0000813762-18-000002.txt : 20180109 0000813762-18-000002.hdr.sgml : 20180109 20180109090637 ACCESSION NUMBER: 0000813762-18-000002 CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE: SC 13D/A PUBLIC DOCUMENT COUNT: 2 FILED AS OF DATE: 20180109 DATE AS OF CHANGE: 20180109 SUBJECT COMPANY: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: SANDRIDGE ENERGY INC CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0001349436 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS [1311] IRS NUMBER: 208084793 STATE OF INCORPORATION: DE FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: SC 13D/A SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 005-83370 FILM NUMBER: 18517970 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: 123 ROBERT S. KERR AVENUE CITY: OKLAHOMA CITY STATE: OK ZIP: 73102-6406 BUSINESS PHONE: 405-429-5500 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: 123 ROBERT S. KERR AVENUE CITY: OKLAHOMA CITY STATE: OK ZIP: 73102-6406 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: RIATA ENERGY INC DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 20060111 FILED BY: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: ICAHN CARL C CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0000921669 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: UNKNOWN SIC - 0000 [0000] IRS NUMBER: 000000000 STATE OF INCORPORATION: NY FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: SC 13D/A BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: C/O ICAHN ASSOCIATES HOLDING LLC STREET 2: 767 FIFTH AVE., SUITE 4700 CITY: NEW YORK STATE: NY ZIP: 10153 BUSINESS PHONE: 212-702-4300 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: C/O ICAHN ASSOCIATES HOLDING LLC STREET 2: 767 FIFTH AVE., SUITE 4700 CITY: NEW YORK STATE: NY ZIP: 10153 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: ICAHN CARL C ET AL DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 19950612 SC 13D/A 1 sdsch13damd0401092018.htm

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 13D

Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No. 4)*

Sandridge Energy, Inc.
(Name of Issuer)

common stock, par value $0.001 per share
(Title of Class of Securities)

80007P869
(CUSIP Number)

Jesse Lynn, Esq.
Icahn Capital LP
767 Fifth Avenue, 47th Floor
New York, New York 10153
(212) 702-4300

(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person Authorized to
Receive Notices and Communications)

January 9, 2018
(Date of Event which Requires Filing of this Statement)

If the filing person has previously filed a statement on Schedule 13G to report the acquisition that is the subject of this Schedule 13D, and is filing this schedule because of Section 240.13d-1(e), 240.13d-1(f) or 240.13d-1(g), check the following box / /.

NOTE: Schedules filed in paper format shall include a signed original and five copies of the schedule, including all exhibits. See Rule 13d‑7 for other parties to whom copies are to be sent.

*The remainder of this cover page shall be filled out for a reporting person's initial filing on this form with respect to the subject class of securities, and for any subsequent amendment containing information which would alter disclosures provided in a prior cover page.

The information required on the remainder of this cover page shall not be deemed to be "filed" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act") or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that section of the Act but shall be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see the Notes).


SCHEDULE 13D

Item 1. Security and Issuer

The Schedule 13D filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 22, 2017, as previously amended (the "Schedule 13D"), by High River Limited Partnership, Hopper Investments LLC, Barberry Corp., Icahn Partners Master Fund LP, Icahn Offshore LP, Icahn Partners LP, Icahn Onshore LP, Icahn Capital LP, IPH GP LLC, Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P., Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., Beckton Corp. and Carl C. Icahn (collectively, the "Reporting Persons"), with respect to the shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share ("Shares"), of Sandridge Energy, Inc. (the "Issuer"), is hereby further amended to furnish the additional information set forth herein. All capitalized terms contained herein but not otherwise defined shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Schedule 13D.


Item 4. Purpose of Transaction

On January 9, 2018, the Reporting Persons delivered a letter to the Issuer's board of directors, a copy of which is filed herewith as an exhibit and incorporated herein by reference.


Item 7. Material to be Filed as Exhibits

1 Letter to the Issuer's board of directors dated January 9, 2018.



2

SIGNATURE

After reasonable inquiry and to the best of each of the undersigned knowledge and belief, each of the undersigned certifies that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete and correct.

Dated: January 9, 2018

ICAHN PARTNERS MASTER FUND LP
ICAHN OFFSHORE LP
ICAHN PARTNERS LP
ICAHN ONSHORE LP
BECKTON CORP.
HOPPER INVESTMENTS LLC
BARBERRY CORP.
HIGH RIVER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
By: Hopper Investments LLC, general partner
By: Barberry Corp.

By: /s/ Edward E. Mattner
Name: Edward E. Mattner
Title: Authorized Signatory


ICAHN CAPITAL LP
By: IPH GP LLC, its general partner
By: Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P., its sole member
By: Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., its general partner
IPH GP LLC
By: Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P., its sole member
By: Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., its general partner
ICAHN ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS L.P.
By: Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., its general partner
ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC.

