0001610520-23-000139.txt : 20230901 0001610520-23-000139.hdr.sgml : 20230901 20230901070346 ACCESSION NUMBER: 0001610520-23-000139 CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE: 6-K PUBLIC DOCUMENT COUNT: 1 CONFORMED PERIOD OF REPORT: 20230630 FILED AS OF DATE: 20230901 DATE AS OF CHANGE: 20230901 FILER: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: UBS Group AG CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0001610520 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS [6021] IRS NUMBER: 000000000 STATE OF INCORPORATION: V8 FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: 6-K SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 001-36764 FILM NUMBER: 231230586 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: BAHNHOFSTRASSE 45 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: CH-8001 BUSINESS PHONE: 41-44-234-1111 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: BAHNHOFSTRASSE 45 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: CH-8001 FILER: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: CREDIT SUISSE AG CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0001053092 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: SECURITY BROKERS, DEALERS & FLOTATION COMPANIES [6211] IRS NUMBER: 000000000 STATE OF INCORPORATION: V8 FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: 6-K SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 001-33434 FILM NUMBER: 231230587 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: PARADEPLATZ 8 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: 8001 BUSINESS PHONE: 01141 44 333 1111 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: P.O. BOX 1 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: 8070 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: CREDIT SUISSE / /FI DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 20050607 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON / /FI DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 19980115 FILER: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: UBS AG CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0001114446 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS [6021] IRS NUMBER: 000000000 STATE OF INCORPORATION: V8 FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: 6-K SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 001-15060 FILM NUMBER: 231230588 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: BAHNHOFSTRASSE 45 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: CH 8001 BUSINESS PHONE: 203-719-5241 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: 600 WASHINGTON BLVD. CITY: STAMFORD STATE: CT ZIP: 06901 6-K 1 investorpreso20230901.htm investorpreso20230901
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington,
 
D.C. 20549
_________________
FORM 6-K
REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE
 
ISSUER
PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-16 OR 15d-16 UNDER
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Date: September 1, 2023
UBS Group AG
(Registrant's Name)
Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive office)
Commission File Number: 1-36764
UBS AG
(Registrant's Name)
Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
Aeschenvorstadt 1, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
 
(Address of principal executive offices)
Commission File Number: 1-15060
 
Credit Suisse AG
(Registrant's Name)
Paradeplatz 8, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive office)
Commission File Number: 1-33434
Indicate by check mark whether the
 
registrants file or will file annual reports under
 
cover of Form
20-F or Form 40-
F.
Form 20-F
 
 
Form 40-F
 
This Form 6-K consists of the transcripts
 
of the presentation of the Second
 
Quarter 2023 Results of
UBS Group AG and related Q&A session,
 
which appear immediately following
 
this page.
 
1
Second quarter 2023 results
 
31 August 2023
Speeches by
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
, Group
 
Chief Executive Officer,
 
and
Todd
 
Tuckner
,
Group Chief Financial Officer
Including analyst Q&A session
Transcript.
Numbers for slides
 
refer to
 
the second quarter
 
2023 results
 
presentation. Materials
 
and a
 
webcast
replay are available at
www.ubs.com/investors
 
 
 
 
 
2
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Slide 3 – Our strategy is unchanged and
 
is accelerated by the acquisition of
 
Credit Suisse
Thank you
 
Sarah, and
 
good morning
 
everyone.
 
I hope
 
you had
 
a relaxing summer
 
break.
 
For us,
 
these past
 
eight
weeks were intense
 
as we were
 
busy writing the next
 
chapter in UBS’s history.
 
This is the first-ever
 
acquisition
involving two global systemically important
 
banks.
 
It was announced only
 
five months ago and
 
we closed it less
than 100
 
days ago.
 
This would
 
not have
 
been possible
 
without extraordinary
 
effort
 
and dedication
 
from
 
my
colleagues across
 
both
 
organizations.
 
It also
 
required
 
extensive
 
cooperation
 
from
 
the Swiss
 
government and
regulators in Switzerland and around
 
the world.
We
 
are
 
swiftly
 
executing
 
on our
 
integration
 
plans, already
 
achieving
 
a number
 
of important
 
milestones.
 
We
established a target operating model, created a dedicated integration office, and
 
rolled out responsibilities with
management appointments up
 
to three
 
levels below
 
the Group Executive
 
Board, just to
 
name a
 
few.
 
We are
 
also
making progress on our cost
 
-saving and de-risking plans and resolving
 
some legacy matters for both
 
firms.
 
Following a detailed analysis, we terminated and handed back all Swiss
 
government support a few weeks ago.
Lastly,
 
we decided to fully integrate the Swiss
 
business of Credit Suisse after a
 
thorough strategic review.
The thing I am proudest about is that clients have
 
rewarded our unwavering commitment
 
with extended trust.
 
Thanks to their restored belief in the combined firm we were able to swiftly stabilize the Credit Suisse core – its
wealth, asset management, and Swiss Bank franchises.
 
We are happy to see markets recognizing our ongoing
work.
Slide 4 – Enhancing client franchises and increasing
 
scale
Our
 
strategy
 
is
 
unchanged,
 
and
 
the
 
Credit
 
Suisse
 
acquisition
 
will
 
act
 
as
 
an
 
accelerant
 
to
 
our
 
plans.
 
We
 
will
strengthen our position as the
 
only truly global wealth manager,
 
and as the leading Swiss universal bank,
 
with
scaled-up asset management and a focused
 
investment bank.
 
With a
 
highly
 
complementary
 
footprint,
 
we
 
will
 
reinforce
 
our
 
position
 
in key
 
growth
 
markets,
 
including
 
the
Americas and APAC, and build on our leadership in Switzerland and EMEA. We will relentlessly focus on clients
and continuously
 
improve
 
and expand
 
our services
 
and products.
 
With 5.5
 
trillion dollars
 
in assets
 
across
 
the
combined firm,
 
the transaction
 
adds scale
 
that will
 
lead to
 
increased efficiencies. This
 
will allow
 
us to
 
better focus
our resources, and target
 
investments that provide superior
 
levels of client service.
Slide 5 – Improving our business mix,
 
with unchanged capital allocation discipline
We will
 
achieve our
 
strategy while remaining
 
disciplined in
 
our resource management
 
across the entire
 
firm.
 
The
IB consuming
 
no more
 
than 25%
 
of the
 
Group’s risk-weighted
 
assets and
 
the rundown
 
of the
 
Non-core and
Legacy portfolio are just two of the more visible examples of our approach. In essence, we will
 
repeat what this
bank successfully accomplished during the
 
last decade.
Slide 6 – Update on integration – divider
 
Before I
 
discuss the
 
Swiss Bank
 
decision, let
 
me give
 
you a
 
brief overview
 
of our
 
assessment of
 
Credit Suisse as
 
of
March 19.
 
Since then, and especially
 
after we closed the
 
acquisition in June, we
 
conducted an in-depth analysis
that has only confirmed the
 
necessity of the decisive actions taken
 
over that weekend.
 
 
 
3
It was
 
not just
 
a matter
 
of liquidity
 
drying up.
 
Credit Suisse’s business
 
model and
 
business mix
 
was deeply
 
flawed
and its
 
reputation
 
severely
 
damaged.
 
With its
 
structural
 
lack of
 
underlying
 
profitability,
 
unsustainable
 
capital
allocation, and
 
negative revenue
 
and costs prospects,
 
the bank was
 
no longer in
 
a position to
 
continue on its
own. This is clearly
 
visible from the year-to-date losses Credit Suisse reported today, a culmination of the bank’s
two loss-making years.
 
Thanks to our
 
financial and balance sheet strength, UBS
 
was in a
 
position to answer a
 
rescue call from the Swiss
government, helping to stabilize the financial system.
 
Importantly,
 
the transaction preserves the best of Credit
Suisse’s
 
excellent
 
client
 
relationships,
 
people, and
 
industry-leading
 
products
 
that
 
in other
 
plausible
 
scenarios
would have
 
been weakened
 
or lost.
 
Unlocking Credit
 
Suisse’s strengths
 
as part
 
of UBS, will
 
allow us to
 
build
something of a more enduring value for
 
all stakeholders. This combination will reinforce our status as a
 
premier
global franchise – one that our home market, Switzerland, can be proud of.
 
We are humbled by this task, and
the responsibility entrusted to us.
 
But let
 
me make
 
one thing
 
absolutely clear:
 
Our ability
 
to stabilize
 
Credit Suisse,
 
and return
 
the government
guarantees in timely fashion, should not take away from the gravity of the situation we inherited. Nor should it
diminish the scope and scale of the task
 
ahead.
Slide 7 – Diligent approach to
 
identify and asses strategic options for
 
Credit Suisse (Schweiz)
That being said, let
 
me walk you
 
through how we came to
 
our decision on
 
the future of Credit Suisse
 
(Schweiz).
 
As I promised when I returned as CEO a few months ago, the decision would be driven by facts, not emotions,
and mindful of the extraordinary
 
circumstances of the transaction.
 
We conducted an
 
extremely thorough review involving teams comprised
 
of some of
 
the best people
 
across both
firms, with support from external experts
 
where needed. Our analysis focused
 
on four key aspects that, for us,
would determine the
 
long-term viability
 
of the business.
 
We examined what
 
the decision would
 
entail for our
clients, shareholders, and employees. And we gave special consideration to financial and
 
funding sustainability.
We started with a broad spectrum of possibilities, ranging from IPO, sale, partial or full integration to a spinoff,
and even a dual-brand strategy.
 
Eventually,
 
based on our criteria, we narrowed down our selection to the two
best options:
 
a full
 
integration or
 
a spin-off
 
of a focused
 
perimeter,
 
which would
 
exclude segments
 
requiring
global capabilities.
 
The final outcome was crystal clear: Full
 
integration is by far the best choice.
 
Slide 8 – Integration of Credit Suisse
 
(Schweiz) is the best path forward
It is not
 
just that the
 
financial merits of integration
 
are greater.
 
It is also
 
the best way forward for
 
our clients, for
whom the
 
industry-leading offering will
 
improve and broaden
 
as we
 
combine products
 
and
 
capabilities
 
from
 
both
firms.
 
The
 
alternative
 
would
 
have
 
been
 
a
 
bleak
 
one,
 
considering
 
the
 
current
 
situation,
 
combined
 
with
 
the
necessity to
 
carve out
 
most of
 
its global
 
capabilities. Even
 
a more
 
focused spin-off of
 
Credit Suisse
 
Schweiz would
fail to meet the needs of many of its
 
corporate clients, as well as the entrepreneurs
 
it considers core.
At the same
 
time, separation
 
from the
 
Group would
 
entail a costly,
 
risky and
 
lengthy carveout
 
of technology
platforms, causing uncertainty
 
for clients and employees
 
for years to come.
 
Moreover,
 
our analysis revealed
 
a
substantial dependency of
 
the Swiss
 
subsidiary on
 
financial resources
 
and
 
operational
 
support
 
from
 
the parent.
 
As
a result,
 
it would
 
have existed
 
as a
 
fragile entity
 
struggling to close
 
its funding gap,
 
unable to
 
compete effectively
and failing to
 
deliver sustainable
 
returns.
 
We believe
 
this would not
 
have been an
 
acceptable proposition
 
for
clients, employees – and very likely - regulators.
 
 
4
By contrast, being
 
a part of
 
UBS ensures it
 
will have continuous backing
 
from one of the
 
most stable and
 
trusted
global
 
financial
 
institutions.
 
The
 
strength
 
of
 
UBS
 
will
 
underpin
 
the
 
franchise
 
and
 
provide
 
access
 
to
 
efficient
funding, as demonstrated by our ability
 
to return all extraordinary government
 
and central bank facilities.
 
We
 
take
 
our
 
social
 
responsibilities
 
very
 
seriously.
 
This
 
is
 
why
 
I
 
have
 
repeatedly
 
emphasized
 
the
 
fact
 
that
employment-related considerations must be a key decision-making factor in our evaluation.
 
We have analyzed
their impact
 
in both
 
absolute
 
terms and
 
in relation
 
to the
 
Swiss
 
job market.
 
Every
 
lost job
 
is painful
 
for
 
us.
 
Unfortunately, in this situation,
 
cuts were unavoidable,
 
regardless of the
 
selected scenario.
 
