EX-99.1 2 dex991.htm ANNUAL REPORT Annual Report
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Exhibit 99.1










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Business Activities

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a holding company owning subsidiaries that engage in a number of diverse business activities including property and casualty insurance and reinsurance, freight rail transportation, utilities and energy, finance, manufacturing, services and retailing. Included in the group of subsidiaries that underwrite property and casualty insurance and reinsurance is GEICO, the third largest private passenger auto insurer in the United States and two of the largest reinsurers in the world, General Re and the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group. Other subsidiaries that underwrite property and casualty insurance include National Indemnity Company and affiliated insurance entities, Medical Protective Company, Applied Underwriters, U.S. Liability Insurance Company, Central States Indemnity Company, Kansas Bankers Surety, Cypress Insurance Company, BoatU.S. and several other subsidiaries referred to as the “Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies.”

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation (“BNSF”), acquired by Berkshire on February 12, 2010, operates one of the largest railroad systems in North America. In serving the Midwest, Pacific Northwest and the Western, Southwestern and Southeastern regions and ports of the U.S., BNSF transports a range of products and commodities derived from manufacturing, agricultural and natural resource industries. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company (“MidAmerican”) is an international energy holding company owning a wide variety of operating companies engaged in the generation, transmission and distribution of energy. Among MidAmerican’s operating energy companies are Northern Electric and Yorkshire Electricity; MidAmerican Energy Company; Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power; and Kern River Gas Transmission Company and Northern Natural Gas. In addition, MidAmerican owns HomeServices of America, a real estate brokerage firm.

Berkshire’s finance and financial products businesses primarily engage in proprietary investing strategies (BH Finance), commercial and consumer lending (Berkshire Hathaway Credit Corporation and Clayton Homes) and transportation equipment and furniture leasing (XTRA and CORT). McLane Company is a wholesale distributor of groceries and nonfood items to discount retailers, convenience stores, quick service restaurants and others. The Marmon Group is an international association of approximately 130 manufacturing and service businesses that operate independently within diverse business sectors.

Numerous business activities are conducted through Berkshire’s other manufacturing, services and retailing subsidiaries. Shaw Industries is the world’s largest manufacturer of tufted broadloom carpet. Benjamin Moore is a formulator, manufacturer and retailer of architectural and industrial coatings. Johns Manville is a leading manufacturer of insulation and building products. Acme Building Brands is a manufacturer of face brick and concrete masonry products. MiTek Inc. produces steel connector products and engineering software for the building components market. Fruit of the Loom, Russell, Vanity Fair, Garan, Fechheimer, H.H. Brown Shoe Group and Justin Brands manufacture, license and distribute apparel and footwear under a variety of brand names. FlightSafety International provides training to aircraft operators. NetJets provides fractional ownership programs for general aviation aircraft. Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, Star Furniture and Jordan’s Furniture are retailers of home furnishings. Borsheims, Helzberg Diamond Shops and Ben Bridge Jeweler are retailers of fine jewelry.

In addition, other manufacturing, service and retail businesses include: The Buffalo News, a publisher of a daily and Sunday newspaper; See’s Candies, a manufacturer and seller of boxed chocolates and other confectionery products; Scott Fetzer, a diversified manufacturer and distributor of commercial and industrial products; Larson-Juhl, a designer, manufacturer and distributor of high-quality picture framing products; CTB International, a manufacturer of equipment for the livestock and agricultural industries; International Dairy Queen, a licensor and service provider to about 6,000 stores that offer prepared dairy treats and food; The Pampered Chef, the premier direct seller of kitchen tools in the U.S.; Forest River, a leading manufacturer of leisure vehicles in the U.S.; Business Wire, the leading global distributor of corporate news, multimedia and regulatory filings; Iscar Metalworking Companies, an industry leader in the metal cutting tools business; TTI, Inc., a leading distributor of electronic components and Richline Group, a leading jewelry manufacturer.

Operating decisions for the various Berkshire businesses are made by managers of the business units. Investment decisions and all other capital allocation decisions are made for Berkshire and its subsidiaries by Warren E. Buffett, in consultation with Charles T. Munger. Mr. Buffett is Chairman and Mr. Munger is Vice Chairman of Berkshire’s Board of Directors.


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Business Activities

    Inside Front Cover   

Directors and Officers of the Company

    Inside Back Cover   

*Copyright©2011 By Warren E. Buffett
All Rights Reserved


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Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500


     Annual Percentage Change        


   in Per-Share
Book Value  of
    in S&P 500
with  Dividends


     23.8        10.0        13.8   


     20.3        (11.7     32.0   


     11.0        30.9        (19.9


     19.0        11.0        8.0   


     16.2        (8.4     24.6   


     12.0        3.9        8.1   


     16.4        14.6        1.8   


     21.7        18.9        2.8   


     4.7        (14.8     19.5   


     5.5        (26.4     31.9   


     21.9        37.2        (15.3


     59.3        23.6        35.7   


     31.9        (7.4     39.3   


     24.0        6.4        17.6   


     35.7        18.2        17.5   


     19.3        32.3        (13.0


     31.4        (5.0     36.4   


     40.0        21.4        18.6   


     32.3        22.4        9.9   


     13.6        6.1        7.5   


     48.2        31.6        16.6   


     26.1        18.6        7.5   


     19.5        5.1        14.4   


     20.1        16.6        3.5   


     44.4        31.7        12.7   


     7.4        (3.1     10.5   


     39.6        30.5        9.1   


     20.3        7.6        12.7   


     14.3        10.1        4.2   


     13.9        1.3        12.6   


     43.1        37.6        5.5   


     31.8        23.0        8.8   


     34.1        33.4        .7   


     48.3        28.6        19.7   


     .5        21.0        (20.5


     6.5        (9.1     15.6   


     (6.2     (11.9     5.7   


     10.0        (22.1     32.1   


     21.0        28.7        (7.7


     10.5        10.9        (.4


     6.4        4.9        1.5   


     18.4        15.8        2.6   


     11.0        5.5        5.5   


     (9.6     (37.0     27.4   


     19.8        26.5        (6.7


     13.0        15.1        (2.1

Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2010

     20.2     9.4     10.8   

Overall Gain – 1964-2010

     490,409     6,262  

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.



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To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.*

The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that’s working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire’s “normal” earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we’ve quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.

A “normal year,” of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the “Investment” section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about $17 billion pre-tax and $12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.

Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF’s future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That’s three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.

Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.

Last year – in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy – we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending $6 billion on property and equipment. Of this amount, $5.4 billion – or 90% of the total – was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending – $8 billion – and spend all of the $2 billion increase in the United States.

Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of “great uncertainty.” But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.


* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.



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Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective.

We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.


Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.

In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.

The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.

To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.

The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.

Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.

To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.

After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.

Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.



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Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 by Five-Year Periods


     Annual Percentage Change        

Five-Year Period

   in Per-Share
Book Value  of
     in S&P 500
with  Dividends


     17.2         5.0        12.2   


     14.7         3.9        10.8   


     13.9         9.2        4.7   


     16.8         7.5        9.3   


     17.7         2.0        15.7   


     15.0         (2.4     17.4   


     13.9         3.2        10.7   


     20.8         4.9        15.9   


     23.4         (0.2     23.6   


     24.4         4.3        20.1   


     30.1         14.7        15.4   


     33.4         13.9        19.5   


     29.0         8.1        20.9   


     29.9         14.1        15.8   


     31.6         17.3        14.3   


     27.0         14.8        12.2   


     32.6         14.6        18.0   


     31.5         19.8        11.7   


     27.4         16.4        11.0   


     25.0         15.2        9.8   


     31.1         20.3        10.8   


     22.9         13.1        9.8   


     25.4         15.3        10.1   


     25.6         15.8        9.8   


     24.4         14.5        9.9   


     18.6         8.7        9.9   


     25.6         16.5        9.1   


     24.2         15.2        9.0   


     26.9         20.2        6.7   


     33.7         24.0        9.7   


     30.4         28.5        1.9   


     22.9         18.3        4.6   


     14.8         10.7        4.1   


     10.4         (0.6     11.0   


     6.0         (0.6     6.6   


     8.0         (2.3     10.3   


     8.0         0.6        7.4   


     13.1         6.2        6.9   


     13.3         12.8        0.5   


     6.9         (2.2     9.1   


     8.6         0.4        8.2   


     10.0         2.3        7.7   

Notes: The first two periods cover the five years beginning September 30 of the previous year. The third period covers 63 months beginning September 30, 1966 to December 31, 1971. All other periods involve calendar years.

The other notes on page 2 also apply to this table.



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Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.



     Period      Compounded Annual Increase
in Per-Share Investments


   $ 66         


     754         1970-1980         27.5


     7,798         1980-1990         26.3


     50,229         1990-2000         20.5


     94,730         2000-2010         6.6

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.



Pre-Tax  Earnings
     Period      Compounded Annual Increase in
Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings


   $ 2.87         


     19.01         1970-1980         20.8


     102.58         1980-1990         18.4


     918.66         1990-2000         24.5


     5,926.04         2000-2010         20.5



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For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.

Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.

Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle – and frequently we can’t – we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.



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When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.

There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.

Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.

This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.

We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.


Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.

Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.



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One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.

Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.

That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)

Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened – with the stock falling by more than 95% – Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)

We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)

A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal – saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance – remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.

When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.

Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.

The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value – $2.7 billion – was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.

Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO – off to a strong start in 2011 – is the gift that keeps giving.



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One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personal-lines insurance agencies, which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.

I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

We will look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.


Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:



(in $  millions)


   $ 39   









If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.

At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.



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Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:



Underwriting Profit


Yearend Float

     (in millions)  

Insurance Operations

       2010              2009              2010              2009      

General Re

   $ 452       $ 477       $ 20,049       $ 21,014   

BH Reinsurance

     176         250         30,370         27,753   


     1,117         649         10,272         9,613   

Other Primary

     268         84         5,141         5,061   
   $ 2,013       $ 1,460       $ 65,832       $ 63,441   

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.



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Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

Balance Sheet 12/31/10 (in millions)



Cash and equivalents

   $ 2,673   

Accounts and notes receivable




Other current assets


Total current assets


Goodwill and other intangibles


Fixed assets


Other assets

   $ 51,146   
Liabilities and Equity       

Notes payable

   $ 1,805   

Other current liabilities


Total current liabilities


Deferred taxes


Term debt and other liabilities



   $ 51,146   


Earnings Statement (in millions)


     2010     2009     2008  


   $ 66,610      $ 61,665      $ 66,099   

Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,362 in 2010, $1,422 in 2009 and $1,280 in 2008)

     62,225        59,509        61,937   

Interest expense

     111        98        139   

Pre-tax earnings

     4,274     2,058     4,023

Income taxes and non-controlling interests

     1,812        945        1,740   

Net earnings

   $ 2,462      $ 1,113      $ 2,283   

*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let’s look first at the record-breakers.



TTI, our electronic components distributor, had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and Asia at 50%. The thousands of items TTI distributes are pedestrian, many selling for less than a dollar. The magic of TTI’s exceptional performance is created by Paul Andrews, its CEO, and his associates.



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Forest River, our RV and boat manufacturer, had record sales of nearly $2 billion and record earnings as well. Forest River has 82 plants, and I have yet to visit one (or the home office, for that matter). There’s no need; Pete Liegl, the company’s CEO, runs a terrific operation. Come view his products at the annual meeting. Better yet, buy one.



CTB, our farm-equipment company, again set an earnings record. I told you in the 2008 Annual Report about Vic Mancinelli, the company’s CEO. He just keeps getting better. Berkshire paid $140 million for CTB in 2002. It has since paid us dividends of $160 million and eliminated $40 million of debt. Last year it earned $106 million pre-tax. Productivity gains have produced much of this increase. When we bought CTB, sales per employee were $189,365; now they are $405,878.



Would you believe shoes? H. H. Brown, run by Jim Issler and best known for its Born brand, set a new record for sales and earnings (helped by its selling 1,110 pairs of shoes at our annual meeting). Jim has brilliantly adapted to major industry changes. His work, I should mention, is overseen by Frank Rooney, 89, a superb businessman and still a dangerous fellow with whom to have a bet on the golf course.

A huge story in this sector’s year-to-year improvement occurred at NetJets. I can’t overstate the breadth and importance of Dave Sokol’s achievements at this company, the leading provider of fractional ownership of jet airplanes. NetJets has long been an operational success, owning a 2010 market share five times that of its nearest competitor. Our overwhelming leadership stems from a wonderful team of pilots, mechanics and service personnel. This crew again did its job in 2010, with customer satisfaction, as delineated in our regular surveys, hitting new highs.

