Remarks of Isaac C. Hunt, Jr. Commissioner* U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. “A CALL FOR RESEARCH ON SEC INITIATIVES” Annual Convention of the American Accounting Association New Orleans. Louisiana August 17, 1998 * The views expressed herein are those of Commissioner Hunt and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission, other Commissioners or the Commission’s staff. I. OPENING REMARKS Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to address this plenary session of the American Accounting Association. I am honored to make a presentation before such a distinguished group of scholars. As a member of an agency one of whose cardinal principals is full disclosure to the investing public, I should tell you two things at the outset of my remarks. First, the views I am about to express are mine and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff. Second, I am not an accountant. However, I have been fortunate enough to speak before accounting professionals throughout my tenure at the Commission. One of my first speeches as an SEC Commissioner was before a group of management accountants, and I gave a speech on auditor independence before the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy in September of last year. In December 1997, I delivered an address at the 25th Annual Convention of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. My participation in these events reflects my strong interest in the field of accounting and reflects that I have focused a substantial amount of my work at the Commission on addressing accounting issues. In addition to having another opportunity to voice my views on accounting matters under consideration at the Commission, I am especially pleased to address your association because of our shared interest in academic pursuits. Prior to joining the Securities & Exchange Commission, I served for eight years as Dean and Professor of the University of Akron School of Law in Ohio. Before that, I held the position of Dean at the Antioch School of Law in Washington D.C. Although I am now a Commissioner at the SEC, my commitment to scholarly pursuits has not abated. I think my continued dedication to teaching and research is evident to those at the Commission who know me well -- many of them have taken to referring to me as “The Dean.” All members of the academic community have an opportunity to play a role in the formation of policy at the Commission. I cannot imagine a circumstance in which the Commission would adopt rules or take final regulatory action without seeking feedback from the persons and entities who have interest or expertise in the subject matter covered by the proposed rule or action under consideration by the Commission. As scholars, you are probably best suited to the task of providing honest and frank commentary on Commission proposals without regard to whether your views would be satisfactory to a client. In addition, you are endowed with the skill to review an issue, formulate a scientific approach to examine the issue, collect data, and apply analytical reasoning to reach a sound conclusion. Few others are so well equipped to scrutinize proposed Commission actions and provide statistically supported recommendations as to the wisdom of those actions. In sum, you have the potential to wield substantial influence over the course of Commission policy in many areas. My remarks today reflect my objective of inspiring you, the scholars of the accounting profession, to utilize your research skills and your independent perspectives towards making a substantive difference in the agency’s approach to various issues impacting accounting practices. As a fellow academic, I see immense potential for academic achievement through involvement in SEC initiatives. Specifically, I believe academic efforts can have substantial influence in the outcome of Commission endeavors in four areas of tremendous import to accountants. Those areas are: - international accounting standards; - auditor independence; - market risk disclosures; and - conduct resulting in professional discipline when practicing before the Commission. I hope my remarks will spark some interest and ultimately generate some results in the world of accounting and the formation of Commission policy. II. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS As you probably know, the Securities and Exchange Commission was founded after the market crash of 1929. Its primary goal is the protection of investors by ensuring full disclosure. Financial information is therefore of paramount importance to the Commission. Federal securities laws set out the specific financial information that must be disclosed to the public, who must make such disclosures, and under what circumstances. For this full disclosure system to provide sufficient information for public investors to make informed investment decisions, the accounting and reporting standards governing financial information must be of the highest quality. I believe that we here in the United States have achieved high quality standards for financial reporting in the form of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. However, we are now entering an era of globalization where our need for financial information is greater. Modern technology now enables us to communicate with someone clear across the globe with the stroke of a computer key. Technological advances and a bull market are two of the factors that have encouraged U.S. investors to broaden their investment horizons and look abroad for investment opportunities. Of course this option currently is available to U.S. investors for foreign companies listed on U.S. exchanges, which