UNITED STATES
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
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Washington, D.C. 20549
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SCHEDULE 13D
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Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No. 11)*
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BAJA MINING CORP.
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(Name of Issuer)
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Common Shares, Without Par Value
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(Title of Class of Securities)
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05709R103
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(CUSIP Number)
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with a copy to:
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Mr. Jonathan Fiorello
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Robert G. Minion, Esq.
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Mount Kellett Capital Management LP
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Lowenstein Sandler PC
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623 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor
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1251 Avenue of the Americas, 18th Floor
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New York, NY 10022
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New York, NY 10020
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(212) 588-6100 |
(646) 414-6930
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(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person
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Authorized to Receive Notices and Communications)
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March 26, 2012
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(Date of Event which Requires Filing of this Statement)
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Cusip No. 05709R103
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1.
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Names of Reporting Persons. I.R.S. Identification Nos. of above persons (entities only):
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Mount Kellett Capital Management LP
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2.
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Check the Appropriate Box if a Member of a Group (See Instructions):
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(a)
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o
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(b)
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o
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3.
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SEC Use Only
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4.
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Source of Funds (See Instructions): WC
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5.
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Check if Disclosure of Legal Proceedings Is Required Pursuant to Items 2(d) or 2(e): Not Applicable
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6.
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Citizenship or Place of Organization: State of Delaware
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Number of
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7.
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Sole Voting Power:
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67,421,117*
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Shares Beneficially
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8.
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Shared Voting Power:
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0*
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Owned by
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Each Reporting
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9.
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Sole Dispositive Power:
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67,421,117*
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Person With
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10.
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Shared Dispositive Power:
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0*
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11.
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Aggregate Amount Beneficially Owned by Each Reporting Person: 67,421,117*
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12.
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Check if the Aggregate Amount in Row (11) Excludes Certain Shares (See Instructions): Not Applicable
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13.
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Percent of Class Represented by Amount in Row (11): 19.9%*
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14.
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Type of Reporting Person (See Instructions): IA
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1.
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Why does Baja fear truly independent directors?
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2.
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Why has Baja resorted to a web of baseless hypotheticals to try and distract shareholders?
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3.
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Why did the company only react to highlighted governance deficiencies once put in the spotlight?
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4.
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Why wouldn’t the board benefit from the experience and insights of truly independent directors that are committed to working with the other board members and to guiding management?
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-
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Pre-emptively stop self-dealing at the board
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-
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Enforce proactive versus “reactive” corporate governance
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-
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Assure policies are permanent and adhered to in practice
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-
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Provide accountability to shareholders and prevent value destruction
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