Even though NetJets was consistently a runaway winner with customers, our financial results, since its acquisition in 1998, were a failure. In the 11 years through 2009, the company reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million, a figure that was far understated since borrowing costs at NetJets were heavily subsidized by its free use of Berkshire’s credit. Had NetJets been operating on a stand-alone basis, its loss over the years would have been several hundreds of millions greater.

We are now charging NetJets an appropriate fee for Berkshire’s guarantee. Despite this fee (which came to $38 million in 2010), NetJets earned $207 million pre-tax in 2010, a swing of $918 million from 2009. Dave’s quick restructuring of management and the company’s rationalization of its purchasing and spending policies has ended the hemorrhaging of cash and turned what was Berkshire’s only major business problem into a solidly profitable operation.

Dave has meanwhile maintained NetJets’ industry-leading reputation for safety and service. In many important ways, our training and operational standards are considerably stronger than those required by the FAA. Maintaining top-of-the-line standards is the right thing to do, but I also have a selfish reason for championing this policy. My family and I have flown more than 5,000 hours on NetJets (that’s equal to being airborne 24 hours a day for seven months) and will fly thousands of hours more in the future. We receive no special treatment and have used a random mix of at least 100 planes and 300 crews. Whichever the plane or crew, we always know we are flying with the best-trained pilots in private aviation.

The largest earner in our manufacturing, service and retailing sector is Marmon, a collection of 130 businesses. We will soon increase our ownership in this company to 80% by carrying out our scheduled purchase of 17% of its stock from the Pritzker family. The cost will be about $1.5 billion. We will then purchase the remaining Pritzker holdings in 2013 or 2014, whichever date is selected by the family. Frank Ptak runs Marmon wonderfully, and we look forward to 100% ownership.



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Next to Marmon, the two largest earners in this sector are Iscar and McLane. Both had excellent years. In 2010, Grady Rosier’s McLane entered the wine and spirits distribution business to supplement its $32 billion operation as a distributor of food products, cigarettes, candy and sundries. In purchasing Empire Distributors, an operator in Georgia and North Carolina, we teamed up with David Kahn, the company’s dynamic CEO. David is leading our efforts to expand geographically. By yearend he had already made his first acquisition, Horizon Wine and Spirits in Tennessee.

At Iscar, profits were up 159% in 2010, and we may well surpass pre-recession levels in 2011. Sales are improving throughout the world, particularly in Asia. Credit Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman for an exceptional performance, one far superior to that of Iscar’s main competitors.

All that is good news. Our businesses related to home construction, however, continue to struggle. Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick have maintained their competitive positions, but their profits are far below the levels of a few years ago. Combined, these operations earned $362 million pre-tax in 2010 compared to $1.3 billion in 2006, and their employment has fallen by about 9,400.

A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at some point. Consequently: (1) At MiTek, we have made, or committed to, five bolt-on acquisitions during the past eleven months; (2) At Acme, we just recently acquired the leading manufacturer of brick in Alabama for $50 million; (3) Johns Manville is building a $55 million roofing membrane plant in Ohio, to be completed next year; and (4) Shaw will spend $200 million in 2011 on plant and equipment, all of it situated in America. These businesses entered the recession strong and will exit it stronger. At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, with important common characteristics that distinguish them from our many others. Consequently, we give them their own sector in this letter and split out their financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that, even under very adverse business conditions, amply covers their interest requirements. For example, in recessionary 2010 with BNSF’s car loadings far off peak levels, the company’s interest coverage was 6:1.

Both companies are heavily regulated, and both will have a never-ending need to make major investments in plant and equipment. Both also need to provide efficient, customer-satisfying service to earn the respect of their communities and regulators. In return, both need to be assured that they will be allowed to earn reasonable earnings on future capital investments.

Earlier I explained just how important railroads are to our country’s future. Rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, measured by ton-miles, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 28% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that more than 11% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. Given the shift of population to the West, our share may well inch higher.

All of this adds up to a huge responsibility. We are a major and essential part of the American economy’s circulatory system, obliged to constantly maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with its ancillary bridges, tunnels, engines and cars. In carrying out this job, we must anticipate society’s needs, not merely react to them. Fulfilling our societal obligation, we will regularly spend far more than our depreciation, with this excess amounting to $2 billion in 2011. I’m confident we will earn appropriate returns on our huge incremental investments. Wise regulation and wise investment are two sides of the same coin.

At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.



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MidAmerican supplies 2.4 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Wyoming and Utah and as an important provider in other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day.

MidAmerican has delivered outstanding results for both its owners (Berkshire’s interest is 89.8%) and its customers. Shortly after MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report published, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.

In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. Iowa rates have not increased since we purchased our operation there in 1999. During the same period, the other major electric utility in the state has raised prices more than 70% and now has rates far above ours. In certain metropolitan areas in which the two utilities operate side by side, electric bills of our customers run far below those of their neighbors. I am told that comparable houses sell at higher prices in these cities if they are located in our service area.

MidAmerican will have 2,909 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2011, more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that MidAmerican has invested or committed to wind is a staggering $5.4 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn.

As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by David Sokol and Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:



   Earnings (in millions)  
         2010             2009      

U.K. utilities

   $ 333      $ 248   

Iowa utility

     279        285   

Western utilities

     783        788   


     378        457   


     42        43   

Other (net)

     47        25   

Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes

     1,862        1,846   

Interest, other than to Berkshire

     (323     (318

Interest on Berkshire junior debt

     (30     (58

Income tax

     (271     (313

Net earnings

   $ 1,238      $ 1,157   

Earnings applicable to Berkshire*

   $ 1,131      $ 1,071   

*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $19 in 2010 and $38 in 2009.




(Historical accounting through 2/12/10; purchase accounting subsequently)

   (in millions)  
         2010              2009      


   $ 16,850       $ 14,016   

Operating earnings

     4,495         3,254   

Interest (Net)

     507         613   

Pre-Tax earnings

     3,988         2,641   

Net earnings

     2,459         1,721   



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Finance and Financial Products

This, our smallest sector, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes.

Both of our leasing businesses improved their performances last year, albeit from a very low base. XTRA increased the utilization of its equipment from 63% in 2009 to 75% in 2010, thereby raising pre-tax earnings to $35 million from $17 million in 2009. CORT experienced a pickup in business as the year progressed and also significantly tightened its operations. The combination increased its pre-tax results from a loss of $3 million in 2009 to $18 million of profit in 2010.

At Clayton, we produced 23,343 homes, 47% of the industry’s total of 50,046. Contrast this to the peak year of 1998, when 372,843 homes were manufactured. (We then had an industry share of 8%.) Sales would have been terrible last year under any circumstances, but the financing problems I commented upon in the 2009 report continue to exacerbate the distress. To explain: Home-financing policies of our government, expressed through the loans found acceptable by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, favor site-built homes and work to negate the price advantage that manufactured homes offer.

We finance more manufactured-home buyers than any other company. Our experience, therefore, should be instructive to those parties preparing to overhaul our country’s home-loan practices. Let’s take a look.

Clayton owns 200,804 mortgages that it originated. (It also has some mortgage portfolios that it purchased.) At the origination of these contracts, the average FICO score of our borrowers was 648, and 47% were 640 or below. Your banker will tell you that people with such scores are generally regarded as questionable credits.

Nevertheless, our portfolio has performed well during conditions of stress. Here’s our loss experience during the last five years for originated loans:



   Net Losses as a Percentage
of Average Loans











Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.

If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income. This policy kept Clayton solvent and also kept buyers in their homes.

Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today’s lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks. (The two best investments were wedding rings.) For the $31,500 I paid for our house, my family and I gained 52 years of terrific memories with more to come.



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But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender – often protected by a government guarantee – facilitates his fantasy. Our country’s social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.


Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.






   Percentage of
     Cost *      Market  
                   (in millions)  
  151,610,700       American Express Company      12.6       $ 1,287       $ 6,507   
  225,000,000       BYD Company, Ltd.      9.9         232         1,182   
  200,000,000       The Coca-Cola Company      8.6         1,299         13,154   
  29,109,637       ConocoPhillips      2.0         2,028         1,982   
  45,022,563       Johnson & Johnson      1.6         2,749         2,785   
  97,214,584       Kraft Foods Inc.      5.6         3,207         3,063   
  19,259,600       Munich Re      10.5         2,896         2,924   
  3,947,555       POSCO      4.6         768         1,706   
  72,391,036       The Procter & Gamble Company      2.6         464         4,657   
  25,848,838       Sanofi-Aventis      2.0         2,060         1,656   
  242,163,773       Tesco plc      3.0         1,414         1,608   
  78,060,769       U.S. Bancorp      4.1         2,401         2,105   
  39,037,142       Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.      1.1         1,893         2,105   
  358,936,125       Wells Fargo & Company      6.8         8,015         11,123   
   Others         3,020         4,956   
   Total Common Stocks Carried at Market       $ 33,733       $ 61,513   


  * This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience – and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century – undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth – and I still have my wife.”) In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In our earlier estimate of Berkshire’s normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).

The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these – our Swiss Re note – was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others – our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks – are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.



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All three of the companies redeeming must pay us a premium to do so – in aggregate about $1.4 billion – but all of the redemptions are nevertheless unwelcome. After they occur, our earning power will be significantly reduced. That’s the bad news.

There are two probable offsets. At yearend we held $38 billion of cash equivalents that have been earning a pittance throughout 2010. At some point, however, better rates will return. They will add at least $500 million – and perhaps much more – to our investment income. That sort of increase in money-market yields is unlikely to come soon. It is appropriate, nevertheless, for us to include improved rates in an estimate of “normal” earning power. Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can’t come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book.

In addition, dividends on our current common stock holdings will almost certainly increase. The largest gain is likely to come at Wells Fargo. The Federal Reserve, our friend in respect to Goldman Sachs, has frozen dividend levels at major banks, whether strong or weak, during the last two years. Wells Fargo, though consistently prospering throughout the worst of the recession and currently enjoying enormous financial strength and earning power, has therefore been forced to maintain an artificially low payout. (We don’t fault the Fed: For various reasons, an across-the-board freeze made sense during the crisis and its immediate aftermath.)

At some point, probably soon, the Fed’s restrictions will cease. Wells Fargo can then reinstate the rational dividend policy that its owners deserve. At that time, we would expect our annual dividends from just this one security to increase by several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

Other companies we hold are likely to increase their dividends as well. Coca-Cola paid us $88 million in 1995, the year after we finished purchasing the stock. Every year since, Coke has increased its dividend. In 2011, we will almost certainly receive $376 million from Coke, up $24 million from last year. Within ten years, I would expect that $376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn’t be surprised to see our share of Coke’s annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.

Overall, I believe our “normal” investment income will at least equal what we realized in 2010, though the redemptions I described will cut our take in 2011 and perhaps 2012 as well.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Last summer, Lou Simpson told me he wished to retire. Since Lou was a mere 74 – an age Charlie and I regard as appropriate only for trainees at Berkshire – his call was a surprise.

Lou joined GEICO as its investment manager in 1979, and his service to that company has been invaluable. In the 2004 Annual Report, I detailed his record with equities, and I have omitted updates only because his performance made mine look bad. Who needs that?

Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats. We will miss him.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Four years ago, I told you that we needed to add one or more younger investment managers to carry on when Charlie, Lou and I weren’t around. At that time we had multiple outstanding candidates immediately available for my CEO job (as we do now), but we did not have backup in the investment area.

It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of – and sensitivity to – risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed. Finally, we wanted someone who would regard working for Berkshire as far more than a job.



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When Charlie and I met Todd Combs, we knew he fit our requirements. Todd, as was the case with Lou, will be paid a salary plus a contingent payment based on his performance relative to the S&P. We have arrangements in place for deferrals and carryforwards that will prevent see-saw performance being met by undeserved payments. The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have received huge payouts on the upside and who then, when bad results occurred, have walked away rich, with their limited partners losing back their earlier gains. Sometimes these same general partners thereafter quickly started another fund so that they could immediately participate in future profits without having to overcome their past losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled patsies, not partners.

As long as I am CEO, I will continue to manage the great majority of Berkshire’s holdings, both bonds and equities. Todd initially will manage funds in the range of one to three billion dollars, an amount he can reset annually. His focus will be equities but he is not restricted to that form of investment. (Fund consultants like to require style boxes such as “long-short,” “macro,” “international equities.” At Berkshire our only style box is “smart.”)

Over time, we may add one or two investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager’s performance compensation be dependent on his or her own portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We want a compensation system that pays off big for individual success but that also fosters cooperation, not competition.