means those foreign companies who prepare their financial statements in, or reconcile them to, U.S. GAAP. Despite the tremendous success of U.S. exchanges in attracting non-U.S. companies, we continue to look for ways to reduce barriers to cross-border capital raising activities. In this vein, the SEC and fellow regulators around the world have been exploring the development of a set of international accounting standards. This task involves identifying common needs of investors around the globe, and developing standards that are responsive to those needs while providing benefits to all capital market participants. With international accounting standards, issuers could lower their costs for communication with shareholders, potential investors and lenders. Further, these standards would make it easier for investors to “shop and compare” investment opportunities. The road to achieving international accounting standards has not been short. The International Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”), an organization consisting of member bodies from over 87 countries throughout the world, has been dedicated to this task since its formation in 1972. The Commission has supported development of international accounting standards, both through its active participation in the IASC’s work, as well as through its role as a member of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”). In April 1996, the IASC announced its commitment to completion of the key components, or “core standards,” of international accounting standards. The SEC issued a statement supporting IASC’s efforts to develop international accounting standards, and indicating its willingness to consider allowing foreign issuers to use the IASC standards in securities offerings in the U.S., provided those standards met certain criteria. At this time, the IASC expects to complete the core standards by the end of 1998. Once the IASC completes its work on core standards, the baton will be passed to IOSCO. The SEC and its staff will actively participate in IOSCO’s assessment of the acceptability of the core standards. How will this endeavor affect American issuers and investors? Currently, foreign companies seeking access to U.S. markets must provide audited financial statements either prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP or reconciled to U.S. GAAP. The assessment of the acceptability of the core standards will help form the basis for the Commission’s decision on whether it should reduce or remove the current requirements on using, or reconciling to, U.S. GAAP. If the Commission decides to change these requirements, it will have to issue a rule proposal which describes in great detail the proposed changes, and solicits public comment thereon. However, the Commission may decide to issue a “concept release” on this matter before doing a rule proposal. A concept release would explore alternatives for changing the current requirements without making a specific proposal. The Commission would seek comment on the concepts and alternatives described in the release. No decisions have yet been made on how the Commission will proceed if it decides to alter the current requirements on the use of U.S. GAAP. But I understand that the staff is exploring the possibility of recommending that the Commission issue a concept release in early 1999 concerning international accounting standards. While it is unclear at this point whether and/or when the Commission will formally solicit your input on international accounting standards, I encourage you to take a look at the issued draft standards now. They are publicly available on the IASC’s web site at www.iasc.org.uk and I believe AAA’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee will be coordinating research efforts concerning these standards. As the Commission indicated when it announced its support for international accounting standards, it will consider certain key factors in making its assessment of the acceptability of these standards. The Commission will consider whether the standards: - constitute a comprehensive basis of accounting; - are of high quality; - result in transparency, comparability and provide for full disclosure; and - can be rigorously interpreted and applied. In applying these criteria to assess the completed standards, the Commission will be confronted with many issues. For example, how can the draft standards be tested against these factors? Are these factors the most appropriate measure by which the standards should be tested? Do these factors protect or give favorable treatment to certain market participants over others? Ladies and gentlemen, I believe it is your research, your analysis and your reasoning that will be best suited to the task of addressing these questions. I urge you to take part in framing the discussion, providing the data, and helping us form the conclusions. Even if you decide not to conduct research on the draft core standards, I ask that you consider sharing your opinions on the standards. The Commission’s invitation for comments will be sincerely extended and all submissions will be seriously considered. Your input is valued and vital. So I encourage you to speak out. Review the standards with a critical eye; be frank in your assessment and, most importantly, make certain your views, your knowledge and your expertise make their way to the Commission. Our staff is accessible and interested. I know that Lynn Turner, our Chief Accountant, is making appeals for participation of various accounting professionals in this process. Lynn also is speaking on international accounting standards in more detail during this convention. I promised to cover four areas in which your involvement could have an impact on public policy. Let me move on to the second area, auditor independence. III. