From: Ken Weiss [kweiss1@tampabay.rr.com] Sent: Thursday, July 25, 2002 11:40 AM To: rule-comments@sec.gov Subject: File No. S7-21-02 Attached is my comment letter for the above rule. Thanks for your consideration. kenweiss@stockholderaction.com July 25, 2002 RE: RULE NO S7-21-02 For fifteen years I worked as in house counsel for four public companies. I was also deeply involved with acquisitions and financing during the Drexel era. That experience made it clear to me that proposed rule S7-21-02 requires some modification. In summary my suggested changes are as follows: €In addition to the CEO and CFO, the rule should require the general counsel of the company (and perhaps even its outside law firm) to certify the disclosure documents. An exclusion related to the actual numbers in the financial statements might be appropriate. €The certification should be absolute and not limited to the Œknowledge¹ of the certifying officers. €The burden of proof in resolving an inaccurate certification or proving the lack of knowledge should be on the certifying officer, not the SEC. € Small cap and foreign companies should not be excluded from the certification requirement. Certification Standards and Burden of Proof The SEC has proposed that the CEO and CFO ³Šcertify to his or her knowledge, the information in the report of which he or she is aware or that he or she believes is important to a reasonable investorŠis true² or for annual reports that such report ³contains all information about the issuerŠ² I take exception to that proposed standard because it is limited to the officer¹s ³knowledge². It is far too lenient in the breadth of the certification, which still provides the executive with the ³I didn¹t know² defense. More importantly, the allocation of the burden of proving actual knowledge remains with the SEC. The company¹s SEC disclosure documents provide the public with information of the corporation¹s transactions, business entities, operations, and financial condition. They are the only documents that analysts and investors are provided to allow them to make an informed investment decision about the company. It is inconceivable that the executive officers should not or could not understand completely every word and transaction described in those documents. It also stretches the bounds of reality to imagine that the CEO, CFO and general counsel do not have actual knowledge of every material transaction required to be reported. If it is decided that the certifying officer is given the leeway of the Œknowledge¹ representation standard then the burden of proof should be on the executive to prove that he did not have knowledge of a questionable disclosure issue. Remember, the reality of the world of these officers is that they have total control of the content of the documents and over every single financial statement and transaction disclosed in the documents. Those officers are the most highly compensated class of individuals in the world. They are paid millions of dollars, given huge option grants, and private jets. It is their absolute obligation to the shareholders to insure that the disclosures are correct in all material respects. They should be held strictly liable for misstatements. If they don¹t have actual knowledge of those transactions they are the wrong people for the job. General Counsel Certification Public companies, the economic ships of every American, are now on the rocks. While the captains of those ships may have been the CEOs, it is clearly the lawyers who have been at the helm. Yet they have neither borne nor accepted any responsibility for their actions that led us to the precipice. It is absolutely inconceivable that the abuses recently revealed by Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, Global Crossing and many others could have been accomplished without the direct cooperation and complicity (or negligence) of the general counsel and outside counsel for the companies involved. In every public company the lawyers are far more involved and responsible for the creation and review of SEC filings than the CEO. It is therefore, obvious, that the lawyers who prepared and reviewed the documents should be held responsible for their accuracy. Every SEC filing is reviewed by the company¹s general counsel and other in house counsel as well as by its outside counsel. Not only are the lawyers the final arbiters of the substance of the SEC documents but also in most cases, except for the financial statements themselves, lawyers draft the majority of the language included the filings. It is their responsibility to ensure that the information included in those filings is accurate in all material respects and does not mislead investors either by misstatements or by failure to disclose material facts. For this reason alone, the general counsel of the company at the very minimum should be required to certify the facts (if not the numbers) of every SEC filing. But there are more reasons. Any lawyer who has ever worked in house for a public company knows that there are few, if any, Œsecret transactions¹. While it may be true that the board of directors is occasionally misled, the company¹s in house lawyers and outside counsel know the details of each and every transaction, bar none. Yet not one SEC action, not one headline, not one news report has focused on the perpetration of this fraud by the legal professionals who actually create and draft the transactions themselves and are responsible for the public disclosures of those transactions. This modus operandi of disguised off balance sheet financing, egregious executive compensation, and the plethora of arcane revenue creating transactions have not only been countenanced by the lawyers involved but have been created by them. Every single fraudulent transaction, every compensation package, every misleading SEC document had legions of lawyers twisting and contorting the letters of the law to accommodate the egos and wallets of the CEO and his cadre. I believe that it is essential that the lawyers who are responsible for SEC documents and the related disclosure face disbarment for the violation of this certification requirement. None of this fraud would have been possible if any of the lawyers involved had refused to participate in the misleading disclosures. Lawyers are currently not at risk for their cooperation and complicity in permitting such disclosures. They are, in fact, at more personal risk, if they fail to cooperate with the CEO¹s directives. Only with a bright line test such as certification will the disincentive be clearly defined. Small Entities and Foreign Registrants The burden on the officers of smaller public companies is even less and the control over day-to-day operations and transactions even greater for small entities than for the included group. I see no credible reason to provide an exclusion for these or foreign entities. If a CEO, CFO or general counsel is unable or unwilling to read, understand, and certify that the company¹s disclosure documents are accurate, they are the wrong individuals to serve in those offices and the board should find people who are. For all the reasons set forth above I would urge that Proposed Rule S7-21-02 be modified in accordance with these comments. Respectfully submitted, Kenneth L. Weiss, Esq. kenweiss@stockholderaction.com -- Kenneth L. Weiss, Esq. 11085 9th St. E. Treasure Island, FL 33706 727-367-8829 727-367-9512-Fax kweiss1@tampabay.rr.com