
lawsuits, arbitration proceedings, government inquiries and investigations, executive and administrative orders
and directives, and other legal, regulatory, and administrative actions and proceedings as our business grows
and as we deploy new technologies, models, platforms, and applications. In particular, as our models, platform,
and applications increasingly include agentic AI systems capable of taking autonomous actions with real-world
consequences, we may face novel legal theories of liability, including intellectual property infringement,
product liability, agency, and negligence claims, that have not been tested in the context of autonomous AI
systems and for which the scope of our potential exposure is uncertain. In addition, as we expand our
healthcare and life sciences offerings, regulators may conclude that certain of our products, or our customers’
use of them, are subject to healthcare regulation or to other laws governing healthcare and health information,
which could require us to obtain authorizations, modify or restrict our offerings, or incur significant compliance
costs. Errors or other undesirable outputs from our models in these contexts could contribute to patient harm,
compromised research, or regulatory failures by our customers, and could expose us to claims from customers,
patients, and other third parties, as well as to regulatory inquiries and enforcement actions.
We are also subject to antitrust and competition law risk arising from our public advocacy regarding AI safety
and the responsible pace of AI development and from our participation in industry groups, safety
collaborations, and standard-setting initiatives. Communications, advocacy, or collaboration among companies
that develop frontier AI models, or conduct alleged to reflect coordination among such companies, may be
characterized as concerted action subject to the antitrust and competition laws, including Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and analogous state and non-U.S. laws, even where undertaken for safety purposes, conducted
publicly, or intended as advocacy for governmental action or industry standards. In September 2026, a putative
class action was filed against us and other developers of frontier AI models in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, alleging that we and the other defendants agreed to restrain competition by
slowing the pace at which we develop and improve our respective AI models, in purported violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act. The complaint seeks treble damages, injunctive relief, and other relief on behalf of a
purported class of purchasers of the defendants’ paid consumer subscriptions. We disagree with the claims and
intend to defend the matter vigorously, but the outcome of this and any similar proceeding is inherently
uncertain.
Antitrust litigation can be complex, protracted, disruptive, and expensive, and an adverse outcome could result
in treble damages and injunctive relief. We could also become subject to additional private litigation or to
investigations or enforcement actions by the U.S. Department of Justice, the FTC, state attorneys general, or
non-U.S. competition authorities. We have proposed public efforts to work with the U.S. government and other
developers of frontier AI models to establish safety standards, including with respect to the pace of capability
development, and have suggested that such collaboration may warrant a narrow exemption or safe harbor from
antitrust laws. These proposals have drawn public opposition from political leaders, some of whom have
characterized such efforts as anticompetitive regardless of the purpose of such exemption or safe harbor. There
is no assurance that any such exemption or safe harbor will be adopted. Our advocacy for such an exemption,
and any safety commitments we pursue with other developers of frontier AI in its absence, could subject us to
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additional regulatory, litigation, and other risks. These risks may cause us to limit or modify our public
advocacy, our participation in industry safety and standard-setting initiatives, and our communications with
other developers of frontier AI, which could adversely affect our ability to pursue collaborative approaches to AI
safety that we believe are important to our mission.
The results of any such claims, lawsuits, arbitration proceedings, government inquiries and investigations,
executive and administrative orders and directives, or other legal, regulatory, and administrative actions and
proceedings cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. Any claims, lawsuits, investigations, orders,
directives, regulatory actions, or proceedings against us, whether meritorious or not, could adversely affect our
revenue, cause potential customers to pause sales discussions, cause existing customers to delay, pause, or
cancel contracts or seek to modify their contracts, undermine our ability to pursue future contracts, damage our
relationships with partners and customers, adversely affect our institutional standing, undermine investor
confidence, limit our ability to sell our models, platform, and applications in certain industries, result in costly
litigation or regulatory or other defense, adversely affect our reputation, require significant management
attention, consume significant time, and divert significant resources.
Determining reserves for our pending litigation or other disputes is a complex and fact-intensive process that
requires significant subjective judgment and speculation. It is possible that a resolution of one or more such
proceedings could result in substantial damages, settlement costs, fines, and penalties that could adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. Because of the potential risks, expenses, and
uncertainties of litigation or other dispute resolution processes, we may, from time to time, settle disputes, even
where we have meritorious claims or defenses, by agreeing to settlement agreements, as we did, for example, in
Bartz. Moreover, as in Bartz, insurance may not fully cover such claims, provide sufficient payments to cover all
the costs to resolve one or more such claims, or continue to be available on terms acceptable to us. A claim
brought against us that is uninsured or underinsured could result in unanticipated costs. These proceedings
could also result in harm to our reputation and brand, sanctions, consent decrees, injunctions, or other orders
requiring a change in our business practices. Further, under certain circumstances, we have contractual and
other legal obligations to indemnify and to incur legal expenses on behalf of our business and commercial
partners and current and former directors and officers. Any of these consequences could adversely affect our
business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We are subject to anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws, anti-money laundering laws, and
similar laws.
We are required to comply with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, the United Kingdom
Bribery Act 2010, and other anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws, anti-money laundering laws, and similar
laws in the United States and non-U.S. countries where we have operations and conduct business. Anti-
corruption and anti-bribery laws, which have been enforced aggressively and are interpreted broadly, prohibit
companies and their employees, agents, intermediaries, and other third parties from, among other things,
promising, authorizing, making, or offering improper payments or other benefits to government officials and
other persons in the public and private sector.
We leverage third parties, including intermediaries and agents, to conduct our business and to sell our models,
platform, and applications, and in connection with lobbying and other activities. We and these third parties
have in the past and may in the future have direct or indirect interactions with officials and employees of
government agencies, including state-owned or state-affiliated entities, and we potentially could be held liable
for the corrupt or other illegal activities of third-party business partners and intermediaries, our employees,
representatives, contractors, partners, agents, and other third parties, even if we do not explicitly authorize
such parties’ activities.
We cannot ensure that our policies and procedures to address compliance with these anti-corruption and anti-
money laundering laws will be effective, or that all of our employees, representatives, contractors, partners,
agents, intermediaries, or other third parties have not taken, or will not take, actions that violate these laws, for
which we may be ultimately held liable.
As we increase our non-U.S. sales and business, our risk of violating these laws may increase. Non-compliance
with applicable anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws, anti-money laundering laws, and similar laws could
subject us to criminal or civil sanctions, settlements, prosecution, loss of export privileges, suspension or
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debarment from U.S. government contracts, other enforcement actions, disgorgement of profits, significant
fines, damages, other civil and criminal penalties or injunctions, whistleblower complaints, adverse media
coverage, and other consequences. Any investigations, actions, or sanctions could adversely affect our
reputation, business, financial condition, and results of operations. Responding to any investigation or action
could result in a significant diversion of management’s attention and resources and significant defense costs
and other professional fees.
Governmental trade controls, including export and import controls, sanctions, customs
requirements, and related regimes, could subject us to liability or loss of contracting
privileges or limit our ability to compete in certain markets.
Our models, platform, and applications are subject to U.S. export controls, and our current or future models,
platform, and applications may be controlled under the Export Administration Regulations administered by the
U.S. Department of Commerce or, in more limited circumstances, under the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (the “ITAR”) administered by the U.S. Department of State. Because the capabilities of our AI
models are currently evolving rapidly through ongoing training and frequent model development, and because
the export control treatment of AI technologies under relevant laws is developing, the classification of, and
controls related to, our models, platform, applications, and technologies under these regimes are inherently
uncertain and are likely to change over time. Certain of our models, platform, and applications, and the
underlying technology and source code associated with our models, platform, and applications, may require
authorization for export, re-export, or transfer in-country, and for individuals of certain nationalities to access
such technology or source code, including within the United States.
In particular, our core models, platform, and applications leverage encryption for data protection, and some of
our future models, platform, and applications may be able to produce export-controlled software, which may
subject exports, re-exports, and transfer of such models, platform, and applications to export authorization
requirements.
Our commercially available models, platform, and applications generally can be exported without an export
license. However, some exports may require us to obtain authorization from the cognizant government agency.
In certain contexts, the provision of our models, platform, and applications may constitute export of defense
articles or defense services subject to the ITAR, which can be exported only if we obtain required export licenses
or other government authorizations. Compliance with applicable export controls may delay the introduction or
sale of our models, platform, and applications outside the United States, restrict our customers’ ability to deploy
our models, platform, and applications globally, inhibit our ability to engage in certain research and
development activities, limit the performance of our models, platform, and applications, or prohibit exports to
certain jurisdictions altogether. Such restrictions have already affected our offerings directly. For example, in
June 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed worldwide export restrictions on our Fable 5 and
Mythos 5 models. To ensure compliance, we disabled Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all of our customers; access to
our other models was not affected. We redeployed the Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models after we updated our
safeguards in coordination with the U.S. government and our industry partners and once the U.S. Department
of Commerce lifted its restrictions. Similar export controls could recur, could remain in place longer, or could
extend to additional models or capabilities. In addition, future updates to our safeguards or other remedial
measures may not be sufficient to obtain relief from such restrictions or relief may not be granted on a similar
timeline or at all. The restrictions imposed in June 2026 and potential restrictions in the future may also limit
our ability to recruit talent, to fully utilize our existing workforce, to continue to improve our models, and to
make our products available internationally. Any such restrictions could adversely affect our financial results;
impair the research, compute, and development investment our models represent; and cause us to lose
customers, partners, and market share, including to competitors not subject to similar restrictions.
Further, our activities are subject to economic, financial, and trade sanctions administered by the United States
and other countries. Economic, financial, and trade sanctions restrict or prohibit providing certain services and
engaging in certain transactions or other activities or dealings with individuals, entities, organizations,
governments, territories, and countries targeted by or the subject of these sanctions. These restrictions, as well
as other applicable international trade rules, are subject to change with little to no notice. In addition, U.S. law
increasingly authorizes the U.S. government to restrict or review the use of hardware, software, and services
originating from, or linked to, countries it designates as adversaries, including such technology incorporated
into the supply chains for the data centers and compute infrastructure on which we depend. Such restrictions
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could narrow our choice of suppliers, delay our infrastructure projects, or increase our costs, and any non-
compliance could result in penalties, loss of contracting privileges, or reputational harm.
We take various steps to comply with applicable export controls and sanctions, including: maintaining a global
trade policy and a supported regions policy, implementing IP-based geo-blocking controls that restrict access
from certain jurisdictions to our models, platform, and applications, conducting restricted party screening of
certain customers and vendors, and including sanctions and export compliance provisions in our customer
terms of service and vendor agreements. However, we cannot guarantee the compliance measures and internal
controls we have adopted will prevent violations of applicable export controls and sanctions. Our compliance
measures and internal controls have not always been and may not always be fully effective, and we have in the
past voluntarily disclosed, and may in the future voluntarily disclose, instances of non-compliance to the
relevant authorities. We cannot guarantee that our measures will prevent future violations or keep pace with
the changing substance, application, and interpretation of export controls and sanctions. In addition, third
parties have in the past and may in the future take action to circumvent our compliance measures and controls
in order to gain access to our products and services.
If we misclassify a product or service, export, re-export, transfer, or provide access to a product, or provide
services in violation of applicable export controls or sanctions, or otherwise fail to comply with applicable
export controls or sanctions, we could be subject to criminal or civil sanctions, settlements, prosecution, loss of
export privileges, suspension or debarment from U.S. government contracts, other enforcement actions,
disgorgement of profits, significant fines, damages, other civil and criminal penalties or injunctions,
whistleblower complaints, adverse media coverage, and other consequences. Any investigations, actions, or
sanctions could adversely affect our reputation, business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Responding to any investigation or action could result in a significant diversion of management’s attention and
resources and significant defense costs and other professional fees.
Decreased use of our models, platform, and applications by customers outside the United States or a limitation
on our ability to export, provide access to, or sell our models, platform, and applications to customers and other
parties outside the United States may cause our revenue from such unsupported jurisdictions to decline and
otherwise adversely affect our business and financial condition.
If we or our business partners or counterparties, including licensors and licensees, prime contractors,
subcontractors, sublicensors, vendors, customers, or contractors, violate export controls or sanctions, including
by failing to obtain appropriate import, export, or re-export licenses or permits, or if we fail to secure such
contractual commitments from such parties, we may also be adversely affected through reputational harm as
well as other negative consequences, including government investigations or penalties.
Negative consequences stemming from violations or apparent violations of export controls or sanctions may
include the loss of the right to sell our models, platform, and applications or services to the U.S. government, or
to other U.S. or non-U.S. public bodies, or a reduction in our ability to compete for such sales opportunities
involving government agencies or other public bodies. Further, ensuring that we are complying with applicable
export controls and sanctions regulations may be time-consuming and could result in the delay or loss of sales
opportunities in connection with particular transactions.
Also, in addition to the United States, various countries regulate the import and export of certain encryption
and other technology and have enacted laws that could limit our ability to distribute our models, platform, and
applications or could limit our customers’ abilities to implement our models, platform, and applications in
those countries. For example, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States and other countries
imposed financial and trade sanctions and export controls against Russia, Belarus, and certain regions of
Ukraine, and the United States and other countries could impose wider sanctions and export restrictions and
take other actions should the conflict further escalate. Any new export restrictions, new legislation, changes in
sanctions, or shifting approaches in the enforcement or scope of existing regulations, or in the individuals,
entities, governments, territories, countries, or technologies targeted by or subject to such regulations could
result in decreased use of our models, platform, and applications by existing customers outside of the United
States, reduced adoption of our models, platform, and applications by new customers with non-U.S. operations,
limited expansion into new markets, and decreased revenue.
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To continue to grow our business, we will need to continue to expand internationally, and our
non-U.S. operations and sales to customers outside of the United States expose us to risks
inherent in international expansion, sales, and operations.
We are a U.S.-headquartered company with extensive U.S. operations, as well as subsidiaries and operations in
several other countries and regions, including the United Kingdom, the EU, Canada, and Asia-Pacific, and we
expect that our future growth will depend in part on expanding our operations, customer base, and market
presence in additional jurisdictions. Operating in non-U.S. markets requires significant resources and
management attention and subjects us to regulatory, economic, and political risks that are different from those
in the United States. As we continue to expand internationally, we have faced and will continue to face risks in
doing business internationally that could adversely affect our business, including:
•the need to localize and adapt our models, platform, and applications for specific countries, including
translation into foreign languages and associated expenses;
•privacy laws, export controls, sanctions, and other national security regulations that impose different
and potentially conflicting obligations with respect to how personal data is processed or require that
customer data be stored in a designated territory;
•laws in certain jurisdictions that may compel our personnel, vendors, or facility operators to provide
governmental authorities with access to our systems, data, or other information, in some cases without
notice to us and with limited means of recourse;
•national security-driven data security regulations. For example, the Department of Justice issued a
final rule, effective in April 2025, that places limitations, and in some cases prohibitions, on certain
transfers of covered data to partners, service providers, vendors, employees, and investors located in
China or with other specified links to China (and other designated countries). We may be required to
re-examine current contracts or engage in new contract negotiations with third parties that aid in
processing data on our behalf or otherwise have access to covered data. These rules also may broadly
require us to extract promises from other third-party service providers that they will not transfer data
we share with them onward to parties linked to countries of concern;
•import regulations, including U.S. and non-U.S. governments’ restrictive trade policies, customs duties
and other parallel regulations, tariffs, and countermeasures;
•AI, data-related, cybersecurity, and digital service laws and regulations (such as the EU AI Act, NIS2,
the EU Digital Services Act, the United Kingdom’s Online Safety Act 2023, and the EU Data Act) that
are rapidly evolving, require continuous monitoring to maintain compliance, and often provide for
substantial penalties in the event of a violation;
•difficulties in staffing and managing non-U.S. operations, including the complexity of engaging in
various employer-of-record arrangements that are geographically dispersed, and the risk that these
arrangements, or any failure to establish local employing entities on a timely basis, may not comply
with local employment, labor, or tax laws, exposing us to fines, penalties, reclassification, or back-
payment claims;
•difficulties of maintaining our culture across various jurisdictions;
•regulatory and other delays and difficulties in setting up non-U.S. operations, including delays in
forming, registering, and obtaining governmental approvals for local subsidiaries, delays in
establishing local banking, payroll, and benefits arrangements, and difficulties relating to safety of
personnel and information, any of which could delay local hiring efforts;
•the potential need for reviews by the U.S. government or non-U.S. governments of certain transactions
with non-U.S. entities;
•different pricing environments, longer sales cycles, longer accounts receivable payment cycles, and
collections issues;
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•new and different sources of competition;
•weaker protection for, and practical difficulties in enforcing, intellectual property and other legal rights
outside of the United States compared to protections available domestically;
•laws and business practices favoring local competitors;
•compliance challenges related to the complexity of multiple, conflicting, and changing governmental
laws and regulations, including copyright, employment, tax, privacy, and data protection laws and
regulations, export controls, and sanctions;
•parties outside the United States seeking to circumvent sanctions and export controls;
•increased financial accounting and reporting burdens and complexities;
•increased costs in establishing infrastructure across various jurisdictions;
•declines in the values of foreign currencies relative to the U.S. dollar;
•restrictions on the transfer of funds;
•potentially adverse tax consequences;
•the cost of and potential outcomes of any claims or litigation;
•future accounting pronouncements and changes in accounting policies;
•changes in tax laws or tax regulations; and
•regional and local economic and political conditions.
Entry into certain transactions with non-U.S. entities or persons may be subject to government regulations and
review, including review by U.S. or non-U.S. government entities related to contemplated or past foreign direct
investment (“FDI”). In recent years, many countries around the world have adopted FDI regulatory regimes
that seek to scrutinize investments into, and acquisitions of, domestic companies by non-domestic parties,
granting governments broad discretion to review contemplated and past investment and acquisition
transactions. These FDI regimes may restrict our ability to attract investments, invest in or fund partners
outside of the United States that build or operate data centers or supply infrastructure for us, or acquire
promising new technologies, companies, and talent in countries around the world, potentially limiting our
ability to carry out our business strategy.
More broadly, increasing geopolitical tensions, shifting national security priorities, and evolving technology-
focused trade, export control, investment, and data-governance regimes may result in restrictions, heightened
scrutiny, or other limitations on our ability to operate, sell products, partner with customers, or deploy our
models in certain jurisdictions or with certain counterparties. Governments may adopt or expand policies
aimed at protecting domestic technology ecosystems, restricting the cross-border flow of data, or limiting access
to AI systems, which could reduce our addressable market, increase compliance costs, or require operational
changes. In particular, the U.S. government has increasingly scrutinized AI companies’ exposure to Chinese
state actors, and future executive orders, legislation, or regulatory actions could restrict our ability to serve
customers or users connected to China, impose new compliance obligations, lead us to implement anti-abuse
mechanisms or other technical access restrictions, or limit the deployment of our models in ways that reduce
our addressable market. Any escalation of U.S.-China tensions, retaliatory measures by either government, or
failure or perceived failure by us to prevent non-U.S. state-actor access to or misuse of our technology could
subject us to regulatory action, reputational harm, and adverse effects on our business, financial condition, and
results of operations.
As we continue to expand our business globally, our success will depend, in large part, on our ability to
anticipate and effectively manage these risks. These factors and others could adversely affect our ability to
increase non-U.S. revenue and, consequently, could materially impact our business. The expansion of our
existing non-U.S. operations and entry into additional non-U.S. markets will require significant management
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attention and financial resources. Our failure to successfully manage our non-U.S. operations and the
associated risks effectively could limit the future growth of our business.
Increasing scrutiny and changing expectations from regulators, our investors, customers,
and employees with respect to ESG may result in additional compliance risk and costs and
may impact our reputation and business.
Companies across many industries are facing increasing scrutiny related to their environmental, social, and
governance (“ESG”) practices and reporting, both in the United States and internationally. For example, new
U.S. and non-U.S. laws and regulations relating to ESG matters, including environmental sustainability and
climate change, are under consideration, being adopted, or being rolled back or revised, which may impact our
necessary disclosures and increase compliance costs. Further, there is particular focus on concerns relating to
AI and its impact on society and the environment, including the power-intensive nature of the industry, public
concern regarding high consumption of water, and reliance on critical minerals and rare elements in the
manufacture of chips. Some investors may use these non-financial performance factors to guide their
investment strategies and, in some cases, may choose not to invest in us if they believe our policies and actions
relating to ESG are inadequate.