When Charlie and I are no longer around, our investment manager(s) will have responsibility for the entire portfolio in a manner then set by the CEO and Board of Directors. Because good investors bring a useful perspective to the purchase of businesses, we would expect them to be consulted – but not to have a vote – on the wisdom of possible acquisitions. In the end, of course, the Board will make the call on any major acquisition.

One footnote: When we issued a press release about Todd’s joining us, a number of commentators pointed out that he was “little-known” and expressed puzzlement that we didn’t seek a “big-name.” I wonder how many of them would have known of Lou in 1979, Ajit in 1985, or, for that matter, Charlie in 1959. Our goal was to find a 2-year-old Secretariat, not a 10-year-old Seabiscuit. (Whoops – that may not be the smartest metaphor for an 80-year-old CEO to use.)


Two years ago, in the 2008 Annual Report, I told you that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operations at our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the few left over at Gen Re). Today, the comparable number is 203, a figure reflecting both a few additions to our portfolio and the unwinding or expiration of some contracts.

Our continuing positions, all of which I am personally responsible for, fall largely into two categories. We view both categories as engaging us in insurance-like activities in which we receive premiums for assuming risks that others wish to shed. Indeed, the thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk. That’s important.

Our first category of derivatives consists of a number of contracts, written in 2004-2008, that required payments by us if there were bond defaults by companies included in certain high-yield indices. With minor exceptions, we were exposed to these risks for five years, with each contract covering 100 companies.

In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float.



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Subsequently, as you know too well, we encountered both a financial panic and a severe recession. A number of the companies in the high-yield indices failed, which required us to pay losses of $2.5 billion. Today, however, our exposure is largely behind us because most of our higher-risk contracts have expired. Consequently, it appears almost certain that we will earn an underwriting profit as we originally anticipated. In addition, we have had the use of interest-free float that averaged about $2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago.

Our other large derivatives position – whose contracts go by the name of “equity puts” – involves insurance we wrote for parties wishing to protect themselves against a possible decline in equity prices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts are tied to various equity indices, such as the S&P 500 in the U.S. and the FTSE 100 in the U.K. In the 2004-2008 period, we received $4.8 billion of premiums for 47 of these contracts, most of which ran for 15 years. On these contracts, only the price of the indices on the termination date counts: No payments can be required before then.

As a first step in updating you about these contracts, I can report that late in 2010, at the instigation of our counterparty, we unwound eight contracts, all of them due between 2021 and 2028. We had originally received $647 million in premiums for these contracts, and the unwinding required us to pay $425 million. Consequently, we realized a gain of $222 million and also had the interest-free and unrestricted use of that $647 million for about three years.

Those 2010 transactions left us with 39 equity put contracts remaining on our books at yearend. On these, at their initiation, we received premiums of $4.2 billion.

The future of these contracts is, of course, uncertain. But here is one perspective on them. If the prices of the relevant indices are the same at the contract expiration dates as these prices were on December 31, 2010 – and foreign exchange rates are unchanged – we would owe $3.8 billion on expirations occurring from 2018 to 2026. You can call this amount “settlement value.”

On our yearend balance sheet, however, we carry the liability for those remaining equity puts at $6.7 billion. In other words, if the prices of the relevant indices remain unchanged from that date, we will record a $2.9 billion gain in the years to come, that being the difference between the liability figure of $6.7 billion and the settlement value of $3.8 billion. I believe that equity prices will very likely increase and that our liability will fall significantly between now and settlement date. If so, our gain from this point will be even greater. But that, of course, is far from a sure thing.

What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining “float” of $4.2 billion for an average of about 10 more years. (Neither this float nor that arising from the high-yield contracts is included in the insurance float figure of $66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.

As I have told you before, almost all of our derivatives contracts are free of any obligation to post collateral – a fact that cut the premiums we could otherwise have charged. But that fact also left us feeling comfortable during the financial crisis, allowing us in those days to commit to some advantageous purchases. Foregoing some additional derivatives premiums proved to be well worth it.

On Reporting and Misreporting: The Numbers That Count and Those That Don’t

Earlier in this letter, I pointed out some numbers that Charlie and I find useful in valuing Berkshire and measuring its progress.

Let’s focus here on a number we omitted, but which many in the media feature above all others: net income. Important though that number may be at most companies, it is almost always meaningless at Berkshire. Regardless of how our businesses might be doing, Charlie and I could – quite legally – cause net income in any given period to be almost any number we would like.



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We have that flexibility because realized gains or losses on investments go into the net income figure, whereas unrealized gains (and, in most cases, losses) are excluded. For example, imagine that Berkshire had a $10 billion increase in unrealized gains in a given year and concurrently had $1 billion of realized losses. Our net income – which would count only the loss – would be reported as less than our operating income. If we had meanwhile realized gains in the previous year, headlines might proclaim that our earnings were down X% when in reality our business might be much improved.

If we really thought net income important, we could regularly feed realized gains into it simply because we have a huge amount of unrealized gains upon which to draw. Rest assured, though, that Charlie and I have never sold a security because of the effect a sale would have on the net income we were soon to report. We both have a deep disgust for “game playing” with numbers, a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to.

Operating earnings, despite having some shortcomings, are in general a reasonable guide as to how our businesses are doing. Ignore our net income figure, however. Regulations require that we report it to you. But if you find reporters focusing on it, that will speak more to their performance than ours.

Both realized and unrealized gains and losses are fully reflected in the calculation of our book value. Pay attention to the changes in that metric and to the course of our operating earnings, and you will be on the right track.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

As a p.s., I can’t resist pointing out just how capricious reported net income can be. Had our equity puts had a termination date of June 30, 2010, we would have been required to pay $6.4 billion to our counterparties at that date. Security prices then generally rose in the next quarter, a move that brought the corresponding figure down to $5.8 billion on September 30th. Yet the Black-Scholes formula that we use in valuing these contracts required us to increase our balance-sheet liability during this period from $8.9 billion to $9.6 billion, a change that, after the effect of tax accruals, reduced our net income for the quarter by $455 million.

Both Charlie and I believe that Black-Scholes produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options. We set out one absurd example in these pages two years ago. More tangibly, we put our money where our mouth was by entering into our equity put contracts. By doing so, we implicitly asserted that the Black-Scholes calculations used by our counterparties or their customers were faulty.

We continue, nevertheless, to use that formula in presenting our financial statements. Black-Scholes is the accepted standard for option valuation – almost all leading business schools teach it – and we would be accused of shoddy accounting if we deviated from it. Moreover, we would present our auditors with an insurmountable problem were we to do that: They have clients who are our counterparties and who use Black-Scholes values for the same contracts we hold. It would be impossible for our auditors to attest to the accuracy of both their values and ours were the two far apart.

Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can’t supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can’t come up with an exact figure – anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn’t bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.

John Kenneth Galbraith once slyly observed that economists were most economical with ideas: They made the ones learned in graduate school last a lifetime. University finance departments often behave similarly. Witness the tenacity with which almost all clung to the theory of efficient markets throughout the 1970s and 1980s, dismissively calling powerful facts that refuted it “anomalies.” (I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship’s circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.)



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Academics’ current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic’s inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.

Life and Debt

The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.

Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that’s also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade – and some relearned in 2008 – any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.

Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.

Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.

Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire’s well-being. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.

A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn’t meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather’s grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather’s name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.

On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found – along with $1,000 of cash – when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.

Ernest never went to business school – he never in fact finished high school – but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his $1,000 solution a bit further and have pledged that we will hold at least $10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least $20 billion on hand so that we can both withstand unprecedented insurance losses (our largest to date having been about $3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry’s most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil.



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Dear Fred & Catherine:

Over a period of a good many years I have known a great many people who at some time or another have suffered in various ways simply because they did not have ready cash. I have known people who have had to sacrifice some of their holdings in order to have money that was necessary at that time.

For a good many years your grandfather kept a certain amount of money where he could put his hands on it in very short notice.

For a number of years I have made it a point to keep a reserve, should some occasion come up where I would need money quickly, without disturbing the money that I have in my business. There have been a couple of occasions when I found it very convenient to go to this fund.

Thus, I feel that everyone should have a reserve. I hope it never happens to you, but the chances are that some day you will need money, and need it badly, and with this thought in view, I started a fund by placing $200.00 in an envelope, with your name on it, when you were married. Each year I added something to it, until there is now $1000.00 in the fund.

Ten year have elapsed since you were married, and this fund is now complete.

It is my wish that you place this envelope in your safety deposit box, and keep it for the purpose that it was created for. Should the time come when you need part, I would suggest that you use as little as possible, and replace it as soon as possible.

You might feel that this should be invested and bring you an income. Forget it — the mental satisfaction of having $1000.00 laid away where you can put your hands on it, is worth more than what interest it might bring, especially if you have the investment in something that you could not realize on quickly.

If in after years you feel this has been a good idea, you might repeat it with your own children.

For your information, I might mention that there has never been a Buffet who ever left a very large estate, but there has never been one that did not leave something. They never spent all they made, but always saved part of what they made, and it has all worked pretty well.

This letter is being written at the expiration of ten years after you were married.


/s/ Ernest Buffett



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We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe’s observation, “More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun.” At Berkshire, we don’t rely on bank lines, and we don’t enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.

Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.

By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.

The Annual Meeting

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30th. Carrie Kizer from our home office will be the ringmaster, and her theme this year is Planes, Trains and Automobiles. This gives NetJets, BNSF and BYD a chance to show off.

As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,053 pairs of Justin boots, 12,416 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Dairy Queen Blizzards® and 8,800 Quikut knives (that’s 16 knives per minute). But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t learned where to shop.

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 60 books and DVDs, including the Chinese language edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the ever-popular book about my partner. So what if you can’t read Chinese? Just buy a copy and carry it around; it will make you look urbane and erudite. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

If you are a big spender – or merely a gawker – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet.



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An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

Airlines have often jacked up prices – sometimes dramatically so – for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive is about 2 1/2 hours and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $33.3 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that – as far as I know – exceeds the one-week total of any retail store anyplace. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st , from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 1 p.m., I will be at Borsheims with a smile and a shoeshine, selling jewelry just as I sold men’s shirts at J.C. Penney’s 63 years ago. I’ve told Susan Jacques, Borsheims’ CEO, that I’m still a hotshot salesman. But I see doubt in her eyes. So cut loose and buy something from me for your wife or sweetheart (presumably the same person). Make me look good.

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire shareholder.

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites and – still being a growing boy – I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it.



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We will again have a drawing at 8:15 a.m. on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We hope to answer at least 60 questions. From our standpoint, the more the better. Our goal, which we pursue both through these annual letters and by our meeting discussions, is to give you a better understanding of the business that you own.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 14,097-page Federal income tax return along with state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and joyful. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.

This home office crew has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to our Woodstock for Capitalism on April 30th and tell them so.


February 26, 2011   Warren E. Buffett
  Chairman of the Board



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and Subsidiaries

Selected Financial Data for the Past Five Years

(dollars in millions except per-share data)















Insurance premiums earned (1)

   $ 30,749       $ 27,884       $ 25,525      $ 31,783       $ 23,964   

Sales and service revenues

     67,225         62,555         65,854        58,243         51,803   

Revenues of railroad, utilities and energy businesses (2)

     26,364         11,443         13,971        12,628         10,644   

Interest, dividend and other investment income

     5,215         5,531         5,140        5,161         4,568   

Interest and other revenues of finance and financial products businesses

     4,286         4,293         4,757        4,921         4,925   

Investment and derivative gains/losses (3)

     2,346         787         (7,461     5,509         2,635   

Total revenues

   $ 136,185       $ 112,493       $ 107,786      $ 118,245       $ 98,539   



Net earnings attributable to Berkshire Hathaway (3)

   $ 12,967       $ 8,055       $ 4,994      $ 13,213       $ 11,015   

Net earnings per share attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders (4)

   $ 7,928       $ 5,193       $ 3,224      $ 8,548       $ 7,144   

Year-end data:


Total assets

   $ 372,229       $ 297,119       $ 267,399      $ 273,160       $ 248,437   

Notes payable and other borrowings:


Insurance and other businesses

     12,471         4,561         5,149        3,447         4,431   

Railroad, utilities and energy businesses (2)

     31,626         19,579         19,145        19,002         16,946   

Finance and financial products businesses

     14,477         13,769         12,588        11,377         11,228   

Berkshire Hathaway shareholders’ equity

     157,318         131,102         109,267        120,733         108,419   

Class A equivalent common shares outstanding, in thousands

     1,648         1,552         1,549        1,548         1,543   

Berkshire Hathaway shareholders’ equity per outstanding Class A equivalent common share

   $ 95,453       $ 84,487       $ 70,530      $ 78,008       $ 70,281   



Insurance premiums earned in 2007 included $7.1 billion from a single reinsurance transaction with Equitas.