We are committed
 
to
minimizing the
 
impact on
 
employees by
 
treating them fairly, providing
 
them
 
with
 
financial
 
support,
 
outplacement
services, and retraining
 
opportunities.
 
Our aim here
 
is to enable
 
those affected
 
to take advantage
 
of a quite-
healthy Swiss job market, where more
 
open positions in finance are available
 
than there are job seekers.
 
Let me emphasize: the vast majority of job reductions will come from natural attrition, retirements
 
and internal
mobility.
 
Around
 
1,000 redundancies
 
will result
 
from the
 
integration of
 
Credit Suisse
 
Schweiz.
 
These will
 
be
spread over
 
a couple
 
of years,
 
starting in
 
late 2024.
 
Importantly, in the alternative
 
spin-off scenario,
 
restructuring
would also
 
have been
 
necessary, and resulted in
 
about 600
 
redundancies. In addition,
 
the
 
necessity
 
to
 
profoundly
restructure other parts
 
of Credit
 
Suisse is
 
expected to
 
lead to
 
about 2,000
 
additional redundancies in
 
Switzerland
over the next couple of years.
After weighing all of the above factors,
 
we came to the view that a full
 
integration is the best way forward.
 
Slide 9 – Unwavering commitment to our clients,
 
employees and the Swiss economy
 
Our decision reinforces
 
our commitment to clients, employees,
 
and the Swiss economy.
 
Our goal
 
is to
 
make the
 
transition for
 
clients as
 
smooth as possible.
 
The two
 
Swiss ringfenced
 
entities
 
will
 
operate
separately until their planned
 
legal integration in
 
2024.
 
Credit Suisse brand and
 
operations will remain separate
during that time.
 
We will gradually migrate clients
 
onto our systems and expect to
 
finish this process in
 
2025.
Given this, nothing will
 
change for clients in
 
the foreseeable future and they do not
 
have to take any
 
immediate
action.
 
We will continue to provide the premier levels of service that they
 
have come to expect. And with time
they will begin to see the further benefits
 
of the combined franchise.
As we
 
progress in the
 
integration, we
 
remain fully committed
 
to our
 
personal, private, institutional
 
and
 
corporate
clients. In
 
terms of
 
lending,
 
thanks to
 
our even
 
-stronger
 
capital base,
 
our intention
 
is to
 
keep the
 
combined
exposure unchanged while
 
maintaining our
 
risk discipline. We
 
are sensitive
 
to
 
the
 
important
 
role both
 
firms
 
play
 
in
the lives of
 
our employees
 
and their communities.
 
We want
 
to remain
 
an employer
 
of choice
 
in Switzerland,
offering attractive career
 
opportunities.
 
Last but
 
not least,
 
as we
 
combine, we
 
will honor
 
all agreed sponsorships
of civic, sporting and cultural activities
 
in Switzerland at least until the end
 
of 2025.
I have
 
made it
 
abundantly clear to
 
our colleagues
 
that they
 
must not
 
be distracted
 
by the
 
integration.
 
We cannot
take our eyes off
 
our vision and
 
must remain focused on
 
client needs.
 
After all, competition in
 
the Swiss market
remains robust.
 
The cantonal banks in aggregate will continue to have
 
the highest market shares in all relevant
personal and
 
commercial banking products.
 
And our
 
branch network,
 
even after
 
the merger, is the
 
third-biggest.
We welcome
 
the challenge.
 
Competition is
 
what makes
 
all of
 
us better,
 
and what
 
makes the
 
Swiss financial
system stronger.
 
 
 
 
5
Slide 10 – Stabilized flows and focusing
 
on client win-back opportunity
Given the
 
events leading up
 
to the
 
acquisition, stabilizing the
 
Credit Suisse
 
client franchises globally
 
has been
 
our
most immediate priority.
 
Since closing in June, we have won back clients’ confidence, as evidenced by positive
asset flows and strong engagement
 
across Wealth Management
 
and the Swiss business.
 
We saw formidable momentum in deposits, with
 
23 billion dollars in inflows
 
for the quarter, 18 billion of which
came
 
into
 
Credit
 
Suisse’s
 
Wealth
 
Management
 
and
 
Swiss
 
Bank.
 
Meanwhile,
 
UBS
 
wealth
 
management
 
has
delivered the highest second-quarter
 
net new money performance in over a
 
decade.
 
We are pleased
 
to share that
 
this positive
 
trend has
 
carried on
 
into July
 
and August.
 
While the
 
quarter is
 
not over
yet, so far we have attracted net new
 
assets of 8 billion for the combined wealth
 
management businesses.
It is
 
encouraging and rewarding to
 
see the
 
franchise stabilize so
 
quickly.
 
Winning back
 
the more than
 
200 billion
dollars of
 
client assets that
 
left Credit Suisse
 
over the
 
past year won’t
 
be easy, but recapturing as
 
much as
 
we can
is one of our top priorities.
 
Slide 11 – Non-strategic assets and businesses
 
to be exited through Non
 
-Core and Legacy
 
Let’s move to assets that we have designated as non-core. First, let me briefly touch on the 9 billion RWAs that
will be included in the combined Investment
 
Bank.
These assets
 
were selected through
 
a disciplined
 
process designed to
 
enhance our
 
Global Banking
 
and
 
derivatives
operations.
 
The
 
transferred
 
businesses
 
are
 
expected
 
to
 
be
 
accretive
 
from
 
next
 
year.
 
They
 
will
 
help
 
drive
economies of scale while adding only
 
13% to the investment bank’s current
 
non op-risk RWAs.
 
The remaining 17 billion
 
of Credit Suisse’s investment bank,
 
as you can
 
see from the chart,
 
will be transferred to
the newly-formed Non-core and Legacy unit.
 
This will also include Credit Suisse’s entire Capital Release Unit as
well as
 
selected assets
 
from the
 
combined wealth and
 
asset management
 
businesses
 
that
 
are not
 
aligned
 
with
 
our
risk appetite or strategy.
 
Overall, the
 
NCL will
 
comprise of 224
 
billion in
 
LRD, with
 
a significant
 
portion
 
in high-quality
 
and
 
liquid
 
assets,
 
and
55 billion in risk weighted assets excluding
 
op-risk RWAs.
 
With the perimeter largely defined, we are already executing on our
 
strategy to exit these assets in a
 
timely and
efficient manner.
 
We made a
 
good start
 
in the
 
second quarter, reducing positions representing
 
a total
 
of
 
9 billion
in RWA. Around
 
half of those came from sales that
 
we actively pursued.
Slide 12 – Non-core and legacy
 
rundown to drive lower costs and efficient
 
capital release
 
As I
 
mentioned before, this
 
is not
 
the first
 
time our
 
organization has
 
managed a
 
successful run-down of
 
non-core
assets.
 
Our previous experience is a
 
big part of why we are confident
 
in our ultimate success.
 
A clear priority
 
for us is
 
to take out
 
a substantial part
 
of the operating
 
costs associated with this
 
unit.
 
I will touch
on that in a minute.
Thanks
 
to
 
our
 
strong
 
capital
 
position,
 
and
 
markdowns
 
we
 
took
 
as
 
part
 
of
 
the
 
PPA
 
adjustments,
 
we
 
have
substantial
 
flexibility
 
in order
 
to optimize
 
the outcome.
 
These are
 
not distressed
 
assets, so
 
we can
 
maintain
positions if they preserve value.
 
Our decisions whether to do so will be based on economic profitability,
 
taking
into account funding, operating and
 
capital costs of the portfolios.
 
On those positions we do
 
decide to exit, we
will move at pace, acting fairly and protecting
 
our clients and counterparties.
 
 
 
6
The natural
 
run-off profile
 
is a
 
steep one.
 
As you
 
can see
 
from the
 
chart, we
 
will have
 
a 50%,
 
or 27
 
billion,
reduction in non op-risk RWAs by 2026
 
and a similar reduction in
 
LRD.
 
But let me assure you
 
that our proactive
approach to accelerate the wind-down
 
will continue.
Slide 13 – Executing on plans to achieve
 
greater than 10bn gross
 
cost reductions by year-end
 
2026
Now let’s
 
turn to
 
cost reductions, a
 
key element of
 
returning to
 
profitability and creating
 
sustainable value across
the combined
 
firm. First,
 
as we
 
speak, we
 
are actively addressing
 
the need
 
for deep
 
restructuring at Credit
 
Suisse.
 
This is an
 
acceleration and
 
expansion of the
 
work that the
 
firm itself saw
 
as necessary to
 
put a stop
 
to losing
money.
 
Secondly,
 
additional efforts are required
 
to generate synergies across
 
the combined businesses.
 
We aim
 
to take
 
out over
 
10 billion
 
dollars in
 
gross expenses from
 
the combined
 
franchise, based
 
on
 
full-year
 
2022
cost base.
 
Around half of
 
that will come from
 
restructuring the investment
 
bank and running down
 
non-core
assets.
 
The other half will come from
 
actions across the rest of our operations.
 
There is meaningful duplication
that can be removed, thousands of applications and IT platforms to be decommissioned, and hundreds of legal
entities to be merged or closed to make
 
us more efficient and effective.
Let me
 
give you
 
an example.
 
Of Credit
 
Suisse’s current 3,000+
 
IT applications only
 
around 300
 
will be
 
integrated
into UBS infrastructure, contributing
 
to our combined future business
 
model.
Importantly,
 
we will
 
continue
 
investing
 
to make
 
our platforms
 
and
 
processes
 
more
 
resilient
 
and support
 
our
existing, and future, growth
 
ambitions.
 
We will also
 
absorb some further inflation.
 
All told, we
 
aim to bring
 
the
Group’s underlying cost/income ratio
 
exit rate below 70% in 2026.
 
Slide 14 – We aim to substantially
 
complete integration for the Group
 
by year-end 2026
We
 
are
 
two and
 
a half
 
months
 
into one
 
of the
 
biggest
 
and most
 
complex
 
bank mergers
 
in history.
 
We
 
are
executing
 
our
 
plans
 
at
 
pace
 
and
 
wasting
 
no
 
time
 
in
 
delivering
 
value
 
for
 
our
 
all
 
our
 
stakeholders,
 
including
shareholders.
In the next four to six months our focus will be on
 
restoring underlying profitability,
 
while progressing on other
areas, including business
 
transformation, client
 
migration
 
and
 
simplification
 
of
 
our
 
combined
 
legal
 
entity
 
structure.
 
On the latter, a key milestone will be the merger of
 
our parent operating entities UBS AG and Credit Suisse AG.
 
This step,
 
planned for
 
2024, will allow
 
us to simplify
 
our structure
 
and operating
 
model, optimize
 
capital and
liquidity within the Group, and will
 
support achieving our cost-savings
 
ambitions.
We expect to substantially complete
 
our integration program by
 
2026.
 
Slide 15 – Working towards
 
~15% RoCET1
 
A key
 
pillar of
 
our strategy
 
is to
 
maintain a
 
balance sheet
 
for all
 
seasons -
 
one that
 
supports our
 
capital-generative
business and
 
allows us
 
to offer
 
attractive capital
 
returns.
 
We expect to
 
operate at
 
around 14% CET1
 
capital ratio
over the medium term. And as we exit 2026, we aim to achieve an underlying return on CET1 of around 15%.
 
As you
 
know, we have
 
suspended share repurchases for
 
the time
 
being.
 
But
 
we
 
remain
 
committed
 
to
 
growing
 
our
dividend and
 
returning excess capital
 
to shareholders through buybacks.
 
We will update
 
you on
 
our plans
 
in this
regard with the fourth-quarter
 
results.
With
 
that,
 
let
 
me
 
hand
 
over
 
to
 
Todd.
 
 
7
Todd
 
Tuckner
Slide 17 – UBS Group 2Q23 results
Thank you, Sergio.
 
Good morning everyone – it is a privilege
 
to be with you today as Group
 
CFO, especially
at this watershed moment for UBS.
Since my appointment, my focus has
 
been on the financial consolidation of
 
the two firms, progressing
 
the
work done on transaction adjustments, optimizing
 
our liquidity and funding position, firming
 
up our cost
savings and enhancing financial reporting
 
controls for the expanded
 
group.
Regardless of whether staff
 
come from Credit Suisse
 
or UBS, I’ve been extremely impressed
 
with the
dedication of the finance team.
 
