EX-99.2 3 dex992.htm SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION DATED JANUARY 9, 2008 Supplemental Information dated January 9, 2008
January 9, 2008
Supplemental Information
Exhibit 99.2


2
Safe Harbor Disclosure
This presentation and our remarks may contain forward-looking
statements. Important factors such as general market conditions and the
competitive environment could cause actual results to differ materially
from those projected in these forward-looking statements. Risk factors
are detailed in our 10K, which is available on our website,
www.mbia.com.  The company undertakes no obligation to revise or
update any forward-looking statements to reflect changes in events or
expectations.
In addition, the definitions of the non-GAAP terms that are included in
this
presentation
may
be
found
on
our
website
at
www.mbia.com.


3
MBIA’s Insured Portfolio is Large and Diverse
$432.7 billion Public Finance
Insured Portfolio
Percent of Net Par Outstanding by Bond Type
$240.2 billion Structured Finance
Insured Portfolio
Percent of Net Par Outstanding by Bond Type
Total of $673 billion Net Par Outstanding as of 9/30/07
Special Revenue, 11%
Sovereign/Sub
Sovereign, 3%
Investor-Owned
Utilities, 3%
Housing, 4%
Municipal Utility,
18%
Higher Education, 6%
General Obligation,
39%
Health Care, 6%
Transportation, 10%
Commercial Real
Estate CDOs, 4%
Corporate CDOs, 24%
Multi-Sector CDOs,
13%
Direct RMBS, 19%
Commercial
Real Estate
Loan Pools, 3%
Structured CMBS
Pools, 13%
Other, 2%
Corporate Asset
Backed, 11%
Consumer Asset
Backed, 11%


4
Market Dislocation Has Impacted Our Insured Portfolio
Mortgage market disruption
Increasing delinquencies
and
defaults
on
mortgages
are
impacting
our
RMBS
and
ABS CDO portfolios causing us to increase loss reserves
MTM losses resulting from market disruption are not economic in the absence of credit
impairments
Rating agency
capital
charges
have
gone
up
and
we
have
increased
our
expectation
of credit losses in the stress scenarios
2007 operating results will be impacted
Case reserves related to prime second-lien RMBS portfolio estimated at $614 million
MTM loss at $3.3 billion: $3.1 billion non-economic and $200 million credit impairment
associated with CDS contracts/CDOs
Increase in unallocated case reserve by $100 million
MBIA’s capital plan
Exceeds all rating agencies Triple-A requirements
Creates “dry powder”
to capitalize on new business opportunities


5
Credit Road Map: RMBS and Multi-Sector CDOs
•High quality, Triple-A only since 2004
$4.7
Subprime
Increase in loss reserve of $614mm on
HELOC and Closed-End Seconds
•Performing below expectation
•Performing below expectation
•Mostly European Triple-A
Comment
$45.2 Bn
Total RMBS
11.1
Closed-End Seconds
11.7
HELOC
17.8
Prime First Mortgage
Net Par ($Bn)
RMBS
•70% of collateral Triple-A rated with 41%
originated 2005 or prior
•$200mm impairment in portfolio
•Diversified across 2000-2004 origination
•Only 1 US deal written since 2004
•High quality, low risk book
Comment
$30.6 Bn
Total Multi-Sector CDO
9.0
CDOs
of CDOs
1.8
Secondary Market
3.7
Mezzanine
$16.1
High Grade
Net Par ($Bn)
Multi Sector CDOs


6
MBIA’s RMBS Exposure
Subprime, $4.5,
10%
Prime Closed-End
Seconds, $11.1,
25%
Prime HELOCs, $11.7,
26%
Prime First Mortgage,
$17.6,
39%
$45.2
billion
of
RMBS
Exposure
Closed-End
Seconds
/
HELOCs
by
Vintage
RMBS exposure comprises 7% of insured portfolio as of 9/30/07
MBIA wraps 100%
of issuance
Excess Spread and
Overcollateralization
BBB
$ bn
%
2005 and Prior
5.3
23%
2006
8.4
37%
2007
9.1
40%
Total
22.8
100%
MBIA
Collateral


7
Total HELOC and Closed-End Seconds Portfolio of $22.8bn
MBIA identified several HELOC and Closed-End Seconds deals
totaling $9.5bn of net par outstanding performing below expectations
Defaults consumed excess spread and overcollateralization
“Layered”
risk unexpectedly increased
Low documentation (i.e. limited income/employment verification)
High Combined Loan to Value (CLTV)
Negative Home Price Appreciation (HPA) environment)
Speculation
MBIA has announced loss reserves of $614 million
MBIA has paid $46 million of claims so far
Prime HELOC and Closed-End Seconds Portfolio More
Exposed