On February 12, 2010, BNSF became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Berkshire and BNSF’s accounts are included in Berkshire’s Consolidated Financial Statements beginning as of February 13, 2010. From December 31, 2008 to February 12, 2010, Berkshire’s investment in BNSF common stock was accounted for pursuant to the equity method.



Investment gains/losses include realized gains and losses and non-cash other-than-temporary impairment losses. Derivative gains/losses include significant amounts related to non-cash changes in the fair value of long-term contracts arising from short-term changes in equity prices, interest rates and foreign currency rates, among other factors. After-tax investment and derivative gains/losses were $1.87 billion in 2010, $486 million in 2009, $(4.65) billion in 2008, $3.58 billion in 2007 and $1.71 billion in 2006.



Represents net earnings per equivalent Class A common share. Net earnings per Class B common share is equal to 1/1,500 of such amount.



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We are eager to hear from principals or their representatives about businesses that meet all of the following criteria:


  (1) Large purchases (at least $75 million of pre-tax earnings unless the business will fit into one of our existing units),
  (2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
  (3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
  (4) Management in place (we can’t supply it),
  (5) Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
  (6) An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

The larger the company, the greater will be our interest: We would like to make an acquisition in the $5-20 billion range. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer – customarily within five minutes – as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We don’t participate in auctions.

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: “When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”




Management of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting, as such term is defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13a-15(f). Under the supervision and with the participation of our management, including our principal executive officer and principal financial officer, we conducted an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010 as required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13a-15(c). In making this assessment, we used the criteria set forth in the framework in Internal Control – Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Based on our evaluation under the framework in Internal Control – Integrated Framework, our management concluded that our internal control over financial reporting was effective as of December 31, 2010.

The effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010 has been audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, as stated in their report which appears on the following page.

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

February 25, 2011



Table of Contents


To the Board of Directors and Shareholders of

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

Omaha, Nebraska

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and subsidiaries (the “Company”) as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, and the related consolidated statements of earnings, cash flows and changes in shareholders’ equity and comprehensive income for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2010. We also have audited the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, based on criteria established in Internal Control – Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. The Company’s management is responsible for these financial statements, for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting, and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, included in the accompanying Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements and an opinion on the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement and whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in all material respects. Our audits of the financial statements included examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, and evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. Our audit of internal control over financial reporting included obtaining an understanding of internal control over financial reporting, assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, and testing and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our audits also included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinions.

A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the supervision of, the company’s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s board of directors, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.

Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the possibility of collusion or improper management override of controls, material misstatements due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.

In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, and the results of their operations and their cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2010, in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. Also, in our opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, based on the criteria established in Internal Control – Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.


Omaha, Nebraska

February 25, 2011



Table of Contents


and Subsidiaries


(dollars in millions)


     December 31,  
   2010      2009  



Insurance and Other:


Cash and cash equivalents

   $ 34,767       $ 28,223   



Fixed maturity securities

     33,803         35,729   

Equity securities

     59,819         56,562   


     19,333         29,440   


     20,917         14,792   


     7,101         6,147   

Property, plant and equipment

     15,741         15,720   


     27,891         27,614   


     13,529         13,070   
     232,901         227,297   

Railroad, Utilities and Energy:


Cash and cash equivalents

     2,557         429   

Property, plant and equipment

     77,385         30,936   


     20,084         5,334   


     13,579         8,072   
     113,605         44,771   

Finance and Financial Products:


Cash and cash equivalents

     903         1,906   

Investments in fixed maturity securities

     1,080         1,402   

Other investments

     3,676         3,160   

Loans and finance receivables

     15,226         13,989   


     1,031         1,024   


     3,807         3,570   
     25,723         25,051   
   $ 372,229       $ 297,119   



Insurance and Other:


Losses and loss adjustment expenses

   $ 60,075       $ 59,416   

Unearned premiums

     7,997         7,925   

Life, annuity and health insurance benefits

     8,565         5,228   

Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities

     15,826         15,530   

Notes payable and other borrowings

     12,471         4,561   
     104,934         92,660   

Railroad, Utilities and Energy:


Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities

     12,367         5,895   

Notes payable and other borrowings

     31,626         19,579   
     43,993         25,474   

Finance and Financial Products:


Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities

     1,168         937   

Derivative contract liabilities

     8,371         9,269   

Notes payable and other borrowings

     14,477         13,769   
     24,016         23,975   

Income taxes, principally deferred

     36,352         19,225   

Total liabilities

     209,295         161,334   

Shareholders’ equity:


Common stock

     8         8   

Capital in excess of par value

     37,533         27,074   

Accumulated other comprehensive income

     20,583         17,793   

Retained earnings

     99,194         86,227   

Berkshire Hathaway shareholders’ equity

     157,318         131,102   

Noncontrolling interests

     5,616         4,683   

Total shareholders’ equity

     162,934         135,785   
   $ 372,229       $ 297,119   

See accompanying Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements



Table of Contents


and Subsidiaries


(dollars in millions except per-share amounts)


     Year Ended December 31,  
   2010     2009     2008  



Insurance and Other:


Insurance premiums earned

   $ 30,749      $ 27,884      $ 25,525   

Sales and service revenues

     67,225        62,555        65,854   

Interest, dividend and other investment income

     5,215        5,531        5,140   

Investment gains/losses

     4,044        358        1,166   

Other-than-temporary impairment losses on investments

     (1,973     (3,155     (1,813
     105,260        93,173        95,872   

Railroad, Utilities and Energy:


Operating revenues

     26,186        11,204        12,668   


     178        239        1,303   
     26,364        11,443        13,971   

Finance and Financial Products:


Interest, dividend and other investment income

     1,683        1,600        1,616   

Investment gains/losses

     14        (40     7   

Derivative gains/losses

     261        3,624        (6,821


     2,603        2,693        3,141   
     4,561        7,877        (2,057
     136,185        112,493        107,786   

Costs and expenses:


Insurance and Other:


Insurance losses and loss adjustment expenses

     18,087        18,251        16,259   

Life, annuity and health insurance benefits

     4,453        1,937        1,942   

Insurance underwriting expenses

     6,196        6,236        4,634   

Cost of sales and services

     55,585        52,647        54,103   

Selling, general and administrative expenses

     7,704        8,117        8,052   

Interest expense

     278        189        212   
     92,303        87,377        85,202   

Railroad, Utilities and Energy:


Cost of sales and operating expenses

     19,637        8,739        9,840   

Interest expense

     1,577        1,176        1,168   
     21,214        9,915        11,008   

Finance and Financial Products:


Interest expense

     703        627        583   


     2,914        3,022        3,419   
     3,617        3,649        4,002   
     117,134        100,941        100,212   

Earnings before income taxes

     19,051        11,552        7,574   

Income tax expense

     5,607        3,538        1,978   

Earnings from equity method investments

     50        427        —     

Net earnings

     13,494        8,441        5,596   

Less: Earnings attributable to noncontrolling interests

     527        386        602   

Net earnings attributable to Berkshire Hathaway

   $ 12,967      $ 8,055      $ 4,994   

Average common shares outstanding *

     1,635,661        1,551,174        1,548,960   

Net earnings per share attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders *

   $ 7,928      $ 5,193      $ 3,224   


* Average shares outstanding include average Class A common shares and average Class B common shares determined on an equivalent Class A common stock basis. Net earnings per common share attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shown above represents net earnings per equivalent Class A common share. Net earnings per Class B common share is equal to one-fifteen-hundredth (1/1,500) of such amount or $5.29 per share for 2010, $3.46 per share for 2009 and $2.15 per share for 2008 after giving effect to the 50-for-1 Class B stock split that became effective on January 21, 2010. See Note 18.

See accompanying Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements



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and Subsidiaries


(dollars in millions)


     Year Ended December 31,  
   2010     2009     2008  

Cash flows from operating activities:


Net earnings

   $ 13,494      $ 8,441      $ 5,596   

Adjustments to reconcile net earnings to operating cash flows:


Investment (gains) losses and other-than-temporary impairment losses

     (2,085     2,837        640   


     4,279        3,127        2,810   


     255        (149     (1,248

Changes in operating assets and liabilities before business acquisitions:


Losses and loss adjustment expenses

     1,009        2,165        1,466   

Deferred charges reinsurance assumed

     147        (39     64   

Unearned premiums

     110        (21     1,311   

Receivables and originated loans

     (1,979     697        (2,222

Derivative contract assets and liabilities

     (880     (5,441     7,827   

Income taxes

     2,348        2,035        (2,057

Other assets and liabilities

     1,197        2,194        (2,935

Net cash flows from operating activities

     17,895        15,846        11,252   

Cash flows from investing activities:


Purchases of fixed maturity securities

     (9,819     (10,798     (35,615

Purchases of equity securities

     (4,265     (4,570     (10,140

Purchases of other investments

     —          (7,068     (14,452

Sales of fixed maturity securities

     5,435        4,338        14,796   

Redemptions and maturities of fixed maturity securities

     6,517        5,234        18,550   

Sales of equity securities

     5,886        5,626        6,840   

Purchases of loans and finance receivables

     (3,149     (854     (1,446

Principal collections on loans and finance receivables

     3,498        796        740   

Acquisitions of businesses, net of cash acquired

     (15,924     (108     (6,050

Purchases of property, plant and equipment

     (5,980     (4,937     (6,138


     (476     1,180        849   

Net cash flows from investing activities

     (18,277     (11,161     (32,066

Cash flows from financing activities:


Proceeds from borrowings of insurance and other businesses

     8,204        289        134   

Proceeds from borrowings of railroad, utilities and energy businesses

     1,731        1,241        2,147   

Proceeds from borrowings of finance businesses

     1,539        1,584        5,195   

Repayments of borrowings of insurance and other businesses

     (430     (746     (247

Repayments of borrowings of railroad, utilities and energy businesses

     (777     (444     (2,147

Repayments of borrowings of finance businesses

     (2,417     (396     (3,847

Changes in short term borrowings, net

     370        (885     1,183   

Acquisitions of noncontrolling interests and other

     (95     (410     (132

Net cash flows from financing activities

     8,125        233        2,286   

Effects of foreign currency exchange rate changes

     (74     101        (262

Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents

     7,669        5,019        (18,790

Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year

     30,558        25,539        44,329   

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year *

   $ 38,227      $ 30,558      $ 25,539   

* Cash and cash equivalents at end of year are comprised of the following:


Insurance and Other

   $ 34,767      $ 28,223      $ 24,356   

Railroad, Utilities and Energy

     2,557        429        280   

Finance and Financial Products

     903        1,906        903   
   $ 38,227      $ 30,558      $ 25,539   

See accompanying Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements



Table of Contents


and Subsidiaries


(dollars in millions)


     Berkshire Hathaway shareholders’ equity     Non-
   Common stock
and capital in
excess of par

Balance at December 31, 2007

   $ 26,960      $ 21,620      $ 72,153       $ 120,733      $ 2,668   

Net earnings

     —          —          4,994         4,994        602   

Other comprehensive income, net

     —          (17,267     —           (17,267     (255

Adoption of equity method

     —          (399     1,025         626        —     

Issuance of common stock and other transactions

     181        —          —           181        —     

Adoption of new accounting pronouncements

     —          —          —           —          128   

Changes in noncontrolling interests:


Business acquisitions

     —          —          —           —          1,568   

Interests acquired and other transactions

     —          —          —           —          (271

Balance at December 31, 2008

     27,141        3,954        78,172         109,267        4,440   

Net earnings

     —          —          8,055         8,055        386   

Other comprehensive income, net

     —          13,729        —           13,729        199   

Issuance of common stock and other transactions

     172        —          —           172        —     

Changes in noncontrolling interests:


Interests acquired and other transactions

     (231     110        —           (121     (342

Balance at December 31, 2009

     27,082        17,793        86,227         131,102        4,683   

Net earnings

     —          —          12,967         12,967        527   

Other comprehensive income, net

     —          2,789        —           2,789        9   

Issuance of common stock and other transactions

     11,096        —          —           11,096        —     

Changes in noncontrolling interests:


Interests acquired and other transactions

     (637     1        —           (636     397   

Balance at December 31, 2010

   $ 37,541      $ 20,583      $ 99,194       $ 157,318      $ 5,616   


(dollars in millions)


     2010     2009     2008  

Comprehensive income attributable to Berkshire Hathaway:


Net earnings

   $ 12,967      $ 8,055      $ 4,994   

Other comprehensive income:


Net change in unrealized appreciation of investments

     5,398        17,607        (23,342

Applicable income taxes

     (1,866     (6,263     8,257   

Reclassification of investment appreciation in net earnings

     (1,068     2,768        895   

Applicable income taxes

     374        (969     (313

Foreign currency translation

     (172     851        (2,140

Applicable income taxes

     (21     (17     118   

Prior service cost and actuarial gains/losses of defined benefit plans

     (76     (41     (1,071

Applicable income taxes

     25        (1     389   

Other, net

     195        (206     (60

Other comprehensive income, net

     2,789        13,729        (17,267

Comprehensive income attributable to Berkshire Hathaway

   $ 15,756      $ 21,784      $ (12,273

Comprehensive income of noncontrolling interests

   $ 536      $ 585      $ 347   

See accompanying Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements



Table of Contents


and Subsidiaries


December 31, 2010


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices


  (a) Nature of operations and basis of consolidation

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (“Berkshire”) is a holding company owning subsidiaries engaged in a number of diverse business activities, including property and casualty insurance and reinsurance, railroad, utilities and energy, finance, manufacturing, service and retailing. In these notes the terms “us,” “we,” or “our” refer to Berkshire and its consolidated subsidiaries. Further information regarding our reportable business segments is contained in Note 21. Significant business acquisitions completed over the past three years are discussed in Note 2.