I’m proud of what we as a
 
unit have already been able to
 
accomplish, and
we, like the entire firm, continue
 
to execute at pace.
We recognize that this is a
 
complex deal, but our aim is to be clear and
 
forthcoming in explaining the
financial implications of our actions during this
 
critical period and beyond.
Today,
 
I’ll cover our second quarter operating
 
performance, the impact of the merger
 
on our balance sheet
and capital as of day 1 and, finally,
 
our integration plan and outlook.
Let’s start with the quarter on slide 17.
 
I’ll refer to UBS Group
 
AG’s consolidated results, which
 
this quarter
include one month of Credit Suisse’s
 
operating performance, presented
 
under IFRS and in US dollars.
On a reported basis, the second
 
quarter profit was 29 billion, both
 
pre-
 
and post-tax.
 
These results were
largely driven by the net impact from
 
items related to the acquisition,
 
principally negative goodwill of
28.9 billion and integration-related expenses
 
and acquisition costs.
 
Excluding these items, the Group
 
pre-tax
profit was 1.1 billion, of which
 
2.0 billion from the UBS sub-group,
 
and negative 0.8 billion from the
 
Credit
Suisse sub-group.
Slide 18 – Negative goodwill and overview
 
of purchase price allocation adjustments
Turning to slide
 
18.
 
The negative goodwill of 28.9 billion
 
is calculated as the difference
 
between the
consideration UBS paid and the fair value
 
of the acquired net assets after
 
taking into account the various PPA
adjustments of
 
negative 25 billion.
 
The roughly
 
6 billion difference between
 
the negative goodwill reported today
 
and the amount included in
the Form F4 registration statement
 
just prior to closing is principally explained
 
by two factors. First, Credit
Suisse generated operating losses over the
 
first 5 months of 2023 that were
 
not captured in the F4, which
was prepared as if the transaction
 
occurred on December 31, 2022.
 
Second, we applied additional net
negative PPA
 
adjustments to Credit Suisse’s financial
 
assets and liabilities, reflecting
 
a more detailed fair value
assessment post-closing.
 
The total net PPA
 
adjustments of negative 25 billion consist
 
primarily of marks of negative 14.7 billion
 
in
connection with financial assets and liabilities.
 
This includes negative 12.4 billion on mainly
 
fixed-rate accrual
assets and liabilities, of which around
 
8 and half billion relates to our core
 
businesses and around 4 billion to
Non-core and Legacy.
 
In addition, we made negative 2.3
 
billion of further necessary adjustments to
 
fair value
positions, mostly related to Non-core
 
and Legacy.
The negative 8 and a half billion of marks
 
on core-business accrual financial instruments
 
include, for example,
PPA adjustments
 
on the Swiss mortgage book, which were
 
almost entirely interest
 
rate driven.
 
 
 
8
The majority of the accrual-basis positions are
 
expected to mature within
 
the next 3 to 4 years and, if held to
maturity,
 
will pull to par.
Of the total marks on accrual positions,
 
6 billion pre-tax, or 5 billion net of tax,
 
are CET1 capital-neutral as
FINMA has granted us transitional relief,
 
which mainly applies to Swiss mortgages.
 
The transitional treatment
is subject to linear amortization concluding
 
by June 30, 2027.
The negative marks of 2.3 billion on fair
 
value assets and liabilities that I
 
mentioned earlier reflect UBS’s
assessment of the complexity,
 
liquidity and model risk uncertainties in
 
the book, as well as the relevant
markets for potential strategic exits.
We also made PPA
 
adjustments of negative 4.5 billion
 
to capture UBS’s determination
 
of Credit Suisse’s
provisions and contingent liabilities
 
related to litigation, regulatory
 
and similar matters. This includes 1.5
billion of incremental provisions
 
Credit Suisse took in the second
 
quarter.
Other net PPA
 
adjustments, totaling to negative 5 and
 
a half billion, largely relate
 
to GAAP differences
associated with pension accounting, but also
 
goodwill and intangibles, and fair value
 
marks on non-financial
assets and liabilities, including software
 
and real estate.
Of the total negative 25 billion of PPA
 
adjustments,
 
negative 17 billion is CET1 capital-relevant,
 
with the
balance relating to the 5 billion regulatory
 
waiver I mentioned earlier,
 
and other items that are filtered
 
out of
CET1 capital, such as pension accounting
 
differences, goodwill and
 
intangibles.
Overall, we believe the negative goodwill, including
 
the PPA
 
adjustments therein – in addition
 
to
underpinning almost 240 billion of acquired
 
RWA - provides
 
us with sufficient capacity to absorb
 
the costs to
achieve our two key saving objectives:
 
first, an efficient wind-down
 
of the non-core businesses and
 
associated
overhead we acquired, and second,
 
positive operating leverage and synergies
 
in our core franchises.
 
All while
remaining capital-generative
 
over the integration timeline.
Slide 19 – The acquisition
 
strengthens the foundation of the
 
combined bank
We are highly confident that
 
we can successfully integrate Credit
 
Suisse, enhancing our business model and
operating metrics, while continuing to ensure
 
we maintain world class capital ratios
 
and a balance sheet for
all seasons.
 
On page 19, we illustrate how the transaction
 
strengthens key financial
 
measures from day 1, offering
 
us a
highly attractive starting point as we commence
 
this journey.
 
Since the acquisition, our capital position
 
is even
stronger with almost 200 billion total
 
loss absorbing capacity,
 
and a CET1 capital ratio of 14.4%.
 
Additionally,
 
our tangible book value per share
 
is up 49% quarter on quarter and, today,
 
we manage over 5
and a half trillion dollars of invested assets
 
with a unique and meaningful presence
 
in all the major markets
across the globe.
Slide 20 – Our balance sheet for all seasons
 
remains the foundation of our
 
success
Remaining on capital on slide 20.
 
The strength of our balance
 
sheet is the foundation of our success
 
and the
reason why we were able
 
to restore financial stability
 
and client trust in such a short amount
 
of time.
As of the end of June, as just mentioned,
 
our CET1 capital ratio was 14.4% and
 
our CET1 leverage ratio was
4.8%.
 
Included in our capital ratio this quarter are
 
the impacts from the closing
 
of the Credit Suisse acquisition,
including a 10 billion operational risk RWA
 
reduction from diversification
 
benefits and a combined lower
forward-looking risk profile.
 
 
 
9
Looking through to the end of the
 
year,
 
we expect our CET1 capital ratio
 
to remain around
 
14%, as the
benefit of RWA reductions,
 
improvements in our underlying profitability,
 
mainly from cost saves, and
 
CET1
capital-relevant pull-to-par effects
 
from the PPA
 
adjustments are expected
 
to largely,
 
but not fully,
 
offset
integration-related expenses.
 
We also expect to maintain a
 
CET1 capital ratio of around
 
14% and a CET1 leverage ratio
 
or more than 4%
over the medium-term.
You
 
have often heard us referring
 
to our balance sheet for all seasons and
 
our capital-generative operating
model that allows us to service clients and
 
invest in the business through
 
the cycle.
 
It’s how we’ve operated
over the last decade, and it’s how we
 
intend to continue to operate going
 
forward.
 
So rest assured,
maintaining a balance sheet for all seasons
 
will remain among our very top
 
priorities.
Slide 21 – Prudent management of liquidity
 
and funding
On liquidity and funding on slide 21, we
 
closed the quarter with an average
 
liquidity coverage ratio of 175%,
well above our prior quarter level, and
 
a net stable funding ratio of 118%.
 
The liquidity coverage ratio
increase largely reflects the
 
elevated HQLA levels at Credit Suisse,
 
including the effect of the usage
 
of the
Swiss National Bank facilities.
As Sergio highlighted, positive net new
 
deposits in the past few months enabled
 
us to repay ELA+ and
terminate the Public Liquidity Backstop facility,
 
as announced earlier this month.
 
We expect to continue
attracting net new deposits, and as of this
 
week we’ve already seen, in the
 
third quarter,
 
13 billion of positive
net new deposit flows in our combined wealth
 
management and Swiss franchises.
 
While this will help us
narrow the inherited funding gap
 
and continue to manage our liquidity
 
coverage ratio at prudent levels, we
expect to resume execution of
 
our funding plans shortly.
In addition to maintaining significant liquidity
 
and funding buffers on a consolidated
 
basis, we’re actively
managing the allocation of financial resources
 
among our significant legal entities,
 
which also have
standalone funding requirements
 
and will continue to operate while we
 
progress towards our
 
target legal
entity structure.
 
We’re working towards
 
merging Credit Suisse AG
 
into UBS AG in 2024, as this is a critical step
 
to removing
resource allocation bottlenecks
 
and enabling the realization of
 
business and operational efficiencies.
Slide 22 – 2Q23 UBS business divisions
 
and Group Functions (IFRS) – excl.
 
Credit Suisse
Now onto slide 22.
 
Excluding Credit Suisse’s performance
 
in June, the effects of the acquisition
 
I mentioned
earlier,
 
and a gain on sale of 848 million in
 
Asset Management last year,
 
UBS’s pre-tax profit in the
 
quarter
was 2.0 billion, up 12% year-over-year.
Slide 23 – Global Wealth Management
Before turning to the UBS sub-group
 
business divisions starting on page 23,
 
let me first point out that for the
second quarter,
 
the negative goodwill as well as a
 
substantial portion of integration-related
 
expenses have
been retained and reported
 
in Group Functions.
 
Starting with the third quarter,
 
we intend to consolidate the
reporting of our business divisions
 
across the UBS and Credit
 
Suisse sub-groups, and we’ll
 
report integration-
related expenses in the respective
 
combined segments.
 
All references to figures
 
are in US dollars and comparisons
 
are year-over-year,
 
unless stated otherwise.
 
10
In Global Wealth Management, we
 
delivered net new money of 16
 
billion, the strongest second quarter
 
in
over a decade, with inflows across
 
Switzerland, EMEA and APAC,
 
and despite 5 billion in seasonal tax
payments in the US.
 
We also delivered net new
 
fee generating assets of 13 billion, or an annualized
 
growth rate of 4% with
positive flows across all regions,
 
as well as net new deposits of
 
5 billion.
These strong inflows across
 
net new money,
 
fee-generating assets and deposits
 
demonstrate our continuous
focus on active client engagement and
 
the trust our clients place in us.
 
This was especially important during
 
a
quarter where the macro
 
backdrop and developments with
 
Credit Suisse placed a premium
 
on our investment
advice and the stability of our GWM franchise.
Profit before tax was 1.1
 
billion, down 4% despite strong growth
 
in EMEA and Switzerland of 15% and
 
9%,
respectively.
 
Positive top-line contributions from
 
all regions outside of Americas
 
supported a 1% revenue
increase, which was more
 
than offset by higher expenses.
In the Americas, revenues were
 
down 4% mainly as net interest
 
income reflected continued rotation
 
into
higher yielding deposits and investments
 
from transactional and sweep
 
deposit accounts.
 
Although we
expect NII in the Americas to continue
 
to tick-down sequentially from
 
ongoing cash sorting and deleveraging
in the current rates environment,
 
we nevertheless continue to see the
 
US market as a strategic priority for
 
us,
and hence we continue to invest in the
 
business for future growth.
 
As a result, we expect our
 
pre-tax margin
in the Americas to be low double-digit
 
to mid-teens over the near-term.
 
Onto total GWM revenues.
 
Net interest income was up
 
14% year-over-year,
 
and down 3% sequentially,
 
the
latter reflecting mix shifts and lower
 
deposit and loan balances, partly offset
 
by higher deposit margins.
 
Recurring net fee income decreased
 
3% due to negative market performance while
 
positive inflows were
offset by clients’ continued repositioning
 
into lower margin solutions.
 
As a reminder,
 
we bill based on daily
balances in the Americas and on month
 
-end balances everywhere
 
else.
 
As such, second quarter revenues
 
did
not fully reflect June’s market
 
rally, which
 
we’re seeing benefit the third
 
quarter.
 
Transaction
 
-based income decreased 6%,
 
impacted by investor uncertainty,
 
particularly in Americas and
APAC.
 