8
Multi-Sector CDOs
Structural protections include:
Most senior position
Full control rights within the deal documentation
Interest coverage and overcollateralization tests (funded deals)
Collateral portfolio quality tests (managed deals)
Events of default (including par based OC tests)
Collateral manager termination and replacement rights
Acceleration and liquidation of collateral fully in control of MBIA
In the event of impairment, our CDOs have one of the three payout patterns:
Principal only or capped–
$4.3bn
Scheduled interest and ultimate principal –
$18.2bn
Credit events as they occur-
$8.1bn


9
Typical Multi-Sector High Grade CDO Exposure Losses
20% CDO
(70% ABS
CDO)
30%
prime
RMBS
20% other
ABS
30%
subprime
RMBS
$1 billion CDO, with $1 billion in High
Grade Collateral.
Hypothetical Collateral Loss
Assumptions
12.3%
9.8%
49% loss of CDO collateral
(70% loss of ABS CDOs)
(70% x 20%) x 70%   =
0.0%
0% loss                                =
1.0%
15% loss less, average 10%
overcollateralization
(15% -
10%) x 20%    =
1.5%
15% loss, less average 10%
overcollateralization
(15% -
10%) x 30%    =
Total
loss
of
12.3%
is
below
MBIA’s
15%
attachment
point.
MBIA wrapped top 85%, most senior tranche


10
CDOs of CDOs Exposure
9 transactions, $9bn in total
70% of the underlying collateral rated Triple-A
Subordination = 12% on average
$200 million of credit impairment
Other, 1%
RMBS, 12%
CDOs of ABS, 20%
CBO/CLO, 60%
Investment Grade
Corporate, 2%
Other ABS, 2%
TruPS, 3%
2005 and Prior, 41%
2007, 26%
2006, 33%
By collateral type
By vintage of underlying collateral


11
Rating Agency Capital Position
Estimating capital requirements
based on hypothetical:
“worst case”
ratings downgrades
“worst case”
economic losses
“Forward looking”
analyses incorporate future stress
S&P using 40% and 16% cumulative net loss (CNL) for Prime/Closed-
End Seconds (CES) mortgages and HELOCs
Moody’s using 19% CNL for subprime first mortgages
Fitch “downgrading”
all current CDO collateral 6 to 9 additional notches


12
Rating Agency Capital Position-
After Stress Analysis
Post re-rating & stress analysis:  Capital Shortfall as of 9/30/07
$2.0
$1.4
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
$1.5
$2.0
$2.5
Low
High
($ in billions)


13
Loss Reserve/Credit Impairment versus Capital
Requirement
No
2. Mark-to-Market (a)          
(with credit impairment)
No
No
4.
Capital Requirement
(Stress scenario –
worst
case loss in a 1 in 10,000
loss stress case plus 30%
added cushion)
No
No
3.
Mark-to-Market (b)
(non-economic; will reverse
to zero as bonds approach
maturity)
No
1.
Loss reserves
(expected losses in insured
portfolio)
Reason for
Capital Raise
Reflection of 
Expected Losses
P&L
Impact


14
Capital Plan Exceeds Rating Agencies’
Capital
Requirement
Net maturities, amortization
$300-
$500 million
Q4 2007 Roll-off
Of Back Book
$2,350-
$2,650 million
Total
Warburg Pincus Commitment &
Backstopped Rights Offering
$1,000 million
Common Equity
Covering diversified portions of our
portfolio
$50-
$150 million
Reinsurance
Benefit
To be Completed
$1,000 million
Debt
MBIA has also announced a 62%
dividend cut


15
The Warburg Pincus Commitment
Announced December 10, 2007
Two “tranches”
$500 million common equity investment @$31 per share
$500 million commitment to backstop a rights offering to existing shareholders
Firm commitment
No “outs”
for rating agency outcomes or MAC
No bring-down of reps and warranties
Expected closing dates
First $500
million
to
close
upon
HSR
and
FSA
approvals
approximately
late
January
Rights offering expected to close in February


16
Estimated “Excess Capital”
Position After Capital
Plan Completion as of 12/31/2007
The capital plan will increase MBIA’s total claims-paying resources
from $14.2bn at 09/30/2007 to at least $16.2bn proforma at 12/31/2007.
$900
$500
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
Low
High
($ in thousands)


17
Current Market Trends Play to MBIA’s Strengths
Demand for financial guarantee insurance is expected to
rebound
Credit market disruptions have reinforced the need for financial
guarantees
Public finance and global infrastructure finance needs are growing
Resilience of demand for the municipal bond insurance industry
Structured finance market is expected to recover from the dislocation
Market conditions are attractive
Wider spreads and increased overcollateralization
are creating significantly
higher ROE on new business
Competitive dynamics in the industry are shifting
Underwriting can be more selective
MBIA remains well positioned in this market.


18
Core Business Opportunities are Robust
Public Finance
Risk-adjusted pricing is improving
Public finance needs in the U.S. are expected to grow
Privatization of essential infrastructure projects globally continues to
present attractive opportunities
Structured Finance
Insured volume will be very low in the first half of 2008
Minimal impact on revenue due to long tail nature of business
As structured finance market rebuilds, MBIA will play a key role
resulting in new opportunities at attractive prices