By: /s/ SungHwan Cho
Name: SungHwan Cho
Title: Chief Financial Officer



/s/ Carl C. Icahn 
CARL C. ICAHN

[Signature Page of Amendment No. 4 to Schedule 13D – Sandridge Energy, Inc.]


3
EX-1 2 sdsch13damd04010918ex1.htm

Exhibit A
CARL C. ICAHN
767 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4700
New York, New York 10153

January 9, 2018

John V. Genova
Chairman of the Board
SandRidge Energy, Inc.
123 Robert S. Kerr Avenue
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

Re: Moving Beyond the Bonanza Debacle

Dear John:

We were obviously pleased that you made the wise choice to terminate the Bonanza merger agreement, but we still have grave concerns about many of the things this board of directors has permitted to happen at SandRidge. We believe the current directors were remiss in attempting to ram through a dilutive, overpriced and value-destroying acquisition without at the very least reaching out and discussing this with the company's shareholders. This was especially insulting considering management's post-bankruptcy promises to protect the balance sheet, reduce operating costs, generate free cash flow and develop SandRidge's significant remaining inventory in the Northwest Stack and North Park Basin in a disciplined manner. At the risk of sounding cynical, we believe the primary effect of the deal would have been to entrench yourselves at the expense of shareholders.

Additionally, we question why you refuse to hold James Bennett accountable for his history with SandRidge during a period of massive value destruction, including an ill-advised acquisition binge, a bankruptcy filing, Bennett presiding over a $90 million payout to the former CEO, and taking over $50 million in compensation for himself, all while the shareholders suffered. Further, your attempt to entrench yourselves by adopting an unorthodox poison pill intended to prevent large shareholders from talking with one another to oppose the Bonanza acquisition would make a totalitarian dictator blush. Over the years we have unfortunately seen many boards attempt to take advantage of owners, but we cannot recall another situation where a board has gone to such lengths to completely eviscerate shareholder rights. Your apparent disregard for any semblance of accountability to the owners of SandRidge reminds me of the medieval belief in the divine right of kings.

Based on the above, we are very concerned that, without shareholder representation, the board of directors cannot be trusted to oversee management to ensure that the sins of the past are not repeated. Therefore, as we discussed preliminarily with Mr. Bennett last week, we believe the following changes must be instituted immediately:

1.
Two of the five members of the board of directors must resign and be replaced by new directors to be designated by the shareholders. As SandRidge's largest shareholder, we would expect to designate one of the new directors. The right to designate the other director should be offered to SandRidge's other four or five largest shareholders. If none are willing to do so then we would agree to designate both new directors.

2.
SandRidge must agree that going forward any new extraordinary transactions (including major acquisitions, divestitures, equity issuances and the like), as well as any material changes to the company's compensation arrangements, must be approved by a super-majority vote of the board (i.e., a vote of four out of the five directors).

3.
According to SandRidge's own disclosure, the board purportedly adopted the poison pill to comply with the company's obligations under the merger agreement with Bonanza and the pill was designed to protect shareholders' right to vote on the associated share issuance proposal. Since the Bonanza merger agreement has been terminated and the share issuance proposal has been abandoned, it stands to reason that SandRidge must now terminate the pill. If the board nevertheless insists on keeping the poison pill in place through the upcoming annual meeting of shareholders, then at the very least the pill must be amended in the interim to delete the "Acting in Concert" provision and to increase the trigger threshold from 10% to 25%. As you must already suspect, it is a virtual certainty that the pill will be voted down in its entirety at the annual meeting in any event, so making these modest changes should be a no-brainer.

We understand that you intend to meet next week with some of SandRidge's largest shareholders to discuss their views on the future of the company. We obviously support this and encourage a fulsome and ongoing dialogue between the board and the company's owners and, while we are extremely troubled by your lack of urgency, we nevertheless look forward to meeting with you on January 17th as part of this process. But that should by no means be the exclusive forum for discussing issues vital to the company's continued existence. If the pill is not terminated immediately then SandRidge should dispel lingering shareholder concerns by making a public announcement, by no later than Thursday, January 11th, stating unequivocally that discussions among shareholders concerning the above proposed changes – and any other corporate governance changes suggested by other shareholders – will not trigger the pill. As you might be aware, the Delaware courts have not ruled on the validity of "Acting in Concert" provisions but we are convinced they are illegal and would be happy to debate the matter before a Delaware judge if you insist.

We expect that you will act quickly and decisively regarding the matters described above. The last thing we want to see is more money squandered on unnecessary and distracting fights. However, be assured that if you continue to turn a blind eye to the interests of shareholders, we will not hesitate to take whatever actions we deem necessary to protect our investment.

Very truly yours,


CARL C. ICAHN