However,
 
towards the end of the second
 
quarter and into the third, we’re
 
seeing a pick-up in both
client sentiment and transactional momentum
 
especially in APAC.
Operating expenses ex-litigation, integration
 
-related expenses and FX were
 
up 3% driven by increases in
technology and personnel expenses.
Slide 24 – Personal & Corporate Banking
 
(CHF)
Turning to Personal
 
& Corporate Banking on slide 24.
 
We delivered another record
 
quarter excluding past
one-off gains.
 
Profit before tax was
 
up 54% to 612 million Swiss francs.
 
Revenues increased 24%, with
increases across all revenue
 
lines, highlighting continued momentum
 
in the business. Net interest income
increased by 45% year on year
 
and 12% quarter-on-quarter.
 
Sequentially,
 
we continued to see loan growth,
while the deposit base remained roughly
 
stable. Costs were up 9%,
 
driven by continued tech investments
 
and
higher personnel expenses.
 
The cost-to-income ratio was 51%,
 
a 7 percentage-point improvement
 
year-on-
year,
 
demonstrating strong positive operating
 
leverage.
We saw strong momentum
 
with 10% annualized growth in net
 
new investment products and
 
almost
6 thousand net new clients, reflecting
 
the trust our clients continue to
 
place in us.
 
 
 
 
11
Slide 25 – Asset Management
Moving to slide 25.
 
In Asset Management the profit
 
before tax was 90 million.
Excluding last year’s gain on sale, total
 
revenues decreased 5%,
 
with lower net management fees,
 
driven by
market headwinds, asset mix, as well
 
as lower performance fees.
 
These headwinds were partially
 
offset by
1% lower costs.
Net new money in the quarter was strong
 
at 17 billion, a 6% annualized growth
 
rate.
 
Net new money
excluding money markets and associates was
 
19.5 billion, with positive momentum
 
in SMAs and alternatives.
Slide 26 – Investment Bank
Turning to slide
 
26.
 
In the Investment Bank the profit
 
before tax was 139 million.
The operating environment for the
 
Investment Bank’s trading businesses was
 
defined by significantly lower
equity volatility levels compared
 
to the prior-year period.
 
Within Global Markets, this resulted in a
 
meaningful decline in client activity levels
 
across both Equities and
FRC, where revenues of
 
1.5 billion were down 11%, broadly
 
consistent with our peer group.
 
Our Financing business continued to deliver
 
strong results, reporting
 
its best second-quarter and best first-half
on record. This demonstrates
 
the resilience of our balanced
 
portfolio of risk-efficient businesses,
 
as we
continue to invest in capabilities that are
 
critical to our clients.
Global Banking revenues of 371
 
million were down 2% as the
 
second quarter saw the global fee
 
pool hit its
lowest quarterly level since 2012.
 
In the second quarter we significantly
 
outperformed the fee pool in EMEA
and gained share in global M&A.
Operating expenses were up 2%,
 
predominantly on higher tech
 
investments offsetting lower provisions
 
for
litigation, regulatory and similar
 
matters.
Slide 27 – 2Q23 Credit Suisse AG
 
reported loss of (8.9bn), (4.3bn)
 
excluding acquisition related
 
effects;
(2.1bn) adjusted loss (CHF,
 
US GAAP)
On slide 27, I now turn to Credit Suisse
 
AG’s full second quarter results,
 
which were separately published
earlier today.
 
Credit Suisse AG’s reported
 
pre-tax loss for the second quarter
 
was 8.9 billion Swiss francs.
 
This result includes several large
 
items, including 2.2 billion in adjustments
 
to fair value marks, 1.8 billion in
software write-downs, 1.3 billion in additional
 
litigation provisions, and 1.0 billion
 
for a goodwill impairment.
 
Stripping out these and other items that
 
are not representative
 
of Credit Suisse AG’s underlying
 
performance
in the quarter,
 
the adjusted operating loss was 2.1
 
billion Swiss francs.
 
Not included in this figure are
 
the results of a few legal entities
 
that fall outside of Credit Suisse
 
AG’s
consolidation scope.
 
Including those entities, the Credit
 
Suisse sub-group’s pro
 
-forma second quarter
adjusted operating loss was 2.0 billion Swiss
 
francs.
 
In discussing the Credit Suisse
 
sub-group performance in
the second quarter,
 
I’ll focus on this 2-billion Swiss franc
 
adjusted loss as it better informs the starting
 
point
for the group in combination with
 
UBS’s quarterly underlying performance.
 
 
 
12
Slide 28– Credit Suisse adjusted
 
2Q23 results (CHF,
 
US GAAP)
On slide 28, Credit Suisse’s
 
quarterly adjusted pre-tax loss was
 
largely driven by operating losses in the
 
Credit
Suisse Investment Bank and the Capital
 
Release Unit, as well as elevated funding
 
costs in the Credit Suisse
Corporate Center.
Sequentially,
 
revenues declined by 38%, driven
 
by Credit Suisse’s Investment
 
Bank, down 78%, where the
sharp drop in revenues was
 
due to little-to-no new activity in the context
 
of expected exits following the
acquisition.
 
Second quarter revenues also reflected
 
elevated funding costs, primarily from
 
the Swiss National
Bank facilities.
 
Going forward, we’ll focus on two
 
key priorities in relation to Credit
 
Suisse’s Investment Bank and Capital
Release Unit.
 
First, rebuild activity and profitability
 
levels of the businesses we decided to retain
 
as part of our
core Investment Bank. And second,
 
actively manage the wind-down
 
of businesses and positions that are
 
not
aligned to our strategy.
 
These include those already
 
in the Credit Suisse Capital Release
 
Unit and Investment
Bank not retained as core,
 
and will be managed and reported
 
within our Non-Core and
 
Legacy segment
beginning in the third quarter.
Moreover,
 
as the wind down is executed,
 
we’ll decisively take out all costs in relation
 
to resources, technology
and real estate that are not
 
needed to support either what is retained
 
in our core Investment Bank or
 
what is
strictly required to efficiently
 
wind-down businesses and positions managed
 
by our Non-core and Legacy
team.
In contrast to Credit Suisse’s Investment
 
Bank and Capital Release Unit, we saw relative
 
stability across Credit
Suisse’s Wealth Management, Swiss
 
Bank and Asset Management segments.
 
In Credit Suisse Wealth
 
Management, we’ve seen a stabilization
 
of net new assets, trending from
 
substantial
outflows in April to net inflows in June, with
 
14 billion dollars of net new deposits
 
in the quarter.
 
We remain
focused on introducing Credit
 
Suisse’s clients to the unrivaled value
 
proposition of the combined
 
firm to
counterbalance any headwinds to our flows
 
from lag effects stemming
 
from past or future attrition
 
of Credit
Suisse relationship managers.
 
In addition to clear and decisive actions
 
to retain client assets, we
 
also
implemented client advisor incentive programs
 
with the clear objective to “win
 
back” and sustainably retain
client assets.
 
Quarter to date, these actions
 
have helped us to attract net new deposits
 
of 10 billion dollars
and positive net new assets in the Credit
 
Suisse wealth management franchise.
 
Credit Suisse’s adjusted operating
 
expenses were down 10% sequentially,
 
reflecting actions initiated
 
before
and after the merger announcement, as
 
well as voluntary attrition of employees.
 
As of the end of the second
quarter,
 
headcount was down by over 8,000 compared
 
to the end of 2022, split roughly
 
equally between
internal and external staff.
Slide 29 – Driving positive underlying profitability
 
and maintaining ~14% CET1 capital
 
ratio
I now turn to slide 29.
 
On an illustrative and underlying basis,
 
the sum of the UBS sub-group
 
pre-tax profit of
2.0 billion, and the Credit Suisse sub-group
 
pre-tax loss of 2.2 billion, after translation
 
to US dollars, equals a
combined pro forma Group
 
operating loss of around negative
 
0.3 billion.
 
You
 
can consider this indicative
level as a useful starting point to contextualize
 
the trajectory of our underlying profitability
 
going forward,
and assess the steps we are taking
 
to achieve our ambitions.
 
First and foremost, we’re
 
executing on our cost reduction
 
plans at pace and we expect positive combined
underlying profits in the second
 
half of 2023.
 
We expect to deliver underlying exit
 
rate cost savings of over 3
billion by the end of the year - which
 
will
 
benefit our 2024 results - and to
 
incur a broadly similar amount
 
of
integration-related expenses in 2H23.
 
While neutral to our underlying performance,
 
I would note that such
integration-related expenses will be
 
partly offset by pull-to-par effects
 
of over 1 and a half billion.
13
Second, asset and deposit retention and
 
win-back initiatives will continue to
 
support the positive momentum
across our wealth management businesses.
 
In particular we expect to see positive
 
underlying contribution
from the Credit Suisse wealth
 
management franchise by the first half
 
of 2024.
 
We will apply this same
systematic approach to client and
 
asset retention and win-back
 
across all of our core franchises,
 
especially
following today’s announcement in connection
 
with the Swiss businesses.
Third, our second quarter 2023 pro
 
forma results include 550 million
 
of funding costs related to the Swiss
National Bank facilities that Credit
 
Suisse reported in its Corporate
 
Center.
 
The repayment of these facilities
will lead to materially lower funding
 
costs in the third quarter and further
 
benefits in the fourth quarter for
the combined Group.
 
Continuing on the NII topic, sequentially
 
for 3Q23, we expect a low single-digit
percentage decline in our combined
 
wealth management businesses, with
 
positive contribution from the
Credit Suisse franchise, and a mid
 
-single-digit percentage decline
 
in our Swiss businesses.
 
This excludes the
pull to par effects I mentioned earlier.
These elements, in combination with disciplined
 
resource management and
 
a focused execution mindset
across the leadership team, give
 
us confidence in our ability to deliver a
 
successful integration, starting with
approaching break-even in
 
the third quarter and returning to
 
positive underlying profitability
 
before the end
of the year.
With that I’ll hand back to Sergio for his closing
 
remarks.
 
14
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti – closing remarks
 
Slide 29 – Key messages
 
Thank you, Todd.
 
As we speak,
 
the geopolitical
 
and macroeconomic
 
outlook remains
 
volatile and
 
difficult to
predict.
 
Of course, major developments on this front will impact
 
our business in the short term.
 
As always, our
first priority is to stay close to
 
clients and help them manage the challenges and opportunities presented by this
uncertain environment.
 
For us, this is business as usual and we
 
remain focused on this priority.
 
At the same time, we will also execute on our integration plans with determination and
 
pace.
 
That will unlock
significant
 
economies
 
of
 
scale
 
allowing
 
us
 
to
 
fund
 
future
 
investments
 
as
 
we
 
continue
 
to
 
pursue
 
growth
opportunities. We are well aware of the
 
additional trust and responsibility that accompany this
 
transaction.
 
We
will not betray that trust, remaining
 
faithful to our strong culture
 
and conservative risk management.
 
I am excited about the opportunities that
 
lie ahead of us.
 
I strongly believe UBS will emerge
 
as a stronger
global financial institution, one of even greater
 
value to its clients, while remaining
 
safe and delivering
superior returns.
 
With that let’s get started with questions.
15
Analyst Q&A (CEO and CFO)
Jeremy Sigee, Exane BNP Paribas
Good morning. Thank you very much for all
 
the information. There's a lot to
 
get through and a lot of
questions. I'll just ask two things. One is,
 
could you talk about the Swiss integration,
 
which obviously takes
time and I think you said it's going to
 
legally close in 2024 and then physically
 
integrate in 2025. I just
wondered, you know,
 
what determines that timeframe
 
and how you manage? How you intend
 
to keep the
businesses stable whilst they're in
 
that slight sort of limbo period. So that's
 
my first question.
And the second question is about sort
 
of capital stack. The 14% CET1 target
 
I imagine it implies that you're
going to reissue AT1
 
and rebuild the AT1
 
part of your capital stack. And I saw a
 
headline the other day that
you might even do that this autumn.
 
I just wondered if you could
 
comment on that aspect, your intentions
 
in
terms of issuing AT1.
 
Thank you.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Thank you, Jeremy.
 
So, well, first of all, on the integration,
 
of course, you know,
 
now that we go through, as
I mentioned, it's very important to understand
 
the sequence of how we're
 
going to go through the merger
 
of
the different legal entities.
 
You know,
 
we, as I mentioned before,
 
our intention is to merge the two parent
company,
 
UBS AG and Credit Suisse
 
AG. And as a follow-through
 
different entities underneath will
 
go
through the same process.
 