Our sustainability initiatives, goals, or commitments could be difficult to achieve or costly to implement.
Moreover, compliance with recently adopted and potential upcoming ESG requirements, including California
legislation that requires various climate-related disclosures, the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Directive and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, and the United Kingdom’s Streamlined Energy
and Carbon Reporting framework, will require the dedication of significant time and resources. At the same
time, anti-ESG sentiment has gained momentum across the United States, particularly at the federal level, and
the federal and certain state governments have enacted or proposed “anti-ESG” policies or legislation or have
issued related legal opinions. Such policies, legislation, initiatives, and scrutiny could expose any sustainability,
employment, governance, or other corporate practices we adopt to the risk of litigation, antitrust investigations
or challenges by federal or state authorities, and result in injunctions, penalties, and reputational harm.
Additionally, if our competitors’ corporate social responsibility performance is perceived to be better than ours,
potential or current investors may elect to invest with our competitors instead. Our business may face increased
scrutiny related to these activities and our related disclosures, including from the investment community and
the local communities in which we operate, and our failure to achieve progress or manage the dynamic, and at
times conflicting, public sentiment and legal landscape in these areas on a timely basis, or at all, could adversely
affect our reputation, business, and financial condition. Further, we may experience backlash from customers,
government entities, advocacy groups, employees, or other stakeholders who disagree with our actual or
perceived positions, or with our lack of position on social, environmental, governance, political, public policy,
economic, geopolitical, or other sensitive issues. Any perceived lack of transparency about these matters could
adversely affect our brand and reputation, our employees’ engagement and retention, and the willingness of our
customers and partners to do business with us. Both advocates and opponents of ESG-related matters are
increasingly resorting to a range of activism forms, including media campaigns and litigation, to advance their
perspectives. To the extent we are subject to such activism, it may require us to incur costs or otherwise
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
If we or our payment processing partners fail to manage the risks related to our payment
processing activities, we could be subject to fines, regulatory scrutiny, disruptions to our
business, or reputational harm.
A portion of our customers authorize us to bill their credit card accounts through our third-party payment
processing partners for our paid subscriptions. We have experienced, and expect to continue to experience,
fraudulent activity, including the creation of accounts using false identities and the use of stolen or otherwise
unauthorized payment credentials, which has resulted, and may in the future result, in losses, including
payment processing fees, chargeback fees, and fines and penalties imposed by our payment processors or card
networks, for which we may not be reimbursed. We maintain fraud-detection and identity-verification
measures, but these measures have not identified, and may not identify, all such activity. Further, our
customers provide us with credit card billing information online, and we do not verify the physical identity of
cardholders or conduct additional verification beyond what we collect online, which increases our risk of
exposure to fraudulent activity.
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We also incur chargebacks when customers or card issuers claim that a transaction was unauthorized or
otherwise improper. If the volume of chargebacks were to become excessive, we could be subject to higher
processing fees, additional fines, fraud mitigation requirements, or the termination or suspension of our ability
to accept certain payment methods, including credit cards, through one or more payment processors.
In addition, payment processors, card networks, and financial institutions periodically revise their rules,
standards, and practices, including data protection and documentation standards, required to utilize their
services. Our compliance with these evolving requirements, and the continued compliance of our third-party
payment processing partners, may require additional operational resources and expense. Failure by us or our
payment processing partners to comply with applicable standards could result in fines, increased scrutiny,
disruptions to our business and our ability to process payments for our intelligence service, or reputational
harm.
Risks Related to Tax and Accounting Matters
Changes in tax laws or regulations could be enacted, or existing tax laws or regulations could
be applied to us or our customers in a manner that could increase the costs of our models,
platform, and applications and adversely affect our business.
We operate in multiple jurisdictions and are subject to tax laws and regulations of U.S. federal, state, and local
and non-U.S. governments. Income, sales, use, or other tax laws, statutes, rules, regulations, or ordinances
could be enacted or amended at any time (possibly with retroactive effect) and could be applied solely or
disproportionately to models, platforms, and applications provided over the internet. These enactments or
amendments could reduce our sales activity due to the inherent cost increase the taxes would represent and
ultimately harm our results of operations and cash flows. Further, the application of U.S. federal, state, local,
and non-U.S. tax laws to services provided electronically is unclear and continuously evolving. Existing tax
laws, statutes, rules, regulations, or ordinances could be interpreted or applied adversely to us, possibly with
retroactive effect, which could require us or our customers to pay additional tax amounts, as well as fines or
penalties, and interest for past amounts. If we are unsuccessful in collecting such taxes due from our customers,
we would be held liable for such costs, thereby adversely affecting our results of operations and harming our
business.
As we expand the scale of our non-U.S. business activities, any changes in the U.S. or non-U.S. taxation of such
activities may increase our worldwide effective tax rate and harm our business, financial condition, and results
of operations. We may be subject to taxation in several jurisdictions around the world with increasingly
complex tax laws, the application of which can be uncertain. In addition, our hiring of personnel and
engagement of third-party employer-of-record providers in non-U.S. jurisdictions, as well as our data center
and other infrastructure activities outside the United States, have created, and may in the future create,
permanent establishments or other taxable presence in those jurisdictions, which could subject us to additional
income, withholding, and indirect taxes, as well as interest, penalties, and additional compliance obligations. In
advance of forming and obtaining approvals for local operating entities, we have entered into, and expect to
enter into, additional letters of intent, leases, and other agreements relating to our international compute and
infrastructure activities through interim contracting arrangements with existing entities, and we may be unable
to transfer these arrangements to local entities on a timely basis or at all. Any prolonged reliance on these
interim arrangements, or any failure to migrate them to local entities, could increase our exposure to
permanent establishment or other taxable-presence determinations and could result in non-recoverable value-
added or similar indirect taxes, which could be material in certain jurisdictions. Although we have not been
required to pay income taxes, other than in immaterial amounts in certain jurisdictions to date, the amount of
taxes we pay in these jurisdictions could increase substantially as a result of changes in the applicable tax
principles, including increased tax rates, new tax laws, or revised interpretations of existing tax laws and
precedents, which could adversely affect our liquidity and results of operations. For example, a number of
countries and organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”),
have proposed changes to existing tax laws or new laws that could impact our tax obligations, including a
framework that imposes a 15% global minimum tax, which has been implemented into the domestic laws of
some jurisdictions in the EU, among other jurisdictions, and is being considered for implementation by other
countries. On January 5, 2026, the OECD announced a “side-by-side” elective safe harbor that exempts electing
U.S.-parented multinational entities from certain provisions of the global minimum tax for fiscal years
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beginning on or after January 1, 2026. In addition, the authorities in these jurisdictions could review our tax
returns and impose additional tax, interest, and penalties, and the authorities could claim that various
withholding requirements apply to us or our subsidiaries or assert that benefits of tax treaties are not available
to us or our subsidiaries, any of which would harm us and our results of operations.
Our business, financial condition, and results of operations may be adversely affected if we
are required to collect sales or other related taxes for subscriptions to our models, platform,
and applications in jurisdictions where we have not historically done so.
We collect sales tax in a number of jurisdictions. Sales, use, value-added, digital services, and similar tax laws
and rates vary by jurisdiction. One or more states or countries may seek to impose incremental or new sales,
use, or other tax collection obligations on us. A successful assertion by a state, country, or other jurisdiction that
we should have been or should be collecting additional sales, use, or other taxes could, among other things,
result in substantial tax payments, create significant administrative burdens for us, discourage potential
customers from subscribing to our models, platform, and applications due to the incremental cost of any such
sales or other related taxes, or otherwise harm our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Further, certain jurisdictions in which we operate have enacted a digital services tax, which is generally a tax on
gross revenue generated from users or customers located in those jurisdictions, and other jurisdictions are
considering enacting similar laws. Any successful action by taxing authorities to compel us to collect and remit
sales, use, value-added, digital services, and similar taxes, either retroactively, prospectively, or both, may
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our ability to use our net operating loss carryforwards and certain other tax attributes may
be limited.
We have incurred substantial net operating losses (“NOLs”) during our history. In general, under Sections 382
and 383 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), a corporation that undergoes an
“ownership change” is subject to annual limitations on its ability to utilize its pre-change U.S. federal NOL
carryforwards and certain other tax attributes, including tax credit carryforwards, to offset its future taxable
income or tax liabilities. For these purposes, an ownership change generally occurs if the percentage of a
corporation’s stock (by value) owned by one or more “5-percent shareholders” increases by more than 50
percentage points over a rolling three-year period. We have experienced ownership changes in the past, and we
may experience ownership changes in the future, including as a result of this offering or subsequent shifts in
our stock ownership, some of which may be outside our control. NOLs and other tax attributes of companies we
have acquired are, and of companies we may acquire may be, subject to similar limitations. Similar provisions
of state tax law and the tax laws of non-U.S. jurisdictions may also limit our ability to utilize state and non-U.S.
NOL carryforwards and other tax attributes. In addition, certain states, including California, have suspended or
otherwise limited the use of NOL carryforwards and other tax attributes, which could accelerate or permanently
increase our state income tax liabilities. Separately, under current law, U.S. federal NOLs arising in taxable
years beginning after December 31, 2017 may be used to offset only 80% of taxable income in any year, whether
or not an ownership change occurs. As a result of the foregoing, even if we attain profitability, we may be unable
to use all or a material portion of our NOLs and other tax attributes, which could adversely affect our future
cash flows and results of operations.
Our corporate structure and intercompany arrangements are subject to the tax laws of
multiple jurisdictions, and we could be required to pay additional taxes, which could
adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
As we continue to expand our non-U.S. operations, we are, and may increasingly be, required to report taxable
income in various jurisdictions around the world based on our business activities in those jurisdictions. Our
corporate structure and associated transfer pricing policies reflect the functions, risks, and assets of the entities
involved in our intercompany transactions. However, our tax position is subject to various risks, including
increases in tax rates, new or revised tax laws (which may apply retroactively), and new interpretations of
existing tax laws and policies by taxing authorities or courts, any of which could increase our overall tax
obligations.
Our intercompany transactions are subject to complex transfer pricing rules administered by tax authorities in
the jurisdictions in which we operate, many of which apply divergent, and sometimes conflicting, legal
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standards. Tax authorities may take inconsistent positions regarding the application of the arm’s-length
principle, the characterization or valuation of our intellectual property, or the pricing of intercompany services
and other transactions. If a tax authority successfully challenges our transfer pricing or the allocation of income
and expenses among jurisdictions, we could be required to reallocate income or pay additional taxes, interest,
and penalties. If the jurisdiction from which income is reallocated does not agree with the adjustment, we could
also be subject to double taxation. In addition, certain of our cross-border contracting arrangements, including
infrastructure-related agreements entered into by U.S. entities pending the formation of local subsidiaries, may
give rise to non-recoverable value-added or similar indirect taxes or other tax costs, which could be material
depending on the jurisdiction.
Although we believe our tax positions are reasonable, our tax reserves are adequate, and our transfer pricing
practices reflect arm’s-length terms, tax authorities may disagree with our assumptions, judgments, and
estimates. If a tax authority were to prevail in asserting that our intercompany arrangements do not satisfy
applicable transfer pricing requirements, we could be required to pay additional taxes, interest, and penalties
that exceed our reserves. Such an outcome could increase our effective tax rate, reduce our cash flows, and
adversely affect our ability to achieve and sustain profitability.
If our judgments or estimates relating to our critical accounting policies prove to be incorrect,
our results of operations may be adversely affected.
The preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP requires management to make judgments in
applying our accounting policies and to make estimates and assumptions that affect the amounts reported on
our consolidated financial statements and accompanying notes. We base our estimates in part on historical
experience, market observable inputs, if available, and various other assumptions that we believe to be
reasonable under the circumstances, as provided in the section titled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Critical Accounting Estimates.” Significant accounting
policies, estimates, and assumptions used in preparing our consolidated financial statements include, but are
not limited to, revenue recognition, stock-based compensation, common stock valuations, fair value of
convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs, leases, income taxes, and loss contingencies. In addition, we
engage in complex and novel transactions and may be required to consolidate certain assets or entities on our
financial statements, which may involve significant judgment and could result in volatility in our reported
results of operations. Our results of operations may be adversely affected if our assumptions change or if actual
circumstances differ from those in our assumptions, which may cause our results of operations to fall below the
expectations of securities analysts and investors and cause a decline in the market price of our Class A common
stock.
If we fail to maintain an effective system of disclosure controls and internal control over
financial reporting, our ability to produce timely and accurate financial statements or comply
with applicable regulations may be impaired, which may adversely affect our business,
financial condition, and results of operations.
As a public company, we will be subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and the listing standards of the Nasdaq Global Select Market. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related
Exchange Act rules require, among other things, that we maintain effective disclosure controls and procedures
and internal control over financial reporting. We are continuing to develop and refine our disclosure controls
and other procedures that are designed to assure that information required to be disclosed by us in the reports
that we will file with the SEC is recorded, processed, summarized, and reported within the time periods
specified in SEC rules and forms and that information required to be disclosed in reports under the Exchange
Act is accumulated and communicated to management, including our principal executive and financial officers,
to allow timely decisions regarding disclosure. We are also continuing to improve our internal control over
financial reporting. We have expended, and anticipate that we will continue to expend, significant resources to
maintain and improve the effectiveness of our disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over
financial reporting.
Our current controls and any new controls that we develop may become inadequate because of changes in the
conditions in our business. Further, weaknesses in our disclosure controls, procedures, or internal control over
financial reporting may be discovered in the future. Any failure to develop or maintain effective controls, or any
difficulties encountered in their implementation or improvement, may adversely affect our results of operations
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or cause us to fail to meet our reporting obligations and may result in a restatement of our financial statements
for prior periods. We also rely on distribution partners and other third-party service providers to process and
store data underlying our financial reporting. Our ability to maintain effective internal controls therefore
depends in part on the design and operating effectiveness of controls maintained by these third parties, and our
ability to audit or remediate deficiencies in such third-party control environments is limited.
Any failure to implement and maintain effective internal control over financial reporting may also adversely
affect the results of periodic management evaluations and annual independent registered public accounting
firm attestation reports regarding the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting that we will
eventually be required to include in our periodic reports that will be filed with the SEC. Ineffective disclosure
controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting may also cause investors to lose
confidence in our reported financial and other information, which would likely adversely affect the market price
of our Class A common stock. In addition, if we are unable to continue to meet these requirements, we may not
be able to remain listed on the Nasdaq Global Select Market. We are not currently required to comply with the
SEC rules that implement Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and are therefore not required to make a
formal assessment of the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting for that purpose. As a
public company, we will be required to provide an annual management report on the effectiveness of our
internal control over financial reporting commencing with our second annual report on Form 10-K.
We are exposed to fluctuations in interest rates and currency exchange rates, which could
negatively affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
We hold a significant amount of cash, cash equivalents, and investments, a substantial portion of which is
invested in instruments with variable or market-based interest rates. As a result, our investment income is
sensitive to changes in prevailing interest rates. A decline in interest rates could reduce the income we earn on
these investments, which could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations. In addition,
volatility in interest rates may impact the fair value of our investment portfolio and could affect our overall
financial performance.
Our sales are currently denominated in U.S. dollars, euros, and British pounds, and will likely be denominated
in other currencies in the future. Because we report our results of operations and revenue in U.S. dollars, we are
exposed to foreign currency translation risk and may in the future face additional foreign currency risks. For
example, a strengthening of the U.S. dollar compared to these foreign currencies could increase the real cost of
our models, platform, and applications to non-U.S. customers, which could reduce demand for our models,
platform, and applications and adversely affect our results of operations. In addition, as our non-U.S.
operations expand, an increasing portion of our operating expenses may be denominated in foreign currencies
and subject to fluctuations due to changes in foreign currency exchange rates. If we are not able to effectively
manage these risks, including through any hedging activities, our financial condition and results of operations
could be adversely affected.
Risks Related to our Governance Structure
Our capital stock structure features certain provisions that are novel or otherwise not
common among other corporations with multiple-class structures, and may effectively
eliminate the ability of holders of our Class A common stock to influence important decisions,
including a change in control.
We have a novel capital and corporate governance structure that has no direct public company precedent. We
are incorporated as a PBC under Delaware law. As a PBC, we are required to balance the pecuniary interests of
our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose
identified in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation. In addition, the LTBT possesses certain
rights that are designed to help ensure that we are managed in a manner that responsibly balances our goals as
a PBC. Through a special class of common stock, Class T common stock, the LTBT generally has the authority to
elect and remove the Class T directors, who together will constitute a majority of the authorized members of our
board of directors. See the section titled “Our Governance Structure and Its Goals—Long-Term Benefit Trust—
Election and Removal of Directors” for more information. The LTBT is intended to operate as an independent
body of five financially disinterested Trustees, and our Class T common stock has no economic rights. As a
result, the LTBT may have interests that differ from yours, and it may exercise its power in a way with which
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you disagree or in a way that may be adverse to your interests. Immediately prior to the completion of this
offering, we will also issue a single share of Class F common stock, a special class of our common stock, to the
Founder LLC. Our Class F common stock will be entitled to an aggregate number of votes that equals 50.1% of
the total voting power of our outstanding shares of capital stock as of the applicable record date with respect to
matters submitted to stockholders generally, including the election of our directors other than the Class T
directors. Immediately prior to the completion of this offering, we will also authorize a special class of our
common stock, Class E common stock, which we will issue to our employees, excluding our co-founders. Our
Class E common stock will be entitled to vote only on certain limited matters and will not have any economic
rights. Under this governance structure, we expect that the LTBT and the Founder LLC will collectively have the
ability to elect all members of our board of directors, and the Founder LLC will have the ability to determine the
outcome of all matters submitted to a vote of our stockholders generally for the foreseeable future. Accordingly,
holders of our Class A common stock generally will not be able to affect the outcome of any matter submitted to
a vote of our stockholders or the election of our directors, regardless of how they vote, unless a majority of the
Continuing Founders (as defined below) cannot agree on how our Class F common stock will be voted (in which
case our Class F common stock will generally be voted proportionately with the votes of our Class A common
stock cast on the matter).
Our governance structure is likely to have the effect of limiting the likelihood of an unsolicited merger proposal,
unsolicited tender offer, or proxy contest for the removal of directors. As a result, our governance structure may
make it more difficult to replace our directors and management and may have the effect of depriving our
stockholders of an opportunity to sell their shares at a premium over prevailing market prices.
We cannot predict whether our structure will result in lower demand for our Class A common stock, increased
volatility, adverse publicity, or other adverse consequences. In particular, the absence of judicial precedent
interpreting this structure increases the risk and unpredictability of governance-related litigation, and courts
may interpret the obligations inherent in our structure in ways that we might not anticipate.
Our capital structure will concentrate voting power with the LTBT and the Founder LLC for
the foreseeable future and will result in the LTBT and the Founder LLC having voting power
that is not derived from or proportionate to economic interests in our company.
Our Class T common stock will generally entitle the LTBT to elect and remove the Class T directors, who
together will constitute a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors. Our Class T common
stock will remain outstanding indefinitely, subject to the right of our board of directors and the Trustees or
specified majorities of our Class A common stock, Class E common stock, and Class F common stock to amend
or terminate the terms of the LTBT or the rights of our Class T common stock or to redeem our Class T common
stock (such time as no share of Class T common stock is outstanding, the “Class T Sunset Time”). The Class T
common stock may also be transferred without restriction upon the receipt of the same approvals required to
amend, terminate, or redeem it. We intentionally structured the Class T common stock in this manner to
preserve long-term flexibility if circumstances change. If the Class T common stock were transferred to a person
or entity that is not affiliated with the LTBT or is not otherwise required to consider the Company Purpose, for
so long as we remain a PBC, all of our directors, regardless of how they are elected, would continue to be
obligated to act in accordance with Delaware law and our certificate of incorporation, bylaws, and other
governing documents as then in effect, including those provisions relating to our public benefit purpose. The
Trust Agreement (as defined below) limits Trustee compensation to a reasonable cash amount fixed annually by
the Trustees. Trustee compensation will not vary with or be conditioned upon the profits or any action or
inaction of our company. The policies of the LTBT prohibit a Trustee from directly purchasing or holding any of
our securities.