The accompanying Consolidated Financial Statements include the accounts of Berkshire consolidated with the accounts of all subsidiaries and affiliates in which we hold a controlling financial interest as of the financial statement date. Normally a controlling financial interest reflects ownership of a majority of the voting interests. We consolidate a variable interest entity (“VIE”) when we possess both the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact its economic performance and we are either obligated to absorb the losses that could potentially be significant to the VIE or we hold the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.

Intercompany accounts and transactions have been eliminated. Certain amounts in prior year presentations have been reclassified to conform with the current year presentation.


  (b) Use of estimates in preparation of financial statements

The preparation of our Consolidated Financial Statements in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States (“GAAP”) requires us to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts of assets and liabilities at the date of the financial statements and the reported amounts of revenues and expenses during the period. In particular, estimates of unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses and related recoverables under reinsurance for property and casualty insurance are subject to considerable estimation error due to the inherent uncertainty in projecting ultimate claim amounts that will be settled over many years. In addition, estimates and assumptions associated with the amortization of deferred charges reinsurance assumed, determinations of fair values of certain financial instruments and evaluations of goodwill for impairment require considerable judgment. Actual results may differ from the estimates used in preparing our Consolidated Financial Statements.


  (c) Cash and cash equivalents

Cash equivalents consist of funds invested in U.S. Treasury Bills, money market accounts, demand deposits and other investments with a maturity of three months or less when purchased.


  (d) Investments

We determine the appropriate classification of investments in fixed maturity and equity securities at the acquisition date and re-evaluate the classification at each balance sheet date. Held-to-maturity investments are carried at amortized cost, reflecting the ability and intent to hold the securities to maturity. Trading investments are carried at fair value and include securities acquired with the intent to sell in the near term. All other securities are classified as available-for-sale and are carried at fair value with net unrealized gains or losses reported as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income.

We utilize the equity method of accounting with respect to investments when we possess the ability to exercise significant influence, but not control, over the operating and financial policies of the investee. The ability to exercise significant influence is presumed when an investor possesses more than 20% of the voting interests of the investee. This presumption may be overcome based on specific facts and circumstances that demonstrate that the ability to exercise significant influence is restricted. We apply the equity method to investments in common stock and to other investments when such other investments possess substantially identical subordinated interests to common stock. In applying the equity method with respect to investments previously accounted for at cost or fair value, the carrying value of the investment is adjusted on a step-by-step basis as if the equity method had been applied from the time the investment was first acquired.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)


  (d) Investments (Continued)


In applying the equity method, we record our investment at cost and subsequently increase or decrease the carrying amount of the investment by our proportionate share of the net earnings or losses and other comprehensive income of the investee. We record dividends or other equity distributions as reductions in the carrying value of the investment. In the event that net losses of the investee reduce the carrying amount to zero, additional net losses may be recorded if other investments in the investee are at-risk even if we have not committed to provide financial support to the investee. Such additional equity method losses, if any, are based upon the change in our claim on the investee’s book value.

Investment gains and losses arise when investments are sold (as determined on a specific identification basis) or are other-than-temporarily impaired. If a decline in the value of an investment below cost is deemed other than temporary, the cost of the investment is written down to fair value, with a corresponding charge to earnings. Factors considered in judging whether an impairment is other than temporary include: the financial condition, business prospects and creditworthiness of the issuer, the relative amount of the decline, our ability and intent to hold the investment until the fair value recovers and the length of time that fair value has been less than cost. With respect to an investment in a debt security, we recognize an other-than-temporary impairment if we (a) intend to sell or expect to be required to sell before amortized cost is recovered or (b) do not expect to ultimately recover the amortized cost basis even if we do not intend to sell the security. We recognize losses under (a) in earnings and under (b) we recognize the credit loss component in earnings and the difference between fair value and the amortized cost basis net of the credit loss in other comprehensive income.


  (e) Receivables, loans and finance receivables

Trade, premium and other receivables of the insurance and other businesses are stated at the outstanding principal amounts, net of estimated allowances for uncollectible balances. Allowances for uncollectible balances are provided when as of the balance sheet date it is probable counterparties will be unable to pay all amounts due based on the contractual terms and the loss amounts can be reasonably estimated. Receivables are generally written off against allowances after all reasonable collection efforts are exhausted.

Loans and finance receivables consist of consumer loans (primarily manufactured housing and other real estate loans) and commercial loans originated or purchased. Loans and finance receivables are stated at amortized cost based on our ability and intent to hold such loans and receivables to maturity and are stated net of allowances for uncollectible accounts. Amortized cost represents acquisition cost, plus or minus origination and commitment costs paid or fees received, which together with acquisition premiums or discounts, are deferred and amortized as yield adjustments over the life of the loan. Loans and finance receivables include loan securitizations issued when we have the power to direct and the right to receive residual returns. Substantially all of our consumer loans are secured by real or personal property.

Allowances for credit losses from manufactured housing and other real estate loans include estimates of losses on loans currently in foreclosure and losses on loans not currently in foreclosure. Estimates of losses on loans in foreclosure are based on historical experience and collateral recovery rates. Estimates of losses on loans not currently in foreclosure consider historical default, collateral recovery rates and existing economic conditions. Allowances for credit losses also incorporate the historical average time elapsed from the last payment until foreclosure.

Loans in which payments are delinquent (with no grace period) are considered past due. Loans which are over 90 days past due, in foreclosure, or where borrowers are in bankruptcy, are placed on nonaccrual status and interest previously accrued but not collected is reversed. Subsequent amounts received on the loans are first applied to the principal and interest owed for the most delinquent amount. Interest income accruals are resumed once a loan is less than 90 days delinquent.

Loans in the foreclosure process are considered non-performing. Once a loan is in foreclosure, interest income is not recognized unless the foreclosure is cured or the loan is modified. Once a modification is complete, interest income is recognized based on the terms of the new loan. Loans that have gone through foreclosure are charged off when the collateral is sold. Loans not in foreclosure are evaluated for charge off based on individual circumstances that indicate future collectability of the loan, including the condition of the collateral securing the loan.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)


  (f) Derivatives

We carry derivative contracts at estimated fair value in the accompanying Consolidated Balance Sheets. Such balances reflect reductions permitted under master netting agreements with counterparties. The changes in fair value of derivative contracts that do not qualify as hedging instruments for financial reporting purposes are recorded in earnings as derivative gains/losses.

Cash collateral received from or paid to counterparties to secure derivative contract assets or liabilities is included in other liabilities or assets. Securities received from counterparties as collateral are not recorded as assets and securities delivered to counterparties as collateral continue to be reflected as assets in our Consolidated Balance Sheets.


  (g) Fair value measurements

As defined under GAAP, fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability between market participants in the principal market or in the most advantageous market when no principal market exists. Adjustments to transaction prices or quoted market prices may be required in illiquid or disorderly markets in order to estimate fair value. Different valuation techniques may be appropriate under the circumstances to determine the value that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction. Market participants are assumed to be independent, knowledgeable, able and willing to transact an exchange and not under duress. Nonperformance or credit risk is considered in determining the fair value of liabilities. Considerable judgment may be required in interpreting market data used to develop the estimates of fair value. Accordingly, estimates of fair value presented herein are not necessarily indicative of the amounts that could be realized in a current or future market exchange.


  (h) Inventories

Inventories consist of manufactured goods and goods acquired for resale. Manufactured inventory costs include raw materials, direct and indirect labor and factory overhead. Inventories are stated at the lower of cost or market. As of December 31, 2010, approximately 39% of the total inventory cost was determined using the last-in-first-out (“LIFO”) method, 32% using the first-in-first-out (“FIFO”) method, with the remainder using the specific identification method or average cost methods. With respect to inventories carried at LIFO cost, the aggregate difference in value between LIFO cost and cost determined under FIFO methods was $637 million and $575 million as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.


  (i) Property, plant and equipment

Additions to property, plant and equipment are recorded at cost. The cost of major additions and betterments are capitalized, while the cost of replacements, maintenance and repairs, that do not improve or extend the useful lives of the related assets are expensed as incurred. Interest over the construction period is capitalized as a component of cost of constructed assets. The cost of constructed assets of certain of our regulated utility and energy subsidiaries that are subject to ASC 980 Regulated Operations also includes an equity allowance for funds used during construction. Also see Note 1(p).

Depreciation is provided principally on the straight-line method over estimated useful lives. Depreciation of assets of regulated utility and energy subsidiaries is provided over recovery periods based on composite asset class lives. Railroad properties are depreciated using the group method in which a single depreciation rate is applied to the gross investment in a particular class of property, despite differences in the service life or salvage value of individual property units within the same class.

We evaluate property, plant and equipment for impairment when events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying value of such assets may not be recoverable or the assets are being held for sale. Upon the occurrence of a triggering event, we review the asset to assess whether the estimated undiscounted cash flows expected from the use of the asset plus residual value from the ultimate disposal exceeds the carrying value of the asset. If the carrying value exceeds the estimated recoverable amounts, we write down the asset to the estimated fair value. Impairment losses are reflected in the Consolidated Statements of Earnings, except with respect to impairments of assets of certain domestic regulated utility and energy subsidiaries where impairment losses are offset by the establishment of a regulatory asset to the extent recovery in future rates is probable.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)


  (i) Property, plant and equipment (Continued)


Our railroad business is very capital intensive and its large base of homogenous, network-type assets turns over on a continuous basis. Each year, a capital program is developed for the replacement of assets and for the acquisition or construction of assets to enhance the efficiency of operations, gain strategic benefit or provide new service offerings to customers. Assets purchased or constructed throughout the year are capitalized if they meet applicable minimum units of property criteria. Normal repairs and maintenance are charged to operating expense as incurred, while costs incurred that extend the useful life of an asset, improve the safety of our operations, or improve operating efficiency are capitalized. Rail grinding costs are expensed as incurred.


  (j) Goodwill

Goodwill represents the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable net assets acquired in business acquisitions. We evaluate goodwill for impairment at least annually. Evaluating goodwill for impairment involves a two-step process. The first step is to estimate the fair value of the reporting unit. There are several methods that may be used to estimate a reporting unit’s fair value, including market quotations, asset and liability fair values and other valuation techniques, including, but not limited to, discounted projected future net earnings or net cash flows and multiples of earnings. If the carrying amount of a reporting unit, including goodwill, exceeds the estimated fair value, a second step is performed. Under the second step, the identifiable assets and liabilities of the reporting unit are estimated at fair value as of the current testing date. The excess of the estimated fair value of the reporting unit over the current estimated fair value of net assets establishes the implied value of goodwill. The excess of the recorded goodwill over the implied goodwill value is charged to earnings as an impairment loss. A significant amount of judgment is required in estimating the fair value of the reporting unit and performing goodwill impairment tests.


  (k) Revenue recognition

Insurance premiums for prospective property/casualty and health insurance and reinsurance are earned over the loss exposure or coverage period, in proportion to the level of protection provided. In most cases, premiums are recognized as revenues ratably over the term of the contract with unearned premiums computed on a monthly or daily pro rata basis. Premiums for retroactive reinsurance property/casualty policies are earned at the inception of the contracts, as all of the underlying loss events covered by these policies occurred in the past. Premiums for life reinsurance contracts are earned when due. Premiums earned are stated net of amounts ceded to reinsurers. Premiums are estimated with respect to certain reinsurance contracts where reports from ceding companies for the period are not contractually due until after the balance sheet date. For contracts containing experience rating provisions, premiums are based upon estimated loss experience under the contract.