So, we need to optimize the timing from
 
different aspects. And last
 
but not least,
also one of regulatory approvals.
 
So, we are starting now the
 
process to do that in terms of
 
the Swiss
business.
You know,
 
the way we will manage that is
 
by, as
 
I mentioned, first of all, assuring that
 
all people employed in
the Swiss businesses at UBS and Credit
 
Suisse will not be subject to any redundancies
 
until the end of 2024.
So, what's the most important message
 
is to clients, that nothing changes for them
 
and our view is to make it
very smooth for clients to go through
 
the transition.
And so once we go through this
 
kind of legal process and regulatory
 
process of merging the two entities,
 
at
the same time, we are also
 
tackling the IT migration, the operational
 
migration. And this is something that
will only be completed early on in 2025.
 
So, what we, the message here
 
is a balance between showing the
way forward to our people, to
 
clients, but without rush and in a stable
 
manner.
 
So that people you, our
clients continue to be served in the way
 
they expect to be served.
In terms of the CET1 target, well, of course,
 
AT1 continues
 
to be an important element of our capital
 
stack
and strategy.
 
I will not comment on speculations.
 
We are watching the market
 
carefully,
 
we will assess the
timing and the need of tapping the
 
markets when appropriate.
 
But, yes of course we are looking
 
at the AT1
markets and we will make our consideration
 
when appropriate.
Alastair Ryan, Bank of America Merrill
 
Lynch
Yes. Thank
 
you. It's Alastair,
 
BofA. Sergio, good morning. Great
 
to have clarity on the strategy and
 
obviously
the market is delighted as you are
 
that the flows have come back. Just then
 
on operating costs. Very
 
clear
ambitions and it looks like you're
 
bringing forward a little 2027
 
to 2026 when you've landed everything.
 
But
just given the size of the operating costs
 
in the old Credit Suisse investment
 
bank and non-core, can you
 
give
us any sense about how quickly you can
 
go there? So the quite a large
 
restructuring charge, integration
charge in the second half, but does that
 
cost number move out quickly so that
 
you normalize profitability or
 
is
there still quite a long, long tail to
 
the cost in that part of the business?
 
It's just, you know,
 
IB classic, the
revenues have gone, the costs are
 
still lingering and how quickly they
 
go? Thank you.
 
16
Todd
 
Tuckner
Hi, Alastair.
 
Yeah.
 
In terms of the speed at which we
 
expect to take out cost. As Sergio and
 
I said, we've been
operating at pace in terms of the cost takeout
 
which is among our top priorities.
 
In terms of in particular
restructuring the parts of Credit
 
Suisse that need immediate attention
 
and restructuring.
 
And so you see how
we're making very strong
 
progress out of the gate
 
in terms of the cost takeout through
 
the second half of
2023 and the cost to achieve those cost
 
takeout as well.
 
We've obviously modeled to get to
 
the targets that – or the landing
 
zones that we described earlier in terms
of returns and the cost-to-income ratio
 
at the end of 2026.
 
But as you say,
 
the costs do have a long tail in
some cases, and that's because of the
 
complexity of the operation that we
 
have to unpack.
 
Because you
have significant infrastructure and
 
technology; you have a very large
 
array of legal entities, over a thousand
legal entities, that have to be addressed.
 
And just back one proof point
 
on the software components,
 
there are 3,000 applications
 
and the work that
our team has done suggests that we will
 
only integrate 300 into UBS. That takes
 
time. And so, yes, there is a
long tail, but you can count on us to
 
operate quickly.
The last thing I would say is in terms
 
of clarity on a sense of as those things
 
hit through, because we give a
degree of clarity through the
 
second half of the year and we give
 
sort of that landing zone, we will come
back with further clarity once we do the
 
business planning process in the
 
second half of the year.
 
,And that
will be with our fourth quarter earnings in early
 
February.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
And I would probably complement
 
Todd’s
 
observation. Because, it is very important
 
that de facto the vast
majority of the assets are in
 
non-core and legacy are
 
supported by the Credit Suisse
 
IB platform. So, as we
progress in winding down
 
the, call it, core day-to-day
 
operation from the front
 
office stand point of view.
Whatever is left is going to be legacy infrastructure,
 
IB infrastructure, that is only
 
there for non-core. And so
you can see out then this will be a very
 
important element in determining how
 
quickly we get rid of non-core
assets. Because as a consequence of that,
 
we accelerate the winding down
 
of this operation. But I think that's
exactly what we are working on
 
and we will give you more
 
detail early on next year when we present
 
our Q4
results and our three year
 
plan.
Chris Hallam, Goldman Sachs
Good morning, everybody.
 
And thanks for taking my questions.
 
Just two for me. First, in Wealth
Management, you've talked about now
 
essentially being at scale in every growth
 
market globally.
 
But in
tangible terms, what does that enhanced
 
scale enable you to do that perhaps
 
you weren't able to do
previously? And have you seen any
 
proactive response from
 
competitors in reaction to
 
that enhanced scale?
That's my first question.
And then second, looking at the banking
 
business in Switzerland. Now the dust
 
has settled, does all the
volatility we saw earlier in the year changed
 
at all how you think strategically about running
 
the combined
Swiss bank be it in terms of capital, funding,
 
liquidity,
 
etc.? I guess just sort of simply has your
 
risk appetite
changed in Switzerland?
17
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Thank you. So, , look, in terms of scale,
 
of course, there is an economy
 
of scale. So, being able to leverage
UBS's IT platform as we onboard
 
all the assets. It's a huge advantage
 
because we have, call it, marginal costs
effects. But also when you look at
 
the geographic footprint of the two
 
operations, they are extremely
complementary in some areas
 
by relationships, but also in geographical
 
terms, i.e. for example, in Brazil, right.
So, we had a we had a lot of operation,
 
Credit Suisse is much stronger,
 
we now create a very
 
important
player.
 
In Asia we've really reinforced
 
our position and both in North Asia and
 
Southeast Asia. I think that in
Switzerland its quite clear,
 
And also across Europe where
 
there are different
 
markets where you know
 
ideally
it's a very fragmented market in general,
 
wealth management, particularly in
 
Europe. So there,
 
we create
economies of scales and things that we would
 
have not been able to fund from
 
our organic standpoint of
view. So, it's very
 
important.
 
As I mentioned before also Credit
 
Suisse across the board,
 
in asset management, in wealth management
brings capabilities and excellent products
 
that can be then leveraged into our,
 
into the UBS client franchise.
And we've seen the competitors.
 
I mean the reaction of competitors,
 
of course, they started to take
advantage of the fragile situation of Credit
 
Suisse already during 2022,
 
late 2022, of course, at the beginning
of the year.
 
And it's a pretty normal situation so.
 
Now having said that, I think that
 
as you saw from the
flows, clients are now comfortable
 
and they understand the value added
 
of the franchise, we are able to
retain and actually re-attract
 
back clients.
 
So, now it's our turn to be proactive
 
and we will not spare any
effort to regain back any lost
 
assets.
 
So, in terms of the Swiss has anything,
 
is anything changing? I mean, it's very
 
important to reiterate that
nothing changes in the way we run
 
our Swiss businesses until they are
 
fully integrated, right? So, from a
client point of view,
 
and in service, and in risk, and
 
capital allocation, nothing changes. And
 
even after we
merged, our commitment, as I said in my
 
remarks, is that we will continue
 
to sustain the combined lending
book. Of course, there are
 
exceptional risky situations, but our principle
 
is very clear.
 
One and one makes
two. We want to keep our market
 
share in Switzerland. Switzerland
 
is strategic, absolutely strategic for the
Group, and we will not want to
 
lose any of the market share we
 
have today.
Kian Abouhossein, JP Morgan
 
Yeah,
 
good morning, Sergio and Todd.
 
Thanks for taking my questions. First
 
question is on risk weighted
assets. You
 
have around USD 557 billion, USD
 
145 billion operational risk weighted assets.
 
And I'm just
wondering how we should think about
 
the exit run rates in 2026 in terms
 
of total risk weighted assets as well
as in terms of operational risk weighted assets
 
if I may.
 
And then the second question is related
 
to the non-
core. Could you talk a little bit about
 
the P&L effects of the non-core
 
ex any more active write-downs
 
or sales,
so to say,
 
leading to potential write-downs? I'm just trying
 
to understand the P&L in terms of run
 
rate of the
noncore legacy bank, if I may.
 
Thank you.
Todd
 
Tuckner
Hi Kian. In terms of the op risk RWA,
 
we will come back next quarter after
 
doing a fair bit of additional
modeling in terms of the op risk RWA
 
of the combined bank.
 
We've started to have initial views
 
on that and
initial discussions with our regulators
 
and that informed the 10 billion reduction
 
that I spoke about in my
comments. And then, in terms of the
 
trajectory and how we think about the
 
5.57 towards 2026, you'll have
more color on that after we
 
complete the business planning process
 
and our 3 YSP and come back early
 
next
year as mentioned.
18
In terms of, you asked about the P&L and
 
the run rate in non-core. So,
 
what I would say on that is. So first
off, the thing that's most important
 
is to take costs out and to focus very
 
significantly on the cost takeout
because there's a significant level
 
of overhead and costs that aren't
 
associated with the wind down of the
portfolio. So, the way to think about it
 
is that we have emphasized so far today
 
that we have to take costs
out and effectively,
 
the costs that sit in parts of Credit
 
Suisse that don't work. And so, those costs,
 
whether
they be personnel costs or whether they
 
be technology costs or real estate
 
costs, they move into non-core
and legacy if they don't support the core
 
businesses and they have to be run down
 
extremely quickly.
 
And so,
I would say,
 
first and foremost, it's a cost.
 
The way to think about it is the
 
cost rundown over the integration
timeline. Then there's the asset
 
rundown and we talked about the trajectory
 
from a natural rundown
perspective. And of course as Sergio mentioned
 
that there will be strategically
 
and actively looking at that.
And of course from that perspective,
 
we have taken some PPA
 
adjustments in excess of USD 5 billion
 
relating
to non-core and legacy.
 
I think that's a useful way to think about
 
it too, the fact that some of that pulls to
 
par
and some of that will be fair value positions.
And we will manage that book in the
 
most capital efficient way that we
 
can and dispose of positions as
appropriate. And also keeping just
 
considering funding costs and the costs
 
of operations, technology,
 
people,
etc.
Kian Abouhossein, JP Morgan
 
Okay.
 
Thank you. If I may just very briefly
 
on the risk weighted assets, if I –
 
to take a very simplistic view and I
just assume. I know the runoff,
 
I can make some assumptions about
 
Basel IV then op risk which is clearly
 
very
difficult to predict if I want
 
to be conservative. One could assume
 
that ultimately the risk weighted assets
conservatively could not grow if
 
at all to materially decline?
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Kian, its, you know,
 
we can't really comment right
 
now. We are
 
modeling. We are
 
really going through the
details of the plan. We need to really
 
also go through the exercise.
 
I'm sure you appreciate when
 
we put
together legal entities, the optimization
 
of all that, it's a fairly complex operation.
So, I wouldn't go into a territory of
 
projecting risk-weighted assets
 
going forward because: one, there
 
are two
elements – well, three elements.
 
The starting point is a good starting
 
point. We know that we can make
 
some
adjustments in the next three to four
 
months. Op risk was one of these subjects.
 
But then you need to go
through, first of all, what are
 
the efficiencies we take out as
 
we run down assets. Yes.
 
What are the efficiency
on optimizing legal entity operations? And
 
then what is the growth? Because
 
remember,
 
we are going to
grow, as well.
 
And we have to attach also that
 
prospect into the equation. I wouldn't
 
go into too much of a
risk-weighted assets projection until
 
you see what we tell you in Q3 and
 
Q4, for the Q4 results.
Flora Bocahut, Jefferies
 
Yes. Good
 
morning. Thank you for taking my questions.
 
I'd like to go back actually to some of
 
the elements
you have discussed on this call already,
 
especially the NCL. Maybe trying to
 
help us understand how much of
the ROCET1 improvement towards
 
2026 is going to be driven by this
 
unit, considering our move to natural
runoff here, you know,
 
trying to help us assess already
 
at this stage what – how loss-making
 
it is today and
how loss- making it would end up being
 
in 2026, only considering the natural runoff.
And then the other question I wanted to
 
raise is on the cost save. Just to
 
make sure I understand correctly.
 