Our Class F common stock will entitle the Founder LLC to an aggregate number of votes that equals 50.1% of
the total voting power of our outstanding shares of capital stock as of the applicable record date with respect to
matters submitted to stockholders generally, including the election of our directors other than the Class T
directors. Our Class F common stock will remain outstanding until the earlier of (i) the completion of the Class
F Transition Period (as defined below), which will commence when there have been fewer than three
Continuing Founders (not including any successor member who is a “Non-Qualifying Member” as defined in
the Founder LLC limited liability company agreement (the “Founder LLC Agreement”)) for 90 consecutive
calendar days and (ii) the time when there is no Class F common stock outstanding, including as a result of a
redemption thereof agreed to by a Supermajority (as defined below) of the Continuing Founders or upon the
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dissolution of the Founder LLC (the “Class F Sunset Time”). Upon the completion of this offering, based on
beneficial ownership as of September 30, 2026, our co-founders will collectively hold approximately (i)           %
of the total voting power of our outstanding capital stock with respect to matters submitted to stockholders
generally, excluding through their interests in the Founder LLC, and (ii)           % of the total voting power of our
outstanding capital stock with respect to matters submitted to stockholders generally, including through their
interests in the Founder LLC.
The voting powers of the LTBT and the Founder LLC are not derived from or proportionate to economic
interests in our company and will not be subject to dilution or the loss of rights upon the issuance of additional
shares of Class A common stock (including upon conversion of any Class N common stock) or any other shares
of our capital stock. Moreover, the LTBT, Founder LLC, and our individual co-founders may have interests that
differ from yours and may vote in a way with which you disagree and that may be adverse to your interests. For
example, while the LTBT, Founder LLC, and our co-founders share a long-term commitment to our mission
that may benefit stockholders who share our public benefit goals, the separation between voting power and
economic interests may result in such persons exercising their influence in a manner that prioritizes actions or
outcomes they believe to be consistent with the Company Purpose and the best interests of those materially
affected by our conduct over the pecuniary interests of our other stockholders. This divergence of voting power
from economic interests in our company is likely to persist for the foreseeable future and will not be subject to
dilution based on additional issuances of our capital stock or reduction for sales or dispositions of our capital
stock by our individual co-founders. For additional information about the circumstances in which our Class T
common stock and Class F common stock could be redeemed, see the section titled “Description of Capital
Stock—Common Stock—Redemption.”
Our governance structure and the adoption of our amended and restated certificate of
incorporation may negatively affect the decision by certain institutional investors to
purchase or hold shares of our Class A common stock.
Certain aspects of our governance structure, such as our multi-class capital structure, may limit the ability of
certain institutional investors to invest in us as a result of their investment policies or may make such an
investment less attractive to the portfolio managers of certain institutional investors.
In addition, our multi-class capital structure may make us ineligible for inclusion in indices, and as a result,
mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and other investment vehicles that attempt to passively track these
indices would not invest in our stock. These policies may depress our valuation compared to those of other
similar companies that are able to be included in such indices.
We are considered a “controlled company” within the meaning of the Nasdaq Global Select
Market corporate governance requirements, and, as a result, we qualify for, and currently
rely on, exemptions from certain corporate governance requirements.
We are considered a “controlled company” within the meaning of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate
governance requirements because the LTBT, as the sole holder of our Class T common stock, generally has the
power to elect a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors. As a result, we may elect not to
comply with certain corporate governance requirements, including:
•the requirement that a majority of our board of directors consist of independent directors;
•the requirement that our board of directors have a nominating and corporate governance committee
that is comprised entirely of independent directors with a written charter addressing the committee’s
purpose and responsibilities; and
•the requirement that we have a compensation committee that is comprised entirely of independent
directors with a written charter addressing the committee’s purpose and responsibilities.
If we elect not to comply with certain requirements, you will not have the same protections afforded to
stockholders of companies that are subject to all of the Nasdaq Global Select Market corporate governance
requirements. Although we qualify as a “controlled company,” we do not expect to rely on this exemption except
with respect to our NGC, which will not consist entirely of independent directors. Our board of directors
currently consists of a majority of independent directors and our audit and compensation committees currently
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consist entirely of independent directors. In the event that we cease to be a “controlled company” and our Class
A common stock continues to be listed on the Nasdaq Global Select Market, we will be required to comply with
the provision that our NGC be comprised entirely of independent directors within the applicable transition
period.
We operate as a Delaware public benefit corporation. As a public benefit corporation, we
cannot provide any assurance that we will achieve the Company Purpose.
As a PBC, we are intended to produce a public benefit or benefits and to operate in a responsible and
sustainable manner, balancing our stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially
affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose identified in our amended and restated certificate of
incorporation. We cannot assure you that we will achieve the Company Purpose or that the expected positive
impact from being a PBC will be realized, which could adversely affect our reputation, business, financial
condition, and results of operations. As a PBC, we are required, under Section 366 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law (“DGCL”) and pursuant to our amended and restated bylaws, to disclose to stockholders a
report at least biennially on our overall performance in promoting the public benefit identified in our amended
and restated certificate of incorporation and the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct and
on our assessment of our success in achieving the Company Purpose and in promoting those interests. If we are
not timely or are unable to provide this report, or if the report is not viewed favorably by parties doing business
with us, regulators, others reviewing our credentials, or other stakeholders, including holders of our Class A
common stock, our reputation as a PBC may be adversely affected.
Our focus on the long-term best interests of our company as a PBC, and the duty of our
directors to balance the pecuniary interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those
stakeholders materially affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose, may conflict with
short-, medium-, or long-term financial interests and business performance, which may
negatively impact the value of our Class A common stock.
We have made, and may in the future make, decisions that we believe balance the pecuniary interests of our
stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose set forth
in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation, even if such decisions may negatively impact the
short-, medium-, or long-term performance of our business, financial condition, and results of operations or the
short-, medium-, or long-term performance of our Class A common stock. This may impact the value of our
Class A common stock and make owning our Class A common stock less appealing to investors who are focused
on returns. Our decisions and actions in pursuit of long-term success may not result in the long-term benefits
we expect, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations, as well as
the market price of our Class A common stock. Such decisions and actions may include changes to our models,
platform, and applications; limitations on certain uses of our models, platform, and applications; moderating
the pace of the development of our models for safety-related reasons; adjustments to the timing of new
offerings; changes in how we deliver customer support; investments in our relationships with partners and
employees; investments in and introductions of new models, platforms, and applications; investments in social
impact initiatives consistent with our public benefit objectives; and changes in our approach to working with
local or national jurisdictions on laws and regulations governing our business.
Our policies, including those on usage, currently prohibit, or may be revised in the future to prohibit, certain
usage or other actions, which may have adverse commercial consequences to us. For example, our usage policy
prohibits the use of our models, platform, and applications to develop or operate fully autonomous weapons or
to conduct mass surveillance, including mass domestic surveillance, and we have declined to permit such uses
based on the Company Purpose, notwithstanding the revenue those or similar uses could generate. Maintaining
these limitations has had, and may continue to have, adverse commercial and financial consequences. We have
also restricted or delayed the availability of certain capabilities for safety reasons. For example, we initially
released our Mythos model only as a gated research preview through Project Glasswing rather than making it
broadly available to the public. Similarly, we have chosen not to develop certain commercially attractive
offerings, such as image and video generation models, in order to direct our compute toward our research and
safety priorities. Our public advocacy, and the decisions we make to moderate the pace of AI development,
delay or restrict the release of models or features, or forgo commercial opportunities for safety-related reasons,
may not maximize stockholder value, could have a negative impact on the value of our Class A common stock,
and could result in litigation. Each of these decisions reflects our directors’ balancing of the pecuniary interests
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of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose.
While we believe these decisions are consistent with the Company Purpose, as a result of these decisions, we
may forgo revenue, customers, or growth opportunities that a corporation managed solely to maximize
stockholder value might pursue.
Further, while directors of traditional corporations typically have a fiduciary duty to focus on maximizing
stockholder value, directors of a PBC have a duty to consider not only the stockholders’ financial interests but
also the company’s specific public benefit purpose and the best interests of those stakeholders materially
affected by the company’s actions. Thus, our directors are not merely permitted, but obligated, to consider the
Company Purpose and the interests of other stakeholders. Under Delaware law, directors are shielded from
liability for breach of these obligations if they make informed and disinterested decisions that serve a rational
purpose. In the event of a conflict among the interests of our stockholders, the Company Purpose, or the
interests of our other stakeholders, our directors must only make informed and disinterested decisions that
serve a rational purpose; thus, we cannot guarantee that such a conflict would be resolved in favor of our
stockholders’ monetary interests, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of
operations and cause the market price of our Class A common stock to decline. In addition, there is very limited
judicial precedent interpreting the balancing requirement applicable to PBCs under Delaware law, particularly
for companies with significant scale or visibility, or with a scope of PBC purpose similar to ours. As a result, the
scope of directors’ obligations, the standards by which their decisions may be reviewed, and the nature and
availability of stockholder remedies in connection with alleged failures to responsibly balance these interests
remain uncertain. Future judicial interpretations of these provisions could be more expansive than we currently
anticipate and could result in increased litigation risk, greater scrutiny of board decision-making, or outcomes
that differ from our expectations.
Additionally, as a PBC, we are less vulnerable to an unsolicited takeover effort than a traditional company
would be and, therefore, your ability to realize your investment through an acquisition may be limited. We may
also not be an attractive target for activists or hedge fund investors because new directors must consider and
give appropriate weight to the pecuniary interests of our stockholders, the best interests of those materially
affected by our conduct, and the Company Purpose, and stockholders may be able to enforce this obligation
through litigation. Further, by requiring that our board of directors consider additional stakeholders and the
Company Purpose, and not just maximizing stockholder value, Delaware law could make it easier for our board
of directors to reject a hostile bid, even where the acceptance of such a bid would provide the greatest short-
term financial yield to investors.
In addition, we intend to direct a meaningful portion of our resources toward our public benefit initiatives,
which may include contributions to nonprofit organizations, research institutions, underserved communities,
and other third parties that may not otherwise have access to frontier AI capabilities. These initiatives, which
include the Initial Public Benefit Issuance and the future Public Benefit Issuances, have been, and may continue
to be, substantial in scale, and we expect to significantly grow these efforts over time. The benefits of such
expenditures may be difficult or impossible to measure in financial terms and may not result in any direct or
measurable benefit to our business or our stockholders. The amount of resources directed toward these
initiatives may, in any given period, reduce our revenue, increase our expenses, or otherwise affect our results
of operations.
As a Delaware public benefit corporation, we may be subject to increased litigation
concerning our board of directors’ obligation to balance our stockholders’ pecuniary
interests, the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct, and the Company
Purpose, the occurrence of which may have an adverse impact on our business, financial
condition, and results of operations.
Section 367 of the DGCL provides that stockholders of a Delaware PBC with shares listed on a national
securities exchange may only file an action to enforce the statutory balancing requirement imposed on the
board of directors by the DGCL if they, individually or collectively, own the lesser of at least two percent of the
corporation’s outstanding shares or shares of the corporation with a market value of at least $2,000,000 as of
the date the action is instituted and, in the case of a derivative action, such stockholders satisfy any other
conditions applicable to filing a derivative action. This potential liability for enforcement of the statutory
balancing requirement does not exist for traditional corporations. Therefore, we may be subject to the
possibility of increased litigation, which would require the attention of our management, and, as a result, may
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adversely affect our management’s ability to effectively execute our strategy. There is limited judicial precedent
for this type of balancing litigation, which may create uncertainty around the scope of our directors’ obligations
or the remedies available to stockholders. Additionally, any such litigation may be costly, which may adversely
affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Our amended and restated bylaws will designate a state or federal court located within the
State of Delaware as the exclusive forum for substantially all disputes between us and our
stockholders, and also provide that the federal district courts will be the exclusive forum for
resolving any complaint asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, each of which may limit our stockholders’ ability to choose the judicial forum for
disputes with us or our directors, officers, stockholders, or employees.
Our amended and restated bylaws, which will become effective immediately prior to the completion of this
offering, will provide that, unless we consent in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware (or, if the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware does not have
jurisdiction, another State court in Delaware or the federal district court for the District of Delaware) will, to the
fullest extent permitted by law, be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding
brought on our behalf, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any of our current
or former directors, stockholders, or officers or other employees to us or our stockholders, (iii) any action
arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, or as to which the DGCL confers jurisdiction upon the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware, (iv) any action arising pursuant to or to interpret, apply, enforce, or
determine the validity of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation, or our amended and restated
bylaws, or (v) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine, except for, in all cases, any
claim as to which such court determines that there is an indispensable party not subject to the jurisdiction of
such court (and the indispensable party does not consent to the personal jurisdiction of such court within 10
days following such determination).
Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), establishes concurrent jurisdiction
for federal and state courts over Securities Act claims. Accordingly, both state and federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear such claims. To prevent having to litigate claims in multiple jurisdictions and the threat of
inconsistent or contrary rulings by different courts, among other considerations, our amended and restated
bylaws will also provide that, unless we consent in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the federal
district courts of the United States will, to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, be the sole and
exclusive forum for resolving any complaint asserting a cause or causes of action arising under the Securities
Act against any person in connection with any offering of our securities, including, without limitation, any
auditor, underwriter, expert, control person, or other defendant. Unless we consent in writing to the selection of
an alternative forum, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware will, to the fullest extent
permitted by applicable law, be the sole and exclusive forum for the resolution of any derivative action or
proceeding brought to enforce any duty or liability created by the Exchange Act or the rules or regulations
thereunder. All other claims arising under the Exchange Act may be brought in any federal court of competent
jurisdiction.
Any person or entity purchasing, holding, or otherwise acquiring any interest in any of our securities shall be
deemed to have notice of and consented to the foregoing bylaw provisions. Although we believe these exclusive
forum provisions benefit us by providing increased consistency in the application of Delaware law and federal
securities laws in the types of lawsuits to which each applies, the exclusive forum provisions may limit a
stockholder’s ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum of its choosing for disputes with us or our current or
former directors, officers, stockholders, or other employees, which may discourage lawsuits with respect to such
claims against us and our current and former directors, officers, stockholders, or other employees. Our
stockholders will not be deemed to have waived our compliance with the federal securities laws and the rules
and regulations thereunder as a result of our exclusive forum provisions.
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Provisions in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and amended and
restated bylaws could make a merger, tender offer, proxy contest, or other significant
corporate transaction difficult, potentially depressing the market price of our Class A
common stock.
Our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and amended and restated bylaws, which will become
effective immediately prior to the completion of this offering, will contain a number of provisions that may
make the acquisition of our company more difficult. Such provisions will include:
•a multi-class common stock structure, which will provide the LTBT and the Founder LLC with the
ability to elect all members of our board of directors, and will provide the Founder LLC with the ability
to determine the outcome of all matters submitted to a vote of our stockholders generally (including
the approval of any merger, sale of our company, and other significant corporate transaction requiring
stockholder approval) for the foreseeable future;
•prior to the Class F Sunset Time, vacant or newly created directorships for any directors who are not
Class T directors can be filled by our board of directors in accordance with a notice from the Founder
LLC or by the holders of our Class A common stock and Class F common stock, voting together or
acting by written consent;
•prior to the Class T Sunset Time, the number of directors constituting our board of directors will be
permitted to be set only with the approval of 80% of the authorized members of our board of directors
(rounded up or down to the nearest whole number (any exact 0.5 rounding up));
•a special meeting of our stockholders may only be called by (i) our board of directors acting pursuant to
a resolution adopted by a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors; (ii) the
Chairperson of our board of directors; (iii) our Chief Executive Officer; (iv) our President; (v) following
the Class F Sunset Time, a majority of the directors who are not Class T directors; (vi) prior to the Class
F Sunset Time and only with respect to a special meeting at which holders of our Class E common stock
will be asked to vote on a proposal, the secretary of the company; or (vii) prior to the Class F Sunset
Time, the Founder LLC as the holder of our Class F common stock;
•prior to the Class F Sunset Time and the Class T Sunset Time, stockholders may act by written consent
only with respect to (i) any action to nominate, elect, or remove directors or appoint a director to fill
any vacancy or newly created directorship; (ii) any action to satisfy certain redemption and protective
provisions in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation related to our Class F common
stock, Class T common stock, and Class E common stock; and (iii) any matter in which stockholders
vote together as a single class if such matter is first approved or requested by our board of directors,
and following both the Class F Sunset Time and the Class T Sunset Time, any action required or
permitted to be taken by our stockholders must be effected at a duly called annual or special meeting of
stockholders and may not be effected by any written consent of our stockholders; notwithstanding the
foregoing, any action required or permitted to be taken by the holders of our Class E common stock
must be effected at a duly called annual or special meeting of stockholders and may not be effected by
any consent in writing by such stockholders;
•advance notice procedures required for Class A stockholders to nominate candidates for election as
directors or to bring matters before an annual meeting of stockholders;
•following the Class F Sunset Time, our board of directors will shift to having a classified board of
directors consisting of three classes of directors with staggered three-year terms;
•following the Class F Sunset Time, 66 2/3% of the voting power of our Class A common stock will be
required to amend certain provisions in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and our
amended and restated bylaws;
•not providing for cumulative voting; and
•authorizing undesignated preferred stock, the issuance and terms of which may be established by 80%
of the authorized members of our board of directors (rounded up or down to the nearest whole number
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(any exact 0.5 rounding up)) and, prior to the Class F Sunset Time, only with the consent of the
Founder LLC as the holder of our Class F common stock.
These provisions, alone or together, could discourage, delay, or prevent a transaction involving a change in
control of our company. These provisions could also discourage proxy contests and make it more difficult for
stockholders to elect directors of their choosing and to cause us to take other corporate actions they desire, any
of which, under certain circumstances, could limit the opportunity for our stockholders to receive a premium
for their shares of our Class A common stock, and could also affect the price that some investors are willing to
pay for our Class A common stock.
Risks Related to Ownership of our Class A Common Stock
There has been no prior public trading market for our Class A common stock, and an active
trading market may not develop or be sustained following this offering.
We have applied to list our Class A common stock on the Nasdaq Global Select Market under the symbol “ANT.”
However, prior to this offering, there has been no public trading market for our Class A common stock. We
cannot assure you that an active trading market for our Class A common stock will develop on such exchange or
elsewhere or, if developed, that any market will be sustained. The initial public offering price of our Class A
common stock will be determined through negotiations among us, the selling stockholders, and the
underwriters. This price will not necessarily reflect the price at which investors in the market will be willing to
buy and sell shares of our Class A common stock following this offering.
The market price of our Class A common stock may be volatile, and you may lose all or part of
your investment.
We cannot predict the prices at which our Class A common stock will trade. The initial public offering price of
our Class A common stock will be determined through negotiations among us, the selling stockholders, and the
underwriters. This price will not necessarily reflect the price at which investors in the market will be willing to
buy and sell shares of our Class A common stock following this offering. The market price of our Class A
common stock following this offering may fluctuate substantially, depending on a number of factors, many of
which are beyond our control and may not be related to our operating performance. These fluctuations may
cause you to lose all or part of your investment in our Class A common stock. Factors that may cause
fluctuations in the market price of our Class A common stock include the following:
•price and volume fluctuations in the overall stock market from time to time, including fluctuations due
to general economic uncertainty or negative market sentiment;
•volatility in the market and trading volumes of technology stocks;
•supply chain constraints, particularly those impacting compute, and new and evolving trade
regulations and tariffs, and countermeasures;
•changes in the operating performance and stock market valuations of other technology companies
generally, or those in our industry in particular;
•sales of shares of our Class A common stock by us or our stockholders, as well as the anticipation of
lock-up releases;
•rumors and market speculation involving us or other companies in our industry or related industries;
•failure of securities analysts to maintain coverage of us, changes in financial estimates by securities
analysts who follow our company, or our failure to meet these estimates or the expectations of
investors;
•actual or perceived significant data breaches involving our business;
•the financial or non-financial projections we may provide to the public, any changes in those
projections, or our failure to meet those projections;
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•third-party data published about us or other companies in our industry, whether or not such data is
accurate;
•announcements by us or our competitors of new models, platforms, or applications;
•the public’s reaction to our press releases, other public announcements, and filings with the SEC;
•fluctuations in the trading volume of shares of our Class A common stock or the size of our public float;
•short selling of our Class A common stock or related derivative securities;
•actual or anticipated changes or fluctuations in our results of operations;
•actual or anticipated developments in our business, our competitors’ businesses, or the competitive
landscape generally;
•changes in the anticipated future size or growth rate of our addressable markets;
•our issuance of shares of our Class A common stock, including as a result of the conversion of our Class
N common stock in connection with certain transfers;
•litigation or regulatory action involving us, our industry, or both, or investigations by regulators into
our operations or those of our competitors;
•developments or disputes concerning our intellectual property or other proprietary rights;
•announced or completed acquisitions of businesses or technologies, or similar strategic transactions,
by us or our competitors;
•new laws or regulations or new interpretations of existing laws or regulations applicable to our
business;
•regulatory enforcement actions or other governmental efforts affecting our models, platform, and
applications;
•changes in accounting standards, policies, guidelines, interpretations, or principles;
•major catastrophic events such as war, incidents of terrorism, pandemics, or responses to such events;
•any additions or departures of founders, board members, management, or key personnel; and
•general economic conditions and slow or negative growth of our markets.