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE Auditor independence is an important yet sensitive issue for both accountants and securities regulators. Your participation in this area would be valuable, in large part, because of this sensitivity. First, a little background. As I indicated before, the federal securities laws were developed in the wake of the collapse of our securities markets in 1929. To regenerate public trust and credibility at a time when investor confidence was at an all time low, Congress mandated that financial statements of companies whose securities are publicly held be certified by independent public accountants. These accountants, by act of Congress, are entrusted with the duty of serving as protectors of the reliability and integrity of the financial information disseminated to the investing public. Independent auditors shoulder a large responsibility and are held to high standards. Notably, independent auditors must not only maintain independence “in fact,” but also must be independent “in appearance.” In essence, independent auditors must avoid even the suggestion that they have an interest in the company whose financial statements they are auditing. Auditors cannot, for example, invest money in businesses related to their audit client, participate in the management of such clients, or audit their own work for a client. These restrictions seem relatively straight-forward to me. A limitation on auditors’ activities which raises more difficult issues is whether and when they can provide non-audit services to audit clients without impairing their independence. In addressing the issue of when auditors lack independence because of non-audit services provided to audit clients, the Commission focuses on how reasonable investors would perceive auditors’ independence in light of those non-audit services. More recently, the Commission has seen challenging fact patterns where the impact of non-audit services on auditors’ independence has been difficult to assess. Moreover, such determinations are having an increasing impact on the revenues earned by accounting firms due to the large amount of non-auditing services these firms now provide. In response to these and other challenges, the Commission and the accounting profession jointly formed the Independence Standards Board (“ISB”). Its mission is to establish independence standards applicable to audits of public companies. Auditor independence is, in my view, a cornerstone in maintaining the integrity of capital markets and thereby maximizing investor protection. My concerns about the ability of auditors to maintain their independence are heightened when I hear, for example, that the auditing function of accounting firms now brings in less money than other services the firms provide, and that firms believe they must expand their non-audit services to remain competitive. The work of the ISB will be invaluable in addressing my concerns. Their efforts would be perfectly complemented if dedicated members of the academic accounting community take an active role in considering standards in this area and applying scholarly approaches to answering the tough questions that auditor independence issues raise. For example, what is the correlation between perceived and actual lack of independence? How should that correlation be measured in determining when an auditor lacks independence? What other factors can undermine investors’ confidence in the audit process? These are challenging questions, and I am sure there are others that need to be addressed. You possess the unique skill and expertise to conduct the research and analysis important to reaching a conclusion on these issues. It seems to me that the ISB, the Commission and the public would benefit greatly from your active participation in this project. I encourage you to consider undertaking academic research in this area. IV. MARKET RISK DISCLOSURES Market risk disclosure is an area in which the Commission has chosen to exercise its rule making authority. By way of background, derivatives have come to serve as an important tool for public companies in controlling the extent to which they will make or lose money as the result of changes in market conditions. While derivatives can be useful, they can also be devastatingly harmful. The bankruptcy of Orange County in 1994 is a prime example. In that instance, the county sustained immense losses on derivatives transactions when interest rates rose. Some were so concerned about the potentially harmful effects of derivatives trading practices on investors that they questioned whether derivatives should be banned outright. The Commission chose to address these concerns by focusing on the adequacy of disclosures of market risk. In 1994, FASB adopted FAS No. 119 on disclosures concerning derivatives. The staff of the Commission undertook, during 1994 and 1995, to review approximately 500 annual reports filed by public companies to get a grasp on the extent of public disclosures being made of companies’ exposure to market risk as a result of derivatives positions. The staff’s review identified deficiencies in the disclosures, although it also found that disclosures had improved in 1995 over 1994 (presumably as the result of the adoption of FAS No. 119). In response to these findings, the Commission amended its regulations in 1997 to require disclosure of market risks in financial statement footnotes and outside of the financial statements. To provide companies subject to these regulations time to address the new disclosure requirements, the