So
you basically have already a target
 
of 3 billion cost saves on an annualized run
 
rate at the end of this year.
 
But this is compared to the end of
 
2022, I think. So, how much of
 
the annualized 3 billion do you kind
 
of
already have, you know,
 
in the 2Q accounts, please? Thank you.
19
Todd
 
Tuckner
Thanks, Flora. So, in terms of, I'll take,
 
maybe address the second point
 
first. In terms of the cost saves in the
– in terms of what we're projecting
 
by the end of the year at 3 billion. In terms
 
of what we see already in the
second quarter,
 
we haven't disclosed that specific number.
 
But I think from just the head count
 
reductions
that I mentioned in my remarks,
 
you could probably consider that
 
there's somewhere more
 
than, around half
has already started to hit through,
 
and what we're already
 
seeing in our underlying results.
In terms of our CET1 and how to think about
 
NCL as we go through the process.
 
For sure, NCL is, you know,
is going to be something that weighs down
 
on our CET1 naturally
 
Just given the fact that, you know,
 
we
have significant, at least over the 2024 to
 
2026 period.
 
If you just look at the natural profile
 
rundown, which
is effectively basis for how we started
 
thinking about the RoCET,1
 
not the only way we started to model
 
it,
but, for sure, one of the ways
 
that we were thinking about it. There's
 
a drag by definition in the sense that,
by the end of 2026, you could see in the
 
slide the natural profile has
 
roughly half going away.
 
Now, we can
model different scenarios as
 
can you, but we're not going to
 
discuss how we're thinking about
 
it and
obviously,
 
some of that is still very much unknown.
 
In terms of the cost takeout, we
 
would expect to be
taking out the lion's share of the
 
costs in non-core and legacy
 
by the time the integration is materially
complete, by definition. We will
 
do that. There’ll be, we expect
 
some residual carry that we'll
 
have to take on
or continue to run down beyond 2026. So,
 
there is some, if you will, negative
 
burn that is associated with
NCL in our modeling.
Stefan Stalmann, Autonomous Research
 
Good morning and thank you very much for the
 
presentation. I have two numbers
 
questions, please. So, the
first one is on capitalized software.
 
You
 
have taken these roughly 1.8 billion
 
of software impairments in the
PPA. Can
 
you give us a rough sense
 
of how much of a remaining amount
 
of capitalized software remains
 
in
your group accounts that relates
 
to CS? And is there a risk of further
 
impairments given that you want
 
to
retain only about 10% of these
 
systems?
And the second question relates
 
to your capital requirements.
 
So, you show still at 10.6% CET1
 
over risk-
weighted assets. If we were
 
to apply the current capital metrics
 
that is outlined in Swiss banking
 
law, what
would be the capital requirement
 
if there was no FINMA transitional
 
forbearance, please ? Thank you very
much.
Todd
 
Tuckner
Okay.
 
Thanks, Stefan. In terms of the capitalized
 
software, as you say,
 
1.8 billion was the amount that was
 
in
the Credit Suisse AG reported
 
number today.
 
I think in the PPA
 
number overall in total, there was
 
slightly
more about2 billion. You
 
can look at the CS, you know,
 
balance sheet from year end
 
or Q1, Q2, or sorry,
 
Q1
or year end and see, there
 
was capitalized software in the
 
neighborhood of 3 billion. So effectively
 
what we
have done is taken two-thirds
 
down and have one-third left
 
on a shorter economic useful life that
 
aligns with
how we think about: a), the time it's
 
going to take us to fully decommission everything
 
and b), leaving what
we think we still get value from
 
at the end. So, all that has been sort
 
of factored into the PPA.
 
So, I don't see
necessarily further impairments, but because
 
we now have just what's left, about
 
a 1 billion that will have a
shorter economic useful life, that aligns
 
to how we're thinking about
 
the restructuring.
20
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Stefan on CET1, I think when you look
 
at the fully implemented regime
 
in Switzerland which is not applicable
to us until 2027, it would be around
 
12.5%. 12-point-plus and that's you know
 
the reason why we raised
 
our
CET1 ratio was both to reflect, you
 
know, a buffer
 
there to accommodate for the
 
restructuring, but also is a
clear,
 
call it small, front running of what
 
we expect to come.
 
As a consequence of that, and
 
our, and
 
the
finalization of Basel III, which is partially
 
already in our books. So, you can
 
count on this number to be
calibrated with a pretty medium term,
 
medium to long-term expectation
 
of the current interpretation
 
of all
regulatory regimes worldwide,
 
including Switzerland.
Anke Reingen, RBC
Thank you very much for taking my questions.
 
The first is on revenue cost synergies.
 
I mean, you had a
comment and especially if you think you
 
can keep this with market share
 
unchanged. Is it something you
really think maybe people get
 
overly concerned and you don't see quite that risk
 
of a revenue dissynergies
even if you potentially have to contract
 
some of this at bit more attractive
 
rates or incentivizing your advisors?
And then secondly,
 
on slide 16 where you show us
 
the return path and there's this
 
block about the funding
cost efficiencies. And that's something
 
you – I guess apart from the
 
drop out of the higher expense funding
at Credit Suisse, is there
 
other areas where you see
 
the material benefits from lowering
 
funding costs and
overall group benefits because this
 
block is the same size as the cost base
 
rightsizing? Obviously can maybe
elaborate a bit more on that area.
 
Thank you.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Let me take the first question. First
 
of all, I haven't said that we will keep
 
our market share. I said that our
ambition is to keep the market share.
 
Now, having said
 
that, Credit Suisse lost their market
 
share and
business in the last 12 months or so.
So, what we count on is the fact that,
 
you know, we
 
will be able to recapture
 
and regain some of the market
share and what you saw lately
 
in the last couple of months is a good
 
sign of that. But, of course, we are
 
not,
we are realistic and we are
 
also factoring in that we may lose market
 
shares because some clients
 
may or may
not feel, you know,
 
that they want a certain concentration
 
of risk. So, you know,
 
there is no danger of us
budgeting or planning blue-sky scenarios
 
on that one. We are realistic,
 
but that should not be confused with
our desire to keep as much as
 
we can.
Todd
 
Tuckner
Anke, on the second, –the second
 
question in terms of material benefits, we
 
see you obviously highlighted
the most significant one, which will be
 
just the take out of the significant cost
 
that we were wearing in
connection with the PLB and the ELA+
 
facilities. But, I would say,
 
and, as I've remarked earlier,
 
that we expect
the positive contribution from the
 
Credit Suisse wealth management
 
franchise in our NII in 3Q and that
comes principally from having stabilized
 
the business and net new deposits that
 
are also helping on NII. So,
 
I
would say that's another factor that
 
is helping on the underlying profitability.
Benjamin Goy,
 
Deutsche Bank
Yes. Hi.
 
Good morning. Two
 
questions from my side. The first,
 
to play devil's advocate, are there
 
more
outflows to come or where you
 
kind of already had outflows from
 
clients, but maybe some longer-term
structures, partnerships or anything
 
like that take time to see the outflows?
And then secondly,
 
for the first time in a while, your
 
CET1 capital is higher than your tangible
 
book value or
21
almost the same. So now,
 
the 15% return on CET1, should
 
that also be broadly similar to
 
RoTE, going
forward, or should we expect
 
more moving parts towards
 
2026? Thank you very much.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Thank you. Let me take the first questions.
 
I guess, as I mentioned before,
 
now, we are
 
under wealth
management broader perimeter.
 
I think that, of course, we may still
 
have client advisors that resigned
 
over
the last three or four months
 
or that, as they move into a new
 
organization, they may be able to
 
bring some
assets with them. What we see right
 
now is clear that the ability of the
 
people that left a while ago to really
move assets is fairly limited. And this
 
is nothing new compared to what
 
UBS went through 10 years ago
 
or
more than 10 years ago in recognizing
 
that there is a lot of institutional
 
loyalty of the client base. And now
that we have stabilized the franchises, of
 
course, we are even stronger
 
in retaining assets. And as
 
I mentioned
before, our desires to re
 
-bring back assets. So, look, the movement,
 
the gross movements are
 
going to be
very difficult to predict, but
 
the net outcome we feel pretty
 
comfortable will be positive.
Todd
 
Tuckner
 
And Benjamin, in terms of the return
 
on CET1 versus RoTE impact, I'd say there
 
are two factors that do argue
in favor of moving in that direction,
 
just not yet but for sure on the
 
first one, the denominator effect
 
we’re
bigger and so that's obviously going to make
 
the difference between
 
the historic RoTE versus RoCET1 smaller,
by definition. So – and you know that
 
– so that denominator effect
 
is now in play and it is helpful as you
suggest probably as well, contributing
 
to what you observe.
The other one though which has been
 
our historic delta that really has
 
given us pause to move off of
 
what
we think is a more meaningful return
 
measure are DTAs.
 
But there of course, you know,
 
as they amortize
down, because these generally although
 
not exclusively but generally relate
 
to you know very old losses that
we're you know now you know
 
continuing to just chip away at as that
 
balance comes down, then that's yet
another factor that would argue in favor
 
of moving to the other measure.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Well, by the way,
 
for the foreseeable future
 
and from a the other angle
 
of measuring our capital return
flexibility,
 
the CET1 ratio is a better proxy
 
because this is the true binding constraint.
Benjamin Goy,
 
Deutsche Bank
Fair enough and very clear.
 
Thank you.
Amit Goel, Barclays
Hi. Thank you and thanks for a lot
 
of good information. The first question
 
was, I appreciate there's
 
a lot of
moving parts. We're going
 
to spend a bit of time trying to update
 
estimates and all that kind of stuff.
 
But in
terms of the path for the RoCET1 to
 
get to that kind of 15% 2026 exit rate,
 
are you able to give any color
 
in
terms of expectation for 2024, 2025,
 
or how you’d like it to trend?
And then secondly,
 
just on the costs. It'll be great
 
to get a bit more color on the
 
saving. So, I'm just kind of
curious things like, you know,
 
10 billion gross, but how much
 
net saving or how much reinvestment
 
of that
do you expect to do where
 
you found the incremental 2 billion
 
versus the 8 billion? And also, how
 
you're
spending, you know,
 
the 12 billion restructuring? Because
 
it does seem like, you know,
 
quite a big number.
So, you know, just
 
wondering if there could be
 
benefits there as well. Thank you.
22
Todd
 
Tuckner
Hey Amit. So, as mentioned in terms
 
of color,
 
further color on the trajectory as to
 
we get end of 2023 to end
of 2026, we'll come back on that to
 
provide an update in 3Q as to where
 
we are. But then, you know,
 
a
much more fulsome perspective
 
after our business planning processes
 
is complete by the end of the year
 
into
early next year.
In terms of the cost savings, you know,
 
Sergio also made, remarked
 
in his comments. The gross number
 
is
greater than 10 billion as you
 
highlight. But we will be making investments.
 
We're going to grow
 
our
business. We're going to
 
invest in technology.
 
We're going to, you know,
 
also deal with inflationary factors
 
if
need be. So, you know,
 
that's all in the thinking around
 
it, around half of the gross
 
cost saves relate to
effectively restructuring the
 
Credit Suisse IB and CRU units. And
 
the other half gross relates
 
to the synergies
we expect
 
to realize, but then that will
 
be – they'll be investments back into the
 
technology and the people to
grow the core franchises.
Andrew Lim, Société Générale
Hi. Good morning. Thanks for taking my questions
 
and thanks for all the detail. So, firstly,
 
on the fair value
markdowns that you've taken there,
 
related to that, could you
 
give an idea of the maturity remaining
 
on
these financial assets and how we should
 
think about the reversal of those
 
markdowns? So, you've
highlighted more than 1.5 billion
 
for the second half of this year.
 
Is that the kind of run rate that we
 
should
be expecting going forward?
And then secondly,
 
on the NCL, perhaps I can ask it a
 
different way.
 
Do you have a better idea now of what
the ultimate cumulative losses might be from
 
the NCL? Would they
 
be less than the 5 billion maybe that you
might have been exposed to under the LPA
 
agreement? That's my question
 
there.
And then thirdly,
 
might I quickly ask, on the domestic
 
side, certainly for some businesses, you
 
will have a
significant market share. And
 
I wonder if there's any maybe
 
regulatory risk that that market share
 
might be
looked at and you'd be forced
 
to bring it down to a level which is more
 
palatable to the regulators. Thank
you.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Yeah.
 