In addition, if the market for technology stocks or the stock market in general experiences a loss of investor
confidence, the market price of our Class A common stock may decline for reasons unrelated to our business,
financial condition, and results of operations. The market price of our Class A common stock may also decline
in reaction to events that affect other companies in our industry even if these events do not directly affect us.
Accordingly, we cannot assure you of the liquidity of any trading market, your ability to sell your shares of our
Class A common stock when desired, or the prices that you may obtain for your shares of our Class A common
stock.
In the past, stockholders have initiated securities class action lawsuits against companies following periods of
stock price volatility. If the market price of our Class A common stock is volatile, we may become the target of
securities litigation. Such litigation may subject us to substantial costs, divert resources and management’s
attention, and adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
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The issuance of additional stock in connection with financings, acquisitions, investments, our
equity incentive plans, the conversion of our outstanding convertible promissory notes, the
conversion of our outstanding Class N common stock, our public benefit initiatives, or
otherwise will dilute the interests of the holders of our Class A common stock.
Our amended and restated certificate of incorporation that will become effective immediately prior to the
completion of this offering authorizes us to issue up to an aggregate of 300,000,000,000 shares of Class A
common stock, 100,000,000,000 shares of Class N common stock, one share of Class T common stock, one
share of Class F common stock, 30,000,000,000 shares of Class E common stock, and 30,000,000,000 shares
of preferred stock, with such rights, powers, and preferences as may be determined by our board of directors
(subject to limitations in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation, which will become effective
immediately prior to the completion of this offering, or prescribed by Delaware law). Subject to compliance with
applicable rules and regulations, we may issue shares of our capital stock or securities convertible into shares of
our capital stock from time to time in connection with a financing, an acquisition, an investment, our equity
incentive plans, the conversion of our outstanding convertible promissory notes, the conversion of our Class N
common stock, our public benefit initiatives, which may include issuances of equity to third parties such as
nonprofit organizations, research institutions, or other recipients, or otherwise, including the Public Benefit
Issuances. Any such issuances may result in substantial dilution to the holders of our Class A common stock
and cause the market price of our Class A common stock to decline. For a discussion of the dilutive impact of
our Class N common stock on the holders of our Class A common stock, see the section titled “—A substantial
number of shares of our Class N common stock will be outstanding upon the completion of this offering, which
will dilute the voting power of the holders of our Class A common stock upon conversion.”
In addition, registration rights agreements entered into with counterparties to certain of our NPAs provide such
counterparties with rights to cause us to register for resale after this offering (i) shares of our common stock
underlying such notes, (ii) shares of Class A common stock issuable upon conversion of Class N common stock
issued upon conversion of the notes, and (iii) shares of our common stock issued in connection with certain
contractual rights to private placements concurrent with this offering. The exercise of such registration rights
could facilitate sales of large blocks of our Class A common stock into the public market, which could depress
the market price of our Class A common stock or increase its volatility.
A substantial number of shares of our Class N common stock will be outstanding upon the
completion of this offering, which will dilute the voting power of the holders of our Class A
common stock upon conversion.
Immediately prior to the completion of this offering, after giving effect to the Preferred Stock Conversion and
the Convertible Notes Conversion, we will have            shares of Class N common stock outstanding,
representing approximately           % of our outstanding capital stock prior to this offering and approximately
          % of our outstanding capital stock following the completion of this offering (in each case, excluding our
Class T common stock, Class F common stock, and Class E common stock). After giving effect to the Preferred
Stock Conversion and the Convertible Notes Conversion, Amazon and Google will each hold greater than five
percent of our outstanding capital stock. Although our Class N common stock is non-voting, their holdings
represent a significant economic interest in our company, and because our Class N common stock converts into
Class A common stock upon transfer to an unaffiliated third party, these shares could also become significant to
the voting power of our Class A common stock following any such transfer. Immediately prior to the completion
of this offering, after giving effect to the Preferred Stock Conversion and the Convertible Notes Conversion, and
immediately following the offering, Amazon will hold            shares of our Class N common stock and Google
will hold            shares of our Class N common stock. An aggregate of an additional           shares of Class N
common stock will be issuable after this offering upon conversion of remaining outstanding convertible
promissory notes, all of which are held by Amazon, that could not convert immediately prior to the completion
of this offering without exceeding the applicable ownership cap. Additional shares of Class N common stock
may also be issued following this offering pursuant to the Public Benefit Issuances, future drawdowns and
related issuances or conversions under our NPAs, and certain contractual rights. See the sections titled “Shares
Eligible for Future Sale—Class N Common Stock,” “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations—Liquidity and Capital Resources—Convertible Notes,” and “Business—
Our Commitment to Public Benefit.”
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Although our Class N common stock is not entitled to vote, it is entitled to economic rights equivalent to those
of our Class A common stock, including the right to participate ratably with our Class A common stock in any
dividends we may declare and in distributions upon a liquidation, dissolution, or winding up. As a result, the
shares of Class N common stock issued in connection with the completion of this offering as a result of the
Preferred Stock Conversion and Convertible Notes Conversion will dilute the economic interests, including any
dividends and any proceeds available for distribution to stockholders, of the holders of our Class A common
stock, and such shares are included together with our Class A common stock in determining net tangible book
value per share. See the section titled “Dilution.”
The shares of Class N common stock will automatically convert into an equal number of shares of Class A
common stock upon a transfer effected through: (i) a registered offering or an open market sale of such shares
or (ii) a transfer to an unaffiliated third party, subject to certain limitations described in the section titled
“Description of Capital Stock.” While held as Class N common stock, these shares are non-voting and therefore
do not impact the voting power of the holders of our Class A common stock. Upon the conversion of shares of
Class N common stock into Class A common stock, however, the resulting shares of Class A common stock will
be entitled to one vote per share and the issuance of such shares will dilute the voting power of the existing
holders of our Class A common stock. Any shares of Class N common stock that we issue in the future would
have the same effect, diluting the economic interests of the holders of our Class A common stock while
outstanding, as well as diluting their voting power upon conversion into Class A common stock.
Future issuances of our Class A common stock and Class N common stock will not dilute the
voting power of our Class F common stock.
Future issuances of our Class A common stock, including upon conversion of our Class N common stock, and
our Class N common stock will not dilute the voting power of our Class F common stock because our Class F
common stock is entitled to a fixed 50.1% of the total voting power of our outstanding shares of capital stock as
of the applicable record date with respect to matters submitted to stockholders generally. For example, if we
were to issue 1,000,000 additional shares of Class A common stock, our Class F common stock would
automatically be entitled to an incremental number of votes sufficient to cause the aggregate voting power of
our Class F common stock to equal 50.1% of the total voting power of our outstanding shares of capital stock as
of the applicable record date with respect to matters submitted to stockholders generally, or approximately
1,004,008 additional votes. Any future issuances of additional shares of Class A common stock, including upon
conversion of our Class N common stock, and Class N common stock will not be subject to approval by our
stockholders except as required by the listing standards of the Nasdaq Global Select Market.
Future sales of our Class A common stock in the public market could cause the market price of
our Class A common stock to decline.
The market price of our Class A common stock may decline due to sales of a large number of shares of our Class
A common stock in the market after this offering. The potential for such sales to occur may also depress the
market price of our Class A common stock. Following the completion of this offering, based on            shares of
our Class A common stock outstanding and            shares of Class N common stock outstanding as of September
30, 2026 (after giving effect to the Preferred Stock Conversion, Convertible Notes Conversion, Initial Public
Benefit Issuance, and RSU Settlement), we will have a total of            shares of Class A common stock
outstanding and            shares of Class N common stock outstanding. Our directors, executive officers, and the
holders of substantially all of our capital stock and securities convertible into or exchangeable for our capital
stock have entered into market standoff agreements with us or have entered or will enter into lock-up
agreements with Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, on behalf of the underwriters,
under which they have agreed, subject to specific exceptions including specified early expiration provisions, to
certain restrictions on their ability to transfer any shares of our Class A common stock or Class N common stock
or securities directly or indirectly convertible into or exchangeable or exercisable for our Class A common stock
or Class N common stock during the period ending (i) in the case of our co-founders and certain of our
stockholders holding more than 0.5% of our fully diluted shares prior to this offering, on the earlier of (A) 6:00
AM Eastern Time on the second full trading day immediately following the public release of our quarterly
financial results for the fiscal quarter ending September 30, 2027 and (B) immediately after the close of the
trading day on the 365th day after the date of this prospectus, and (ii) in the case of all other such holders, on
the earlier of (A) 6:00 AM Eastern Time on the second full trading day immediately following the public release
of our quarterly financial results for the fiscal quarter ending March 31, 2027 and (B) immediately after the
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close of the trading day on the 180th day after the date of this prospectus. Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC may release stockholders from the lock-up agreements, and we may, generally only
with their consent, release stockholders from the market standoff agreements, in each case prior to the end of
the applicable period. See the sections titled “Underwriting” and “Shares Eligible for Future Sale—Lock-Up and
Market Standoff Agreements” for further information about these agreements, including the specified early
expiration provisions.
As a result of these agreements and the provisions of our amended and restated investors’ rights agreement,
dated as of May 28, 2026 (our “IRA”), as described further in the section titled “Description of Capital Stock—
Registration Rights,” and subject to the provisions of Rule 144 or Rule 701 under the Securities Act, additional
shares of our Class A common stock (including shares issuable upon conversion of our Class N common stock)
will become available for sale in the public market at various times after the date of this offering, beginning on
the first trading day following the date of this prospectus. See the section titled “Shares Eligible for Future Sale”
for additional information.
Upon completion of this offering, stockholders owning an aggregate of up to            shares of our Class A
common stock (including those issuable upon conversion of our Class N common stock) will be entitled, under
our IRA, to demand registration rights. In addition, we intend to file a registration statement to register shares
reserved for future issuance under our equity compensation plans. Upon effectiveness of that registration
statement, subject to the satisfaction of applicable exercise periods and the expiration or waiver of the lock-up
and market standoff agreements referred to above, the shares issued upon exercise of outstanding stock options
or settlement of RSUs will be available for immediate resale in the United States in the open market.
In addition, our co-founders have each pledged to dedicate 80% of their personal equity in Anthropic to
philanthropic causes. These commitments are voluntary, revocable expressions of each co-founder’s
philanthropic intent and do not constitute legally binding obligations. The timing, amount, recipients,
structure, and manner of any donations in furtherance of this pledge are uncertain and will depend on a variety
of factors, including each co-founder’s individual circumstances, tax and estate planning considerations,
applicable transfer restrictions, market conditions, and philanthropic priorities at the relevant time. The co-
founders may satisfy this pledge over time through a variety of means, including donations to donor-advised
funds, charitable organizations, private foundations, or other philanthropic vehicles, certain of which have
entered into irrevocable proxy agreements with us, as described under the section titled “Certain Relationships
and Related Person Transactions—Irrevocable Proxy Agreements.” Donations of shares of our Class A common
stock in furtherance of this pledge and any subsequent sales by recipients could, subject to the lock-up and
market standoff agreements described above and applicable securities laws, result in the sale of a significant
number of shares in the public market. Because the timing and amount of any such donations and sales cannot
be predicted, any such sales, or the perception that such sales could occur, could depress the market price of our
Class A common stock. These pledges relate to the co-founders’ personal economic interests in shares of our
Class A common stock and do not apply to our Class F common stock or alter the Founder LLC voting structure
described under the section titled “Our Governance Structure and Its Goals—Founder Voting Structure.” As
such, as our co-founders make donations in furtherance of this pledge, their personal economic interests in us
will decrease while their voting control through the Founder LLC will remain unchanged for so long as each co-
founder continues to satisfy the minimum retained ownership condition for continued membership in the
Founder LLC described in the section titled “Description of Capital Stock—Founder LLC Agreement,” which
may reduce the alignment between the interests of our co-founders and those of our other stockholders, or
cause those interests to diverge.
Sales of our Class A common stock by stockholders as lock-up restrictions end or pursuant to registration rights
may make it more difficult for us to sell equity securities in the future at a time and at a price that we deem
appropriate. These sales may also cause the market price of our Class A common stock to fall and make it more
difficult for you to sell shares of our Class A common stock.
Because we do not anticipate paying any cash dividends on our capital stock in the
foreseeable future, capital appreciation, if any, will be your sole source of gain.
We do not anticipate paying cash dividends in the foreseeable future. We currently intend to retain future
earnings, if any, to fund the development and growth of our business. In addition, the A&R Credit Agreement
contains, and any future credit facility or financing we obtain may contain, terms limiting the amount of cash
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dividends that may be declared or paid on our capital stock. Any future determination to pay cash dividends
will be at the discretion of our board of directors and will be dependent upon our financial condition, results of
operations, capital requirements, and applicable contractual restrictions. As a result, stockholders should rely
on sales of their Class A common stock or Class N common stock after price appreciation, if any, as the only way
to realize any future gains on their investment.
If securities or industry analysts do not publish research or publish inaccurate or unfavorable
research about us, our business, or our market, or if they change their recommendation
regarding our Class A common stock adversely, the market price and trading volume of our
Class A common stock could decline.
The market price and trading volume for our Class A common stock will depend in part on the research and
reports that securities or industry analysts publish about us, our business, our market, or our competitors. The
analysts’ estimates are based upon their own opinions and are often different from our estimates or
expectations. If any of the analysts who cover us change their recommendation regarding our Class A common
stock adversely, provide more favorable relative recommendations about our competitors, or publish inaccurate
or unfavorable research about our business, the price of our securities would likely decline. If few securities
analysts commence coverage of us, or if one or more of these analysts cease coverage of us or fail to publish
reports on us regularly, we could lose visibility in the financial markets and demand for our securities could
decrease, which could cause the price and trading volume of our Class A common stock to decline.
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Special Note Regarding Forward-looking
Statements
This prospectus contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, which
statements involve substantial risks and uncertainties. All statements contained in this prospectus other than
statements of historical fact, including statements regarding our future results of operations, financial position,
market size and opportunity, our business strategy and plans, the factors affecting our performance, and our
objectives for future operations, are forward-looking statements. In some cases, you can identify forward-
looking statements because they contain words such as “may,” “will,” “shall,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,”
“anticipate,” “could,” “intend,” “target,” “project,” “contemplate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,”
“goal,” “objective,” “seek,” “forecast,” or “continue,” or the negative of any of these words or other similar terms
or expressions that concern our expectations, strategy, plans, or intentions. Forward-looking statements
contained in this prospectus include, but are not limited to, statements about:
•our future financial performance, including our expectations regarding our revenue, compute and
infrastructure expenses, and operating expenses, and our ability to achieve and maintain future
profitability;
•the sufficiency of our cash, cash equivalents, and investments and amounts available under our A&R
Credit Facility to meet our working capital and liquidity needs;
•the amount, nature, and timing of our capital expenditures and other compute and infrastructure
commitments, our ability to fund such commitments and achieve expected returns, and our ability to
convert compute investments into revenue-generating customer workloads on anticipated timelines;
•our ability to successfully execute our business and growth strategy, including scaling our operations
and managing costs, timelines, and operational complexity, and pursuing our public benefit initiatives
consistent with our public benefit purpose;
•our expectations and management of future growth;
•our ability to raise additional capital through future debt or equity financing on acceptable terms, and
the potential dilutive or restrictive effects of any such financing on our stockholders and operations;
•our expectations concerning relationships with third parties and access to compute and infrastructure,
including potential conflicts of interest with cloud service providers and chip partners that develop
competing AI offerings;
•the demand for our offerings and the pricing thereof, including potential changes to our pricing
structure;
•our ability to attract and retain customers and our expectations regarding revenue concentration
among a limited number of customers and distribution channels;
•our ability to attract, develop, and retain highly skilled personnel, and to maintain our culture, talent
density, and mission alignment as we grow;
•our ability to develop new models, platforms, and applications and bring them to market in a timely
manner and make enhancements to our current models, platform, and applications, and to remain at
the frontier of AI;
•our plans and commitments with respect to AI safety, responsible deployment, and safety-related
access restrictions on frontier models, and the commercial and operational implications of those
commitments;
•our ability to maintain the availability and operability of our models, platform, and applications;
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•our ability to compete with existing and new competitors in existing and new markets and offerings;
•our expectations regarding new and evolving markets, including our ability to expand our operations,
customer base, and revenue internationally and to adapt our models, platform, and applications to
local language, regulatory, and market requirements in new jurisdictions;
•our ability to identify, execute, and integrate beneficial acquisitions, investments, and strategic
partnerships;
•our ability to manage risk associated with our business, including risks arising from our public benefit
corporation status and the role of the LTBT in our governance;
•our ability to protect our models, platform, applications, and systems against cybersecurity threats,
including nation-state and other sophisticated threat actors;
•our expectations regarding the effects of existing and developing laws and regulations, including with
respect to AI, copyright, privacy and data protection, and export controls, economic sanctions, and
other trade controls;
•our ability to maintain, protect, and enhance our intellectual property;
•our ability to develop and protect our brand, including the impact of safety, security, or misuse
incidents and of our public positions on AI policy and regulation;
•the increased expenses associated with being a public company;
•the outcome of pending or future litigation, regulatory proceedings, and governmental enforcement
actions, and their potential effects on our business, financial condition, and results of operations;
•our dividend policy, including our current intention not to pay cash dividends and to retain future
earnings for use in our business;
•the development and maintenance of an active trading market for our Class A common stock and the
potential volatility of our stock price following this offering; and
•our anticipated uses of net proceeds from this offering.
We caution you that the foregoing list may not contain all of the forward-looking statements made in this
prospectus.
We have based the forward-looking statements contained in this prospectus primarily on our current
expectations, estimates, forecasts, and projections about future events and trends that we believe may affect our
business, financial condition, results of operations, and prospects. The outcome of the events described in these
forward-looking statements is subject to risks, uncertainties, and other factors, including those described in the
section titled “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in this prospectus. Moreover, we operate in a very competitive and
rapidly changing environment. New risks and uncertainties emerge from time to time and it is not possible for
us to predict all risks and uncertainties that could have an impact on the forward-looking statements contained
in this prospectus. Although we believe that we have a reasonable basis for each forward-looking statement
contained in this prospectus, we cannot assure you that the future results, events, and circumstances reflected
in the forward-looking statements will be achieved or occur at all, and actual future results, events, and
circumstances could differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements. Accordingly, you
should not place undue reliance upon forward-looking statements as predictions of future events.
The forward-looking statements made in this prospectus relate only to our expectations as of the date on which
the statements are made. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements made in this
prospectus to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this prospectus or to reflect new information or
the occurrence of unanticipated events, except as required by law.
In addition, statements that “we believe” and similar statements reflect our beliefs and opinions on the relevant
subject. These statements are based upon information available to us as of the date of this prospectus, and while
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we believe such information forms a reasonable basis for such statements, such information may be limited or
incomplete, and our statements should not be read to indicate that we have conducted an exhaustive inquiry
into, or review of, all potentially available relevant information. These statements are inherently uncertain, and
investors are cautioned not to unduly rely upon these statements.
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Industry, Market, and Other Data
Unless otherwise indicated, data, estimates, and other information contained in this prospectus concerning our
industry and the market in which we operate, including our general expectations, market position, market
opportunity, and market size, are based on industry publications and reports generated by third-party
providers, other publicly available studies, and our internal sources and estimates. This information involves a
number of assumptions and limitations, and you are cautioned not to give undue weight to such estimates.