Sales revenues derive from the sales of manufactured products and goods acquired for resale. Revenues from sales are recognized upon passage of title to the customer, which generally coincides with customer pickup, product delivery or acceptance, depending on terms of the sales arrangement.

Service revenues are recognized as the services are performed. Services provided pursuant to a contract are either recognized over the contract period or upon completion of the elements specified in the contract depending on the terms of the contract. Revenues related to the sales of fractional ownership interests in aircraft are recognized ratably over the term of the related management services agreement as the transfer of ownership interest in the aircraft is inseparable from the management services agreement.

Interest income from investments in fixed maturity securities and loans is earned under the constant yield method and includes accrual of interest due under terms of the agreement as well as amortization of acquisition premiums, accruable discounts and capitalized loan origination fees, as applicable. In determining the constant yield for mortgage-backed securities, anticipated counterparty prepayments are estimated and evaluated periodically. Dividends from equity securities are recognized when earned, which is on the ex-dividend date or the declaration date, when there is no ex-dividend date.

Operating revenue of utilities and energy businesses resulting from the distribution and sale of natural gas and electricity to customers is recognized when the service is rendered or the energy is delivered. Amounts recognized include unbilled as well as billed amounts. Rates charged are generally subject to federal and state regulation or established under contractual arrangements. When preliminary rates are permitted to be billed prior to final approval by the applicable regulator, certain revenue collected may be subject to refund and a liability for estimated refunds is accrued.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)


  (k) Revenue recognition (Continued)


Railroad transportation revenues are recognized based upon the proportion of service provided as of the balance sheet date. Customer incentives, which are primarily provided for shipping a specified cumulative volume or shipping to/from specific locations, are recorded as a reduction to revenue on a pro-rata basis based on actual or projected future customer shipments. When using projected shipments, we rely on historic trends as well as economic and other indicators to estimate the liability for customer incentives.


  (l) Losses and loss adjustment expenses

Liabilities for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses represent estimated claim and claim settlement costs of property/casualty insurance and reinsurance contracts issued by our insurance subsidiaries with respect to losses that have occurred as of the balance sheet date. The liabilities for losses and loss adjustment expenses are recorded at the estimated ultimate payment amounts, except that amounts arising from certain workers’ compensation reinsurance business are discounted as discussed below. Estimated ultimate payment amounts are based upon (1) individual case estimates, (2) reports of losses from policyholders and (3) estimates of incurred but not reported losses.

Provisions for losses and loss adjustment expenses are charged to earnings after deducting amounts recovered and estimates of amounts ceded under reinsurance contracts. Reinsurance contracts do not relieve the ceding company of its obligations to indemnify policyholders with respect to the underlying insurance and reinsurance contracts.

The estimated liabilities of workers’ compensation claims assumed under certain reinsurance contracts are carried at discounted amounts. Discounted amounts are based upon an annual discount rate of 4.5% for claims arising prior to January 1, 2003 and 1% for claims arising thereafter, consistent with discount rates used under insurance statutory accounting principles. The change in such reserve discounts, including the periodic discount accretion is included in earnings as a component of losses and loss adjustment expenses.


  (m) Deferred charges reinsurance assumed

Estimated liabilities for claims and claim costs in excess of the consideration received with respect to retroactive property and casualty reinsurance contracts that provide for indemnification of insurance risk are established as deferred charges at inception of such contracts. Deferred charges are subsequently amortized using the interest method over the expected claim settlement periods. Changes to the estimated timing or amount of loss payments produce changes in periodic amortization. Changes in such estimates are applied retrospectively and are included in insurance losses and loss adjustment expenses in the period of the change. The unamortized balances of deferred charges reinsurance assumed were $3,810 million and $3,957 million at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.


  (n) Insurance premium acquisition costs

Costs that vary with and are related to the issuance of insurance policies are deferred, subject to ultimate recoverability, and are charged to underwriting expenses as the related premiums are earned. Acquisition costs consist of commissions, premium taxes, advertising and certain other costs. The recoverability of premium acquisition costs generally reflects anticipation of investment income. The unamortized balances of deferred premium acquisition costs are included in other assets and were $1,768 million and $1,770 million at December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively.


  (p) Regulated utilities and energy businesses

Certain domestic energy subsidiaries prepare their financial statements in accordance with ASC 980 Regulated Operations, reflecting the economic effects from the ability to recover certain costs from customers and the requirement to return revenues to customers in the future through the regulated rate-setting process. Accordingly, certain costs are deferred as regulatory assets and obligations are accrued as regulatory liabilities which will be amortized over various future periods. At December 31, 2010, the Consolidated Balance Sheet includes $2,497 million in regulatory assets and $1,664 million in regulatory liabilities. At December 31, 2009, the Consolidated Balance Sheet includes $2,093 million in regulatory assets and $1,603 million in regulatory liabilities. Regulatory assets and liabilities are components of other assets and other liabilities of utilities and energy businesses.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)


  (p) Regulated utilities and energy businesses (Continued)


Regulatory assets and liabilities are continually assessed for probable future inclusion in regulatory rates by considering factors such as applicable regulatory or legislative changes and recent rate orders received by other regulated entities. If future inclusion in regulatory rates ceases to be probable, the amount no longer probable of inclusion in regulatory rates is charged to earnings or reflected as an adjustment to rates.


  (q) Life, annuity and health insurance benefits

The liability for insurance benefits under life contracts has been computed based upon estimated future investment yields, expected mortality, morbidity, and lapse or withdrawal rates and reflect estimates for future premiums and expenses under the contracts. These assumptions, as applicable, also include a margin for adverse deviation and may vary with the characteristics of the reinsurance contract’s date of issuance, policy duration and country of risk. The interest rate assumptions used may vary by reinsurance contract or jurisdiction and generally range from approximately 3% to 6%. Annuity contracts are discounted based on the implicit rate of return as of the inception of the contracts and such interest rates range from approximately 1% to 7%.


  (r) Foreign currency

The accounts of our non-U.S. based subsidiaries are measured in most instances using the local currency of the subsidiary as the functional currency. Revenues and expenses of these businesses are generally translated into U.S. Dollars at the average exchange rate for the period. Assets and liabilities are translated at the exchange rate as of the end of the reporting period. Gains or losses from translating the financial statements of foreign-based operations are included in shareholders’ equity as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income. Gains and losses arising from transactions denominated in a currency other than the functional currency of the entity that is party to the transaction are included in earnings.


  (s) Income taxes

We file a consolidated federal income tax return in the United States, which includes our eligible subsidiaries. In addition, we file income tax returns in state, local and foreign jurisdictions as applicable. Provisions for current income tax liabilities are calculated and accrued on income and expense amounts expected to be included in the income tax returns for the current year.

Deferred income taxes are calculated under the liability method. Deferred income tax assets and liabilities are based on differences between the financial statement and tax basis of assets and liabilities at the enacted tax rates. Changes in deferred income tax assets and liabilities that are associated with components of other comprehensive income are charged or credited directly to other comprehensive income. Otherwise, changes in deferred income tax assets and liabilities are included as a component of income tax expense. Changes in deferred income tax assets and liabilities attributable to changes in enacted tax rates are charged or credited to income tax expense in the period of enactment. Valuation allowances are established for certain deferred tax assets where realization is not likely.

Assets and liabilities are established for uncertain tax positions taken or positions expected to be taken in income tax returns when such positions are judged to not meet the “more-likely-than-not” threshold based on the technical merits of the positions. Estimated interest and penalties related to uncertain tax positions are generally included as a component of income tax expense.


  (t) New accounting pronouncements

We adopted FASB Accounting Standards Updates (“ASU”) 2009-16 and ASU 2009-17 as of January 1, 2010. ASU 2009-16 eliminated the concept of a qualifying special-purpose entity (“QSPE”) and the exemption of QSPEs from previous consolidation guidance and also modified the criteria for derecognizing financial assets by transferors. ASU 2009-17 amended the standards related to consolidation of variable interest entities. ASU 2009-17 included new criteria for determining the primary beneficiary of VIEs and increased the frequency in which reassessments must be made to determine the primary beneficiary of VIEs. The guidance in these standards is applied prospectively except that upon the adoption of ASU 2009-17 we reevaluated VIEs for purposes of determining whether or not those entities should be included in our Consolidated Financial Statements based on the new guidance. See Notes 7 and 14 for information concerning the most significant impact of adopting these pronouncements.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)


  (t) New accounting pronouncements (Continued)


In January 2010, the FASB issued ASU 2010-06, “Improving Disclosures About Fair Value Measurements.” ASU 2010-06 requires the separate disclosure of significant transfers into and out of the Level 1 and Level 2 categories; requires fair value measurement disclosures for each class of assets and liabilities; and requires disclosures about valuation techniques and inputs used in Level 2 and Level 3 fair value measurements. These disclosure requirements became effective at the beginning of 2010. In addition, effective in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2010, ASU 2010-06 also requires Level 3 disclosures of activity on a gross rather than a net basis. We do not anticipate that the remaining disclosures under ASU 2010-06 will have a material impact on our Consolidated Financial Statements.

In July 2010, the FASB issued ASU 2010-20, “Disclosures about the Credit Quality of Financing Receivables and the Allowance for Credit Losses.” ASU 2010-20 requires increased disclosures about the credit quality of financing receivables and allowances for credit losses, including disclosure about credit quality indicators, past due information and modifications of finance receivables. The guidance regarding end of period reporting is effective for reporting periods ending after December 15, 2010, while guidance about activity during the reporting period is effective for reporting periods beginning after December 15, 2010, except for guidance regarding loan modifications, which has been delayed. We do not anticipate that the adoption of ASU 2010-20 will have a material impact on our Consolidated Financial Statements.

In October 2010, the FASB issued ASU 2010-26, “Accounting for Costs Associated with Acquiring or Renewing Insurance Contracts.” ASU 2010-26 modifies the types of costs incurred by insurance entities that are deferred in the acquiring or renewing of insurance contracts. ASU 2010-26 requires that only direct incremental costs related to successful efforts are capitalized. Capitalized costs may include certain advertising costs which are allowed to be capitalized if the primary purpose of the advertising is to elicit sales to customers proven to have responded directly to the advertising and the probable future revenues generated from the advertising are proven to be in excess of expected future costs to be incurred in realizing those revenues. ASU 2010-26 is effective for fiscal years and interim periods beginning after December 15, 2011 and may be applied on a prospective or retrospective basis. We are evaluating the effect that the adoption of ASU 2010-26 will have on our Consolidated Financial Statements.

In December 2010, the FASB issued ASU 2010-28, “When to Perform Step 2 of the Goodwill Impairment Test for Reporting Units with Zero or Negative Carrying Amounts.” ASU 2010-28 modifies Step 1 of the goodwill impairment test for reporting units with zero or negative carrying amounts. For those reporting units, Step 2 of the goodwill impairment test is required if it is more likely than not that a goodwill impairment exists, after considering whether there are any adverse qualitative factors indicating that an impairment may exist. ASU 2010-28 is effective prospectively for fiscal years and interim periods beginning after December 15, 2011. We do not anticipate the adoption of ASU 2010-28 will have a material impact on our Consolidated Financial Statements.


(2) Significant business acquisitions

Our long-held acquisition strategy is to purchase businesses with consistent earning power, good returns on equity and able and honest management at sensible prices.

On February 12, 2010, we acquired all of the outstanding common stock of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation that we did not already own (about 264.5 million shares or 77.5%) for aggregate consideration of $26.5 billion that consisted of cash of approximately $15.9 billion with the remainder in Berkshire common stock (80,931 Class A shares and 20,976,621 Class B shares). Approximately 50% of the cash component was funded with existing cash balances and the remaining 50% was funded with proceeds from debt issued by Berkshire. The acquisition was completed through the merger of a wholly-owned merger subsidiary (a Delaware limited liability company) and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation. The merger subsidiary was the surviving entity and was renamed Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (“BNSF”). BNSF is based in Fort Worth, Texas, and through BNSF Railway Company operates one of the largest railroad systems in North America with approximately 32,000 route miles (including 23,000 route miles of track owned by BNSF) of track in 28 states and two Canadian provinces.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(2) Significant business acquisitions (Continued)


Prior to February 12, 2010, we owned 76.8 million shares of BNSF (22.5% of the outstanding shares), which were acquired between August 2006 and January 2009. We accounted for those shares pursuant to the equity method and as of February 12, 2010, our investment had a carrying value of $6.6 billion. We are accounting for the acquisition of BNSF pursuant to the acquisition method under Accounting Standards Codification Section 805 Business Combinations (“ASC 805”). Upon completion of the acquisition of the remaining BNSF shares, we were required under ASC 805 to re-measure our previously owned investment in BNSF at fair value as of the acquisition date. In the first quarter of 2010, we recognized a one-time holding gain of approximately $1.0 billion for the difference between the fair value of the BNSF shares and our carrying value under the equity method.