Because you asked three questions
 
instead of two, I'll take the last one.
 
On the market share one, as
you know, we got regulatory
 
approvals to basically not be subject
 
to any competitive constraints, and
 
that
was done just to secure and
 
be able to communicate and to be able
 
to place. Although it was already
 
crystal
clear as it is today that there is
 
no market share topics for the combined
 
unit in Switzerland.
I mean if you go across the board,
 
cantonal banks are larger on any
 
dimensions of relevant personal
 
and
commercial banking business in Switzerland.
 
And when you measure in
 
terms of branches, we are combined
the third largest player.
 
So, now this is very relevant
 
but because some people may argue,
 
well, these
cantonal banks are combined versus
 
you being one unit. Well, the
 
fact, the truth of the matter is that we
compete in those cantons with the local
 
cantonal banks. It's extremely
 
relevant to make that difference.
Therefore we will, of course,
 
contribute what the competitive authorities
 
have to say about it and put our
views into it. But I don't really expect
 
that on a fact based discussions we
 
will be subject to any limitation or
meaningful limitations in respect
 
of our activities going forward.
23
Andrew let me just unpack your first
 
and second, I think they're
 
related. So, on the first, you
 
know as we
highlighted earlier,
 
we took around 15 billion of
 
fair value marks on financial assets
 
and liabilities, 12.5 billion
where we indicated would pull to
 
par because they relate to accrual
 
accounted positions and another roughly
2.5 billion relate to fair value positions
 
where we had further markdown
 
in light of liquidity model risk other
type issues.
On the piece that pulls to par,
 
just keep in mind that 4 billion of that
 
12.5 relates to non-core
 
and legacy.
 
So
that's important to know and about 8.5
 
billion more in our core
 
businesses. On the core business
 
piece,
generally speaking, we see three
 
to four years that we should unwind
 
between 70% and 80%. There
 
will be
a longer tail especially on some fixed
 
rate loans that will go longer than
 
that. So, we'll see pull-to-par effects
that extend beyond the three-
 
to four-year timeframe. But most of
 
it will accrete to income over the shorter
timeframe, as I mentioned.
To
 
the NCL point though, since we have
 
roughly 4 billion of the pull-to-par
 
in NCL and roughly 2 billion in
 
the
fair value marks, so you have 5 to
 
6 billion of fair value adjustments in NCL.
 
And I think, to go to your second
question, that's important to understand
 
just given that we think that the
 
positions are appropriately
 
marked.
And from here, we will continue
 
to consider all our optionality in terms
 
of running down the portfolio, as
Sergio mentioned earlier,
 
in a most capital and cost efficient
 
way.
 
But we think the positions are
 
being carried
at appropriate levels presently.
Andrew Lim, Société Générale
That's great. That's really
 
helpful. Thanks.
Adam Terelak,
 
Mediobanca
Morning. Thank you for the questions. I want
 
to get under the hood a little bit more
 
in Wealth Management.
Firstly,
 
on the CS business acquired,
 
clearly there are some
 
business exits to worry about some
 
that you think
non-core in the kind of the
 
wealth management unit. Can you give
 
us a sense of what the revenue
 
attached
to that might look like. But also any detail
 
on AT1 cost
 
savings that come through
 
the NII in that division as
well.
And then secondly,
 
the competitive environment.
 
I noticed in your GWM business, UBS
 
standalone costs are
up on lower revenues. I just want
 
to know kind of what the cost
 
is to retain management at this point?
 
What
are you seeing the competitive landscape
 
on the RM side or the advisors side,
 
but also in your deposit side
what sort of campaigns have you been
 
running to re-attract deposits and
 
how easy or difficult has that
 
been
in the current rates and deposits environment?
 
Thank you.
Todd
 
Tuckner
Thanks, Adam. On the second one, would
 
just say in terms of GWM costs. So,
 
there's very significant positive
operating leverage outside of the US, such
 
important to note this is in the GWM
 
– in the UBS subgroup
GWM, very significant positive operating
 
leverage. We were investing
 
for growth in that business.
 
But that
business as well has been, you know,
 
saw a strong NII performance
 
and had strong PBT growth
 
as I
highlighted in my comments earlier.
As I also highlighted, it's more
 
on the GWM overall side, just the fact
 
that we've seen a lot of cash sorting
and rotation on NII in the Americas
 
and that sort of pulled the Americas
 
revenue down reasonably
significantly.
 
So, quarter-on-quarter,
 
year-on-year.
 
And as a result, you know,
 
we see that negative operating
leverage, but we're continuing to
 
invest in that business across the
 
board and so some of that as
 
well,
contributes to the higher cost.
 
24
On your deposit campaign question I would
 
say that you know like any bank,
 
we value deposits, we value
deposits in the win-back context in wealth
 
management. We also just value
 
deposits to fund our business,
loan growth, et cetera, so there's
 
nothing I've seen that I would call out there
 
in terms of deposit betas that
have moved in a direction I would
 
consider to be anything other than
 
what we see across peers.
In terms of the acquired – you
 
were asking business exits and the
 
revenue attached. At this point,
 
we have in
terms of what's being expected to move
 
into non-core and legacy that
 
was highlighted on one of the earlier
slides. The revenue attached with
 
that business is less than 100 million
 
on an annualized basis in terms of net
revenues, in terms of what's moving
 
across. And that's of course
 
you know not risk-adjusted for – and so
that, that needs to be considered.
 
In terms of AT1
 
cost savings that hit through the
 
business from what had
been, say,
 
anything there has really
 
just been captured in the Credit
 
Suisse Corporate Center as an
 
offset
potentially to the inflated cost so I would
 
expect that that'll normalize now as you
 
know as the businesses
come together.
Adam Terelak,
 
Mediobanca
So, funding it seems that is in the corporate
 
center and not in the divisions?
Serio P.
 
Ermotti
Can you repeat? It wasn't clear.
 
Sorry.
Adam Terela
 
k, Mediobanca
So, any funding noise, AT1
 
versus liquidity facility resourced
 
out in the corporate center rather than
 
in-house?
Todd
 
Tuckner
Yeah. That
 
was our understanding from
 
Credit Suisse's practice pre-acquisition,
 
yes.
Adam Terelak,
 
Mediobanca
Okay.
 
Thank you.
Andrew Coombs, Citigroup
Good morning it’s Andrew Coombs from
 
Citi and thank you for taking my
 
questions. Two
 
if I may.
 
Firstly,
 
I
want to turn back to follow up on the PPA
 
pull-to-par bit in relationship
 
to the restructuring charges.
 
You
made this comment that, out of the period
 
at end of 2026, I think restructuring
 
charges will be largely but
not wholly offset by the PPA
 
pull-to-par effect. And then
 
in your later comments, you talked about
 
probably
0.5 billion of pull-to-
 
par effect, of which 4.5 would
 
be noncore, and that most of
 
that would be recognized
in a three-
 
to four-year timeframe.
 
So, can we assume restructuring
 
charges of the magnitude of 12.5?
 
And
can you give us a feel for the timing
 
of those relative to the PPA
 
pull-to-par?
And then the second question is on slide
 
29. You
 
provide a useful quarterly trajectory
 
going from minus 0.3
billion in Q2 and you talked about breakeven
 
in Q3. But you also flagged 750 million
 
of savings, 550 million
of funding cost savings. There's
 
a 650 million arguably one-off
 
ECL charge on the non-credit
 
impaired CS
portfolio data this quarter.
 
So, just trying to understand the going from
 
minus 0.3 billion to 0, even with all
those additional benefits Q-on-Q, what's
 
the offset? I guess there'd
 
be some seasonality on revenue,
 
a bit of
a decline in NII. But any more
 
color there?
25
Todd
 
Tuckner
So, Andrew,
 
in terms of – I’ll take the second
 
point first – in terms of the story on the
 
underlying profitability,
yeah, I mean just be very clear that the
 
cost saves that we expect to see by
 
the end of 2023 of 3 billion, which
we think you can price into 2024, some
 
of that has been realized. But as
 
I would – the way I would think
about it is there is work that's ongoing
 
and we expect that the greater
 
than 3 billion number is something
that we'll see at the end of the year
 
hitting through. I would continue to
 
reemphasize the funding cost
 
point
that was in 2Q that will benefit 3Q and
 
fully in 4Q that helps. And then the
 
stabilization as flows and all that
will sort of hit through as we
 
go on an underlying basis. And as I said,
 
we expect to break even
 
in the third
quarter coming out of roughly a
 
300 million-
 
plus improvement. And then to
 
be positive in 4Q for the reasons
that I mentioned.
In terms of the restructuring you asked
 
about, we'll come back in further details
 
in terms of how much
restructuring specifically there'll
 
be. We're giving a perspective
 
that we expect the number to be
 
broadly
offset by the pull-to-par effects.
 
But at this point in time, we're
 
going to need to detail that out in the
business planning process and come
 
back, as we have said, with our fourth
 
quarter earnings.
 
Andrew Coombs
Thank you.
Vishal Shah, Morgan Stanley
Hi. Thank you so much for your questions.
 
My first one is on wealth management.
 
Just wanted to get a sense
on you know how you are
 
assessing you know the business overlaps
 
in that segment – in that segment
 
or
you've had you know further chance to sort
 
of you know look at you know different
 
regions and how to
respond to all the ongoing competitive
 
pressures and in terms of you
 
know relationship managers and
 
then
sort of bankers in that segment? So, if you
 
could give a bit of an update on
 
that side?
And then the second one is on the investment
 
bank, the CS non-core perimeter
 
of 55 billion. I know in one of
your slides have provided a natural run
 
-off rate, but I was just trying
 
to get a sense if you could provide
 
any
sort of color in terms of what is your
 
sort of ambition on actively winding
 
down this perimeter in terms of
timeline, i.e., could we expect you
 
know the next two years basically by
 
2025 you know broadly most
 
of this
run down to be done. Is that is that a fair
 
assumption or are you looking
 
at it in a bit of a different
 
way?
Thank you so much.
Todd
 
Tuckner
Hey,
 
Vishal. I mean I think on this on that
 
second question, we've addressed
 
that in the sense that you know
we offer the natural rundown just
 
given you know of course, we have
 
to take care and ensure
 
that we're
protecting our counterparties and
 
we're doing things in the
 
best interests of the firm and so
 
on these
positions that we, you know,
 
we will look – we will look strategically
 
to exit them as quickly as possible.
 
But
at this point, I would say,
 
we'll come back and give you progress
 
as we've done already in 2Q
 
in terms of the
actual RWA reduction
 
relative to the natural runoff
 
profile. We'll continue to
 
do that. And to the extent we
can give more color through
 
our planning process, we will.
 
But again, these are positions where
 
we think,
naturally,
 
there'll be strategic exits and
 
opportunities that arise and not something
 
we'll, I will be disclosing.
26
In terms of your first question on Wealth
 
Management and assessing business
 
overlaps, I mean, in general,
the way we approach the integration
 
is to look at Credit Suisse is adding
 
value in a lot of the areas
 
in which
we already operate. But also, as Sergio
 
mentioned, areas where
 
we have less of a presence.
 
Brazil was
mentioned. There are important
 
parts of the Middle East where that's
 
the case; important parts of Southeast
Asia. Also, much bigger in Europe
 
overall. So, in terms of assessing the
 
overlaps, I mean, in the end of the
day, relationship
 
managers have their client relationships
 
and we want to retain them
 
all. And of course,
we're looking at how to manage
 
the business in the most efficient
 
and effective way.
I would make one additional comment
 
which is very important, which is that
 
Iqbal had announced the area
market heads on a combined basis, and
 
that was very important just in the last
 
several weeks and was in
comments Sergio made as well, because when
 
we start integrating how we approach
 
the market and so
we're in the market on an integrated
 
basis, which, of course, just took time even
 
though we move quickly in
the two and a half months since we've
 
closed, to be in the market on
 
an integrated basis having market
heads that have now been decided across
 
wealth management on a combined and
 
integrated basis is quite a
step that helps us to manage some of
 
the business overlaps and competitive pressures
 
that you were asking
about.
Vishal Shah, Morgan Stanley
Okay.
 
