From: paul [paul@thorntonmotion.com] Sent: Monday, December 22, 2003 3:32 PM To: rule-comments@sec.gov Subject: S7-19-03 Comments on S7-19-03 (Proposed Director Nomination Changes) Dear Sir or Madam: The proposed director nomination rule changes rely on trigger mechanisms. Two in particular: a successful 14a-8 direct access proposal or a 35% withhold vote. It is my experience that the SEC does not fully enforce the present 14a-8 regulations, and it is my understanding that the SEC regards a withhold vote campaign as a solicitation. Given these circumstances, these proposed triggers will not be effective. In order to make these triggers effective: 1) The SEC should require companies to properly handle 14a-8 shareholder proposals. 2) The SEC should require companies to accurately report the results of their annual meetings. 3) The SEC should create a safe haven for withhold vote campaigns. I have personally witnessed several examples of improper handling of shareholder proposals by companies. The most recent example is Warren Buffett's handling of a shareholder proposal at the Berkshire Hathaway 2003 Annual Meeting. WARREN BUFFETT'S CONDUCT OF 2003 BERSHIRE HATHAWAY ANNUAL MEETING 15,000 to 20,000 people attended the 2003 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting in Omaha, Nebraska, on May 3, 2003. Ten microphones were spread among the crowd, but only one microphone was used during the formal part the of meeting. Warren Buffett made it clear that he wished to conduct the formal part of the meeting very quickly-- in five to ten minutes. The "Notice of Annual Meeting" stated that one of the purposes of the meeting was to "act on a shareholder proposal, if properly presented at the meeting." A 14a-8 shareholder proposal, by Christopher J. Fried, was properly presented at the meeting. Warren Buffett, as meeting chairman, asked for a second to the proposal. When no second was offered, he allowed the proposal to be ruled "dead" and did not call for a vote on it. I would have seconded the motion, but the meeting was organized to prevent shareholder participation during the formal part of the meeting--only one microphone for 15,000 people. Warren Buffett acted improperly in this case. There is no requirement for a second in Delaware law, the Berkshire Hathaway Certificate of Incorporation, or the Berkshire by-laws. The SEC has offered the opinion (Motorola, Inc. No-Act. October 8, 1987) that requiring a second is not a "valid condition" under these circumstances. Even if a second could be required, Warren Buffett had a duty to make it possible for any shareholder to second the proposal. In the above mentioned no-action letter, the SEC also indicated that it would not take any enforcement action regarding Motorola's improper handling of a 14a-8 proposal. It appears that companies need not handle 14a-8 shareholder proposals properly. WARREN BUFFETT'S REPORTING OF THE 2003 ANNUAL MEETING RESULTS I informed Warren Buffett of a number of problems regarding the conduct of the 2003 Annual Meeting. The result was that Berkshire Hathaway reported a vote for this 14a-8 shareholder proposal even though it had been ruled "dead" and was not put to a vote. I have made both the SEC and Berkshire Hathaway aware of this inaccurate reporting. The vote was reported in the Berkshire 10-Q for the second quarter of 2003. I am not aware of any action being taken to correct the record. SAFE HAVEN FOR WITHHOLD VOTE CAMPAIGNS In its present form, the sole purpose of the withhold vote is to allow shareholders to communicate a general dissatisfaction to the board. A withhold vote is therefore speech and the SEC should not interfere with this shareholder speech. The withhold vote remains speech even if the SEC decides to use a withhold vote as a trigger. Shareholders should therefore be allowed to conduct a withhold vote campaign without SEC interference. The SEC should create a safe haven for withhold vote campaigns. The SEC should clearly state, in plain English, that: 1) No SEC filings are required to conduct a withhold vote campaign. 2) Withhold vote campaigns will only be subject to the normal prohibition against fraud. CONCLUSION Without changes in SEC enforcement and the SEC developing a respect for the free speech of shareholders, these proposed rule changes are meaningless. Thank you for your consideration. Paul Tomasik 605 N Williams Thornton, Il 60476 paul@thorntonmotion.com