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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

March 6, 2001

BY FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

William G. Farrar, Esquire
Sullivan & Cromwell
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004-2498

Re: The Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc. - Omission of a Shareholder Proposal Pursuant to Rule 14a-8

Dear Mr. Farrar:

By letter dated January 22, 2001, you notified the Securities and Exchange Commission of the intent of The Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc. to exclude from its 2001 proxy soliciting materials a shareholder proposal and supporting statement submitted by Opportunity Partners, L.P.* The proposal states:

RESOLVED: We recommend that the directors try not to violate their fiduciary duty to the stockholders.

You requested our assurance that we would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the fund excludes the proposal in reliance upon subparagraphs (i)(3), (i)(7), (i)(8) and (i)(10) of Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Exchange Act"). Since there appears to be some basis for your view that the proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), we express no opinion whether all or any part of the proposal may be excluded under any other provision of Rule 14a-8.

Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits the exclusion of a shareholder proposal "[i]f the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including [Rule] 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials." Examples of misleading statements are given in the rule; these include: "Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factualfoundation." Note (b) to Rule14a-9.

As the proposal implies that the directors of the fund have violated, or may choose to violate, their fiduciary duty, the proposal impugns their character, integrity and personal reputation and in our view, may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). Phoenix Gold International, Inc. (pub. avail. November 21, 2000) (opinion that directors are not independent violates Rule 14a-9 and may be excluded); CCBT Bancorp, Inc. (pub. avail. April 20, 1999) (supporting statement that board of directors violated their fiduciary duty may be deleted under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because it violates Rule 14a-9).

Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the fund omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

Attached is a description of the informal procedures followed by this Division in responding to shareholder inquiries. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to call me at (202) 942-0638.

Yours very truly,

Linda B. Stirling
Senior Counsel

cc: Phillip Goldstein
Opportunity Partners L.P.
60 Heritage Drive
Pleasantville, NY 10570


Footnote

* The proposal is contained in a letter dated November 17, 2000, addressed to the fund. This proposal is a modification of Opportunity Partners' original proposal contained in a letter to the fund dated October 30, 2000. We have also reviewed and considered a February 13, 2001, letter from the proponent to the Securities and Exchange Commission.




Incoming Letter

Sullivan & Cromwell
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004

January 22, 2001

Securities and Exchange Commission,
450 Fifth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20549.
Attention: Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management

Re: The Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc. - Omission of Shareholder Proposal Pursuant to Rule 14a-8

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc. (the "Fund") received in the form of a letter, dated November 17, 2000, a shareholder proposal (the "Proposal") and supporting statement (the "Supporting Statement") from Opportunity Partners, L.P. (the "Proponent") for inclusion in the Fund's proxy materials for its 2001 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the "2001 Proxy Statement"). We are writing as special counsel to the Fund and counsel to its independent directors to confirm the Fund's intention to omit the Proposal and Supporting Statement from its 2001 Proxy Statement.

The Proponent's original proposal and supporting statement, which were received in early November 2000, are attached as Exhibit A. On behalf of the Fund, we contacted the Proponent to inform it of concerns with the proposal that the Fund believed warranted its exclusion under Question 3 of Rule 14a-8. At that time we also asked the Proponent to consider eliminating vague, false and misleading statements from the original proposal and supporting statement and provided it with examples of statements that the Fund deemed objectionable. Theresubmitted Proposal and Supporting Statement, attached as Exhibit B, continue to contain information that we believe warrants their exclusion from the 2001 Proxy Statement under Question 9 of Rule 14a-8. For your convenience, the Proposal is repeated immediately below.

"RESOLVED: We recommend that the directors try not to violate their fiduciary duty to the stockholders".

Grounds for Omission

The Proposal and Supporting Statement may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8 because:

  1. the Proposal has been substantially implemented (Rule 14a-8(i)(10));

  2. the Proposal and Supporting Statement contain false or misleading statements (Rule 14a-8(i)(3));

  3. the Proposal and Supporting Statement relate to an election for membership on the Fund's board of directors (Rule 14a-8(i)(8));and

  4. the Proposal relates to ordinary business operations (Rule 14a-8(i)(7)).

1. Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

The Fund believes that it may exclude the Proposal pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(10), which permits the exclusion of a shareholder proposal from a company's proxy materials if the proposal has been "substantially implemented" by the company. In recent no-action letters, the staff (the "Staff") of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") has suggested that, in order for a proposal to have been "substantially implemented", the company must have actually taken steps to implement the proposal. See, e.g., Brazilian Equity Fund, Inc. (avail. May 8, 1998); The Growth Fund of Spain, Inc. (avail. May 8, 1998); see also Exchange Act Releases Nos. 20091 (August 16, 1983) and 40018 (May 21, 1998). In Honeywell InternationalInc. (avail. February 29, 2000) the Staff found evidence that a proposal requesting the board to investigate whether management used "improper accounting practices" was substantially implemented, in part because the company's senior management continually monitors accounting practices. See also Kmart Corporation (avail. February 23, 2000). The Fund respectfully submits that the Proposal has been "substantially implemented" through the Board's compliance with its duty to act as fiduciaries in relation to the Fund and its stockholders.

The Board is and has always been keenly aware of this duty. As a general matter, this firm has been counsel to the Fund's independent directors for several years. As their counsel, we have attended and observed substantially all of the Fund's Board and committee meetings during those years.

The recent By-law amendments that are referred to in the Proposal were the subject of careful deliberation by the Board. The Fund retained both this firm and special Delaware counsel to advise the Board regarding the recent By-law amendments. The Proponent's disagreement with the Board's business judgment is not a breach of their fiduciary duty. Because the Directors have acted, and will continue to act, as fiduciaries, as required by Delaware law, there is nothing to implement.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Fund submits that the Proposal has been substantially implemented and may be excluded from the Fund's proxy statement under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

2. Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

Rule 14a-9 prohibits the inclusion within proxy materials of statements that are false or misleading and the omission from proxy materials of material facts necessary to make statements made therein not false or misleading. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits the omission from a proxy statement of a proposal which violates any of the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9. For purposes of Rule 14a-9, the Commission considers misleading "material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personalreputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factual foundation". See note (b) to Rule 14a-9.

The Fund believes that the Proposal and Supporting Statement are clearly false and misleading as further described below.

(a) By requesting the Fund's Directors to "try not to violate their fiduciary duty", the Proponent falsely suggests that the Directors have a choice as to whether or not they should violate their fiduciary duty. As mentioned above, however, the fiduciary duty that the Directors owe to the Fund and its stockholders is mandatory under Delaware law. As a result, the Proposal is misleading to stockholders.

(b) In addition, the Proposal and Supporting Statement are false, misleading and impugn the character of the Directors in that they clearly imply that the Directors have violated their fiduciary duty. By including in the Proposal and Supporting Statement that the Directors "try" not to violate their fiduciary duty, the reader is left with the impression that, as a matter of fact, the Directors have violated their fiduciary duty and therefore have violated state law. See Phoenix Gold International, Inc. (avail. November 21, 2000) (misleading to assert that a proposal will give an opportunity to elect a truly independent director, because proposal implied current directors were not independent) (emphasis added). The Fund believes that the Proponent has not provided a factual foundation for his statement. A determination regarding whether the Board has violated its fiduciary duty is a determination properly made by a court of competent jurisdiction, not the Proponent, and no such determination with respect to the Fund's Board has been made. The Proponent's assertion that the Directors have violated their fiduciary duty does not make it a fact.

(c) Lacking any legitimate foundation for the allegations, the Proponent has included incomplete and misleading references to the reporting of last year's stockholder proposal vote and the Delaware Chancery Court decision in Chesapeake v. Shorewood Packaging Corp. in an attempt to support its charge of improper conduct.

