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Preliminary Proxy Statement
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Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
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Definitive Proxy Statement
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Definitive Additional Materials
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Soliciting Material under Rule 14a-12
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Illumina, Inc.
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(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)
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(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)
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Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):
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No fee required.
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Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
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Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:
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Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
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Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
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Total fee paid:
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Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.
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Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the
Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.
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Amount Previously Paid:
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Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
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Filing Party:
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Date Filed:
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1. |
The Illumina Board went through a rigorous, comprehensive process in deciding to close the acquisition of GRAIL prior to getting regulatory approval.
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The process was informed by external experts, both at signing and closing
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Our deliberative process included the following steps:
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We had independent director-only sessions without management participation, in addition to sessions with the full Board, with and without management
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The Board’s decisions were informed by legal and regulatory external advice from EU, U.S. and UK counsel
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Illumina founded GRAIL and the two companies are not competitors. GRAIL continues to be powered by Illumina’s core NGS technology to enable its multi-cancer early detection tests
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There was no precedent of successful vertical merger challenges by the FTC (in fact, the only other challenge in the prior 40 years was the DOJ’s failed attempt to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner), and the European
Commission had never relied on Article 22 and highly speculative vertical integration theories of harm to prohibit a merger
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GRAIL had no revenues in Europe or plan for revenues in Europe which signaled that there was no nexus for an EU challenge (and in fact, the European Commission had never solicited referrals to take jurisdiction over an acquisition
of an American company that had no revenue in Europe)
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We evaluated public statements by the EU Commissioner that it would not invoke jurisdiction over transactions such as ours by retroactively applying a new interpretation of laws
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The merger contract would have lapsed had Illumina not closed on the transaction and the Board would have forgone the opportunity of owning GRAIL in the face of a preponderance of evidence suggesting that the merger would
ultimately receive regulatory approval
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In its decision to close the deal, the Board also took into account its initial reasons for entering into the GRAIL transaction, including the market opportunity globally, the science, the financials, the intellectual property and
the legal issues
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There is no faster timeline to divest GRAIL – the appeals process does not impede divestiture and that work is ongoing.
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This is a finite process ending in a decision by early 2024; Illumina will have to win both U.S. and EU appeals in order to keep GRAIL
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There is no faster timeline to divest GRAIL – the appeals process does not impede preparatory divestiture work and that work is ongoing
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The potential value of GRAIL to Illumina’s shareholders outweighs the costs of challenging a regulatory decision that was both unprecedented and factually incorrect
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Even if we win both appeals, we are committed to a full review of the total GRAIL opportunity, including potential synergies still achievable, before making a decision to keep GRAIL
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A win in both appeals removes any fines and increases the options to deliver incremental value to shareholders (by removing any restrictions that the divestiture order might place)
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Illumina is not satisfied with the current share price and has laid out strategies to create additional value by improving both the top and bottom line.
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Illumina and our Board and management holds itself to the highest standard of performance and value creation
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The Board is as unhappy with the Company’s Total Shareholder Return (TSR), growth and margin as our shareholders
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We are laser focused on taking the steps necessary to immediately and consistently improve performance on all of these dimensions - revenue growth, cost management (including commitments
already made to 2024 and 2025 core operating margins), and ongoing innovation and will regularly engage shareholders to provide an update on progress on these measures
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The dissident slate has not offered a clearly articulated strategy to improve performance - including any viable strategy on GRAIL
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Illumina has an ongoing Board refreshment process and has developed profiles for two new directors, based on the skills that would help Illumina achieve its strategic objectives over the next five years
and beyond.
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The profiles are:
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One for a public, healthcare company CEO, with experience scaling a growth company and experience with manufacturing/operating in China
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One for a public, healthcare company CFO, with previous Wall Street experience
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Illumina engaged a specialized, external recruiter – the same one that helped bring Scott Gottlieb, the former U.S. FDA Commissioner onto Illumina’s Board
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It was a rigorous process starting with more than 85 candidates, that culminated with selecting two finalists
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The Board did not complete the evaluation process prior to the relevant deadlines for the upcoming annual meeting
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Thus, the appointment of additional Board members will be subject to post-annual shareholder meeting Board approval and thereafter annual shareholder approval
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Carl Icahn’s nominees would be harmful to Core Illumina.
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Carl Icahn’s associates cannot serve as truly independent directors, are short-term focused, and add nothing to the Board’s capabilities
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The dissident director nominees are Icahn’s current and former employees
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Most of Icahn’s investments are held for less than 2 years, and his directors typically leave when Icahn exits the position
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None of Icahn’s nominees has any operational experience or any relevant healthcare experience (Mr. Intrieri sat on a healthcare company board a decade ago for all of one year)
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Icahn’s nominees do not understand innovation-focused businesses, which makes it difficult to conclude that they can enhance our long-term performance in highly technical research and clinical marketplaces
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They do not bring any skill set that Illumina needs to achieve its strategic plan and introduce unnecessary disruption and risk
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Icahn’s attempt to position his nominees as street-smart financial experts is, like most of his campaign, baseless rhetoric. His nominees have no successful operating experience in senior management roles, unlike many of Illumina’s
directors (including those he is seeking to replace)
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John Thompson was and is extremely qualified to lead Illumina’s Board.