Although we are responsible for all of the disclosure contained in this prospectus and we believe the
information from the industry publications and other third-party sources included in this prospectus is reliable,
we have not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of the data contained in such sources.
Forecasts and other forward-looking information with respect to market and industry data and other data are
subject to the same qualifications and additional uncertainties regarding the other forward-looking statements
in this prospectus. See the section titled “Special Note Regarding Forward-looking Statements” for more
information. The content of, or accessibility through, the below sources, except to the extent specifically set
forth in this prospectus, does not constitute a portion of this prospectus and is not incorporated herein and any
websites are inactive textual references only.
The sources of the statistical data, estimates, and market and industry data contained in this prospectus are
identified by superscript notations and are provided below:
•IDC, The Economic Impact of AI: 2026 Edition, doc # US54452226, April 2026.
•IDC, Worldwide Black Book: Live Edition V2 2026 Forecast, July 2026.
•IDC, Worldwide Developer Population Growth Forecast, 2025–2029, doc # US53789825, September
2025.
•IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science, Global Medicine Use Trends 2026, February 2026.
•U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics, May 2025.
•World Bank Group, GDP (current US$), 2025.
The industry in which we operate is subject to a high degree of uncertainty and risk due to a variety of factors,
including those described in the section titled “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in this prospectus. These and other
factors could cause results to differ materially from those expressed in the reports and estimates made by the
aforementioned third parties and by us.
Certain estimates in this prospectus regarding global knowledge workers’ wages, which we refer to as the
annual economic value represented by global knowledge workers, are our own, derived from third-party data.
Based on wage data for U.S. workers by occupation classification from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in
2025, we calculate the total salary for the subset of workers that we believe to represent knowledge workers.
Based on International Labor Organization data for global labor income as a percentage of global GDP, and
based on 2025 global GDP, we estimate a 2025 global wages figure. We calculate the ratio of total U.S. wages in
2025 to the 2025 global wages figure, and apply that ratio to the total U.S. knowledge workers’ wages figure to
arrive at an estimate of global knowledge workers’ wages.
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Use of Proceeds
We estimate that the net proceeds to us from the sale of shares of our Class A common stock in this offering will
be approximately $          , based upon the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the
midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, and after
deducting estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us,
or approximately $           if the underwriters’ option to purchase additional shares of our Class A common stock
from us is exercised in full. We will not receive any proceeds from the sale of shares of Class A common stock by
the selling stockholders.
Each $1.00 increase or decrease in the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the
midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, would increase or
decrease, as applicable, the net proceeds that we receive from this offering by approximately $          , assuming
that the number of shares offered by us, as set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, remains the same and
after deducting the estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses
payable by us. Similarly, each increase or decrease of 1.0 million in the number of shares of our Class A
common stock offered by us would increase or decrease, as applicable, the net proceeds that we receive from
this offering by approximately $          , assuming the assumed initial public offering price remains the same and
after deducting the estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses
payable by us.
The principal purposes of this offering are to increase our capitalization and financial flexibility, create a public
market for our Class A common stock, facilitate an orderly distribution of shares for the selling stockholders,
and enable access to the public equity markets for us and our stockholders.
We intend to use the net proceeds from this offering for general corporate purposes, including working capital,
operating expenses, and capital expenditures, including investments in compute and infrastructure, as well as
hiring and retention of highly skilled personnel. Additionally, we may use a portion of the net proceeds we
receive from this offering to acquire or invest in businesses, products, services, or technologies. However, we do
not have agreements or commitments for any material acquisitions or investments at this time.
We also intend to use a portion of the net proceeds we receive from this offering to satisfy our anticipated tax
withholding and remittance obligations of $           related to the RSU Settlement. This amount is based upon the
assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of the estimated offering price
range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, and an assumed           % tax withholding rate. Each $1.00
increase or decrease in the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of
the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, would increase or decrease, as
applicable, the amount we would be required to pay to satisfy our tax withholding and remittance obligations
related to the RSU Settlement by $          .
We cannot further specify with certainty the particular uses of the net proceeds that we will receive from this
offering. Accordingly, we will have broad discretion in using these proceeds. Pending the use of proceeds from
this offering as described above, we may invest the net proceeds that we receive in this offering in short-term,
investment-grade, interest-bearing instruments.
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Dividend Policy
We have never declared or paid any cash dividends on our capital stock. We currently intend to retain all
available funds and any future earnings to finance the operation and expansion of our business and do not
expect to pay any dividends in the foreseeable future. Any future determination to declare cash dividends will
be made at the discretion of our board of directors, subject to applicable laws, and will depend on a number of
factors, including our financial condition, results of operations, capital requirements, contractual restrictions,
general business conditions, and other factors that our board of directors may deem relevant. In addition, the
terms of the A&R Credit Agreement place certain limitations on the amount of cash dividends we can pay, even
if no amounts are currently outstanding under the credit facility.
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Capitalization
The following table sets forth our cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments, as well as our
capitalization, as of September 30, 2026:
•on an actual basis;
•on a pro forma basis, giving effect to (i) the Preferred Stock Conversion, as if such conversion had
occurred on September 30, 2026, (ii) the Convertible Notes Conversion, as if such conversion had
occurred on September 30, 2026, (iii) the Class F Stock Issuance, as if it had occurred on September
30, 2026, (iv) an increase to additional paid-in capital and accumulated deficit related to stock-based
compensation of $           related to RSUs subject to the RSU Settlement, and (v) the filing and
effectiveness of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation in Delaware that will become
effective immediately prior to the completion of this offering; and
•on a pro forma as adjusted basis, giving effect to (i) the pro forma adjustments set forth above, (ii) the
sale and issuance by us of            shares of our Class A common stock in this offering, based upon the
assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of the estimated
offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, and after deducting estimated
underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us, and (iii) the
use of net proceeds from this offering, together with existing cash and cash equivalents, if necessary, to
satisfy the estimated tax withholding and remittance obligations related to the RSU Settlement. We will
not receive any proceeds from the sale of shares of our Class A common stock by any of the selling
stockholders.
The pro forma as adjusted information set forth in the table below is illustrative only and will be adjusted based
on the actual initial public offering price and other terms of this offering determined at pricing. You should read
this table together with our consolidated financial statements and related notes and the section titled
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” that are included
elsewhere in this prospectus.
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As of September 30, 2026
Actual
Pro
Forma(1)
Pro
Forma As
Adjusted(2)
(in millions, except share and per share amounts)
Cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments
$131,845
$                     
$                     
Convertible notes payable
$130,502
Redeemable convertible preferred stock, par value $0.00001
per share: 1,040,440,652 shares authorized,            issued and
outstanding, actual; no shares authorized, issued, and
outstanding, pro forma and pro forma as adjusted
157,510
Stockholders’ equity (deficit):
Preferred stock, par value $0.00001 per share: no shares
authorized, issued, and outstanding, actual;
30,000,000,000 shares authorized, no shares issued and
outstanding, pro forma and pro forma as adjusted
—
Class A common stock, par value $0.00001 per share:
10,906,111,730 shares authorized,            shares issued and
outstanding, actual; 300,000,000,000 shares authorized,
           shares issued and outstanding, pro forma; and
300,000,000,000 shares authorized,            shares issued
and outstanding, pro forma as adjusted
—
Class N common stock, par value $0.00001 per share:
7,128,888,270 shares authorized,            shares issued and
outstanding, actual; 100,000,000,000 shares authorized,
           shares issued, and            shares outstanding, pro
forma; and 100,000,000,000 shares authorized,           
shares issued, and            shares outstanding, pro forma as
adjusted(3)
—
Class T common stock, par value $0.00001 per share: 1
share authorized, 1 share issued and outstanding, actual,
pro forma, and pro forma as adjusted
—
Class F common stock, par value $0.00001 per share: no
shares authorized, issued, and outstanding, actual; 1 share
authorized, 1 share issued and outstanding, pro forma and
pro forma as adjusted
—
Class E common stock, par value $0.00001 per share: no
shares authorized, issued, and outstanding, actual;
30,000,000,000 shares authorized, no shares issued and
outstanding, pro forma and pro forma as adjusted
—
Additional paid-in capital
6,481
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)
(161)
Accumulated deficit
(156,193)
Total stockholders’ equity (deficit)
(149,873)
Total capitalization
$138,139
$                     
$                     
______________
(1)Each $1.00 increase or decrease in the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of the
estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, would increase or decrease, as applicable, the
amount we would be required to pay to satisfy our tax withholding and remittance obligations related to the RSU Settlement by
$          .
(2)Each $1.00 increase or decrease in the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of the
estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, would increase or decrease, as applicable, the
amount of our pro forma as adjusted cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments, additional paid-in capital, total
stockholders’ equity (deficit), and total capitalization by $          , assuming that the number of shares offered by us, as set forth
on the cover page of this prospectus, remains the same and after deducting estimated underwriting discounts and commissions
and estimated offering expenses payable by us. Each increase or decrease of 1.0 million in the number of shares offered by us
would increase or decrease, as applicable, the amount of our pro forma as adjusted cash, cash equivalents, and short-term
investments, additional paid-in capital, total stockholders’ equity (deficit), and total capitalization by $          , assuming the
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assumed initial public offering price remains the same, and after deducting estimated underwriting discounts and commissions
and estimated offering expenses payable by us.
(3)The number of shares of Class N common stock issued on a pro forma and pro forma as adjusted basis includes shares issued in
the Initial Public Benefit Issuance, which (i) are considered legally outstanding, (ii) are not considered outstanding for
accounting purposes while held by our wholly owned subsidiary, and (iii) accordingly are not reflected as outstanding in the
table above.
If the underwriters’ option to purchase additional shares of our Class A common stock from us were exercised
in full, pro forma as adjusted cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments; additional paid-in capital;
total stockholders’ equity (deficit); total capitalization; and shares of Class A common stock outstanding as of
September 30, 2026 would be $          , $          , $          , $          , and            shares of Class A common stock,
respectively.
The pro forma and pro forma as adjusted columns in the table above are based on            shares of our Class A
common stock,            shares of our Class N common stock, one share of our Class T common stock, and one
share of our Class F common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026 (after giving effect to the Preferred
Stock Conversion, Convertible Notes Conversion, Class F Stock Issuance, Initial Public Benefit Issuance, and
RSU Settlement), and exclude the following:
•1,774,342,693 shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the exercise of options to purchase
shares of our Class A common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026, with a weighted-average
exercise price of $2.91 per share;
•           shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs
outstanding as of September 30, 2026, but for which (i) the service-based vesting condition was not
satisfied as of the date of this offering and (ii) the performance-based vesting condition, if applicable,
will be satisfied upon the effectiveness of the registration statement of which this prospectus forms a
part;
•           shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs granted
after September 30, 2026;
•           shares of our Class A common stock and 848,882 shares of our Class N common stock issued
after September 30, 2026 in connection with our acquisitions of privately-held companies; and
•           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance under our equity compensation
plans, consisting of:
◦           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance upon conversion of Class N
common stock issuable under our Donation Matching Plan, which shares include the Pledge
Issuance;
◦           shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our 2026 Plan,
which will become effective prior to the completion of this offering;
◦           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance under our 2021 Plan, which
number of shares will be added to the shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future
issuance under our 2026 Plan upon its effectiveness, at which time we will cease granting awards
under our 2021 Plan; and
◦           shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our ESPP,
which will become effective prior to the completion of this offering.
Our 2026 Plan and ESPP each provide for an annual automatic increase in the number of shares of our Class A
common stock reserved thereunder, and our 2026 Plan provides for increases to the number of shares that may
be granted thereunder based on awards under our 2021 Plan that expire or are cancelled or forfeited, and
shares under our 2021 Plan that are tendered to or withheld by us for payment of an exercise price or for
satisfying tax withholding obligations, or are forfeited or otherwise repurchased by us, as more fully described
in the section titled “Executive Compensation—Equity Plans.”
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Dilution
If you invest in our Class A common stock in this offering, your ownership interest will be diluted to the extent
of the difference between the initial public offering price per share of our Class A common stock and the pro
forma as adjusted net tangible book value per share of our Class A common stock and Class N common stock
immediately after this offering. Net tangible book value dilution per share to new investors represents the
difference between the amount per share paid by purchasers of shares of our Class A common stock in this
offering and the pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value per share of our Class A common stock and Class
N common stock immediately after completion of this offering.
Net tangible book value per share is determined by dividing our total tangible assets less our total liabilities and
redeemable convertible preferred stock by the number of shares of our Class A common stock and Class N
common stock outstanding; because our Class T common stock, Class F common stock, and Class E common
stock have no economic rights, they are excluded from the per share calculation. Our historical net tangible
book value as of September 30, 2026 was $(150.6) billion, or $(68.47) per share. Our pro forma net tangible
book value as of September 30, 2026 was $          , or $           per share, based on the total number of shares of
our Class A common stock and Class N common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026, after giving effect
to the Preferred Stock Conversion, Convertible Notes Conversion, Initial Public Benefit Issuance, and RSU
Settlement.
After giving effect to (i) the pro forma adjustments set forth above and (ii) the sale by us of            shares of our
Class A common stock in this offering at the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is
the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, after deducting
estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us and the use
of net proceeds from this offering, together with existing cash and cash equivalents, if necessary, to satisfy the
estimated tax withholding and remittance obligations related to the RSU Settlement, our pro forma as adjusted
net tangible book value as of September 30, 2026 would have been $          , or $           per share. This represents
an immediate increase in pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value of $           per share to our existing
stockholders and an immediate dilution in pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value of $           per share to
investors purchasing shares of our Class A common stock in this offering at the assumed initial public offering
price. The following table illustrates this dilution on a per share basis:
Assumed initial public offering price per share
$                     
Historical net tangible book value per share as of September 30, 2026
$(68.47)
Increase per share attributable to the pro forma adjustments described
above
Pro forma net tangible book value per share as of September 30, 2026
Increase in pro forma net tangible book value per share attributable to new
investors purchasing shares of Class A common stock in this offering
Pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value per share immediately after this
offering
Dilution in pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value per share to new
investors in this offering
$                     
The dilution information discussed above is illustrative only and may change based on the actual initial public
offering price and other terms of this offering. Each $1.00 increase or decrease in the assumed initial public
offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the
cover page of this prospectus, would increase or decrease, as applicable, our pro forma as adjusted net tangible
book value per share by $          , and would increase or decrease, as applicable, dilution per share to new
investors purchasing shares of Class A common stock in this offering by $          , assuming that the number of
shares offered by us, as set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, remains the same and after deducting
estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us. Similarly,
each increase or decrease of 1.0 million in the number of shares of our Class A common stock offered by us
would increase or decrease, as applicable, our pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value by approximately
$           per share and increase or decrease, as applicable, the dilution to new investors purchasing shares of
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Class A common stock in this offering by $           per share, assuming the assumed initial public offering price
remains the same, and after deducting estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated
offering expenses payable by us.
If the underwriters’ option to purchase additional shares of our Class A common stock from us is exercised in
full, the pro forma as adjusted net tangible book value per share of our Class A common stock would be
$          per share, and the dilution in pro forma net tangible book value per share to new investors purchasing
shares of Class A common stock in this offering would be $           per share.
The following table presents, as of September 30, 2026, after giving effect to the Preferred Stock Conversion,
Convertible Notes Conversion, Initial Public Benefit Issuance, and RSU Settlement, the differences between the
existing stockholders and the new investors purchasing shares of our Class A common stock in this offering
with respect to the number of shares purchased from us, the total consideration paid or to be paid to us, which
includes net proceeds received from the issuance of our Class A common stock, and the average price per share
paid or to be paid to us at the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of
the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, before deducting estimated
underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us:
Shares Purchased
Total Consideration
Weighted-
Average
Price Per
Share
Number
Percent
Amount
Percent
Existing stockholders
%
$                     
%
$                     
New investors
 
$                     
Total
100%
$                     
100%
The foregoing table does not reflect any sales by the selling stockholders in this offering. Sales by the selling
stockholders in this offering will cause the number of shares held by existing stockholders to be reduced to
           shares, or approximately           % of the total number of shares of our Class A common stock and Class N
common stock outstanding after this offering, and will increase the number of shares held by new investors to
           shares, or approximately           % of the total number of shares of our Class A common stock and Class N
common stock outstanding after this offering.
Each $1.00 increase or decrease in the assumed initial public offering price of $           per share, which is the
midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the cover page of this prospectus, would increase or
decrease, as applicable, the total consideration paid by new investors and total consideration paid by all
stockholders by $          , assuming that the number of shares of our Class A common stock offered by us, as set
forth on the cover page of this prospectus, remains the same and after deducting estimated underwriting
discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us. Similarly, each increase or decrease
of 1.0 million in the number of shares of our Class A common stock offered by us would increase or decrease, as
applicable, the total consideration paid by new investors and total consideration paid by all stockholders by
$          , assuming the assumed initial public offering price remains the same and after deducting the estimated
underwriting discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses payable by us.
Except as otherwise indicated, the above discussion and tables assume no exercise of the underwriters’ option
to purchase additional shares of our Class A common stock from us. If the underwriters’ option to purchase
additional shares of our Class A common stock were exercised in full, our existing stockholders would own
          % and our new investors would own           % of the total number of shares of our Class A common stock
and Class N common stock outstanding upon completion of this offering.
The number of shares of our Class A common stock, Class N common stock, Class T common stock, and Class F
common stock that will be outstanding after this offering is based on            shares of our Class A common stock,
           shares of our Class N common stock, one share of our Class T common stock, and one share of our Class F
common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026 (after giving effect to the Preferred Stock Conversion,
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Convertible Notes Conversion, Class F Stock Issuance, Initial Public Benefit Issuance, and RSU Settlement),
and excludes:
•1,774,342,693 shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the exercise of options to purchase
shares of our Class A common stock outstanding as of September 30, 2026, with a weighted-average
exercise price of $2.91 per share;
•           shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs
outstanding as of September 30, 2026, but for which (i) the service-based vesting condition was not
satisfied as of the date of this offering and (ii) the performance-based vesting condition, if applicable,
will be satisfied upon the effectiveness of the registration statement of which this prospectus forms a
part;
•           shares of our Class A common stock issuable upon the vesting and settlement of RSUs granted
after September 30, 2026;
•           shares of our Class A common stock and 848,882 shares of our Class N common stock issued
after September 30, 2026 in connection with our acquisitions of privately-held companies; and
•           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance under our equity compensation
plans, consisting of:
◦           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance upon conversion of Class N
common stock issuable under our Donation Matching Plan, which shares include the Pledge
Issuance;
◦           shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our 2026 Plan,
which will become effective prior to the completion of this offering;
◦           shares of our Class A common stock reserved for future issuance under our 2021 Plan, which
number of shares will be added to the shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future
issuance under our 2026 Plan upon its effectiveness, at which time we will cease granting awards
under our 2021 Plan; and
◦           shares of our Class A common stock to be reserved for future issuance under our ESPP,
which will become effective prior to the completion of this offering.
Our 2026 Plan and ESPP each provide for an annual automatic increase in the number of shares of our Class A
common stock reserved thereunder, and our 2026 Plan provides for increases to the number of shares that may
be granted thereunder based on awards under our 2021 Plan that expire or are cancelled or forfeited, and
shares under our 2021 Plan that are tendered to or withheld by us for payment of an exercise price or for
satisfying tax withholding obligations, or are forfeited or otherwise repurchased by us, as more fully described
in the section titled “Executive Compensation—Equity Plans.”
To the extent that any outstanding options to purchase our Class A common stock are exercised, RSUs are
settled, or new awards are granted under our equity compensation plans, there will be further dilution to
investors participating in this offering.
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134
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations
The following discussion and analysis of our financial condition and results of operations should be read in
conjunction with the section titled “Summary Consolidated Financial and Other Data” and the consolidated
financial statements and related notes thereto included elsewhere in this prospectus. This discussion contains
forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. Our actual results may differ materially
from those anticipated in these forward-looking statements. Factors that could cause or contribute to such
differences include those identified below and those discussed elsewhere in this prospectus, particularly in the
sections titled “Risk Factors” and “Special Note Regarding Forward-looking Statements.” Financial data as of
and for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025 have been derived from our audited consolidated
financial statements appearing at the end of this prospectus. Our historical results are not necessarily
indicative of the results that may be expected for any period in the future.