The first point raised in (i) of the Supporting Statement charges the Directors with incomplete reporting ofthe voting with respect to last year's stockholder proposal by the same Proponent. However, any incomplete reporting of the voting on last year's stockholder proposal (which was brought to the Fund's attention by the Proponent) was promptly corrected on November 15, 2000, in the Fund's Quarterly Report to stockholders for the period ended September 30, 2000, a copy of which was sent to the Proponent. Due to an oversight by the Fund, incomplete details of the outcome of last year's stockholder proposal were included in the Fund's Semi-Annual Report to stockholders for the six-months ended June 30, 2000. However, the details that were omitted in this earlier stockholder report were substantially reported in open session at the annual meeting at which the proposal was made directly in response to a question by a person that identified himself as a representative of the Proponent.

By not informing stockholders that the Fund corrected any prior mistakes or that the results were reported at the meeting, the Proponent attempts to mislead stockholders into believing that an error by officers of the Fund without the knowledge of the Directors is a violation of the Board's fiduciary duty and that the Board "did not want [stockholders] to know" the results. See CCBT Bancorp, Inc. (avail. April 20, 1999) (supporting statement that asserted the board deliberately "intended to hurry [stockholders] so we might not carefully consider the implications of the proposal" is excludable as false and misleading). Moreover, section (i) of the Supporting Statement claims that "Here is how the results were 'reported'". This is now an incomplete and misleading statement.

The second point raised in (ii) of the Supporting Statement involves an interpretation of Chesapeake v. Shorewood. The Proponent uses a one-line summary of Chesapeake, with no factual context in an effort to support the charge that the Board violated its fiduciary duty in approving the recent By-law amendments. The facts and circumstances surrounding that court's decision are entirely different from any facts and circumstances involving the Fund. The Proponent is very well aware of this. In fact, the materials provided by the Proponent with his initial submission and included herewith as part of Exhibit A demonstrate that Chesapeake involved board action in the context of a threatened tender offer and consent solicitation, not a board exercising its business judgment in the face of no such threat. Being inapplicable, thereference does not provide a factual foundation for the Proponent's charge. Therefore, the Proposal and Supporting Statement run afoul of Rule 14a-9 (and consequently Rule 14a-8(i)(3)) by indirectly charging the Directors with violation of their fiduciary duty without factual foundation.

(c) The Staff has also recognized that a proposal may be excluded if it is "so inherently vague and indefinite that neither the shareholders voting on the proposal, nor the Company implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty what actions or measures the proposal requires". Philadelphia Electric Co. (avail. July 30, 1992). The fiduciary duty that directors owe to a corporation and its stockholders is very complex and because of the wide latitude that directors have in complying with their duty, compliance therewith may occur in numerous ways. See e.g., Mark A. Sargent, D&O Liability Handbook, (West Group 2001) ("[A director's] fiduciary obligation is best understood . . . as a cluster of specific types of obligation, each of which has developed its own peculiar and sometimes idiosyncratic jurisprudence."). Accordingly, stockholders considering the Proponent's Proposal "would not know what action they were requesting management to take, and management would not be able to ascertain what mandate was being given to them by the shareholders if the proposal was adopted." Maryland Realty Trust (avail. February 7, 1980). In fact, because of the vagaries of the Proposal, any actions that the Directors might take as a result of the Proposal could well be in contravention of the intention of stockholders who voted for the Proposal. See Weirton Steel Corporation (avail. April 21, 2000) (proposal that requested directors to amend charter and bylaws so that directors and officers are "held accountable for the decisions they make" excludable as vague and indefinite). Accordingly, the Proposal should be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-9 (and consequently Rule 14a-8(i)(3)).