The allocation of the aggregate $34.5 billion purchase price (including the fair value of the previously owned shares of BNSF and the value of certain BNSF outstanding equity awards that were converted into Berkshire Class B equity awards on the acquisition date) to BNSF’s assets and liabilities is summarized below (in millions):




Cash and cash equivalents

   $ 971   

Property, plant and equipment





   $ 65,463   

Liabilities and Net assets acquired:


Accounts payable and other liabilities

   $ 6,623   

Notes payable and other borrowings


Income taxes, principally deferred


Net assets acquired

   $ 65,463   


BNSF’s financial statements are included in our Consolidated Financial Statements beginning as of February 13, 2010. The following table sets forth certain unaudited pro forma consolidated earnings data for the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, as if the BNSF acquisition was consummated on the same terms at the beginning of 2010 and 2009. Amounts are in millions, except earnings per share.


     2010      2009  

Total revenues

   $ 138,004       $ 126,745   

Net earnings attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

     13,213         9,525   

Earnings per equivalent Class A common share attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

     8,024         5,786   

We had no significant business acquisitions in 2009. During 2008, we acquired approximately 64% of the outstanding common stock of Marmon Holdings, Inc. (“Marmon”), a private company owned by trusts for the benefit of members of the Pritzker Family of Chicago, for approximately $4.8 billion in the aggregate. Marmon is an international association of approximately 130 manufacturing and service businesses that operate independently within diverse business sectors. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, we will acquire the remaining equity interests in Marmon between 2011 and 2014 for consideration to be based on the earnings of Marmon. We also acquired several other relatively small businesses during 2008. Consideration paid for all businesses acquired in 2008 was approximately $6.1 billion.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(3) Investments in fixed maturity securities

Investments in securities with fixed maturities as of December 31, 2010 and 2009 are summarized below (in millions).



December 31, 2010


U.S. Treasury, U.S. government corporations and agencies

   $ 2,151       $ 48       $ (2   $ 2,197   

States, municipalities and political subdivisions

     3,356         225         —          3,581   

Foreign governments

     11,721         242         (51     11,912   

Corporate bonds

     11,773         2,304         (23     14,054   

Mortgage-backed securities

     2,838         312         (11     3,139   
   $ 31,839       $ 3,131       $ (87   $ 34,883   

Insurance and other

   $ 30,862       $ 3,028       $ (87   $ 33,803   

Finance and financial products

     977         103         —          1,080   
   $ 31,839       $ 3,131       $ (87   $ 34,883   

December 31, 2009


U.S. Treasury, U.S. government corporations and agencies

   $ 2,362       $ 46       $ (1   $ 2,407   

States, municipalities and political subdivisions

     3,689         275         (1     3,963   

Foreign governments

     11,518         368         (42     11,844   

Corporate bonds

     13,094         2,080         (502     14,672   

Mortgage-backed securities

     3,961         310         (26     4,245   
   $ 34,624       $ 3,079       $ (572   $ 37,131   

Insurance and other

   $ 33,317       $ 2,984       $ (572   $ 35,729   

Finance and financial products

     1,307         95         —          1,402   
   $ 34,624       $ 3,079       $ (572   $ 37,131   

Unrealized losses include $24 million at December 31, 2010 and $471 million at December 31, 2009, related to securities that have been in an unrealized loss position for 12 months or more. During the fourth quarter of 2010, we recorded other-than-temporary impairment charges of $1,020 million with respect to certain fixed maturity securities where we concluded that we were unlikely to receive all remaining contractual principal and interest amounts when due. These securities had been in an unrealized loss position for more than two years.

The amortized cost and estimated fair value of securities with fixed maturities at December 31, 2010 are summarized below by contractual maturity dates. Actual maturities will differ from contractual maturities because issuers of certain of the securities retain early call or prepayment rights. Amounts are in millions.


     Due in one
year or  less
     Due after one
year  through
five years
     Due after five
years  through
ten years
     Due after
ten years

Amortized cost

   $ 7,095       $ 14,734       $ 4,448       $ 2,724       $ 2,838       $ 31,839   

Fair value

     7,231         16,146         5,091         3,276         3,139         34,883   



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(4) Investments in equity securities

Investments in equity securities as of December 31, 2010 and 2009 are summarized below (in millions).


     Cost Basis      Unrealized

December 31, 2010


American Express Company

   $ 1,287       $ 5,220       $ —        $ 6,507   

The Coca-Cola Company

     1,299         11,855         —          13,154   

The Procter & Gamble Company

     4,321         336         —          4,657   

Wells Fargo & Company

     8,015         3,521         (413     11,123   


     20,622         5,709         (259     26,072   
   $ 35,544       $ 26,641       $ (672   $ 61,513   

Insurance and other

   $ 34,875       $ 25,616       $ (672   $ 59,819   

Railroad, utilities and energy *

     232         950         —          1,182   

Finance and financial products *

     437         75         —          512   
   $ 35,544       $ 26,641       $ (672   $ 61,513   

December 31, 2009


American Express Company

   $ 1,287       $ 4,856       $ —        $ 6,143   

The Coca-Cola Company

     1,299         10,101         —          11,400   

The Procter & Gamble Company

     4,962         78         —          5,040   

Wells Fargo & Company

     7,394         2,721         (1,094     9,021   


     22,265         7,118         (1,953     27,430   
   $ 37,207       $ 24,874       $ (3,047   $ 59,034   

Insurance and other

   $ 36,538       $ 23,070       $ (3,046   $ 56,562   

Railroad, utilities and energy *

     232         1,754         —          1,986   

Finance and financial products *

     437         50         (1     486   
   $ 37,207       $ 24,874       $ (3,047   $ 59,034   


* Included in Other assets.

Unrealized losses of equity investments at December 31, 2010 that were in a continuous loss position for more than twelve months and for which other-than-temporary impairment charges were not recorded were $531 million, including $384 million related to Wells Fargo & Company. As of December 31, 2009, unrealized losses over one year in duration were approximately $2.7 billion, including $832 million related to Wells Fargo & Company. As of December 31, 2010, such losses generally ranged between 3% and 15% of the original cost of the related individual securities. We believe that the impairment of each of the individual securities that have been in an unrealized loss position over twelve months as of December 31, 2010 is temporary. Our belief is based on (a) our ability and current intent to hold the securities to recovery; (b) our assessment that the underlying business and financial condition of the issuers improved over the past year and that such conditions are currently favorable; (c) our opinion that the relative price declines are not significant; (d) the fact that the market prices of these issuers have increased over the past year; and (e) our belief that it is reasonably possible that market prices will increase to and exceed our cost in a relatively short period of time. Changes in market conditions and other facts and circumstances may change the business prospects of these issuers as well as our ability and current intent to hold these securities until the prices recover.

During the fourth quarter of 2010, we recorded other-than-temporary impairment losses of $938 million related to certain other equity securities. These securities had been in unrealized loss positions for over two years. The amount of the impairments averaged about 20% of the original cost of each security. Other-than-temporary impairment losses result in a reduction of the cost basis of the investment but not the fair value. Accordingly, such losses that are included in earnings are offset by a corresponding credit to other comprehensive income.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(5) Other investments

Other investments include fixed maturity and equity securities of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“GS”), General Electric Company (“GE”), Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company (“Wrigley”), Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. (“Swiss Re”) and The Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”). As of December 31, 2009, we also owned 22.5% of BNSF’s outstanding common stock, which we accounted for pursuant to the equity method and included in other investments of insurance and other businesses in our Consolidated Balance Sheet. Upon acquiring all remaining outstanding shares of BNSF on February 12, 2010, we discontinued using the equity method and began consolidating the accounts of BNSF. See Note 2. A summary of other investments follows (in millions).


     Cost      Unrealized

December 31, 2010


Other fixed maturity and equity securities:


Insurance and other

   $ 15,700       $ 4,758       $ 20,458       $ 19,333   

Finance and financial products

     2,742         947         3,689         3,676   
   $ 18,442       $ 5,705       $ 24,147       $ 23,009   

December 31, 2009


Other fixed maturity and equity securities:


Insurance and other

   $ 18,347       $ 5,451       $ 23,798       $ 22,854   

Finance and financial products

     2,742         428         3,170         3,160   

Equity method-BNSF

     5,851         1,721         7,572         6,586   
   $ 26,940       $ 7,600       $ 34,540       $ 32,600   

We own 50,000 shares of 10% Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock of GS (“GS Preferred”) and warrants to purchase 43,478,260 shares of common stock of GS (“GS Warrants”) which we acquired in 2008 for a combined cost of $5 billion. The GS Preferred may be redeemed at any time by GS at a price of $110,000 per share ($5.5 billion in aggregate). The GS Warrants expire in 2013 and can be exercised for an additional aggregate cost of $5 billion ($115/share). In 2008, we also acquired 30,000 shares of 10% Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock of GE (“GE Preferred”) and warrants to purchase 134,831,460 shares of common stock of GE (“GE Warrants”) for a combined cost of $3 billion. The GE Preferred may be redeemed by GE beginning in October 2011 at a price of $110,000 per share ($3.3 billion in aggregate). The GE Warrants expire in 2013 and can be exercised for an additional aggregate cost of $3 billion ($22.25/share).

We own $4.4 billion par amount of 11.45% Wrigley subordinated notes due in 2018 and $2.1 billion of 5% Wrigley preferred stock, which we acquired in 2008. In December 2009, we also acquired $1.0 billion par amount of Wrigley senior notes due in 2013 and 2014. The Wrigley subordinated and senior notes are classified as held-to-maturity and we carry these investments at cost, adjusted for foreign currency exchange rate changes that apply to certain of the senior notes. We carry the Wrigley preferred stock at fair value classified as available-for-sale.

We own 3,000,000 shares of Series A Cumulative Convertible Perpetual Preferred Stock of Dow (“Dow Preferred”), which we acquired in 2009 for a cost of $3 billion. Under certain conditions, each share of the Dow Preferred is convertible into 24.201 shares of Dow common stock. Beginning in April 2014, if Dow’s common stock price exceeds $53.72 per share for any 20 trading days in a consecutive 30-day window, Dow, at its option, at any time, in whole or in part, may convert the Dow Preferred into Dow common stock at the then applicable conversion rate. The Dow Preferred is entitled to dividends at a rate of 8.5% per annum.

In 2009, we also acquired a 12% convertible perpetual capital instrument issued by Swiss Re at a cost of $2.7 billion. The instrument had a face amount of 3 billion Swiss Francs (“CHF”). The terms of the instrument allowed Swiss Re to redeem at its option the instrument under certain conditions. On November 3, 2010, we entered into an agreement with Swiss Re regarding the redemption of the instrument in exchange for aggregate consideration of approximately CHF 3.9 billion of which CHF 180 million was received on November 25, 2010 with the remainder to be paid to us in 2011. As of December 31, 2010, the amount due (and subsequently received on January 10, 2011) was classified in our Consolidated Balance Sheet as a component of receivables of insurance and other businesses.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(6) Investment gains/losses

Investment gains/losses are summarized below (in millions).


     2010     2009     2008  

Fixed maturity securities


Gross gains from sales and other disposals

   $ 720      $ 357      $ 212   

Gross losses from sales and other disposals

     (16     (54     (20

Equity and other securities


Gross gains from sales and other disposals

     2,603        701        1,256   

Gross losses from sales

     (266     (617     (530


     1,017     (69     255   
   $ 4,058      $ 318      $ 1,173   


* Includes a one-time holding gain of $979 million related to the BNSF acquisition. See note 2.

Net investment gains/losses are reflected in the Consolidated Statements of Earnings as follows.


Insurance and other

   $ 4,044       $ 358      $ 1,166   

Finance and financial products

     14         (40     7   
   $ 4,058       $ 318      $ 1,173   


(7) Receivables

Receivables of insurance and other businesses are comprised of the following (in millions).


     2010     2009  

Insurance premiums receivable

   $ 6,342      $ 5,295   

Reinsurance recoverable on unpaid losses

     2,735        2,922   

Trade and other receivables

     12,223        6,977   

Allowances for uncollectible accounts

     (383     (402
   $ 20,917      $ 14,792   

As of December 31, 2010, trade and other receivables included approximately $3.9 billion (CHF 3.7 billion) related to the redemption of the Swiss Re convertible capital instrument. See Note 5.