Overview
Anthropic was founded in 2021 by a team of researchers responsible for many of the breakthroughs that define
AI. We are first and foremost a research lab—our mission is the responsible development and maintenance of
advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity. This mission directs our focus—along with our talent and
culture, our frontier and safety research, our approach to compute, and our enterprise strategy, it is one of the
core advantages that set us apart. These advantages enable us to continuously advance frontier AI and shape
the standards for its safe and responsible development. Our frontier AI, Claude, is delivered to customers
through our models, platform, and applications. Claude has experienced the fastest enterprise adoption of any
technology in history, as demonstrated by revenue growing from $0 at commercial launch in the first quarter of
2023 to $17.0 billion for the three months ended September 30, 2026.
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Our Financial Model
Our financial model is built on four primary drivers that define the trajectory of our results:
•Adoption of Claude. The advancing intelligence and capabilities of each successive version of a
Claude model drive the diffusion of Claude across the global economy. As new customers adopt Claude
and existing customers expand their usage into new workflows, our revenue grows.
•Compute Efficiency. We are focused on increasing the intelligence produced and revenue generated
per dollar of compute invested and have delivered significant efficiency improvements.
•Operating Efficiency. Our high talent density, efficient go-to-market, and how extensively our
teams leverage Claude in their work help to drive improved operating margin, Adjusted Operating
Margin, and revenue per employee.
•Compute Investments. Investing in compute is critical to support our long-term growth, and we
intend to continue making substantial investments in compute.
The drivers of our financial model materialize on different timelines. The adoption of Claude and associated
revenue growth, compute efficiency, and operating efficiency have each increased rapidly over time. Compute is
procured and committed in advance and the expense is incurred as it is brought online and added to our
fungible pool, often in large, discrete steps. The fungible pool can support all workloads dynamically, including
research, model development, serving customers, and internal usage of Claude. As a result, there is a lag
between when investment is committed and when the full revenue associated with such investment is realized.
This dynamic has produced a financial model in which our operating margin and Adjusted Operating Margin
for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 have expanded significantly year over year. As significant
incremental compute is brought online in future periods, the associated expense will be recognized in advance
of the full revenue that the compute will ultimately support, and we expect operating margin and Adjusted
Operating Margin may compress in those periods. At our current stage, this cycle is an inherent aspect of our
business and will cause operating margins to fluctuate from period to period, at times meaningfully, even if the
underlying economics of the business continue to improve.
In addition, the majority of our compute is contracted under multi-year commitments that we typically procure
12 to 18 months in advance of availability. When customer demand or research needs exceed this long-term
capacity, we procure short-term compute that currently costs significantly more than comparable compute
procured under our multi-year commitments. We expect our use of short-term compute to continue to increase
in the near term and to in turn compress our operating margin and Adjusted Operating Margin as a result.
Adoption of Claude
Each successive version of a Claude model is designed to advance the frontier with capabilities that customers
value most, including coding, agentic workflows, computer use, and complex reasoning, which unlock new
categories of use and drive compounding demand from new and existing customers. Claude’s intelligence is a
primary driver of its diffusion and our revenue growth: because Claude leads at the AI frontier, customers
rapidly adopt it, quickly see real value, and organically expand their use. We complement this intelligence-led
growth with direct go-to-market and Applied AI teams and extend our reach through native availability across
all three major cloud platforms—AWS, GCP, and Azure—and through partnerships with SIs, consultants, and
data platforms.
We deliver this intelligence through an integrated approach. Our Claude model family is the foundation, with
model classes optimized for different points along the capability-cost-speed curve. On top of our models, Claude
Platform gives developers access to the primitives we use ourselves, which they can use to build their own AI
solutions. We have also built first-party applications on Claude Platform for customers that prefer a ready-to-
deploy option. We believe the value of this integrated approach is reflected in the increasing number of
customers that use both Claude Platform and our first-party applications. For the three months ended
September 30, 2026, over 50% of our customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis used
136
Claude Platform and at least one of our first-party applications, up from approximately 30% for the three
months ended December 31, 2025.
As more customers adopt Claude and expand their usage, we have rapidly grown our base of customers that
generate meaningful revenue. We had more than 11,900 customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a
TTM basis as of September 30, 2026, up from more than 950 as of September 30, 2025. In addition, as
customers further embed Claude into their most critical workflows and growth initiatives, many rapidly expand
their deployments into higher revenue tiers. As of September 30, 2026, we had more than 1,900 customers with
$1 million or more of revenue on a TTM basis and approximately 250 customers with $10 million or more of
revenue on a TTM basis.
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This customer momentum is driven by significant usage expansion as customers realize the value of deploying
Claude across their organizations. The value that Claude delivers to customers has helped drive our Net
Revenue Retention of approximately 900% as of September 30, 2026.
The growth in our business reflects the degree to which enterprises are embedding Claude directly into their
business-critical workflows. Despite these trends, adoption across the global economy remains nascent. As
Claude’s capabilities continue to advance, we believe the addressable opportunity will expand, and Claude will
continue its rapid diffusion across more enterprises.
Compute Efficiency
Compute is the most significant operating cost in our business, and compute efficiency is a critical determinant
of our operating efficiency and revenue. Our research-driven algorithmic improvements in training and
inference optimization and multi-chip compute architecture have combined to dramatically increase our
compute efficiency as our revenue has scaled. The result is that we are able to continue increasing the
intelligence our research can produce and the revenue our business can generate per dollar of compute
investment.
We define compute efficiency as maximizing the intelligence produced and revenue generated per dollar of
compute invested. Three pillars drive our compute efficiency:
•Training Efficiency. Our researchers regularly innovate compute multipliers. Increasingly, Claude
itself assists in the research and engineering that produce each successive version of our models, which
is a recursive dynamic we refer to as “closing the loop,” with successive versions of our models
accelerating the development of the next and compounding these gains across model generations.
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•Inference Efficiency. Our researchers have delivered meaningful compute multipliers for inference
—reducing the compute required to serve a given level of model performance—while our engineering
teams have driven significant optimizations in how efficiently that compute is utilized in production.
This allows us to provide greater value for customers and generate greater revenue from our compute
base over time, which is critical as we have consistently operated in a compute-constrained
environment where customer demand exceeds available compute.
•Multi-Chip Compute Approach. We train and serve Claude natively across four major chip
families (AWS Trainium, Google TPUs, NVIDIA GPUs, and AMD GPUs) using a proprietary
orchestration layer that enables us to optimize workloads for price and performance. This flexibility,
which took years and significant investment to build and we believe is difficult to replicate at scale,
expands our available compute, reduces dependence on any single vendor, and enables us to
continuously route workloads to the most optimal hardware for those workloads. This foundation,
paired with Claude’s increasing understanding of chip and model architectures, allows us to onboard
new chip platforms in a fraction of the time this once required.
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Revenue per dollar of compute has expanded meaningfully, even as we have accelerated research and product
velocity and expanded our internal Claude usage. For example, our revenue grew 1,127% year over year for the
three months ended September 30, 2026, compared to our compute and infrastructure expenses that grew
382% during the same period. While serving our growing customer demand, we also advanced the frontier with
new leading models, including Mythos 5, Fable 5, and Opus 5, and launched new products, including Claude
Cowork, Claude Security, and Claude Design.
In the three months ended September 30, 2026, our underlying compute efficiency improvements were
partially offset by the delivery of additional compute, including $5.0 billion of compute under short-term
commitments, which currently costs significantly more than comparable compute procured under our multi-
year commitments. This reduced revenue per dollar of compute compared to the preceding quarter.
Operating Efficiency
Our operating efficiency is derived from our high talent density, our efficient go-to-market, and how extensively
our teams leverage Claude in their work. Claude is the common thread, amplifying the output of our employees.
For example, over 90% of the contributions to our codebase in September 2026 were written by Claude.
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Additionally, the average daily volume of code contributed to our codebase per engineer in the three months
ended September 30, 2026 was over 45 times the average daily volume in the year ended December 31, 2024.
From September 30, 2025 to September 30, 2026, TTM revenue increased approximately 1,200% while
headcount increased approximately 170%, driving TTM revenue per employee from $1.4 million to over $6.6
million, a reflection of extraordinary talent density and a culture built to compound it.
Our go-to-market model reflects this as well—intelligence-led growth and broad distribution partnerships
enable us to rapidly expand customer adoption and revenue without being limited by the rate at which we can
grow our sales and marketing organization, resulting in greater sales efficiency as compared to typical
enterprise technology companies.
Our revenue was $33.2 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2026, up from $2.5 billion for the nine
months ended September 30, 2025. Our operating loss was $1.3 billion for the nine months ended September
30, 2026, down from $5.2 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The result of our revenue
growth, compute efficiency, and operating efficiency has been a significant improvement in Adjusted Operating
Income, which was $4.1 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2026, up from an Adjusted Operating
Loss of $3.1 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025. We expect operating margin and Adjusted
Operating Margin to fluctuate over time, particularly in periods when substantial incremental compute is
delivered to us and we incur the associated expenses. See the section titled “—Non-GAAP Financial Measures”
for a description of and information about Adjusted Operating Income (Loss) and Adjusted Operating Margin,
as well as a reconciliation of these measures to the most directly comparable financial measures calculated in
accordance with GAAP.
Our operating loss was $567 million for the three months ended September 30, 2026, compared to an operating
income of $974 million for the three months ended June 30, 2026, primarily driven by $5.0 billion of compute
under short-term commitments, which currently costs significantly more than comparable compute procured
under our multi-year commitments, and $2.0 billion of non-cash charges related to our donation matching
program.
Adjusted Operating Income increased for the three months ended September 30, 2026 to $2.5 billion compared
to $2.2 billion for the three months ended June 30, 2026, while Adjusted Operating Margin decreased from
19% for the three months ended June 30, 2026 to 15% for the three months ended September 30, 2026,
primarily driven by the $5.0 billion of short-term compute noted above.
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Compute Investments
Investing in compute is a prerequisite for long-term growth. We invest in compute for research, model
development, serving customers, and internal usage of Claude. Our commercial traction, research progress, and
the scale of the opportunity ahead give us the conviction to continue investing aggressively in compute. An
increasing portion of these investments relates to building out our own compute and infrastructure and
vertically integrating across the compute supply chain to secure long-term compute at the scale required for
frontier model development. These investments take the form of capital expenditures and other commitments,
including lease obligations, that we incur well in advance of the related compute becoming operational and
generating revenue. As a result, we expect this build-out to change the cash flow profile of our business and to
be a significant use of net cash in operating and investing activities for the foreseeable future. See the section
titled “—Liquidity and Capital Resources” for more information.
In addition, as our compute needs have grown substantially, we are shifting from sourcing compute solely
through fixed-term cloud agreements to a hybrid model that also includes leasing chips directly and hosting
them in dedicated facilities operated on our behalf. We refer to this additional source of compute as Anthropic
Direct, which helps to address our scaling compute requirements and we believe will provide long-term
economic advantages. Anthropic Direct represents a more flexible use of capital by allowing us to separate our
commitments for data center capacity from our commitments for the compute infrastructure deployed inside
them. Because data centers require longer lead times but represent a smaller fraction of total compute costs,
this approach enables us to secure data center capacity early while deferring larger accelerator investments
until our specific compute needs are more certain.
As of and subsequent to September 30, 2026, we have entered into purchase commitments and lease
agreements, including short-term commitments, as well as leases not yet commenced, with an aggregate
committed spend of approximately $895.4 billion. These commitments include approximately $447.5 billion
expected to be incurred before December 31, 2030, and substantially all of the remainder is expected to be
incurred between 2031 and 2045. Approximately $69.8 billion of these commitments are due in the 12 months
following September 30, 2026. A significant portion of this total committed spend relates to Anthropic Direct,
and we expect it to represent a growing share of our compute investments over time. The flexibility from
Anthropic Direct allows us to backfill the short-term compute we procure during periods of high demand with
more cost-effective, long-term compute as our dedicated infrastructure comes online.
We intend to fund these investments through the revenue we generate and the capital that we raise. As of
September 30, 2026, and prior to taking into account the net proceeds to us from this offering, we had $146.6
billion of liquidity, comprised of $95.6 billion of cash and cash equivalents, $36.3 billion of short-term
investments, and $14.8 billion of availability under our A&R Credit Facility (as defined below). We also
maintain significant funding support from our strategic partners, including up to $77.0 billion in available
financing capacity under our NPAs and up to $5.0 billion in equity commitments. In addition, we estimate that
the net proceeds to us from this offering will be approximately $          , based upon the assumed initial public
offering price of $           per share, which is the midpoint of the estimated offering price range set forth on the
cover page of this prospectus, and after deducting estimated underwriting discounts and commissions and
estimated offering expenses payable by us, or approximately $           if the underwriters’ option to purchase
additional shares of our Class A common stock from us is exercised in full.
How We Generate Revenue
At the foundation of our business is our family of four Claude model classes—Mythos (including Fable), Opus,
Sonnet, and Haiku—each optimized for a different point on the capability-cost-speed curve. Our frontier
models allow customers to match the right model to each use case. Customers typically use higher-capability
models for complex reasoning, coding, and agentic workflows where greater model intelligence is required.
Customers also frequently adopt our full range of models, routing individual tasks to the models that are most
optimized to meet their needs along the capability-cost-speed curve. The model a customer uses and the volume
of usage are the primary drivers of customer spend. We establish a direct contractual relationship with the
customer and offer customers the flexibility to purchase directly from us or through CSP marketplaces, and
many customers utilize both channels.
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Pay-for-intelligence, our consumption-based revenue model, is our primary revenue model and currently
represents the substantial majority of our total revenue. Under this model, customers pay for usage, which is
metered in tokens and priced according to the model selected. Our pay-for-intelligence revenue is primarily
generated from customers building applications incorporating Claude or utilizing our first-party applications.
In addition, we offer certain of our applications on a subscription basis, serving both enterprises and
prosumers. Under this model, customers pay a subscription fee for a specified level of usage and capabilities
during the subscription term, which is generally 12 months or less.
Depending on the model, platform, or applications chosen by our customers, they enter into pay-for-
intelligence pricing, subscription-based pricing, or both. For example, when subscribers approach or exhaust
the usage capacity included in their tier, they may utilize a higher subscription tier or purchase more
intelligence directly, creating a seamless bridge from subscription to incremental pay-for-intelligence revenue.
A growing number of enterprise customers agree to non-cancelable annual or multi-year contracts with
minimum spend commitments in exchange for a committed price list. These contracts result primarily in
consumption-based revenue.
Consumption-based revenue increased from $288 million, or 75% of total revenue, for the year ended
December 31, 2024, to $3.8 billion, or 83% of total revenue, for the year ended December 31, 2025, to $26.3
billion, or 79% of total revenue, for the nine months ended September 30, 2026. Subscription-based revenue
increased from $98 million, or 25% of total revenue, to $789 million, or 17% of total revenue, to $6.9 billion, or
21% of total revenue, over the same periods. The larger dollar increase in consumption-based revenue reflects
the growth in customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis. For 2023, our revenue of $41
million was substantially all consumption-based, reflecting our early operations. We expect consumption-based
revenue to continue to represent the substantial majority of total revenue for the foreseeable future.
Our recent growth may reflect early-stage adoption dynamics, the nascency of the AI market, and rapid initial
customer expansion that may not be sustainable over time. We expect our revenue growth rate to decline over
time, and it may decline significantly and more rapidly than we anticipate as our revenue base increases and as
the market matures.
Our Customers and Approach to Claude Diffusion
Our Customers
We serve enterprises of all sizes and across industries, in nearly every region of the world. Organizations that
use Claude range from the world’s largest enterprises to AI-native startups, research institutions, and mission-
driven organizations working on some of the world’s most consequential problems. Customers realize value
from Claude in three primary ways: more productive employees, faster processes, and embedded intelligence in
their products. As enterprise customers push Claude into increasingly complex workflows, we engage with them
to understand their evolving requirements, which helps shape our product roadmap. This feedback loop
deepens customer relationships with each release and makes Claude more capable for all customers.
Software developers have been core to our strategy: they are simultaneously the architects of applications built
on our platform, and they encode their workflows and institutional knowledge into Claude-powered agents.
Developers have been our earliest adopters and often most discerning users: they apply models to unanticipated
use cases quickly and surface the edge cases that sharpen each successive version of a Claude model. Claude
Code is now embedded in software development workflows across major organizations, with these relationships
often beginning with individual engineers who recognized the value of autonomous coding agents and
accelerated adoption across their enterprises.
The same intelligence and capabilities we deliver to enterprises are also valuable to prosumers in their personal
endeavors. These users provide strategic value as a top-of-funnel engine for our enterprise business—
individuals who utilize Claude for their personal work and then champion it inside their organizations.
We are seeing broad-based growth across customer use cases, from software development to financial analysis,
content creation, and complex knowledge work. Claude is extensible: regardless of entry point, enterprises
quickly discover that frontier AI applies to a wide and expanding range of tasks across their organizations. As a
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result, what sometimes begins as a single use case frequently expands into broader adoption spanning coding,
legal analysis, financial modeling, customer operations, and other knowledge-intensive work.
Our Approach to Claude Diffusion
A core driver of Claude’s diffusion is its intelligence—as Claude’s capabilities advance, value to customers
expands, and that value drives greater adoption. Ensuring the accessibility of such intelligence is also critical,
and we do that in the following ways: through our composable platform and applications that meet customers
where they are, through our go-to-market and Applied AI teams directly, and through partnerships that extend
our reach at scale.
Intelligence-Led Growth. Our platform and applications are the primary mechanism through which Claude’s
intelligence can reach users. As users begin building, brainstorming, and problem-solving with Claude, they
quickly come to rely on it as a trusted partner in their work. As Claude becomes part of how people work, they
experience firsthand what frontier AI makes possible, and such individual adoption reshapes how entire
organizations operate. This pattern repeats across organizations: prosumers become internal champions, teams
expand their use of Claude, and what begins as a single workflow grows into something that impacts how an
entire organization operates. This pattern has been core to our revenue growth.
Direct Teams. This organic adoption is complemented and enhanced through our direct go-to-market teams
who help scale Claude to organizations with complex workflows and business processes. By the time our direct
teams engage a customer, Claude is often already in use. Our go-to-market teams use this organic momentum
to build executive sponsorship and drive enterprise-wide adoption.
Applied AI Teams. Our Applied AI teams embed more deeply with select customers, building solutions that
make it easier for organizations to benefit from Claude’s intelligence. They work with enterprises to design and
deploy custom solutions, specialized workflows, and domain-specific implementations tailored to the
customer’s own requirements. This work drives deeper adoption within individual customers and generates the
feedback and information from users that help to shape our platform and product roadmap.
Cloud Partnerships. Claude is accessible on all three major cloud platforms, AWS, GCP, and Azure, allowing
enterprises to deploy Claude within the infrastructure, security perimeters, and commitment structures they
already operate. These CSPs extend our reach through their large combined field teams that are empowered to
sell our platform and applications, accelerating market adoption at a scale we believe would be difficult for any
single organization to directly replicate. We have a joint go-to-market approach with these CSPs through which
we establish direct contractual relationships with our customers while paying a fee to each CSP. This structure
allows us to foster stronger commercial alignment with these CSPs, avoid channel conflict, set pricing, and
realize the financial benefits of ongoing compute efficiency improvements.
Ecosystem Partnerships. Major global SIs have built dedicated Claude practices with teams trained to deploy
our platform and applications. Go-to-market alliances with leading data platforms embed Claude into data
infrastructure that enterprises already operate, facilitating adoption of Claude within existing workflows and
making it easier for enterprises to realize value from Claude.
Ode with Anthropic. We recently launched an AI services company in partnership with leading private equity
firms to bring Claude’s capabilities to mid-sized companies across sectors, building solutions on the Claude
Platform and supporting customers over the long term. Ode with Anthropic will partner closely with our
Applied AI and go-to-market teams.
Together, these approaches have led to a structurally efficient approach to facilitating the diffusion of Claude in
the economy, with our sales, marketing, and partnerships expenses representing 17% of revenue for the nine
months ended September 30, 2026.
