UNITED STATES
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
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Washington, D.C. 20549
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SCHEDULE 13D
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Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No. 10)*
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BAJA MINING CORP.
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(Name of Issuer)
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Common Shares, Without Par Value
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(Title of Class of Securities)
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05709R103
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(CUSIP Number)
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with a copy to:
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Mr. Jonathan Fiorello
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Robert G. Minion, Esq.
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Mount Kellett Capital Management LP
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Lowenstein Sandler PC
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623 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor
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1251 Avenue of the Americas, 18th Floor
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New York, NY 10022
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New York, NY 10020
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(212) 588-6100 |
(646) 414-6930
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(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person
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Authorized to Receive Notices and Communications)
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March 22, 2012
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(Date of Event which Requires Filing of this Statement)
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Cusip No. 05709R103
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1.
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Names of Reporting Persons. I.R.S. Identification Nos. of above persons (entities only):
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Mount Kellett Capital Management LP
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2.
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Check the Appropriate Box if a Member of a Group (See Instructions):
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(a)
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o
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(b)
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o
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3.
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SEC Use Only
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4.
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Source of Funds (See Instructions): WC
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5.
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Check if Disclosure of Legal Proceedings Is Required Pursuant to Items 2(d) or 2(e): Not Applicable
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6.
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Citizenship or Place of Organization: State of Delaware
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Number of
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7.
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Sole Voting Power:
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67,421,117*
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Shares Beneficially
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8.
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Shared Voting Power:
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0*
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Owned by
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Each Reporting
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9.
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Sole Dispositive Power:
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67,421,117*
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Person With
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10.
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Shared Dispositive Power:
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0*
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11.
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Aggregate Amount Beneficially Owned by Each Reporting Person: 67,421,117*
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12.
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Check if the Aggregate Amount in Row (11) Excludes Certain Shares (See Instructions): Not Applicable
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13.
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Percent of Class Represented by Amount in Row (11): 19.9%*
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14.
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Type of Reporting Person (See Instructions): IA
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·
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“Based on the evidence of problematic governance practices in the recent past – including exorbitant equity grants to directors, the CEO's troubling willingness to take an active role in what is supposed to be a completely independent Nominating Committee, and the reactive nature of the governance provisions the board has recently adopted – the dissident has made a compelling case that change is warranted at the board level.”
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·
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“Such large grants may call into question directors’ ability to provide effective oversight of management’s compensation and activity, since their interests may be more aligned with executives than shareholders.”
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“For example, the proposed amendment to the 2011 stock option plan is being proposed only after it was used to make exorbitant grants to directors. One might legitimately question whether closing the barn doors after all the horses have escaped is the best approach to managing an equity plan.”
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·
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“While the board's actions to resolve problematic governance practices are noteworthy, these actions appear largely reactive to the dissident's critique, raising the question of whether the board has fully internalized the view that corporate governance is critical for building the confidence of unaffiliated shareholders.”
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·
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“Moreover, the timing of certain changes calls into question the board's motivation for making these changes.”
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“Accordingly, the company's assertion of “creeping takeover” lacks credibility.”
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“There is, however, no evidence Mount Kellett has previously executed a creeping takeover strategy, or that it has ever launched a hostile bid for any of its portfolio companies. The dissident, moreover, made this point explicitly to the board in its May 2011 presentation. In that presentation, Mount Kellett pointed out that it does not commence hostile transactions or buyouts and is only interested in creating maximum value for all shareholders.”
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·
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“As the largest shareholder of Baja, Mount Kellett's interests are likely highly aligned with those of other shareholders.”
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“Additionally, Waisberg's depth of corporate governance knowledge, as a certified ICD graduate, and experience, on numerous other public boards, should allow him to contribute considerably to the effective oversight of the Baja board.”
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·
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“Accordingly, votes on the dissident BLUE card are warranted: FOR items 2, 3, and 4 (which call for expanding the board to nine, and adding dissident nominees Lehner and Waisberg to the board).”
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* Permission to quote from the ISS report was neither sought nor obtained.
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