Loans and finance receivables of finance and financial products businesses are comprised of the following (in millions).


     2010     2009  

Consumer installment loans and finance receivables

   $ 14,042      $ 12,779   

Commercial loans and finance receivables

     1,557        1,558   

Allowances for uncollectible loans

     (373     (348
   $ 15,226      $ 13,989   

Consumer installment loans receivable increased by approximately $1.5 billion as of January 1, 2010 due to the adoption of ASU 2009-17. As of December 31, 2010, the outstanding balance of such loans was approximately $1.3 billion.

Allowances for uncollectible loans primarily relate to consumer installment loans. Provisions for consumer loan losses were $343 million in 2010 and $380 million in 2009. Loan charge-offs were $349 million in 2010 and $335 million in 2009. Consumer loan amounts are net of acquisition discounts of $580 million at December 31, 2010 and $594 million at December 31, 2009. At December 31, 2010, approximately 96% of consumer installment loan balances were evaluated collectively for impairment whereas about 91% of commercial loan balances were evaluated individually for impairment.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(7) Receivables (Continued)


As a part of the evaluation process, credit quality indicators are reviewed and loans are designated as performing or non-performing. At December 31, 2010, approximately 98% of consumer installment and commercial loan balances were determined to be performing and approximately 93% of those balances were current as to payment status.


(8) Inventories

Inventories are comprised of the following (in millions).


     2010      2009  

Raw materials

   $ 1,066       $ 908   

Work in process and other

     509         438   

Finished manufactured goods

     2,180         1,975   

Goods acquired for resale

     3,346         2,826   
   $ 7,101       $ 6,147   


(9) Goodwill and other intangible assets

A reconciliation of the change in the carrying value of goodwill is as follows (in millions).


     2010      2009  

Balance at beginning of year

   $ 33,972       $ 33,781   

Acquisition of BNSF

     14,803         —     


     231         191   

Balance at end of year

   $ 49,006       $ 33,972   

Intangible assets other than goodwill are included in other assets and are summarized as follows (in millions).


     2010      2009  
     Gross carrying
     Gross carrying

Insurance and other

   $ 6,944       $ 1,816       $ 6,334       $ 1,632   

Railroad, utilities and energy

     2,082         306         76         24   
   $ 9,026       $ 2,122       $ 6,410       $ 1,656   

Trademarks and tradenames

   $ 2,027       $ 166       $ 2,013       $ 114   

Patents and technology

     2,922         1,013         1,656         808   

Customer relationships

     2,676         612         2,080         426   


     1,401         331         661         308   
   $ 9,026       $ 2,122       $ 6,410       $ 1,656   

Intangible assets with definite lives are amortized based on the estimated pattern in which the economic benefits are expected to be consumed or on a straight-line basis over their estimated economic lives. Amortization expense was $692 million in 2010, $414 million in 2009 and $362 million in 2008. Estimated amortization expense over the next five years is as follows (in millions): 2011 – $720; 2012 – $700; 2013 – $681; 2014 – $632; and 2015 – $345. Intangible assets with indefinite lives as of December 31, 2010 and 2009 were $1,635 million and $1,127 million, respectively. Intangible assets are reviewed for impairment when events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount may not be recoverable.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(10) Property, plant and equipment

Property, plant and equipment of our insurance and other businesses is comprised of the following (in millions).


     Ranges of
estimated  useful life
     2010     2009  


     —        $ 744      $ 740   

Buildings and improvements

     3 – 40 years         4,661        4,606   

Machinery and equipment

     3 – 25 years         11,573        10,845   

Furniture, fixtures and other

     3 – 20 years         1,932        1,595   

Assets held for lease

     12 –30 years         5,832        5,706   
        24,742        23,492   

Accumulated depreciation

        (9,001     (7,772
      $ 15,741      $ 15,720   

Assets held for lease consist primarily of railroad tank cars, intermodal tank containers and other equipment in the transportation and equipment services businesses of Marmon. As of December 31, 2010, the minimum future lease rentals to be received on the equipment lease fleet (including rail cars leased from others) were as follows (in millions): 2011 – $608; 2012 – $457; 2013 – $310; 2014 – $198; 2015 – $125; and thereafter – $243.

Property, plant and equipment of our railroad, utilities and energy businesses is comprised of the following (in millions).


     Ranges of
estimated  useful life
     2010     2009  




     —        $ 5,901      $ —     

Track structure and other roadway

     5 – 100 years         35,463        —     

Locomotives, freight cars and other equipment

     1 – 37 years         4,329        —     

Construction in progress

     —          453        —     

Utilities and energy:


Utility generation, distribution and transmission system

     5 – 85 years         37,643        35,616   

Interstate pipeline assets

     3 – 67 years         5,906        5,809   

Independent power plants and other assets

     3 – 30 years         1,097        1,157   

Construction in progress

     —          1,456        2,152   
        92,248        44,734   

Accumulated depreciation

        (14,863     (13,798
      $ 77,385      $ 30,936   

Railroad property, plant and equipment include the land, other roadway, track structure and rolling stock (primarily locomotives and freight cars) of BNSF, which we acquired on February 12, 2010. See Note 2. The cost of these assets includes the fair value adjustments made as of the acquisition date. The utility generation, distribution and transmission system and interstate pipeline assets are the regulated assets of public utility and natural gas pipeline subsidiaries.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(11) Derivative contracts

Derivative contracts are used primarily by our finance and financial products businesses and our railroad, utilities and energy businesses. As of December 31, 2010 and 2009, substantially all of the derivative contracts of our finance and financial products businesses are not designated as hedges for financial reporting purposes. These contracts were initially entered into with the expectation that the premiums received would exceed the amounts ultimately paid to counterparties. Changes in the fair values of such contracts are reported in earnings as derivative gains/losses. A summary of derivative contracts of our finance and financial products businesses follows (in millions).


     2010     2009  
     Assets (3)     Liabilities     Notional
    Assets (3)     Liabilities     Notional

Equity index put options

   $ —        $ 6,712      $ 33,891 (1)    $ —        $ 7,309      $ 37,990 (1) 

Credit default obligations:


High yield indexes

     —          159        4,893 (2)      —          781        5,533 (2) 


     —          1,164        16,042 (2)      —          853        16,042 (2) 

Individual corporate

     84        —          3,565 (2)      81        —          3,565 (2) 


     341        375          378        360     

Counterparty netting

     (82     (39       (193     (34  
   $ 343      $ 8,371        $ 266      $ 9,269     



Represents the aggregate undiscounted amount payable at the contract expiration dates assuming that the value of each index is zero at the contract expiration date.



Represents the maximum undiscounted future value of losses payable under the contracts. The number of losses required to exhaust contract limits under substantially all of the contracts is dependent on the loss recovery rate related to the specific obligor at the time of a default.



Included in Other assets of finance and financial products businesses.

A summary of derivative gains/losses of our finance and financial products businesses included in the Consolidated Statements of Earnings are as follows (in millions).


     2010     2009      2008  

Equity index put options

   $ 172      $ 2,713       $ (5,028

Credit default obligations

     250        789         (1,774


     (161     122         (19
   $ 261      $ 3,624       $ (6,821

The equity index put option contracts are European style options written on four major equity indexes. Future payments, if any, under these contracts will be required if the underlying index value is below the strike price at the contract expiration dates which occur between June 2018 and January 2026. We received the premiums on these contracts in full at the contract inception dates and therefore we have no counterparty credit risk. During the fourth quarter of 2010, certain of these contracts were unwound at the instigation of our counterparty to these contracts. We had originally received premiums of $647 million for these contracts and we paid $425 million to unwind the contracts. The notional value of these contracts was approximately $4.3 billion.

At December 31, 2010, the aggregate intrinsic value (the undiscounted liability assuming the contracts are settled on their future expiration dates based on the December 31, 2010 index values and foreign currency exchange rates) was approximately $3.8 billion. However, these contracts may not be unilaterally terminated or fully settled before the expiration dates and therefore the ultimate amount of cash basis gains or losses on these contracts may not be determined for many years. The remaining weighted average life of all contracts was approximately 10 years at December 31, 2010.

Our credit default contracts pertain to various indexes of non-investment grade (or “high yield”) corporate issuers, state/municipal debt issuers and other individual corporate issuers. These contracts cover the loss in value of specified debt obligations of the issuers arising from default events, which are usually from their failure to make payments or bankruptcy. Loss amounts are subject to aggregate contract limits.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(11) Derivative contracts (Continued)


The high yield index contracts are comprised of specified North American corporate issuers (usually 100 in number at inception) whose obligations are rated below investment grade. High yield contracts remaining in-force at December 31, 2010 expire from 2011 through 2013. State and municipality contracts are comprised of over 500 state and municipality issuers and had a weighted average contract life at December 31, 2010 of approximately 10.1 years. Potential obligations related to approximately 50% of the notional value of the state and municipality contracts cannot be settled before the maturity dates of the underlying obligations, which range from 2019 to 2054.

Premiums on the high yield index and state/municipality contracts are received in full at the inception dates of the contracts and, as a result, we have no counterparty credit risk. Our payment obligations under certain of these contracts are on a first loss basis. Losses under other contracts are subject to aggregate deductibles that must be satisfied before we have any payment obligations.

Individual corporate credit default contracts primarily relate to issuers of investment grade obligations. In most instances, premiums are due from counterparties on a quarterly basis over the terms of the contracts. As of December 31, 2010, all of the contracts in-force expire in 2013.

With limited exceptions, our equity index put option and credit default contracts contain no collateral posting requirements with respect to changes in either the fair value or intrinsic value of the contracts and/or a downgrade of Berkshire’s credit ratings. As of December 31, 2010, our collateral posting requirement under contracts with collateral provisions was $31 million compared to $35 million at December 31, 2009. As of December 31, 2010, had Berkshire’s credit ratings (currently AA+ from Standard & Poor’s and Aa2 from Moody’s) been downgraded below either A- by Standard & Poor’s or A3 by Moody’s an additional $1.1 billion would have been required to be posted as collateral.

Our railroad and regulated utility subsidiaries are exposed to variations in the market prices in the purchases and sales of natural gas and electricity and in commodity fuel costs. Derivative instruments, including forward purchases and sales, futures, swaps and options, are used to manage these price risks. Unrealized gains and losses under the contracts of our regulated utilities that are probable of recovery through rates are recorded as a regulatory net asset or liability. Unrealized gains or losses on contracts accounted for as cash flow or fair value hedges are recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income or in net earnings, as appropriate. Derivative contract assets included in other assets of railroad, utilities and energy businesses were $231 million and $188 million as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively. Derivative contract liabilities included in accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities of railroad, utilities and energy businesses were $621 million as of December 31, 2010 and $581 million as of December 31, 2009.


(12) Supplemental cash flow information

A summary of supplemental cash flow information for each of the three years ending December 31, 2010 is presented in the following table (in millions).


     2010      2009      2008  

Cash paid during the year for:


Income taxes

   $ 3,547       $ 2,032       $ 3,530   

Interest of insurance and other businesses

     185         145         197   

Interest of railroad, utilities and energy businesses

     1,667         1,142         1,172   

Interest of finance and financial products businesses

     708         615         522   

Non-cash investing and financing activities:


Liabilities assumed in connection with acquisition of BNSF

     30,968         —           —     

Common stock issued in connection with acquisition of BNSF

     10,577         —           —     

Liabilities assumed in connection with acquisitions of other businesses

     438         278         4,763   

Equity/fixed maturity securities exchanged for other securities/investments

     —           —           2,329   


(13) Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses

The liabilities for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses are based upon estimates of the ultimate claim costs associated with property and casualty claim occurrences as of the balance sheet dates including estimates for incurred but not reported (“IBNR”) claims. Considerable judgment is required to evaluate claims and establish estimated claim liabilities.



Table of Contents

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)


(13) Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses (Continued)


A reconciliation of the changes in liabilities for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses of our property/casualty insurance subsidiaries is as follows (in millions).


     2010     2009     2008  

Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses:


Gross liabilities at beginning of year

   $ 59,416      $ 56,620      $ 56,002   

Ceded losses and deferred charges at beginning of year

     (6,879     (7,133     (7,126

Net balance at beginning of year

     52,537        49,487        48,876   

Incurred losses recorded during the year:


Current accident year

     20,357        19,156        17,399   

Prior accident years

     (2,270     (905     (1,140

Total incurred losses

     18,087        18,251        16,259   

Payments during the year with respect to:


Current accident year

     (7,666     (7,207     (6,905