Key Factors Affecting Our Performance
Remaining at the Frontier of AI
We believe enterprises consistently choose the most capable and trustworthy AI systems, making our position
at the frontier an important driver of our success. Our ability to rapidly grow our revenue is partially dependent
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on our continued delivery of more intelligent and capable models. Our experience is that as we deliver models
with meaningfully improved capabilities that deliver higher intelligence per dollar spent, customers find new
applications for AI across their businesses, accelerating adoption and revenue growth.
This can be seen in the trajectory of our model family adoption. Successive versions of our most intelligent
generally available model have delivered meaningfully greater intelligence and capabilities. With each release,
we have seen most customers utilize the latest version of our models, reinforcing the direct relationship
between frontier model quality and revenue generation. As we deliver more capable models, customers have
expanded their usage into new use cases and increased their spending accordingly.
We expect our ability to deliver innovation in intelligence and capability at the frontier to remain a key driver of
revenue growth in future periods, and maintaining a leading position requires continued investment in research
and compute, top technical talent, and access to capital sufficient to support our growth trajectory.
Securing Sufficient Compute and Optimizing Its Utilization
Our ability to continue advancing intelligence at the frontier depends on securing sufficient compute for
research, model development, serving customers, and internal usage of Claude. Our ability to leverage
heterogeneous compute helps us to secure compute at sufficient scale and optimal price-performance. If any of
our chip partners are unable to deliver committed compute or experience delays, or if we need to procure
incremental compute, we benefit from having a range of partners as opposed to being overly reliant on any one
partner. The availability, timing, and cost of compute are subject to factors largely outside our control,
including the concentration of chip and memory manufacturing among a limited number of suppliers and
geographies, constraints on the availability of power and data center capacity, and evolving export controls. We
have historically operated in a compute-constrained environment in which demand for compute has exceeded
the supply available to us. In addition, certain of the CSPs on which we rely for compute are also strategic
investors in us, are our customers, and offer AI models and services that compete with ours. These multifaceted
relationships could give rise to conflicts of interest or competitive dynamics that adversely affect our access to
compute, its cost, or the prioritization of our workloads.
As our compute needs have grown substantially, we are shifting from sourcing compute solely through fixed-
term cloud agreements to a hybrid model that also includes leasing chips directly and hosting them in dedicated
facilities operated on our behalf. We refer to this additional source of compute as Anthropic Direct, which helps
to address our scaling compute requirements and provides potential long-term economic advantages of direct
hosting. Anthropic Direct provides us with a more flexible use of capital by allowing us to separate our
commitments for data center capacity from our commitments for the AI accelerators deployed inside them.
Because data centers require longer lead times but represent a smaller fraction of total compute costs, this
approach enables us to secure data center capacity early while deferring larger accelerator investments until our
specific compute needs are more certain.
Optimizing the utilization of our compute is equally important to our success in satisfying customer demand.
We continuously direct compute to its highest-value use case, balancing the need to advance research and
model development with the need to serve our customers and support internal usage of Claude. We rely on
compute efficiencies, such as the discovery of compute multipliers, to get the most out of the compute that we
procure. Our ability to effectively direct compute and drive compute efficiencies will be an important
determinant of both our pace of innovation and our financial results over time.
Attracting and Retaining Technical Talent
Advancing the frontier and maximizing the return on our compute investment require that we attract, hire, and
retain top technical talent. Talent attraction and retention start with our seven co-founders, all of whom have
remained with the company. We believe our culture and mission alignment enable us to hire and retain the
talent required to continuously push the frontier of AI forward in a safe and responsible way. We expect our
ability to continue attracting and retaining top technical talent to remain a key determinant of our pace of
innovation and our financial results in future periods.
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Our Continued Access to Capital
We must make significant investments in compute for research, model development, serving customers, and
internal usage of Claude. Our compute requires substantial upfront commitments and ongoing payments as the
compute becomes available to us. Our compute commitments will continue to grow as we scale our business.
Our ability to secure sufficient compute is directly linked to our ability to access capital on favorable terms, such
as through equity or debt financing or cash flow from operations.
In order to maintain our access to capital, we must continue to demonstrate that we are able to invest that
capital in a highly productive way. The best measures of our progress are Claude’s intelligence and capability,
and customer adoption of Claude. Our ability to convert compute investment into frontier model performance,
and then increase customer adoption, will be a key determinant of our access to capital.
Our ability to sustain access to capital depends in part on demonstrating a credible trajectory toward
profitability. Our revenue growth, compute efficiency, and operating efficiency have significantly improved our
operating margin and Adjusted Operating Margin, but we plan to keep investing heavily, which will adversely
impact our results of operations. Our compute commitments are substantial and generally must be satisfied
regardless of our revenue or utilization, while our access to additional capital depends on a number of
conditions, many of which are outside our control, including market conditions and investor demand. In
addition, a portion of our compute and infrastructure build-out has been funded or supported by capital or
credit support provided or facilitated by certain of our CSPs and chip partners. Our ability to reduce this
reliance over time depends in part on our ability to obtain financing from independent sources on our own
credit.
Our Ability to Diffuse Claude in the Enterprise
Our financial performance depends on the pace and breadth at which AI, and in particular Claude, is adopted
across the global economy. While Claude’s capabilities already address a wide range of enterprise use cases, we
believe that enterprise adoption remains nascent. We believe that our ability to capture this opportunity and
drive revenue growth in future periods will depend on three dynamics:
First, our ability to translate model improvements into accessible products and platform capabilities.
In the nine months ended September 30, 2026, we launched an aggregate of 250 new model versions, platform
features, and applications, including new capabilities in Claude Code, Claude Cowork, and vertical solutions for
key industries. Our growth depends on continuing this pace of product innovation and reducing the friction
between Claude’s capabilities and customer workflows. Our growth also depends on how quickly new
capabilities reach customers, which in turn depends on the steps we take to assess and mitigate the risks of each
model during development and before and after release. In the past, these steps have included delaying the
release of new models and limiting their initial availability, such as our initial release of Mythos through Project
Glasswing and our later release of Fable 5 as a generally-available model with safety restrictions, and in the
future, as we learn more about model capabilities and behavior, could include additional measures that affect
whether, how, and when we develop or release new models or capabilities. We evaluate whether to delay or
restrict a release based on the results of our pre-release capability and safety evaluations and our assessment of
whether available safeguards adequately mitigate the identified risks, and we may also take such steps where
those evaluations are inconclusive. For more information, see the section titled “Business—Safety Research is
Core to Our Business—Our Approach to Model Releases.” These measures, and any laws, regulations, or
standards governing frontier AI development that may be adopted, could cause new use cases to emerge more
slowly and slow the enterprise adoption and expansion on which our revenue growth depends. We believe that
enterprises prefer models that are safe and aligned, and that our continued investment in safety strengthens
customer trust and supports long-term adoption.
Second, our ability to expand and diversify distribution.
A large portion of our growth to date has been self-service and organic. As AI adoption extends further into
enterprises and more regulated industries, we are investing in direct go-to-market, Applied AI teams, and
partnerships across all three major cloud platforms, SIs, consultants, and data platforms. We are also
expanding our ability to serve international customers through the growth of regional offices and partnerships
5 For purposes of this measure, we include only Fortune 500 customers that are publicly traded and calculate the measure using total
expenses as reported in their publicly available financial statements.
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in key markets, and we expect international expansion to be a meaningful driver of revenue growth as global
demand for AI accelerates. The effectiveness of these investments, and our ability to hire and retain go-to-
market talent, will be a meaningful determinant of growth.
Third, our ability to land new customers and expand within existing accounts.
The number of customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis grew from approximately 20 as of
December 31, 2023, to approximately 200 as of December 31, 2024, to approximately 1,500 as of December 31,
2025, and to more than 11,900 as of September 30, 2026. Total revenue from these customers grew from
approximately $37 million to $220 million to $3.5 billion to $26.1 billion and represented 90%, 57%, 76%, and
74% of total revenue for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025, and the TTM period ended
September 30, 2026, respectively. The remaining 26% of total revenue for the TTM period ended September
30, 2026 was generated by approximately 40 million customers, each with less than $100,000 of revenue on a
TTM basis.
In addition, as of September 30, 2026, we had more than 1,900 customers with $1 million or more of revenue
on a TTM basis and approximately 250 customers with $10 million or more of revenue on a TTM basis. Despite
this growth, our penetration into the largest enterprises remains early. Over 50% of the Fortune 500 and over
30% of the Global 2000 were customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis as of September 30,
2026. We believe we are in the early stages of our expansion within these customers, with our revenue from
these Fortune 500 customers representing, on average, less than 0.1% of their total expenses for the three
months ended September 30, 2026.
We compare this measure against our largest Fortune 500 customers, who are further along in their adoption of
AI. For the three months ended September 30, 2026, revenue from our top 10 Fortune 500 customers
represented, on average, less than 1% of their total expenses—still a small fraction of their overall spend, but
over eight times the average of our Fortune 500 customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis.
We believe the difference reflects the substantial runway we have to deepen adoption, both within our largest
customers and within customers earlier in their adoption of  Claude.5
Claude adoption is broad-based. No single customer represented more than 10% of our revenue for the nine
months ended September 30, 2026. Approximately 79% of our revenue came from customers outside of our top
five customers for the three months ended September 30, 2026, up from approximately 64% for the three
months ended March 31, 2026. At the same time, our largest customers continue to expand. For the three
months ended September 30, 2026, our revenue from each of our top five customers reached a record high.
Customer Usage Patterns
Our revenue is influenced by customer usage patterns, which are impacted by the frequency and capability of
new model version releases, as well as seasonal trends, each of which can create variability in our results from
period to period. The continuous and overlapping cadence of new model version releases is inherent to
remaining at the frontier of AI development. For example, model versions released in the six months ended
September 30, 2026 accounted for over 80% of our revenue for the three months ended September 30, 2026.
As we have released successive versions of Claude models, we have continued to see revenue growth as new
capabilities unlock additional use cases, prompting new customers to adopt Claude and existing customers to
expand their usage.
Our customer usage patterns have also typically exhibited seasonality, particularly around holiday and vacation
periods in the summer and winter, when certain workflows slow down and overall customer activity declines.
For example, developer commits and feature launches are typically slower during the code freezes that many
companies schedule over holidays. Consistent with this pattern, for the two weeks ended January 2, 2026, total
customer spend declined by approximately 20% compared to the prior two weeks ended December 19, 2025.
However, our historical growth rates may mask the impact of seasonal trends on our results. These dynamics
are inherent aspects of a pay-for-intelligence revenue model and may be important determinants of our
financial results in future periods.
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Because of these seasonal patterns, our results of operations have varied, and are expected to continue to vary,
from period to period, and our results for any one period may not be indicative of our results for any future
period. As our revenue growth rate declines over time, we expect seasonal effects to become more apparent in,
and to have a greater effect on, our period-to-period results, and to make it more difficult to forecast our results
of operations.
Our Commitment to Public Benefit
Our commitment to public benefit extends to how we deploy our resources. We intend to direct a meaningful
portion of our resources toward ensuring that frontier AI is safe and its benefits are broadly distributed, which
we refer to as our public benefit initiatives. This may include significant contributions to nonprofit
organizations, research institutions, and other third parties working on problems where AI can have the
greatest positive impact, as well as programs designed to make Claude accessible to underserved communities,
educators, and public institutions.
As part of these initiatives, we contributed 846,840,960 shares of our Class N common stock, representing 5%
of our fully diluted shares as of June 30, 2026 (assuming full conversion of the Amazon Notes), to the
Anthropic Public Benefit Fund, our wholly owned subsidiary dedicated to the Company Purpose, which we refer
to as the Initial Public Benefit Issuance. As the value we create grows, we intend for the public benefit to share
meaningfully in that growth as well. To that end, our board of directors has approved a framework for
additional contributions tied to future increases in our share price. Following this offering, our board of
directors, in its discretion, may issue shares of our Class N common stock to the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund
(or other designee) representing up to an additional 2% of our then-outstanding shares (plus any shares subject
to options, RSUs, and other convertible securities and any shares held by the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund)
each time our share price appreciates 50% above the prior share price milestone, beginning with our initial
public offering price. A share price milestone is reached only when our closing share price has exceeded the
applicable threshold on at least 90 of the trailing 120 consecutive trading days, and our average closing share
price over the 10 trading days prior to such issuance also exceeds that threshold. Although our board of
directors has approved this framework, any future contributions will be made at the discretion of our board of
directors. The shares that are contributed to the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund, including the Initial Public
Benefit Issuance, may be transferred or donated to a third party, or otherwise sold in a registered public
offering or private placement transaction in furtherance of our public benefit initiatives. Our board of directors
will determine the allocations and distributions from the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund until it approves a
specific governance structure for the entity, at which point decision-making authority is expected to transition
to designated managers of the Anthropic Public Benefit Fund operating under that structure. The initial
managers are Dario Amodei, Daniela Amodei, Jack Clark, and Dr. Neil “Buddy” Shah. The Initial Public Benefit
Issuance and the additional share contribution framework represent one of the ways in which we intend to
pursue the Company Purpose, but they are not the exclusive means of doing so. We expect to dedicate
additional resources, and to make other business and operational decisions, in furtherance of the Company
Purpose outside of, and in addition to, these equity contributions.
In addition, we maintain a donation matching program through which employees can pledge a meaningful
portion of their equity awards or equivalent cash proceeds to a donor-advised fund or other nonprofit
organization, and we match those donations with shares of our Class N common stock. In the same way the
Company Purpose defines how we direct our work as an organization, our donation matching program reflects
a parallel commitment by our employees to direct the personal financial value created by that work toward the
public good. We view our donation matching program as a meaningful expression of the Company Purpose and
a reflection of the values that define our culture. In addition, our co-founders have each pledged to dedicate
80% of their personal equity in Anthropic to philanthropic causes, separate from and not eligible for our
donation matching program.
Decisions we make to advance our public benefit initiatives may, in any given period, reduce our revenue,
increase our expenses, lower our Adjusted Operating Margin, contribute to dilution, and reduce our
profitability on a per share basis relative to what we would otherwise report. Our public benefit-related
expenses, which currently consist primarily of charitable donations under our donation matching program,
were not significant before the three months ended September 30, 2026. For the nine months ended September
30, 2026, expenses related to our donation matching program were $2.1 billion, representing approximately 6%
of our total operating expenses for that period. However, we expect the cadence and magnitude of resources
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directed toward our public benefit initiatives to increase in future periods and remain a factor affecting our
results of operations.
Components of Results of Operations
Revenue
We generate revenue as customers use Claude through our platform and applications, including Claude Code,
Claude Cowork, and vertical solutions for key industries. Claude is powered by our proprietary Claude model
family, a set of frontier models, each with varying levels of capability, cost, and speed. Enterprise customers
access our intelligence service directly from us or through CSP marketplaces, where we maintain direct
contractual relationships with our customers.
Depending on the model, platform, or applications chosen by our customers, they enter into pay-for-
intelligence pricing, subscription-based pricing, or both. A growing number of enterprise customers agree to
annual or multi-year contracts with minimum spend commitments.
Revenue is recognized when customers use our intelligence service, based on the quantity of tokens consumed.
Subscriptions are generally prepaid on a monthly or annual basis, and are subject to usage limits that reset over
short periods, which results in revenue being recognized on a ratable basis over the subscription period, which
is generally 12 months or less.
We expect our revenue growth rate to decline over time and to fluctuate from period to period. Revenue growth
in any period may be affected by customer usage patterns, customer adoption, the deployment of our models,
platform, and applications, the pricing of our offerings, the timing and success of new model and product
releases, measures we decide to implement to safely deploy new capabilities, our ability to continue meeting
customer requirements, and other factors affecting demand for our models, platform, and applications,
including those described in the section titled “Risk Factors—We are at an early stage of our revenue growth, we
have experienced rapid growth in recent periods, and our historical growth rates are not indicative of future
performance or our ability to sustain or forecast future revenue growth.”
In addition, our revenue has included, and we expect will continue to include, amounts from customers that we
subsequently determine are using our models, platform, and applications in violation of our usage policy or
commercial terms. We believe this dynamic is common in our industry. Because detection, investigation, and
enforcement take time, we recognize revenue from such customers when the related services are provided,
before restricting or terminating their access. Based on our detection and review process, we estimate that
revenue from such customers represented approximately 5% to 7% of our revenue for the nine months ended
September 30, 2026. This estimate requires judgment and may change as our detection methodologies evolve
and we identify previously undetected usage. We expect the percentage of revenue from customers using our
models, platform, and applications in violation of our usage policy or commercial terms to decline in future
periods as we have enhanced our detection and enforcement efforts, in particular in August and September
2026; however, the timing and magnitude of any resulting adverse effect on our revenue and revenue growth
are uncertain.
Operating Expenses
Compute and Infrastructure
Compute and infrastructure expenses primarily consist of costs attributable to operating our technology
infrastructure, which supports the full range of workloads for our models, including research, model
development, serving customers, and internal usage of Claude. These costs primarily consist of compute fees
paid to CSPs under committed and on-demand arrangements, including storage, networking, and connectivity,
and related support costs, infrastructure costs associated with serving customer workloads through partner
channels, colocation facility costs, equipment leases and committed power costs associated with our data center
operations, and third-party application infrastructure software costs directly related to our compute operations.
Beginning in 2026, as our obligations commence under compute and infrastructure leases, these expenses also
include operating lease costs, amortization of finance lease assets, variable lease costs, and depreciation and
amortization on owned servers, networking equipment, and related data center assets. See Note 8 to our
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consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this prospectus for a functional presentation of our
operating expenses, including cost of revenue, and a description of the workloads underlying the compute and
infrastructure expenses within each functional caption. Within that functional presentation, substantially all of
the cost of revenue consists of compute and infrastructure expenses associated with customer-serving
workloads. Additionally, cost of revenue includes certain personnel-related costs and allocated overhead costs.
Customers adopt and retain our technology based on whether our models are at the frontier of AI capability and
maintaining that frontier position is essential to revenue generation. Each model release represents continuous
intelligence improvements, making ongoing model development a critical factor in revenue generation. We
operate an iterative cycle in which compute deployed to model development yields more capable and efficient
models. Those efficiency gains free compute to serve additional customer workloads. In turn, serving our
customers at scale generates feedback that informs research and model development. In this cycle, customer-
serving activity and model development are each a direct input that informs the other, and we therefore view
compute and infrastructure costs as critical to our ability to generate revenue within a short time of incurring
such costs.
We expect compute and infrastructure expenses to increase in absolute dollars and remain our largest
operating expense for the foreseeable future as additional committed compute becomes available to us under
multi-year arrangements with CSPs, and as we continue to invest in additional compute. These expenses are
paid and recognized as compute becomes available to us, rather than when committed, and are generally fixed
in the near term given the majority of our compute is contracted under multi-year commitments that we
typically procure 12 to 18 months in advance of availability. When customer demand or research needs exceed
this long-term capacity, we procure short-term compute that currently costs significantly more than
comparable compute procured under our multi-year commitments. We deploy this committed compute as a
single, shared resource across all workloads, and thus plan, incur, and assess it on a total basis rather than by
individual workload. As a result, compute and infrastructure expenses as a percentage of revenue will depend
primarily on how our revenue scales relative to our total committed compute cost base. In addition, as part of
our public benefit initiatives, we intend to direct a meaningful portion of our resources, which may include
compute, toward ensuring that the benefits of frontier AI are broadly accessible, and we expect to significantly
scale these efforts over time.
Personnel
Personnel expenses primarily consist of stock-based compensation, including expense related to stock options,
RSUs, and restricted stock awards (“RSAs”), cash compensation, including base salaries and bonuses, employee
benefits, including health and welfare benefits, and employer payroll taxes.
We expect personnel expenses to increase in absolute dollars as we continue to expand our headcount to
support the growth of our business. We also expect to incur additional stock-based compensation expense in
connection with this offering, including for certain RSUs for which the performance condition will be satisfied
upon the effectiveness of the registration statement of which this prospectus forms a part. We expect that
personnel expenses may fluctuate as a percentage of revenue depending on the timing and magnitude of stock-
based compensation expense, and the pace of hiring across our organization.
Bartz Settlement
Bartz settlement consists of the charge we recorded in 2025 to settle the Bartz litigation. See Note 13 to our
consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this prospectus for additional information.