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Contrary to Icahn’s claims, John Thompson and his vast and deep experience have provided invaluable insight and leadership to our Board
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Any serious Board would be delighted to have Mr. Thompson serve as Chair (as was Microsoft where, as Chair, he oversaw a period of unprecedented innovation and shareholder value creation)
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John led the Microsoft Board team responsible for selecting Satya Nadella to be Microsoft's CEO, a very successful CEO transition
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At Symantec, where he was CEO for 10 years, he grew revenue from $600 million to $6 billion and delivered a TSR of 819%, outperforming the S&P 500 by 856 percentage points
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During his tenure as chair and lead independent director from February 2012 to present, Microsoft TSR of 885% outperformed the S&P 500 by 683 percentage points
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Francis and John have a professional relationship that began at Symantec; Francis never directly reported to John at Symantec
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John was CEO and then Chair while Francis was a Vice President and then Senior Vice President for most of the time they overlapped
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While John and Francis certainly knew each other, they were not in regular communication, particularly after John left Symantec in 2011, and prior to his joining the Illumina Board in 2017
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The facts do not support Glass Lewis’s own criteria for supporting Icahn’s slate.
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As clearly stated by Glass Lewis, those criteria are:
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Comprehensive analytics and associated commentary firmly linking underperformance to poor board oversight, ineffective strategy, mismanagement and/or other serious governance
concerns; and
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An alternate slate of qualified, unconflicted candidates credibly prepared to address noted deficiencies and oversee a strategy or plan likely to result in a superior outcome for shareholders
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It is important to note that in Glass Lewis’s own words BOTH criteria must be met for them to recommend for the dissident slate. For the reasons discussed above, we believe neither has been met
sufficiently to warrant their conclusion
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Illumina strongly disagrees with Glass Lewis’s recommendation and believes that replacing Illumina’s leadership with Carl Icahn’s associates puts Illumina’s business momentum at risk – particularly during the critical roll-out of
NovaSeq™X
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The 2022 executive compensation awards are not cash – they were made by the Board after consultation with its independent compensation consultant and are
benchmarked against Illumina’s peers.
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In Q1 2022, three members of Illumina’s management team received a one-time special grant of stock options from the Board’s Compensation Committee – CEO, Chief Commercial Officer and Chief Technology
Officer – to help ensure their retention and focus on innovation and increasing shareholder value
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In making this one-time special grant, the Board’s Compensation Committee considered the significant progress that Illumina made in 2021 on our innovation roadmap, culminating in the development and
impending release of the NovaSeq™X, as well as the highly competitive talent environment
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These awards were made by the Board after consultation with its independent compensation consultant and are informed by peer group data provided by the consultant
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These grants are in the form of stock options and only have value if the stock exceeds $330.25 per share as this is the strike price of the grant. Using a Black-Scholes calculation which accounts for
volatility, interest rates and the 7-year term of the grant, to achieve the intended grant value the stock price would need to meet or exceed $444.54
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These grants are aligned with shareholder value creation. Currently, all of these options are underwater. Even though underwater, these options have long term retention value over the 7-year term of the
grant incenting these executives to deliver on our innovation roadmap and drive share price appreciation
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Generally over 85% of our executive officer total direct compensation is “at-risk” and contingent on the achievement of objective, preestablished corporate financial objectives that are linked to
stockholder value. For fiscal year 2022 our pay-for-performance STI (VCP) and LTIP (PSUs) paid out below target and in alignment with our performance. In addition, all equity compensation directly follows shareholder return from value
of initial grant to value at time of realization, aligning executive realized pay with that of our shareholders over a similar time horizon.
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That said, the special grants provide a stronger incentive to drive increased stockholder value through price appreciation and align our executives’ interests with our long-term shareholders’ interest
in pursuit of our mission and the profitable growth of the Company
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Recent concerning developments around Carl Icahn’s holding company, Icahn Enterprises L.P., severely impact the credibility of his challenge.
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Illumina shareholders should be fully aware that on Wednesday, May 10, 2023, IEP disclosed that it was being investigated by federal authorities
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In its recently filed 10-Q, IEP said that the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York contacted IEP on May 3, 2023, seeking production of information relating to it and certain
affiliates’ “corporate governance, capitalization, securities offerings, dividends, valuation, marketing materials, due diligence and other materials”
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On May 2, a well-known analysis firm, Hindenburg Research, issued a lengthy, highly critical report entitled The Corporate Raider Throwing Stones from His Own Glass
House that accused Carl Icahn’s IEP of inflating valuations for IEP’s less liquid and private assets, as well as using cash from new investors to pay dividends to existing investors. “Such Ponzi-like economic structures are
sustainable only to the extent that new money is willing to risk being the last one ‘holding the bag,’” the Hindenburg report concluded
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After Mr. Icahn’s IEP disclosed the investigation and quarterly results, Hindenburg issued a second report on May 11 concluding that, “Given that Carl Icahn has styled himself as a 50+ year warrior for
corporate transparency, we expected he would provide clarity on the issues we highlighted,” Hindenburg wrote. “Icahn Enterprises failed to address every key issue we raised. Instead, it rehashed its prior opaque and inadequate
disclosures”
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