(d) The remainder of the Supporting Statement contains other false and misleading statements made without any factual foundation. Virtually all of paragraph (ii) of the Supporting Statement contains false and misleading statements, presented as fact, without any support. For example, the second sentence of paragraph (ii) states the Fund's By-law "is similar" to the bylaw amendment in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shorewood Packaging Corp. but is void of any support for the statement and falsely suggests that theFund's By-law is "designed to disenfranchise stockholders" and clause (2) of that paragraph states that the procedures adopted by the Directors for stockholders to act by written consent are "burdensome" without demonstrating any additional burden. In addition, clause (3) suggests that stockholders who hold shares in street name have a "right" to nominate directors while the Fund has been advised by its Delaware counsel that no such right exists under Delaware law.

3. Rule 14a-8(i)(7).

Rule 14a-8(i)(7) provides that the Fund may exclude a "proposal [that] deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations". As mentioned, in carrying on the management and business operations of the Fund, the Directors are required, under Delaware law, to act as a fiduciaries in relation to the corporation and the stockholders. Every management decision that is made by the Board, therefore, incorporates the Board's fiduciary duty. In Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. (avail. Feb. 14, 1997), the Staff drew a distinction between shareholder proposals that ask the board to take affirmative actions "beyond the actions required of the directors in fulfilling their fiduciary and statutory duties", which may not be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7), and proposals that ask the board to take actions falling within the ambit of the duties described above, which may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7). On this basis, proposals that relate to matters falling within the scope of the board's legally mandated duties may be excluded. By asking the directors "not to violate their fiduciary duty" the Proposal deals with and is part and parcel of "ordinary business operations" and is therefore properly excludable.

4. Rule 14a-8(i)(8).

Rule 14a-8(i)(8) provides that the Fund may exclude a proposal that "relates to an election for member ship on the company's board of directors . . .". Although, on its face, the Proposal purports to make a recommendation to the Directors for action, in reality the Proposal is nothing more than an erroneous assertion that the Directors have acted improperly. In Philips Petroleum Company (avail. February 12, 1981) the Staff stated that a proposal that alleged that the directors had violated their fiduciary duty and called for their termination, called "into question the qualifications of the named individuals who are candidatesfor re-election; and appear to derogate the quality and integrity of the board members to the extent that the proposals may be deemed an effort to oppose the management's solicitation on behalf of the re-election of these persons". See also, Pepsi Co., Inc. (avail. February 1, 1999); Black & Decker Corp. (avail. January 21, 1997). Because some of the Directors who come under the purview of the Proposal's statement of improper or illegal conduct have been nominated for election at this year's annual meeting of stockholders, the Proposal "relate[s] to an election for membership on the company's board of directors" by opposing such Director's election. As such, the proposal is excludable under 14a-8(i)(8).

*    *    *

In accordance with Rule 14a-8(j), the Fund is contemporaneously notifying the Proponent, by copy of this letter including Exhibits A and B, of its intention to omit the Proposal and Supporting Statement from its 2001 Proxy Statement.

On behalf of the Fund, we hereby respectfully request that the Staff express its intention not to recom mend enforcement action if the Proposal and Supporting Statement are excluded from the 2001 Proxy Statement for the reasons set forth above. If the Staff disagrees with the Fund's conclusions regarding the omission of the Proposal and Supporting Statement, or if any additional submissions are desired in support of the Fund's position, we would appreciate an opportunity to meet with you or speak to you by telephone prior to the issuance of the Staff's Rule 14a-8(j) response. If you have any questions regarding this request, or need any additional information, please telephone John T. Bostelman of this office at (212) 558-3840 or the undersigned at (212) 558-4940.

Six copies of this letter are being submitted as contemplated by Question 10 of Rule 14a-8. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and the enclosed materials by stamping the enclosed copy of the letter and returning it to our messenger, who has been asked to wait.

Very truly yours,

William G. Farrar

Attachments:

Exhibit A - Original proposal of Opportunity Partners L.P.
Exhibit B - Revised proposal of Opportunity Partners L.P.

cc: Opportunity Partners L.P.
c/o Mr. Philip Goldstein
60 Heritage Drive
Pleasantville, New York 10570

bcc: Paul Brenner

Messrs. West
Bostelman
Frankle

 

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/swiss030601.htm


Modified: 12/10/2001