Sales, Marketing, and Partnerships
Sales, marketing, and partnerships expenses primarily consist of fees paid to channel partners and marketing
and advertising costs, including media and public relations spend.
We expect sales, marketing, and partnerships expenses to increase in absolute dollars as we continue to invest
in activities to drive continued adoption and expanded usage of our models. We expect that sales, marketing,
and partnerships expenses may fluctuate as a percentage of revenue depending on the timing of and spend on
148
marketing campaigns and changes in the terms of our channel partner distribution arrangements and the cost
to deliver our intelligence service.
Other Operating and Administrative
Other operating and administrative expenses primarily consist of charitable donations expense related to our
donation matching program, vendor costs related to data quality and performance evaluation services,
information technology and cloud software costs, payment processing and platform fees, facility and occupancy
costs, non-income taxes, professional services costs, bad debt expense, and depreciation and amortization
related to non-data center assets.
We expect that other operating and administrative expenses will increase in absolute dollars as our business
grows and as a result of operating as a public company, including expenses related to compliance with SEC
rules and regulations, the listing standards of the Nasdaq Global Select Market, additional costs for directors’
and officers’ liability insurance, and professional services. We also expect other operating and administrative
expenses to fluctuate as a percentage of our revenue over time as our business grows, in part as we significantly
scale our public benefit initiatives, including expanded programs to make Claude accessible to underserved
communities, increased charitable donation matching, contributions to philanthropic vehicles or foundations
we may establish or support in the future, and other efforts aligned with our mission.
Interest Income
Interest income consists of interest earned on our cash and cash equivalents and short-term investments, which
primarily consist of debt securities, including U.S. Treasury and agency securities, corporate debt, and
commercial paper.
Change in Fair Value of Convertible Notes, Derivative Liabilities, and SAFEs
Change in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs consists of gains and losses as a result
of recording our convertible promissory notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFE liabilities at fair value at the end
of each reporting period. Because these instruments are marked to market, increases in our enterprise
valuation drive increases in this expense. We will continue to recognize changes in the fair value of our
convertible notes until they are converted into equity, repaid, or otherwise settled. For more information, see
Note 4 to our consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this prospectus.
Other Income (Expense), Net
Other income (expense), net consists primarily of the change in fair value of strategic investments and financial
instruments, the change in fair value of certain derivative instruments in connection with an acquisition of a
privately-held company in December 2025, interest expense from finance leases, and foreign currency exchange
gains and losses. For more information on the acquisition, see Note 15 to our consolidated financial statements
included elsewhere in this prospectus.
Provision for Income Taxes
The provision for income taxes primarily consists of income taxes in certain federal, state, local, and foreign
jurisdictions in which we conduct business. Our effective tax rates will vary depending on the impact of the
valuation allowance and nondeductible fair value adjustments to derivatives, as well as the relative proportion
of foreign income to domestic income, generation of tax credits, changes in the valuation of our deferred tax
assets and liabilities, and changes in tax laws.
149
Results of Operations
The following table sets forth our consolidated statements of operations data for the periods indicated:
Year Ended December 31,
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions)
2023
2024
2025
2025
2026
Revenue
$41
$386
$4,585
$2,545
$33,242
Operating expenses:
Compute and infrastructure
433
2,522
7,326
4,381
18,808
Personnel(1)
95
454
1,839
1,027
4,863
Bartz settlement
—
—
1,500
1,500
—
Sales, marketing, and
partnerships
2
43
568
322
5,529
Other operating and
administrative
62
347
1,412
539
5,302
Total operating expenses
592
3,366
12,645
7,769
34,502
Operating loss
(551)
(2,980)
(8,060)
(5,224)
(1,260)
Interest income
69
106
431
239
2,359
Change in fair value of
convertible notes, derivative
liabilities, and SAFEs
(1,045)
(5,434)
(34,308)
(20,107)
(94,324)
Other income (expense), net
(2)
—
(8)
(3)
(10,397)
Total other income (expense),
net
(978)
(5,328)
(33,885)
(19,871)
(102,362)
Loss before provision for income
taxes
(1,529)
(8,308)
(41,945)
(25,095)
(103,622)
Provision for income taxes
2
1
20
12
417
Net loss(2)
$(1,531)
$(8,309)
$(41,965)
$(25,107)
$(104,039)
______________
(1) Includes stock-based compensation expense of $29 million, $192 million, and $1.2 billion for the years ended December 31,
2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively, and $591 million and $3.3 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and
2026, respectively.
(2)Includes change in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs, which were $1.0 billion, $5.4 billion, and
$34.3 billion for the years ended December 31, 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively, and $20.1 billion and $94.3 billion for the
nine months ended September 30, 2025 and 2026, respectively. These changes were primarily driven by an increase in the fair
value of our outstanding convertible promissory notes resulting from an increase in our enterprise valuation during each of the
respective periods.
150
The following table sets forth our consolidated statements of operations as a percentage of revenue data for the
periods indicated:
Year Ended December 31,
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
2023
2024
2025
2025
2026
Revenue
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Operating expenses:
Compute and infrastructure
1,056
653
160
172
57
Personnel
232
118
40
40
15
Bartz settlement
—
—
33
59
—
Sales, marketing, and
partnerships
5
11
12
13
17
Other operating and
administrative
151
90
31
21
16
Total operating expenses
1,444
872
276
305
104
Operating loss
(1,344)
(772)
(176)
(205)
(4)
Interest income
168
27
9
9
7
Change in fair value of
convertible notes, derivative
liabilities, and SAFEs
(2,549)
(1,408)
(748)
(790)
(284)
Other income (expense), net
(5)
—
—
—
(31)
Total other income (expense),
net
(2,385)
(1,380)
(739)
(781)
(308)
Loss before provision for income
taxes
(3,729)
(2,152)
(915)
(986)
(312)
Provision for income taxes
5
—
—
—
1
Net loss
(3,734)%
(2,153)%
(915)%
(987)%
(313)%
______________
Note: Totals of percentage of revenue may not foot due to rounding.
Comparison of the Nine Months Ended September 30, 2025 and 2026
Revenue
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Revenue
$2,545
$33,242
$30,697
1,206%
Revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $30.7 billion, or 1,206%, compared to the
nine months ended September 30, 2025. Consumption-based and subscription-based revenue increased by
$24.2 billion and $6.5 billion, respectively, for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 compared to the
nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was driven by successive model and product releases that
drove higher usage, expansion, and broader adoption across our offerings. The number of customers with
$100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis grew from more than 950 as of September 30, 2025 to more than
11,900 as of September 30, 2026. Total revenue from these customers grew from $1.9 billion for the nine
months ended September 30, 2025 to $24.5 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 and
represented approximately 75% and 74% of total revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and
2026, respectively.
151
Operating Expenses
Compute and Infrastructure
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Compute and infrastructure
$4,381
$18,808
$14,427
329%
Percentage of revenue
172%
57%
Compute and infrastructure expenses for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $14.4
billion, or 329%, compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was driven by the
delivery of committed compute throughout the first nine months of 2026 under our CSP arrangements. As our
compute and infrastructure capacity grows, the associated compute and infrastructure expenses have increased
accordingly.
Compute and infrastructure expenses as a percentage of revenue decreased as revenue increased significantly in
the nine months ended September 30, 2026 compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025, against a
compute base that was primarily committed in advance. The decrease was partially offset by the delivery of
additional compute, which includes $6.5 billion of compute under short-term commitments for the nine
months ended September 30, 2026, which currently costs significantly more than comparable compute
procured under our multi-year commitments.
Personnel
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Personnel
$1,027
$4,863
$3,836
374%
Percentage of revenue
40%
15%
Personnel expenses for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $3.8 billion, or 374%,
compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was driven by a $2.7 billion increase in
stock-based compensation expense and an $891 million increase in cash compensation, both as a result of
headcount growth.
Bartz Settlement
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Bartz settlement
$1,500
$—
$(1,500)
(100)%
Percentage of revenue
59%
—%
Bartz settlement expense of $1.5 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 reflects the charge
related to the legal settlement of the Bartz litigation reached and accrued during the third quarter of 2025.
Sales, Marketing, and Partnerships
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Sales, marketing, and partnerships
$322
$5,529
$5,207
1,617%
Percentage of revenue
13%
17%
152
Sales, marketing, and partnerships expenses for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $5.2
billion, or 1,617%, compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was primarily driven
by a $4.8 billion increase in fees paid to channel partners, reflecting the growth of our business.
Other Operating and Administrative
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Other operating and administrative
$539
$5,302
$4,763
884%
Percentage of revenue
21%
16%
Other operating and administrative expenses for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $4.8
billion, or 884%, compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was primarily driven
by a $2.1 billion increase in non-cash charges related to donations made under our donation matching
program, a $757 million increase in vendor costs related to data quality and performance evaluation services, a
$435 million increase in payment processing fees, a $428 million increase in professional services costs, and a
$407 million increase in information technology and cloud software costs.
Interest Income
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Interest income
$239
$2,359
$2,120
887%
Interest income for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $2.1 billion, or 887%, compared
to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was primarily driven by an increase in investment
income due to higher average cash and cash equivalents and short-term investments balances in the first nine
months of 2026.
Change in Fair Value of Convertible Notes, Derivative Liabilities, and SAFEs
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Change in fair value of convertible notes,
derivative liabilities, and SAFEs
$(20,107)
$(94,324)
$(74,217)
369%
Change in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs for the nine months ended September
30, 2026 increased by $74.2 billion, or 369%, compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. This
change was primarily driven by an increase in the fair value of our outstanding convertible promissory notes
resulting from an increase in our enterprise valuation from 2025 to 2026.
Other Income (Expense), Net
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Other income (expense), net
$(3)
$(10,397)
$(10,394)
NM
______________
NM – Not meaningful.
Other income (expense), net for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 decreased by $10.4 billion,
compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The decrease was primarily driven by the initial fair
value recognition and change in fair value of the assets and liabilities recognized under the partner financing
153
arrangements described in Note 4 to our consolidated financial statements included elsewhere in this
prospectus.
Provision for Income Taxes
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2025
2026
$ Change
% Change
Provision for income taxes
$12
$417
$405
NM
______________
NM – Not meaningful.
Provision for income taxes for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 increased by $405 million,
compared to the nine months ended September 30, 2025. The increase was primarily driven by higher U.S.
state income taxes and higher foreign income taxes driven by increased taxable income in non-U.S.
jurisdictions.
Comparison of the Years Ended December 31, 2024 and 2025
Revenue
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Revenue
$386
$4,585
$4,199
1,088%
Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $4.2 billion, or 1,088%, compared to the year
ended December 31, 2024. Consumption-based and subscription-based revenue increased by approximately
$3.5 billion and $691 million, respectively, for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended
December 31, 2024. The increase was driven by successive model and product releases during the year that
drove higher usage, expansion, and broader adoption across our offerings. The number of customers with
$100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis grew from approximately 200 as of December 31, 2024 to
approximately 1,500 as of December 31, 2025. Total revenue from these customers grew from approximately
$220 million to $3.5 billion and represented approximately 57% and 76% of total revenue for the years ended
December 31, 2024 and 2025, respectively.
Operating Expenses
Compute and Infrastructure
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Compute and infrastructure
$2,522
$7,326
$4,804
190%
Percentage of revenue
653%
160%
Compute and infrastructure expenses for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $4.8 billion, or 190%,
compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was driven by the delivery of committed compute
in tranches throughout 2025 under our CSP arrangements entered into in prior years. As each tranche became
available to use, compute and infrastructure expenses increased accordingly.
Compute and infrastructure expenses as a percentage of revenue decreased as revenue increased significantly in
2025 compared to 2024, against a compute base that was committed in advance and did not fluctuate with in-
period demand.
154
Personnel
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Personnel
$454
$1,839
$1,385
305%
Percentage of revenue
118%
40%
Personnel expenses for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $1.4 billion, or 305%, compared to the
year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by a $973 million increase in stock-based
compensation expense and a $339 million increase in cash compensation, both as a result of headcount growth.
Bartz Settlement
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Bartz settlement
$—
$1,500
$1,500
NM
Percentage of revenue
—%
33%
______________
NM – Not meaningful.
Bartz settlement for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $1.5 billion compared to the year ended
December 31, 2024. The increase was entirely driven by the preliminary legal settlement for Bartz reached
during the period.
Sales, Marketing, and Partnerships
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Sales, marketing, and partnerships
$43
$568
$525
1,221%
Percentage of revenue
11%
12%
Sales, marketing, and partnerships expenses for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $525 million,
or 1,221%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by a $341 million
increase in fees paid to channel partners, reflecting the growth of our business, and a $170 million increase in
marketing and advertising expenses, reflecting higher media and public relations spend to support product
launches.
Other Operating and Administrative
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Other operating and administrative
$347
$1,412
$1,065
307%
Percentage of revenue
90%
31%
Other operating and administrative expenses for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $1.1 billion, or
307%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by a $541 million
increase in non-cash charges related to our donation matching program, a $165 million increase in vendor costs
related to data quality and performance evaluation services, and a $102 million increase in information
technology and cloud software costs.
155
Interest Income
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Interest income
$106
$431
$325
307%
Interest income for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $325 million, or 307%, compared to the
year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by a $305 million increase in investment
income due to higher average cash and cash equivalents balances and new short-term investments entered into
during 2025.
Change in Fair Value of Convertible Notes, Derivative Liabilities, and SAFEs
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Change in fair value of convertible notes,
derivative liabilities, and SAFEs
$(5,434)
$(34,308)
$(28,874)
531%
Change in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs for the year ended December 31, 2025
increased by $28.9 billion, or 531%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. This change was primarily
driven by an increase in the fair value of our outstanding convertible promissory notes resulting from an
increase in our enterprise valuation from 2024 to 2025.
Other Income (Expense), Net
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Other income (expense), net
$—
$(8)
$(8)
NM
______________
NM – Not meaningful.
Other income (expense), net was not material for the periods presented.
Provision for Income Taxes
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2024
2025
$ Change
% Change
Provision for income taxes
$1
$20
$19
NM
_____________
NM – Not meaningful.
Provision for income taxes for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $19 million, compared to the
year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was largely driven by an increase in foreign taxes associated with
our international operations.
Comparison of the Years Ended December 31, 2023 and 2024
Revenue
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Revenue
$41
$386
$345
841%
Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $345 million, or 841%, compared to the year
ended December 31, 2023. Consumption-based and subscription-based revenue increased by approximately
$249 million and $96 million, respectively, for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the year ended
156
December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily driven by growth in new customers and reflected the broader
commercial availability of our AI platform following the launch of the Claude 3 family of Opus, Sonnet, and
Haiku models in 2024, which expanded the range of supported use cases and drove adoption. The number of
customers with $100,000 or more of revenue on a TTM basis grew from approximately 20 as of December 31,
2023 to approximately 200 as of December 31, 2024. Total revenue from these customers grew from
approximately $37 million to $220 million and represented approximately 90% and 57% of total revenue for
the years ended December 31, 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Operating Expenses
Compute and Infrastructure
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Compute and infrastructure
$433
$2,522
$2,089
482%
Percentage of revenue
1,056%
653%
Compute and infrastructure expenses for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $2.1 billion, or 482%,
compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase primarily reflected the staged delivery of
committed compute under our CSP arrangements entered into in 2023, with the substantial majority of that
compute delivered in tranches during 2024. Compute and infrastructure expenses as a percentage of revenue
decreased as revenue scaled against a compute base that is committed in advance and does not fluctuate with
in-period demand.
Personnel
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Personnel
$95
$454
$359
378%
Percentage of revenue
232%
118%
Personnel expenses for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $359 million, or 378%, compared to the
year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily driven by a $164 million increase in cash
compensation and a $163 million increase in stock-based compensation expense, both as a result of headcount
growth.
Sales, Marketing, and Partnerships
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Sales, marketing, and partnerships
$2
$43
$41
2,050%
Percentage of revenue
5%
11%
Sales, marketing, and partnerships expenses for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $41 million, or
2,050%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily driven by a $39 million
increase in marketing and advertising expenses reflecting higher media and public relations spend to support
product launches.
Other Operating and Administrative
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Other operating and administrative
$62
$347
$285
460%
Percentage of revenue
151%
90%
157
Other operating and administrative expenses for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $285 million,
or 460%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily driven by a $165 million
increase in vendor costs related to data quality and performance evaluation services, a $30 million increase in
professional services costs, a $28 million increase in information technology and cloud software costs, and a
$24 million increase in facility and occupancy costs due to headcount growth.
Interest Income
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Interest income
$69
$106
$37
54%
Interest income for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $37 million, or 54%, compared to the year
ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily due to higher average cash and cash equivalents
balances, driven by the growth of our money market funds portfolio.
Change in Fair Value of Convertible Notes, Derivative Liabilities, and SAFEs
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Change in fair value of convertible notes,
derivative liabilities, and SAFEs
$(1,045)
$(5,434)
$(4,389)
420%
Change in fair value of convertible notes, derivative liabilities, and SAFEs for the year ended December 31, 2024
increased by $4.4 billion, or 420%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily
driven by an increase in the fair value of our outstanding convertible promissory notes resulting from an
increase in our enterprise valuation from 2023 to 2024.
Other Income (Expense), Net
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Other income (expense), net
$(2)
$—
$2
NM
_______________
NM – Not meaningful.
Other income (expense), net was not material for the periods presented.
Provision for Income Taxes
Year Ended December 31,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
$ Change
% Change
Provision for income taxes
$2
$1
$(1)
NM
______________
NM – Not meaningful.
Provision for income taxes was not material for the periods presented.
Non-GAAP Financial Measures
To supplement our consolidated financial statements prepared and presented in accordance with GAAP, we use
certain non-GAAP financial measures, as described below, to facilitate analysis of our operating performance
and for internal planning and forecasting purposes.
We use Adjusted Operating Income (Loss), Adjusted Operating Margin, and Adjusted Net Income (Loss) to
evaluate our operating performance, formulate business plans, prepare budgets and forecasts, and make
strategic decisions, including those relating to operating expenses and the allocation of internal resources. By
158
excluding certain items that management believes are not directly reflective of the ongoing operating
performance of our business, we believe these non-GAAP financial measures provide investors, analysts, and
others with meaningful insight and enhance their overall understanding of our business and financial
performance by providing a more consistent and comparable overview of our financial performance across
periods.
Other companies in our industry, including those with similar business models, may define or calculate
similarly titled measures in different ways, which may limit the usefulness of these measures for direct
comparison. In addition, other companies may not publish these or similar metrics. Further, these metrics have
certain limitations in that they do not include the impact of certain expenses that are reflected on our
consolidated statements of operations. Thus, our non-GAAP financial measures should not be viewed in
isolation or as a replacement for the most directly comparable measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.
We encourage investors and others to review our business, financial condition, and results of operations in their
entirety, not to rely on any single financial measure, and to view our non-GAAP financial measures in
conjunction with their respective most directly comparable financial measures calculated in accordance with
GAAP, as well as our consolidated financial statements and accompanying notes included elsewhere in this
prospectus.
Adjusted Operating Income (Loss) and Adjusted Operating Margin
We define Adjusted Operating Income (Loss) as operating loss excluding (i) stock-based compensation expense,
(ii) non-cash charitable contributions, and (iii) the Bartz settlement. We define Adjusted Operating Margin as
Adjusted Operating Income (Loss) divided by revenue.
A reconciliation of our Adjusted Operating Income (Loss) and Adjusted Operating Margin to operating loss and
operating margin, the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, respectively, is presented below:
Year Ended December 31,
Nine Months Ended
September 30,
(in millions, except for percentages)
2023
2024
2025
2025
2026
Operating loss
$(551)
$(2,980)
$(8,060)
$(5,224)
$(1,260)
Stock-based compensation expense
29
192
1,165
591
3,255
Non-cash charitable contributions(1)
—
—
541
—
2,086
Bartz settlement(2)
—
—
1,500
1,500
—
Adjusted Operating Income (Loss)
$(522)
$(2,788)
$(4,854)
$(3,133)
$4,081
Revenue
$41
$386
$4,585
$2,545
$33,242
Operating margin
(1,344)%
(772)%
(176)%
(205)%
(4)%
Adjusted Operating Margin
(1,273)%
(722)%
(106)