Commission phased in these provisions in two stages. Banks, thrifts and other large cap companies, which presumably have more experience and resources for determining market risk, were required to comply with the new disclosure provisions in filings made with the Commission for fiscal years ending after June 30, 1997. Most other companies do not have to comply until they file their financial statements for years ending after June 30, 1998. This phase-in means that banks and large-cap companies with calendar (December 31) year-ends were required to comply with the rules in their annual reports that were due by March 30, 1998. So, as of April 1, 1998, there was a good deal of new, and hopefully useful, information reaching investors concerning market risk management. At the time these market disclosure rules were adopted, some market participants expressed concern. Among other things, they questioned whether the information disclosed would be understandable to investors, and expressed some concern about the costs of compiling and presenting this additional information. In connection with its adoption of these rules, the Commission indicated that it would conduct a review three years after their effective date to assess the effect and usefulness of the disclosure rules. Recently, the staff conducted a preliminary one-year review of the new rules. The staff’s preliminary impression was that the new disclosures provided useful information to investors and analysts, but that it might be too early to tell whether the risk management disclosures were resulting in better risk management techniques by the reporting companies. In two years, the Commission will undertake an expanded examination of the effects and impact of these rules. This will be a daunting task on many levels. The challenging aspect I raise with you is the need for studies examining this issue. In particular, research and data would be useful on the impact, if any, of these risk disclosures on the manner in which companies approach risk management. I also think the Commission would benefit from studies on the competitive harm, if any, of these market risk disclosures. I believe this could be a promising area for academic study because the Commission’s review of these rules is two years away, providing some time for formulating, designing and executing research on this issue. Walter Teets, a professor at Gonzaga University and an outgoing SEC Accounting Fellow, has been intimately involved in this issue, and I believe he is addressing it at one of the sessions to be held during this convention. I encourage you to seek him out if you’d like to hear more or further discuss how you can get involved. V. RULE 102(e) The last area where I’d like to pique your interest and solicit your participation is professional discipline under the Commission’s rules. Pursuant to Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice, the Commission can censure, suspend or bar professionals who practice before it under certain circumstances. While accountants are most often the subject of Rule 102(e) proceedings, the Commission also has sought sanctions against attorneys under this provision. Frankly, I’d like to see the Commission discipline more lawyers under this provision, but that is a topic for another speech! The purpose of Rule 102(e) is to ensure diligence and competence of the professionals on whom the Commission relies. Accountants are a vital part of the disclosure process which is core to the Commission’s regulatory scheme; their importance is illustrated by Congress’s mandate in the securities laws themselves of an independent auditor. In June of this year, the Commission published for comment proposed amendments to Rule 102(e) concerning what constitutes “improper professional conduct,” which is one basis for a Rule 102(e) proceeding. This amendment was proposed principally in response to a decision by the D.C. Court of Appeals indicating that, in the interest of fairness, the Commission should define with some specificity the circumstances under which a professional may be deemed to have engaged in improper professional conduct. The proposed amendment includes, as a basis for action under Rule 102(e), intentional violations of applicable professional standards and, under certain circumstances, negligent conduct. I understand that Walter Schuetze, Chief Enforcement Accountant at the Commission, will be discussing Rule 102(e) in a presentation during this convention, so I won’t go into the details of the proposal at this time. But, I do want to say that Rule 102(e) is an important tool in protecting the integrity of the Commission’s processes, and therefore in protecting investors. The proposed amendment is the result of much hard work by the Commission staff and I am looking forward to receiving the comments that are submitted on the proposal. I want to specifically ask you to contribute your views on the proposed amendment to Rule 102(e). The comment period officially ends this Thursday, August 20th, but comments will be accepted even after that date. Your independence as well as your role in influencing the accounting professionals of tomorrow give you a unique point of view on this issue. I think the Commission will be greatly benefited if you share your views with us. CLOSING Thank you for allowing me to share my views on how accounting scholars can have an impact on current Commission initiatives. I hope you will consider taking an active role in one or more of these areas. I am convinced that this organization has the resources and the skills to make a difference in the formation of Commission policy. Please consider taking advantages of these opportunities. 24