Thank you so much.
Sergio P.
 
Ermotti
Okay.
 
The last answer and questions and I'm sure
 
we're going to have a chance
 
to stay in touch between
now and November 7
th
 
when we announce the Q3 results.
 
For the time being, thank you for
 
dialing in.
Thanks for your questions. And well as
 
I say,
 
looking forward to staying in touch.
 
Thank you.
 
27
Cautionary Statement
 
Regarding Forward
 
-Looking Statements
 
|
 
This document
 
contains statements
 
that constitute
 
“forward-looking statements,”
including but not limited
 
to management’s outlook for
 
UBS’s financial performance, statements
 
relating to the anticipated
 
effect of transactions and
 
strategic
initiatives on UBS’s
 
business and future development and
 
goals or intentions
 
to achieve climate,
 
sustainability and other social
 
objectives. While
 
these
 
forward-
looking statements
 
represent UBS’s
 
judgments, expectations
 
and objectives concerning
 
the matters described,
 
a number
 
of risks, uncertainties
 
and other
important factors could cause
 
actual developments and results
 
to differ materially from
 
UBS’s expectations. The
 
Russia–Ukraine war continues to
 
affect global
markets, exacerbate
 
global inflation,
 
and slow global
 
growth. In
 
addition, the war
 
has caused significant
 
population displacement,
 
and shortages
 
of vital
commodities, including energy shortages
 
and food insecurity, and has
 
increased the risk of
 
recession in OECD
 
economies. The coordinated sanctions
 
on Russia
and Belarus, and
 
Russian and Belarusian
 
entities and nationals,
 
and the uncertainty
 
as to whether the
 
war will widen and
 
intensify,
 
may continue to have
significant adverse effects on the market and
 
macroeconomic conditions, including in ways that cannot be
 
anticipated. UBS’s acquisition of Credit Suisse has
materially changed our outlook and strategic direction and introduced new operational challenges. The integration of the Credit Suisse entities into the UBS
structure is expected to
 
take between three to
 
five years and
 
presents significant risks, including the
 
risks that UBS
 
Group AG may
 
be unable
 
to achieve
 
the cost
reductions and other benefits
 
contemplated by the transaction.
 
This creates significantly greater uncertainty
 
about forward-looking statements. Other factors
that may affect our
 
performance and ability to
 
achieve our plans,
 
outlook and other
 
objectives also include, but
 
are not limited
 
to: (i)
 
the degree
 
to which
 
UBS is
successful in the execution of
 
its strategic plans, including its
 
cost reduction and efficiency initiatives and
 
its ability to manage
 
its levels of risk-weighted assets
(RWA) and leverage ratio
 
denominator (LRD), liquidity coverage ratio
 
and other financial
 
resources, including changes in
 
RWA assets and liabilities
 
arising
 
from
higher market
 
volatility and
 
the size
 
of the combined
 
bank; (ii) the
 
degree to
 
which UBS
 
is successful
 
in implementing
 
changes to its
 
businesses to
 
meet
changing market, regulatory and other conditions, including as a
 
result of the acquisition of Credit Suisse; (iii) increased inflation and
 
interest rate volatility in
major markets; (iv) developments in the macroeconomic climate and in the
 
markets in which UBS operates or
 
to which it is exposed, including movements in
securities prices or
 
liquidity, credit spreads, currency exchange rates, deterioration or
 
slow recovery in
 
residential and
 
commercial
 
real estate
 
markets,
 
the effects
of economic conditions,
 
including increasing
 
inflationary pressures,
 
market developments,
 
increasing geopolitical
 
tensions, and changes
 
to national trade
policies on the financial
 
position or creditworthiness
 
of UBS’s clients and
 
counterparties, as well
 
as on client
 
sentiment and levels
 
of activity,
 
including the
COVID-19 pandemic and the measures taken
 
to manage it, which
 
have had and may
 
also continue to have a
 
significant adverse effect on global and
 
regional
economic activity, including disruptions to global
 
supply chains and
 
labor market displacements; (v) changes
 
in the availability of
 
capital and
 
funding,
 
including
any adverse changes
 
in UBS’s credit
 
spreads and credit ratings
 
of UBS, Credit
 
Suisse, sovereign issuers, structured credit products
 
or credit-related
 
exposures,
 
as
well as availability
 
and cost of
 
funding to meet requirements for
 
debt eligible for total
 
loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC), in
 
particular in light of
 
the acquisition of
Credit Suisse; (vi) changes in central bank policies or the implementation of financial legislation and regulation in Switzerland, the US, the UK, the European
Union and other financial centers that have
 
imposed, or resulted in, or may
 
do so in the future, more stringent
 
or entity-specific capital, TLAC, leverage ratio,
net stable funding ratio, liquidity and
 
funding requirements, heightened operational resilience requirements, incremental tax requirements, additional levies,
limitations on permitted
 
activities, constraints on remuneration,
 
constraints on transfers of
 
capital and liquidity
 
and sharing of operational
 
costs across the
Group or other measures,
 
and the effect these
 
will or would have
 
on UBS’s business activities;
 
(vii) UBS’s ability to
 
successfully implement resolvability
 
and
related regulatory
 
requirements and
 
the potential need
 
to make further
 
changes to the
 
legal structure
 
or booking model
 
of UBS in
 
response to legal
 
and
regulatory requirements
 
and any additional
 
requirements due
 
to its acquisition of
 
Credit Suisse, or
 
other developments; (viii)
 
UBS’s ability to
 
maintain and
improve its systems and
 
controls for complying with sanctions
 
in a timely
 
manner and for the
 
detection and prevention of money
 
laundering to meet evolving
regulatory requirements
 
and expectations,
 
in particular
 
in current
 
geopolitical turmoil;
 
(ix) the uncertainty
 
arising from
 
domestic stresses
 
in certain
 
major
economies; (x) changes in UBS’s competitive position, including whether differences in regulatory capital and other requirements among the major financial
centers adversely affect UBS’s ability
 
to compete in certain lines of business;
 
(xi) changes in the standards of
 
conduct applicable to our
 
businesses that may
result from
 
new regulations
 
or new
 
enforcement
 
of existing
 
standards,
 
including
 
measures to
 
impose new
 
and enhanced
 
duties when
 
interacting with
customers and in
 
the execution and
 
handling of customer transactions;
 
(xii) the liability to which
 
UBS may be
 
exposed, or possible
 
constraints or sanctions
 
that
regulatory authorities might impose on
 
UBS, due to
 
litigation, contractual claims and
 
regulatory investigations, including the potential for
 
disqualification
 
from
certain businesses, potentially large
 
fines or monetary
 
penalties, or the
 
loss of licenses
 
or privileges as
 
a result of
 
regulatory or other governmental
 
sanctions,
 
as
well as the effect that litigation, regulatory and similar matters have on the
 
operational risk component of our RWA, including as a result of its acquisition of
Credit Suisse, as well as the amount of capital available for return to
 
shareholders; (xiii) the effects on
 
UBS’s business, in particular cross-border
 
banking, of
sanctions, tax
 
or regulatory
 
developments and
 
of possible
 
changes in
 
UBS’s policies
 
and practices;
 
(xiv) UBS’s ability
 
to retain
 
and attract
 
the employees
necessary to generate
 
revenues and to manage,
 
support and control its
 
businesses, which may
 
be affected by competitive
 
factors;
 
(xv) changes
 
in accounting
 
or
tax standards or policies,
 
and determinations or interpretations affecting the
 
recognition of gain or
 
loss, the valuation
 
of goodwill, the recognition of
 
deferred
tax assets and
 
other matters; (xvi) UBS’s ability
 
to implement new
 
technologies and business
 
methods, including digital services
 
and technologies,
 
and ability
 
to
successfully compete with both existing and new financial service providers, some
 
of which may not be regulated to the
 
same extent; (xvii) limitations on the
effectiveness of UBS’s
 
internal
 
processes for risk management,
 
risk control, measurement and modeling,
 
and of
 
financial
 
models
 
generally;
 
(xviii) the
 
occurrence
of operational failures, such as fraud, misconduct, unauthorized trading, financial crime, cyberattacks, data leakage and systems failures, the risk of which is
increased with cyberattack threats from both nation states and non-nation
 
-state actors targeting financial institutions; (xix) restrictions on the ability of UBS
Group AG to make
 
payments or distributions, including due to
 
restrictions on the ability of
 
its subsidiaries to make
 
loans or distributions, directly or indirectly,
or, in the case of financial difficulties, due
 
to the exercise by FINMA
 
or the regulators of UBS’s
 
operations in other countries of their
 
broad statutory powers in
relation to protective measures, restructuring and liquidation proceedings; (xx) the degree to which changes in regulation, capital or
 
legal structure, financial
results or other factors
 
may affect UBS’s
 
ability to maintain its
 
stated capital
 
return objective; (xxi) uncertainty over
 
the scope of
 
actions that
 
may be
 
required
 
by
UBS, governments and
 
others for UBS
 
to achieve goals
 
relating to climate,
 
environmental and
 
social matters, as
 
well as the evolving
 
nature of underlying
science and industry and the
 
possibility of conflict between different governmental
 
standards and regulatory regimes; (xxii) the ability
 
of UBS to access
 
capital
markets; (xxiii) the ability of UBS to successfully recover from a disaster or other business continuity
 
problem due to a hurricane, flood, earthquake, terrorist
attack, war, conflict (e.g., the Russia–Ukraine war), pandemic, security breach, cyberattack, power loss, telecommunications failure or other natural or man-
made event, including the
 
ability to function remotely
 
during long-term disruptions such
 
as the COVID-19
 
(coronavirus) pandemic; (xxiv) the level
 
of success
 
in
the absorption of
 
Credit Suisse, in
 
the integration of
 
the two groups
 
and their businesses,
 
and in the
 
execution of the
 
planned
 
strategy
 
regarding
 
cost reduction
and divestment of any non-core assets, the existing assets and liabilities currently
 
existing in the Credit Suisse Group, the level of resulting impairments
 
and
write-downs, the effect of
 
the consummation of the
 
integration on the
 
operational results, share price and
 
credit rating of UBS
 
– delays,
 
difficulties,
 
or failure
 
in
closing the transaction may
 
cause market disruption and
 
challenges for UBS
 
to maintain business,
 
contractual and
 
operational
 
relationships;
 
and (xxv)
 
the
 
effect
that these or
 
other factors or
 
unanticipated events, including media
 
reports and speculations, may
 
have on
 
our reputation
 
and the
 
additional
 
consequences
 
that
this may have
 
on our business
 
and performance. The sequence
 
in which the
 
factors above are presented is
 
not indicative of
 
their likelihood
 
of occurrence
 
or the
potential magnitude of their
 
consequences. Our business and
 
financial performance could be affected
 
by other factors identified
 
in our past
 
and future filings
and reports, including those
 
filed with the US Securities and Exchange
 
Commission (the SEC). More
 
detailed information about those
 
factors is set forth in
documents furnished by UBS and
 
filings made by UBS
 
with the SEC, including the
 
Annual Report on Form 20-F for
 
the year ended 31 December 2022.
 
UBS is
not under any
 
obligation to (and
 
expressly disclaims any obligation to)
 
update or alter
 
its forward-looking statements, whether as
 
a result of
 
new information,
future events, or otherwise.
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities
 
Exchange Act of 1934, the registrants
 
have duly
caused this report to be signed on their behalf
 
by the undersigned, thereunto duly
 
authorized.
UBS Group AG
By:
 
/s/ David Kelly
 
_
Name:
 
David Kelly
Title:
 
Managing Director
 
By:
 
/s/ Ella Campi
 
_
Name:
 
Ella Campi
Title:
 
Executive Director
UBS AG
By:
 
/s/ David Kelly
 
_
Name:
 
David Kelly
Title:
 
Managing Director
 
By:
 
/s/ Ella Campi
 
_
Name:
 
Ella Campi
Title:
 
Executive Director
Credit Suisse AG
By:
 
/s/ Ulrich Körner
 
_____
Name:
 
Ulrich Körner
Title:
 
Chief Executive Officer
By:
 
/s/
 
Simon Grimwood
 
_
Name:
 
Simon Grimwood
Title:
 
Chief Financial Officer
Date:
 
September 1, 2023