From: Joe Berns [mailto:j_berns@hotmail.com] Sent: Sunday, July 07, 2002 2:36 AM To: senator@boxer.senate.gov; BizCenter@CNBC.com; capreport@cnbc.com; cavuto@foxnews.com; ClosingBell@CNBC.com; vice.president@whitehouse.gov; senator@feinstein.senate.gov; demldr@hr.house.gov; dhastert@hr.house.gov; president@whitehouse.gov; Kudlow-Cramer@CNBC.com; MarketWeek@CNBC.com; mike.honda.@mail.house.gov; MorningCall@CNBC.com; PowerLunch@CNBC.com; Lou@CNBC.com; rule-comments@sec.gov; Squawk@CNBC.com; tom_daschle@daschle.senate.gov; sentorlott@lott.senate.gov; wakeupcall@CNBC.com Subject: Corporate Corruption (s7-24-02) I am not a CEO, MBA, or CPA. I am an individual investor that attempts to perform my due diligence as part of the process of making my investing decisions. It is clear to me that the current outbreak of corporate corruption and “cooked” financial statements are a threat to the viability of our stock markets, our publicly traded corporations, and possibly our political institutions. Although the rule changes being proposed by the SEC and the proposed legislation proceeding through the House and Senate (including the Sarbanes bill) are small steps in the right direction, they are insufficient to correct the types of major corruption that have been occurring. Here are some suggested auditing proposals that should be considered for all publicly traded corporations (not just corporations over $1 billion): 1) Until further notice, all publicly filed financial statements should have two separate audits, by two independent auditing firms. Two auditing firms should be harder to corrupt than one. 2) Corporations should be required to change their auditing firms every year. In other words, you cannot use the same auditing firm for more than one year in row. This proposal could be used as an alternative to proposal 1, but it would be preferable (in my opinion) to use it in addition to proposal 1. 3) Do not let executive management pick the auditing firm. Alternative possibilities to audit firm selection by executive management could include the board of directors (or the auditing committee on the board), the management of the stock exchanges that the corporations trades on, or the SEC. A fair process could be established for selecting the auditing firms to perform the audits and formulas could be developed for calculating the auditing fees, based on the size of the audit (or the size of the corporation being audited). 4) Auditing firms answer and report to the board directors first (not executive management). 5) The CEO, CFO, and chairman of the board, should sign the publicly filed financial statements of their corporation, vouching for the honesty and integrity of the financial statements, at their risk of criminal penalties. Here are some additional suggestions relating to governance of and by the corporate board of directors. Most of these suggestions are based on recommendations currently being made by the major stock exchanges: 1) An independent director is a director that has not previously worked for the company, has no material relationship with the company (customer, supplier, etc.), and receives no pay from the company other than director’s fees. 2) Independent directors must comprise a majority of the board. 3) A CPA must head the board’s auditing committee. 4) Limit the number of boards of publicly traded corporations (possibly to one) that a director can serve. I would rather have a director serve on one board well, as opposed to being a rubber stamp and serving many boards poorly. 5) Any waiver of corporate conflict of interest rules must be approved by a majority vote of the stockholders. 6) Compensation packages for executive management should require approval by a majority of the stockholders. 7) Stocks options must be reported on financial statements as expenses to the corporation. Thank you for your consideration. Respectfully yours, Mr. J. S. Berns 2005 Canary Island Ct. Santa Clara, CA 95050